



MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION

U.S. Naval War College

Ms. Coll. 17

MAHAN, ALFRED THAYER

Papers: notes, etc.,
for naval strategy lec-
tures. [1907-1911]

71-4

vol. 13

Data for Naval Strategy Lectures

Among the complex problems which the idea of
Strategical Strategy gives rise, there is none more important than
Conditions the constitution of the Fleet;

should It therefore goes without saying that every project
determine which fails to take account ¹ of the foreign relations of
Composition a great nation, or, 2 of the material limits fixed
of the Fleet by its resources, rests upon a basis which is both
weak and unstable

Darriens. p. 102

Necessary Foreign Policy is the inspiring cause of Strategy
Dependence Indeed, Strategy, with the operations which it entails,
of Strategy is so closely tied to Policy, that it is not possible to
Policy on sketch a plan of war, without a perfect (clear) know-
ledge of political objectives, of ends pursued, of
possible alliances { Foreign Policy and Strategy are bound together
by an indestructible link p. 109
Ibid 108

The Method To prevent historical study from being sterile, it is
of necessary to sum up the conclusions gradually
History reached [i.e. formulate them into doctrines] and so
Instruction for the small number of doctrines which the sequence of
events shall not have invalidated [Survival of fittest]
Upon this follows the application of these teachings
[thus formulated] to existing navies [naval problems of
to day] in a chosen nation

Ibid

Coast Defence, involving protection of the resources of the Country, and so being a special case of the general defensive problem, is one of the most important branches of Strategy.

Its importance derives not merely from the purely military side of securing naval bases - Strength - but from the equally military, though more remotely strategical, necessity of conserving resources.

Darriens p. 115

National Strategy and Tactics should be national; i.e. Conditions correspond to national conditions. Von der Goltz

117

After demonstrating the supremacy of the sea from the case of the *Arcturion*, calling attention incidentally to the fact that the ship, though reduced to powerlessness, still floated and was soon repaired for service, Darriens comments:

The lessons of History are not measured by the status of its events; small may afford suggestion equal to that of great

190

consequence

Effect of Every military action, small or great [right or wrong] is the enforced consequence of a controlling idea upon thought, of a general plan [or cast of idea] aiming at a definite object; it necessarily derives from strategy either good or bad.

That is why the analysis of every war campaign reveals a lesson [promptly imitation or avoidance]

Necessity
of clear
Idea

191

This lesson may be the result of an absence of a supreme controlling idea, manifested in a course of action lacking in accurate direction and sustained power

Spk

Ships may
be subdued
without
being sunk

After Punta Argamas, Yalu reminds us that to reduce a war ship we are not necessarily limited to attacking her water line. The limit of capacity to resist, if the personnel, can be reached without destroying the buoyancy.

Like the Huascar, the Chen-Yuen and the Tung Yuan, without guns and fighting against fire, yielded to the effects of gunfire against the upper works

200

Revised, if not written, before Tsushima, this does not mention the effect of shells which explode but do not penetrate

Success will result from having a directing principle, a plan of operation, as opposed to absence of initial conceptions and reliance upon luck

202

4

Corbett & Mahan

In his account of the War of the League of Augsburg, Corbett, to my apprehension complements my own; but in so doing it appears to me that interest in his particular subject — the Medⁿ — he exaggerates the perception of William III.

The King seems to me to have taken indeed a great step, worthy to be commemorated, in deciding to keep the great fleet away from England during the winter months of 1694-5, and 1695-6. Great because of the opposition of the sea officers on professional grounds; great also because to a certain extent it uncovered the Channel.

But, his decision proceeded from a prior act of Louis XIV, in moving the French fleet to the Mediterranean, with the object of supporting thereby operations against Spain — Catalonia — and Savoy. This move of the French fleet necessitated the movement of the British ^{Dutch} Great Fleet, under Russell; it also permitted the transfer because it removed the threat to the Channel. The effect of the move also was signified by the successful French advance along the Catalan coast; which in the inefficiency could only be stopped by the allied fleet driving away the French

To get the great ships safely to British ports before the violent season, it appears to have been thought necessary to clear the Catalan coast early in August - at latest. This of course gave the Toulon fleet two months freedom to support the army, and a similar interval at the opening of operations in the spring. William's decision had the great merit that by keeping the allied fleet in Cadiz for the winter it could remain near Barcelona till the end of September, or perhaps later - especially at Alicante, a friendly port; and moreover it was a perpetual threat should the French from Toulon go out. Even from Cadiz it exerted this influence; for under Tourville's advice Louis's policy for the fleet was a strict defensive. It was not to fight but to wait; because it was inferior; and this inferiority was the result of the general French policy emphasized at La Hougue, a lesson which kept Louis at Tourville's feet ever after.

Louis's object in the Catalan operations - and also in Piedmont - had been to force Savoy and Spain to peace, thus releasing his armies in those quarters to the operations on his Eastern frontier - Germany and Holland. This was defeated by William's counter move; but

Naval Strategy

in general idea this was so obvious that it seems done scarcely & has claim & originality. I find more of this in the French; for they first moved their great fleet to Toulon.

