

VOL I OPERATIONS PROBLEM II - 27 BROW 24 NOV 1926

Summary - Not wash-up circa March 27

This problem had been played @ NWC for past 15 years. B vs O again. Spruance helped prepare O solution, under Capt Mason. Here again he worked w/ Kalbfus.

Introductory Remarks by Capt. Yarnall

Tension between B & O. Diplomatic fail. What will B do? O wants to expand south & west. O will immediately invade Philippines & establish control of the sea in the general area. B must try get to WESPAC, establish base, and wrest control of Asiatic waters from O. Hard task, taking his fleet 5,000 mi into enemy waters w/ no base at the end of it. B may

- (1) Proceed direct to WPAC
- (2) Proceed via MANDATE IS, providing bases to the rear as he proceeds.

The first plan involves great risks at great possibilities. The second is safer but allows ample time to consolidate his position.

→ IMPORTANT "The problem just played and those of preceding years will at least serve to give the class a good general understanding of the situation that some day some of you may be called upon to meet under the actual conditions of war." USE THIS!

Capt Greenlade then presented the Situation

Pacific becoming more important in the eyes of military and political strategists. So situation is presented annually because it is both good academic training and good preparation for our most probable future war. Students had already studied Navy Dept War Plans & CinC Asiatic Fleet OP PLAN & noted similarities & differences, notably availability of expeditionary force or need for rear bases. Greenlade not clear here.

OP II-27

Vol III

Notes on Critique

More realistic communications because of Pratt insistence.

War between BLUE & BLACK. The Study of Overseas Expedition with Forced Landing. BLACK attempts to capture Narragansett Bay. Massive movement and order writing. This was an actual war game, played by the Army & Navy in the "War of 1927", ending in "Fleet Week." I imagine the WWC followed this w/ great interest.

WWC Plan called for a landing in Newport area, which is what actually happened.

Landing was by "power boats." Many duels between BLACK ships and BLUE shore batteries and railway artillery. Newspaper says the BLACK mission was repulsed.

This problem was created by Pratt in Spring of 26.
See OPPOSED LANDING STUDY 1926-7

The Logistics Course issued "Notes as to Joint Army and Navy Action in Overseas Expeditions" GI was the result of an incomplete study on the subject, preparing for a war problem of landing on hostile shores, pushed by Pratt in Spring 1926.

GI is one hell of a remarkable document, because it accurately projects into the future. GI covers nearly every phase of amphibious warfare; it is a very clear crystal ball. For instance, air superiority, shore fire support, selection of landing site — and many, many more that accurately, very accurately predicted the principles of amphibious warfare.

In general, it said what must be done, but was rather hazy on how things were to be done, especially in defining equipment. Landing craft is the most obvious subject.

(Over)

EXPEDITIONS (86)

As confirmed by Moore (5 Nov interview) as late as 1940 Navy proposed using cutters with gun on the bow, and made no provision for landing tanks & other heavy equipment. This means the Navy did nothing even when 1926 NWC study showed that special landing craft were needed.

See OA III-37

War College History p176 relates that it was decided (by Pratt, I presume) that "Due to the Joint Army & Navy exercises to be conducted on the NEW ENGLAND COAST in the Spring of 1927, it was decided to have the class solve and play a problem which paralleled the one to be actually carried out by the U.S. Fleet and the First Corps Area."

INFLUENCE OF CHANGES, 1926-7

COMMITTEES

Capl Greenslade talking to Class about OP II-27, during critique in Mar 27.

"This year 1926-27 is marked by great change and growth in the War College." The Estimate of the Situation was radically changed, and its newness was a handicap to problem solvers, especially the specification of the Plan.

Pratt wanted a Jarrid Landing Problem, including details on debarcation and shore fire bombardment support. Because of the magnitude of the problem, the work was done by committees *versus* individuals, for Major Operation Problem, and by a student Staff Organization for Task Group Operational and Tactical Plans. Committee solutions had advantages & disadvantages; problems of great scope and complexity could be solved, but a "weak link" member could screw it up, or a member by working on his area might not grasp the big picture.

(over) [But to me, this looks like a good method, because this is how the real life problems are handled] OP II-27 (90)

Summing up the effect of the changes, he said, "And so it is hoped that the Members of the Class of 1927, who were forced to detour, while this road building was going on, may have gotten as much atmosphere and scenery, despite the rough going, as will later classes rolling smoothly along on the boulevard of learning, past direction post, bill boards and gas stations."

P³¹

In Spring 1926 Pratt decided to have a landing problem against opposition stressing logistics. Problem drawn up based on Joint Army & Navy Problem # 2, Landing at Oahu.

all through here, the influence of Pratt is felt!

See OP III - 27

Capt Greenslade, OPI critique, June 27

The committee system came into use during the latter half of 1926, and it was first used by the class in providing solutions to major operation problems. The first situation so solved should concern the opening phase of B-O war, so solution could be compared w/ those of earlier years. If committee solution successful, it could be expanded for use in later years.

55

53

43

4004

544

GENERAL, NAVAL OPERATIONS & LOGISTICS STUDY 1927

Studies assigned to committees, Sr & Jr classes. Comm chairman assigns appropriate subjects within committee. Student reports study results in writing to chairman. Comm prepares synopsis for May presentation, one hr ea for Ops & Logs.

Operations

- (a) British & German major naval ops in WWI
- (b) Naval ops in Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5
- (c) Nelson's campaign leading up to & including Trafalgar

Logistics

- (a) Logistics in a ORANGE-BLUE Pacific War
- (b) Logistics in a Caribbean-Panama BLUE-BLACK War
- (c) The Strategic Raw Materials - Sources - Trade Routes & Their Protection in time of war

(OVER)

- (d) National & Naval Logistics Planning in Peace Time; War Time
(e) Logistics & mobilization for an ORANGE-BLUE war.
-

Six committees assigned, Sr & Jr, about 11 ea.

