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U.S. Naval War College

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Papers: research
notes, 1901.

71-4

Vol. 8

Subs. Papers

A. T. Mahan

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1091st N. Y.

Marini, Storia civile e politica del Comercio
dei Veneziani

Heyd (Franco Fr. Ger. & Ital) Colonie Commerciali degli
Ital. in Oriente nel medio Evo

Crank's History of British Commerce

The Merchant's Map of Commerce by Lewis Roberts, folio,
London 1638. — " — Index v. 157 notes

No. 61 Edinburgh Review (w'd be between 1815 - 20)
Early laws of Castile

Memorias Historicas ^{Company} sobre el Comercio, de Marina de Barcelona
Madrid 1779-1792 (vol III pp. 336-7) [Procott I. 29]

Calendar State Papers Spain 1485-1509 - General
also Introdⁿ - p. 133

Stubbs' Lectures

Exposition of the
Thesis
that Medieval
Hist^y, as contrasted
with Modern,
is a History
of
Rights & Wrongs
i.e.
of Legal
Rights & Wrongs

The middle ages proper - fr 1000 to 1500 A.D.,
fr. Emp. H. II to Emp. Maximilian - were ages of
legal growth, ages in wh. a idea of Right, as embodied
in law, was a lead^g idea of statesmen, & a idea of
rights just^d or just^{fl} by a letter of a law, was a
profound influence wth politicians

What logic was to philosopher, legisⁿ was to a
statesman & moralist, a practical casuistry, as
the ob was theor^l cas^g; an attempt to justify all
its conclusions by dir^t ref^{ce} to 1st prin^{ples},
& in both philosophy & law, & Med Ages ex-
emplified a like tend^g to growth & to syst^{em}^{ize};
the names of Aquinas & Duns Scotus st^d over
agstst the use of Ed I & Louis IX, as leaders of thought,
emancipators fr aⁿ hinc, imprisonment fr aⁿ future,
in a realm far wider thⁿ that of pract^l legisⁿ.

241-3

As a rule, medieval wars are wars of rights;
seldom wars of unprovoked, never wars of absol^{ut}
unjust^{fl}, aggression. Nor are they wars of idea, of
hon^{or}, or of glory, or of nationality, or of propaganda

Shutts Lectures

In what sense
and
to what degree
the
Misale App
affected
by Law & Right

I have not meant to say that Law and Right were the uling ideas of medieval statesmen; did I so mean, I could only prove my thesis by show^g. It is not as if men loved law, but what I mean is not that men loved law, but that they did so far respect it as to wish always to seem to have it on their side. . . . They alighted a legal claim, or a legal grievance, & in maj^y of cases really had one or the other. . . . When a man coveted his neighbor's vineyard, he did not simply seize by force, but went to law for it, as it were.

Illustrations follow

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A Universal
Conscience

It was charac., not of Eng legal instinct, but of a long med.^e Civ, A Conscience of war is just^{ly} only by law. . . . And the same conviction ext^d to small private Rts; rt. of a toll bridge, a mill, or a dove-cote

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My own
Personal
Reflections

I may add that of same instinct, uncon-
scious seems to underlie a guild regulation;
the constituent of legal relat^s, to wh. disputes
can be ref^d as standards, hav^g moral sanction.
It may also be that here lay the strength of feudalism
that to annex req^d a law it gave a law. And all

St Paul
and
The Law

this, I may add, acquires its new and expressing
interest by recalling how St Paul speaks of law as
the state of childhood, easily comprehended because
mandatory and simple; but always a first stage
of discipline to lead on to something higher & better

I find also the following brief notes in my own

Rule of Law & Right \rightleftharpoons Guild Regulation &c; i.e. the
Prevalence of Statutory Obligation

also \rightleftharpoons Childhood & Youth

Balance of Power \rightleftharpoons Competition, the economic
(Stubbs 2^d Period) phase that succeeded, hi-
storically, to the minute
regulation of Middle Ages

Balance of Power also \rightleftharpoons Struggle of Maturity,
Youth Passed, Survival
of Fittest.

I find also the following suggested analogy

The Crusades = Christendom Against Mahomet

To day = Christendom (W) vs East

Casuals

Stubbs' Lectures

Rights
in
Civil Wars.

The civil wars, for Nat. lib^{ties} were not in
gr^{at} means Wars for ideas, but Wars for Rights.

xxx Italy perhaps an ex^{ptⁿ} from special
causes. xxx In Eng rights fought for are
hist. Rts, & lib^s secured hist. lib^s. Step by
step, preced^d. by prec^d, & Nat. gr^{at} asserts self,
& O Rts, yielding consent, recog hist^{ical} of

How far
does the
Passage
here copied
account
for
Different
Results in
England &
in France?

claim, or exch^g resist^{ce} for sympathy,
but new but hist. energies into O Com. gr^{at}.
In med. gr^{at} of Constⁿ. Eng has little to shame,
little conspir^y, little fanaticism, as little

self-seek^g as poss. to pol^{itⁿ}. There is
quo of idea of lib^{ty} & sound gov^t. to lift
out of region of mere legal matter to man

for
Louis X. IV
&
William III?

legal oppression; there is gr^{at} tow^{ard} lib^{ty} in
all O vindicⁿ - even of cl Rts & priv^s; a
gr^{at} ~~so nat^l~~ so spontaneous, so little
self-conscious, as to show O not factitious
but natural gr^{at}. It is not taught by
philosophers, nor excited by agitators; it

is outgrowth of law and a law-abiding spirit, tends by
very nature to predom & order (Lib^y & Law) the
transitⁿ fr. Med to Mod Hist^y in its dept. of Natl
life is not an abrupt transitⁿ, but a growth befitting
a land of settled govt."

255-6

The
Balance
of
Power
is the
Unifying
Motive
in the
Drama of
Europ. Hist^y
1500-1800
— " —

The foremost idea (thought?) of 3 C^{ies} bet
1500 & 1800 is that of a Balance of Power

The Bal of Powr, however defined — i.e.
whatsoever Powers were bet. wh. nec. to maintⁿ
Equilib^m, such that weaker sh^d not be crushed by
strong^r — is a prin^{tl} wh. gov^s unity & a plot of Mod.
Eur. Hist^y. Whatsoever the drama, it is a Key to a Plot.

No Drama
in
Medieval
History
— " —

The existence of a drama at all is a first feature
of our sketch in Mod Eur Hist^y; the fact that one
work Powrs bet wh. to maintⁿ a Bal. Med Hist^y
may, if you choose, be read as a drama, but
tis not one in wh. plot is obvious. (too many personal)
It is rather series of dramas, of wh. may be combined,
but with trilogies &c, ea of wh. has plot of own.

Medieval
History
Preparatory
to Drama

In it, a hist^y of ea Grt. Natⁿ is a drama by itself;
it is a per^d of prepⁿ, in wh. actors in the drama to be

Stubbs Lectures

Separate
Schooling
of the Actors
in Drama
of Modern
History

in wh the Nations (the great Personae of the
Drama yet to be) are being educ'd. for or pts.

In Mod History the Personae appear and begin
to take or pts. But the early preparation

had bn carried on in great part separately
(And here no doubt is to be found much of

the different fault, which as I have said
is personified in the royal attributes of

Louis XIV and William III, two chief
characters in the whole drama 1500-1800.

For this precedent training of which Stubbs
speaks is the Environment, which is

one fraction of the whole national character
of which the other is native character - or

as we say Heredity)

Transition
from Medieval
to Modern

"There was no great crash at the pass^g of
the old & the com^g of the new. The new influences,
many & var^s in char., quickly combined to
prod. a new actors & to clear a common stage

258-9

Effect of
English Wars
on
French Nationality

The concert^o appears in Fr. dur^g the 17th
only became possible, when the long struggle with
Eng made it necessary

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England,
How Wielded
with
Unity

England on the other hand was brought into con-
centration of power (territorial unity it had long
had, therein diff^r fr. France) not by ext^l pressure,
invasion, & injury by for^m foe, in anterior atleast,
but by intestine strife. In long antecedent territorial
unity, involving the facile realization of nat^l unity,
so disturbed by the mere exist^{ce} in Fr. of a gr^t terr^l-
feudatories, Eng^d had acq^d even in middle ages
one element of concent^d nat^l strength. The
Parl^t came from the whole of a K^g^{dm} politically
one, wh. doubtless gave it a more representative
character in the eyes of the people, and when
the days came for Parl^t to resume, not only
its functions, but its essential, independent
powers, it was one, whole, indivisible,
unrivalled exponent of a one people.

Analogy
between
France and
Holland
in
initial
stages

France in fact in her independent
feudatories, presented on a larger scale
the same problem as Netherlands, except
of course that there was from remote periods
a royal power, a King; whereas in the

Stubbs Lectures

Initial
Differences
in
the Modern
Development
of
France and
Netherlands
— " —

Nath^l, at the time of their revolt, there was no such recog^d political centre with its unquestionable traditional prestige — no such moral force. Holland owed the preeminence it attained & physical superior force, not exerted in compulsion, perhaps, yet felt as a controlling factor

The two countries — so to call them — though achieved their unity under very diff^t initial conditions, with an corresponding wide diff^r of result. In France everything revolved to the King — & the royal power — disappeared. There was a head and no members. In Holland the centralizing force was not able — even in the great hands of the first William — to overcome the centrifugal tendency, which marked Dutch effort through generations

Query Can an analogy here be estab-
lished between these two countries, & Liberty & Law
the Centripetal & the Centrifugal

Holland also like France eternal prison

Political
Succession
in
Three Countries

{ Henry IV. Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV
James I Charles I Cromwell William III
William I. Barnard Maurice Dr Witt

Period
of
Political
Torpor in
England

" England, growing rich in a peace wh. its political
K & its busy people alike left all else to culture,
grew so strong in will & union & obedience of law,
till it became likewise (i.e. like Fr) ready to
act as a force in the hand of one man " 260

N.B. The per? of obedience of law, being necess.
also one of obedience of pol. authority, became one of
ind. actⁿ elsewhere - in all dept^s of national life
and one of usurpation, by nat. in politics

Contrast
between
Austria &
France

The strength of Fr (under Fr. I) is in her compactness,
& concentration (central posⁿ? etc), that of Austria
House (Char V) in its extent universality; to which
add wld of Am^a. 261

Popes
—
Baltic
States

The main actors of a day also had first up to Louis. Papes
abandⁿ of pl. as overseers of a too wide domⁿ, had begun to accum
terr^s. in wh. they call selves "The State". Vasa was reconstructⁿ
Sweden; & so att^{pt} failed to unite 3 Scam. K^g ^{Den}, & same
influence bindⁿ up it. as well as S. in bundles - larger groups
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Stubbs' Lectures

Predominance
of Concern for
Balance of Power
over
that for
Technical Right
— " —

due to struggle, (Fr I & Ch. V.) the older idea
of Rts for wh. to fight is not disapp^d, but now
a int is not in a Rt, but in a battle (not in
the cause, or occasⁿ but in the result, as affⁿ
rel. powers - force). So it has been, ever since

Chas VIII
opens
Drama.

Chas VIII, marchⁿ into Italy, led off a new Drama
Rts were sought out, & put for! as pretexts, but
a struggle was for sup^{ty} & for hold on pow^r

Austria
Defensive;
France
Aggressive.

"The House of Austria was on def (diffused
power). Francis & H II were neces-aggressive
wherever they turned, except seawards, they were
forces of Austria confrontⁿ — Pyrenees, Alps
Rhone, Rhine, within hist. limits of Fr,
N^o & E^t, they were a rival Pow^r; even on
seaboard was hostile fleet"

Why?

261-2

Reformation,
a spiritual
Movement,
becomes
political in
character, by
seeking the
Reformation

Setting aside for moment the idea of a Refⁿ
follow a rivalry of the foremost Pow^{rs} (i.e. a
political aspect). In so, Refⁿ cuts curiously
across the earlier divid^d lines. It takes up
such unity as Ger^y had, & so got Fr. a first
grt. adv.; for a strong alle^y of H II was a Post.

P^W 2, strikes first hard blow at propagand of Aust.,
& vicar. Loss of 3 Bp^{nci} is one of 6 mortal
wounds of Emp.

In short in all this 4 Refⁿ, ho⁹ brought
in politics for and ap^t itself, in so far loos st^g
as an idea. It has takⁿ 4 sword, (both the Church
and the Reformation) and in its true spiritual
force, win men's minds, wills, affectioⁿs, it has perished
by the sword.

This is the frequent remark, often illustrated
in fact, that much persecution was addressed
against our faith or the other, not as a religious
belief but as a political force.

Political force, therefore, rather than religious
idea came soon to be the dominant factor,
instancy in action, but in the motives for
action, in the religious struggle. E.g. H IV
had reason & view of apprehension in the ob-
stinate perpetuation of political opⁿ
among his former co-believers

Stubbs' Lectures

Character of
Thirty Years
War
less Religious
than
Political;
less concerning
Ideas
than concerning
Powers.

The Thirty Years War is largely religious
in character and motive; yet here too relig.
infl. prod. cross divⁿ; Luthⁿ. & Calv^t. will not
fight side by side; Bavⁿ. sets R.Csm bet Impsm;
Aust. sets fam^{ly} int by rith; yet Aust. is as
R.C. as Jesuits & as Imp^l. as jurists can
make her. But, despite its cross-infl. of
Rts & ideas, the 30 Yrs War is mainly a war
of force, a war for determ^d bal, not bet.
ideas or Rts, not bet Compet^d lib^s or
Compet^d Relij^s; but bet armed sover^{ties}
& terr^e-aggregations. x x The lofty idealism
of Gustavus Ad. ends in a ar^{ty} aff^{irm}ent
of Sweden; as intrigue of Rⁿ. ends in utter
humilⁿ of D^{mk}. As for France, her
interf^{ce} is a simple intrusⁿ of force, without
sympathy of idea, or pretext of legality

263-4

During the Refⁿ, certainly, both Rts and ideas
were very strong in centⁿ. circles of Fr own, & it
w^d. be serious mistake to consid Bal of Pow^r,

The
Realization, in
Act, of the Re-
formation de-
layed by the
Comparative
Preponderant
Force of the
Body to be
Reformed
- The Papal
Church -
Contrasted
with the
withheld
Divided and
Petty Forces
of the
European
Political
Community

A struggle of mat^l forces, & sole lesson of its
post^r of hist^y. Yet I think it even here we
shall see it a principle of idea vs less operation
On a principle of force; & not^r of force more effect^{ive}
On a not^r of idea. The crisis of a Repⁿ is not
less remarkable in its results On in its causes.
Doctrinal & Disciplin^e discontent had been brewing
& shrank? for a C^y. "The desire for Repⁿ in h^d
& members had been present all its time; but
Repⁿ did not come till a stage had, as we have
seen, been cleared for & new actors. We are
convinced. At which & consentⁿ of a new Papal Co.
Arsenal got^r indiv^y, vital^y, & more managable
force, it w^d. ex^{ist}. vit^y of & older orgⁿ, which
kept them together whilst divisions were smaller, &
con. actⁿ less vivid. Whilst Papal of dom
were busy wth their own int^l Rts and border quarrels,
a languid acquiescence in indiv. Sup^{er} of Rome was
more partial wth. On c^d. be when two, or three
new & well-sit^d Constit^{ts} were ready to assent to
autonomy; still more, when one new Constit^{ts} saw
& that it by must be master^d in our houses. As

Stubbs Lectures

we saw, a concentrⁿ of pow^r in Spain, in France
& Ger^y meant more an absorption of weaker
states (territorial); it meant, in Am^a, (not in Am^a
ultimately, there only the momentary paralysis)
"the absorption of w^l pow^r in a state (autocracy)"

Function

of
Force in
Effecting

the Reformation,
and in
Subsequent
History

The strong actors in a new drama must be strong
gov^ts at home, as well as strong Count^{ies} abroad
Great deserts, great rivalries, demanded con-
centrated energies, determined wills. Strong
gov^t came in wth 16 C^y, & strong gov^t was very
str^g element in R^{fn} hist^y, for it weak^d a
solidarity of R.C. Ch., & prep^d way for 'cujus
regis, ejus religio', wh. disrupted Nat^l Ch[?]
as well"

266-7

Benefit
and
Superior
of
Concentration
of
Power,
Inadequately
Checked

This necessity for concentrⁿ of all pow^r
of a state, legi as well as ex, in one function,
if not in one person, explains a pow^r of France
& of Spain, when in strong hands; explains
& weakness of Eng^d under & Straights - but
explains also the survival of her laws and
the loss of those where concentration under the

Casuals

King - legitimate - was effected - Stuyvesant
Cromwell, & why Cromwell - usurper - did not
& could not effect against the liberties of the people
what legitimate authority - Richelieu, Mazurin,
Louis XIV did

Does it explain Stuy, in a form like
provt. Eng, where legis and ex functions are
combined, by entrusting latter to a committee
of the legislature, thus assured of support, & which
holds ex. office under condition of being an elected
representative of legislature - unless a peer?

It appears also to me reading this a few
days later, and having just seen Mr. Robert
Trist Paine's eulogy of Concentrated Action - in
Church & Business matters - as contrasted with
what he deems the worn-out methods of Com-
petition, that unchecked power is the secret
at once of the force, of the beneficial effect,
and of the social danger of the Trust

Hubb's Lectures

I proposed for myself two leading principles:

This
Plan
for
Historical
Teaching

the first was to begin at the beginning - 'We must begin at the right end, work from the past forwards, not backwards from the present & & I intended in fact to trace & grad. devel^t. of the modⁿ. world, not on to trace back partic. pts. of devel^t. to its orig^l. germs. & & The result has been that in these ten yrs I have not got beyond 1648

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Necessary
Connection
between
History
&
Law.

For Lytle

It will be a fatal thing for the study of Hist^y here, if the study of Law sh^d ever be quite eliminated fr. the Hist^y course; & as fatal for the study of Law if it sh^d ever come to be read on its merely scientific or merely empiric basis. & & It seems due, in connection wth any own study, of the growth of jurisprudence, & history of formⁿ. Codes, anc. & modⁿ, & the connectⁿ. bet legal & constⁿ. growth, are, as well as internat^l law, a common ground bet the two studies - Law & Hist^y. & & To some extent the relatⁿ. of these studies is the same

as it bet Eccl^l Histo & Theology; each is a
very unaimed affair without the o^r.

40-41

The training of the judgment is the great edu-
cational or disciplinary object of historic teaching; the
formative acquisition that should result from
such teaching as distinguished from the material
gain

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Misleading articles - Reviews - which enumerate the
mistakes and misstatements of a book, ignoring the
fact that, with much carelessness of detail,
the author has shown a great grasp of knowledge
of his subject, skill in grouping & coloring (Adams
'form'), & power in investing the subject with
true and real interest

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In recounting blemishes, the reviewer should
not confuse structural wth incidental errors

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What shall we say of the Crimean War? begun as
it was by the wisest of Nations wth the grst reluctance
but because they believed it they sh^d keep nat^l
promises, & maintain treaties even at risk of self

Hints
for
my own
writing,
in that they
show what
Shutts
considers
more
important

Crimean
War

Stubb's Lectures

Crimian
War
Fruitless

weak & wicked govt^s For all the good it did
it met as well never to be fought. The treaties
result^d for it are drawn down winds; & pers^{on} of
fought he resumed the nat^l attitude wh^{ich} treaties
may modify but cant alter; & crisis of it
tried to avert is approaching more quickly &
cert^{ly}; & it is doubt^d to only because in
it an expt^{er} wh^{ich} we thought fit to try was
tried in vain. The history of our time does,

Disproportion
of
Size in
Contemporary
Events

while in progress, seem more imp^{ort} on any
hist^{ory} wh^{ich} has gone by; gov^t int^s are seen
to be involved; gov^t arm^{ies} trot end fields;
more crit^{ic}l chg^s follow; more startling
pre^{sen}ts are enunciated; Metaph all & prop^{er}
of hist^o incident is scarcely chg^d. The tide
began to roll w^{ith} gov^t waves at Refⁿ "x x"
& so on; "the storms grow wilder as world
grows older, but the results are not, so far
as we can see much more permanent

History of
Empire
Ports

"The history of Emp. Ports, & of the mercantile Com-
munities on the Coast, lie at the root of our naval
history, & contain the germ of international jurispru-
dence. Their history has yet to be explored. Every
year perhaps (1876) we are drawing nearer, for
the discovery of Hist. Mass. Comm. are richer in
fact than in any other region, & for syst. use of them
we must look to the assocⁿ of such laborers as
now in Amer^a are employ^d on history of House 15."

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Complete
Break of
Continuity
between
Ancient
and
Modern
History

As bet. anc. & mod. Hist^y Stubbs argues:
The element of cont^y is want^d. "The connectⁿ of
pol. ideas is one of coincidence, not of cont^y.
Every factor is new; even the area, & nat^lty of
actors, & whole idea in its origin & in every stage
of growth is new. Or, let area be same; what has
modⁿ Greece in cont^y wth anc^t G. but the soil,
& sky & the, to it, unmitigated wreck of anc^t
imag^{ee}, for which it fails to draw the ord^y lessons of
cit^{zn} What per^o & regⁿ of whole hist^y of world
conveys a less instruct^{ve} lesson than G. dur^g mid ages of
Eur^o Hist^y. whence lessons wth Italy, except at Italy

Stubbs Lectures

as center & Stage of Eccl. History, in which
above are to be found the unity and
continuity of Anc^t & Modⁿ History on any
large or broad scale

Argument
that there
is no vital
connection,
no continuous
life thread,
between Ancient
and Modern
History;
save only
the Christian
Church, which
itself is a
new life
brought! I
make all
things new!

The vital int. of Med. & Modⁿ History
lies in Eng, Fr, & Ger^y, as certly as that of
Anc^t lies in East, in Greece & in Italy. No
small pt of Future lies in & further Wⁿ world
The actors in med^t & modⁿ drama are &
new Nations, unheard of by decline of Romⁿ
Emp began, & which inher^d fr. that Emp only
of eccl^t culture, not of pol. syst^m, nor of
pol. map wh. that syst^m had laid out. The
ideas of med^t & modⁿ ~~life~~ life are of med^t &
modⁿ growth; or, if count^d w^o out^{ly} are so
by a new birth of culture, a rediscover^y, a re-
creation, not by a contin^s impulse of vital^y.
Save in one region, that of Religion; & x x & on
How pt. fact of the Xⁿ dispensⁿ, wh. connects &
anc^t. Hebrew isolⁿ w^o & Cath. Ch, is itself as
much a break as a link of cont^y

It cert^{ly} seems curious &c, altho' & advocate of
the Unity and Continuity of Hist^y, and the believers
in the science & philosophy of Hist^y, likewise
Hesius to be diametrically opposd. one to the other,
the weakness of the respective positions appear to
be the same. Both prefer to work out generalizations
& to collect coincidences, rather than study the
drama in its plot and personnel.

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"The main feature of our idea of teaching in
this place is exemplified in the Exⁿ. Statute. The
main feature of it is the Thorpold division into,
first, a continuous reading of our Nat^l. Hist^y;
second, an epochal treatment of a portion of
general European hist^y; & third the special
study of some character or period in the
original authorities x x x x

"I am not sure that it would not be
more true to the idea" - of teaching - "to require
the student to read a single book and by
plot its mechanism & materials, rather than
set before him a character or institution, & bid

Stubbs Lectures

him look up illustration of it in a partic-
ular set of books; + + + for essay ~~at last~~
~~the~~ the one might be an invaluable training,
but we here are obliged to keep in mind the
list of examination.

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Regarded as a study of a subject, rather
than as a first step into the region of origi-
nal authorities, this part of our work ex-
emplifies one of two diametrically opposed
methods of reading. And, whether there is
or is not a Science of History — and I be-
lieve that in the reasonable and intelli-
gent sense of the word there is such a
science — there is, I am sure, an Art
of writing history, and an art of reading
it; and the educational use of History is
an instance of the "art" — of reading and of
writing

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Science
and
Art
in the
Study
of
History

Two forms
of
Historic
Art

"According to this" - the Art conaption - "the
reader, or the writer may set before himself two
opposite ideas; 1, he may wish to produce a
historical statue or group of statuary; or, 2,
he may wish to produce a historical picture.

Historic
Statuary
or Sculpture

In the former case he has to look out his
materials first, then to construct from a
conceivable view of them an idea - or model -
of the object which he desires to reproduce,
& then to work out his idea. It is neces-
sary for him to look at his subject all
round, and while seeking for unity and
perfection" (of effect?) "to make truth &
reality the first object

Historic
Painting

The second form of our Art is anal-
ogous to painting, & its result is a picture.
It aims at reproducing - not a character or
a life, but - a situation. It requires a
background & a foreground, scenery and
perspective, as well as unity and symmetry

Stubbs Lectures

It studies the relations and positions, the features and habits of each of the persons or groups that the picture is to contain, & tries to make them true to the eye, whatever they may be in the life." (I don't understand the last clause of this sentence)

As a matter of presentation I should conceive that the pictorial method would have great advantages in allowing a greater number of actors and vivid coloring, and action, than the statuary plan

Thoroughness and complete realization are not a requisite of this sort of work, so much as accurate reproduction. The painter is not, like the statuary, obliged to look at his figures all round; so the historian, who works at a situation, will often satisfy himself if his grouping is true & consistent for the moment which he tries to seize; he will not spend much time in trying to show how the scene comes to be what it is, satisfied that his reproduction adequately represents what it seemed to be

Historical
Art
Patterned
upon
Dramatic
Art.

A third form of the Art of History, which combines & adds to these two, borrows its analogue from the domain of another of the arts, and attempts to read not only character and situation, but plot also. This is, in itself, very far in value beyond the other two. It involves the complete identification of persons, and the complete realization of relations; of persons identified through long historical careers, and of relations varying from moment to moment during the long periods over which the drama extends. It can perhaps better afford than the second form of Historic Art, to discard circumstances and characters that are not essential to the plot, but it cannot afford to neglect any such circumstance or feature that may be essential to it. The result of such writing is seen in its best form in the history of great institutions, great empires that have had definite periods of growth, duration, & decline. (E.g. Sea Power) It has all the unity of the statuesque, & all the vividness of the picturesque; but a continuity of life and of argument that are its own alone. For this are needed the clear sept that can apprehend the idea which gives life and truth" (unity) "to the story, together with the labor which will apply itself to details as if it were out of the study of details, only that life and truth could come.

Stubbs Lectures

Both in the study of a general period, which embraces in its scope many countries through a defined epoch of time, or in the continuous history of a particular country, dramatic interest will be found strong and capable of almost infinite illustration

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History
as a Science,
not an Art

There is yet another way of reading and of writing history which can scarcely be regarded as educational, because the historic faculty must already have been educated before this task can be approached. To read and write with the simple purpose of collecting, listing, and arranging the facts of history, to discover causes and work out consequences, to determine the rights and wrongs of questions as they arise, the growth & decline of institutions as they emerge from & retire into darkness when their work is done, to build up history into a treasure

house of knowledge, that may enable a man who attempts the task to read with like facility the history of the past and the present, to solve the difficulties of conflicting testimony, and to hold the balance of Equitable judgment between conflicting systems — this study of history for its own sake can scarcely be regarded as a method coordinate with the other three. But it unites the advantages of the all three, and furnishes still more formative and disciplinary influence of its own. In relation to its subject, it is an end in itself, and is not to be classed among means and methods; if there be a science, this is the Science of History. And yet this idea, like the others, is apt to be lowered, and made vulgar, by the impatience and intolerance of the utilitarian theory. Of all important things, utilitarian theory is the most so

Steebs Lectures

The Men of
Henry VIII's
time did
not see any
such exigency
as called
for Dictator-
ship

They were
simply
bull-dozed
by
Henry

We may, if we please, admit of a Nat.
accept^d & actⁿ of H VIII as of a divinely const^d
dictator; a theory wh involves the assumptⁿ, altho
groundless, of a natⁿ thought by said & exist^d
circs to be such as demanded a dictatorship;
but I am persuaded that the theory is based on the
process of read^g hist^y backward, apt^{ly} wh. I have
constly to struggle.

