

MAHAN, MISSION OF WAR COLLEGE

6 Aug 88

"... speaking broadly, it may be said that the true aim [of the NWC] is to promote, not the creation of naval material, but the knowledge how to use that material to the best advantage in the conduct of war."

and many terrible difficulties p 626

Mahan said initial argument against NWC was that it would compete w/ Annapolis school. above statement clarified. went on to say we had many hardware experts but none "... who are our authorities on the art of war..." A most persuasive argument on the need for the NWC. 9th object: "91 is the study and development, in a systematic, orderly manner, of the art of war as applied to the sea, or such parts of the land as can be reached from ships." pp 627, 8

The conduct of war is controlled by general principles, not by cast-iron rules of invariable application. These must be studied and understood so that they may be applied by our naval leaders. p 628 College would concentrate on Strategy and Grand Tactics p 632 And Logistics p 635 Note this petered out and Spruance reinstated in 1946 - also minor subjects of Hygiene, Coast Defense & attack

Mahan ①

ATMOSPHERE OF 20s & 30s

1920s worse because of disarmament & low status of military. 1930s better because of job security. Pay cut not too bad because purchasing power increased. also under Roosevelt Navy started rebuilding.

Cannolly Oral History

Capt H.C. Taylor, Pres NWC, reflects on the summer's work, hopes that the Navy feels NWC is justifying its existence. Hopes NWC will make naval officers more aware of questions of strategy & tactics.
p 800-1

MAHAN, PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF NWC

6 SEPT 92

Pd 89-93 turbulent. Question of where to locate NWC and possible consolidation of Torpedo & Apprentice School, length of school year. (apparently only 2 mos/yr.)

Questioned what we would do with our new Navy we were building p160. Deplored lack of written works or interest or understanding of naval warfare p161

Provided a spirited argument against naval officers who said NWC was not practical. He defended by saying it was practical from viewpoint it trained naval officers to fight war.

Mahan (3)

Pointed out that Army had advanced schools, and that a similar school was needed for the Navy.

They must study the science of war and be led into a philosophic study of naval history. Coaster Island had all the needed facilities. Proposed a course of post-graduate study for the Science of War, Ordnance, and International Law

(He ran into a hell of a lot of trouble by using phrase "post-graduate")

Wahon was a miracle in that he provided the genius, inspiration, and ability to make it a going concern

" Dear Admiral Melson,

My duty at the Naval War College prior to World War II covered six years between 1926 and 1938 --- the first year taking the Senior Course and, later, two tours of duty on the staff. I consider that what I learned during those years was of the utmost value to me, in the opportunity it gave me to broaden my knowledge of international affairs and of naval history and strategy.

The Naval Academy course in my time as a midshipman --- 1903 to 1906 --- was by no means a liberal education. The courses at the Naval War College in later years, with the fine lectures that we had and the problems in strategy that were given to the student officers to solve, gave us a liberal education. (CONT)

(over)

This to me was of the utmost value throughout the years of World War II in the Pacific, and later after retirement during my three years as Ambassador to the Philippines from 1952 to 1955.

Cordially,
(s) Raymond A. Spruance
RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE

Note: Nimitz sent a similar letter to Melsou about the same time. Looks like Melsou was soliciting testimonials.

Was a member of NWC Class of 1923. "The enemy of our games was always - Japan - and the courses were so thorough that after the start of WWII - nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected. Each student was required to plan logistic support for an advance across the Pacific - and we were well prepared for the fantastic logistic efforts required to support the operations of the war - The need for mobile replenishment at sea was foreseen - and even practiced by me in 1937. . . " "I credit the Naval War College for such success I achieved in strategy and tactics both in peace and war." "I regard your [VAUGHN MELSON] job as President of the Naval War College as being second only to that of CNO in importance and I congratulate you on having that fine billet."

P II Spruance's recommendation for a standard planning form for all services was adopted. It came out in a War College Pub called "Naval Manual of Operational Planning," which replaced "Cominch P-1, Naval Directives and the Order Form." 1947 issue was interim for NWC use only. 1948 issue was for Navy-wide use. 1947 issue see p ii

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1946

Spruance considered that the "Estimate of the Situation" should be simplified and reduced and a standard publication issued which is not to be changed by a shift in command of the War College or by the new ideas of individuals every one or two years. Also maintained that a basic statement and form be established for joint use by all services. Spruance apparently went to Washington in March 46 to push his argument.

Note that this was 11 Mar, ten days after he took over NWC. He wanted suggestions from staff NLT 12 Mar. He apparently was highly successful.

See FOTS 47-B

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1910

"Estimate" and "Formulation of Orders" introduced,
based on the papers of Griepenkerl, the German
military writer p 1162

Staples

(7)

"As Admiral Spruance himself explained: "at the Naval War College in our Estimate of the Situation form we used to have: 'The enemy, his strength, disposition and probable intentions.' Later, 'probable intentions' was changed to 'capabilities.' We found that there had been a tendency to decide what an enemy was going to do and lose sight of what he could do. I have seen just this happen in fleet problems at sea, and it is very dangerous." "

See also POTTER (113)

Patten Ltr (18)

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 1926-7

OP II - 27

In the OP PROB II-27, F o t S, the following considerations were emphasized:

Urgency

Prospect of Success

Cost of Success or Failure

Possible Gain Worth Possible Cost

Forces.

This seems to follow Spruance's WWII reasoning.

The advantages & disadvantages were also stressed. So in determining objectives, or courses of action, they were using an "advantages, disadvantages, considerations" sequence. (over)

OP II - 27 (90)

Also 1926-7 NWC plans called for the isolation rather than the invasion of Japan. This is what Spruance advocated in 1945

Character of Japs - NWC looked upon them as fanatical, disciplined, loyal people who will fight like hell.

ADM BEHNCKE VISIT APRIL 1927

Pratt sent a ltr to Director of Naval Intelligence reporting Behncke's visit.

Arrived 191130 APR 27. No war game in progress, but saw physical layout. Chatted w/ Pres & staff about an hr. After lunch, he hesitated, then consented to address the class at 1400. RADM Sims (No 1) & other high ranking officers invited to attend.

In introduction, Pratt said NWC had never before been honored w/ two high ranking officers who had opposed ea other during WWI. "Admiral Behncke had consented to tell, in his own way, of some of his experiences during the World War.