Spruance aspd Comm #3, Captain F.H. Brumby Chmn,
9 Navy Ltn, 1 Navy Sr, 1 USA.

Capt Van Ambler	Lcdr Haas	Lt McClellan
Capt Shoup	Lcdr Dayle	Capt Brumby
Ldr Woods	Lt Welch	Ldr Spruance

Comm #3 aspd (1) Study of naval operations conducted by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (2) A study of the strategic Raw Materials, Sources, Trade Routes, and their protection in time of war.

TACTICS COURSE SYNOPSIS

1926-7

p196,7

Tactical Period I 21 days Reading tactical publications. Reviewing 1926 Fleet Battle. TACEX I - Mechanics of Board Maneuver
TACEX II Same only added weapons TACEX III Simple exercise requiring Battle Orders

Tactical Period II 21 days Tactical Problem I (TAC I). B
✓ Scouting Fleet, protecting TRUK-MANILA Convoy, engages O Striking Force. Convoy stays in TRUK

Tactical Period III 12 days Chart maneuvers testing Strategic Phase of Operations Problem I (OP I) Night attack by O Striking Force on B Scouting Fleet accompanied by Convoy.

Tactical Period IV 25 days Chart maneuvers testing Strategic Phase of OP II, contact between O Fleet & B Fleet accompanied by Convoy. The big tactical game of the year
(OVER)

WK HISTORY (15)

TACTICAL PERIOD IV 3 days Chart maneuver of operational phase
% OP III, incidental to landing & support of Army troops in
Narragansett Bay.

In summary

Course in Tactics designed to lead up to and include a Major
Fleet Action. Big tactical problem not specifically developed;
rather it was hoped that tactical problems, requiring chart maneuver,
would evolve from fleet confrontations resulting from the playing
of operation problems. Interesting to note that strategic situation
disinclined C in C for Fleet Battle, which had to be artificially
forced. Concluded that major Fleet Battle, in the future, should
use specially prepared tactical problems.

BOARD MANEUVERS 1926-7

Capt Greenlake talking to Class about OP II-27 during critique in Mar 27.

Staff regretted paucity of opportunities for Board Maneuvers. "... two of the opportunities which were presented did not develop as completely as they should." [was referring to TAC II-27 & OP II-27].

BIBLIOGRAPHY, NAVAL OPERATIONS & LOGISTICS STUDY 1987

Essential for study of naval strategy & logistics

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History	Mahan
Naval Strategy	"
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy	Corbett
War on the Sea	Darrius
The Genius of Naval Warfare	Dauahy
Principles of War	Fach
Naval Logistics . . . Essays by McKean, Lewis, & Baker	
War Finance	Baruch
Mass Procurement	Wainwright
Mobilization and Man Power	Johnson

Plus about 10 other books " for those having time and inclination "

(over)

Japanese Naval Strategy in Russo-Japanese War

The Japanese in Manchuria

Cordonnier

Influence of the Sea on the Political

Ballard

History of Japan

Expenditures of the Russo-Japanese War

Ogawa

Russo-Japanese War

Lowen

Also the Tsushima folio file containing contemporary reports.
Comment.

The UWC wanted these fellows to read! Almost a
program for the reading of the great classics!

Finally, students were referred to 1926 comm rpt.

TACTICS COURSE RQPD READING 1927

Operations Div C2 required a rather lengthy list of Navy Dept & NWC pubs for the tactics course.

Familiarize

(C) War instructions, U.S. Navy, 1924
General

(A) General Tactical Instructions, US Navy, 1924

(C) Formations & Manuevers of the Battle Line, 1922

(C) General Signal Book, C.S.P. 435, 1925

Also a host of ship & AIC tactical instructions, manuals, principles, and so on.

War College Pubs

Principles of War as Applied to Naval Officer, plus a number of rules and instructions for war gaming

MANUAL WAR GAMING

p4-3

These games had a lot of dead time. "After ^{the} players make a move they wait a long time for the central group to assess interactions, transmit intelligence, and call for the next move." The dead time caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. "The slow pace of manual games also cuts heavily into the curriculum time of military colleges." p4-4. Slower pace does give serious players time for contemplation. NWC used civilians for purely war gaming functions such as computational, bookkeeping, clerical, or drafting tasks.

Entire chapter 4 emphasized the infinite variations of the game by modifying rules, games, techniques. Sprounce liked brain puzzles, NWC War Games was his bag.

p4

Before launching into war gaming, one should study:

- (1) "The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Forms"
This is the basis pub on how to solve military problems and how to write OPORDS
- (2) "The Study of Strategy" Supplement "Estimate"
- (3) "The Service of Information and Security" Basic doctrine on searches, patrols, scouting, screens
- (4) "The Chart & Board Maneuvers" The instruction manual for gaming

Then

Individually solve simple scouting & screening problems

Then

Play these simple problems as chart maneuvers

Then

One is ready for more complicated games CHARTS/BOARDS (76)

BOARD MANEUVER PROCEDURES 1926-7

p40

- (1) Problem handed out, estimate deduced, decision made, orders formulated & promulgated.
- (2) As maneuver develops, new decisions usually needed for new problems.
- (3) Contest ended when definite value obtained.
- (4) Commanders submit est-rit at game's end.
- (5) History & critique several days later. Full, frank discussion invited. "Quick decision" problems critiqued immediately.

p45-49

Game was played on a 200" x 308" wooden board, chalk, model ships, cards, protractors, & all kinds of aids. Apparently ships & staffs could do this to.