There was nothing in the circs of Eur dur^g
the whole life of H VIII, such as there was under Q
Eliz, wh int. persuade peop on liv^g of the need
of such an ext^{rdy} off^r. We, look^g back on the time,
may see how dang^{er} it was, how full of pitfalls &
snarcs, & how, in the result, a gr^{at} adv. was gained
for Eng in her such a hand as even a bloody nd
of H to guide her thro; but a crit^{ic} char. of the
time was not app^t to the time, or to the lead^g men
of Eng dur^g it, and our later read^g cant be made
to acct. for the condⁿ of feel^g & actⁿ & we here
contemplate

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Parliament
of
Henry VIII

Henry held nine parlt^s in his 38 yrs. of
Age, one ext^d over the best ht. of 7 yrs, that is the
1st organic parlt^e, which began in 1529, and

ran on to the spring of 1536; a partt. wh., b^t on acct. of length, and for ^{the} imp^{ce} of its acts, may deserve a title of a Long Parl^t. of H VIII. Of ^{the} eight partts, two, ^{of} ^{the} ^{parl^t} ^{sum^d} in 1572, & ^{of} ^{the} ^{parl^t} in 1542, ran over three yrs, wth short sess^{ns}. The oth are all shorter, of one or two ~~sess^{ns}~~ ^{sess^{ns}}

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Attitude
of
Commons
People
towards
Statute
of
Appeals
1533

The oth gr^t Act of 1533 (besides the Divorce Act) was a Statute of Appeals. On Mar. 14, acc^dg to Chapuys, it was prop^d. in parl^t. to make a statute declar^g that Pope has no auth^y in Os K^g ^{xxx} ^{xxx}. On 7 31st a impl. envoy announces that Convocⁿ. has passed a Divorce Bill, but H. of C. has ref^d. to pass Statute of Appeals, on ground that, if Pope were off^d, he w^{ld}. injure a wool-trade. But by Apr 10 he has a record of a opposⁿ in gr^t way by K's Overt & enforce praemunire agst. larty & & It is no doubt an ^{un-~~usual~~} ^{un-~~usual~~} of Chapuys when he says that that w^{ld}. be welcomed Emp^r as a deliv^{er}; but there can be no reason to questⁿ his statements as to a sincerity of a opposⁿ.

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After all I have said, I think you will allow that I have grounds for believing that H VIII was a master, & in no sense a minister, of his people; that, where

Stubbs Lectures

Henry VIII
the Master,
not the
Minister,
of his
People

he carried ^{to} good will wth him, it was by
forcing, not by anticipⁿ, or even Educⁿ, it.
I am obliged altho^{gh} to reject ^{the} notⁿ of he
was in any sense ^{the} interpretation of ^{the} wishes of
his peop^{le}. The utmost of he did in ^{the} directⁿ
was to manip^{ulate} & utiliz^e ^{the} prejud^{ice} of his own
purposes. I allow fully ^{the} truth of ^{the} story
of one gr^{eat} prin^{ti}ple of his pol^{it}y was to obt^{ain} for
all his meas^{ures} ^{the} acqu^{ies}ce of his peop^{le}, & ^{as} to
neverth^{less} I'm wth an irrefrag^{able} aut^{hor}ity; but I
must add of he knew how to turn app^{ro}p^{ri}ate
into acqu^{ies}ce, or to take acqu^{ies}ce for grant^{ed}.
Further, I am conv^{inc}ed of he was his own ch^{ief}
Counsellor, his own sole Coun^{sel}l^{or}; & of not one
of his advisers, after Wolsey, was anything
more ^{than} ^{an} instrument of his imperious,
even-encroaching, will.

Friday's Greece

Beginning
of the
Byzantine
Empire
716 A.D.

Friday makes a Byzantine Emp. to begin - c. e.
to succeed the E.ⁿ Emp. - with the accⁿ of Leo III, & Isaac
reign. "A new era, & under his govt & Emp not only
ceased to decline, but soon began to resume much of
its early vigor. 716

The E.ⁿ Emp. as ref^d is call'd by modⁿ hist^{ns}
the Byz. Emp. The E.ⁿ Emp. had, on so deep^d & it
was in an of being repeop^d by Slav col^{ts}, & Cong^d by
Saracen invaders. By & inc^d strength of Emp., & by &
energy infus^d into admⁿ, & Byz. armies began to
be able to oppose firm barriers

Leo III's
Achievements

Leo III was a founder of a dyn^y, & savior of
Const., & a reform^r of Ch & St. He was first &
soon to arrest the progress of Mah^{dn} conquest. Nothing
can prove more decidedly the strength of his Emp. & assume
a new name on contrast present^d by & condⁿ
of what is to be of subj^s of preced^d? & No govt.
of wh^{ch} history has preserv^d & rec^d, unless it be China,
has secur^d. eq^l adv^d & its subj^s for so long a per^d

Justinian's Greece

Three

Periods
of
Byzantine
History

I. 716-867

The Hist^y of the Byz Emp. divides into 3 per^{ds}

I Commences wth the regⁿ of Leo III, 716, and ends
wth that of Michael III. 867

Per^d of the predominance of Iconoclasts. Opens
wth efforts by wh. Leo & perp saved Roman law
& X^{ty} fr Cong⁹ Saracens. Embraces a long
struggle bet. Emp^s & peop^l, Emp^s seek^g to
inc. cent^l pow^r by destr^yg every local franchise,
to consol. emp^l aut^y

The true hist^l feature of this per^d is
the aspect of a decl^y Emp^s sav^d by a moral vig^o.
devel^t in soc^y, & of central aut^y stri^o a
restored nat^l prosp^y. Now we seem such a
line of able sover^{ns} follow^g one another.

II Sec^d. per^d. begins wth Basil I, 867
and ends wth deposⁿ of Michael VI. 1057.

II 867-1057

At this time Byz Emp attains highest pt.
of ext^l pow^r & int^l prosp^y. Saracens pursued
into plains of Syria. Antioch & Edessa reunited to
Emp, Bulgar^s mon^y cong^d, & Danube becomes its
frontier. Byz. Com. filled whole Medⁿ & just^l
claim of Emp. of Const. to the title of Autocrat of all^g.

But the real glory of the period consists in the power of the Law. Respect for the administration of justice pervaded society more than it had ever done at any preceding period of the world - a fact generally overlooked but of almost immense importance in the history of human civilization

10

III. 1057-1202

III The third period extends from the accession of Isaac I (Comnenus), 1057, to the conquest of Byz. Emp. by Crusaders, 1204

This is true period of decline & Fall of the Eastern Empire. It began by a rebellion of the great nobles of Asia, who effected an internal revolution of the Empire, by wrenching administration out of the hands of well trained officials, & destroying the responsibility created by systematic procedure. Thus an edifice resting not on vital force but upon mechanical routine was disorganized, & work efficiency ruined.

11.

Decrease
of
Slave
Population
8th - Century

The fermentation which pervaded the society in the 8th century marks the commencement of modern civilization, as contrasted with ancient. Its force arose out of general diminution of slave labor. Middle class of the 7th century no longer rich enough to buy slaves, hence slave population became minority in the Eastern Empire

Justinian's Greece

Prestige of
the Imperial
Idea
716-867

The democ. ideas wh exist among free lab^{rs}
replaced & arist. caution wh is insepk. fr
necess^y. of watching numerous popⁿ of slaves
Greal attⁿ became direct^d to th eq^l admⁿ of justice;
& here Emp app^d. alone remov^d above influence
of part^y & trib^y. The prosp^y. of Com. seemed
as dir^y count^d. wth imp^l. sup^{cy} as jud. Eq^{ty}
trial, for only th part^y of th Emp c^d enforce one
uniform syst^m of Customs fr. Cherson &
Ravenna. Every trad^e felt th imp^l. govt^s as
necess to secure fin^l. & legal unity

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Delimitation
of the
Empire's
803

A treaty was concl^d. in 803 bet Char-
magne & Nicephorus, th Byz Emp. It reg^d
th frontier of th two Emp^s. Sup^{cy} of Eaⁿ was recog^d
over Venici, Istria, mar. pts of Dalmatia &
S. of Italy; while th Wⁿ Emp. Ravenna, &
Pentapolis, & Rome. The com. of Ven. wth E. w^{as}
already so imp^t, & Byz admⁿ. off^d. so many
guaranties for security of prop^y. at Ven^{ty},
despite threats of C. vend. firm in alliance
wth Const. & & It was dur^g regⁿ of Nicph

Venetian
Govt
moves from
the Continent

At the site of present city of Ven became seat
of Ven. Govt. A duke & principal nobles retiring
from court. A Revolto & escape att^{ns} of Pepin
100-1

Byzantine
Commercial
Preeminence

813-820

The imp. of a Byz Emp^s in W cont^d to
be very gr^t. - despite Cong^s of Charlemagne,
independence of Popes, & formⁿ of a two Saracen
K^gdoms in Africa & Spain - in conseq. of ext^{ve}
{ much countries of Greeks who on poss^d. most
lucrative pt. of a Medⁿ Com

Saracen
Piracy

These gr^t suppd. much fr. "Saracen pirates"
Lampedusa had been occup^d by Sar. corsairs, & many
Gk ships capt^d, by joint forces of D^s of Sicily &
Naples, wth vass of Amalfi & Venici def^d plun-
ders, & cleared sea for awhile
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Flourishing
Condition
of
Archipelago
c. 822

This remarkable civil war last^d three yrs.
"The large fleets coll^d on both sides prove that
popⁿ & wealth of coasts & isls of Archipel had not
declined under adminⁿ of Iconoclasts, tho' the pt
of Emp was least likely to be fav^d by its Emp^s
no⁹ stead^y. opp^d. Am
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Friday's Greece

Conquest of
Sicily and
Crete
by Saracens

The period wh in our days impels nat^{ns} &
col^{rs} new cit^{ies}, in 9th Cth led Saracens
& Normans to ravage every C^{ty} by ed. enter,
destr^y cap^l, & so dimin^e Cult^{re} & pop^l.

Crete & Sicily, two of most val^{uable} prov^{inces} of
Byz. Emp., which almost exclus^{ively} by G^{reeks}, &
b^{oth} in high state of civ^{il} & prosp^{erity} were conq^u
by Saracens, without off^{er} resist^{ance} th^{at} mt. h^{ad} b^{een} exp^{ected}

Crete in 823 and became a nest of
Saracenic piracy until recapt^d, 135 yrs. later.

134, 137

Conquest of Sicily by Sar^{acens} ext^{ended} fr. 827-878
138-9

Russians
Ravage
Coasts of
Constantinople

In yr. 865 a nat^{ion} hitherto unknown app^{ears}
in hist^{ory} of world, by an att^{empt} to take Const^{antinople}
In 862 Rurik, a Scand. chf., arr^{ived} at Novgorod
& laid first found^{ation} of Russ^{ian} state. Under his
Varangian dom^{ination} Russ^{ian} peop^{le} inv^{aded} in part^s & subdued
many of the neighbors. In 865, when Emp. Mich^{ael}
was about to proceed ag^{ainst} Sar^{acens}, 200 small Russ^{ian}
vessels, suddenly pass^{ed} Bosph^{orus} w^{ith} fav^{orable} wind &
ravaged c^osts round Const^{antinople} & & How far do

Exp^{on} of Russos must be count^d wth spirit of these
enterprising warriors fr. Scandinavia, wh. sav. 500⁰
& Normandy, Naples, Sicily, Eng^d & Russia, is
yet to be determ^d.

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Re-invigoration
of
Byzantine
Empire
716-867

The regⁿ of Leo III opens a new soc^l era to
mark^d, as well as the 4th Emp. Much of its amel-
ioration may be traced & infusion of new vigor
into soc^l fr. pop. feelings, of wh. diff^t & trace
causes or devel^t. Byz Emp, tho it retained some of
old Roman cent^l vigor, c^d not pres^t. loss of
swth provs; & Basil I, 867-886, gov^d an
emp smaller in extⁿ on its const^d by Leo III,
tho one also far richer & more powerful. Ravenna,
Rome, Crete, Sicily h^d. pass^d under Domⁿ of his^th
It^s. Venice h^d become completely indep^t. On
oth^r hand, in 917 Sar^s occup^d gr^t pt. of Asia
Minor, which was 867 by were almost completely expell^d.

Venice
Independent

Cherson
Subdued

The only cong. of wh. Emp^s c^d. boast was complete
subjⁿ of allied city Cherson & cent^l admⁿ.
Cherson h^d prev^{ly} enjoyed a degree of pol. indep^e-
wh. h^d for c^{iv} secur^d. Count^l prosp⁹.

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Friday's Greece

Byzantine
Wealth
Due to
Commerce

The gr^t. wld of Byz. Govt. at its time, 716-867
was derived fr. com^o. preeminence among nat^{ns}
of earth. The com of Eur. centred at Constantⁱⁿ,
in 8 & 9 C^{ts}, more completely than it has ever since
done in any one city. The prin^{cl}s of its gov^t., wh
reprob^d monop, & the mod^s of its duties, wh
reprob^d privs, were fav. to exten^s of tr.

Contrasted
Policies of
Charlemagne
and
Byzantine
Emperors
in Trade
Matters

Which Charlemagne ruined int^l tr. of his dom^{ns}
by fix^g. max^m. of prices, & distr^{ct}. for^m. com.
under the idea that, by discour^g. lux^u., he c^d. enable
his subj^s to accum^e treas wh. he int. aft^{er}
extort^{ed} fr. them, & Emp. Theophilus forbade his
court fr. engag^g. in merc. spec^u., but by sh^{ut}-
ting out & reg. channels of com^o intercourse, by
dimin^g. prof^{ts} of indiv^l dealer. He said the
com. was prin^{cl}. source of wld of his peop, & that
as many derived their subsistence fr. tr., & drew
fr. it alone means for pay^{mt}. of public burdens,
int^{er}ference wth lib^{ty} of com^o was a hurt as well as a
priv. injury. Pot. imp^{er} of Com^o! cl^os^{ed} led Rome
to purchase or pay by dimin^g. duties at Bosphorus
& Hellaspent.

Dependence
of
Western Europe
for
East Indian Wares
upon
Byzantine
Commerce

During the period, 716-867, the names of
Eur drew supplies of Ind. Commod. fr. Constth,
& Byz Emp. suppl^d on wth all the gold coin in
circulⁿ for sev^l c^{ies}

The Grk Navy, merc & mil^y, w^{as} on & most
& most num^{er} in exist^{ce} A part Grk merc ships
& private vessels of Egypt, African, & Spanish
Arabs, were chiefly dir^d. We possess no author^{ty}
details of com^{er} state of the Byz Emp, nor of
the Grk pop^u dur^g Icon. per^{od}, but we may
safely transfer to its time & rec^d the exist^{ce}
proof^s ext of Grk Com dur^g Basilian Dyn^y.
867-1057. Indeed, we must remember that,
as ig^{er} & pop^u of W. Eur was much gr^{er} in
11 & 12 C^{ies} than in 8 & 9, we may conclude
that Byz Com was also gr^{er} (prop^{er}) dur^g Eastern
per^{od}.

Grk
Commerce
Overlooked
by
Western
Historians

The influence of the Arabs wth E. I.
on the supply of m^{er} of W. Eur has been over-
rated, & that of the Grks usually lost sight of.
This is, in some degree, due attrib^d to fact of

Cause Why
The Importance
of the
Overland
Route by
Central Asia
has been
Overlooked
in Later Days

—11—

Reasons
Why
This Route
was so
used by
Christians
in preference
to that by
Red Sea

Friday's Lecture

A most W^{ly} unt^o, in a times period?
Crusades, were better acqu^{it} wth Com. & literature
of Arabs of Spain than wth use of Byz. books,
& also to the preservⁿ of an int^g acct. of the
ext^{er} type of the Arabs in the Eⁿ seas, dur^g
the very per^{od}. 710-867, 867-1057 when
we are deprived of all me^{ans} of Byz. Com.
Byz. m^{ark}ts draw to Ind^{ia} & China prod^s
fr. Cent^{al} Asia, & to pass? N. of Caspian
down^{er}, thro' terr^{it} of Khazars to the Blk
Sea. This route was long freight^{ed} by X^{mas}, to avoid the
str^{ait} in poss^{ess} of Moh^{am} & was highway of inv.
Com. fr. w^{est} Cis. Tho' it was app^{ar} more
diff^{er} & exp. route than by Red Sea & Ind. Ocean,
it was really safer, quicker, & more econ^{om} in
8, 9, 10 Cis. This needs no proof to be acqu^{it}
wth caravan life in E, & who object^{ed} to the
imp^{er} of anc. nav^{ig}, & the dangers & delays to
wh sailing vess of any size are expos^d in Red S.
When Venet^{ians} & Gen^o began to surpass S^{ultans}
in Com^{er} enterprise, by und^{er} a acct^{ing} to

route; & we have some acct. of him it foll^d, & a
manner in wh carried on, aft^r E. had been thrown
into captivity by a cong^s of Crusaders & Tartars,
in a travel of Marco Polo.

Conditions
of the
Commercial
Route
North of
Caspian
and
Black Sea

For sev^l C^{ies} A num^s cities of a Byz
Emp. suppl^d Eur. consumers wth Indⁿ wares,
& two in Am alone At nec. secur^y of prop^y
exist^d to preserve large stores of mch^d. Con-
stantinople was then as much sup^d. A very city in
a civ^z world, in wth & com, as London now is
to of Eur. cap^s. And it must also be rememb^d
At times of Cent^l Asia were not then in barb^s
cont^d into wh by no sunk, S^{uic} nomad nat^{ns}
subdued them. On many pts of road trad^d by
Caravans, mch^d found a num^s & wth popⁿ,
ready to traffic in many art^s sought after
both in E & W. The one commod^y of furs so
val^d opp^y to add gthly to prof^t

211-12

Sev^l cities. contriv^d & transfer to fr. dom^{ns}
of Caliphs & Gov^{ts}. The Mah^d law, wh prohib^d
all loans at int, & a arbit^y admⁿ of justice, rendered

Effect of
the closure of
Canal joining
Nile to Red
Sea

767
—*—

propⁿ & espec. Com^t propⁿ insecure.

Again the Com^t route by way of Egypt & Red Sea became too difficult & expensive, about 767, by the Caliph Al Mansur, wh closed canal Countⁿ Nile wth Red S. The harvest of E. wh. had by filled coast of Arabia wth plenty, c^d no more be transp^d to ports of R.S. in quant^s; living became exp^{ve}; popⁿ Arabia decl^d; & a carrying tr was ruined by & add^d exp^{tr} req^d. The C. As impov^d & depop^d. Rebel cities Mecca & Medina to such degree as to make Ar milⁿ & pol. pur bes dang^s to central auth^y at Bagdad; but at same time he ruined comⁿ of E. wth India & Eⁿ coast of S. Africa. Since then as most imp. line of commⁿ has now been rest^d, & a coarse foods, of wh. E. can furnish inexhaustible supp^s, an dep^d of Ar nat^l mkt in arid regions Arabia. The hostile relat^s of Caliph of Bagdad & Spain likewise caused consid^l ht of M^hon pop. on shores of Medⁿ to maintⁿ close com^t relats wth Constantⁿ

Hostilities
between
Spain and
Bagdad

Proofs of
Abundance
of
Specie
in
Byzantine Empire

Proof of gr^t. w^lth in Byz Emp at its time,
716-867, is found in immense amt. of specie in
circⁿ. Byz Emp. furn^d all Wⁿ. nat^s of Eur
w^lth gold coin for sev^l C^{ts}; & when the hoards
of the Mohⁿ empⁿ of India were seized by Eur.
merchants in later years, "gold coin of Byz
Emp formed no small pt. The sums accum^d
by Al Mansur & Theophilus were so gr^t., & so
extensⁿ. c^d. be coll^d Am, had not peop^l been w^lthy
& gr^t. act^v in com^l. transactⁿ

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Wealth
of Mediterranean
Near Regions
Indicated
by
Spanish
Coinage

Further confirmⁿ of gr^t. w^lth of Cirⁿ on
shores of Medⁿ, in wh. com^l we allow some
degree of w^lth, is found in w^lth of Ab-
derrahman III in Spain, who is said to
have poss^d ann^l. income = £ 5,500,000
The poor^d of Eur at later per^d., when isrlⁿ came
by feud syst^m had annihil^d com^l, & pres^t
circⁿ of prec^l. metals, cannot be used as ar-
gument agst proofⁿ of its w^lth h^o exist^d
at the earlier per^d of wh. we are treat^d

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Justin's Greece II

Contrast
between
Effects of
Commerce
and
Agriculture

Welfare of nations depends in grt degree on
Com., but hb & strength is derived fr. agric.
Com. is cosmopol; Agric is natl. The
inhab. of cities do not reproduce rapidly —
need to be recruited fr. country. Constantinople, as
renewed fr. dist Ts, & fr. nat^s dissimilar
in manners & lang., was always undergoing
grt. chgs, yet always kept peculiar type of a
city destitute of homogen^y in soc^y, or of
decided nat^y. It became in turn a Roman,
Assacene, & Greek, as & R. A, or G. arist^y acq^d
& predom. influence in its admⁿ. Under Roman
oligarchy two more decidedly Asiatic. Whether
Asiatic, G^y, or Slaves formed grt no. of inhabs
cant be ascert^d. The arist^y chiefly Asiatic, &
mid. cl^s & artisans chiefly G., but the lower
classes of all occup^{ns}, when not slaves, app^r to
be on chiefly Slaves of Theodorus & Maximian

Superior
Moral Tons
in
Byzantine
empire

The moral condⁿ of peop of Byz Empire was ²¹⁶ superior
to that of any equal no. of human race in any
preced^g period. The bulk of soc^y had high
soc^l posⁿ. On in time of Pericles; & masses

had gained more by decrease of slavery, & the extent
of free labor on priv'd cl^s had lost. x x x. There
can be no doubt of the sup^y of Byz Soc^y over
it wh exist^d in contemp^y Empires of Saracens
and Franks x x. Violence & injustice claimed
unbounded hence at Bagdad until Turk merce-
naries exting^d caliphate; & it was Norman in-
vaders who ref^d Soc^y condⁿ of Franks.

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Ravages of
Saracens
on the
Coasts
of the
Mediterranean
Ninth Century
— " —

The Saracens of wh had for some time past
devast^d the shores of w^{est} Xth C^{try} bord^d on Medⁿ,
plundering wh reg^y & id^s of Ionian Sea & Archip.
(~~757-780~~⁸⁶⁷⁻⁸⁸⁰) Took city of Bari, landed at mouth
of Tiber. Incessant ravages in Italy, attk^d
Rome &c &c. " The daring wh wh. S^s carried on
or nav exp^{ns} over Medⁿ at th^s per^d is a
remark^{ble} feature in a state of Soc^y. The attk^s
of Danes & Normans on Coasts of Eng^d & Fr^{ce}
not more const. nor more terrible"

250

Friday's Green II

Trade
Function
of
Bulgarian
Nation
900

The Bulgarian Natⁿ had now 886-912
att^d posⁿ occp^d some Cis by by & Avars. They
win & most civ^zd & com^d of all & Nⁿ barbars, &
formed medium for suppl^y gr^o pt. of Ger^y &
Scand^a w^o neces. Commod^s fr. Asia, & w^o
Byz m^o & gold. This ext^{ve} to h^d some on
stead^y inc^d am^t tunci treaty - 716 - fix^d amt.
of duty to be p^d on Byz frontier

280

Strength
of
Byzantine
Institutions

The calam^s & crimes we hv. & mention
may create an opin. of a gov^t w^o worse &
& condⁿ of peop. of the Emp. more miserable,
thⁿ w^o really the case. A sav^y of war, & in-
curious of private wast^d only small pt. of
Byz terr^y, & amph time w^o gr^o in most
dist^s to again desol^d & depop^d. As caused
the cent^r gov^t. still not^d instit^s wh^o enabled it
to encounter pol. storms & wrecked neigh^b states;
and, w^o much corruptⁿ & weakness, these instit^s
still guaranteed life & prop^y. to an extent unknown
in any o^r pt of the world, Xⁿ a M^o

284

Re-
Capture
of
Crete by
Romanus II
961

The only mode of prot? & com of Const^{ble},
and the coasts of Gr. w^o to long. I^d. of Crete,
and expul^d the Sarⁿ. popⁿ. Romanus II
fitted out an exp^d. July 960; a blockade
was maint^d dur^g ensuing winter, & on May
7, 961, Chandax, the chief town was takⁿ by
storm. The Sar. popⁿ. was exterm^d, or en-
slaved. The island had been in Saracen hands
for 135 yrs. 317-18

Alienation
between
Byzantine
and
Greek
Temperaments

The educ^d el^s of Byz Emp. were gent^l
about any symp^y. w^o Greece, & looked down on
Gks as prosl^d & alien race. && Byz Soc^y was
a devel^t. of Roman civ^{zn}, & hence Byz mind was
pract^l. & pos. ; admⁿ. & law were to it what lib^{ty}
& philos^y had been to Hellenes of old. A strong
mental diff^{er}. ∴ was the cause of the aversⁿ. to Gr.
& Gks. It is app^t. in Byz Soc^y & reap^d. by Gks.
&& The gr^t. Soc^l feature of Hell^{ic}. race dur^g. 9th & 10th C^s
is its statismariness. The 8th C^y was one of gr^t. act^g, &
improv^t among Eur. Gks, as among every oth pt. of
Eⁿ Emp. But aft^r subjugⁿ. of Slav Col^s in first

Finlay's Greece, II

years of 9th C^y, & a re-visit of Com^l relates one whole Medⁿ, but Soc^y again relapsed into a stationary condⁿ.

Prosperity
of
Greece in
the 9th 10th
& 11th C^{ies}

Still, fr. end of 9th C^y to the invasion of the
Crusaders, Greece was a rich & flour^y prov. The
mat^l causes of its wld are no obvious as are
A moral causes of its pol. insignt^e — The govt.
pt. of a com. of Medⁿ was in hands of Byz^{ts};
A wld of Byz^{ts} placed ample cap^l. at or
Com^l; A silk mf. was to Thebes & Athens what
cotton mf. now is to Manchester; Monsmoravia
was the wh. Venice became later; A slave-tr,
As it brot misery down & demor^{zn} to Pⁿ.
Soc^y, brot wld to shores of Greece. The
mass of agric popⁿ. enjoy^d as much prosp^y as or
Com^l. Country prodⁿ. abund^y; labor was highly
paid; a few days toil creat^d an amt. of prodⁿ
wh bore the compⁿ. & its cost, & Gr. at the time
poss^d monop^y of a finer kinds of oil, wine & fruit

321

Unfortunately, the exigencies of or Byz^{ts} Gov^t.
led to severe fiscal exactions. Taxation
absorbed all the annual profits of industry

Stationnamin
of
Greece
900-1200

Society of f. no invitⁿ to form new plant^{ns}, or
to ext^d. exist^g imp^s, & to age afforded no openings
for new enterprises. Each gen^{tn} moved exactly
in to limits of that which preceded it, so that Greece,
to mat^l prosp^s, "was morally stagnant" and on
the brink of decline

Reasons for
Success
of
Station
Competition

Decline began at moment of States were able
to avail themselves of the nat^l resources of the country
— i.e. as soon as competition arose. Amalfi,
Pisa, Genoa, Venice, freed fr. fiscal oppⁿ
of a central gov^t. (i.e. admⁿ of their own affairs)
became first & rivals, on a sub^{ns} of links
in com, ind^y, & wld.

322

Russian
Civil and
Commercial
Conditions

The first Russ. expⁿ ag^t Constth in 865
and prob^{ly} he. on fall^g by obsrd of Turkish turn
named Patzinaks made these masters of lower
Dnieper, & on us^d by Emp^r to arrest & hold Varang^{ns}
The rulers of Kiev were these rude warriors & in-
fest^g Eng & Fr, but Russ peop^l was on in a more
adv^d state of soc^y. On a mass of the popⁿ in Britain
& Gaul * * * The com. too, of Russians was already

9th-10th Centuries

Furlan's Greece II

Russian
Commerce
with
Constantinople
865-950

so extensive as to influence acts of br Govt. &
to modify mil^y order of the Varangian masters
But the com, aft. fall of Khazar Emp & invasi^on of
Eur. by Magyars and Patzinaks, was carr^d. on
under obstacles wh. req^d. its extent & value, &
wh. req^d. much skill & perseve^{nce} to overcome.

and
Its Influence
upon
War
and
Policy

The old overlords & rapac^ous Var. Chpts^h by the
tr. invited from & att^k Const^h, wh. app^d. the
center of numerous. notes

Aft. a defeat of 865 Russ. peop. induced
hr rulers to send envoys to Const^h, to renew
com^l. intercourse, & to invite Xⁿ. miss^ons. The
com^l. relat^s of Russ^{es} wth Cherson & Const^h
were now carr^d. on dir^y, & many Russ. trad^{es}
resided in these cities.

But the Scandⁿ. rulers wanted booty.