Got there first; but not with enough men

But, having done so, and wisely, they immediately had to feel the effect of the mistake by which they had allowed their sea power to decline. What William did was the absolutely excellent counter move, especially as he had great superiority of naval force. His excellence is in the moral force that carried into execution a great idea against professional prepossession and real risk.

As soon as Louis found himself thus foiled, he resorted to the appropriate method of relieving the new pressure. ~~Assailing himself of the opportunity offered by either mismanagement of the allies, or their mischance he shipped his fleet back to Brest & made a very serious demonstration of collecting troops on the Channel shores for invasion of England. The seriousness the English have soon felt & such a threat led to an immediate withdrawal of the allied fleet from the Mediterranean; and before new arrangements (dispositions) could be made Tourville's fleet shipped~~

out from Toulon and sailed Brest without being intercepted. This fixed naval center of damage at Channel.

The consecutive failure of France in this war was due to misuse of a sea power, or rather of a navy, which at the moment of outbreak was superior. The misuse was South. William not only was allowed to land in England, but was allowed to consolidate the "base" of his power by reducing Ireland; and then permitted to develop his superior naval force. He then gained position, strength and resources.

The English fleet rather followed the movements of the French than originated a policy.

Corbett's

Seven
Years War

The function of the Fleet upon which Corbett lays such stress as being distinct from Naval Strategy is the same as the function of Sea Power used by us in the last Chap. of French Rev: Empire

So also I had anticipated his remarks on the bearing of diplomatic and military considerations on naval strategy, the interrelations of the three, in my discussion of "British Policy" in the same chapter.

I had derived from Jouin the formal recognition and appreciation of the fact that military considerations cannot be severed from political

Corbett's England in Mediterranean

To summarize my immediate impressions, after reading Corbett concerning the War of the Spanish Succession, — in connection with my own Sea Power 1660-1783, — I should say that ~~he~~ he demonstrates what I had overlooked that the effect of Sea Power, in general, (we do not differ as to details materially), was to settle European conditions, European balance of power, by establishing British naval power in strong Mediterranean positions, with consequent influence upon the States, — France, Spain, Savoy, and the Italian States — bordering the Med^t. Turkey of course felt the same influence; in less degree because more remote from the new British bases.

Lapeyrouse-Bouffé's does indeed point out the bearing of Port Mahon upon Toulon; as I myself that of San Fernando in the later hostilities. I have recognized these strategic results and their bearings; and it would be more precise to say that I had not justly appreciated that the War of Span. Succⁿ was as it were the prelude to the great Colonial Wars, because it settled a European balance by lowering France, strengthening England and in measure Austria in Europe. This balance consisted largely in the development of the British navy, in numbers and

bases, and the consequent enhancement of British
commerce and its dependent finance

Corbett's strong point, which so far as I now
see he makes good, is that the establishment of
this balance was not merely the result of this War.
It was the outcome of the strategic purpose of
Marlborough; by him derived from William III
by the process noted in preceding pages. The
effect of the presence of the British fleet in
the Med^d had been noted and appreciated by
the King. From this perception derived the decision
that the fleet must winter in, or near, the
Med^d; and upon this decision followed
necessarily the obtaining of ports of refuge.

Note
Sequence

I am less sure of the accuracy of Marl-
borough's conception of seizing Toulon. He
had inherited the understanding of the need for
a winter port; and for the present occasion
a large operation in Southern France would
undoubtedly be not only a powerful diversion
but if it resulted in the fall and capture
of Toulon would not only supply the needed
base but be a crushing blow to France. Ob-
viously, however, France not only must regain
Toulon but in all probability could do so
by military force. There was no sea to cross;
and if the condition of works was such as to permit

The effect of the War of the Spanish Succession was to advance the frontier of Great Britain to the Medⁿ, to its western basin from Greece to Spain, with all the influence which such nearness exerted upon the surrounding shores.

The British frontier was also brought thus much nearer to those of Turkey

It also was placed on the flank of all sea communications from all seaports on those shores; whether those communications were with the Levant or with the Atlantic.

Apply to the Eastern Question & Philippines

The War of the League of Augsburg brought out in strong relief the necessity for Great Britain to check France on her Medⁿ seaboard, and in adjacent Italy, and Spain; and not only in the Channel and Atlantic. The direct corollary of this was Medⁿ ports on which to base a fleet.

This understanding, not reached before this war, was fully gained during it, and consequently formed a clear, apprehended motive of strategic action in the War of the Spanish Succession.

In this war the bases were obtained; and with them a naval and military position of advantage for the great years of 1739-83. Let it not however be overlooked that all these

A navy is the luxury of successful countries. So long as a nation has not consolidated its unity, so long as it is traversing that period of growth which precedes its natural development, all its resources are not too much for employment upon its own territory. This is why England could not lay the foundations of her colonial empire until after her union with Scotland. This is the reason that the French Navy dates from Louis XIV, and that of Germany from the constitution of the Empire. But when a nation possesses in itself that need of expansion which is the well spring of the life of peoples, it seeks to substitute periods of wealth for periods of heroism, as soon as it has reached its natural frontiers. Having formed itself, it wishes to grow rich; and it demands in colonies and over sea commerce outlets for its surplus of activity.