CHART GAMES 1926-1938

p4-28, 29

Strategic games concerned w/ naval campaigns, stressing strategic employment of naval forces rather than tactics of battle. When main bodies closed to engage, game ended, was trf to game board, & tactical game was played. Sr officers assumed higher commands, jr officers CO of indiv. ships.

Games embraced large areas and were played on medium or small scale Mercator charts (thus name "chart games" or "chart maneuvers"). Battle plans & orders were prepared during planning phase & implemented in the chart games.

A 91-page, typed, double-spaced manual telling one how to play NWC war games.

p2 Purpose of Chart Maneuver

Efficient substitute for actual maneuvers.
Training for naval warfare strategy
To develop naval plans

p3 "A problem for chart maneuvers can be drawn to cover any or all phases of naval warfare up to the time of general contact, varying from those involving simple scouting exercises, in which only a few vessels are engaged, to those embracing the entire naval strength of the assumed belligerents."

p6 Some 14 forms used for chart maneuvers

p40 - Purpose of the Board Manoeuvre

"Success in any art depends primarily upon skill in its practice. Effective instruments to work with and knowledge of principles are needed, but the power to accomplish rests finally with the skill to use the instruments under the guidance of a trained judgment. Our art is the art of war. We have an instrument of war, the fleet. We must learn well the use of this instrument."

(Comment: a good opening - Spruance reads this early on, etc.)

Begin w/ simple moves for familiarity & try, then to more difficult chores! ^{p47} The whole purpose is self-training, learning lessons, a keener and clearer perception of situations, and the habit of quick decisions.

although the rules are as realistic as possible, avoid temptation to give definite & permanent valuations to types represented on board. Basic truths will emerge, but the real world still has variables
NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ON GAME BOARD.

WAR GAMING IN 1926-38

4-14 "In 1922 a new and more sophisticated system for assessing damage was devised, a system based on actual armaments and actual ships." Called the "War College Fire Effect System" it was designed to provide a relative strength comparison between actual fleets & to provide accuracy and realism to the games.

P4-15, 16 Ships were given "Original life" values indicating the relationship between hits received and resultant damage.

P4-17 This "life value" was based on tonnage and thickness of armor belt, for instance. Various fleets of the world were assigned colors - US/Blue, Japan/Orange, G.B./Red, Germany/Black etc. "Fire effect" tables gave data & expected results for each type of gun vs each type of target.

4-19 Currier also given formulas to determine effectiveness.

4-21 Games usually played for a part of the day, master plot updated, and records of (win)

WAR GAMING (5)

moves were recorded. Later all info put together for a
critique & a permanent record. Very accurate records
were kept.

WAR GAMING 1926-38

p51 " In the third era, 1922 to 1951, the emphasis shifted to educational games, that is, to games conducted for the primary purpose of providing the players with decision-making experience. The term 'war game' was not defined, but it was noted that results of the games served to create successive changes in the military situation. The results which led to these changes had been arrived at under conditions which simulated the realities of war - at least to the extent that they were usually arrived at after the actions of the opposing commanders and their subordinates had been considered."

WAR GAMING - THE CHART AND BOARD MANEUVERS 1926-7

p43 Some elemental tactical "doubt"

"Be chary of forming fixed rules of tactics. The Principles of War or the Principles of Tactics, indeed, are founded in truth, and truth is unchanging, but the application of principles will vary to suit conditions..."

"Study well the situation, keep constantly before your eyes the mission, weigh the difficulties and the means of meeting them, and form a clear decision. Then adhere to your plan. Remember that an imperfect plan vigorously and consistently prosecuted is far more likely to succeed than a much more perfect plan haltingly followed or changed in execution." GOOD - GOOD

"Place no undue value upon geometrical movements in tactics." I don't know what that means.

"Adopt an order of battle and form your parties for action before gun range is reached." Do, be formed and at GO when the shooting starts.

P44 Mission (FINALCY)

The mission of the tactical maneuver is

- (1) To deduce, develop, and illustrate tactical principles.
- (2) To afford opportunity for the practical application of such principles.

It also appears that ships were playing board games & used this pub as their guide. The NWC also issued "War Game Outfits" for use on ships. MK I 1915, MK II 1929, MK III 1930. These kits had all the paraphernalia needed.

A 200" x 308" wooden board, using miniature ships, was used by NWC. (Ships used 6' x 8' linoleum boards)

HISTORY OF WAR GAMING

p 51 - 52. Proposed by W^m McCarty Little in 1887, played by staff 1887-1893, w/ Little studying & developing same. 1894 introduced into curriculum by Ldr Harry C. Taylor, Pres. NWC. Little continued to develop & refine game.

Phases

- 1887-1893 - Little & staff study & prepare games
- 1894-1921 - Featured use of the war game as an analytical tool for devising & testing plans & doctrines
- 1922-1951 - Characterized by use of detailed rules, particularly those dealing with damage assessment.
- 1952-1957 - Use of posters & paper gaming techniques, & a shift in the scope & level of college games
- 1958 - pres NWC

"When Pringle Hall ^{was} completed in 1934, the areas now occupied by the lecture hall, coffee mess and offices to its north formed one large maneuver or game room. The deck of the game room consisted of a game board with a scale of 6 inches to 1,000 yards. The present offices to the west formed the central room." Civilian in the drafting room above prepared & produced maps, charts, records, etc.