Russian
Raids

In 907, Oleg wth 2000 boats savaged C^{ty} about
Const^h. In 912, hostil^{ty} ended by a new Com^l. Treaty

In 941, Igor made an att^k. Peace in 945,

the terms show^g imp^{er} attached to com^l of
Russians wth Cherson & Const^h + + + The

Inquiries
Effects
of
Lack of Union

attention has paid to int. of Russ to ^{the} shows the
pow. in country, At a num^r body of free cit^s were
closely connect^d wth com^ml^y prop^y of Russia
unfortunately for the pop., & munic^{ip} indep^{en}
of the cities, wh^{ch} enabled em to acq^u wth & cit^{iz}
was not joined to any central inst^{ns} wh^{ch} insured
good order, justice & mutual support. Each
fell sep^{ar}ly. ∴ wth sup^r mil^{it} force of barb^s
Varangians of Scand^{ia}

342-3

Centralization
versus
Local Self
Government

Apropos of Cherson & local self-govt: The
energy of munic^{ip} inst^{ns} filled Med^{an} & Europe
wth br^{ic} col^s. Rome rose to gr^{eat}ness as a munic^{ip};
central^{iz}ed arrest^d her progress & depop^d & w^{as}
Gr. B., wth her col^s & Ind. Emp., afford an instance of
sup^{er} of indiv^{id} pat^{er} & self respect, born of local
inst^{ns}, over a strict obed^{en} & scientific (mechan^{ic})
pow. confer^d by central^{iz}

But the respective merits of self-govt. &
central govt. are in course of vic^{is}itudinal dem^{on}
by U. S. & Russia

352

Flaherty's Greece II

The reign of Basil II, 976-1025, of the
Basileian dynasty wh. began wth Basil I, 867,
is a culm^{to} pt. of Byz greatness. During his
life, the Empire flew in a long career of vict^y, fr
the Danube to the Euphrates, & fr. Armenia to
shores of Italy

368

In 1031, reign of Romanus III, Sar^s. of
Africa & Sicily laid waste Illyria & Corfu.
They were still in habit of sending out large
fleets to plunder coasts of Emp. & by
govt. of the day found easier to plunder
terr^s. of Em^p. An old defⁿ own, for most soon^{ly}
disarmed wth body of the subj^s, leaving, if the
h^l. arms, by w^h. succ^{ess} must fiscal exact^{ions}

403

The capture of Otranto by the Normans
under Robt. Guiscard, in 1055 may be consid^{er}
as the end of the Greek par. in Italy (of the E^{ast} Emp)

439-40

With the death of Theodora, Aug 30, 1057, the
Basileian dyn^y. ended, & wth it the admⁱⁿtr^{ative} gov^{ern} of
the Byz Empire

449

On Apr 2. 1057, Isaac I, Comnenus rec^d
the imp^l Crown in Ch. of S. Sophia

455

The mid cl. in Byz Emp was a remnant of anc.
soc^y - a survival fr. a days of municip^l lib^y.
Many free cits cont^d. to till or land - many
also occup^d. in com & mfg^y. It was a class wh
filled treas^{ry} of Emp^{re} - tax^{es} yield little in a
state heap! by gr^t. nobles & imper^d serfs; & it
was a wld of Byz Gov^t. wh gov. it a decided
sup^{ty} over all contemp^l. for sev^l. C^{en}

The Byz treas^{ry} had large res^{ts} at a per^l. when
& prec^{is} metals - in the rev. is paid - "were extremely
rare in W^{est} Eur. A curious comp^{ar}. c^{an}. be made be-
tween a country in the respect, & in luxury, in
& contemp^l counts of Egbert & Theophilus. && It
is diff^{ic} to explain the rarity of & prec^{is} metals
in W when we remember that the Fin of Egbert's Domⁱⁿ
found its way to Const^{an}, & that byzants were the
current coin of Eng^l." It fail^d him to understand Finlay's
dript, but says it is to acc^t. for the gr^t. differ^{en}ce in am^{ts} of coin
in E & W. I presume it was because of W. prod^l. little to
exch^{ge}, & h^{ad}. before to pay in coin; also little com. ∴ little comp^{ar}
used of med^{ia} of exch^{ge} (Last pp. Vol II)

Beginning of
Decay in Byz.
Zantua's Empire
1057

—

Cont. Financial
Prosperity

—

Occasion
of this

After 1057, "the genl decline of civ^l, which & roads were fall^g to decay, & pop^l dec^d, it seems strange at rev^l of Byz. emp cont^d almost undim^d. Results fr. two causes. Ruin of pers^l of Caliphs remov^d a com^l rival in Asia, & a impro^d in cont^d of pers^l. On Eur creat^d. add^d wk^l for Byz mf^l; at same time & abund^t supply of prec^l metals, wh^l for two Cui h^d. Just^d pers^l of Emp^r, still cont^d. It is diff^c to trace & sources of th^s supply, but a fact is well estab^d

Decline of
Military
Efficiency

The depopⁿ of agric. dist^s - owing to a "miser^l" & a heavy taxⁿ - " & a high price of labor in mf^l & com^l cities, made Byz Gov^l more dep^t. on forⁿ mercenaries in 11 & 12 C^l as in 9th & 10th. At same time a rapid adv^l of th^s Eur. Nat^l in wld & civ^l made more diff^c for emp^r to buy services of best Eur. warriors. Hence Byz armies began to be inf^r to Wⁿ; th^r mil^l syst^m was Conserv, th^r of Wⁿ Nat^l progress^l. Normans, already sup^r in valor & endur^l, soon surpassed th^m also in mil^l accomp^l & pol^l scienc^l

Thursday 4
Political
Territorial
Disintegration
11th Century

"In attributing imp^{ce} to misgov^t of Michael & his
minister, we must not forget a gen^l tend^y of all ex-
treme w^{rs} in 11th C^y to sep. into smaller circles
of pol^l action." The roads were falling to decay,
and the trad^{es} of imp^l rule & civ^{iz} were losing
power; physical & moral causes worked together
for disintegration

40

Effects of
Sack of
Constantinople
1081

The sack of Const^{nt} April 1. 1081 by a
Selav^s, Bulgar^s & Turks in service of fam^{ly} of
Comnenus, Ducas & Palaeologus, who ~~had~~ cut
track^s into city was prologue to its sup^{pl} at
storm of Crusaders, 1204. From a former date
decay of w^{ld} & civic sup^{pl}, but as a Capt. has
a comb^l city

57-2

Excessive
Conservatism
of
Byzantine
Social
Order
1100

At end of 11th C^y an extreme spirit of Conserv^{ism}
prevailed whole mass of Byz. Soc^y, causing an attach^t
to stationary cond^{ns}. Thus by race volunt^{ly} circumscribed
its intell^t & restrained its res^l fac^s at a very moment
when Wth Eur was entering on a career of progress

58

Debasement
of
Coinage
and
its Commercial
Consequences

Alexis I carried a debasing of the coinage to a great extent. An alloy of the former times, & to the and kindred means may be attributed decline of Byz. Com. in Medⁿ. The credit of the medⁿ was the ruin of large quantities of capⁿ trans^d fr. the Emp. to the Italⁿ. Rep^s.

62-3

Expedition
of
Robert Guiscard
against
Byzantine
Empire
1081

Alexis I was pressed at same time by Seljuk Turks who had gained Nicaea by treach^r, & occup^d sev^l ports on Bosphorus & S. of Marmora, & by Robt. Guiscard on W.

"The spirit of enterprise wh. under religⁱ enthusiasm, carried bravest nations of W. to Crusades, led in the present genⁿ, from the conquest of Eng^d & of S. Italy by Normans. This raised the milit^r reputⁿ & self confid^{ce} very high, & Robt. Guiscard wh. was 1st of Normans in Italy far sup^r in val^r to Normandy, hop^d to eclipse & succ. of W^m I by conquest of Byz. Emp. & & In June, 1081, he sailed fr. Brindisi with fl^t. of 130 ships, & 30,000 troops, seized Corfu, & besieged Dyrrachium

72-4

Venetian
Interest
in
Byzantine
Commerce

Alexis Comnenus! Venetians to his assist, & they were bound to Byz cause at the time by their interests. They were alarmed that the lucrative trade with Greece & Levant shd. be at mercy of Normans if Guiscard gained possⁿ of entrance to Adriatic. They ∴ joined in a war without hesitⁿ.

74-5

The conditions stipul^d by treaty of Alex^{us} bet Byz. & ~~Genoa~~ Venetians, 1082, laid the foundation of a Ven. merc. cols wh settled in Byz Emp.

75 note

Philosophy
of
The Crusading
Impulse

Like all gr^t mov^ts, Crusades must be traced to many coincideⁿ causes, Pilgrimages, & Com^d relations suddenly rec^d a check fr. Turk^h Conq^s of Palestine, at a period when Soc^l chg^s in W. Eur placed new obstacles in way of nat^l emigⁿ & conq^s, like those of Danes & Normans. The impulse to such mov^ts was still active, & forⁿ employ^t c^d alone avert int^l rev^o. In the world a relig^o motive off^d a new directⁿ. Thus unity of action was creat^d as if by divine impulse, & as was facilit^d by fact that just at the time Asia was thrown into state of anarchy

94-5

Traffic
and
Transit
between
Western Europe
&
Palestine
at and before
Crusades
— " —

Pilgrimages to Jerusalem never ceased, even
during parts of first anarchy in W. Eur. Many
passed annually thro E. Emp. & Palestine. The
improved condⁿ of W. nations in 11th C., & a
aug^d com. of States, & add^d imp^{er} to pilg^{er}
The invasion of Seljuks inc^d & disorders of Pal.
The prosp^r of pilgrims suff^d as well as the p^{er}ty
The Easter fair of Jerus^m w^{as} of imp^{er} & most
Eur. nations, Gen^{oa} & Pisa fl^o to Pal. by
& Crusades, & a m^{er}ch^{an} of Amalfi had already
founded a Hosp^{ital} of S. John, whose serv^{ants}
became a bulwark of X^{ty} at Rhodes & Malta

Fleets of
The Italian
States

At time of 1st Crusade, fl^o of Italian States w^{as}
no. suff^{er}ed to transp^{ort} large armies to Pal,
had long been sole obj. of Crusaders; for in a
single battle wth Guiscard, Ven lost a whole
fl^o & 13,000 men, about 90% mortal wound
Genoa, within 13 yrs fr. Commenc^{er} of

Crusades, sent some large fl^o to Pal
The services of Com to adv^{ance} in mid ages were
g^{iv}g^{ing} on base of Chivalry

Seljuks
at
Jerusalem
1076

In 1076, Seljuks took possⁿ of Jerusalem
& immediately began exacting upon pilgrims. The
religious feelings of X^m were irritated, & a cry
for vengeance arose thro' Eur.

96

Desolation
of
Asia Minor
1050-1100

Now, perhaps, had any other fallⁿ so rapid
fr. civil to barbⁿ, or ch^d. A great body of inhab^s,
language, religion, & mode of life so completely
Asia Minor in latter half of 11 C^y. In a single
genⁿ as accep^d wh. a thous^d yrs he got into
crisis failed to do. Depop^d, roads impass^{bl},
w^h traps, wells choked all caused a
delay Crusades. 1097

109

Movements
of
Fleets

Commenced as
affected
by them

In 1103 the Byz. Emp^r was trait with collision
wth Crusades. The Greeks, already in contact with
Count into wth Mar. Ital. states, were by hostile
wth Crusades, excl^d fr. Crusadⁿ partⁿ of the of that
at time when he was rec^d. gr^t. extⁿ The Byz
army gained no adv., but the fl^t. Comm^d. det^d, & so
reduced Bohemund to gr^t. diff^y He, however,
form^d ally wth Pisans, who sent a fl^t. to aid. This
had a meetⁿ wth the imp^l. fleet bet Rhodes &

Fulking's Greece III

Naval
Movements
of
Italian
or
Byzantine
Fleets

Palatka. Result in decisive, but Pisans & the inj^d
by storm. A divⁿ of Imp^l fleet com^d Channel
bet. Cyprus & Cilicia, to excl^d allis of Bohemans
fr. shelter on Asⁱ coast, so that Prouci of
Antioch was closely block^d thro winter; for nav^l
of that time found to enter open sea S. of Cyprus

In 1104, Gen. flt was ordered to assist Bohemans,
with whose down^y Gen. had form^d com^d relatⁿ.
xx A large Gen. flt visit^d coast of Syria in 1098,
by Jer^m capt^d. In 1099 a Ven. flt. of 200
sail fell in with Pisan, but on way to Syria.
A battle foll^d, so that states were on at peace.
Pisani beaten.

116 and note

Alexis I
Dius
(Comnenus)

Alexis I died in 1118, his⁹ began to reign in
1081. He was succ^d by John II, 1118-1143. The
latter was engag^d in Const. wars, but a whole enjoy^d
an int^l secur^y took. by had on long straits. The
Byz^s had oppⁿ to remain or form^d com^d of imp^l
actⁿ

129, 138

Political
Action of
Venice
as affected
by
Commercial
Interests
1120-1130

Up to this time (c. 1120) Ven. had been firm ally of Byz. Emp., & to a degree was considered to owe homage to Emp^r. This count^y now dis^ord, & began disputes which took prom^t pl. in hist^y of Eⁿ Eur. The establishment in Pal. had opened new field for com[!] intercourse of Ven., & led in gr^t. meas[!] ch[!] dir^t of the mar. tr.; which freq^t. quarrels bet Grks & Franks forc^d trad[!] R[!] of Italy to join one bell^y. in order to gain profits in & ports. For short time, habit kept Ven^t attached to Emp^r; but by soon found the int[!] more count^y w[!] Syria to be Const[!]. They joined Ks of Jer^m in ext[!] of Anq^s, & obt[!] consid. estab[!] in all mar. Ts of the Ks[!] From h[!] the customers & allies of Grks, by became riv[!]. Hostil[!] began; Doge cond[!] num[!] fl[!] into Archip. plundered Rhodes, & next yr raided Samos, Lesbos, Paros & Andros. Modon also acc[!] by Ven^t, harbor of refuge on route to Syria. + + These w[!] hardly noted by Byz. writers, but of vast imp[!] to Ven. Place was estab[!] by Emp^r? restor[!] to Ven. all com[!] priv[!] poss[!] by was began

This war bet 1122-1130

Finlay's Greece III

Accession of
Manuel I
1143

John II succ^d. in 1143 by Manuel I,
who reigned till 1180.

Policy of
Manuel I
towards Pisa
and Genoa

Manuel recog^d vic^g. pow^r. of Ital. Com^d. Rep^s,
& made treaties wth Pisa & Genoa, & prot^d. Amal-
fitans, wh. had made col^l. at Const^{an} wh. the city was
taken by Normans. By the alliance, Man^l. sought
to counterbalance & sit. with Ven. had acq^d. on
Byz. finances an immense priv^l. so^l. on by
Alex I, as reward for services in Norman war
(1081-2); priv^l. wh. implied some loss in nature
much^l. A street of warehouses in Cap^l. had to

Privileges
granted
to Venetians
by Alexius I
Circa 1082

gov^r. to Ven^s, Amalpitans Comp^d. to hd. & sell
under Ven. protⁿ. & pay an dues. Ven. mech^l.
Exempt fr. Customs, & Ven mech^l. permitted to
tr. over all Emp as far as entrance of Bk Sea

No doubt the marked commenc^t. of ruin of
Byz. Com in Medⁿ, & the priv^l. so^l. in &
many abuses by Ven^s, & a consequ^t. disast^r.
so^l. nei even to hostil^l. in days of John II

Several distinctⁿ causes, however, pres-
ent. The adv^t. of Ven^s proving so entirely

& to Imp! treasury

rumors ~~a native market~~ as we m^t. suppose.

Checks on
Venetian
Prosperity

- 1 All forⁿ ships were as yet excl^d fr. Blk Sea
- 2 1242. Gov^t. int^l. monop. of Com. in grain and in prov^{is} of all kinds, bot imp^t. & exp^t.
- 3 Rents of shops & warehouses formed no small part of Imp. rev^{ue} in Const^{nt}^{inople}; do tis not easy to say how pr^{ic}is gov^t. to Ven. raised the rents of them

Decline of
Greek Commerce
1100 - 1200
to what desc

Still, there can be no doubt that proper gov^t to form
dec^{ree} 12 C⁴ was a principal cause of decl. of Gr.
 Com., wh^{ch} sh^{ld} be attrib^d rat^o to dis^t. effect of
fiscal meas^{ures} of Comnenus Emper^{or} (as to inc^{re}ased
 com^{mer}cial act^{ions} of Ital^{ian} corp^{orations} caused by Crusades.

Stipulations
of
Treaties
1100 - 1200

The pride of Emper^{or} of Romans, as the
 Lords of Ch^{urch} were called, induced them to treat
 Ital^{ian} Rep^{ublics} as municipalities still dep^{endent} on the
 Emper. of wh^{om} they once had been pt., & rulers of Pisa
 & Genoa so consented, in order to share prof^{its}
 of Ven^{ice}.
 Among various reciprocal engagements, may
 note that a treaty at Genoa, 1169, the duty on
 goods imp^{orted} or exp^{orted} fr. Ch^{urch} by Ital^{ian} w^{as} 4 p^{er} cent.

Customs
in the
Byzantine
Empire

but in other cities of Empire. Pisani & Gen^s would
pay same rates as other Latins, except Ven^s.
These duties finally amt^d to 10 p.c. For non
were expressly excl^d fr. Bk Sea to, by Gen. Treaty
(1169) save when by spec^l license fr. Empire?

154-6

Manual I's
Destructive
Naval Policy

In state of crisis of E. Empire, & finances
as in west Eur, were a mov^g par. of a Gov^t.
The central^{z^g} part of Man I had him^d
order sent to C^h all the money wh. Gk
Count^s Count^{ies} had been in habit of raising
for local gallies for mar. def. of Aegean &
Archip. For repairs ships had to C^h
But the money was devoted to other uses &
ships left to rot, so the com. of Gks was
exposed to small bodies of Ital pirates who
they wd not be dared to plunder in the waters.
The navy so was ruined, & soon followed suit
157

Foreigners not
permitted trade
in Black Sea
before 1204

A special license fr. Empire was needed for for^g
vess. to enter Bk S. until apt taken by C^h by
Crusaders in 1204
154 note

The Sicilian
Normans
sawade
Northern
Greece
c. 1147-50

Early in his regⁿ Man 1 became engaged wth
Roger, K of Sicily in hostilities. R. had collect^d a part^l
flt. at Brindisi, for purpose of att^l Byz Emp.
or of transp^g X^{as} to Syria. Corps was betrayed
wh^{en} by rebels weary of imp^l fiscal extortⁿ. Fr.
Corps, & Sicil^{an} adv^{nc} sail^d to Monemvasia, An one
of prin^{ci}pal count^{ies} of E, but was reb^{el}led by & pop^l.
Plundered coasts of Euboea & Attica, & turned W.
ravaged Acarnania & Aetolia, & landed troops at
Cressa. These plundered Thebes, & Oee Corinth. Ex-
cept Corps, nothing was ret^{ain}d, save plunder; but
fr. as pass^g wasⁿ decline of Byz. Source is to
be dated. Dur^g prev^g century Gre^{ce} had been uninter^{rupt}
tranquillity, & & Gr. pop^l had inc^{re} rap^{id} in noth & w^{est}.
It was in pass^g of ext. com^{er} & many flour^{ish} m^{an}uf^{act}. The
ruin of the m^{an}uf^{act} was ascribed to trans^{act} of silk to
fr. Thebes & Cor to Sicily, where it was encour^d by
Roger; but more correct to say at opp^o fin^{al}
admⁿ of Byz Emp^{er} did & destructⁿ.

Silk
Industries
transferred
from
Thebes to
Sicily

Roger cert^{ain} did estab. silk m^{an}uf^{act} in his domⁱⁿ
utilizing & workmen bro^{ught} back fr. Thebes &c, settling
them at Palermo, & encour^{ag}g^{ing} both them & his subj^{ects} to
dev^{elop}. Use ind^{ust}ries Roger was in adv. of his adv

Byzantine Greece III

Loss of
Silk Industry
to
Byzantine Greece
c. 1150

in encouraging internal development. By him
A culture of the sugar cane was introduced into Sicily
Upon a restoration of peace with Sicily
Manuel Komnenos I made an effort to
restore the silk weavers of the country, not
to restore the silk industry. It is not remarkable: the
A silks were permitted to transit to Greece & Italy

163-4

Change of
Course of
Trade
towards Hungary
due to
Byzantine
Exactions

Manuel I had an important war with the King of Hungary
He controlled possession of the neck bet. Save & Danube, which was
center of rapid incursions. To avoid fiscal exactions of
Byzantine, much of the trade which had once come by
Cherson & Trebizond to Constantinople now avoided the
Empire, & passed along the northern shores of Caspian & Black
Seas, over territory of Patzinaks, to Zeugma. Thus
Commerce of the Balkans was declined in the north as well as south. The
Patzinaks, Russians & Hungarians became the
rivals in commerce by land, as Venetians & Genoese
& Genoese were by sea; while Jews and Lombards
were beginning to supplant
them as capitalists

Capture of
Zeugma

Zeugma taken by Manuel, 1157

173-4

War between
Hungary
and
Byzantine Empire
1151-1168

In a campaign in 1166 Manuel Comg. all
ctry bet Save and Danube; with a second army
subdued all Hungarian Dalmatia

177

Peace was concluded in 1168, Hungary ceding
Zelazum, Scrimin & Dalmatia. The battle of
Zelazum in 1166 was one of the last great
victories won by Byz. Emp. Its splendor was
begin to wane & was rap^{ly} obscured, never to recover

179

Effect of
Conquest of
Dalmatia
upon
Venetian Feud
— 11 —

The conquest of Dalmatia alarmed Ven, &
made prob. a war wth Emp. In its state of feeling
Manuel, in conseq of some tumults bet. Ven^s &
Lombards, at C^hle, imposed new restrictions on
Ven^s. Trautner, however, died; & in 1171 he would
all Ven^s in his domⁿ. He arrested & his prop^s
to be sequest^{ed}. Hence War

War between
Venice and
the Empire
1172-74

In 1172 the Doge sailed wth 100 galleys &
20 carracks to attack & rec^t. conq^t of Emp. in
Dalmatia. Trau & Ragusa were takⁿ. & Byz
forces soon expelled fr. all Dalmatia. His attempts
in Archep much less fortunate; Ven^s everywhere showed
gr^t. animosity to Ven^s, whose Com^t. priv^s had

Wealth of Nations I (1)

8 (Contract with Smollett's picture of world-chemists
x11; apparently though amount of products equal
the water reactions make the money) § 95

19-23 water-carriage

Stock is stored up labor

Rent is interest on borrowed land

Land owned is stock; it is also stored
up labor; either by purchase, which

is made with money - stock - or else

by conquest discovery any of which
are simply forms of labor

II

7, This remark about the advantage of foreign
trade maybe correct, altho the reasons ~~support~~
supporting it be erroneous. 19-20 For. Trade.

26-7 I doubt here a little. 36 The Dutch still(?)
the great carriers of Europe. Dutch still the principal

then (1654) the only (?) ^{salt} fish suppliers of our
72 Govt of Holland

72, 165-170, 174, 178 (note that Ploeger's
note contradicts Smith's text.) 186

I wonder would it be a correct statement
that goods on a voyage are idle stock
through so many days - except supporting
the labor of the ship's company -

Again, is not the carrying trade, even
thus viewed, something more than a necessary
evil? Is it not a means to distribute wealth
by employing a number of men as carriers?

190 - Does not Smith leave somewhat out of account
the political benefit of tying the Colonies to Mother Country

191, 191-2 Herein we have, perhaps, summarized the
causes of England's ^{economic} growth & prosperity & wealth via increasing -

Note that unimpaird freedom of commⁿ: internal, the =
cheapest intl commⁿ: is a predominant cause; & this cause
applies also to all commⁿ: extⁿ: & intl

197, 208-9, 210, 213, 215, 221

334, 335, 337-8, 338, 340, 341, 343
345, 346-7, 350, 352, 376

383. In connection with cond. intercourse
 by the alps, it is to be noted how continually
 the alps were traversed by military expeditions
 or by political movements

386-7 This prevalence of the Roman lead
 doubtless powerfully contributed to a
 basic unity of idea - of popular opinion
 in Europe - not in Germany only, but
 in Europe also

388 Note: Empire of Papacy / Complementary
 (in idea), not antagonistic

389 Distinction without difference

304, 307, 308, 309-12 (The election of Max
notable in this, that the electors conscious more or
less of the danger now surrounding Germany, departed
from the palatine tradition wh. had made Emperor
an important prince, & chose for that unifying
post in disintegrated Germany the most
powerful of her princes)

315, 325, 327

332 (the trouble here is that religion when
truly apprehended, realized, & embraced so
takes possession of a man's affections & permeates
his life, that it is extremely difficult to
detach it ^{from influence & activity} from action not only in a
legitimate but even an illegitimate way.
It requires the choicest intellectual &
moral - spiritual - insight to do so, and
such insight is with the mass of men
not instantaneous (for that is genius) but
graded in the life of the individual &
of the race)

Bryce

33, 49, 50-51, 52 (compare with Stubbs's period of rights), 57, 62.

70-75 Read at least, if not copy

76-9, 79, 123, 123-4, 127 & notes, 130

132 (the sea + the mountain, the baronless & the locally narrow) 157 (Burgundy)

Is not the essence of feudalism local independence, held on the terms of a tribute, out of money payments, if at all, but of military service -

Is not feudalism the opposite pole of centralization

162. Rome, divide et impera, 164-5, Hohenstaufen

176, 176-7, 179-80 (Towns), 195, 199-200,

201, 210, 210-11, 211, 212 (1st Interim) 213

214, 215, 223 (Power of cities, + final dictum) 224

231-2 (No of Electors) 239, 275, 281

Bayliff's Venice vol I

Casually noted, 541-2, 645-

800-07

Brown's Venice

30, 41, 65, 66 (note the command of
 months of rivers - Poeneta, Pease, Sile, Sissura)
 68-9, 79-81, 92, 94, 96 (note that from
 the beginning to the end Venice is essentially eastern; her
 importance & her policy depend on that fact), 116,
 130, 131, 132 (Coron, Corfu, Crete, bases
 on which a great Ven Navy at that critical point which
 a heartland (in this case Sth Penn) always is) 134,
 152, 157, 158-9, 160-1, 162-4, 233-4,
 236 (note as prophetic, preference for Austria over a Broth Mass
 237-8, 239-40, 248-9,

250-54 (It will be interesting to inquire how topographic features affected land routes, especially transalpine e. g. plain country with rivers north of Venice; north of Geneva & Bern, then country comparatively rugged as compared with lower Po; then Alps etc. Also question of distances, and of rivers as more or less navigable)

— u —

261 - There is much here that suggests a parallelism with Holland

— u —

263, 263-5, 290, 324-5, 325-6, 340-1,
341, 343, 347, 347-8, 349

Friday's Greece III

robbed him of much of the tr. Dage saw no chance of permitt. Cong^s in Archip or Aegean.

War of the
Empire with
Venice

1172-74

Mech^{ts} of Ven soon felt loss of C^h tr, & Senate began to fear it or privs wd be ext^d to Pisans & Isen^s. The following year 1173 saw other mishaps to Ven, & both parties being dis-
posed to peace, terms were reached in 1174.

The Ven-privs were restored, & an indemnity for property sequest^d.

181-83

End of the
Byzantine
Empire
1204

— " —

Succeeded
by Empires
of Constantinople
(Latin), Nicaea
and Trebizond

With the storm of C^h by X^{an}, 1204, ended the Byz phase of the Eⁿ Roman Empire. Many new states were formed to its territory, as had be^{happ'd} in fall of Emp. of W. These of the assum^d rank of Emp^s; & the Belgⁿ Emp. of C^h found itself comp^d to disint^r & honor of repⁿ & Rom. Emp. of E. wth two ^{brk} soons, who tk the Imp^l title at Nicaea & Trebizond

Most of the Europ provs were sub^d to new ^{codes of} laws, & had to adapt new habits & manners. The feudal system was imposed on Greece, & a caused ht. of the Hellenic race

Protracted
Subjugation
of Greece

never again recov^d indep^{ce}, but when a part of its
feudal Pr^s & of mast^s, Ven^s, Gen^s, & Katz^s of S.
John, declined it pass^d under Ottⁿ domⁿ.