Then appears the Navy — and external policy overseas.

Darkey p. 421

The above applies to the United States also. Not till after the exaggerated period of State Rights had been definitely left behind did the nation reach out beyond the sea —

Then the Navy appeared

Proper
Method
of
Military
Study
is
History

The study of military questions is relatively recent. It is posterior to the institution of standing armies, and dates only from the epoch in which the first military schools were founded.

The modes, or methods, of instruction which have been followed can be reduced to three.

1. The rational, so called, claims to base itself upon logic and good sense.
2. The second was makes of war an exact science.
3. The third seeks its indications in history.

Darby Preface p. 4

Darby adheres to the historical method, the study of history. This, being the record of experience, if exhaustively studied brings out all the various factors which enter war because history, however unperceptive, forgets none of them. History is photographic, the rational processes tend to be selective and in relying upon reason take too little account of the irrational factors, the instincts, mistakes, perversities which affect war.

Recd in this connection my comments in Star. A. M. Preface.

Darby continues accurately: The scientific method grows in favor during long periods of peace, because, for a long while, men have ceased to have examples under their eyes. War then tends to take on

a constitutional aspect. It is no longer seen as it is, but as it is conceived to be; that is, disengaged from reflection, and independent of all the elements which modify its aspect each passing moment.

Dardley p. xi

Criticism
of
Bonap

If Bonap had profited by the two occasions on which he met the enemy to win an easy victory, his cruise would appear as one of the best conceived of strategic operations. Executed as it was, we fail to understand it. For three months the cards were shuffled; the forecasts of the Admiralty shattered; then, little by little each party found itself again in the same position, or one equivalent (same relative posⁿ)

And thus it will always be when the equilibrium of forces is not in some degree disturbed.

18

Deduction
from
Bonap's
Present
& Past
Conditions

The unwillingness of the British Gov^t, in 1799, to detach to the Medⁿ, after Bonap had brought the Fr. & Sp. fleets to Brast, needs to be coupled with the constant feeling in 1689-97, and 1702-14 of the need to protect Br. shores; of near home interests

Similarly now, the center of interest should have shifted from Medⁿ to North Sea, under existing political conditions - German Navy

In the Anglo Dutch wars, the necessity to concentrate the fleets (in order to establish by battle the control of the sea) was not at once evident. The solution of the problems of war is much more the fruit of experience than the result of reasoned calculation. [This is in line with my comment upon William III's reputation of necessity of the fleet remaining in the N. Sea, & consequent need of efforts. Also, it bears upon Darwin's preference for historical teaching, present or absent, *ante* over the deductive of a priori reasoning. *ante*]

Accordingly, during the first war, other systems than concentration were tried [experiments with] such as the direct protection of commerce [by conveying ships] and the direct attack of that of the enemy. But the danger of this line of action was soon seen, and with the second war the concentrations were absolute.

Nevertheless, mere concentration does not lead to results, if it effect only an equality with the enemy. In such case, injury tends to be equal, and the resulting condition also equal.

Hence arises the aim of strategy, to effect a superiority of force by a greater wisdom, or rapidity of movement.

pp 29, 30

Note. Recall my position as a Atlantic & Pacific fleets; and illustrate with the American fleet's victory in the Pacific.

The maritime defensive, under any point of view, offers nothing but drawbacks. One may be forced to undergo it, but cannot adopt it. Both sides must seek the appropriate offensive, but they will not do so upon the same plan.

The stronger will always seek to meet the different hostile squadrons, in order to destroy them before they can do injury. The weaker will first endeavor to slide contact, in order to bring about changed distribution of forces, and to create the surprise. Then, he will try to draw his enemy to a favorable field of battle where his weaker units can come into play. So long as this contest continues, so long as a decisive battle shall not have inclined the balance, the two sides will lay aside the aspirations which have provoked the war [will disregard the object in favor of the objective] For it is the field of battle which will decide the issue of the aspirations.

Which will be victor? The most active, the most skilful, the most tenacious; the one possessing the character of force best adapted to the requirements of war

The mere fact of having placed an enemy in an unforeseen situation puts him in a condition of inferiority and prevents him from recovering himself; while, on the other hand, one has succeeded in giving one's own forces the best utilization.

The characteristic of the offensive is that of imposing battle instead of accepting it.

58

This applies when original inferiority is not too great as in Russ. Tur. War. Methan

Instead of bringing the Toulon Fleet to Brest, in the days of Louis XIV and XV, it is the opinion of D'Arbigny that Concentration would have been effected more logically by sending the Brest fleet (the *Invincible*) to J^a at the time that the Toulon was accustomed to sail; that is, a little before the opening of the Campaign, in March or April. The Brest would pass the Straits, unite with the Toulon, and then proceed to N^a. The worst that C^a happens would be pursuit by English, but it is better to retire before the danger than to run in its way.