"Phone communications and pneumatic tubes extended from the central room to many offices in Pringle Hall. Together, all of these facilities constituted what was at the time perhaps the most modern war gaming center in the nation, if not in the world."

p2-51 THE PLACE OF THE C-in-C in BATTLE 1911
& WAR GAMING

"During a lecture at the Naval War College on June 10, 1911, Captain Little noted that 'The temptation for the commander-in-chief, when he has nothing to do in his own sphere of action, to interfere in the area of discretion of his subordinates, is very great, and is moreover very dangerous, because it tends to make the commander-in-chief believe that it is his proper business, it tends to dull in the subordinate his sense of responsibility, and, when the commander-in-chief really has got something of his own to do, it seriously, if not fatally, interferes with his freedom of mind properly to attend to it. The only cure for this is proper war game training."

p2-54

Referring to war gaming between world wars,
Nate Nimitz said in 10 Oct 60 WC lecture

" The war with Japan had been re-enacted
in the game room here by so many people and in so
many different ways that nothing that happened during
the war was a surprise -- absolutely nothing except
the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war;
we had not visualized those."

RED FLEET 1925-26

This may have been used 1926-7, in that this is ~~the~~
apparently the last issued prior to June 26,

British Fleet is huge!

18 BB, 4 CC, 4 CA (w 5 buildings), 36 Ch, & 4 CV

NWC issued this pub for war gaming using actual Japanese ships then in existence.

p c "To make more interesting the problems studied at the War College and to familiarize officers with the characteristics and capabilities of existing ships, it is considered desirable to use in such problems the actual types and numbers of ships in our navy and in such other navies as may be selected as the opposing force in these hypothetical problems."

Gave every possible ships' characteristic. Japs credited w/ 6 BB, 4 CC, 2 CV, 4 CA* & 21 CL first line.
* CA were building

Interesting it's CONF rather than SECRET. Also, it contained many corrections indicating it was kept current. However, it was serialized & apparently accountable.

BLUE FLEET

1956-7

Same as ORANGE FLEET sub & same purpose.

We had 18 BB, no CA, 10 CL, & 2 CV first line.
The disparity in cruisers is evident. Recall how this
affects thinking in Strategic Row Math study, also
refer to Laning w/ members on Congress.

A NWC pamphlet, 161 typed, double-spaced pages, containing hundreds of rules for NWC war games.

Table of Contents

Classification of Vessels w/ Standard Nomenclature and Limiting Characteristics July, 1926

General Rules

Conduct of the Maneuver

Speed and Fuel

Visibility, Audibility, and Smoke Screens

Communications

Gunfire

Torpedo Fire

Mines

Submarines

Aircraft

[COMMENT: The NWC falls short because familiar w/ the capabilities & limitations of ships & AK of the major fleet, marches today.]

(over)

This pamphlet combined rules for the Chart Maneuvers and the Board Maneuvers.

The most important rule, A-1 "Actual types of ships will ordinarily be used in the maneuvers."

WAR GAMING - SUPPLEMENT TO THE CHART & BOARD MANEUVERS, 1920

A NWC pamphlet containing several forms used in war gaming: Fire sheets apparently were a record of what major guns were fired when. Each sheet listed the heavier than in service for B, O, & R

Contents

Fire Sheets, Major, Blue, Red, & Orange

Fire Sheet, Minor

Umpires Damage Sheets, Blue & Orange

Umpires Damage Sheet, Minor

Umpires Communication Record

Umpires Torpedo Fire Record

Expenditure Record, Torpedo, Mine, and Depth Charges

Annexes I & II. (I. Numerical comparison of forces, II Comparison of fighting strengths)

WAR GAMING

1894

1894 Summer Course introduced a "Problem of Warfare"

Students had to provide solutions for problem of combating a fleet attacking New England.

See also McHugh 1569 Review article

Professional Note (4)

HISTORY OF WAR GAMING

Had been an institution at NWC almost since its founding. It is "applicatory problem solving". Emphasize this.

WAR GAMING

1894

War gaming, as a serious element of the NWC course of study, introduced for first time

See also McHugh 1969 Review article

APPLICATION SYSTEM OF PROBLEM SOLVING

1910

BRIG GEN John H. Russell, USMC, - then on NWC faculty, initiated this process on basis of Griepenkerl's "Letters on Applied Tactics" introduced to me by Capt Mc Cartty Little

This was a major change in NWC philosophy of instruction

Russell (8)

TSUSHIMA TACTICS (SUPPLEMENTARY) 1926-7

Heavy stress placed on Japanese use ^{& misuse} of Principles of War, such as Security, Superiority, Economy of Force, Offensive, Movement

p 7 "With great presence of mind he [Togo] changed course to the northwest in order to carry out his plan to attack on the Russian port bow on easterly courses. It is well worth noting Admiral Togo's coolness and patience at this critical moment as demonstrated by his turn-away to gain the positions of tactical advantage. It is in direct contrast to a thoughtless impetuous attack."

p 14 "The most noteworthy feature of the Japanese tactics was the freedom of action allowed the division commanders in carrying out the plan. (CONT'D)

Each division retained freedom of movement. Rapidity in formation was subordinated to flexibility of manœuvre." One of Spruance's basic principles

Entire report was a blow-by-blow account of the big battle. Used illustrative plates

Cover sheet indicates Welch presented this to Comm #3. Why it was supplementary is hard to say. It does appear to contain more details than the orig rpt. Perhaps it was a reading supplement to the orig rpt which was presumably read.

TSUSHIMA TACTICS

1926-7

A blow-by-blow account and analysis of the big battle. Used illustrative charts. Supplementary report was also made.

RUSO-JAP (50)

RUSSO-JAP WAR, TACTICS

1926-7

p1 Torp boats, 300-400 tons, 18" torpes, 2K yds range
Primitive fire control, 4K-7K yds best range

p1 Japs wanted to land troops in Manchuria & Korea; Taps to keep Russ flt from interfering, from going to sea.

p1 Taps initiated war w/ Russia by a surprise attack!
Typical?