Limited
Extent
of Nicaea

The Crk Emp. of Nicaea, when apt. he had
expelled the Belgic Emp. fr. C^hle (1261) never
ext^d his pow. over more than a half of Crk natⁿ

276-7

Michael VIII
of Nicaea
Plans Reconquest
of
Constantinople
1259-61

The succ. campaign of 1259, & a capt^y of 6 Pr^s
of Achaia, dep^d Latin Emp. of its most useful ally.
Michael VIII, (Palaeologos) us^d. As farth opp^d to
attemp^t reconq. of C^hle. Emp^r Baldwin II took
weak to def. wth own resources; & Ven^s no longer
poss^d. Ot comb. of sea wh enabled him to introd.
succors dur^g siege, fr Ven. & Gen. An engaged
in a fierce war, disting^d. by succⁿ of bloody naval
battles. x x x In 1260, attk^s. were repulsed &
truce for one yr bet. C^hle & Nicaea

- 340-1

Michael VIII's
Treaty
with Genoa
1261

In spring of 1261, M VIII signed treaty wth
Gen., renew^d all concess^{ns} of Emp. Manuel (1143-80),
BA p^{ts} engag^d to maintⁿ a war wth Ven. Mich., in
case of recov^d C^hle, promised to gv. Gen^s palac^e, castl^e,
ch., & domain then held by Ven^s, & Gen^s promised a fl^t

Finlay's Greece, 111

Concessions
of
Black Sea Trade
to
Genoese
1261

to aid in conquest. By the treaty & conv. of 1238,
binding Ven & Gen not to ally themselves wth Gk
Emp, save by mut. consent, was annulled, &
the foundn laid of a grt. com. ascend. wth Gen's
acq. in Bk Sea. By it Emp. engaged to gv.
Gen's poss. of city & pt. of Smyrna, & to close
Bk S. agt all W. nations except Gen's & Pisano

341 (and note 5)

Date of
Recapture of
Constantinople

Constantinople was re-taken by Greeks
July 25, 1261. Latin occup. had been 57 yrs
3 mos, 11 days

344, note

Fallen
Material
Condition
of
Constantinople
during
Latin Empire

City had fallen grtly in wealth & splendor under
feudal govt. of Latins; & it was not dest'd to
regain former pop. & rank as empress of X.
cities under Palaeologoi. The X. & Ven. too
desty. as well as plun. anc. City; & the Gk
city of Ps. cd. hardly bear comp. wth Genoa
& Venice. x x x The state of city attested a
barbarism of feudal nobles, & a misapp. of
feudal org. to direct complic'd machinery of civil
adm. for needs of a crowded & wretched pop.

350-1

Misdirected
Efforts of
Mamuel
towards
Sea Power

Which Michael VIII on one hand made propⁿ
unconscious & improv^d his subj^s, he tried by all ar-
rang^{ts} to inc. Turk. popⁿ of Cap^t, in order to
counterbalance bold & influence of For. tr^{ds}. Many
riches of Archip. were induced to emig. to Ch^h,
& a col^y of Laconians fr. Monemvasia, wh^o
the suppl^t imp^l ft^t wth best seamen, was
settled in Golden Horn. But war, not Com,
was M's obj; & which trying to inc. means to
recruit A & N, he allowed Gen^s to prof^t by
his pol. errors, to make Osens masters of
Com. of Bk S. & of ft. pt. of carrying tr. of Ch^h

353

Quarrels
between
Grecians and
Venetians
at
Constantinople

When Michael remained Ch^h he found consid
pt. of tr^{dy} popⁿ consist^d of Vens, estab^d in E.
as perm^t col^{ts}. One reading trans^f alleg^{ce} fr
Latin Oth. Emp & Michael fr. Am protⁿ in
his lawful pursuits, as he also did to Pisans.
But Vens thought all Vens sh^d be expelled,
to allow Am full benefit of the treaty. Michael
refus^d & do so, & behaved wth violence &
riot in streets of Cap^t.

Friday's Greece III

Invasion of
Italy by
Charles of Anjou
leads to
Alliance between
Venice
and
Byzantine Empire
1265
— " —

The invasion of Italy by Charles of Anjou
& the pretensions of Pope to dishonour of crown, alarmed
both Mich^l & Ven, & led to a secret prov^o hostile,
& to form close alliance on pt of Mich^l wth
Genoa, ag^t wh. he now declared war. This
treaty is dated June 1265, about a month
before Char rec^d. crown of Two Sicilies fr. Pope
Emp. engaged to expel Gen^o fr. C^{ph} & not to
make peace wth him, except in concert wth Ven.
Ven^o engaged to hire galleys to Emp. & serve
even ag^t Pope, K of Fr, or Char of Anjou,
as well as ag^t Genoa Pisa, or Aragon or
any of its mt. all^y wth Emp. When
Gen^o concl^d treaty of 1261, by so far yielded
to hub. opⁿ of W as to exempt the galleys fr.
serv^g ag^t Pope & serv^g of spect^d Princes

355

Greater Power
of
Venice on the
Mainland of
Italy

The Pope had excom^d Gen. even to its limited
stip^m but he did not dare same wth Ven, as its
part on cont of Italy was so much gr^o. On pt of
Genoa

356

Diplomatich
Concessioni
made by
Michael VIII
to
Venetians
1265

In the art. of the treaty wh. relat. to Com., the Emp
neglect. int. of Gks; & which he made sp. concess^{ns}
exact. in return no more on the his Subj's shd
his free intercourse wth Ven, on pay^g usual duties,
& that by int. imp. & exp. such mech^{ns} as they pleased. xx
On the hand Vns were exempted fr. ord^g control of C. H.
off^{rs}, & to guard sp. trans on imp. rev, spec^l
quarters were assigned them, acc^g to art. of tr, in the
principal pts of Emp. Within the factories, Vns were
gov^d by the laws of Ven, & by their own magistrates.
They had full lib^{ty} to transport their goods by land as
well as by sea to all pts of Emp, without pay^g
any duty, being req^d only to fr. rev. off^{rs}
exact statements of val. At a duty int. be call^{td}
fr. purchasers.

Shipping
and Shipfy
Alliances

This all^{ce} of 1265 did not last long. New
troubles & wars bet. Gen & Ven. In 1275 a new
all^{ce} of Emp wth Gen^s. xx Some yrs later, the
were allowed a grant settl^{td} fr. Ch^h of Galata, where
they form^d a col^y wh. soon dep^d Gks of fr^{tr} pt of
the tr in Black Sea

Finaly Greece III

Hostilities
between
Venetians &
Genoese
1348-52
the Greek Empire
aiding Venetians
— 11 —

Cantacuzenos (1351) preferred adopt? meas.
to annihil. influence of Palaeologoi in Ch^l. This
c^d. be done only by driv^g Gen^s out of Galata, wh
he hoped to do wth assist^{ce} of Ven^s, who then were
carrying on wth Gen^s. A war called War of Caffa.

The Gen^s had drawn into their hands wth pt^y of
Com. of Bk Sea. The T. of Tana, or Azof, was then
of gr^t. com^l. imp^{ce} as many prod^{cs} of India &
China came to Eur. thro its warehouses. Gen^s, in
conseq. of quar^l wth Tartars, had had to suspend
th^{ir} intercourse wth Tana, & Ven^s had stepped in
to serv^e the int^{er} of th^{er} tr & prof^{ts}. The envy of
Gen^s had then to obstruct Ven. tr, & capt. Ven
ships, until at length war broke out in 1348

Genoese
Monopoly
in the
Black Sea

Union
Alliance
with
Aragon

The Ven^s form^l ally wth Aragon, & Catalan
fleet app^{er} on scene. Various Engag^{ts}, in gen^l
favor of Gen^s. Peace was again made bet^{we}n
wth Gen^s in 1352; confirmed all priv^lg^s priv^l
& encroach^{ts} of Col^l of Galata, & of wth Gen. estat^s in
Emp, & Turk ships were only all^l to tr wth Tana
in co. wth Gen & wth spect^l licence from th^e Rep.

The weakness of Byz. Emp, & of its mar. pow, were
its made manifest to all Eur.

456-8

Rapid
Reduction
of the Greek
Empire

1340-1453

I now pass on the remaining century of the
Greek Empire's existence, noting that between 1340 and
1358 its already reduced dimensions were still further
cut down by prolongⁿ of Serbia down nearly to G. of Corinth
In 1358, the Eur. Domns. of Byz. Emp were reduced to S.
of Balkan & E. of the Strymon, wth the Thessalonian peninsula
In 1401, there is only a little territory about the city of C^{ph}
and on opposite, Asian, shore Galata & suburbs, is
all the Asian terr^y left from 1340 onward

From the ^{Map} Geographica

Deterioration
of the
Maritime Power
of the
Greek Empire
before 1200

When Byz. Emp. first came in contact wth Wⁿ.
nations, its mil^l forces were num^{er}ous & well discipl^d, & its
navy led on for some time respect^{ly}, its artill^y & machⁱⁿ
of war were sup^{er}ior to those of X^{an}. But a gr^{at}. Ch^{an}ge took
pl. by commenc^t. of 1300. In int^{er} bet 1st & 4th
X^{an}, the navies of the Ital Rep^{ub}lcs grew more powerful than
that of Emp^{re}

IV. 41

Inter-Relation
between
Commercial Interests
and
The Crusades

Com^l int^s were not unconn^d wth the origin of Xth, & the
Com^l enterprise of the age was perhaps less confined to
attain. to Com a very prompt pt. in prodⁿ. the gr^t
exp^d ; but if all facts be count^d. Am wth prog^s. of
ti. be overlooked a very nice. idea w^d. be formed
of the various causes of its origin, Com. ex^d. almost
as much impl. in prodⁿ Xth, as the did in
imp^{oy} & ext^d & relat^s of Com. The roads w^{ch}
Early Xth folk^d in march^d. to Pal were the routes
used by the Com^l. caravans bet^w. Ger^y, C^h,
& Syria. This tr^{ad} had been very consid^d in early times
& had enrich^d the Avars & Bulg^{ms}. Fr. C^h &
Antioch the gr^t. road had always been much frequ^{nt}
until Com^l. Commerce in Asia Minor was
depressed by incursions of Seljouks *** thirty-
five years before Xth, Ingulf, Sec^y. & W. Conq^r
mentions it in actⁿ. to. Hilg^{er} & Ter^m, he
found at Joppa a fl^{ot}. of Gen. merchantmen, in order
of wh. he took pass for Eur. As early as First
Crusade, fl^{ts} of Ital Rep^s w^d be suff^d. to
transport large armies direct to Pal. Anacpi,
Pisa & Genoa all able to send large fl^{ts} as

Mercantile
Fleets
of the
Italian Republics
before
The Crusades

Effect of
the Incursions
of the
Seljouk Turks
on the
Safety of
Trade

soon as by head X_{day} were in presⁿ of Jer^m. The
Coun^t? Vnus & Byz^s are said by Anna Comnena to
be lost 13,000 in the naval defeat by Rost. Guisard, 1072.

But? are unimpaired. proceed? X_{day} , socⁿ had rec^d
a gr^t deb^t. & was h^t to be aided in, & prof^t by,
& mov^t. There is no gr^t. anachronism in to suppose
that coun^t. situⁿ of Ital Rep^s arose out of the expedⁿ
Their Com. was already so extⁿ that Coun^t. alarm
caused by cond^t. of Seljouks was one of causes of X_{day}
The caravans of pilgrims wh. us^{ly} rep^d to E., suppl^d
Eur. wth many commod^s, & aug^t price of sp^{ch} was
felt as a univ^l. griev^{ce}. The fair on held at
Jer^m dur^g Easter was one of gr^t. Coun^t. univ^l to
all Eur. nat^{ns}, & its mk^t. was in danger of being
closed. It seemed as if Com. of E., if allowed to
exist at all by M^hms, was in danger of becoming
a byk monopol.

The Scandⁿ. spirit of adv., the auct. superstⁿ of
people, & wth of Latin Ch, cruelties of M^hms, & a
Coun^t. necess^{ty} of times, all conspired to awaken in
them^{en} for something greater than ordⁿ. Comm^{pl}
wther, & wth this the Sepulchre of Christ gave a war-cry

Finlay's Greece IV.

Origin
of the
Commercial Relations
of Venice

The Com. relations of Ven arose fr. the wth links of Byz Emp. Dur^g sev^l ages Byz Emp^{re} consid^d Ven. as a vassal municip^l, not as an indep. city Even under Iconoclast & Basilian dyn^s, & Ven^s recog^d. & suzer^{ty} over Medⁿ as attrib^{ts} of Imp^l Crowⁿ. Indeed for nearly two C^{ts} & down^g of sea by Byz Emp was only temp^l disturb^d by a few viol^l catastrophes

Causes of
Industrial and
Commercial Decay
of the Greek
Subjects of
Constantinople
after 1057

Aft. extinctⁿ of Bas^l Dyn^y, Empr^{re} ceased to gov^{rn} by a syst^c hierarchy of trained off^{ls}, & under Comnenians assumed form of an adm^{ove} despoticism fr. aggrand^z of a few families. The Com^l & ind^l corpor^{ms} of Grks were now destr^y by fiscal rapac^y of Comneni. Grk. com. decl^d, & down^g of sea passed to free cities of Italy. Amalpi, Venice, Pisa & Genoa became sharers in the Eⁿ Com, wh^{ch} had been monopol^d by sub^{js} of Byz Emp.

Naval Power
of Venice
1080-1100

Twond end of 11 C^y naval pow^r of Ven was lost at when R. Guiscard invaded Emp. Alex. I purch^d assist^{ce} of Ven Fl^{ot}. by

got? imp. immuno D Ven com. at C^h x x
There was a Ven col^y at C^h by, but a privi^s of
Comp^d. made Ven a rich & powerful com^{ty}

Concessions to
Venetian Trade

The concessions as made in 1082 cont^d. thro
Byz & Turk Emp^s. For^m being the privi^s ayst
extortⁿ, & unprivi^s. Turk Subj^s were improv^d
The syst^m, of wh the charter was a pragmat^a, was
recl. by Ottoman Sultans & under the cont^d

Venetian
Retaliation
through
Superior
Sea-Power
1122-26

Owing to freq^{cy} of street disturbances &
a insolence of Ven^s. John II (1118-43) ex-
pelled a whole colony. Meas. were taken to
revive & imp^{ro}. In 1122 Ven Xth att^k
Corfu & plund^d. Rhodes. In 1124 same body
ret^d. plund^d. Lesbos, Samos, Andros. On
return to Ven. surprisid Modon & plund^d.
Coast of Morca. In 1126 another body of Ven^s.
conq^d. Cephalonia. The Emp^r, finding self
unable to contest sea wth Ven alone, or even
to def. his coasts made peace & restored all
former privi^s.

Finlay's Greece IV.

Relations of
Manuel I
with Italian
Republics

1148 -

In 1148, when Manuel succ^d. John II, he, in
order to obtⁿ. act. assist^{ce} fr. Ven in war wth K. Roger
of Sicily, conf^d. charters of his fath^r & grnd fath^r, so th^t
immunities of Ven^s were uply becoming more burdens^m
to th^e Gr. to Emp. The insol. of Ital^s & envy
of Gr^s caused violent hatred, wh. brk into bloody
quarrels at siege of Corfu, 1149. * * * For many
yrs. value of th^e alliance was so gr^t. wth Rep & Emp, th^t
Manuel endured all; but to counterbalance, in meas,
th^e overbearing pow. of Ven^s, he gr^t-^d com. priv^s,
& gr^t-^d for col^s, to Pisans & Genoese. He th^t
dem^d. exorb^t. gains of Ven^s, wthout brk^g. treaties,
th^t by ven^s exempt fr. imp. duties, whereas Pisans
h^d to pay 4 p.c., & Gen^s same as nat. Gr^s m^{ch}ts,
viz: 10 p.c. And treaty of 1155, wh. bound Gen^s
Gen^s st. of estat^s. wth. at Ch^{le}, bound th^e col^s
to mil^l serv. in def of Emp. Amalfitans h^d
th^e long bn estat^s in Emp, but under Venth control

Treaty
with
Ancona

When th^e crisis, Manuel looking th^t allies
made treaty wth free city Ancona. Also demanded
abd of fealty fr. Ven^s permit^{ly} used^t in Emp.
Proposed also to make th^e response. th^t good

behavior of Genk? Ven. med¹⁵ These men excited
 Jeal^s of Ven Govt. who req^d. help in th war wth W^m 11
 of Sicily 1167. The cont^d insurrection & riots provoked
 Emp at last wth sequent^s of 1171, before mentioned
 wth results 77-9

Piracy of
 Italians
 in
 Aegean

These alternating cond^{ns} of all^{ies} & host^{ies} cont^d
 thro last half of 12 Cth "Piracy was carried on by
 Ital merchant-nobles in Aegean on a scale resembling
 th priv. wars of gr^t. feudal nobles of W^m Eur

80

Treaties of
 Alexius III
 with
 Venetians

In 1199 Alex III made off & def all^{ies} wth
 Ven on same cond^{ns} as his bro^r Isaac in 1187
 "Ad us Fium Veno poss^d ext. tr. over whole Emp,
 & num^s. cols of Ven merch^{ts} settled in all gr^t.
 mar. cities, exclud^g nat^s for most lucrative br^{ch}
 of for. com." "The ult. result of priv^{ts}. A Ven
 Govt & Pisans w^o to dep links of any share in E^m
 tr. "The grow^g. jeal^{ty} of Grks "prov^d. made Vens feel
 necess. of mind^g or poss^d more secure by acq^g. poss^{ns}
 in Archip. For to 4th Xth de off. an off^g.

Venetians
 Contemplate
 Territorial
 Acquisition

81

Friday's March IV.

Venetian
Acquisitions
after
the fall of
the Byzantine
Empire
of
Constantinople

1204 -

After Latin conq. of Jerusalem C^h, Emp. was
partit^d. In C^h Ven were but in possⁿ of
qt. far more ext than it held under Gr. Empl., &
within it they were gov^d by their own magis^{ts}
as tho in a sep. city

Boniface, marg^s of Montferrat, rec^d in
first inster a feud^l K^g^m in its Ad. prov^s;
but, to be nearer suppt. to his her^l prin^{ts}
in Italy his share was ult^y transf^d to prov.
of Macedonia, & he rec^d. Thessalonica for cap^e,
with title K of Saloniki. But by his share
determ^d to his subjⁿ, he made priv. treaty
with Ven^s ced^d on all his possⁿ acq^d
by Xth. Portent^l & his rec^d prom^s of
C^h for young Alex IV, & assent^l his for
had rec^d. grant of K^g^m of Thess^{alia} for Empl.
Manual, he ceded C^h, Thess^{alia} & other prov^s
to Ven^s, who bound himself to pay him 1000
marks silver & to gr. him terr^l in W^{est} pt of
Empl. for his share of 8 parts

C^h

Ven. Rep. in one way or other rec^d about $\frac{3}{8}$

Venice
do not
occupy nearly
all the
portion

of the Empire. Admitted many islands, were
in terr^o dom assg^d; but they made no attempt to
the possⁿ of course itⁿ of the share. Many of
the Greek is^{ds} were ceded by Senate & priv. acts,

— " —

on condⁿ of the Constⁿ. One at the own expense

Duchy of
Naxos

Remainder of Empire was parcelled among
no. of gr^t vassals many of whom New Constⁿ
kept as assg^d & & &. The most imp^t of Frank
possⁿ in Gr. was princip^{ty} of Achaia — sub-
stantially Peloponnesus

97-8

The Frank
Duchy of
Athens

In the Frank Duchy of Athens, one of the
spoils of the Empire, a description by the Span^{ish} Mun-
tana, who was well acqu^t with all the rich cities
round Med^a. (he? he with the Catalan exp^d about 1310)
& families too with most magn^t courts of Eur. He says
D^s of A were among the most gr^t pr^o. It did not wear
a crown. The nobles were so entirely Fr. that they
spoke as purely as Parisians. City was large & w^{ell}
m^{ul} villas. Aqueducts & castles fert^l lands
now unprod. ; olive, almond, fig trees, ^{variously} ground
now by want of water reduced to scant pasture

Friar's Greece IV

Conditions
of
Athens
under the
Frank Dukes
c. 1210

for nomad shepherds. Valonia, cotton, silk
& leather of Attica on suppl? nat mfs., &
surplus had high price in for. mkt. The tr.
of Athens was consid, & lux⁴ of Ducal Court was
celeb^d in all Wⁿ repairs of Chivalry. Gen.
mkt^s had prosp^t to at Athens, & shared
wth nat^l profit^s fr. silk mfg. of Thebes, where
richest brocades still worn

The post. of the subj^s at the per^d was not
of severe oppⁿ. Civ^{zn} had penet^d deeper into
relat^s of men in Gr. On in west of Eur, & its
effects were displayed in a excitⁿ of a mid. cl.
living in ease, & by decay of slavery & serfdom.
Though Grks were cong^d race, feudalism was
modified by its circ., & by pol^{ty} of Dukes in
opposing a mid cl., & producers of riches, &
spurs of a gr^{er} vassals 143-145

Period of
Latin Domination
1205-1456

The Frank Dukes were supplanted by the
Catalans, ¹⁴⁷⁻¹⁵⁷ 1308-11, & these in turn by a line of
Florentine Dukes, Acciaiuoli of Florence, 1386. In
1456, the Latin domination finally ended by expulsion
by Mohammed II (164)

Maritime
Significance
of
Principality
of
Achaia

The principality of Achaia, the Peloponnese, had a particular mar. value fr. its communication, situation & coast line. Therefore we find in it several important cities: Monemvasia, at the extreme pt. of the S.E. penins.; Coron at extreme of S.W. Pen; Modon, near Coron; & the Gulf of Corinth

Alliance between Charles of Anjou, King of Naples and the Prince of Achaia 1267

In 1266, Charles of Anjou, bro. of St. Louis, Congl. King of Naples & Sicily, by defeat of King Manfred. Next yr., 1267, Wm. Villehardouin, Pr. of Achaia, took B.S.L. to Manfred, purch^d. alliance of C. of Anjou by betroth^g his daughter Isabella, heiress of Achaia, to Philip second son of Charles. This alliance had powerful infl. on Fr. estab^{ts} in Gr., & imposed new life into Fr. Chris^{ty} in Achaia. It also gave new direction to pol^y of Latins in E., by involv^g them in a mortal quarrel bet Anjou & Aragon. The great adv. of Soc^y in W^m Eur was grad^{ly} diminish^g no. of men who lived by arms, & it was daily app^{ar}ent that feudal orgⁿ could not meet adeq^{ly} to new cond^{ns}. In its cond^{ns}, it could not Fr^{ts} of Achaia be suppl^d by private Pr. & mil^l pop^l close at hand, they could not resist assaults of Byz. Gr^{ks} on one hand, & encroach^{ts} of Ven^{etians} & Geno^{ese} on the other

Finalis Greece IV.

Emperor
Baldwin II
transfers
sovereignty
of Achaia
to
King of Naples
1267

The arrangt. between Charles of Anjou and
Pr. of Achaia was streng^d by a act of Baldwin II,
a deposed Latin Empr. of C^{re}. Baldwin by
Treaty of Viterbo, in return for prom^d. succor
fr. Ch^s, ceded to him sw^z of the prin^d of
Achaia & the Morra, wh. he sep^d. entirely fr.
Empr. of Romania, & rest^d. in crown of Sic^y & Naples.

— " —
The Prince
of Achaia
renders feudal
services in feud
to
King of Naples
in
Italy

W^m, Pr. of Achaia, became vassal
of his S. J. L. - that was when. He rendered
eff^{ve} serv. to Char of Anjou, at the decis
battle of Tagliacozzo; after wh. Char so him
a strong aux^y force wh. enabled him to make
a fav^{or} peace wth G^{rk} Empr. In next
yrs. aft^r ths, Pelop^{us} enjoyed tranqu^l. 205-6

— " —
Change of
conditions
in
Achaia
— " —
Greek Population
emigrates
in large numbers
to Constantinople

The condⁿ of G^{rk} popⁿ in Morra underwent
consider^{ab} change at ths per^d, ths his impress to
trace in detail causes of gr^{at}. change soon prod^d.
Com. of E. passed out of hands of G^{ks}, ths transit^d
to cities of Ital Rep^s & of Sp. Coast; besides,
many prod^s of wh. G^{ks} had enjoy^d monop^y, were
now raised, more & better, in Sicily, Italy & Spain

The men of IZAKONIA & MAINIA, (I suppose these to be districts in Achaia, ∴ no longer under Byz rule) no longer able to find employ^t. in milit. serv^t of Byz. Empr, & cut off fr. cont^l forays into ~~the~~ ^{the} terr^s, sought service in fl^t. at C^{ph}, & aided in ravag^g id^t of ARCHON, wh. were in possⁿ of Tr^{ki}, or coasts of Achaia now poss^d by Turks. Women, old men, & children were left as prin^{ci}pal inhab^s of mtⁿ dist^s of MORIA, where th. labor suff^d. to collect oliv^s, valonia, dyestuffs & mulberry leaves, & for weaving clo^s & rearing silk worms, & only occ^{si}on^l yielded any consid^l profit. in th. ct^y. Many entire fam^s however, left th. nat. mt^s & settled at C^{ph}

206-7

History of
Achaia
until
Turkish
Conquest
1300 - 1500

The subsequent hist^y of Achaia is a record of Anarchy, into wh. not necessary to go at length. It was possess^d by Byz. Empr, ravaged by pirates & finally passed into hands of Turkey, about 1479. The Venetians had obt^d. a foothold at sev^l places and had held Modon & Coron since 1210 (Hist^y Geog^s). At the peace of 1479, Ven. ret^d. Nauplia (at head of G. of Nauplia, or Argos), Monemvasia, Coron

Fulani's Greece IV

Final
expulsion
of
Venetians
from
Greece
1540

Modon, & Navarin; but had to cede Marina,
Vatica & Rampano wh. had bn capt. in town.
In 1500, Bayezid II cong. Modon & Corin, &
in 1540 Ven. Forts were drivn fr. all rem. poss. in
Morea, by Sulaiman, who took Neuphat & Monemvasia

268-9

Venetian
Commercial
Status
under the
Latin Empire
of
Constantinople

As soon as any pt. of Byz. Emp. was cong. by
X^{ros}, Ven. were reinstated in all com. priv. &
gr^{ts} bn by Byz. Emp. In add., the sett^l
in C^h was ext. to $\frac{3}{8}$ of city, in wh. dist they
managed their own affs. The Ven. Col. here
was very prosp. & his said twas debated in
Ven. & proj. of trans^g a nat. to C^h

Policy of
Venice
as to her
Transmarine
possessions

Insuperable obstacles withstood duration
of Latin Empire of East; but fr. many of the
evils Ven escaped by mak. its prin. terr^{ts}
poss. in E. dir. dep. of a state, sending V.
col. to acc. fort. cities, V. gov. to maint.
order, & V. judges to adm. acc. to V. laws

Only max. poss. c. be so treated, & even be
obed. c. be secured only by freq. visits
of fleet.

270-1

Power of
Venice
limited by
Deficient
Numbers

At com^t of 1300, influence of Ven. very gr^t in
Levant, both among Xⁿ & Moh^d nations; yet state
consist^d only of cities & is^l of lagoons. The possⁿ in
Istria & Dalmatia held by farrⁿ, not resp^d by cit^s
Popⁿ of Rep. small, duties of cit^s gr^t & various; to
win all by toil & tr, & to def^d it & state by arms.
The numbers were unass^t, & Ven had to hire men-
cenaries for forⁿ dep^{er}. Hence unpossⁿ for V.
to attempt to cong^{er} means of prov^d ass^d her by a
Treaty of partitⁿ

271

Importance
of
Crete
&
Venice

Crete was most val^u possⁿ acq^d by Ven thro
4th X^{de}, both on acct. of com^l imp^{er}, & as a
nav. statⁿ. It was a refuge for fl^{ts} at tr^d wth
Egypt, Pal^{est}ina, Cyprus, Asia Minor, C^{ph}, & the
Black Sea as far as Trebizond & Tana. Bought by
Mar^q of Montferrat, and gr^t wth not completed wthout
much struggle

271-2

Ionian Islands
Importantly
held

Besides, Corfu, Sta Maura, Cephalonia, & Zante
as well as sev. is^l of Albania, Acarnania & Aetolia
& sev^l is^l in Moria were ass^d to Ven. For various
reasons, the tenure of these was. gen^l weak & unprotected

272

Finlay's Greece IV.

Other
Territories
Assigned
to
Venice
1204-5

The N^w & S^w pts of Euboea & Cyclades
were also assg^d to Ven. Some id^s of Aegean
were never to Emp^r, & app^r some never!
to Xth. But whatever & orig^l distribⁿ, &
grt. pt. fell to Ven families, some of wh ret^d
or pass^d to 16 C^y

In Hist^l Geog. Euboea does not appear
Ven^t: till 1401; but Cyclades & Crete are
so from 1210 to 1464 inclusive

273

Relation of
Venice
to Modern
History

In grt. pt. of Greece, & Ven domⁿ forms &
Conn^{ty} link bet Byz oppⁿ & Ottoman tyranny.
The records of ot domⁿ are ∴ much woven wth Grk
hist^y. To understand Em, his necess. & obs^{er}

— 11 —
Contrasted
Character
of
Venetians
&
Greeks

& grt. pol. & soc^l contrast app^r. by Gr^{ks} &
stat^{ng} of & free republics at Comet 13 C^y
when they were bro^t into closest contact. Ven^s
were not so & stat^y Conserv perp by apt. became
so peop more enterpris^g & indept. Their indiv
energy as & chy elt. of pow^r in & Rep. The Gr^{ks}
were passive & unasserting, seekg only to keep &
maint^l adv^{ts} wh. they had. They were united to

Byz. gov^t by us pol. sympathy, but have passively
obed^{ce}. They were conseq prop^d to transfer same ob^{ce}
to another master.