(Over)

In his address, emphasized German emphasis on their ships stability, seaworthiness, & damage control. Also stressed superior fire control & ammo, altho guns were of lesser calibre than Brits. — Then he described his part in Battle of Jutland, the maneuvers, and so on. Stressed need for admiral to be out where he can see things. (Important in lines of battle. Later in WW II he sees things through radar & radio rptg).

Sims remarked how impressed he was w/ German math & technical superiority.

Then Pratt related Admiral's private political views.

Returned for one more visit on 20th, left in afternoon.

Pratt felt he was visiting US "... searching out the American opinion of Germany & certainly Germany is well represented by a man of this type."

Retired German naval officer in command of First German Squadron in Battle of Jutland. Lunched at Pratt, then.

"In describing that memorable battle Admiral Behncke gave a first hand account of it, telling of his experiences, which were closely followed by the War College officers, some of whom asked questions. It was a matter of surprise to Admiral Behncke to learn that, prior to the Battle of Jutland, the Naval War College officers then in this city staged a theoretical Battle of Jutland, the result of which came out exactly as did the fight when it was staged as the biggest naval battle of modern times." "Admiral Sims, who had heard the talk at the War College, also spoke there, at the conclusion of Admiral Behncke's remarks, calling particular attention to the fact that Admiral Behncke had (cont.)

given his remarks in English, after which Admiral Sims asked how many of the American officers could give a similar talk on naval tactics in German."

"I was in the famous Battle of Jutland room in the war college, so named following the discussion there during the war of what might happen in the North Sea if the German and British Fleets came together, that the German officer politely invited the attention of those present to the German interpretation of the result of the famous naval engagement. So far as the German high command was concerned, he said, the result of the battle, recognized by the world as an English victory, was a victory for the Germans."

used usual aids & apparently did it convincingly justifying his victory claim to Boston Post reporter.

III Command Phase (See MOORE ON COMMAND)

By acquiring professional knowledge you can monitor the work of your subordinates, can give them guidance when necessary, and no interference. "There is nothing which gives a man more supreme confidence, making him less apt to interfere with the duties of others, than the knowledge that he is the master of his own profession. When you have attained this confidence, through hard and conscientious work, you will exact the same performance of duty from others, but you will be less likely to be suspicious, to nag, or to interfere with their work because you will be a better judge of whether it is well done, from having done it well yourself. Therefore, the power which you will hold over your subordinates is not one which displays itself in nagging or in doing the work yourself, but in a close inspection of the work of others, and the ability to guide the (cont)

effort of your subordinates along the proper line; ... If he interferes too much with the details which should be the province of others to execute, he causes chaos and dissatisfaction within his command."

GENERAL ROUTINE 1926-27

Pg 3 Daily Sessions 0900-1530 1st Pd 0900-1230
2nd Pd 1330-1530
Wed & Sat 0900-1230

Those desiring to be absent must get permission from
Cops

Pg 5 Quarters War College Secretary kept detailed housing
info

Pg 5 Medical House calls made in Newport

Pg 5,6 Commissary ~~sto~~ Stores delivered to WC orderly room
or to homes

Pg 6 Laundry Picked up & delivered in Newport

(DUFER)

Routine (16)

Pg 7 Library Open 0900-1630 on working days

Pg 8 Reading lounge Books in student room libraries

Pg 8 Archives Hold classified material

Pg 10 Uniform Civilian clothes

Pg 11 Rubber heels Wear rubber heels to reduce noise.

ACADEMIC CURRICULUM

1926-27

Pg 13

Length of Course: 11 max

Composition of Classes: Sr. 50 Navy Line

1 MC

1 NC Naval Constructor

1 CE

Actually not that many

4 USMC

4 USA

1 USCA

Jr. 23 Navy Line

2 USMC

Course of Instruction:

- (1) Lectures (2) Reading courses (3) Thesis writing & committee reports (4) Problem solving (5) Chart & board maneuvers (6) Logistics (7) International Law Situations

(OVER)

ROUTINE (16)

p 13 (1) Lectures: "Lectures are on subjects directly bearing upon current work at the college, or on other subjects of professional interest."

Reading Courses: Purpose for preparation of theses and for general instruction. Pre-war familiarization reading should include Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form, War Instructions, and various tactical problems.

p 13, 4 (2) Theses & Committee Plans: Two copies of theses req'd. Orig ret'd w/ comments. Carbon filed in library.

p 14, 5 (3) Problems: Classified as Operations, Strategic, or Tactical, followed by Roman numeral. Ex: OPERATIONS PROBLEM II-37. An operations problem can be continued as a Chart or Tactical Manuever, all problems reviewed by Div C; Div D reviews those parts pertaining to command subjects. International Law Problems reviewed by Div D. Logistic problems by Div A. Additional statistical data used to solve problem must be foot noted. Tactical problem solutions usually played on manuever board and on game board.

P15

(5) Chart & board maneuvers - used to test solutions of each scouting & screening problem, and some strategic and tactical problems

(6) Logistics - Not amplified

(7) International Law - Promulgated separately.

Schedule of Employment Sheds issued yearly & monthly.
Forenoons for problem solutions and playing of tactical & chart maneuvers, afternoons for lectures, reading, thesis work, & problem solving.

P15⁶ Make-up of theses, committee plans, & problems: Brief instructions on format.

CLASS & FACULTY 1926-27

President - RADM W.V. Pratt
 Chief of Staff
 Secretary
 Aide

Div A - 2 ; Div B - 1 ; Div C - 11 ; Div D - 3

Sr Class

USN 34
 MG 2
 SC 2
 CEC 1
 USMC 3
 USA 3

Jr Class

USN - 23
 USN(cc) - 1
 USMC - 2

45
 26
 1

Rayall Ingersoll - Future Admiral
 Forrest Sherman - Future CNO

TOTAL 45

REGISTER (17)

- (1) The solution of operations problems, involving strategy & tactics, on an analytical and competitive basis
- (2) Lectures
- (3) The solution & discussion of international law topics
- (4) Reading courses
- (5) Thesis work
- (6) Committee reports on naval campaigns

Great emphasis on logistics

MAHAN'S PICTURES IN THE LECTURE HALL 1926-7

P17 Admiral Mahan's picture was on the wall so that the students receiving lectures looked straight at him.