61

This would resemble an army retreating on its resources, in place of one holding its ground and rec^g. *Umpire*^{ts}. Evidently, the choice of methods depends upon the other cond^{ns}, in each several case.

I will try here to summarize and co-ordinate my impressions derived from first hundred pages of Corbett.

Until the year 1500, and somewhat later, the military navies of the Medⁿ were galleys. Somewhere in the first decade of 17th Century an English adventurer, named Ward, ran away with a ship from the Eng Channel, and made his way to Tunis, where he entered the service of the Bey seeing his sailing vessel and others taken by him as corsairs. From this beginning the Barbary corsairs ceased to be galleys and became broadside sailing ships.

About the same time the same lesson was taught Algiers by one Saizen.

The superiority of these cruisers to the galleys for operations in heavy or even ordinary weather made the Barbary corsairs military masters of the Medⁿ. Spanish Commerce and Spanish shores - including Naples, Sicily, Sardinia were at their mercy.

At this time, 1610, the Duke of Osuna was made viceroy of Sicily. Having served in the Netherlands, he had come in contact with the sailing navies of the North; had also visited England, and become convinced of the influence of Sea Power, and of the decision

superintending of sailing vessels, one gallery for existing it. Accordingly, Osuna began to reconstitute the naval force at his command; transforming it into a sailing force, to cope with the Barbary States, and in measure with Turkey. His other object and a constant aim of his was to reestablish Spanish control from the Straits at least as far as the Greek peninsula; thus insuring the coasts and commerce.

This period coincided with and followed the peace - or truce - between Spain and the Netherlands. It also embraced the political changes and combinations which led up to the Thirty Years War - which began 1618-9.

The controlling political aspect of this was the probability of combined action between the two branches of the House of Austria, in Germany and in Spain. Communication between these could be only through the Medⁿ, because the fleets of the Protestant Powers - chiefly, if not solely England and the United Provinces - controlled the Ocean routes.

The Mediterranean communications would be by Genoa under Spanish control, and by Lombardy (Italian) also Spanish. The Adriatic was also a line, but it was then dominated by Venice, which was likely

to be opposed to Spain - was so opposed in the event.

The Spanish Milan therefore had on either side, contiguous, states the hostility of which was menacing: Savoy ^{Piedmont} on the West, the continental territory of Venice on the East. Savoy bore also on Geneva by its neighborhood, and intrinsically, superior local power.

These considerations made Geneva and Venice the important points of commanding strategic interest on the lines joining the Hapsburgs of Spain to the same family in Germany.

It follows that control of the Medⁿ was essential to support Geneva, to neutralize or overcome Venice, and so to keep the communications clear to Germany.

But in the now demonstrated superiority of the sailing fleet over the galley fleet, the existing sea power of the Northern States being wholly in sailing vessels was evidently able to control the communications, unless and until the Spanish navy in its various local divisions was reconstituted on this modern basis.

This series of considerations led to

the intervention of the Northern Sea Powers in the Medⁿ. This took place, not by direct national action, but indirectly; by the Venetian Government hiring Dutch and British fleets of armed merchantmen to support their position in the Adriatic. By the international law of the day these subsidized forces, above all north of Spain; the two governments, while permitting this employment remained (officially) neutral.

Both British and Dutch - the latter more especially - sent national squadrons into the Medⁿ; but they did so under the pretext of safeguarding trade against the Barbary states; Beyond this, actually they did not go at this time. Indeed, on one occasion the Dutch navy was present while the Dutch squadron hired by Venice was in actual battle with the Spanish fleet near Gibraltar and did not aid their countrymen - who pro tem were Venetian auxiliaries.

The years 1625-1648 were years of the Thirty Years War. They were also years of Charles I's reign, with its civil discord, and paralysis for external movement. They were years of Richelieu (died, 1639) and of Mazarin in which France was opposed to the Hapsburgs. In these

Javelin, H

D. states from a French source, (Report of
 Inland D'Estrees) that in 1672 the junction of the
 of British and French fleets was effected in the
 Concentration manner of preceding page. (17)

Illustrates Geography Effect on Strategy
 Ruyter tried to intercept junction by taking
 position in Straits of Dover. The D. of York
 put to sea hurriedly from the Thames, passed
 the St. first, and fell down Channel till the
 junction was effected at the spot designated.
 Then the combined fleet moved E, &
 rallied the ^{Pr} ships which had been left behind
 because not ready

at + not

Evidently a special case; probably of
 Br. inferiority & Ruyter alone

Mars Richelieu was nursing up the French Navy, and had transferred it in part to the Medⁿ. Mazarin, succeeding became increasingly aware of the Influence of Sea Power upon the Strife because of the Strategic conditions which focused from Catalonia to the head of the Adriatic, and have been noted. After successful operations on the Catalonian coast, in which the Duc de Brézé showed ability Mazarin formulated and pursued the policy of establishing France's territorial basis of Sea Power by conquering Spanish Tuscan ports, and further by acquiring the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily for a French Prince. A certain measure of success was attained, but it stopped short of Naples, and the paralyzing struggle with the Fronde coincided with the early years of the Commonwealth, of Cromwell's steady arm, and of the release of the Dutch sea power by the ending of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia.