Impulse of
Venetian
nobles
towards Indi-
vidual Terri-
torial Acquisition

1204-10

The individ. initiative of Ven. cit^z recd. at this
time (1204) a passiv^e impulse to terr^l acq^{ns}, in
conseq of a sudden part^l wh. they saw many of Xth
nobles fr. Nth Italy obtⁿ by a partⁿ of Byz. Emp.
The abstr Ven nobles were not dispos^d to toil for
state merely a com^d. far^{er} in mar cities. By
pursuing their own priv. enterprises in E., they exp^{t^d}
gr^{at} honors & higher profits, & they were sure of
enjoying gr^{at} pers^l indep^{ce}

Venetian
Government
Authorities
Private
Enterprises
for
Conquest

Cyclades

Reduced
1207

The Ven. Gov^t utrd as tend^l by auth^{ty} wh^{ch}
city to cong. any of a ass^l terr^{is} of wh. State had
not takⁿ possⁿ, & espec. of id^s of Archip^l, by
exp^{dn} at their own exp^{se}. But the cong^s, so fam^l
possⁿ, were to be held as fiefs of Rep, subj to civil
laws & com^d. reg^{ns} of Ven. Many Ven nobles
wh. had th^r pt in Xth were so induced to contribute a
gr^{at} exp^{dn}, wh. by mutual assist^{ce} or simultaneous
att^{ks} cong^d almost all id^s of Archip^l during 1207

Finlay's Greece IV

Cause that
enabled the
Venetian island
of the
Archipelago
to maintain
their independence
for so long
a time

It is nec. to take acct. of the crisis. We enabled
the Ven. nation to maintain its independence so long independ^t
in Archipel. The popes aided to some ext., as the
protectors of all Latins in E.; but the alliance
of Rep. of Venice, & the power of Ven. fleet, more than
the popes saved Duchy of Naxos from Michael VIII,
so naval protection may be kept off Genoa.

In estimating the basis of power of Latin West,
in Byz Empire we must remember that the Ven. who
suggested cong. of C^h, were induced to support the
undertaking by wish to obtain monopoly of Eⁿ trade; &
the cong. of Rep. were subord. to scheme of excludⁿ
every rival for Eⁿ trade. Monop. was obj of
all com^l pol^y in 13th C^y. Aft reconⁿ of
C^h by Gr^k Emp. in 1261, and the close
alliance of Genoa wth the Emp., these rival rep^{ns}
c^d. aim at monop. of trade in Black Sea; &
the islands of Archipel acqu^d. vic^d imp^{ce} both in
mil^l & com^l pt. of views. In order to excludⁿ
rivals fr. ports of Duchy of Naxos, Ven made
close alliance wth a Duke, & persuaded him to inclⁿ
to dom^{ns} in system of com^l priv^l & monop^s wth

Rivalry of
Genoese &
Venetians

Support to
Venetian
Sea Power
by the Islands

we applied to all the former settlements of Ven, & showed
no com. relations wth W^m. Eur save thro' port of Ven.
The mil^l char. of sev^l dukes, of the Sanudo family,
g^o. duchy more imp^e in eyes of Ven Govt.

295-6

Preference
given to
Venetian Com-
merce in the
ports of the
Duchy of Naples

Not easy to fix precise ext. of priv^l as ac-
cording to Com. of Venice in the Duchy of Naples
For. ships always p^d double duties on w^{ar}ts of exp^t
& imp^t, & many w^{ar}ts c^d. be exp^d & imp^d. only in Ven
ships. This clause was consequence of a st. wh. Ven.
claimed of excl^l nav^l of Adriatic, so that w^{ar}ts in
islands c^d. sell to Ven^s alone at pt. of the prod
destined for Eng^d & for Cont^l ports on ocean, to
Cadix & Hamburg. This Com c^d. be carried
beyond Lib only by ppt period^l sent to Venice
under title of a Pt. of Flanders. This Comm^l
system of Ven caused stagnation of ind^l in Greece;
Nat. trad^l est ruined, or forced into retail tr; all
great Com^l transact^l pass^d into hand of Ven^s. Who
left to Duke's subj^s, not- cit^l of Ven, only a trifling
coast^l to necess. & collect & carous at ports wh
Ven ships entered

Connection
of
Neapolitan Trade
with the
Greater Questions
of
Venetian Commerce

Finlay's Greece IV

Effect upon
the Cyclades,
Duchy of Naxos
of the
Exclusive Rule
of
Venetian
Commerce

The consequence of the exclⁿ of the Gr^k natives in
Duchy of Naxos fr. all major op^{ns} of com was a
gradual decline of all enterprise & of popⁿ; & the
dutch perhaps found consolⁿ in the thought of the
less popⁿ made insurreⁿ less prob.

The pow^r of the dutch as became so firm, & the
by gov^t oppress^{ed} about fear of revⁿ. Hence
final exact^{ly} passed a limit wh. permits wld to
be prod^l more rap^d on taxⁿ devours, with the
necess. disastrous results on final prosp^t

Changes in
Political & Social
Conditions
of Greek Race
Consequent
upon
Fall of Byzantine
Empire

In such ways overthrow of Byz^z Empire had
an immense eff^{ct} in pol. & soc^l condⁿ of Greek
race. In religion alone it rem^d. much^{er} & fr
more on 350 yrs Ven nobles ruled in many
of the Gr^k is^l, & fr 250 yrs Latin P^{rs} were
mast^{rs} of consid^{bl} pt^s of Gr^k Cont^t. Dur^g
of long per^d, & natives of Wⁿ Eur. were const^{ly}
adv^g in well being & civ^{zn}. Soc^y w^{as} quiet^{ly} lead^{ed}
& arist^{ic} org^{zn} in progress liv^{ed} popular, wh^{ch} has
gov^t pub. opin. some control over act^{ns} of even the
most desp^{ic} gov^{ns} But at moment when Latins
began to improve Gr^k began to decline in civ^{zn}
numbers, & nat^l importance

Diminution
and
Deterioration
of the
Greek Race.
after
Fall of Greek Empire

In 12 C^y Greeks were richest mech^F, gr^{stat}
mfrs, most expert mech^{em}, & ablest artists in
Eur. In 16 C^y they had lost br sup^{Fy} in arts &
mfrs, br ctry was improv^d & depop^d, peop without
ind^y, & natⁿ disorg^z. It is easy to trace progress
of the decl in J^{ty} of Archip. D^{ist} early per^d of
Ven rule, Greeks suff^d only usual evils of long^d
& heterodox rulers, not incensed in Xth ages. But
aft. Mich^l VIII (Palaeologus) had exp^d Latins to Crete,
Archip became scene of long bloody warfare bet.
Venus, & Greeks aided by Gen^s. Every Ist att^d K^d,
plund^d, peasants kidnapped to slavery in galley.
It. the true rapid dimⁿ of Greek race aft^r.

organized
Piracy

Due^y aft^r of Mich VIII, Greek fl^t pursued long
career of long. In 1269 Venus were exp^d fr. many
isls, & for 20^y yrs. Greek corsairs capt^d every mcht^t
ship or sailed without convoy x x x Sp^d soon
after arriv. in Levant to share plunder of Greeks
Rogⁿ de Loria plun^d. Andros Tenos &c in 1292
x x x when Ven^s first long^d. Andros, it exp^d. wheat &
barley; by mid 14 C^y Greek, Gen. Catalan & Seljuik
corsairs had ruined agric & wheatw^g ind^{ty} from Subola
299-301

Justinian's Greece IV

Prevalence of
Piracy

Venetian
Precautions
against
Corsairs

Many of its suppl. were more on Andros
xx The islands belonging to Ven. vessels were
depopd & by led to col^{re} to desert. pressⁿ by pirates
fr. Crete & Morra. The raids of corsairs fr. Xⁿ
nations were succd. by use of Turkes - Ottomans.
In 15 C^y portⁿ of Ven., by H^{FE} & fort^{fy}, prevent^d
Ottomans fr. long^g. Archipel, but was not always
sufft. to prevent plunder.

301-3

Position
and
Communications
of
Trebizond

The Emp. Adrian, recog^d & nat^l adv^g of
Trebizond const^d a well sheltered port. It & the
town & city became one of principal marts for Eⁿ
prod. Three gr^t. Roman roads conn^{ct} it wth rest
of Asia: one fr W^d. along shores of Euxine; one
E^d. to banks of Phasis; one S^d over the gr^t. mtⁿ
barrier to Euphrates, where, sep^d. into two branches
one by valley of Araxes went to Persia, while
the other led to Syria

Trebizond
under
The Iconodasts

After a per^d. of stagⁿ under the Rom. Emp^r
of E., the Iconodast Dyn^y restored some pt. of
the anc^t. empire. In the 7th C^y the Emp. T^h acq^d. add^l.
empire. It became cap^l. of frontier prov. called
the theme of Chaldia, & the center whence the mil^l. comnd.
pol^l. & dip^l. relations of Byz^z Emper^r were carried

on wth Xth Pr^o of Armenia and Iberia. The com-
ple^t change of a business & dist. fr Cth met^g
Gr. see rulers of T consid. indep^{ce} of actin

309-10

Effect of the
Inursions
of the Seljuks
upon the
Countries affected

At about the time when the Asiatic crisis
was at its height, the Byzantine Emperor Isaac Comnenus on the
11th Nov - 1057 - the arrival of Seljuks in W. of Asia
ch^gl. condⁿ of whabs of all cities bet Italy and
India. They swept away many accessories of civ^{izn}
& destroyed vast acc^{ms} of labor & capital, wh. affrd
means of life & millions; provs wh, a few yrs bet
or com^g nourish^d thous^{ts} of wldy whabs, c^d. sup-
port but a few fam^{ls}.

312

Estimated
Riches of England
1193

The ransom of Rich^d I, in 1193, wh^o was
reg^d. as richest King of his time in W. of Eur,
was fixed at 150,000 marks of pure silver

314

Course of
Trade to and from
Samsoon

Cont. int^l united by the Amisoi & Turkes of
Samsoon in close all^{ce}. This pt. of the coast w^{as} easiest
line of commⁿ. wth the pt. of int^r of Asia Minor
wh. ext^d fr. Italy & Euphrates, as far S. as Syria
The walls of S. conseq^g, prof^d. warehouses filled wth
treas^{rs} of g^ol^d value, wh. w^{as} first coll^{ct}d in cities
of int^r, whence it w^{as} transmitt^d to coast, for the

The Trade
of
Amisus and Samsoun
under the
Byzantine Empire

Turks hd fr. early after venis Com^l (?) Only the
Ottoman race has always been a tribe of warriors.
Prod. acc^{und} at S. we punch! by Exports of Amisus
who furn^d. ships & cap^l. see. for distribⁿ thro Russia
& W^m Eur. The cap^{als} & mar^{not} of Amisus dispersed
to imp^s of nomads, or clt of hair & wool, or
var^d carpets, copper of Tokat, & bull^t dye-stuff
of Caesarea, among the pop^s cities of Byz.
Empire & the Com^l Rep^s of Italy. They conveyed to
Alex^a, Tripoli & Tunis whence by cracked
Morocco & Spain; and to Bulgaria & Thracic
Chersonesus, whence they were transp^d by var^s
routes over N. of Eur & Asia, x x x Amisus
has now disap^d. but Samsoun remains

323

Rivalry
between
Trebizond
and
the Genoese
over
Black Sea Trade
circa 1300

The danger to the Empire of Trebizond was
exp^d. by the efforts of Gen^s to secure monop^y of
Black Sea trade, as well as to threaten it to
Turkoman & Mongols. The Gen^s had already
gained possⁿ of the most imp. pts of the Com^l carried
on bet. W. Eur & the Strait within Bosphorus, both on
Black S. & S. of Anatolia. These Com^l relat^s had been greatly
ext^d aft^r expulsⁿ of Latins fr. Syria, Pal & C^h; & the Gen^s cols at Galata & Caffa, by ¹³⁰⁰ turbulence

and act? of the past, made the danger? in? to a mar-
state like Trebizond, dept. on for. to. the consid.
pt. of rev?

Cause which
drove the
Trade of Asia
to Eastward
of the Caspian

At Aspin - circ 1200 - the ruin of Com?
cities of Syria by invasion of Mongols, & invasion? of
Caravan routes thro domains of Mamlouk Sultans (? Egypt)
& Popul bulk forbid? X_{ms} to the wth Mth, & to impose
of Eur. mch^{ts} pass? thro Syria & Egypt to buy
Judean Commod? — all these things conspired to
drive tra. of Est Asia thro & wide-ext^d domains

Security in the
Dominions
of the
Great Khan
of the
Mongols.

of Grand Khan of Mongols when secur? c^d. be
guaranteed fr. frontiers of China & Hindostan to
shores of Caspian & Bk S. At Aspin, mch^{ts}
c^d. wander safely wth the goods fr. Caffa, Tana, &
Trebizond to Samarcand, Bakhara, & oth depots
of Ind^{ia} & China prod^{ms}. The imp^{er} wh. As to acq^d
& the amt. of wth wh. it kept in circ^l. may be estim^d
fr. effect of Mongol invasion on Com of lands wh.
not be subj^d? far beyond the sphere of influence
Liberum ment? At fear of Tartars pres^t? whals
of Sweden & Denmark fr. send? or ships to fish on Br.
coasts, & the wound price of our wth of food in
152-3

Finlay's Greece IV.

Relations of
Christianism
with
Tauric Mongols

The vassal of the Gt Khan, on the Mongol throne
of Tauris, was a friend of X^m, & an ally of Michael VIII
of C^h & of Eup² of Trebizond. The pol. int^s of
Mongols of Tauris led on to prot^t com^d. intercourse
bet. X^m of Europe & the colonies of India. The
dang^r. value of a M^h of W^m Asia made some
dreaded Tartars seek by every way to dimⁿ & w^d
& resources of the richest countries of Iconium (Roum)
Damascus, & Cairo. The Gt Khan app^d the pol^t
of his vassal, who created act. intercourse wth Tartar
Emp, & sugg^d to X^m hopes of Conv^{tⁿ} Mongol soon^s
Many embassies fr. wh. much int^s infⁿ. The
com. of the best E. rd at the per^d. led to
route fall^d. dur^g. wars of Rome^s wth Parthians,
& of Byz. Emp^m wth Sassanides & early Caliphs

353

The Genoese
gradually
Empress
Commerce of
Black Sea

1261-1300

Treaty of alliance bet. Gen^s & Mich^e VIII, by
recov^r of C^h fr X^m (1261), & v. Amst. com^d. priv^s.
Subseq^t. Gen^s & v. Amst. com^d. priv^s.
C^h. Their own act^s & daring conv^{tⁿ} the fact^s
into a fortress, under eyes of Emp^r & a few hundred
yds. fr. his palace. Manufactories on N Shore of Blk Sea

The Genoese
Organization
of
Factories
between Black Sea
and
Mediterranean

soon became even more imp. to the Com. On it at Galata;
& it by maint'd for Caffa & Tana w^o of such value,
that Caffa became gr^o com^o fact^o, & most val.
col^o of the Rep. The adv^o fr. the col^o enabled them
to ext^d the com, till it far exc^d that of any other Part.

Attempts of
Genoese
to Control
Trade of
Trebizond

1300-1310

Their long chain of factories, from Chios & Phokaia
to Caffa & Tana g^o. the port^o to supply every
mkt. bet of Asia, Eur, & Af, quicker & cheaper
than the rivals - Pisani, Catalan, & Ven^o. When they
feared compet^o of these they plunged into hostilities.

At last the insolence inspired by monarchs of Black S. Tr.

For the time mean a revolt fr. Emper^o of Trebizond
all the priv^o they enjoyed in Empr. of Chk. They
already had an estate at Daphnus, & anch^o of T,
& they wished to forfeit the, & by mt. be indep. of
gov^t. at T, as they already were of Gov^t. of Chk

But in year 1306 Emper^o Alexius II, of T,
made treaty w^o Ven, g^o. them all priv^o hitherto
held by Gen^o alone. This gov^t. gr^o disast^o. to Gen^o.
who first tried resist^o by force, then sent an embassy
& when proposals of the were rejected, they resort

Finlay's Greece IV.

General, though denied additional privileges, continued to prosper at Trebizond

1310 +

to violence but with results most disastrous to Osleros. By a new treaty they were permitted to market Osleros, but without adal. privs. Mun- thers or ind^y soon regained their losses, & they became more partial to gr. to gr., while Gk^s industry in intrigue became prop^{thly} poor.

Decline of Trebizond

The grad^l decay of honest ind^y & growth dep^{en} upon Court favor for success demonstr^d T. as it has no cities & nat^l So Gk Soc^y in Trebizond was decadent & yearly grew worse

Piratic Activity of Sinope

In Mhdⁿ Sinope, all was drift. There was no mil^l skill for improvement. But as his force was too small for Const. Cong^t, Emir of Sinope gr. his attentⁿ to naval aff^s (whi^{ch} H. Barbary Sts) The Bk Sea was scene of enter- prise & very much. vess. or prey. The rich com. of X^{as} & value of Ital seamen made them a yet tr. of Wⁿ nat^l a profth but dang^{er} deep^{ly}. The much. vess. of the days had to sail in small flts, well armed & manned. In Arch. they were exp^d to H Seljuqk pirates of Asia Minor, in Bk Sea to Hae of Sinope. The Ven^{ts}, Ven^{ts}, Pisans & Catalans were always also ready to plunder on slight prov^{oc}.

Dangers of the Sea in 13th & 14th Centuries

Pracy ws. a vice of X^m as well as of M^m; the
diff^r being that wth X^m was a devⁿ to ord^r parents,
while it was chf occⁿ of M^m ships. x x x The oppⁿ
of Europe were usually ag^t ships of Ital rep^s; but if
they met us booty at sea by rapt^d X^m courts. In
1314, by plund^r suburbs of Trebizond
357-9

Last Days
of the
Empire of
Trebizond

Alexis II died in 1330, heⁿ reigned 33 yrs.
But him & Alexis III, a period of 19 yrs ws mark^d
by anarchy & civil war, with gradual declension
of pow^r. In 1349 Alexis III succ^d. to
them of Trebizond, & reigned to 1390, 41 yrs.
Amid universal uproar outside, T. enjoyed more
tranq^y & secur^y. On most countries. The transit to
in his dom^s fr. his financial resources disprop^t
to size of his tiny Empire. The most part of
neighb^r P^s wished friendly relat^s, for or sub^j
pref^d by to to T
385

Fall of
Trebizond
1458-61

There are no further details concerning T, of imp^r
fr. my point of view. The Empire ws finally
overthrown by Mohammed II, 1458-61
413

Friday V.

Ottoman
Customs
Duties

A duty levied on imp^t & exp^s value of $2\frac{1}{2}$ p.c.
when goods were M^h ownership, but 5 p.c. for Jews &
X^{ns}. This mod^t duty enabled com of Ott. Emp. to
flourish grth dur^g 16 & 17 C^{es}. The diff^{er} bet M^h

— " —

Preferential
Duties in
favor of
Mahommedans

& obs was easily compens^d by closer com^l relations wth
for. mch^t in dist C^{tries}, & by int. act^g & econ^y. The
X^{ns} ∴ kept grth share of tr of Turkey, as do by &
Jews were excl^d fr. war & pol^{cs} by ev. whole attⁿ
to com. The diff^{er} members of a family dispo^s
Ottomans in Ts of Emp., to collect & admⁿ. & fam^l
trade - as agents & partners; and fam^l relations
ev. guarantee for honesty, which to pers^l supervision
replaced & lack of extensive credits. Ev^{er} to make

— " —

Practical
Working
of this System

fam^l conn^{ts} a substitute for price of corp^{ns} &
guar^{ds} in a com^l crisis of W^m Eur. Anot civic
fav^r to of non-M^h popⁿ. Venality & rapac^{ty} was
always charac^d Ott. finance, & the opp^l of Porte
soon recog^d that a priv of pay^s smaller duties
hel^d int^s of M^h tr^{de} in oppⁿ to ^{the} imp^l treas^{ry}.
They were ∴ caught to favor & to wh. ev. &
largest returns - to treasury; & a hnt obstacle in
way of the ob. The pol^y of imp^{ed} com^l opⁿ by

Turks grad^{ly} gained strength, until Mehmet^{II} landed in con-
stant, & save time & diff^y, & sell prod^s to rayah meh^{ts},
who by gained possⁿ of the gr^{est} part of the Empire.

Subsequent
Preferences
extended
to
Foreign Merchants

Later, priv^{ileges} gr^{anted} by Com^{mon} treaties to form^{er} subj^{ects}
brought a change into Com^{mon} relations & possⁿ of Xth subj^{ects} of a
Porte, wh. inj^{ured} extremely both w^{ith} moral char^{acter} of
works. Fr- its time & hist^{ory} of Ott. Com becomes
a record of priv^{ileges} & for^{ms}, & of frauds of rayahs to
share the priv^{ileges}, or to elude its effects.

22-4

Comparative
Income of
Sultan
&
European
Sovereigns

In reign of Sulyman & Sot, the w^{orld} of Ott
Emp. was far gr^{eat} than that of any other Eur. State. The
ann^{ual} income of Sultan was gr^{eatly} estim^{ated} at 12,000,000
ducats, which that of Char^{les} V. fr. all his domains did
not exceed 6,000,000

50

The prom^{inent} features in the hist^{ory} of Gr^{eat} peop^{le}
dur^{ing} period elapsed fr. Conq of Morea by Mehmet II
in 1460, to Conq by Ven^{etians}, 1686, is the piracy inflicted
on inhab^{itants} of coasts, whether Mehmet^{II} or Xth, by Corsairs
swarming in Levant. Many depop^{ulated} places on coasts
of Archipel still indicate fear long felt by dwellers
near the Sea

57

Friday's Greece V.

Mohammed II
 reduces all
 territory under
 Orthodox
 Princes;
 but many
 territories
 remain
 under
 Latin rulers

The campaigns of Moh. II united the Ott. Emp. all
 the terr. gov. by Orthodox Princes, but even after he
 had completed his cont. conquests, no increase of terr.
 occup. by Grk race still cont. subj to Cath.
 powers. Venice ext. fortresses (as by) in Moraa,
 with sit. ids Corfu & Creta, with Cyprus soon
 to be added. Duchy of Naxos. Leucadia,
Cephal., Ithaca & Zante ruled by L. di
Tocco. Crete, after the loss of her cont.
 status in Black Sea, cont. & ex. caused influence
 in Archip as poss. of Chris, - wh. was held by
 Gen. joint-stock Co, - and as prot. of
Mitylene. KnE of S. John poss. Rhodes,
Ros & sev. smaller ids. Cyprus still gov.
 by House of Lusignan. This disjointed
 condn. of Grk nat. explains lack of an natl
 actn. & pol. feeling among Grks dur. these
 following Cens

57-8

Dur. war bet. Ven & Sultan 1463-79
 & hostil. fleets ravaged many of wealthiest pts
 of Greece, & fall of sev. Grk states, under

Venetian fleets
better than
Ottoman

practice of helping Ven, aided in the devastⁿ & Wh^l
Ott. ~~flot~~ ^{army} depop^d Ven. possⁿ on mainland, the ships
of Ven Island? Sultan's coasts & & The Ott galleys
manned by Jews Turks & Greeks were gen^{lly} far infer^r
to Vens. in war. eff^{cy}. These opⁿs impo^rd G^rk cities
& dimin^d no^s of G^rk popⁿ, but c^d not arrest Ott.
progress. & & The peace at Ven in 1479 relieved
only pt. of G^rk natⁿ fr. its devastⁿ.

Continuous
Progress
of the

Ottoman conquest
1463-1502

Almost immedi^{ly} aft^r its treaty M. II seized
A terr^{it} of L. de Tocco; & & but Zante was
left to Venici, in cons^{eq} of her int^{er}posⁿ, in 1484, on
condⁿ of a g^rty trib^e to Porte 60-2

In 1480 M. II besieged Rhodes about
success, but rav^d gr^{at} pt. of I^s

In 1499-1502 new war bet Ven^s &

Venici
gains
Cephalonia

Bayezid II. Vens lost sev^l pl^{cs} in Morea,
but took possⁿ of Cephalonia fr. Ott^s; wh. they
found so depop^d! At ^{by} settled ^{one} G^rk farm^s
wh. had fled fr. Morea 62-3

As slaves have always borne much
higher value in M^h ⁱⁿ C^{tr} ^{on} in Xⁿ, a firm^{ly}

Finlay's Greece V

Mahomedan
Slave
Hunting

Obj. of Ott. exp^{ns} den^d? 15 & 16 C^{us} was to
obtⁿ slaves, often rat^d on terr^l. cong^{ts} x x
Be & allee but Ott Em^p & K. of France, &
Turkish corsairs pushed slave hunting cruises
as far as Fr Coasts
63-4

Conquest and
Possession
of Rhodes
by Knights
of St. John
1310-1522

The Knt^s of S. John robbed & took Em^p
of I^o of Rhodes by a succ^l pirat^l exp^{ns} in
1310, & made it & capt^d of an indep. state
comprising sev^l smaller id^s. The Order
maint^d its posⁿ as one of bulwarks of
Cath Em. for 212 yrs, ptly by own valor
ptly by prudence, ptly by weakness of
Em^p of C^{on}, & at soon of Levant
by Ott. Sultans 2^d Cousol^r? Or par in
Asia Minor

Naval Effect
of Position
of Rhodes upon
Ottoman
Trade

The progⁿ of & Knts as sworn en^{ies}
of Islam, & a pirat^l spirit of the age
made exist^{ce} of Order a serious inter^{ptn}
to Comm^{er} bet C^{on} & Syria & Egypt, after
these were cong^d by Selim I, 1516-17

Maritime
Value of
Smaller Islands
belonging to
The Knights

These exploits of the Order were cause of great complaint
by Turkish merchants. Sev. smaller is. of Knts had
notⁿ of grt. mar. skill, & as a prevailt. system
of com. exclusiv. provtd. the fr. tradⁿ in prin^l. pts of
Medⁿ, by were drawn to hire. Their skill in buildg
small vess. of war, & bractⁿ as seamen, were much
esteem'd by the sultans, & Knts

Capture of
Rhodes
by Ottomans

Rhodes was takⁿ fr. Knts by Suleiman
Dec. 25, 1522. Nearly 1,000 Grk fam^l left
the island & took refuge in Venetⁿ. Crete.

66-8

War between
Venice
and
The Porte

1537-40

A new war bet Ven & Porte 1537-40
An attempt on Cyprus failed, but the Ott fleet under
Barbarossa wast^d is. of Archip, many of wh.
were subj^d, also coast of Crete. "The Ott. flag
was never displayed in so domt. a posⁿ over the
whole Medⁿ as at this per^d. B. cruised vict^l. off
Marsellis, & threat^d Venice in Adriatic. He
plund. 25 Grk is., burnt 80 Ts, & carried 30,000
Grks into slavery

By a peace, 1540, Venⁿ. lost all fortresses
in Morra, & the Sultan also ret^d. all is. Cong^d
by Barbarossa

68-70

Findlay's Greece, V.

Chios
under the
Maona of
Gustiniani
1346 - 1566

Chios was conq^d. fr. Turk Empire by
a pirat^e exp^d. of Gen^s in 1346, in same
manner as KnP^e acq^d. Rhodes. x x x The
Rep. being at that time too hard up to pay for
a exp^d. allowed it to be undertakⁿ by a
joint-stock enterprise of citizens. This com-
pany was known as the Maona, & as it
was new. Const. for Genoa & whay the money
& Co. was all? & remain in admⁿ charge.
The sovt^y rem^d. vest^d in Rep, as long as the
democ. constⁿ. rem^d. in force; but the admⁿ,
both civil & fin^e, belong^d to the Maona.

Donation
of a
Joint-Stock
Company

This govt. was for a long per^d. almost oppressive
in the Levant. It offers some pts of likeness
to Br. E. I. Co., & dur^g. its 200 yrs life, proved
it in pol. prud^e & mil^l. courag^e, a soc^y. of
suchst may equal royal Cab^l & Arist^e Senators

Chios became one of the prin^{ci}pal seats
of Ital. Com, aft^r X^{an} were drivⁿ. out of Palestine
Its mk^t were freq^{ly} even by Eng^l mcht^s

During first C^y of Spain acc^o, (1346-1446) popⁿ
over 100,000, and now over 100,000 sequins.