Go to Tulejas book on "Neptune the God, Mahan the prophet" to add color - This was how Navy was regarded in 200 ± 300

P197

THESES

1926-7

Thesis on

Command
Policy

61 days
71 days

11 Sept
4 Dec

Dept issued separate instruction

Cdr H. H. Lammers of the staff conducted a study called "Chemical Weapons in Naval Warfare," for circulation among officers of the Naval War College staff.

RAOM Pratt prepared the paper with some remarks, dated 6 Jan 27. The gist is that "a decided attempt is being made to prolong peace by limiting armaments." (emphasis Pratt's). Pratt recognized the danger inherent in chemical & biological warfare, and one supposes that he told Lammers to explore the subject.

The paper itself uses a crude form of footnotes

(over)
Use this as color; a catalyst to discussion
among w/c students.

P¹² After quoting references & using various reasonings,
he concludes

" (1) That chemical weapons in general are really more humane than guns and explosives;

(2) that their use against military targets should not be prohibited. "

Third, that chemical weapons may be unlawfully used against the civilian population by an unscrupulous enemy, and finally

" all the evidence on the law and the inherent ~~with~~ merits of the matter seem to be that the naval use of chemical weapons in any war in which the United States is a belligerent is both legal and humane. "

SPRUANCE EXPERIENCE PRIOR NWC 1926

- p2 40 years old when he entered NWC
p3 Including USA, 23 years in the Navy
p4 18 years of commissioned service
p6 CO Bainbridge
p8 CO Aaron Ward
CO Percival
p10 CO Dale (for transit to Europe only)
CO Osborne

Comment: Lots of engineering shore duty, lots of sea duty, but nothing in way of planning. But he did read and discuss broader issues. See p7

p24,25

SPRUANCE EXPERIENCE PRIOR NWC 1926-7

Spruance had been a commander for 4 1/2 years, had spent this entire time at sea, and had 13 years of total sea service

SPRUANCE CORRESPONDENCE CSE PRIOR 1926

p 20

Spruance did not complete any ^{NWC} correspondence courses before taking the Ser Course in 1926-7

p11

SPRUANCE PERSONAL FEELING ABOUT NWC 1926-7

As a young officer felt NWC to be important, at that time a tour at NWC essential for attaining position of top command. Ambitious officers "... coveted at least one tour of duty at the Naval War College." Spruance had applied for the course.

p10 " It is widely felt that a letter of reprimand is second only to a General Court Martial in its adverse effect upon an officer's career and prospects for advancement."

p10-11 " It [the incident] illustrates too, that even the greatest and most successful careers are not without human disappointments and reverses which men of character and determination do not accept as final. The letter of reprimand gave Spruance great concern, but in his heart he felt that he had not been at fault to the degree that issuance of a letter of reprimand would imply. As we shall see, his subsequent performance of duty and his devoted application to the tasks at hand eliminated any adverse effect the letter may have caused, a letter that was completely without consequence in his later rise to the top."

NAVY ATTITUDE

1926-7

Go into disarmament, feeling of peace & security, & what effect it may have had on attitude of NWE folks. Check basic history plus USVIP at the time.

Emphasizing a toiling group of professionals at their trade!

TOPIC

STIMSON ON MAHAN &
NAVY IN GENERAL 1929

REF. NO.

TULEJA

94

NOTES

p46 "And even though it was at a later date that he sarcastically described the 'anonymous and continuous' admirals as men who retired from logic' into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States^{Navy} the only true church. . ."

LOCATION

CURRICULUM 1926-27

Captain Parnell outlined year's Operational Problems program.

THREE PROBLEMS

OPERATIONS PROBLEM I

OPERATIONS PROBLEM III

" " II

Authored by Operation Dept.

Authored by War C. Movement

Joint Operations, Landings
in Force - Concurrent w/ Study
in Logistics

See also War College History

Curators File on Curriculum

GRADUATION DAY

27 MAY 1927

P^{7,8}

RAOM Pratt spoke first, "The Three Phases of a Naval Career, Some Reflections of an Older Officer." SECNAV Curtis D. Willhite presented diplomas, including a surprise one to Pratt. It was held in NAVTRASTA auditorium w/ many families attending. People showed off for new duty stations. LT Campbell, his long-time flag Lt, called out names. Capt Van Kewen handed them to SECNAV.

The preceding week marked the end of the "War of 1927" a massive joint Army-Navy exercise and big, gala celebration for the Fleet. Many dinners, dances, and speeches. SECNAV was in town all week talking. It was call "Fleet Week" Big news was Lindbergh crossing atlantic several days earlier.

p193

GRADUATION DAY

27 MAY 70

Some 11 admirals attended ceremonies, as they were there attending fleet week.

p192 Some 70 students & 19 faculty.

SECNAV 1927 GRADUATION SPEECH

SECNAV Curtis D. Wilbur followed Pratt w/ an address

Summarized NWC mission. Called attention of need to master new technologies being introduced into fleet, especially aviation. Lindbergh had just crossed Atlantic. Praised NWC for introducing planes in war gaming. Emphasized education, at first equating "education" with "training for battle readiness." Then he went on to say that sailors trained in service are being educated for civilian jobs. Looked upon Lex & Sara as floating schools, and their 45 mil \$ cost ea is as much an investment in education as a school bldg. (Sounds like he was under fire from educators who "lament the expenditure of forty-five million dollars for an aircraft carrier instead of expending it for education.")

(over)

Then he spoke on loyalty, which enunciated a basic Spruance philosophy (See SECNAV/MOORE/SPRUANCE ON PUBLICITY) "I can only mention one other fundamental quality in national defence and this is loyalty. There is perhaps a greater temptation in war than in civil life to seek for personal glory. One is struck in the writings of John Paul Jones by the weight he places on the attainment of glory. When he presented the problem of the naval officer as one of life-long study, he did not fail to mention glory as one of the objects to be achieved. One cannot study naval history without noting the fact that often the question of personal pride entered entered into the problem of the commander. Something of the spirit of the duel entered into naval combat. Challenges were actually sent and replied to and ships were sometimes thus hazarded in violation of the wishes of and the express orders of superior authority (cont)

It is true that the disobedience of the victorious commander was usually overlooked and his offense condoned by his superior and by the public. Disloyalty, however, cannot be justified by success no matter how much we may overlook and ignore its existence. Personal pride should not enter into the problem of national defense. One cannot study the life of General Grant without noting his humility, his lack of personal pride and his willingness to serve in any station. In his memoirs, he has told us that he never sought an assignment to a command for fear that if he secured such an assignment, he would be unduly influenced in his plans by his desire to justify his selection. He felt that if he was the unbiased choice of his superiors he would do his full duty when he did his best. [Pratt must have been squirming]

Loyalty to be worthy of commendation involves a submission of personal ambitions to the great cause in which it is enlisted. (over)

The success of the nation is more important than the success of an individual and there is no place in the national defence for petty jealousies or political aspirations."