France remained at War with Spain, and embarrassed by the Fronde. Mazarin in common with most Continental governments was steadily inimical to a Republic. Spain equally so at heart, and Portugal, which had secured her independence in 1640.

The status therefore was that these three

essentially, continental states, with inefficient navies, were in a kind of interstitial stife. The two Northern Republics, with powerful navies, though themselves rivals, were in a position to hold a balance; to play off the one state against the other. The fear of the navies returning the Medⁿ on one side, kept Spain and France ^{cool} apprehensive but it showed be against her. As time passed, the English Navy became the weightier consideration, because, with the strong military cast of the Gov^t, it became a more efficient body.

At this period the Br. Gov^t finally broke with the tradition of relying upon merchant vessels, & constitute the armed shipping and developed a regular naval force. The strategic and tactical development passed under the control of army men; the significant feature in which was the submergence of the mere seaman by the military officer - who became the modern naval officer; a seaman, yes; but primarily a combatant.

Depending upon Corbett, the significance of Blake's entry into the Medⁿ, being in pursuit of Rupert, seems to have been that it compelled attention to the large field for decisive military pressure there existing.

Mazarin had realized this in measure; because

the actual conditions and course of the War (30 yrs) had forced him to realize (1) the value of Sea Power to himself and thence (2) the danger from English Sea Power. The English, previously absorbed in the Civil War, were roused to attention by the nervousness manifest in their possible enemies.

But this "lead," by inference from the enemy's hand and play, had to contend with a tradition of Commerce destroying war in the West Indies and Atlantic. This conservative force was supported further by the preoccupations of the King, and by the increasing animosity between the English and Dutch Republics, dependent upon trade interests. The attack and defence of Commerce, and the rising national hatred, tended to fasten attention on the Narrow Seas and neighboring coasts. Of these feelings the acquisition and loss of Dunkirk was an expression.

Nevertheless, the value of diplomatic and military value of sea power in the 17th. was now perceived, and the facility for erecting in a powerful navy appreciated.

The first Navigation Act was Oct, 1651

June 30, 1652 the First Dutch War began formally, the Dutch envoys then leaving London, after the failure of negotiations. There had, however, already been a collision of fleets in the Channel.

The Dutch War had several causes. Among them was the searching Dutch vessels for French goods, during the period when reprisals had been exacted on French shipping because of French injuries to British Commerce. Also, a British Admiral had seized a large number of Dutch vessels in W.I. because of violation of Act of Oct. 1650, forbidding trade with Br. Colonies.

The British had the best of the war, but the effect was to drive the Br. naval force out of the Medⁿ. It may be that we here have a reflex action. That is, that their being on approximate equality between the two navies, the Dutch continuing a much superior force in the Medⁿ were thereby weakened in home waters. The project of the Br. to reinforce the Medⁿ. 1650, after Blake's first victory, led to the assignment of a force from his fleet for the Medⁿ. This detachment caused Blake's defeat by Troup; after which the orders were countermanded and the detach^t rejoined the flag. With this concentration Blake defeated Troup. The project of a detach^t to Medⁿ was then revised, but Monk, who had now joined the

Corbett many, opposed. "The pressing need of the moment before any real one could be made of the Med?, was to crush the Dutch sea power, and the way to do it was to concentrate every available ship upon their main fleet and on the commanding points of the Commerce on which their national vitality depended." p. 270

Two more great battles, Two Days & Four Days, followed; "but, even though victorious, so desperate had been the fight, the English admiral had been unable to establish a working command of the sea, and it was impossible to spare a sq^{dr} for Med?. Thus the Dutch had to be left in undisputed control" 270

Peace in the spring of 1654. The Dutch Sea Power was not entirely crushed, but a real maritime supremacy had been gained for England. This left her free to pursue her interrupted policy within the Straits

10k

The above is another illustration of Atlantic and Pac. fleets; also of Rojdestovsk. Concentration in one quarter prevailed over division between two (Channel and Med?). Consequent victory in one gave control of both

There is an analogous situation of the French Navy between Atlantic & Med?. M 254-6

The effect of the English fleet in the Medⁿ after the First Dutch War lay (1) in its superior force and mobility, enabling it to threaten every port with attack or blockade, and ⁽²⁾ especially to interrupt communication vital to Spain, and scarcely less essential to the more aggressive policy of Maximilian.

These two Kingdoms therefore both feared and courted England because of the effect the English fleet would exercise by joining the one or other.

Between the two Cromwell plays a double game, partly from real dissimulation, partly because his policy was uncertain and contingent upon the attitude of the other states; i.e. the concession either might be willing to yield as the price of alliance, - or cooperation.