Commercial
Prosperity
of
Chios

Also a great monopol^d forⁿ to, still a fine flour^d in
a id. The principal arts of export insured about
supplies. Some arts were peculiar to Chios, others
of better quality than c^d be obt^d elsewhere. The alum
mastic, turbinth, wine silk & fruit were some
of what the Greek inhabs as well as Latin masters

Superiority
of
Italians &
Greeks

1350-1550

The energy of the Italians, who act^d prompt^{ly} in Greek
matters - dur^g more than a C^y by a apt cong^o of Ch^{os}
by Ott^o, compares sadly wth the apathy and
cowardice of Greek popⁿ. The moral infer^o of
Hellenes is conspicuous

Chios passes
under
Dominion
of
the Porte

The Maona became tribut^o to the Porte in
1415 - by cong^o of Ch^{os}. The treaty secur^d Gen^o
lib^{ty} of tr wth all Ott. poss^o in Eur & Asia
until 1453, friendly relat^o bet Sultans & Maona
The trib, orig^l 4,000 gold ducats was then raised
to 6,000, in 1457 to 10,000, & in 1508 12,000
By gr^t pred^o & by sub^o Maona succ^d in keep^g Const^o
relat^o wth Ott. Emp; but as its pow^r grew gr^t, & Gen^o
weaken^d & Rep in 1558 address^d its protest^o and Sultan
in 1566 annexed Chios to Empire

Findlay's Greece V

Capture of
Naxos & Cyprus
by Ottomans
1566, 1571
— " —

The year 1566 saw the extinction of the
Catholic Duchy of Naxos.

In 1571 Cyprus was taken from the
Venetians.

Venetian
Possession of
Cyprus
1489-1571

Venice had acquired Cyprus in 1489, by
act of cession from Catharina Cornaro, a
Venetian lady, widow of James II, & last K
of Lusignan line, who became Q at dth of husband
82

Lepanto
1572
— " —

The practic. result of Lepanto was that enabled
Venice to purch. peace early in 1573, by paying
Porte 300,000 ducats, & prom^g up^{ly} trib^y of
1,500 for Zante

Greek
Seamen in
Opposing
Fleets
— " —

At Lepanto, 25,000 Gks, who were the
consid^d best seamen in Levant, were either at
oar or as sailors in Ott. flt, & hardly less
thn 5,000 in Ven. squadⁿ. x x x Though under
fr. heavy mid^l pt of view, twas in pt a naval
skill of Gks at Ott. Gov^t ord. ease w^h it
replaced fl^t. lost at Lepanto

Nautical
Capabilities
of
Greeks

The peace w^h Ven enabled Turks to restate
br. nav. sup^{cy} in Medⁿ. In May, 1574

① Cap. Pasha left Ch^h wth 298 sail, & 20,000
troops, of wh. 7,000 janiss.

Such were immed results of Lepanto!

86-7

Greek History
from Lepanto
to
Candia War
1572-1645

During a 74 yrs. bet. Lepanto and the war
of Candia, 1572-1645, & Gk natⁿ disapp^r
almost entire fr. histy 87

Prominence
of
Piracy
as a Political
and Commercial
Influence

A prominent feature of Gk Histy in 15th & 17th C^{ts}
is a evils endured thro pir^y in Medⁿ & The
power & exploits of Corsairs ex^d. an imp^t infl.
on a com^l relatⁿ of Sⁿ Eur; by d^{ft} circum-
scribed & ext^d & determin^d & channel^d of tr in E,
quite as dir^y as pol treaties & com^l. Conv^{ts}
of Xⁿ Pow^r wth Porte. Not only were Gk wharfs
of coast plun^d, but br com. wth annihil^d. The
jeal^y of Ott. Gov^t rarely allow^d. Gk to fit
armed veso. for tr, yet mch^t will^d p^r. Double
to ship on armed ship. On oth hand, a prot.
pol^y & com^l. Envy of Xⁿ Pow^r exp^d any armed
veso, manned by Gks, to confiscⁿ in almost every
Eur. pt outside Turkey & Adriatic, unless seen of
armed protⁿ. by Sultan. The Ott flt only put

Greek Commerce
ground
between
Mahomedan
&
Christian

Finlay's forces v

Ottoman
Navy
neglects
Commerce Protection

to sea in ft. force for some definite exp^{dn} &
rarily cruised to prot. com. The wiscom⁷ of
Gks became so ft. At coast to us maint^d by
small boats, at night; but when pirates found
this out, they landed & plundered. Therefore,
vishubs forsook coast for interior

90-91

Knights
of
San Stefano
1560

In 1560, Cosmo de Medici, Duke of Flor,
instit^d new order, on model of Malta, for ex-
press bit of combat⁹ Turks, wh. he called
Knt^s of San Stefano. In its instit^{ns} grew
as much of pir⁹ as of Chiv⁹. Knt^s were a
seek adv^{tn} in Levant, but were not to over-
look plunder while at sea

96

These Knt^s maint^d well-apperd squad
of galleys under own flag, wh. with a fl.
ships of war, made quite a small flt. x x
No respect⁹ with Ott. on Gks prop⁹, or pirth
gangs did not compens^e state for excl^{tn} of
honnet cit^{ies} fr Ott tr.; still Duke wd not
purchase com^l treaty by disarming galleys of
Knt^s

98

Arabian
Naval
Activity
in Levant
c. 1594

In 1594, Fl. had 3,200 men serv^d in Levant
Some yrs later, a united squadron brit & richest
prizes by sea made with Lignyorn - the flt. fr.
Alex^a conveying & trib fr. Egypt to C^{ph}. Two
galleons, 7 galleys, 700 prisoners, & 2,000,000 ducats
announced as a spec^l value; but more profit fr.
ransom of wldy prisoners. At beginning of 17th C^y
galleys of D. of H. acct^d best in Medⁿ, & by
carried on war agst Turks & Barbary Corsairs
wth grst act^{vy}

99

Devastation
of
Greek
Coasts

These & kindred causes spread devastⁿ
on coasts of Gr. & dim^d no^s of Grk race. +
The Ven & Turks at peace fr 1573 to 1644, wth
kept cons^{id} navy for purpose of suppl^y serv^{ts}
but wks. nav. suppl^y more on at this per^d. In
fact, flts maint^d for the protⁿ were often & worst
opp^d, impressing nations & slave at war.

100

Characteristics
of
Ottoman
Navy

The Ott Navy w^{as} org^{z^d} to fight battles & to
effect cong^s, but a single ship was not fitted
out in a way suited to pursue Corsairs & to def.
coasts. The Ott had no love of nav. enterprise

Finlay's Greece V

Characteristics
of
Ottoman Navy

& the Htz were formed only because pol. necess.
imposed duty of maintⁿ naval force. The
African corsairs set pret^s of Sultan at defiance
as Operates of Dalmatia despised Ott of Ven,
wh c^d. not prevent ships of Segna plund^d
even in Adriatic. The grt ext. of Ott. Coasts,
& the grt. amt. of Ven prop^y always afloat,
held out too many induc^ts to Corsairs for
it to be easy to exterm^e them. The corsairs of
Algeris, Tunis, Tripoli, & of Catalonia, Malta,
Sicily, Greece, Tuscany, Dalmatia, all
plund^d by. indiscriminately. * * * Kings of
Eur knew a minimal pow^r wh. Ott. navy c^d
concent. for gr^t purpose, but Corsairs were
well aware of ineffic^y of individ^l Ott gallies,
when act^d sep^{ly}. The Ports c^d. repair
losses of depants cap^{ty}, it c^d. never adeq^{ly}
protect coasts of Greece

101-3

Moh. II closed Bk sea & every Xa Par.
Afr. capt^d. all possⁿ of Gen^s in As. Minor
& Crimea, & destr^y com^l estab^s, in 1475

The Black
Sea
becomes an
Ottoman Lake
1475

he occup^d. Caffa & Tana (Azof), & sit. depots
of br Eⁿ tr, & expelled Am fr. Bk S. From
As time Eⁿ X^{ns} were prohib^d fr. passing out
of Bosp^s, & den^d 16 & 17 Cui wth Xⁿ. Hay was
allowed to nav. Eux. All knowledge of
its shores was lost, its cities beyond sphere
of tr., & cities once frequ^{nt} by Gen & Ven
much fr became a region of mystery

Desolation of
Black Sea
Shores
and the
Decline of
Commerce

Ott. Gov^t has gen^{ly} allowed imp^{er} at fixed
duties, but has prohib^d expⁿ of necess. of physi
except by license, & has subj^d most of expⁿ
to restrictions & monop^y. Under its system tr.
soon langu^{sh} Cities of Bk Sea, hitherto rich
& pop^l, declined into ruin. Many sites were
desert^d. Cherson ceased to exist. Plains wh

Cossack
Naval
Enterprises

once suppl^d Athens wth grain, rem^d uncult^d
Ext^{ly} prov^d became utterly desolate x x In 1613
Empire was surpris^d by Cossacks, & Ott Nav.
was so weak it by capt^d two galleys wth consid
treas. x x In 1624 Cossacks ent^d Bosp^s wth

Finlay's Greece V.

Cossack
Marauding
1613-1671

a fleet of 150 small galleys, carrying each 40 men; marauded vic^{ty} of C^hle. Similar enterprises in succ^d years on var^s coasts of Blk Sea, wh did not cease till capt. Crete 1669 followed by peace wth Ven enabled Porte to send a large divⁿ of Ott. fleet to blk mouths of rivers whence Cossack boats issued on to plunder exp^{ns}

106-8

War with
Venice and
Capture of
Crete
1645-1669

The attack on Crete began in June 1645, & lasted nearly 25 yrs. Xhania capit^d to Turks in first year, but Ven. Navy maint^d sup^{ty} for most pt. & c^d not prev^t. Ott^s fr. throw^s in supplies to a garⁿ. in its place. In Sep. 1669 the Grand viceroy recd keys of Candia, Ven resign^d all rt. to it but not^d there regular fortifications, wth its ports

111-12

Mahom. II reviewed Com. of his Gk subj^s. He revok^d concessions of Gk Em^p to stat Rep^s

Commercial
Policy
of
Mehomed II
+
its Effects
upon
Greek Population

As restor^r, it took a share in Com. of Levant
unfortun^{ly}, corruptⁿ of Sultan's gov^t. soon fav^r Com
of for^m men on it quot^s. Pol. adv^r & bribes
obt^d. relaxⁿ of duties for for^m wh. nat. indiv^l.
wch^t c^d. not buy. So for^m Com. of Levant was
again transf^d to W^m nat^s, which coast^d to
be des^troy^d by pirates. Ven^l & Gen^l secured
Com. monop^y in Ott Emp, & made recip^t
of it, gov^t by Om a Sultan's Subj^s, an empty
priv^l. Still, & auth^r of Turk^l gov^t. levat^d. wch^t
to raise the Com. higher on under the
Emp^r, & to mat^r into of boatmen & petty mch^t
were brnt^d by the cong, so not so much as the
agric^l Com^{ty} x x x Unfortun^{ly}, every cause it
enabled peop^l to better th^l couldⁿ, pro^d a moral
& soc^l debastⁿ of the Hell^l race. The dimin^d popⁿ
lived in plentiful ease wth little labor. Olives, oil,
fruit, wine, & silk were abund^t. The plains easily
grew wheat gov^r supplies for Egypt. Venice dep^d on
Ott-Empire for gov^r part of wheat consumed
in 16 + 17 Cui; & Fr. often suppl^d the lack

Finlay's Greece V

to imp^t wheat from Ott. Downs

Wine, oil, soap, cheese, salt,

Articles of
Greek
Commerce
with Western
Countries

morocco leather, dyings, matls, fruit,
flax, cotton, silk, & valonia were imp^d
into Italy, as well as grain. Cattle &
grain were imp^d to Sicily & Marseilles,
from Morra & Italy, at least 17 C^y.

Currents imp^d to England in large quantities
at begin^g 17 C^y English ships visit^d
both Zante & Cephalonia; & at latter p^t
Exp. duties to Ven. for currents alone,
to amt. of 40,000 scudi yrly

126-7 & note

Some
Particulars
of
Greek Commerce
15th - 17th
Centuries.

The trade of the Greeks had been ruined by partial
oppression of the Greek Empire. Under former govt. of M II
a better prosp^t op^d. They not only occ^d. ports
Aro his downs, but forⁿ. states were compelled
to admit them under Sultan's flag, to ports whence
they had been excl^d. den^d. Greek Empire. In early 16 C^y
Ancona was crowded with those under Ott flag, & its
exchange filled with Greek & Turk merch^{ts}, some of

whom were said, by Ven. rivis, to do a bus^s of 500,000
ducats ann^y. In 1549, 200 Turk fam^s were settl^d
in Ancona. Barcelona also had consid^r to, in
road of Levant, wth Ragusa, Rhodes & Cairo
The long wars of Spain wth Ott. Emp. prov^d dir^t
to, but two fiscal pol^y of Phil II, not a extens.
of Sp. com. wth Am., wh. at last ruined Catalan
to wth Levant.

Turk meh^r trav^l to Azof, Moscow
and Antwerp, when the Janis were st^r. They
were dress of Turks, find^g it in W^m Eur by
were more suspect^d. as Meh^r On as Eⁿ. Schimtes.
The mid cls in Ts were usd at 6s per^d. Dup^r. in
mid^g & same in W^m Eur. Var^s imp^d art^s were
for two C^{us} imp^d sent^g fr. Ott down^s & to other,
partic^l Camlets, rich brocaded silks, embroid^d
scarfs, Turkey carpets, leather & yarn; besides An-
gora wool, cotton wool, raw silk, Flax, hemp,
in addⁿ & usual prod. expt^d at pres^t. day fr.
Levant, S^m Italy, & Sicily. By mid 17. C^y
Manchester men had already turned attⁿ to cotton

Friday's Greece V

Some
Particulars
of
Greek Commerce

mf, & Ar mats^{ts} were bought in London fr
mch^{ts} who imp^d fr. Cyprus & oth pts of
Turkey. Levadia & Athens suppl^d. Sail clo
for Ott. Navy. Eng. ships visit^d Morea &
Messolonghi for currants, & oftⁿ br^g back
also rich scarfs, Turkey leather of bright dyest^{ts}
wh. were imp^d in brk ts, partic^l at Patras,
Gastouni & Lepanto.

The protⁿ wh. Sultan sit^t. Dlower clo
soon enabled many indiv^l brks to acq wld
by coin. Instance of Cantacuzenos

156-8

Argument
The advantage
of
Sovereignty in
Promoting
Freedom of Trade

In almost all cases the rev. of Sovⁿ is drawn fr. the hands of the people. The gr^t & rev. of the people; ∴, the gr^t & annual prod of the land & labor, & more by can afford to Sovⁿ. This his int. ∴ to inc the gr^t prod. But if the is so wth every Sovⁿ, tis partic^l so of one whose rev, like him of Bengal, arises chiefly fr. land rent. That rent must necess^l be in propⁿ to quant^y & value of the prod, & both these must depend on extent of mkt^t. In, a quant^y will always be suited wth more or less exactness to Consumptⁿ of the who can afford to pay, & the price they will pay in propⁿ to easiness of the Competⁿ — i.e. to the demand. This the int ∴ of such a Sovⁿ to open & most extens mkt^t for the prod of his ctry, to allow the most perfect freedom of com, in order to inc the no. & the Competⁿ of the buyers; & upon the acct. to abolish, not only all monop^s, but all restraints upon transpⁿ of home prod fr. one pt. of ctry to othr, upon its expⁿ to for. ctries, or upon impⁿ of any goods for wh. it can be exch^d. He is the most likely to inc both quant^y & value of prod. & conseq of his own rev.

Wealth of Nations II

Uniformity
of
Taxation
promotes
free movement
of
internal trade
— " —

Example
in
Great Britain

The uniform syst^m of taxⁿ, wh, wth a few
excep^{ns} of no gr^t conseq, takes pl. in all diff^t pts
of K^g^m of G. B., leaves a int^r com. of the C^{try},
inland & est^d tr., almost entirely free. The
inland is almost perf^t free, & the gr^{est} pt
of the goods can be carried fr one end to the
of K^g^m, without req^d any permit, without
being subj to questⁿ, visit, or examⁿ fr.
rev. off^{rs}. The few excep^{ns} do not interrupt
any imp branch of inland com. Coastwise
goods, indeed, req certif^s; but, except coals,
are almost all duty free. This freedom of int^r
com. is the effect of the uniformity of taxⁿ, and it
is perhaps one of the prim^{al} causes of the prosp^y
of G. B.; Every gr^t C^{try} being nec^y the best
& most ext^{ve} mk^t. for the est^d pt. of the prod^{ts}
of its own ind^y. If the same freedom, in conseq of
same unif^y, c^d be ext^d to Ireland & the plant^m,
be the grandeur of the state, & the prosp^y of every
pt of Eur^p w^d prob^{ly} be still gr^t. On Nov 24
498-9 124

Differing
Systems of
Taxation
impose
hindrances
on
Internal Trade

Example
in
France

In France, a diff^d rev. laws wh. obtⁿ in
diff^d prov^s req^d num^s off^s to surround, not
only front^r of Kgd^m, but also of ea^{ch} partic^{ular}
prov, in order eit^h to prev^{ent} imp^{ort} of certain
goods, or to subject thm to pay^{ment} of duties, to
a no small interr^{uption} of movement of int^l tr.

And differ: some provs are allowed a com-
pound for a salt tax, oth^{ers} are wholly exempt.

Again: some prov^s exempt fr. exclus. sale of
tobacco, wh is enjoyed by farmers-^{gen^l} thro^{ugh} gov^t
pt. of Kgd^m. The Aides, wh corresp. to ~~excise~~^{excise}

in Eng, are very diff^d in diff^d prov^s. + + + In
thm th^{ere} are many local duties wh. do not ext^{end} beyond
partic. T. or district. The Traites, wh. corresp.

to customs, divide th^e Kgd^m into three gov^t pts.

First, a prov^s subj. to tariff of 1664, called a
prov^s of a five gov^t farms, & under wh. are
comprised Picardy, Normandy & a gov^t pt. of
a int^l prov^s. Second, Prov^s subj. to tariff
of 1667, wh are called for^m, & under wh are

Wealth of Nations II

Diversity
of
Provinces
and
of Local
Dues & Duties
in
France

1775

are compriz'd & ext^d. nt of the frontier prov^s.
Third, the prov^s wh. are said to be treated as
forⁿ, or wh., because they are allowed free
com. wth the ctrys, are in the com. wth the
prov^s of Fr. subj. to same duties as the
the forⁿ ctrys (These bear an analogy to a
free port, in its relatⁿ. wth surrounding CT^{ry})
These prov^s are: Alsace, & three bishoprics
- Metz, Toul & Verdun - and the three cities
Dunkirk, Bayonne & Marseilles. Both in
the prov^s of the five gr^t. farms (so called because of
an anc^t. divⁿ. of the duties of customs into five
gr^t. branches, the sev^{ly} farmed but now united)
the one said to be acct^d forⁿ, there are many
local duties wh. do not ext^d. beyond the partic^l
or district. There are such even in the one wh. are
said to be treat^d as forⁿ, partic^l in Marseilles
It is unne^{ce} to observe how much bad & restraints
upon int^l. com. of the CT^{ry}, & the number
of the sev. off^s must be multiplied, in

order to guard & preserve of the diff^t. prov^s. & dists,
wh. are subj. to such diff^t. systems of taxⁿ.

Such various & complic^d. rev. laws are
not, 1775, peculiar to France. In Ducy[?]
of Milan, there are six prov^s. simil^r. diff^t.
and in Parma there are four

299-500

Upon these diversities of taxation and
consequent tariff laws & duties, I have commented:

Casual
Among the hist^l. causes leading to the est^l.
wealth of Eng may have been the absence of
local, ^{independent} territorial divisions, w^o individual sys-
tems of taxⁿ, & frontier dues, an absence due
to the weakness of the feudal system & power
of great feudatories, who, owing to wise manag-
ement of the Emperor of 800^{ms} who H. II,
could not achieve & internal territorial independ^{ce}.
characteristic of the great French vassals - Ben-
gundy, Brittany &c.

Wealth of Nations II

Superior Importance
of
Internal Commerce

Internal Customs & obstruct very much
the most imp^t. of all branches of Commerce
viz: the int^l. com. of a ct^y

492

Casual

Smith here states again the sup^r. imp^t.
of int^l. com. May it not be the protⁿ. of
the int^l. com, & reserv^d it to a what^s,
may be advantageous to a ct^y as a whole

— " —

Cheap postage illustrates the advantage
of a great market — of a wide spread market —
of many small profits over a very few
huge profits

— " —

Effect of
Colbert's
Measures
upon
Rural
Prosperity

Colbert, in order to support the ind^y. of Ts,
was willing even to depress the int^l. com. In
order to make prov^{is} cheap in Ts, & so to
encourage manuf^g. & forⁿ. com., he prohib^d. entirely
expⁿ. of corn, & its excl^d. inhabs of ct^y
fr. every forⁿ. mkt^t. for by far the most imp^t.
pt. of a prod of the ind^y. This prohibⁿ,

joined to restraints imposed by anct. prov^d. laws
of Fr. upon transpⁿ. of corn from prov. to prov.,
and d^d & arbit^r? & degrading taxes levied upon
cultivators in almost all prov^s., kept down
agriculture very much below & state & wh.
It w^o! nat^{lly} w^o. risen in so happy climate
& soil. The depression was felt more or less
in every pt. of & ct^{ry}, & caused many in-
quiries. One cause seemed to be & prefer-
ence by Colbert to & ind^l? of towns above
that of & ct^{ry}

247

Although & rev. of & inhabs of every ct^{ry}
was supposed to consist altogether, [as the
system (of & Economists) seems to suppose]
in & quant^y. of subsistence wh. the ind^l? cd
procure for, yet, even upon the supposⁿ.,
the rev. of a tr^{lly} & mf^d? ct^{ry} must, if
things being equal, always be much gr^{tr}.
than that of one without tr & mf^d. By means

Wealth of Nations

The Advantages
of
Trade &
Manufactures
to the
Subsistence
of
a Country

Study this out

of the or mfg. a giv. quant. of substce.
can be up^{ly} imp^d. into a partic. ctry on
what its own lands, in a act^l. state
of or cultivⁿ (whatever it be) c^d. afford.
The inhabs of a T, do by may poss. no
lands, yet draw by or indy such an
amt. of a rude prod of lands of o^r
perp. as supplies o^m, not only wth mat^{ls}
for mfg., but wth a fund of or subsistence
What a T always is, wth ref^{ce} to neigh^g
ctry, one indep. state or ctry may oft
be with ref^{ce} to o^r states or ct^{ries}. It
is as if H^d draws giv. pt. of its substce.
fr. o^r ct^{ries}. A small amt. of mfg^d prod
buys a giv. amt. of rude prod. A t^{ly}
& mfg^d ctry, ∴, nat^{ly} buys wth a small
pt. of its mfg^d prod, a giv. pt. of a
rude prod of o^r ct^{ries}; while, on a
contrary, a ctry about to a mfg is gsm^{ly}

obtained to buy, at the expense of a gr^t. pt. of rude
 prod, a very small pt of the mf^d. prod of other
 countries. The one exports wh. can subsist & accom-
 modate very few (i.e. raw prod) & imp^s & sub-
 sist^e & accom^o of a gr^t no; the other exp^s
 subsist^e & accom^o of many & imp^s. It of a few
 The wh^os of the one must always employ a
 much gr^t. quant^y of subs^t on wh. or own
 lands, in the act^l state of cult^{iv}, & aff^r
 The wh^os of the other must always employ
 a much smaller quantity

262-3

Extensive
 Markets
 Needed
 by Manufacturers
 as
 compared to
 Raw
 Materials

Both the anc^t. Egypt^{ians} & Indians must have de-
 pended almost wholly upon nature for the
 of surplus prod; & its dep^{en}, as it must have continued
the mkt, must have discour^d & inc^{re} of its surplus. It
 must have discour^d also & inc^{re} of mf^d. prod, even
 more on of rude prod. Mf^s. req. a much more
ext^{ns} mkt on the most imp^t. pt^s of the rude prod
of the land. A single shoemaker will make more
 than 300 pt^s shoes in a yr, & his own family won't

Wealth of Nations II

Agricultural
Population
&
Producers
are
Comparatively
Independent
of
Extensive
Markets

perhaps wear out six pr^s. Thus, ∴, he has a
custom of at least 50 fam^s such as his own,
he can't dispose of his labor. The most num^s.
class of artif^s will seldom, in a large ct^y,
make more than one in 50, or 20, of the whole
no of fam^s in it. But in such large ct^{ies},
Eng^d & Fr, a n^o of peop. employed in agric
has by some been computed at $\frac{1}{2}$, by oth^rs at
 $\frac{1}{3}$, & by no auth^r that I know at less than $\frac{1}{5}$
of whole popⁿ. But as prod of both Fr & Eng
is, by far & gr^t. pt, consumed at home, ea
person employed in it must req little more
than custom of, perhaps, four fam^s at
outside, in order to dispose of whole prod.
Agric. ∴ can support itself better, under a
discourg^t of a conf^t, than mfg^s can

267

Casual

Does not this really amount to the fact that
agric can only supply at a small rate of
prodⁿ as compared with mfg^s; that its total
production leaves comparatively little profit

with which to exchange; that an agricultural country is therefore relatively a poor country; that even a fertile soil is less fertile than human brains & hands trained to work.

Casual

Again is not agriculture to some extent made more independent, or what is the same thing less dependent, because men must have food, they cannot close that market by abstinence beyond a limited point. Even such necessaries as clothing, shoes, firing &c &c can be made to undergo a rigorous economy, far beyond that which food can bear without serious privation, and even permanent injury.

Causes of
Relative
Independence
of
Agriculture
in respect to
Markets

Again the product of manufactures is not only greater, it is also surer than that of agriculture, in so far as the latter depends upon weather & seasons. This greater certainty extends the market as truly as greater product, of which indeed it is a part.

Wealth of Nations II

Reaction of
Depressed
Manufacturing
Industries
upon
the Prosperity
of
Agriculture

The grst & most imp^{rt} pt. of the com. of any
ctry is that which is carried on bet. the inhabs of the
& those of the ctry. The tr. maint^d bet. these
two sets of peple, consists in last analysis
in a certⁿ amt. of rude prod^s exch^d for a
certⁿ amt. of m^{fg}. The dearer the latter,
(and the fewer the artif^s, & dearer the prod., because
the less the amt.) the cheaper the former; &
whatever in any ctry tends to raise the price
of m^{fg} prod., (as, e.g. the lessening the n^o of
artificers), tends to lower the price
of the prod. & as lowering discourages the agriculturist.

{ To discourage m^{fg} ind^{ies}, ∴ by raising the
price of m^{fg} articles, depresses the agricst
not only so; this effect is further inc^d, by
the fact that a diminishing n^o of artif^{rs}
diminishes the n^o of consumers of agric^l
prod., i.e. contracts its mkt.

The method
of the
Agricultural
Economic
Systems
leads to
Defeat
their own
End

Those systems (the Economists) wh, preferring
agric to all o^r employ^{mt}, impose, in order to
promote it, restraints upon m^{an} & for^{ce} to, act
contrary to & very end by propose, & discourage
indirectly & very ind^{ly}. By means to promote
They are so far, perhaps, even more inconsistent
thⁿ & merc^{tl} syst^m. That syst^m, by en-
courag^g m^{an} & for to more thⁿ agric, turns a
certain part of the cap^l of the soc^y fr. supp^{ly} a
more adv^d to a less adv^d species of ind^l.
But still, in so doing, it does really and in
the end encour. & species of ind^l wh. it
means to promote; whereas & agric^l syst^m,
on contrary, really & in the end depress agricult^r.

272

of
Farming
the
Revenue

Taxes upon consumeth consum^{pt}. may be
levied eit^h by an admⁿ of wh. & off^{rs} are app^{nt}
by Gov^t, & imm^d ac^{ct} to It, in wh. case &
rev. will vary fr. 4% to 4%, acc^d to & amt^o of
prod. coming under & tax; or else they may be levied
by farming for a rent certain, & farmer being
allowed to app^t. his own off^{rs}, who are ac^{ct}.

to a farmer.

Smith then points out that the interest of the farmer of a revenue is necessarily opposed to the interest of the taxed community; whereas the interest of even the worst governments is that the community over which it rules should prosper, for its wealth measures the possible wealth of the Gov^t.

Also he shows that there must needs be in any country very few men capable of certainly paying the large gross sum for which the revenue is farmed, and of those able fewer still willing to undertake it. Therefore, there will be little competition of which Gov^t can take advantage to fit the best solution for itself; & the greater the need of the Gov^t the greater its disadvantage in negotiating with men as a class unscrupulous

have
Disadvantages
of the
System of
Farming
the
Revenue

Farming
and
Monopoly
Combined
in certain
Taxes

1775

Sometimes a tax not only is farm'd for a cert.
amt, but the farmer has besides a monop. of the
art. tax. In Fr., tobacco & salt are thus farm'd.

In such cases, the farmer levies two exorb. taxes
— a profits; & profit of farmer, & that of monarch.
Tobacco being a luxury, a man buys or not, as
he chooses; but salt being nec^y, all are forced
to buy of farmer a cert. amt., lest they should
buy of smuggler. The taxes upon both are exorb.
& consequ. tend^y to smuggle almost irresist^{ly}.

The result is that hundreds go to the gallows
every yr. for offenses agst these laws. x x x These
taxes yield a very consid. rev. to Govt. In

1767, the farm of tobacco was let for 22,541,278
livres yr^{ly}; that of salt for 36,492,404; to
begin in both in 1768, & to last for six yr^s.