Concentrated on the battle when Russ flt tried to go from Port Arthur to Vladivostok. Russ admiral reluctant to do battle, but finally had to move when Port Arthur about to be lost to land forces. Russ had superior fire power. However, loss of steering by Russ flagship threw Russ line into chaos and melee developed. Russ were licked. Lot of maneuvering, w/ Japs the aggressors.

RUSS-JAP (34)

ROSSO-JAP WAR, SUB-COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS 1926-7

May 1927 - 1 hr

Sequence	Spokesman	Subject	Max Time
1.	Capt Van Anken	Introduction & Strategic Planning	8 min
2	Lcdr Haas	Purpose of Campaign & Narrative of Events	10 min
3.	Capt Shoup	Logistics involved & effect on operations	5 min
4.	Cdr Spermann & Lt Welch	Tactics involved including description of Battle of Yellow Sea and Tsushima	30 min

(OVER)

COMM RPT (21)

5. Capt Bramley - Conclusions & Lessons learned

p9 Russian status. ill-trained, poor material condition, and low morale.

"We can well follow the example of the Japanese and concentrate on real preparation for battle."

Report by Shoup, Mayo, & McClellan

- p1 Japanese communications almost ideal. Lack of good bases near area of conflict. Financing only problem
- p2,3 Navy had extensive supply train. Army ran own transports.
- p4 Jap fleet had to destroy Russ flt. Kept them blockaded in Port Arthur & Vladivostok. Also had to guard comm lines to mainland. Logistics prob was to support the fleet.
- p6 Advanced bases near Port Arthur enabled Jap flt to effectively blockade Russ

CONCLUSIONS

p. 8 "The Japanese appear to have made the most of their opportunities. . . ." "The Japanese knew what they wanted, and they concentrated all their energy toward obtaining it, no effort being spared. Side issues that did not contribute to the success of the main plan were discarded; local issues that had no bearing on the main objective had no real weight, but every effort was directed to the main object - the destruction of the enemy fleet." "The planning of future operations was carefully and thoroughly done; all contingencies were anticipated, nothing being left to chance." "Kept well informed on Russian capabilities."

p. 8, 9 "Permanence of personnel was the rule, with the result that the personnel was indoctrinated and trained to a high degree. As a result, the subordinate commanders were allowed much freedom of action, for they could be depended on to carry out the plans and the wishes of the C. in C."

COMM # 3 REPORT, NAVAL OPS & LOGISTICS STUDY ^{MAY} 1927

On Russo-Japanese War, Spruance & Welch allotted 30 min out of hour to describe tactics including Battle of yellow sea & Tsushima. (Suspect Welch may have handled charts). Mc Clellan given 15 min for BLUE vs RED & ORANGE in Strategic Row Materials Study

RUSO-JAPANESE WAR & JUTLAND

1926-7

These two battles were those most intensively studied
by the NWC

RUSO-JAP WAR, PURPOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN

1926-7

Presented by Ldr Woods & Ldr Wayne

Very brief resumé

Main purpose of going to war was to substitute "Japanese for Russian control in Southern Manchuria, and the prevention of any further advance by Russia in the direction of Korea." The duty of the Japanese fleet was to safeguard the passage of the army to the ports of disembarkation and to keep open the sea communications thereafter.

RUSSO-JAP WAR, INTRODUCTION & STRATEGIC PLANNING 1926-7

Report presented by Capt Van Cuyk

p i. " We in the Naval Service of today have much to be thankful for that our Navy did profit by this war. In some cases, it took years to fully appreciate changes necessary, but, nevertheless, our strategy, tactics, ship design, engineering, ordnance, fire control, and gunnery received a great impetus. And, we went into the World War — not in wonderful shape, but better, by far than as if no war had been fought of the magnitude of the Russian - Japanese War. "

p iv. Also spoke that many countries "... sent expert observers to gather experience in what was the first great test of military and naval machinery of modern times. "

(OVER)

RUSS-JAP (35)

p1 War began because of 50 years of conflicting interests in Korea & Manchuria.

p2 Japan started war w/ a surprise attack on Port Arthur.
Those treacherous Nips!

p2 Naval Strategic Planning in Peace

Japanese espionage revealed Russ flt split & training/morale low.
Japanese on good terms w/ US & GB, culminating w/ Anglo-Jap Alliance of 1902.
Now no fear of anyone helping Russ

p3 Army absorbed German military teachings.

p3 Summary

(a) Japan had definite war policy (b) Navy ^{size} increasing & well trained (c) could plan for war against Russia alone (d) Russian fleet divided
(e) Jap morale high (f) Naval leaders motivated & well-trained in tactics & strategy: objective - Beat Russia

- 2 -

RUSO-JAP WAR, INTRODUCTION & STRATEGIC PLANNING. 1926-7

p4 Japan wanted a limited offensive war, objectives: sieg Korea & Manchuria

p4, 5 Japan struck first. "The Japanese strategy of striking suddenly and striking hard seems to be inherent in the nation, whether inculcated from German training or as a racial characteristic, this principle appears to be fundamental."

p5, 6 Japs blockaded Port Arthur w/ limited success. Army captured Port Arthur, allowing Japs to return & overhaul ships before Baltic Flt arrival. Then beat them at Tsushima.

(over)

p6,7 Concluded Japs had done a superb job using
the principles of war

p7,8 The Future

What will Japan do in her next war?

- (1) Absorbs and uses ideas, tactics, & concepts of other navies.
- (2) They feel superior to officers of other navies.
- (3) "Their strategy of surprise in sudden attacks, remaining on interior lines, recognizing the difficulties of long lines of communication for us, keeping fleet repaired in readiness for an engagement and esprit will again follow."
- (4) Japan ~~will~~ will always be ready to fight!