The result was the maintenance of an English fleet in the Medⁿ or near the Straits throughout Cromwell's admⁿ; but in its last year or two his policy became more definitely adverse to Spain, and its general purpose is accurately indicated by the ultimate conclusion to obtain Dunkirk with its entrance into the Continent, and facility thereby of cooperating with both Protestant powers, rather than Gibraltar.

The prevailing feature of these years therefore was rather an increasing demonstration, and consequent recognition of the diplomatic and military

significance of a great preponderating fleet in the Medⁿ, especially if strongly based there. This, rather than any decisive advance by England in her grip there, is the note of Cromwell's action. The Influence of Sea Power on current events was frequently manifested; but it was a current influence, and lacked as yet that element of permanence which fixed territorial establishments, ultimately effected at Gibraltar, Mahon, Tangier, Malta &c would give. In short the policy was developing, in its way and in a general apprehension, but had not yet taken form and hardened.

N.B

Note. That pressure on Spain in her Netherlands did not affect her policy as did that on her Medⁿ comm^{ns}, because too distant and less vital. It resembles in this the attempt to affect China by operations on Formosa "The Spanish Court had always shown itself as indifferent to pressure in the Low Countries as it was nervous about the command of the Medⁿ. In the old war no account of harrying of her Ocean Commerce had served to bring Spain down knees, but the same kind of danger in the Medⁿ was another matter" H. 341

The Quebec operations belong chiefly to Tactics, I don't know that it is worth my while to place down the impression received, but it is as follows (from Corbett)

Montcalm, facing the river on north bank his left rested on the Montmorcuc, his right on the St Lawrence, above Quebec. His center therefore may be considered Q itself and a certain stretch on either side. The French stood steadily on the defence; it was essential therefore to molest and harass them as to entail such dispersing of their force as would present a point of entry and attack.

Wolfe's plan was to turn the right, by outflanking on the upper Montmorcuc, or by forcing a passage of the lower. All failed. Three diversions above the town were initiated by means of the frigates &c, with troops. These became possible only after batteries on Pt. Levis and vicinity had dominated New France on other side. These diversions had no effect in loosening Montcalm's hold around Beauport and Montmorcuc, which both he and Wolfe regarded as the natural point of attack — decision point; but they gradually took the town and result of attack on the French communications

Callwell, and I think Corbett also, challenge my position as regards the action of Galissoniers at Minorca. My principle is stated (p. 288 S.P.) without exception "on all occasions". Perhaps the qualification, that there are exceptions to all rules, should be allowed; but I own to being not yet convinced as to the propriety either of Galissoniers' strategy or Bugey's tactics.

Condensed
from
Corbett.

With regard to the Seven Years War I must get down my Summary of the Diplomatic considerations before they elude me

The particular questions in dispute were American, and the wish of G. B. was to confine the contention, and war if it came to the American field; with the general conditions of which I am sufficiently acquainted

France being distinctly the weaker, at once weakly in America and on the sea, was compelled to seek counter weight on the continent, where it availed the British interest most open to assault. The tradition of the past made Prussia, the ally of France - as against the old hereditary enemy, Austria. The friendship between the two former was essentially dependent on their common enemy.

Prussia then might be feared as an enemy so preponderant in strength & nearer, and so near at hand as, in conjunction with France & assuring Russia and the Austrian Netherlands, possibly Holland also, pressing into control north of Great Britain; a result which would more than compensate any advantage gained in America, and would compel restoration of such gains

Diplomatic Strategy in 7 Years War

at the end of the war.

Then, as now, the whole system of colonial defence rested upon the mother country, the British Islands. Consequently, such results in the Netherlands and Holland were not only G. B. but the Colonies as well.

To assure quiet in Northern Europe, especially North Germany, was therefore necessarily an aim of British negotiation. In order therefore George II, in person, arranged with Russia a subsidy treaty, the return for which was the maintenance of a Russian army in Livonia, threatening Prussia.

When Fred^k got wind of this, he began to march out toward the St. Got^t, with the result that the latter proposed him that all they wished was the maintenance of neutrality in N. Europe - the maintenance of peace - which they thought lay with him; and that they were willing to guarantee him Silesia, which he had from anxiety concerning Russia, & which were their concession, if he would undertake the desired neutrality for North Germany. Fred^k then asked to see the existing Neutral Treaty between Great Britain and Russia.

Seven Years War.

and as soon as he knew its terms entered into the desired arrangement.

The treaty between G. B. and Russia, however, had contained a clause by which the latter entered into ~~no~~ an agreement that neither should open such negotiations with Prussia, without informing the other. The whole arrangement with Fred^d was made in Russia's ignorance; and when it became known the natural displeasure at such faithlessness was increased by the Czarina Elizabeth's personal hatred for Fred^d.