And he concluded, prophetically

"I wish you success in your profession. Success is a true appreciation of your real merit by those competent to understand and to evaluate your conduct and your professional worth."

PRATT'S GRADUATION ADDRESS

27 MAY 27

Entitled "The Three Phases of a Naval Career, Some Reflections of an Older Officer", it shivers the spine because it is so prophetic of Spruance's future. This could also serve as model of contemporary naval thought.

Served as his conception of a naval career, so one assumes that he conveyed these thoughts to his students.

[Comment: Personal influence of sr officers on juniors]

Phase I Preparatory

II Executive

III Command

Phase I - Early, intensive training, usually at USNA & midn cruises. Spoke on need for team-work between corps & organizations, the value of a broad education.

"Education limited entirely to technical aspects sometimes fails to produce in man that state of mind (over)

which enables him to coordinate the fact with the cause and the principles underlying it." "... no matter how your education has been attained, you should never allow it to stagnate. The world moves too fast to permit of mental stagnation in its leaders." Character formed. Loyalty to service superior to loyalty to self.

Phase II - Executive - Benefits of varied sea duty. NWC essential to gain broad perspective necessary for high command. Recommended reading for mental development and knowledge, particularly history & the study of past leaders. "... you should remember that your allegiance is due first to the Service and not to a person. The wise leader never will expect your allegiance to be given to him, but to be given to the Service, and knows that it is given to him only as he stands for something in the Service which you recognize to be right and great."

SPRUANCE AT GRADUATION

Summarizing what he was taught, what was emphasized, what he himself did

MRS SPRUANCE ON NWC

1970

July 31, 1970

Tel. 375-4671

Dear Professor Schwass,

Your letter of July 15th lies before me. I look forward to your visit at the P. G. School on or about September 14th. The only time I may be out of town is in November. In the meantime I shall get the papers and other memorabilia pertaining to my husband ready for you.

I am happy and proud that Admiral Spruance's papers etc., shall someday be in his beloved War College.

Remember me to your Margaret.

Sincerely,

Margaret D. Spruance

Mrs Spruance (84)

NAVAL AVIATION 1926-7

Lt Forrest P. Sherman wrote a paper on the German Naval air arm in WWI. One senses that he wanted to talk about contemporary naval aviation but was not allowed to. So he gave a desultory report on the Germans.

The first contact between two officers (Sherman & Spruance) who would be antagonists during & after WWII.

OUTLINE OF PRAIT INFLUENCE

1926-7

Participated in war game critiques

Pushed logistics very, very hard.

Developed landing problem against opposition.

Reorganized NWCO on joint staff principles

Formed committees to do staff studies.

p 50 No great changes while PRES NWC. With normal NWC practice, he spotted several bright students & retained them as 26-27 faculty. [Check w/ Hol relationship Spruance had w/ NWC pres to merit his rtn] No ~~&~~ Royall Impersall close. Took him out of class of '27 & kept him for five years. I have Impersall. Lt. Pratt selected several outstanding students for his next staff. Spruance warned one of them.

"Like every War College president before him, Pratt tinkered with the administrative and instructional organization of the institution." Repeats what he did, organizing like a naval staff.

p 51 after he left ^{NWC} went back to traditional departments of tactics, strategy, logistics, and law.

(over)

p51 Because of interest in international affairs, had State Dept.
lecturers.

Clairmont Seng Wilbur held Pratt in high esteem, and after
consulting w/ Fleet's admirals, gave Pratt the NWC
diploma in 1937.

"Pratt deeply disliked officers who engaged in special
pleading for their own interests, but he was never hesitant
to keep the Department informed of his preference for duty."
indicative of his ambitious motives and drum beating.

p39 Disliked details. Concentrated on leadership, w/
stuff doing coolie labor.

" Q: Tell me something about Admiral Pratt.

Ingersoll: Admiral Pratt was a very distinguished officer. He had been the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Benson during World War I. He was very much interested in War College work and the education of officers for command."

" Q: Admiral, when Admiral Pratt was made President of the War College, was the intention that he would have a better opportunity there to see the promising young officers and to make some assessment of their abilities for future assignments and their future advancement?"

(over)

Impersell: No. I think it was felt that he was the best officer qualified for that position. Of course, it did give him an opportunity to meet the officer that came to the college. . . . "

PRATT ON NWC

He donated 3 1/2 papers of his ^{aiite} biography to
Pres NWC. Wrote 361 pages in all.

Was deeply impressed when there on staff 1911-13

Indebted to Mc Carthy Little.

Was college training good for those who are receptive,
but fatal for those with fixed, preconceived notions.

Teaches efficient diagnosis, not going to ~~draw~~ to files
to pull out canned solutions.

His 1911-13 tour "... certainly influenced my future
career, and may have been a turning point in it.

P60-1 Wheeler sums up Pratt's success.

1. Held virtually every important flag billet through CNO.
2. Republicans appreciate his work in area of naval limitation. Became an indispensable expert.
3. Would work hard w/ great personal deprivation.
4. Excellent seaman & shiphandler.
5. Open & innovative mind. Communicated well w/ jr officers. Receptive to new ideas.

over

6. Pragmatist & optimist, a struggle ^{simply} for the fight involved wasn't worth the game. Worked within the realm of the possible.

p39 Instructor in tactics at NWC 1911-13. Influenced by venerable Capt W. McCarty Little. Said that NWC provided a great and enduring influence throughout his life — ~~it was~~ NWC was to influence and direct his life and its actions.

WAR COLLEGE MISSION & CURRICULUM

AS SEEN BY PRES NWC ADM PRATT

SEPT 1927

NWI highlighted need for NWC grads and demonstrated NWC value. Navy policy that higher command billets favored NWC grads. Staff & student body greatly increased p 941. Expanded into Jr & Sn classes in 1924. Corres cse reestablished 1919, open to all, and a virtual prerequisite to attend NWC. p 941

Comment: NWC now in solid!