"Our lesson from all this is to be ready in peace and war to beat the 'Strike Sudden and Strike Hard' strategy of Japan."

RUSSO-JAP WAR, OPERATIONS

1926-7

Comm #3 issued a report summarizing the operations in the war. It was a 16-page narrative, identifying the various battles and the outcomes, but had little analysis. Author unknown. Was not orally presented.

Battle a series of fights stretching over many months between Russian PACFLT & Japs. Mostly a war of attrition and blockade. Many ships sunk by mines, PACFLT defeated, then a travel-weary Baltic fleet destroyed later.

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

1944

Had he advanced and attacked Japanese carriers on morning of 19 June, no enemy force would have got between his fleet and the Saipan beach head, as he feared (Monday morning QB, Mr Patten?) However, Jap surface ships between him & Jap CVs would have shot down many transiting US planes (BS, fly high & over them!) In assuming defensive posture shot down 430 japs, equal of sinking Jap CVs.

"In short, in his second turnaway, Spruance did the right thing for what we now see to have been the wrong reason." p24

I wonder!

Patten (10)

SAIPAN / TSUSHIMA PARALCEL

" As a matter of tactics, I think that going out after them and knocking their carriers out would have been much better and more satisfactory than waiting for them to attack us; but we were at the start of a very important and large amphibious operation and we could not afford to gamble and place it in jeopardy. The way Topo waited at Tsushima for the Russian fleet to come to him has always been in my mind. We had somewhat the same basic situation; only it was modified by the long range striking power of the carriers."

STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF the GERMAN
NAVAL FORCES IN THE WORLD WAR

1926-7

Committee #1 under RADM Marvell, concentrated on analyzing both countries' actions in terms of observing or violating certain Principles, such as:

Economy of Force

Simplicity

Objective

Superiority

Movement

Security

Co-operation

Offensive

Surprise

} Same as Russo-JAP
war

On 16 May, the committee made its presentation.

(over)

Introduction

Operations against German cruisers

Naval Operations in the Dardanelles

Operations of the Grand Fleet

British Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations

Operations in the British Channel

Blockade of the North Sea

Logistics

Control of Trade Routes in the Pacific

RADM Marvell

LCDR Cooper, Capt Hoopes

~~Capt~~ Major Lane USA

LT Holcomb, Lcdr Hunter,

Cdr Ingersoll, Cdr Brooks
RADM Marvell

Cdr Meekery

LT Browder

Capt Taylor

RADM Marvell

LCDR Hunter

Many of the committee studies of earlier wars used the "Principles of War" as a basis of comparison. Hope I can find the basic paper on this.

Capl Bakenhus referred to this in his opening logistics lecture. p15 "... the War College during the last three years has given some attention to the subject of Principles of War as applied to naval warfare."

p16 He continued to expound. Having quoted Mahan on the subject, he said, "The principles of war are general or fundamental truths derived from study of many facts and from long experience. They are in no sense rules of conduct or action. Principles form the basis of independent reasoning (over)"

an action, whereas a rule is intended to restrict independent action. The principles of war should, therefore, be regarded not as rules of action but as fundamental and governing the action of the mind under the circumstances of war."

From there he jumped into applying these principles to Logistics. Suro looks like Bakenhaus set a precedent for future committee studies. He spoke to these principles

- (1) Objective
- (2) Superiority
- (3) Economy of Force
- (4) Surprise
- (5) Cooperation

THESIS ON COMMAND, REQUIREMENTS 1926-7

(Emphasizing his getting stuck on OSBORN if time from ok
First of two theses, the other being on Policy. Pre-
pared during pd 1 July - 11 Sept '26. Due 11 Sept '26.
Memo issued 22 July 1926

Memo gave fol guide

- (a) Definition, source, authority, scope, etc.
Basic principles: responsibility, unity, decentralization,
etc
Their application: leadership, qualities and attributes, etc.
Functions: planning, training, indoctrination, etc.
As command responsibility has increased through the
complexity of modern war so has the necessity for
trained assistants to the Commander developed.

- (b) The inseparable relation of Staff to Command, and
the organization and function of a modern Naval Staff
(over)

(c) The thesis will include the following requirement: a graphic plan of Command organization, at the end of the thesis, to bring out the ideas set forth in the discussion of (b).

Bibliography

6 papers of Army & Navy pubs on leadership & organization & general command philosophy, + a few genl books.

Comment

Certainly not a rigorous research paper as we know it today. No requirement for footnotes or bibliography — Look for reasons why this was required. Trace the history of the thesis at NWC. Check Pratt 1926 USNIA piece. Note this was lumped w/ the study on Strategy & Operations. Also Pres. Pratt in some art said that theses work deemphasized.

The thesis was found in the Spruance Papers, indicating it had some significance to him. It was the carbon copy that was ret'd to the author. It was read by CAPT H.F. YARNELL, ^{Head Div D. War Plans & Policy}, 2nd Signature indicating ^{initials} and Capt R F Johnson, Chief of Staff. The "memorandum of comment" sheet from the command department was blank, indicating thesis was satisfactory, neither exceptionally good nor poor. (Believe student retained orig, NWC the copy, check card on "NWC Routine.") There is no way of knowing what was plagiarized & what was original. But it

p 1 is what he BELIEVED! Analysis

Definition To order w/ authority. Compared organized military body and a mob.

Authority "The authority to command in a military or naval force is derived directly or indirectly from the source of authority in the country. In the United States the people are the ultimate source of power." (OVAR) COMD THESIS (29)

People established Constitution, making Pres C in C of Armed Forces, ~~who~~
is empowered to appoint military commanders ^{p1, 2} Discussed freedom
of subordinate commanders in making & changing assignments to command.