Similar taxes & monop. have been estab^d in
many other countries, partic^{ly} in Aust^{ria} & Pruss^{ia}.
down^{no}, & in sev^l pt. of States of Italy

221, It has occurred to me that one of the historical causes leading to the greater wealth of England has been the absence of internal dues, owing to the weakness of the feudal system; owing i.e. to the absence of power to emphasize & maintain internal territorial independence, with octroi & customs dues

Cheap postage illustrates the advantage of a great market - i.e. a wide spread market.

225 ~~Inferentially - and by fair inference - we have here a justification of a colonial system in denuding high personal qualities~~

247, 262, (Does not this mean that the produce of mfd. is surer and greater than of agriculture?) So also 267 because produce is surer & greater it requires a "uniform market"

Wealth of Nations ⁵

500-505, 509-10 (mobility of Capital)
546-50

Nations and individual men have two (at least) sources of income (1) the interest on capital accumulated by either themselves or their predecessors, & (2) their own daily labor

The accumulated capital is I suppose the aggregation of the surpluses of previous generations. As this increases, it becomes a greater supply, and unless the demand ^{or need} keeps pace with the supply, the capital lessens in value, will buy less interest for use. Unless therefore the demands of the population, of the country itself or of accessible foreign parts keep pace with the increase of capital - either by natural increase of population, or by increasing requirements of each individual - capital becomes less and less a source of revenue to the possessor, and the individual is thrown more and more on the necessity of making his living by daily labor, which amounts to saying that daily labor becomes continually a more

Young

56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 67, 69, 82.

136, 187, 188, 193, 260, 261, 288 (Price
of wood per mile. Here note comparative
facilities of commerce, owing a greater
cheapness as well of freight as of persons.
(To this end see Smith's cartage matters.)

319, 321

⁶
important factor, which is also shown by the fact
that its wages rise

Is not this the fact that accounts for the facilities
with which national debts are borne, confounding
the calculations of the originators of systematic political
economy. A national debt is certainly not a national
blessing; but it is capital invested by one generation in
works of national utility — or supposed utility — the
utilities of which, as of most public improvements are not
direct to the state but ^{indirectly} found in general improved con-
ditions of the people — ~~at~~

Wealth of Nations II

In Fr. A gr^t: ht. of Crown rev. comes fr.

Sources of
French Revenue
1775

8 diff^t sources: taille, capitatⁿ, 2 vingtièmes,
gabelles, aides, ^{excise} ^{customs} traites, domaine, & farm of
tobacco. The first last are in most prov^s
under farm; & three first under immed.

Wastefulness
of
Farming System

admⁿ of Gov^t. It is ack^d. th^t, in propⁿ
to what they take fr. peop^l, by bring more
into treas^r of Gov^t. An do the ~~first~~ others,
the admⁿ of wh. is wasteful & expensive

503

Feasible
and
Obvious
Methods
of Improving
French
Revenue

The finances of Fr admit now of three
very obvious ref^ms. First, abolⁿ taille &
capitatⁿ, & by inc^s n^o of 20^{mes}, so as to
prod an add^l rev. = to amt. of these
abol^d, & rev. of Crown mt. be preserved,
& expⁿse of Coll^{rs} be much dimin^d, &
& revⁿ of lower orders, upon whom taille
& capitatⁿ directly fall, mt. be wholly
pres^{rv}^d; & yet A gr^t: ht. of A sup^r
rankes not be more burdened thⁿ now.

1775

Suggesting
Replacing of
Taille and
Capitation
by
Increased
Vingtièmes

The 20^{me} is a tax nearly of same kind as my land-tax

The burden of the taille (as distinct from immed.
rentⁿ) it is ack^d falls finally upon the proprietors
of the land (not on the peasantry); & as the fix^d pt of
the capitⁿ is assessed upon the subj also to
taille, the burden also ultimately comes upon the
landlord, not the tenant. Hence it w^d. seem
that an inc in 20^{mes} equal to loss by taille
& capitation w^d not burden sup^r ranks of peop^l
more than now. True, on acct. of the fix^d unequal^{ty}
w^{ch} the taille is assessed upon diff^t estates
& tenants, some now unduly fav^d individ^l w^d
suffer; & the prob^l will succeed in prev^{nt}
any reformⁿ of the kind

Second, by mak^g taxes on Commod^{ty} uniform
tho the prob^l, expense of collⁿ w^d. be dec^d, & int^l
commerce g^oly helped, to the increase of prod^{ct}
& conse^q inc. of revenue.

Third, By substitution of government
control for farming of revenue

Wealth of Nations II

Comparison
of
French & British
Systems
of Taxation

The French system of Taxation seems in every way inf^r to British. In G. B, £10,000,000 are yr^{ly} levied on less than 8,000,000 peop, without any partic^l order being oppressed

It appears prob. to Fr., Country Bar & Lorraine contains 23 - 24,000,000 souls; there being the n^o of G. B. The soil & climate are better.

Comparative
Results
in
Revenue
— " —

1765-1775

— " —

The c^{try} has been much longer in a state of improvtⁿ & cult^{ure}, & is (? sh^d be) on that acct. better stocked wth all the things that req. long time & raise & accum, such as gr^{ass} T^{owers}, & count^{ies} & well built houses, but in T & c^{try} + + + Yet in 1765 & 1766, the whole rev. pd into treas^{ry} of Fr., acct^d to be, so import^{ant}, acct^d to the obtⁿ, ran between 308 & 325 mill^{ions} of francs; that is, did not am^t.

to £15,000,000 - not $\frac{1}{2}$ what m^t. w. in expnd d peop. contrib^d in same propⁿ to n^o as did peop. of G. B. Nevertheless, it is gen^{lly}

Comparative
Results in
Condition
of the
People

ack^d that peop. of Fr. are much more oppressed by taxes than are the peop. of G. B.

Conditions
of
Taxation
and
Population
in
Holland

After G.B., Fr. is cert^{ly} the gr^{est} Empire of Eur
wh enjoys the mildest Gov^t.

In Holland, the heavy taxes upon necess^{es} of life
are said to be ruin^d & prin^{ci}pal^{ly} imp^{er}, & are wholy
even to discourage fish^g & ship-b^uld^g. The taxes upon
necess^{es} in G.B. are incensed, & no imp^{er}. hitherto has
bn. so ruin^d. The rev^{ue} of the St^{ate} is less^{er} & of the
diff^{er}ent cities are said to amt. to more than £5,250,000;
& as the inhab^{ts} of the U.P. cannot well be supposed more
than $\frac{1}{3}$ those of G.B., they must in prop^{or} be much
more heavily tax^d.

After all proper sub^{je}cts of taxⁿ have bn^{ex}haust^{ed},
if exig^{en}ces of St. req^uire new taxes, they must be imposed
upon sub^{je}cts otherwise improp^{er}. Therefore, the
taxes upon necess^{es} may be no impeach^t of wisdom
of the U.P., wh., to acq^uire & maint^{ain} inde^{pen}d^{en}ce, have,
despite Gov^t frugality been involved in such Gov^t
wars as have compelled to contract Gov^t debts.

Wealth of Nations II

Necessity of
Incurring
War Debts

In war, an estat^t. serv^t. t^his st of peace,
becomes neeq., and conseq^{ly} a nee. prop^{ly} Gov^t.
Suppos^d. that a Gov^t. sh^d. be, wh^h he scarce ever has,
a immed means of inc^r. his rev. in propⁿ. to inc.
of expⁿse, still a prod of taxes, for the inc.,
will not begin to come into treas^r. for better pt.
of a yr^s. ; whereas, instantly, when war seems
even prob., a army & fl^t. must be prepar^d
de se ; and all pt^s of mil^l. estat^t. put in
count^s. for active oper^{ns}.

In this exigency, Gov^t. has no resource
but to borrow

Power inherent
in the
Mobility
of
Capital

The same count^s. state of soc^y. wh^h, by
oper^{ns}. of moral causes (i.e. by affording
means and incentives to superfluous expⁿse
of luxury &c) brings Gov^t. into necessity
of borrowing (tho using all peace rev^s. on
or on absolute necess^s) produces in subj^s
a & ability & a inclin^{to} to lend. If it

commonly brings with it the necessity of borrowing, it also brings facility for so doing.

Mobility of
Capital
Inherent in
Trade

A country abounding with mechanical & manufacturing necessities abounds with persons thro whose hands pass, not only their own capital but the capital of all those who either lend them money or trust them with goods - who, in other words have both capital & credit. These capital pass thro their hands more frequently than the revenue of a private man who, without business, lives on his income. The revenue of such a man passes thro his hands but once a year; whereas that of a merchant may pass two, three, or four times a year. Therefore a country abounding with mechanical & manufacturing necessities abounds with persons who at all times can, if by will, advance very large sums of good money. Hence the stability in subjects of a country state to trade.

Effect of
Security of
Justice
on Commerce
&
Manufactures

Again, commerce & manufactures can seldom flourish long in a state where not regular administration of justice, & & where authority of it is not believed to be regularly supplied in enforcing ^{payment} just debts & contracts.

Wealth of Nations II

Government
Securities
in well administered
Countries
generally of the
best, & being
easily transferred,
rather increase
than decrease
the Capital of
the first lenders.

Com. & Mfg., in short, cannot flourish in
a state where there is not some confidence in
the justice of the Govt. ; [& the existence of Com
& Mfg. is itself an indicⁿ. so far of such
just & settled cond^{ns}] But the same
confidence that disposes mech^s to trust Govt.
for protⁿ, in normal cond^{ns}, disposes them
to trust the use of their cap^l. to the Govt., unless
extraor^y. cond^{ns}. By lend^g, they do not
dimin^t even for a moment their abil^y. to
maintain their trade & Mfg. ; on contrary, they
commonly use it, for the necess^s of St.
make Govt. willing to borrow on terms
adv^s. to lenders, & the security it grants to
lender is commonly transferred to him
to offer & sell in mkt^t. for more than he
paid. Such is Govt. credit

Probable Gains
of
Ireland
from Union
with
Great Britain

By a union wth G. B. I^{re} w^d. gain, besides
freedom of trade, of adv^{ts}. much more imp^t. & w^d. w^d
much more on compens^s. any inc. of taxes & m^t. ac-
comp^s. & union. By a union wth Eng, & m^t. & inf^r.
cl^s. of Scot^d gain'd complete deliv^{ce}. fr. pow^r. of an
arist^o wh^o h^d always b^e oppress'd th^m. By an union
wth G. B. & g^{vt}. b^e of peop^l. of all ranks in Ir^l.
w^d. gain an eq^l. deliv^{ce}. fr. a much more oppressiv^e
arist^o - an arist^o not founded, like th^{at} of Scot^d on
nat^l. & respect^l. distinctions of birth & fortune, but
on religⁱ & pol. prejud^s. x x x Without a union
wth G. B., & what^s of I^{re} are not likely, for many
gener^{ns}, to feel O^url^ls our peop^l.

Spirit of Party
more violent
at
Centres
than at
Extremities

In all g^{vt}. crisis unit^d under one uniform
gov^t, & spirit of party commonly prevails
less in remote prov^s thⁿ in centre of Empire.
The dist. of the prov^s from Cap^l, fr. principal
seat of scramble of faction &c, makes th^m enter
less into a view of a content^d p^{ar}tis, & makes
th^m more undiff^d & impartial spectators. x x The
spirit of party prevails less in Scot^d thⁿ in Eng^l.

Wealth of Nations II

In the case of a union, it wd. prob^{ly} prevail less
in Ist than in Scot^l; & & Am^{er} Col^lies, if & in
union wth G. B., wd. prob^{ly} soon enjoy a degree
of concord & unanimity at present unknown
in any pt. of & Br. Empire

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Forecast of
Increased
Divergence
and Repulsion
among
American
Colonies,
Consequent
upon
Separation
from
Mother Country

Smith at this place forecasts the
probable results to the 13 Colonies, in
case of a total separation from G. B."
"Those rancorous and violent factions wh^{ch}
are inseparable fr. small democ^{ies}, & wh^{ch} are
so freq^{ly} divided & aff^{ct}ed of br peop^l, &
disturb tranquillity of br gov^{ts}, in form
so nearly democratical — these factions in
case of separation wd. be ten times more
violent than ever

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How this forecast was fulfilled, after the
colonists had lost, (1) the unifying influence
of a common mother C^{try}, & (2) the unifying
influence of a common strength for indep^{ce}.

Casual

Of that another story is a matter of history; & it is the highest tribute to the abilities & patriotism of a few great men that they should have been pelotod safely through such a period & "a more perfect union."

Casual

Nations, and individuals, have two (at least) sources of income. 1 Interest on capital accumulated by either Ourselves or by predecessors 2 Their own daily earnings. Savings & earnings

Accumulated Capital is, I suppose, the aggregation of the surpluses of previous generations. As this increases, it becomes a greater supply, and unless the demand, or employment, keeps pace with this increased supply, the Capital lessens in value — will buy less interest for use. Unless, therefore, the demands, requirements, of the population, either of the country itself or of accessible foreign parts, keeps pace with the increase of Capital — either by natural increase of population, or by increasing

requirements of the individual inhabitant, Capital
 becomes less and less a source of income to the
 possessor, and the individual is thrown for sub-
 sistence more and more on his daily labor. This
 amounts to saying that daily labor becomes con-
 tinually a more important factor - a more valu-
 able asset - which is also shown by the fact that
 wages rise. In short, Capital and labor are
 matters of exchange in which the value of the
 latter tends to rise, and of the former to
 sink from the fact that Capital accumulates
 more rapidly than labor increases, although
 labor consists now not only of man's bodily
 work but of highly developed machinery
 as well.

May not these considerations afford
 a clue to the reason why national debts
 are so easily borne, confounding the calcu-
 lations of the founders of systematic poli-
 tical Economy. A national debt is Capital
 invested by our generation in works of

Casual

national utility - or supposed utility - the returns from which, as in most public improvements, are not to the state, or government, directly, but indirectly in general improved conditions for the people.

Casual

The question would then be is the benefit to the people greater than the interest paid on the debt. Regarded as "merely material question, the diminishing rate of interest, which corresponds and indicates a progressive accumulation of surplus would so show that the benefit exceeds. For, the nation borrowed at a high rate of interest, when money was scarce, and is deriving benefit at the cost of a low rate.

All-devised, & offhand; therefore very likely superficial

— " —

Casual
Definitions

Stock is stored-up labor. Rent is interest on borrowed land. Land owned is stock; it is also labor stored-up - either by purchase, which is made by money - stock - or else by conquest, discovery, etc., any of which are simply forms of labor

Wealth of Nations II

Comparative
Advantages
of
Home & Foreign
Trade

The title of Munn's book, "England's Reasons
in Forⁿ Trade," became a fund^l maxim in
pol. Econ^y, not of Eng^d only, but of all o^r com^l
coun^{tr}. The inland, or home trade, & most imp^t
of all, & the in wh. an eq^l cap^l affords & getst rev.,
& creates getst emp^l to the peop., was consid^d as
subsid^y only to forⁿ trade. It must bro^ug^h money in,
nor carried any thing out, it was said. The coun^{tr}, ∴,
c^d never become either richer or poorer by it, except
so far as its own condⁿ w^d affect the forⁿ trade

Rogers on
the above

On this Rogers notes: This contract bet.
home & forⁿ trade, to adv. of home, was sug^g
to Smith by the Econst fr-Whom he learned
his prin^{pl}. That ~~is~~ industry affords & getst
rev. & emp^l wh. best suits a coun^{tr}.

The imp^t of gold & silver is not the prin^{pl},
much less the sole, benefit wh. a natⁿ derives fr
forⁿ trade. But whatever pl^s forⁿ trade is maint^d,
all derive fr. it two dist^t benefits. It carries

Manner in
which
Foreign trade
advantages
a Country

out a surplus of prod, of land & of labor, for wh. there is
no demand at home, & brings in something for wh. there
is demand. It gives value to superfluities, by
exchⁿ. them for something, wh. may sat^{is}fy or wants
or inc. or enj^y. By means of it, the narrowness
of the home mkt. does not prev^t. the dirⁿ of labor
in any one branch of art or mf. fr. being carried
to highest perfⁿ. By opⁿ. more ext^{ns}. mkt.
for surplus prod, it encourages them to improve
or prod^{re} bet^{re}, & to inc. ann^l prod. to utmost,
& thereby to inc. real rev & w^ld of ctry. Thus extⁿ
& unip. services for. tr. is ent^{ly} performing for all
ctrys bet. wh. tis carried on. They all derive fr.
it gr^t. benefit, but usually the ctry most in wh.
the mcht. resides, as gen^{ly} he is ch^{ly} ^{occ^{pl}} supplied in
in supplying the wants & tkⁿ away superfluities of
his own or of another. To unip. prod & sales to
ctrys wh. he. no mines is pt. of for. com; but a most insight pt.
A ctry wh. carries in for. com for its alone w^d scarce fr^t. a ship in a cⁿ.

Wealth of Nations II

Every individ tries to employ his cap^l as near home as poss, & conseq as much as he can in domestic ind^{is}; prob^{ly} he can do dom^o & ord^y, or nearly & ord^y profit on stock

Advantages
of
Home Trade
over
Foreign Trade
and over
Carrying Trade
explained
and
defined

Thus, upon equal or nearly equal profits every mcht. nat^{ly} prefers home tr to a forⁿ tr of consumption, & a forⁿ tr of consumption to carrying tr. In home tr his cap. is nev. long out of sight, as it oft is in forⁿ tr of consumption. He can know better & choose & sitⁿ of persons wh. he has & trust, & if dec^d by om, knows better at home how to seek address. In carrying tr & cap^l of a mcht. is, as it were, div^d but two forⁿ tr & no pt is ever nee^d bro^t home, or pl^d under owner's immed view. The cap^l wh an Amst^m mcht. uses ^{carries} wth bet. Königsberg & Leston, E.g., must gen^{ly} be one half in K and $\frac{1}{2}$ in L. No pt. need ever come to Amst^m. The nat^l resid^{er} of such mcht^s

should be at K or at L, & only some very partic-
ular case can make him prefer A. The uncertainty
he feels at being so far fr. his cap. genly de-
termines him to bring pt. of goods to K, &
also pt of ore to L, to A.; & so he genly
subj^s him to double ch^g of loading & unloading
as well as to some part of customs, yet he
will^y submit to the extra ch^g to hv. some pt
of capt. always under his own view & com^d; &
As it is at every city wh he has any consid share
of carrying to, becomes always Emporium, or
genl. mkt. for goods of all the cities & to of wh.
it carries. The mcht., to save a second load^s
& unload^s, tries always to sell in home mkt.
as much of the goods as he can, As to convert his
car^y to into a for^m to. of consumption. By
As selling he saves the risk & trouble of expⁿ. In
this manner home becomes the centre, if I may so
say, around wh the cap^s of inhab^s of every city
are const^{ly} circ^l, & towrd wh they are always tend^g

Wealth of Nations II

to by partial causes by may sometimes be
driven to more nat^l employ^t

Home trade
the most
advantageous
employment
of
Capital

But a capt^d employ^d in home tr., nec^y
puts in nat^l a gr^t quant^y of domestic ind^y
& gr^t employ^t to gr^t no^o of what^s On an
equal capt^d employ^d in forⁿ tr of consumption;
and likewise one in forⁿ tr of consumptⁿ. Has
a like adv. over equal capt^d employ^d in carry^g tr.

26-7

The Dutch
in
relation to the
Navigation Act
1654 - 1775

When the Nav. Act was made the Dutch
were, what they still are (1775) the gr^t. Car-
riers of Europe. x x x Holland was then, as now
the gr^t. Emporium for all Eur. goods, & by the Act
Br. ships were prevent^d fr. loading in Holl^d. & goods
of any of Eurⁿ. Ctry x x x The Dutch then were
the only fishers in Eur., as they still are the
principal, & attempt^d to supply for. nat^l wth
fish. By Nav. Act. a very heavy burden was
laid upon them in supplying G. B.

Effects of
Opening
Ports

Every T + CT^m, in propⁿ as by ho. of^d or
ports to all nat^{ns}, inst^d of being ruined by
so free to, as a prin^{ple} of a com^l syst^m w^d
teach, ho. be by it enriched. Tho' one in
Eur. a few Ts wh. in some respect deserve the
name of free ports, one is no CT^m wh. you so.
Holl^d? comes nearest to it, so still very re-
mote; & Holl^d! it is ack^d, not only drains its
whole w^{ld} but its very subst^{ce} for forⁿ tr.

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Differing
Effect of
Bounties upon
Production
or
Bounty on
Exportation

The prejud^g estab^d by a Com^l Syst^m has
taught us to believe that w^{ld} areas more
density from expⁿ than fr. prodⁿ. It has
far^r, accord^{ly}, as a more insured means of
bring^g money into a CT^m. Bounties upon
prodⁿ, it has been said, has been found more likely
to fraud the one upon expⁿ. But it is not a
unit of mech^{ts} & inf^{ts} at home mkt^t. It^l be overstock^d
wth prodⁿ, wh. a bounty upon prodⁿ. m^t perhaps occasⁿ.
A bounty upon expⁿ, by enabling one to send surplus
abroad, & to keep up price at home, effect^{ly} prevent^s
surplus stock

92-3

Wealth of Nations II

N. B.

After some observations upon the farth end^s of the
Cont. Col^s of N. A., owing to the degree of self-
govt. by them enjoyed & the pol^l equality of the Colonists, (165)
Smith continues thus:

More Freedom
at the
Seat of Government
in
Arbitrary
Governments
than in the
Provinces

The absol. gov^{ts} of Sp., Fr. & Port, obtain in or
col^s; & the discret^y pow^{rs} wh. by County delegates &
infer^r off^{rs} are, on acct. of the gr^t dist^{ce}, ex^d the
wth more the ord^y violence. Under all absol. gov^{ts}
the is more lib^y in cap^l than in prov^s. The sov^{ty}
himself in new his int. or inclin^{tn} to persecut
justice, or to oppress, & st^l body of the peop. In
cap^l his presence overawes his infer^r off^{rs}, who
in remote prov^s, whence complaints are less likely
to reach him, can tyrann^{ze} wth more safety. But
& Eastⁿ col^s in N. A. are more remote than most
dist^l prov^s of the gr^t emp^{ty} ever by knowⁿ. The
govt. of the Br. col^s is perhaps only one wh. since
world began, c^d. gov. perf^t sec^y to inhabit of so
dist. prov^s. The admⁿ of Fr. prov^s, however, has
been cond^l wth more mod^{ty} than that of Sp. or Port^s.
This sup^{ty} of cond^l is suitable to the charac.

of Fr. Natⁿ, and to what forms the charac. of every natⁿ,
the nature of the govt., wh. do arbit^r in compⁿ wth
that of G. B. is legal & free in compⁿ wth Sp. & Port

It is, however, in the progress of the N.A. (Cont^d)

Better
Success of
Sugar Industry
in
French Colonies
than in
British
— " —

col^s & sup^{ty} of Br. pol^y ch^{ly} appears. The
progress of the sugar col^s of Fr has been at least equal,
perhaps even sup^r to gr^{er} pt. of Eng^l; & yet the
sugar col^s of G. B. have a free govt. of nearly the same
kind as those on Cont^t. But the sugar col^s of Fr

To what Dur
— " —

are not discour^d, as are those of G. B., fr. refining
own sugar; and, what is still more imp^t, the
of the Fr. govt. nat^{ly} brings better manag^t of slaves.

Greater
Efficacy of
Protection to
Slaves
in
Colonies of
Arbitrary
Govt^s

In all Eur. col^s sugar-cane is cultiv^d by
slaves. &&& But, like as the profit & success of
cultivⁿ by cattle depend very much on good
manag^t of the cattle, so the success of cultivⁿ by slaves
depends upon good manag^t of the slaves; & in
as it is freely allowed the Fr. are sup^r to Eng^l.
Protⁿ of slave agst. master is likely to be better ex^d in
a col^y where govt. is arb^r, than in one wholly free
In every c^{try} where slavery exists, the Magistrate, when

Wealth of Nations II

Protection of
Slaves
Better Insured
under
Arbitrary
Governments
than
under Free

he protects slaves, intempers in some meas. agst a
master; & in a free ct^y, where master has a vote
in the election of a gov^t, & magistrate has to
very cautious in such interfere. The respect
he has to his master, makes diff^t to protect
slave. But under arb^y gov^t where arb^y interfere
in private aff^s is freq^t, it is much easier to
defend slave, because magist^{rate} is indep^t of
owner, & more humane disposes him
so to do. The protⁿ of a M. master slave
less contemptible in master's eye, & leads him to
treat him better; and slave is to somewhat raised
t^o condⁿ of a free man

That a condⁿ of slaves is better under
arb^y or under free gov^t is matter of hist^y,
of all ages & nat^{ns}. In under Empire, & we
first in Roman hist^y hear of gov^t intentⁿ
to prot. slaves. Under a Rep. no magi^{strate} w^o has
his power to protect, much less a Democ^{ratic}
master

Proofs of
Superior
Management
of the
French West India
Colonies

The stock (capital) wh. has improv'd & sugar
col^{ies} of Fr., partic^{ly} St. Domingo, has been raised
almost entirely fr. improv't & cult^{ure} of col^{ies} self.

It has been surplus fr. prod. of soil & ind^{ustry} of
col^{ies}, Grad^{ually} accum^{ulated} under good manag^{ement},
& on employ^{ment} in raising stock fr^{om} prod^{uct}.

But in Br. col^{ies} & stock has been improv^{ed}
has come almost wholly fr. G. B. & has by no
means been wholly result of col^{ies}'s efforts. The
prosper^{ity} of Eng. col^{ies} has been, in gr^{eat} meas, owing to
gr^{eat} riches of Eng^{land}, of wh. pt. has employed
upon & col^{ies}; whereas prosper^{ity} of Fr. col^{ies} has been
entirely due to good cond^{itions} of col^{ies}, wh. ∴
must have had some sup^{er}ty over that of Eng^{land} &
as sup^{er}ty has been in nothing so marked as in
treatment of the slaves. 169

N. B

Note here that Chap VII, Part III (VII) of
Smith had better some day be read by me again
quietly & attentively.

Wealth of Nations II

Analysis of
the Effect
Produced upon
British
Commerce &
Naval Power
by the
Navigation Act.

England was a gr^t, tr^d natⁿ, her merc^l. cap^t
 was every gr^t. & likely to become gr^t. every day,
 not only by Nav. Act but estab^d. monop^y of col^l.
 tr, but by ot tr was consid^{bl}. In Dec^l war,
 under Cromwell, her navy was sup^r? to Dec^l;
 and in war at begin^g of Char II, navy was at
 least equal, if not sup^r, to unit^d navies of
 Fr & Holl^l. Its sup^{ty} w^d. scarce appear gr^t:
 now (1775); at least if Dec^l Navy now bore
 same propⁿ? to Dec^l Com. as then. But its gr^t
nav-pwr^t cd. not in these wars be due to Nav.
Act. During first, plan of Act only had been
 formed; & so, by 2^d, it had become a law, yet
 no pt. of it had had time to prod. much effect,
 & least of all ot pt wh. estab^d. monop^y. of col^l. tr.
 Bth col^l? & Or tr then inconsid^{bl} in comparⁿ. to now.
Jamaica then unwholesome desert, little inhabit^d. &
 less cultiv^d. N. Y. & N. J. then poss^d. by Dec^l;
 $\frac{1}{2}$ St Kitts Fr. Antigua, & Carolinias,

Insignificant
Extension
Business
Colonies
1654

Pennsylvania, Georgia & North Carolina were not to
be planted. Virginia, Maryland, & New England
had to be planted; but so thriving, they could not be
the former & rapid progress since made by them
in cult, popⁿ, & impo^t. Barbados was the
sole col^y at all in consⁿ of today. The trade
& col^y, of W^m. Eng, even for some time after Act
enjoy^d but a pit (for Nav. Act was not very strictly
ex^{ec} for some yrs.) could not be the cause of the
grat. trade of Eng^d, nor of a grat. nav. pow^r. by it suppl^d.
The trade on suppl^d of grat. nav. pow^r. was the trade of
Eur, & of circ^l round Medⁿ; but the share of the trade
W^m. G. B. now enjoys could not suppl^d any such pow^r.