ORGANIZATION

Division A Logistics, B information, C movement, D policy and plan. (C, movement a combination of old strategy and Tactics departments. p 943

PRESENT COURSE

(Access Navy statement)

General: Pratt felt NWC mission too narrow, in that it concentrated on conduct of naval warfare and the art of command. Navy must also keep the peace and must study international relations (espies prep represent US), joint operations

with the Army, testing of Navy Dept originated war plans, and cooperation w/ Fleet in stopgap & solution of latter's practical sea problems p 942 Senior class stresses strategical work ~~broadened~~, specifically problems of naval strategy & tactics broadened to include logistics (which includes personnel, material, and supply), plans and policy, and information. Reason: WWI emphatically taught that brilliant tactics cannot compensate for faulty strategy " ... and neither military strategy nor tactics will carry through to success unless basic principles well outside the ken of the purely military school be adhered to." p 943

See next page on course details

Pratt (6)

WAR COLLEGE MISSION & CURRICULUM
AS SEEN BY PRES NWC ADM PRATT

The Present Course

Both classes combine for major problem work. Logistic feature is stressed as well as operational features, less attention to these (only, Policy & Command). More emphasis on committee work, studying certain selected features of a campaign, a battle, source & supply of raw material, or the matter of a national policy. Speakers present findings for platform followed by open discussions. "Much work is crowded into year, perhaps too much." "... the courses have been crowded in order to make the officers themselves realize how many important topics there are, and how many sided is the art of war."

(over)

Pratt (2)

International Law taught by prestigious George Drafton
Wilson of Harvard. Needed to solve complex problems
during war (particularly of neutrals), as well as having to act
as only govt rep in time of peace. Lectures always covered
international relations and lately entered economics, finance,
industry, & labor. All these come under heading of resource,
management, and potential strength. Location near institutions
of higher learning provide many experts, and NWC also draws
upon State & other govt agencies. p 94d Just started improving
liaison w/ AWC, and 1926-27 saw first interchange of officers.
p 94c

When Pratt took over, he abolished the emphasis on theses and adopted the committee system. This system substituted the study of the strategy, logistics, and tactics of actual battles and campaigns for the former strategy and tactics theses.

(Although Bakenhaus doesn't mention it in his Logistics lecture, the committee got going on the Strategic Law Materials subject, also a Logistics study)

Significance: New committees got started.

P181, 2

Subjects of committee reports

1. Logistics in a B-O war
2. Caribbean - Panama area logistics in a Blue-Black war.
3. Strategic Row Maths
4. National and naval logistics planning in peace & war.
5. Logistics of mobilization for a B-O war.
6. Importation of 500K tons of manganese during the first year of a B-O war

LOGISTICS 1926-7

Page 1

Course began on 1 December 1926. Students given introductory lecture by Capt Bahenhaus. Issued packet containing a number of pamphlets.

- (1) Chart by Pratt - Naval Command & Administration
- (2) Outline of Logistics
A. National Logistics B. Naval Logistics
- (3) A. Basic Principles in Naval Logistics B. Logistics and the Principles of War C. Logistics, Conservation of Effort and Material.
- (4) Relation of Naval Logistics to National Logistics (transfer of national resources to the Navy)
- (5) War Time Control of Industry
- (6) Report on War Industries Board by Baruch
- (7) Strategic Raw Materials by AWC (used extensively by Nav Math comm.)
- (8) Fleet Service & Supply by Adm Leonty (9) Rodman Board with Shore Establishment
- (10) Tonnage of Ships & Cargo by Capt Van Keuren. ^{Nav} ~~Army~~ had done earlier. Considered planning for Joint Overseas Expeditionary Force

Logistics had been touched upon earlier at NWC, but not in the depth required. "Furthermore this year is the first time in the history of the War College that the importance of logistics has been emphasized by the establishment of a department and section devoted to the subject." The earlier NWC work in logistics "... has been only spasmodic and lacking in comprehensiveness." Justifying the course, the current war play says "The greatest difficulty in executing all phases of the War operations lie in logistics." Staff's output and work and preparation & expertise "... the result of their efforts has met with the approval of superior authority in the War College." So, Pratt likes what men do, so the student "experts" take it for what it's worth.

LOGISTICS COURSE 1926-7

In the Logistics course, Bakenhus had to lean on the Army for doctrine of marine transportation of troops and supplies, and expeditionary force doctrine. NWC reprinted two chapters from "Logistics of Larger Units in the Theatre of Operations" by The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1922-1923. The Army apparently knew a great deal about operating passenger/cargo ships! However, their concept of moving and landing an Expeditionary Force were naive and archaic. No conception of what was intended.

Logistics course outline cont

- (11) Acquisition and Conversion of Merchant Vessels for Wartime Use
- (12) Marine Transportation of Troops and Supplies and Expeditionary Forces by General Service School, 31 Leavenworth. The Army's doctrine. Showed that the Navy had no doctrine. Army even went into ship's papers, inspection & rating of vessels, lists & registers, libels, marine insurance, port & canal charges, all to do w/ merchant vessels, information "... probably not so well known." Apparently Pratt directed that this paper be used by NWC.
- (13) Command, General Staff, and Staff Organization from Genl Svc School. Another Pratt inclusion.
- (14) Composite of Publications by AWC. Bakenhaus emphasized Army's study & expertise in logistics.
- (15) Recommended reading.
- (over)

(16) Notes as to Joint Army & Navy Action in Overseas Expeditions (Incomplete).

all the NWC had at the time for joint Army/Navy overseas expeditions. Complete study much needed. Would help in NWC landing problems against opposition, stressing logistics.

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On 1 July 26 Division A, Logistics, was established:

Capt RE Bakenhus, CEC, USN (Head of Division)
Col Frank E. Evans, USMC
Captain A.H. VanKuren, CEC, USN
LCol Walter A. Reed, USA

Cols Evans & Reed try to other divisions later in year.
VanKuren's principle duty was College Secy.

Urged that students be broadminded in studying logistics. Would consider logistics all the way from raw matl to mfg to ultimate use. Very, very broad! Even referred to the Dept of Agriculture and population explosion. The Army was much better informed, had conducted intensive studies from which NWC borrowed heavily.