Theoretically advisable to appoint own subordinates & hold them
accountable, but is impractical... A commander's authority varies because of
many factors. "To avoid confusion and misunderstandings when of-
ficers are changed, it would be well if a common doctrine existed through-
out the service as to the authority and responsibility that belong to each
grade." Comment: Not very practical.

p 2, 3 Renewed Chain of Command, Authority, and Responsibility. Nothing
very different.

Spruance on being A SUCCESSFUL COMMANDER

" To be a successful commander, one must combine qualities of leadership with a knowledge of his profession. Either without the other is not of much avail. Leadership comprises a number of moral qualities, among which may be mentioned force; initiative; determination; a strong sense of justice; loyalty, both to superiors and subordinates; good judgement; generosity; self-possession; energy; decision. The qualities of leadership inspire loyalty in one's subordinates; and this loyalty, accompanied by confidence in the commander's professional ability, gives him such enthusiastic support from them that he is, in times of crisis, able to demand and accomplish what might appear to be the impossible. History abounds with instances where great leaders

(OVER) COMD THESIS (29)

have inspired such confidence and enthusiasm in their followers that they have been able to perform the impossible, as witness Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, Fredrick the Great, Napoleon, and Nelson. It requires both the moral qualities and the brains and knowledge to make a great leader. Both may be improved by application, study, and reflection."

Spruance on DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

"... the commander-in-chief and his principal subordinates must take steps to ensure that their orders are understood and executed in the same manner by all hands. An order may be composed of but a few words, but the actions that flow from it, on the part of a large number of subordinates, must be directed towards a common end and each action must harmonize with the others. To accomplish this, there must be a common system of training and common doctrines." Doctrine and training complementary and cannot be exclusive one of the other.

Spruance on FUNCTION OF A STAFF

"The functions of a Staff, then, is not to usurp the primary duty of the Commander, which is that of making decisions, but it is to assist the commander, first, in coming to his decisions, and, then, in making the plans and writing the orders necessary for the carrying out of these decisions. Duty on a staff carries with it no authority to command, or to execute the orders which the staff is instrumental in issuing. Such authority is vested in the subordinate chain of command."

Concluded with a recommended organization of ~~the~~ the function of a modern Naval Staff at the SECNAV level.

(OVER)

COMD THESIS (29)

Admiral Eccles in reviewing the thesis says "This is a relatively trivial sort of short paper in no way deserving the term 'thesis.'" He did agree, however, that it probably did reflect Spruance's belief on command.

SPRUANCE ON TURNER/SMITH 1962

" While all this was going on, I told Admiral Nimitz that I wanted Kelly Turner for the Amphibious Force, if I could steal him from Bill Halsey, and I wanted General Holland Smith for the troops. Kelly Turner and I had been shipmates in the Pennsylvania in 1916-1917, and we had worked closely together for three years at the Naval War College from 1935 to 1938. Holland Smith I had known in the Caribbean in 1940-1941, when he was Comdr. Gen Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral Kinkaid, and I was Comdr. 10th Naval District."

Comment - Command Thesis on picking over subordinates. Moore relating how Spruance had to keep peace between Turner & Smith, but how Spruance made the decisions, also Spruance told Moore to pick the rest of the staff for him. (Moore oral) (over) TURNER/SMITH (100)

"Returning to the question of command relations between Kelly Turner and Holland Smith as raised in Chapter 1, [History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol III, The Central Pacific Drive] I knew that things were not always going smoothly between the two men during the planning for Galvanic [Gilberts]. They were both strong and determined characters. I had confidence that they would work things out between themselves, which they did.

I had a completely new staff myself, except for my Chief of Staff, and I had many important things to work out myself."

MOORE ON TURNER / SMITH ~ 1962

" There were never any quarrels, but much earnest discussion."

" I must be recognized again that personalities played an important part in the questions discussed here [Gilbert Marine Corps History]. Turner, a dominating and overbearing but, withal a sound and capable officer; H. Smith, a complaining and sensitive person, - easily offended, - but a fine and brave soldier; Spruance, serene and quiet, a unique leader and a forceful commander."

" Spruance directed. I was not a case of 'was willing'".

p 20³

LECTURES 1926-7

a total of 46 lectures from 9 July 26 to 27 May 27.

Prior to 11 December, a total of 21 on Policy,
broken down as follows.

Policy, general - 2	Economic policy 3
Policy, Western Hemisphere - 6	League of Nations 2
Policy, Pacific & Far East - 4	
Europe & Near East - 4	

all given by visiting civilian lecturers.

(OVER)

p 204 From 8 Jan on, a total of 23 lectures, as follows

Military - 10

Economics/Logistics - 5

Int'l Relations - 7

International Law - 1

Thus 23 lectures before Christmas, and 23 lectures after.

Compare with how many we have today!

PROF ANDOBSKY ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN

1926-7

Study circa 1926 Stenciled & Printed by NWC

Propheesied that US, GB, & Holland will be aggressors in next war, its objective being markets of China & Russian Far East. Japan on defensive to hold what it had. Full war was inevitable.

Fell Japan had to expand because of over-population & lack of natural resources. Fell US had aggressive, imperialistic policy. Panama Canal permitted a two-ocean Navy, and opened new trade route to Far East, and US would fight to keep trade open to Far East.

p71 Fell best way to defeat Japan was on the flank by US Army. North from the Aleutians & south thru South China Sea, Saigon, & Singapore to central China, essential to Japan as a rear. Fell Japan too strategically strong in Central Pacific by its outlying islands defenses. Again emphasized US would be aggressor.