This gave Austria the opportunity for a great combination against Fred^d, in respect of which she hoped to regain Silesia. Hence she sought the alliance of France, Austria & Russia against Prussia, and Hannover, as representing a British interest; and thereby came into being the Continental War, by the course of which France and England hoped the one to regain losses in America, the other so to direct that war as to leave her pre-ponderant in the New World, and to keep whatever gains she there might make.

growing more and more serious; and as the British strength there decreased, and the throat more multifarious, Moutcalem was forced to increase the mobile force, in order to provide as far as possible against all contingencies.

Wolf's main general now formulated the conception that an attack on the enemy's left flank, up river, should supersede the direction against his right; the more so, because this also threatened the French columns & interposed between Moutcalem & his reinforcements. It is to be noted that, in thus passing above the British also in measure exposed theirs, in the attempt to strike the enemy - a common embarrassment. But the British control of the water & facing; for passing from side to side, more than compensated for this disadvantage.

The effect upon the French, being an inferior, & therefore ignorant when the attack might fall, was that they had to stretch their line, with a pretty inferior power of movement by which to correct mistakes. The inevitable result had

to be the unguarded, or insufficient portion
of some practical entrance (breach) This is
what happened; and Wolfe recognizing by
reconnoissance that the path by which he
mounted was in fact inadequately defended
attacked there, and succeeded in passing
his army through the enemy's center
and massing it there before the flank
could come to its support.

This attack at the center Corbett
says was Wolfe's own design, and
is the opinion and true circumstances of
his genius

Aug 10

Goeben reported to have entered Adriatic; will be a valuable hint to Aust. Navy

German submarine reported sunk in attack upon Br. Cruiser Edin, wh. rec'd no damage

Aug 12

Notif. by Italy that harbors of Spezia, Ancona, Taranto and Venice are mined

Several Greek & Ital. ships carrying coal to Italy stopped by Br. & Fr. cruisers, but allowed to proceed

(Suggests to Italy what she has to expect if war with maritime powers)

"

Geo. Austral. ships have joined Br. Edin in East Asiatic waters

Fr. Cruiser captures two German ships near Shanghai

"

News from Athens that Goeben was seen proceeding in direction of Dardanelles. Thought that Pruslan also and that they will there be interred. Trade Routes secure (she ought to have joined Austrian)

"

Reported that Export route for iron & steel fr. Denmark to England reopened

"

U.S. to protect against reported placing of contact mines in North Sea by Germans. G.B. holds herself at full

Aug 12 liberty to admit similar measures if Germany does.
This will be disregarded under Hague as to automatic
mines, (and circumstances plea in behalf of orders in Council
of 1807)

Hague Rules

- Aug 12 N.Y. Herald
- Forbidden (1) To lay ^{unanchored} automatic contact mines except
when will become harmless one hour after person
laying them ceases to control them
- (2) To lay anchored mines wh. do not become harmless
when they break loose
- (3) To use torpedoes wh. do not become harmless after
missing mark
- (4) To lay auto contact off coasts & ports of sea⁴
w. sole view to stop comm² ships⁴
- (5) Every power: to be taken to secure peaceful
ships⁴
- (Will the bellig⁴ observe rules?)

Aug 12 Dispatch fr. St. ^{Petersburg} says Russ⁴ ships actively scouring
Baltic. 20 Capt⁴ minet⁴ laid⁴ in contact
(Does it signify G. fleet at Elbe end of Canal?)

" Rumors of Br. & G. war ships in Pac. off California

" Br. Suffolk & Essex sighted off N.Y., and at Nantucket
(Displac⁴ 9,800, fourteen 6") N.Y. Herald

Aug. 13 Gorben reported sold to Turkey. (May this be
to strengthen Turks against Greeks?) (The more faithful
Gorben course wd. be ven to join Austro.) N.Y. Times
N.B. G.B. has seized for own use Turkish
ship bl. d.? in Sy?. Dread? Osman I N.Y. Times

Aug 13 A'Court Appington thinks G.' may strike by sea at
Ropungton same time as by land. (Moon grows less now; but on
other hand what effect can defeat of Br. fleet have of
fecting war on land?) (But defeat of Br. H. wd.
stop drafts for Court.)

Comm. Br. Army guarantees safety of N. Atlantic, but
Ranley can give no assurance as to North Sea because of
German mines
"Enemy's (G.'s) ships will be hunted continually)
N.Y. Times

Aug 13 Philadelphia stopped by Fr. torpedo boat in
Channel, and by Br. Suffolk near Sandy Hook

Aug 13 Adm. Cradock reports N. Atl clear of G. Cr²⁷
Cradock's sq. d.: Suffolk (flag) Berwick, Bristol
Lancaster, Essex. Sister ships County class

Aug 21

Aug. 20 Br. Embassy at Wash. rec'd summary of
A & V. sit. to date:

"Since Dec^r War fleet has been respons. for
safety of Allied force, wh^{ch} completed disemb^o in 7th Aug
18, in perfect order & without casualty

"Work of many elsewhere best shown by fact that
Lloyd's rates ^{fall} to 40 p.c for almost all voyages of Br.
vess