Listening to Bahenhaus outlines the extremely broad scope must have been staggering in contemplating the magnitude of his subject.

And he also spoke of cost effectiveness and mobilizing for war.

Bakkenhus developed an extensive optional reading list for the Logistics course. It included extracts from Mahan, Clausewitz, and Tomini; ^{WWI} reports; NBC lectures; books on economics; magazine and professional journal articles; theses; in fact, everything on logistics he could lay his hands on.

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National Economics . . . Dr. W.W. McClure

The Control of Extra Territorial
Supplier of Raw Materials . . . Dr. E. Dana Durand

An Expeditionary Force Overseas . . . Col R.H. Dunlop, USMC

Communications . . . Capt Ridley McLean, USA

Mineral Resources in Their Present
Bearing on International Relations . . . Dr. C.K. Reith

Industry in War . . . Col H.B. Ferguson, USA

(over)

Logistics Plans for Fleet Operations Capt D.C. Cromwell SC

The Trend of Population and Agricultural
Population Production in the U.S. Dr. F.O. Baker

Economics and its Relation to War Dr. James T. Shotwell

" The lecture course was of an informative nature,
designed to broaden the viewpoint of the naval officer.

COL DONLAP ON AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE 4 JAN 1927

General, Overseas Expeditionary Force

Mission: Intended for an expedition over the seas. He discussed the type designed to support the fleet in its advance into hostile waters. (Note, support fleet rather than fleet support troops)

Bases: An advance base or bases is needed because fleet will have to cross vast expanse of water, far from CONUS, to force action on enemy fleet. Bases needed for refit, fueling, rest, or to guard lines of communication.

Enemy Bases: Must be "mopped up" if they threaten fleet's line of communication.

Major Base: Needed so train & auxiliaries may be safe while fleet seeks decisive action. Enemy will aggressively seek to deny (OVER) us potential major bases. | Dunlap (10) |

However, he will not be able to deny us all possible sites, but he will do all in his power to deny to us recognized important positions.

Nature of terrain -- of probable sites in Pacific

Ideal Island for Defense & Anchorage: Volcanic origin, high ground cut with deep ravines, fringed with coral reefs w/ few openings, few good landing beaches. Most ideally it should be isolated from other islands, so no adjacent islands could be used for organizing & staging attacks. Attacker needs a nearby land airdrome and will be attacked by enemy planes while acquiring it.

Tactics of Defense of an Island Position (Spruance could use at Midway!)

Naval Defense: Use your fleet to defeat attacking fleet, transports, or transports at sea. Two recognized purely military methods

- a. Cordon system - defensive line divided into sectors of varying size with given forces with own reserve.
- b. Mobile system - entire defensive line held lightly for observation. Large mobile reserve not committed until main point of attack determined, and ^{such} commitment will best meet the tactical needs (Midway!)

The Island Land Defense: attackers most vulnerable when passing ship to shore. They can be defeated if they land on a narrow front! The defender can concentrate his fire and bring up reserves.

Dunlap (11)

The Attack

Training/Planning: All preliminary time must be used in perfecting plans, and training. Insure all hands know the plans, objectives, & their parts.

Coordination Phases: Closest coordination required between Fleet & Expeditionary Force. Logistics (loading & getting to destination on time), Beach selection, ~~Beach selection~~ (mines, tides, surf, water depth, obstructions), air and naval gunfire support, and general boat schedule, and beach control, & communication details.

Force Disposition: Land on as broad a front as possible, because enemy can't spread his forces & defend equally throughout. Success at one point can assist troops who are bogged down elsewhere. Feints must be persuasive. (But not too broad!)

Timing: He strongly believed that attack must be in darkness or under cover of smoke or gas. Also very small landing with oars.
8-16⁺ men
oars!

Naval gun fire in support of landings

Phases: (1) Preliminary bombardment (2) Covering the landings
(3) Support of troops ashore

Development: Must be developed by naval line officers. Some are now interested. Need development of indirect fire, using air and forward observers, and good communications. Naval gun excels in deflection & has range errors. Use accordingly. Emphasized need for good communications and naval observers controlling fires. Wanted pin-point fire vice barrages.

Air support

Mandatory.

Comment. Through this school of 26-27, see if you can find how the NWC proposed to capture these islands in the Pacific

Greenlade then went into the influence of changes effected this year. See INFLUENCE OF CHANGES.

NWC regretted that there were so few opportunities for tactical games (board maneuvers). See BOARD MANEUVERS.

BLUE End of Greenlade, now 6 problem 24 then 26
B gov't decision

- (1) Isolate O to ensure compliance w/ B demand.
- (2) Do this w/ B fleet near O communication.
- (3) B unable to close O over northern route.
- (4) Timely relief of Manila important
- (5) Army will support Navy

It is estimated that

- (1) Army can hold Manila Bay for 30 days
- (2) That Guam will fall to O

The Blue Detail was divided into 3 committees, headed up by RADM Marvell, Capt Brumby, & Capt Pope respectively. The committee had to come up with a solution by 23 Dec. 91 had to include Admiral A's EOTS, order, staff organization, & Summary of Logistic Requirements. . . Next, they were organized into an admirals staff & chief subordinates, and had to develop by 8 Jan to develop necessary OP ORSS. . . Finally, students would play the chart maneuver, developing tactics as game progressed.

ORANGE

Two committees headed by Capt Moss & Capt Tozer. Spruance in #1, along w/ Kalebuss. O to secure political & economic hegemony of Eastern Asiatic Area.

O General Staff Decision

- (1) To initiate war & capture Manila
- (2) Capture Guam
- (3) Observe Hawaii
- (4) Strengthen home defenses
- (5) Strengthen defenses of Pescadores, Peleus, Bonin, & Nansei Islands

TOPIC

NOTES ON OP II - 27 - TACTIC - 27

REF. NO.

NOTES

George E.

Capt. Marvell questioned wisdom of trying to relieve Manila. Decision made to bolster morale of American citizens. Cost of loss of fleet's fighting efficiency not worth "morale" benefits. Control of the air essential. B was in bad shape when he finally got to Philippines. Logistics a great handicap. Strongly advocated "steam roller" method of island hopping, seeking out and destroying O forces in advance of landings, and commerce raids by subs & chs. A straight shot to Philippines

LOCATION

(over)

used & played ~~it~~ into war of attrition plan of O.