Had the growth of col^y been left free to all nat^s
what share must have fallen to G. B. (of a very big share
w^d. prob^{ly}. have fallen) must have been all an addⁿ to
the trade to W^m. she by possⁿ; but in consⁿ of the
monop^y & use of col^y to her not occasⁿ so much an
addⁿ as a change of direction of Br. Trade

Wealth of Nations II

Dangerous
Effect of
Exported
Monopoly
upon
Commercial
&
Manufacturing
Security

The monopoly of Col. Tr, by forc^{ly} turⁿg it a much
gr^{eat} prop^{erty} of Br. cap^{ital}. On w^h nat^{ion}ly hv. some to it
seems to hv. broken at nat^{ional} balance wh. w^h hv
tak^{en} pl. among all & diff^{erent} br^{anches} of Br. ind^{ustry}.
Just^{ly} of being accom^{modated} to gr^{eat} n^o. of small out^{lets}
it has be^{en} prin^{ci}pally suited to one gr^{eat} m^{arket}.
Br. Com, inst^{ead} of running in sev^{eral} small channels,
has be^{en} made to run in one gr^{eat} channel. Thusly
whole syst^{em} of ind^{ustry} & Com has be^{en} made less
secure; & whole state of & body politic less healthy

Danger of
Concentration
of
Industry

ly. B. now resembles one of the bodies in wh.
Some of vital pts are overgrown, & ∴ liable to
dang^{erous} disorders not incident to the better
proport^{ion}. A small stop in the gr^{eat} blood
vessel, artif^{icially} swell^{ed} beyond nat^{ional} dimensions,

But
may there not
be
compensation?
Is not the
case
overstated?

& Bro, wh. an unnat^{ional} prop^{erty} of ind^{ustry} & Com has be^{en}
forced to circulate, is likely to bring most
dang^{erous} disorders on & whole body. Conseq^{uently},
expect^{ation} of rupture w^{ith} Col^{onial} has caused heap^s of
y. B. more terror than we did Sp. Armada

Exemplified
in the
Stamp Act
Controversy

It was: This term rendered repeal of Stamp Act
so popular among mch^{ts} In total exclusⁿ to
col^d mch^t, even for few yrs, mch^{ts} used to fancy
an entire stop to Br tr; & got. pt. of our mch^{ts}
& entire ruin of Br business; & & got. pt. of our
workmen an end to Br employ^t. A rupture wth
a Cont^d pow^r, so likely to cause some stop in
employ^t of some of these orders, is foreseen without
any such gen^l apprehension

186.

Casual

I would woud it be a correct statement
that goods on a voyage — or in any prolonged
transit — are idle stock through so many days,
except in supporting the labor of the ship's company?

Again is not the carrying trade, when viewed
thus, something more on a necessary evil. Is it
not a means of distributing wealth, not only by
distributing goods, but also among the men
employed as carriers — the off^{rs} & crew of the
vessels employed, not to speak of the subsidiary
employments — building ships &c.

Wealth of Nations II

In diff^t events, unforseen, he concurred
to prot^t G. B. exp^{er} as much as m^t he be
found total exclusⁿ wh^{ch} has now th^o pl. to
more in a yr. (fr. Dec 1. 1774), fr. a very imp.
branch of Col^l Tr - at wth a 12 assoc^d prot^t
of A. A.

Events which
diminished
the bad effect
of American exclusion
upon
British Commerce
and Industry
in 1775

1 These Col^l, in preparⁿ for the non-im-
portⁿ, drained G. B. completely of all commod^s
fit for the m^k^t.

2 The extrordⁿ demand of the Sp. Flota
has yr. drained Germany & the N of many
commod^s, linen in partic, wh^{ch} used to com-
pete, even in Br. m^k^t, wth Br. m^f^s.

3 The peace bet Russia & Turkey has
caused extrordy demand fr. Turkey m^k^t, wh^{ch},
dur^g distress of the C^{tr}, & while Russⁿ fl^t
is cruising in Archip, has been poorly supplied

4 The demand of N. of Eur. for Br m^f^s
has been inc^d fr yr. by yr. for some time past

5 The recent partitⁿ of Poland, & its

conseq^t. pactⁿ, by opⁿ? & mk^t. of th^t gr^t. ct^y
tho^o as y^t. added an extra^r? demand fr. th^e
to th^e already inc^d? demand fr. N.

These errors are all, except H, transitory &
acc^dtl, & th^e exclusⁿ? fr. so imp^t. a pt. of Col. Tr
if it continue much longer, may still cause some
distress; but as th^e, if it come, will come grad^{ly}
it will be felt less severely thⁿ if all at once
186.

The monop of Col Tr, so far as it has turned
two^d th^e to more Br. cap^t? th^e w^d. nat^{ly} ho
some to it, has in all cases turned it fr. a forⁿ
to. of consumptⁿ w^d a near ct^y to one with
a more dist. ct^y; in many cases, fr. a direct
for. to. of consumpⁿ, into a roundabout one; &
in some cases fr. all forⁿ. to. of conspⁿ to a
carrying to. Therefore, it has in all cases turned
it fr. a directⁿ in wh. it w^d. ho. maint^d a gr^t.
amt. of prod^{ve} labor into one in wh. it can
maintⁿ only a much smaller amt.

Injurious
Division
caused
to British
Capital
by the
Navigation
Act.

Wealth of Nations II

The imp^{ts} of Eur. to whom Col Tr. 80s.
Employ^t, constitute a new mkt^t for & prod of
land; & a most adv. of all mkt^s, & home mkt^t
for & corn & cattle, for & bread & butchers'
meat, — in short, a mkt^t for food —, is its
only ext^d by & to. wth Am^a.

But its monop. of tr. wth pop^s &
Chrisⁿ col^s is not alone suff^t to maintⁿ imp^s
in any ct^{ry}, is demonstr^d by Sp. & Port^l.
These were imp^l ct^{ries} by & y^{et} had any consid.
col^s; since by hw had & richest & most
fertile in world, by hw. ceased to be so.

In Sp. & Port^l. the bad effects of monop.,
aggrav^d by oth causes, has nearly overbalanced & prod^d
effects of Col. Tr. These oth causes seem to be:
oth monop^s of var^s kinds; degradⁿ of value of soil
& labor below what they are in oth ct^{ries}; exclusⁿ.
fr. forⁿ mkt^s by improper taxes on expⁿ, &
narrow^d home mkt^t by still more improper
taxes upon transpⁿ of goods fr. one pt. of
ct^{ry} to oth; but above all partial admⁿ.

of justice to the injury of a poor & weak producer, &
fair? & rich & partial consumer. Consequent
lack of certainty in contracts probably.

Summary of Neapolitan affairs

1494 - 1504

The Kingdom of Naples at the accⁿ of Ferr.
Isa was in possⁿ of a branch of the H. of Aragon.
Char VIII of France revived a claim of
the Angevin line, and in 1494 invaded Italy on
invitation of Ludovic Sforza of Milan who promised
his support. Char ent^d Rome Dec 31. 1494 &
Naples Feb. 22. 1495; but altho he quickly poss^d
of the Kgd^m he had so incurred a hatred & his tenure
became insecure, the Italians of North rising behind
him. Char ∴ left Naples for Fr. May 20. 1495, &
aft^r a battle at Fornovo retreated France Oct 27
He had left behind $\frac{1}{2}$ his army under D. of Montpensier
to hold Kgd^m of Naples; but a expelled King (Aragon)
Ferdinand succeeded in regaining it, being supported
by Spanish troops under G. de Cordova (Great Captⁿ)
who reached Messina May 24, 1495, and crossed
at once to Reggio. The term of a French occupa-
tion was defined by the Capⁿ of Aratⁿ, July 21. 1496
wh. stip^d. & evacⁿ. of the Kgd^m

The Aragonese K Ferr. died Sept 7. 1496
and was succ^d by his uncle Ferdinand

Matters now were quiet under Fred. till Char VIII
died 1498, and was succ^d by L. XII who assumed titles
of D. of Milan & K of Naples and undertook to regain
Naples. He invaded Italy in 1499, and again occup^d
Milan, after which negotiations between him &
Fred. settled a part^r of N. Treaty ratif^d Granada
Nov. 11. 1500 Assesim^d to Fred. Calabria & Albania
to France wth pt. of Kingdom wth city N.

In pursuance of this - or rather prior to ratifⁿ
- Louis XII marched fr. N. Italy June 1500 [can
this date be right? is it not 1501] In Oct 1501, Fred^o
forced to abandon Cap^a & retreat to Ischia, took a
safe conduct to Fr., aban^d. & strength & cont^d to
live in France till his death in 1504

G. de Cordova had left Malaga in May 1500,
for Sicily, wth some 5,000 troops, who ready for
whatever turned up. Aft. 2 mos in Sicily where he
rec^d. 2,000 vint^g he sailed again for Messina in Sep
1500, raised siege of Napoli di Romania by Turks,
aided Vint^g in expell^g Turks from Cephalonia
which was effect^d by end of 1500, and returned to
Sicily early in 1501, In March was ratif^d of
Part^r Treaty, & in July 1501 proceeded to Camp

Affairs of Naples 1494-1504

the Calabria, which was effected by Capit.
of Tarento March 1, 1502.

The Fr. & Sp^{ts} quarrelled incessantly over
the domin^{ions} of Kgdm, & hostilities began between
them in spring of 1502. Ow^g & got numb^r.
sup^{ty} of Fr., Cordova was forced for a while to
shut himself up in Ad^e. pt. of Barleta, but
after various operat^{ns} in 1502 & 1503, the
battles of Cerignola (end of April 1503), and
of Seminara Apr 21, 1503 put an end to
the French control of the Neap^l Ctry. On May 14
Cordova entered Naples, & the French were
reduced to the towns only of Gaeta, and of
Venosa, where Louis d'Arms threw himself in

War cont^d into 1504, Gaeta holding out
succ^{ess}, & gr^{at}. new prop^{ns} made by L. & H. An
unsucc^{ess} invas^{ion} of Spain by Fr. New Fr. armies
sent to Naples; delay^d. on march, near Rome by 20
of H. VI, & new papal election. After protracted
operations the battle of Garigliano Dec 29. 1503,
ended in utter defeat of French. Gaeta Capit^d.

Jan^y. 1. 1504 , Gonsalvo int^d , Jan 3 On Feb. 25

1504 there was signed at Lyons a treaty which
guaranteed to Aragon undisturbed possⁿ of her
Cing^{ts} in Naples for 3 y^{rs}

Isabella the Catholici died Nov. 26 1504

Philip the Fair died Sep. 25. 1506

League of Cambray Dec. 10. 1508 (?)

Holy League { Pope Ferd + Venice
 } agst. France Oct 4. 1571

Battle of Ravenna Apr 11. 1572

Eng army lands at Passage June 8 "

Def. Alce (Blois) bet Fr. + Navarre July 17 1572

Spaniards invade Navarre and
overrun all other kingdom in fortnight } July 21. "

Truce for two years Ferd + Louis XII April 1. 1513

Estates of Navarre taken over to Spain Mar. 23 "

Navarre incorp^d wth Spain June 15 1515

Gonsalvo de Cordova (1st Captⁿ) dies Dec 2. 1515

Ferdinand dies Jan^y 23, 1516

Charles (V) lands in Spain Sep. 17, 1517

Ximenes dies Nov. 8. 1577

Measures to
Depress
Power of Nobles
in
Castile

Among a most effectual means of F & J. to
depress pow^r. of nobles was omisⁿ to summon
Priv^y orders to Cortes, in not a most imp^t sess^{ns}.
This was not new stretch of prerog^e, but an ex^{ca}
of anomalous parts of crown already familiar. Nor
was it viewed as gro^v by nob^l?, who reg^d? One
meets wth more indiffer^e, because or Arist^e.
unities exempt^d. from fr. & taxⁿ. wh^{ch} was gen^l
& prompt obj. But to impol^e acq^{see} Surrend?
& most val of or st^s, & intentⁿ of wh^{ch} by
or arist^y has maint^d. unimpaired its pol.
considerⁿ, while that of Castilⁿ has faded away

452

Novi Homines

Another practice was elevⁿ of novi homines,
from lower orders, by claims of merit. This
of course contrib^d to bring classes to same level

452-3

In Aragon
less
Decisive

Similar line of policy was pursued in
Aragon, wth less decisive effect, because or
pow^r was too firmly interw^{ed} behind pos. instit^{ns}
which or of Castilⁿ were swollen beyond law by
usurp^{ns}

454 436

Remainings
Power of
Nobles

When all had been done, & nobles still possessed a
disproportionate wt. in pol. balance. Their reqs. were im-
mense & lands of many ext. unbrk. oro leagues
in all pts of Kingdom. Isabella tried to draw on
sum & court (L. XIV & N VIII) but many, Chench's
feud. with^{ca} prof. live^s surround^d by retainers
in strong castles, bid. or Feme. They seized J's
dth as or opp^s, but succ^s of rulers, Ferd.
Jimmis, & Char V. check^d, & subdued her finally

not subdued
fully
before
Charles V

456

State of
Commons

The court^s of Com^s was prob^{ly} more prosp^s in
reg^s of F & J than at any other pt. of Sp. hist.
New wt. of wld & honors opp^s; & pers^s & prop^s
prot^d fearlessly by O Law.

There was no attempt to maintain^e sto^d army;
none at least near or vol^{ly} levies of her-
mandad, raised & pd. by O people.

The court^s of app^l at J's access^s had forced
her to lean upon people & they did not fail her.
Three sessions of pop. tri^{als} of leg^{is} were held in her
first two yrs. They were app^l more rare; & there was
less occas^s for O Hermandad, w^h itself ample rep^s.
Enforced laws at home & by liberal supplies for for^m
wars reduced full sessions, uninc^d.

462

Pragmaticas

The Pragmaticas were royal ordinances, issued by authority of sovereigns, sometimes of executive, sometimes of legislative character

Inquisitors

Ultimate

Effect

of Pragmaticas

Many of these were econ. in charac., to foster tr & mfg; oth. sumptuary. In meas app^o settled prin^{ts} of criminal jurispr^{ce}, a trust of prop^y, these sovereigns were careful to consult legis. but as example was not always foll^d. by succ^r. The pow^r became a fatal preced^t, & under Aust^r dyn^y became fatal means to restore lib^{ty}

Just as has oppos^t of a parl^y pow^r exists in Aragon, & I was in Castile

Transfer of

Political Power

results - a

Approximation

of the

sovereign

The laws gained pol. considⁿ by depressⁿ of work, but chief gain was dom^{tin} trans^{act} and secur^y of private ests. +. The chief gain of pol. pow^r result^d to sovereigns, & as was inc^d further by a extensⁿ of internat^l relat^{ns}, & control of wh. fell in Spain, as in Eur. gen^{lly} to sovereigns solely

Prerogative
gains
steadily

In result, conse^y, of gov^t. concerns of the Empire
were bro't under control of a few dept^s, wh looked
to Crown as its com. head; and the gov^t. tend^{ed}
as to interpret law in favor of prerog^{ue}—

476

The gov^t. n^o. of laws under it & I were
direct^d. to com & int^l. ind^y. The large n^o. shows
gov^t. expans^{ion} of nat^l. energy & resources, as well
as dispos^{ition} of gov^t. & for^{ign} em; but not always wisely

Regulation of
Commerce
and
Industry

By proh^{ib}. of 1500 all pers, nat. & for^{ign}, were
prohib^{it}d fr. ship^d goods in for^{ign} bottoms fr. a
port where the vess. c^o. he had. Another prohib^{it}d
sale of vess. to for^{ign}. And off^d. premium on
vess. above certⁿ. tonnage; & oth gov. prot^{ion} &
incent^{ives} to seamen. Genl. Obj., like Eng. Nav

Act was set forth to be exclus^{ive} of for^{ign} fr.
carry^{ing} trade, & to build up native marine,
for Com & Def. Col. Expans^{ion} for^{ign} these schemes,
and var^{ious} circ^{umstances} show a gov^t. meas. of success.

Flourishing
Merchant
Marine

The n^o. of vess. in mcht. serv. at begin 16 C^y
was by one auth^{ority}, 1000. We may infer
blow^{ing} und^{er} of merc. mar. fr. the mil^{itary}, as

Shown in armaments sent agst Turks & Bar[?] corsairs. The convoy wh. accp^d Joanne & Flanders in 1496 consist^d of 130 v^{ss}, large and small, wth force of 20,000 men

A prag^{te} of 1491, at petition of Nⁿ

Exportation
of
Precious Metals
Forbidden

provs^d, req^d ev^{ry} sth forⁿ to^{ms} & take returns in fruits, & merch^{se} of C^{try}, not in gold & silver or in bullion. This even, com. & all nat^{ns}, was espec. harmful to Spain, because & prod^{ct} of nat. mins, bth discov. Am, & Amⁿ aff^{ct} formed its gr^t staple. As such, the metals sh^d hv. enjoy^d every fac^e for transpⁿ to oth c^{tries}, where the higher value w^d fr. corresp^d profit to exp^{tr}

477-8

Casual

It seems clear th^t & attempt to control & free course of the w^{ld} be espec^{ly} harmful where such control is by one, or by a small body, instead of influenced by & free deliberation of many interests - by free discussion

Imperial
Regulation

Nothing could be more impulsive than some of
the summary legisⁿ, in check S. mfgs, wh. if
free use had been permitted to the prod, mt. ho.
formed an emp^t-treas. of aidⁿ; but the gov^t went
blindly further in encour^g. prodⁿ. of raw mat^{ls}
which forbidding its use in cutⁿ. mfgs.

Principal
Exports

The chief exp^{ts} of the mfgs were fruits, &
nat^l prod^s of soil, minerals, wh. were abund^t.
& simple mfgs as sugar, dressed skins, oil,
wine, steel, & horses of war. & fruit was very fine

To what extent fruit mfgs were carried, or exp^d
is uncertain. The most acute auth^s, Capmany,

Manufactures

& the only coarse cloths were mfgd, & that for home use.

But royal orders, by minute lists, imply a
considerable prog^{ess} in many mech^l arts; & the
testimony is borne by for^{ner} visits at begin^g.
of 16 C^h, who note fine cloths & arms in Segovia.
silks & velvets of Granada & Valencia, wool & silk
mfgs. at Toledo wh. employ^d 10,000 men, curio^s work
plate at Valladolid, cutlery & glass at Barcelona
working Venice

Conditions
of
Agriculture

The acc^{ts} of seasons of scarc^y, & fluctⁿ of
prices, w^d. suggest doubts as to excell^{ce} of
agric. in its origin; but a gen^l tenor of
legisⁿ of F & I. evid^{ts} relies on it as the main
spring of nat^l prosp^y. The reports of for^{ms},
wh. c^d. best compare cond^{ns} wth those elsewhere,
gr^{ve} & same evidence. They extol fruitfulness of
soil; hills clo^d wth vines & fruit-trees,
much more abund^{nt}, it w^d. seem, in Nth regions
thⁿ by an oval; the valleys & vegas flow^g wth
ripe exuber^{ce} of Sth vegetⁿ; extens. dist^{ts}, now
smitten wth barrenness, where now scarce vestige
of road or habitⁿ, but wh. on turned wth all req^y
for sust^{ce} of pop. cities in neighborhood 484

Subsequent
Decline

Decay of
Spain
begins in
16th Century

The decay now observable had already begun
at close of 16th C^y, for disbanding language of Cortes
shows the work of decay & depopⁿ. x x x There is
no story wh. has undergone such wild ex^{pt}, or
has shown such profound ign^{or} of true prin^{ples}

of econ^d science as Spain under H. of Austria
Matters may be intrinsically bad under F & J
was affected, troubled by blind legisⁿ of succⁿ;
& exportⁿ permission under them were no longer
so under ch^d. countries E. 4.

Vicious

Economic

Legislation

in

Spain

1 In 1492 F & J req^d to take returns
in prodⁿ & mfⁿ of Spain. By law of Ch. V. 1552
expⁿ of num^s dom^{stic} mfⁿ was prohibit^d, & toⁿ
toⁿ was req^d to import certⁿ amt^t of mfⁿ wt^s
- linen & woollen - to exch^{ge} for raw Spain's wool.

2 In 1500, F. & J. prohibit^d impⁿ of silk
from fr. Naples, in order to encour. prodⁿ
at home, & as is seen to no succ^d, by subsequent
laws. In 1552, a law was passed forbidding
expⁿ of mfⁿ silk, & allowing impⁿ of raw
mat^l, wh. of course crushed the mf & custom
of a woollen 486-7

May it not however be those meas.

resulted from decay of mf. & ind^y. In either
case the econ^d mistake is real; but the indicⁿ
is not certain, in days of arbitrary regulation

Casual

Ferdinand and Isabella I

Only four
States
1450

By mid 15 C^y the no of states into wh Sp.
was div^d had been reduced to four: Castile, Aragon,
Navarre & Moorish Granada.

2

Principal
Characteristics
of
Castilian
Towns

Fr. & exp^{os}. of Castilⁿ. T^s to predatory
incurs^{es} of Arabs, two nec^y not only th^{at} of sh^{ould}
be st^{rongly} fort^{ified}, but th^{at} every cit^y sh^{ould} be trained
to arms in def. An immense inc. of cons^{cription} was
gov^{erned} & bus^{iness}, wh^{ich} th^{is} const^{ituted} a most eff^{ective} ht
of nat^{ional} militia. To th^{is} cit^y, as well as th^{at} of
of civit^y sett^{lement} of frontier places by gov^{ernment} of
extr^{aneous} priors is to be attrib^{uted} early date &
but lib^{eral} charac^{ter} of charters to T^{owns} of Castile
These priors in gen^{eral} emp^{owered} th^{em} of adm^{inistrating} own
aff^{airs} not unlike T^{owns} of th^{at} c^{ountries} x x x but a
large ext^{ent} of adj. terr^{itory} was annex^{ed}, comprising
often many T^{owns} & villages wh^{ich} th^{is} of jurisdic^{tion}
th^{is} was th^{is} an adv. & all el^{ements} th^{at} T^{owns} sh^{ould}
be strong & not only to T^{owns} & K

18

The earliest list. on rec^{ord}. of pop. rep^{resentatives} in Castile
occ^{urred}. at Burgos 1169

Status of
the
Commons
in
Castile

The Cast. Com. by request? to make money grants
debt on concess^{ns} fr. Crowⁿ, making! At partial check
wh. was bent^{ly} ex^d in Br. part^l, & so cont^d for
in vain till much later per^d. What then & st. of not?
& claus^{es} & attⁿ? Cortes, or sanct^{ns} w^{as} not deemed nec^y to
valid^y of legisⁿ; for Br. parliam^{ts} w^{as} not req^d in
many ass^{es} of 14 & 15 C^{ts}. This extraor^y per^d of
C^{ts} w^{as} on whole unpar. to Br. lib^s, depriv^d of
support of both orders in struggles wth Crowⁿ.

It was, however, soon recog^d as fund^l prin.
of Constⁿ. At no tax cd be impos^d wthout consent of Cortes

22-3

Practice
vs
Theory

It w^{as}! show little acq^{ty} wth soc^l condⁿ of
Med Ages to suppose th^{at} pract^l ex. of the powers
always corresp^d wth Br. theory.

Conced

It is plain th^{at} work engag^d in earning or living,
wth only incid^l use of arms w^{as} always be wth many
of hurry mil^l classes

25-6

Trade of
Seville

Seville about mid of 15 C^{ts} is described as pass^g
flour^y Com, wth wth unswamp^d Seville Cong^t; active
popⁿ wth var^s mech^l arts. Dom^{stic} fabrics, as
well as nat^l prod^s - oil, wine, wool &c main^d to
wth Fr. H., Italy & Eng. The Biscay ports, (Castⁿ)

Ferdinand & Isabella I

Commerce
of
Biscay

were made of ext. to wth N. dur^g. 13 & 14 C^{ts}
Biscay had export. Com^{rs}. created wth Fr. & Eng,
& had factories at Bourges by use of arms & help,
except Germans

Nature of
Spain's
Exports

Capmany considers & raw mat^{ls} for m^{fg} &
& nat^l prod^{ts} of soil were almost & only art^l of
export fr. Spain, until after 15 C^{ty}

28 note 43

Zenith of
Population
Institutions

Population aut^{ly} reached its zenith in Castile
at acc^{ty} of Henry of Trastamara, 1393

30

Individuality
of
Castilian Concepts
unfavorable
to
Feudal Organization

The wider manner in wh. Cast^{le} notes
effect^s of Cong^{ress}, from Moors, by indiv^{idual} enterprise
was unpar. to introd. of feudal syst^m wh. prev.
prevailed in Castile & to same extent as it did
in Aragon, & in oth pt^s of Eur.

32

King's Power
in
Castile
Fresh
relativity

It is appar^t. fr. & partic. cond^{ns} in Castile,
& soon poss^{ibly} less par^t, & & perhaps more, than in
oth Eur. monarchies, at beginning of 15 C^{ty}

52

The Land
not
represented
in
Castilian
Cortices

The repⁿ of the people in Cortes, inst^d ^{hastly} of emanat^s
as in Eng, for an wider body of landed proprietors,
Cort^s? & real strength of the natⁿ, proceeded 'exclus⁷
fr. the, much more open to corrupt influence, &
prov^d fr. cor^ol. coopⁿ by local se^ls.

53

Castilian &
Aragonese
nobles

Find well charact^r. rel. pos^t. of Arag. & Cast^l
nobles, by saying 'I was as diff^{er}ent to divide one
as to unite two. (Aragonese, small^r but compact)

65

Power of
Aragonese
Cortices

The Cortes of A. ex^{er}c. the first funct^{ns}, delib.
legis, & jud^{ic}. Had r^t. to be consult^d, on all
matters of imp^{er}, espec. of peace & war. No
law valid, no tax c^d. be impos^d without its consent;
& it prov^d for applⁿ of rev. to destined uses

73

The 'General
Privilege'

The Gen^l. Privilege - the name Carta of Aragon -
was granted by Peter & Gr^o, Saragossa, 1283

74

Catalan
Characteristics

The Catalans were peculiarly jealous of their exclus.
priv^{es}, & their civil institutions more democ. than those
of any other of the Confeder^d states (of Aragon)

85-

Ferdinand & Isabella I

Barcelona

Barcelona was disting^d fr. very early
 per^d. for ample municip priv^s. After union
 of C^o wth Aragon in 12 C^o, Ks of A. ext^d
 same lib^s, so that by 13 C^o, B. had reached a
 cons^{id} prosp^{er}ous wall^s Ital Rep^s. She did wth
 Am & lucr^{at}. com. wth Alex^a, & her port, throng^d
 wth for^s of every natⁿ. became prin^{ci}pal emporium
 of Med. for spec^{ies}, drugs, perfumes, & oth comm^{od}
 of E. wher^e by dispers^d on into of Spain,
 & in oth coun^{tr}ies. Her consuls & factories were
 estab^d in every cons^{id} port of Med, of N.
 Eur. Nat^l prod^s of the soil, & her var^s dom
 fabric^s, suppl^d her abund^{ant} mat^{er} for exp^{ort}.
 She imp^{ort}d fr. Eng fine wool in cons^{id} quant^y.
 in 14 & 15 C^{is}, & not^d it imp^{ort}d. wth cloth,
 - an exch^g traded at pres^{ent} day. The w^{ild}
 of city was manif^{est} in her public works, &
 for^s wh^o visited in 14 & 15 C^{is} exp^{at}iate
 on magnif^{ic} of city

But her peculiar glory w^{as} her municip
 instit^{ut}ions, wh^o surround not only municip

Individualistic
Constitution
with
Separatist
Tendency

Reputation, but many acts of hostility: Com.
treaties, defenses of city; provⁿ for secur^y of tr;
grant^y letters of reprisal &c &c

Trade now was esteemed a degradⁿ in
Catalonia as it came to be in Castile

The city seems to have resembled the in-
dependent cities of Italy, at least when it was
in contact with Com.^y contact, as well as geog^y.

near

86-9.

Ferd & Isa I

p. 2, 18 (two direct advantages of all classes
in Castile. At 15 shall be strong - not only A & K
and 15), 18 note, 21 (and note) 22, 23, 25

25-6 It is plain that people engaged in earning
a livelihood, and with only incidental use of arms,
wd always be liable to forcible oppression by the purely
military classes.

————— " —————

26-7 Different from England

28 and note 43, 30, 32, 37, 45, 52, 53 (recall
here what Stubbs says of the superior efficiency of the
kings of the shires over the barons in the central
for preservation of Liberty).

65, 68, 73, 74, 77 note, 85, 86-7, 89

Will not the general statement be justified that
municipal institutions & prosperity = municipal life, in short
founded sooner & stronger where municipal life was possible

110, 185-6, 378-9, 380-7 (396)

Treaty of 1713 II

- 178-9 (Treaty of Utrecht, 4th and Papal Bull)
 254, 255, 56, 260-2 (prin. Stat Russ
 (Venice, Milan, Florence, Rome, Naples -)
 Lomva Pisa Tusc
 338-9, 340-41, 348 (Doubt marriage
 with Austria)

491 Com. in one narrow channel
 492-3, 494 & note, 502-3-4,

III

112. Does not state, precisely, reverse
 the course of England, and is a much less
 type of France. That is instead of one great
 center - the royal power - several centers spring
 from one another in historical tradition as well as
 in place - and of power so little unequal
 that no one could preponderate

157 note Maravedi 331,000,000 M^s = £9,268,000
 of present day
 1 M = 2.8 cents