"German fleet outside Baltic confined & harbors.
Eng commerce almost normal. German commerce by
sea paralyzed

"Auriferous only casualty. One 5th submarine sunk
in North Sea

N. Y. Times Aug 21.

Continents

Abse

"The military position is as fol-
lows:

"The German forces at present
extend from north of the neighborhood
of Basle, through Liege, to a point in
Belgium to the east of Antwerp and
near the Dutch frontier. Outstanding
features of the operations up to the
present have been the delay caused
to the contemplated German offen-
sive across the Meuse by the defense
of Liege, where the forts are still in-
tact. It has permitted the orderly
mobilization and concentration of the
French army and the British expedi-
tionary force. German troops have
now crossed the Meuse both above and
below Liege and are gaining some
ground slowly westward, but their ad-
vance cavalry has been continually
checked by the Belgians.

"In the south, where the German
armies are apparently on the defen-
sive, the French are advancing on a
long line into Alsace and Lorraine, a
great extent of which they now oc-
cupy after driving back in several
engagements the troops opposed to
them."

Aug 20

Aug 21

Steam Florizel from Halifax & N.Y. reports spoken
by Mr. Cr^m Suffolk off Fire Island

Tues Aug 21

RUSSIAN PORTS SHELLED.

German Fleet Said to Have Bombar-
ded Kronstadt, Viborg and Reval.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
LONDON, Aug. 20.—Nothing of im-
portance had been heard of the oper-
ations of the German fleet in the
Baltic since the beginning of the war
and the reported occupation of the
Aland Islands by the Germans.

An English engineer who has just
arrived back from St. Petersburg, and
who is a competent authority on
naval and military matters, reports
that when he left the Russian capital
seven days after the declaration of
war ships of the German squadron
were bombarding Kronstadt, Viborg
and Reval.

This is very important information,
because Kronstadt is the famous
fortress and naval base at the ap-
proach to St. Petersburg. Reval is
the great naval base at the entrance
to the Gulf of Finland, and a place
where large sums of money have
been expended in forming docks and
providing for all the requirements of
an important naval establishment,
while Viborg is a considerable port
in Finland, not far from the Russian
frontier and St. Petersburg.

Capt. Charles Mourrand of the France,
which brought 543 first, 384 second, and
447 third class passengers from Havre,
gave some interesting details of the
English troops' landing in France:

"On Aug. 14 the day we left Havre,"
said he, "at 4 o'clock 35,000 British
soldiers landed there from twenty trans-
ports with their artillery, stores, and
ammunition without any mishap. It
was all done so quietly that no one in
Havre except the military officials and
the naval commandant of the port knew
that the English were coming.

Landing of the British.

"Just after daylight the transports
entered the harbor in single file and
were warped through the dock gates
to the various basins where they were
to land. Each vessel had a big number
painted on the hull amidships and had
its particular quay marked on the plan
made by the commandant. The officers
and soldiers were all dressed in khaki
uniforms and carried their kits in
marching order, and were a fine look-
ing lot of men.

The people of Havre gave them a
hearty welcome as they marched through
the streets with the bands playing the
"Marsellaise," and English, Scotch,
and Irish music."

Capt. Mourrand added that he did not
know where the troops went when they
left Havre as all movements of the
French Army and the allies were kept
secret.

The France was stopped at the mouth
of the Channel by French torpedo boats
and spoke from English warships on
the way across the Atlantic. The last
one was sighted at noon yesterday east
of Fire Island, and asked the France
to hoist her colors and official number,
which was complied with, and then the
warship replied with answering pen-
nant. "All right."

ALLIES CONTROL SEAS.

Britain Declares Germany's Trade
Has Been Destroyed.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22.—That Great
Britain and France now control the seas
in all parts of the world and that 7 per
cent. of the German shipping is now in
British hands are statements contained in
an official announcement given out at the
British Embassy to-night, being a resume
of the naval situation prepared by the
Government in London. The statement
follows:

"The floating trade of Germany has
been brought to a standstill by the opera-
tions of the British cruisers in the differ-
ent parts of the world. The German
fleet is unable to interfere or to set their
commerce free owing to the British main
fleet, which is cruising in full strength and
preventing any interference with the
cruisers.

"Already about 7 per cent. of the total
German tonnage is in British hands,
another 20 per cent. is sheltering in neu-
tral harbors and the remainder is either
in German harbors unable to move or
endeavoring to find security. British
shipping with the exception of less than
1 per cent, which was in German harbors
at the outbreak of war, is actively pur-
suing its business on all the great com-
mercial routes.

"The German squadron in China has
been rendered ineffective by the constant
pursuit by the British squadron in the Far
East. Trade in China is therefore un-
affected.

"The Austrian squadron in the Adriatic
has retired into the Adriatic before the
Anglo-French fleet, which is so superior
that it is able to send strong detach-
ments to any parts of the Mediterranean
or adjoining seas in which naval forces
may be required.

"Great numbers of the seafaring popu-
lation of Great Britain are offering them-
selves for service in the fleet."