Capt Brumby did not consider it practicable to take B
convoys across the Pacific.

Capt Van Cullen was impressed by potential of carrier air
warfare. Very much against a dash for Manila or the
Nansei Is.

Capt Sadler was unhappy w/ DDs. Heavy logistics and little
effectiveness. Need air superiority. Island hopping best
strategy. Command of air & sea necessary before amphibious
operation.

TOPIC

OP II -27

REF. NO.

NOTES

Capt. Emmet deplored decision to relieve Manila.

Amphibious tactics included using boats from all ships to land troops, w/ guns mounted in the bow.

Five days, 29 Mar - 2 Apr. allowed for critique.

LOCATION

COMMENTS ON PHASE I, OP PROB II-27 29 MAR 27

Vol II

Just before the critique on Phase I, the moderator said "With the showing and discussion of the slides will begin over again the war which we have so bitterly fought through the past months; that is inevitable."

[Note it began in early Jan]

Then emphasized there are no winners. Important thing is lessons learned. Justified Staff interference as game progressed "... we cannot let a commonplace war drop on to a dull inevitable finish. Our situations must be full of interest, hair breadth escapes, movie fashion, and the Staff must not be denied the right to create or precipitate new situations."

Orange committee had to come up w/ essentially same solutions and timetable as B.

So the committees turned to & cranked out their solutions.

Comm B1 (Marwell). Mission "To establish the B naval force in superior strength within striking distance of O vital sea communications in order to isolate O." Decision: To prepare for a flank advance on the Nansei Islands from the Philippines by proceeding immediately to relocate and hold our base at Manila in order to establish the Blue Naval Force in superior strength within striking distance of ORANGE vital sea communications." They devoted only two pages to logistic requirements!! Wonder if it was later developed

(over)

Comm B2 (Bremby) Mission: "To establish B Fleet in superior strength within striking distance of O vital sea communications, in order to isolate O." Decision: "To concentrate B Fleet in Eastern Carolines, proceeding by detachments, preparatory to an advance in superior strength, in order to establish B Fleet within striking distance of O vital sea communications. Logistics more detailed & realistic. This solution seemed more hurriedly composed than B1.

Comm B3 (Pope). Mission: To establish B fleet in superior strength within striking distance of O vital sea communications in order to isolate O. Decision: To seize Okinawa in order to establish B Fleet within striking distance of O vital sea communications. (Assumes Manila has fallen). Logistics very hazy

OPERATIONS PROBLEM II-27

-4-

Comm O-1 solution (Moses, Kalbfus^{Spruance} Mission: To prevent the establishment of superior B forces in positions dominating areas vital to O, in order to maintain control of the Eastern Asiatic Seas. - Then a long discussion on nearly every factor in a B-O war. Good for WWII - Comm recognized the many difficulties for B: exterior lines, protection for trains & expeditionary force, huge logistics problems, long lines of communication & supply, lack of intelligence, lack of bases, Jap use of islands to concentrate air strength.

Decision: To oppose the B advance, by attacks of increasing intensity originating near the Bonin - Guam - Truk line, in order to prevent the establishment of superior B forces in positions dominating areas vital to O." Plan did not envision capture of ~~Philippine~~ Philippines or Pac islands, 91 was strictly attack US Fleet, period!" 2 1/2 pages of logistics - (Kalbfus' name prominent) (ours) SEPARATE COMMITTEE SOLUTIONS OP II-27 (90)

Comin O-2 solution (Tager) Mission: To prevent B establishment and maintenance, in superior strength, in a position to control our vital sea areas in order to maintain control over the Eastern Asiatic Seas. Decision: "To weaken B by secondary attacks, in order that we may prevent his establishment and maintenance in superior strength in a position to control our vital sea area." Logistics section almost non-existent.

VOK II OP PROB II then became CHART MANEUVER III-27 on 10 JAN 70. Spruance was chosen as Commander O observation force, which were SUBDIVS 16 ^{& (CEVDIV) 13} & 17. Moses ran whole show, w/ Kallgren of CGS. Used B1 solution, release Philippines & advance on Mansei Is. Used O1 solution.

SENIOR CLASS OF 1927

COMMITTEE STUDIES

STUDIES OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS

1. Committee No. 1 - Rear Admiral George R. Marvell, U.S.N.,
Chairman.
 - (a) Summary - Operations of the Grand Fleet from the Beginning 4 August 1914 to the Evacuation of Gallipoli 20 December, 1915.
 - (b) Studies of the Operations of the British and German Naval Forces in the World War. (Compiled by Committee).
 - (c) Great Britain's Campaign against the German Commerce Raiders (after the Battle of Coronel) (Compiled by Captain E. T. Hoopes (SC), U.S.N.
 - (d) Synopsis of Operations in the North Sea of the British Grand Fleet After the Battle of Jutland.
 - (e) Offensive Operations against German Overseas Possessions.
 - (f) Strategic Relations Between all Countries on the Pacific and the United States in case of an ORANGE-BLUE War, also their Strategic Relations with Japan. (Compiled by Lieut. Harold R. Holcomb, U.S.N.).

2. Committee No. 2 - Captain Stanford E. Moses, U.S.N., Chairman.
 - (a) Summary of the Individual Studies of the Major Naval Operations Conducted by the Germans in the World War, by Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee No. 2, with Instructions and Conclusions, by Captain Stanford E. Moses, U.S.N., Chairman, Committee No. 2.
 - (b) German Baltic Sea and Flanders Coast Operations in the World War, by Captain Wm. H. Bell (MC), U.S.N.
 - (c) German Operations in the Mediterranean; the "Goeben" and "Breslau" and Dardanelles in the World War. By Commander T. F. Caldwell, U.S.N.
 - (d) German Cruiser and Raider Operations - Coronel and Falklands - by Commander Leo Sahn, U.S.N.
 - (e) German Submarine Operations during the World War - by Commander Ernest D. McWhorter, U.S.N.
 - (f) Organization, Strategy and Tactics of the German Navy in the World War - by Captain Ernest Friedrich, U.S.N.
 - (g) German North Sea Operations, Including Jutland in the World War - by Lieut. Comdr. John F. Meigs, U.S.N.
 - (h) The German Naval Air Arm in the World War - by Lieut. F. P. Sherman, U.S.N.
 - (i) German Naval Communications in the World War - by Lieut. Comdr. Alfred T. Clay, U.S.N.
 - (j) A Logistic Study of the Caribbean-Panama Area as a Theatre of Operations in a BLUE-BLACK War.
Report of Subcommittee No. 2 - Lt. Col. P.M. Rixey, USMC
of Comdr. C.E. Reordan, U.S.N.
Committee No. 2 ----- Capt. S.E. Moses, U.S.N.,
Chairman.
 - (k) German Naval Logistics in the World War -
by Major Charles S. McReynolds, U.S.M.C.

3. Committee No. 3 - Captain F.H. Brumby, U.S.N., Chairman.
- (a) Japanese Tactics in the Russo-Japanese War - by report of Committee No. 3, Capt. F.H. Brumby, U.S.N., Chairman.
 - (b) Japanese Naval Operations in Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - submitted by Committee No. 3.
 - (c) The Strategic Planning of Japanese - Naval Operations - by Captain W.R. Van Auken, U.S.N.
 - (d) The Tactics of the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima - by Lieut. P.P. Welch, U.S.N.
 - (e) The Tactics of the Japanese involved in the Battle of Tsushima - by Lieut. P.P. Welch, U.S.N.
 - (f) Japanese Naval Operations in Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - The Purpose of the Campaign - by Sub-Committee No. B - Comdr. J.S. Woods, U.S.N.
Lt.Comdr. J.M. Doyle, U.S.N.
(of Committee No. 3 - Capt.F.H. Brumby, U.S.N., Chairman).
 - (g) Report of Committee No. 3 on Strategic Raw Materials.
 - (h) The Strategic Raw Materials, Sources, Trade Routes, and Their Protection in time of War - BLUE versus RED-ORANGE by Captain F.H. Brumby, USN, Chairman Committee No. 3.
 - (i) Study of Strategic Raw Materials in a war between the United States and the Japanese Empire - by Major K. Truesdell, U.S.N.
 - (j) Logistics - Strategic Raw Materials, their Sources, Trade Routes, and Protection of those Routes in a War between RED and BLUE - by Comdr. J.S. Woods, U.S.N.
 - (k) Strategic Raw Materials, Sources, Trade Routes, and their protection in time of War - BLUE against RED - Report of SubCommittee No. 2 - Comdr.J.S.Woods, U.S.N.
Lt.Cdr.J.M. Doyle, U.S.N.
 - (l) The Strategic Raw Materials, their Sources, Routes into the U.S. and their Protection - Situation: ORANGE and GREEN at war with BLUE - Report of Sub-Committee No.3 - Capt.A.K.Shoup, U.S.N., Chairman
Capt.C.G.Mayo(SC),U.S.N.
Lt.Cdr.E.G.Haas, U.S.N.
 - (m) The Logistics Involved in the Russo-Japanese War and their Effect on the Naval Operations - Report of Sub-Committee "F" - Capt.A.K. Shoup, U.S.N.
Capt.C.G. Mayo, U.S.N.
Lieut. R.A. McClellan.

4. Committee No. 4 - Captain C. M. Tozer, U.S.N., Chairman.
 - (a) Russo-Japanese War - Conclusions and Discussion of Application of Principles - Report of Committee No. 4 - Capt. C.M. Tozer, U.S.N., Chairman.
 - (b) Study of the Naval Operations Conducted by the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - (a) A Brief Narrative of Events - Submitted by Captain W. Ancrum, U.S.N.
 - (c) Study of the Naval Operations Conducted by the Russians - Russo-Japanese War - The Purpose of the Campaign - by Lt.Col. H. D. South, U.S.M.C.
 - (d) Russian Naval Tactics - Russo-Jap War 1904-1905 - Third Phase: Battle of Tsushima - Report of Committee No. 4 on Study of Naval Operations Conducted by the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 - Submitted by Comdr. E. A. Vickery (MC), U.S.N.
 - (e) Operations - Russian Naval Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War - Submitted by Comdr. D.A.Scott, U.S.N.
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 - (f) Study of the Naval Operations Conducted by the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - The Purpose of the Campaign - Submitted by Comdr. Reed M. Fawell, U.S.N.
 - (g) Study of the Naval Operations Conducted by the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - Tactics Covering the second phase of the war - May to August, inclusive, 1904 - Submitted by Lt.Cdr. T.L. Gatch, U.S.N.
 - (h) National and Naval Logistics Planning in Peace Time and War Time.
 - (1) Relation of Naval Logistics to National Logistics.
 - (2) Personnel.Submitted by Comdr. Reed M. Fawell, U.S.N.
 - (i) National and Naval Logistics Planning in Peace Time and War. Operating Shore Bases and Fleet Facilities - Submitted by Lt.Col. H.D. South, U.S.M.C.
 - (j) National Logistics Planning - Submitted by Comdr. D. A. Scott, U.S.N.
Comdr. H. M. Cooley, U.S.N.
 - (k) Report of Sub-Committee No. 5 to Chairman, Committee No.4 - National and Naval Logistics Planning in Peace Time and War - Supplies and Munitions. Submitted by Comdr. E. A. Vickery, U.S.N.
 - (l) National and Naval Logistics Planning in Peace Time and War Time - The Fleet and Operations. Submitted by Lieut.Comdr. T.L. Gatch, U.S.N.
 - (m) Logistics - National and Naval Planning in Peace Time and War Time - Ships: Fighting and Auxiliary Aircraft. Submitted by - Lieut. S.E. Dudley (CC), U.S.N.
5. Committee No. 5 - Captain E.C. Kalbfus, U.S.N., Chairman.
 - (a) TRAFALGAR - A Study of the Naval Operations Conducted by the British up to and including the Battle of Trafalgar. Submitted by - Captain E.C. Kalbfus, U.S.N.
 - (b) Report of Committee No. 5 on The Subject of Manganese Ore. Submitted by Commander R.V. Lowe, U.S.N.
Captain E.C. Kalbfus, U.S.N., Chairman of Committee.
6. Committee No. 6 - Captain R.E. Pope, U.S.N., Chairman.
 - (a) Allied Operations leading up to and including the Battle of Trafalgar.- Submitted by Capt. R.E.Pope, U.S.N.
 - (b) The Logistics of Mobilization for an ORANGE-BLUE War. Submitted by - Committee No. 6.

4. Committee No. 4 - Captain C. M. Tozer, U.S.N., Chairman.
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