99. Considered first a naval war. ~~... will be a naval~~
~~campaign~~. US would try to win w/ naval blockade, esp. cutting
Japan off from China. Felt this would not work. Projected
need to capture Jap-held islands to approach Japan for decisive
battle. Could do this very well either, so best US could do was
an ineffectual distant blockade. ^{P¹⁰⁵} Conclude US, by itself ^{on w/ allies}
present strength, could not defeat Japan ^{in a naval war}. (Emphasized need for
bases & interior lines of communication.) Then concluded that
an land army was needed attacking from flanks; no victory
possible w/ strictly naval war. Summary a 162 page study,
very detailed and analytical, which could serve as a model ~~for~~
for strategic planning, even if one did not agree w/ its conclusions.
Written by the former Chief of the Russian Military Academy,
in August 1925, at Harbin, Northern Manchuria.

The paragraphs and subparagraphs are ^{excessively} numbered & lettered. A long soliloquy analyzing the whole issue of strategic raw materials, including definitions. Very academic in tone, with many "ifs" & "however's." Looks at every issue from every conceivable aspect.

Part I General Principles

Some conclusions: (a) Denial of strategic raw materials does not immediately effect combat power. But how wrong when he says "In conclusion, too much must not be expected as a result of naval operations which are directed solely toward the denial of raw materials to an enemy." p 7. Ye Gods, how about sub operations in WWII against Great Britain & Japan! (b) P⁸ attacks on economic resources undermine morale, severely weakening enemy & assuring defeat. Shades of Danahy! (c) Security of food & war munition essential. Denial leads to defeat. My, how profound!!!

(over)

(d) p 8 "Both the attack and defense of maritime trade violate the principle of concentration of effort." Some unfused thinking on how to use naval forces in relation to attacking lines of communication.

Comment: Lots of data and discussion. Some pro-poor conclusions.

Part II Survey of the U.S.,
Details on strategic raw material requirements

Part III Survey of Japanese Empire
Excellent assessment of all factors.

Section IV US Operations, Defensive, Offensive

Conclusion (a) p 20 "The United States is economically secure in a war against Japan." (b) p 20 "To defeat Japan she must be economically isolated. — Comment: Good reasoning, one wonders if the Japs used same reasoning why they would ever want war w/ U.S. They couldn't win! — Comment: Well researched, part I conclusion poor.

STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS, BLUE VS ORANGE & GREEN 1926-7

Concluded that some math fm Japan would be stopped but that Japan was too weak to stop our commerce, but might harass from Mexican bases. We decided there was no threat. Mentioned no limitations on building cruisers, they were commerce raiders. Acknowledged subs but did not consider threat.

Rather a cursory report

p26,7

Sub-Committee #2 investigated this aspect (Cdr Woods & Lcdr Dayle)

Main conclusions

(1) B cannot protect all necessary trade routes for strategic raw materials because of cruiser inferiority and lack of strategically located bases.

(2) R will stop all trade w/ Europe, Africa, & Indian Ocean. Outside of main war theatre, will concentrate naval strength in Asia, Dutch East Indies, South Atlantic, & Caribbean.

(3) B will have to depend on strategic raw materials from Western Hemisphere. Must promote friendship w/ Latin & S. American countries

(over)

Materials (26)

Report noted how Washington Treaty equalized BB & CV
but not CA. R had a far superior ^{CA} tonnage well
adapted to commerce raiding. Felt R would con-
centrate on focal areas rather than blockade
US ports.

Submarines not mentioned!

A long, extremely detailed report, filled w/
statistics on exactly where we got our raw
mats & how much is needed.

Oral presentation by Capt Brumby, summarized these two situations. Apparently to speak instead of Major Truesdell. Schedule then called for Cdr Woods & Lt McClellan to give presentations on RED & ORANGE-RED.

Most of his summary based on BLUE vs ORANGE report
Assignments

Common Comm # 3	Capt Brumby	RED	Cdr Woods
ORANGE	{ Capt Van Aiken		Lcdr Dayle
	{ Major Truesdell USA	ORANGE-RED	Cdr Spruance
ORANGE-GREEN	{ Capt Sharp		Lt McClellan
	{ Capt Mayo		
	{ Lcdr Haas		

STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS, BLUE VS RED-ORANGE 1926-7

Sub-committee of Spruance & McClellan

p 1 Considered the question of the strategic raw materials, their sources, and the protection of trade routes in the event of a Blue vs Red-Orange War. Used data base of 29 materials and 1925 statistics for imports and production (derived from most recent studies of the War and Navy departments).

Many materials a monopoly of one country or another.

US consumes half as more of many raw mats produced; many mats produced by R & O.

p1, 2 Some mats could be procured from other countries at increased cost.

(over)

RAW MAT'S (30)

p2 Bulk an important consideration. Small items lead to concealment & delivery by enterprising neutrals. Great bulks more difficult (a hell of a good point, not previously discussed by others).

Three trade routes involved:

(1) Europe $\xrightarrow{\text{Atlantic}}$ Africa \rightarrow India vs (2) Western Hemisphere

(3) Asia $\xrightarrow{\text{Pacific}}$ Australia vs Hawaii

p23 Subroutes:

1(a) northern Europe ^{controlled} vs Great Britain

1(b) Med controlled by Gibraltar

1(c) Cape of Good Hope controlled by S. Africa

Conclusion (1) Great Britain could control these three routes by cruisers.

STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS, BLUE VS RED-ORANGE 1926-7

- p3 Subrouter: 2(a) Gulf of Mexico & Caribbean
 2(b) West Coast S. America
 2(c) East Coast S. America

Conclusion: (2) (a) & (b) control retained by U.S. (c) interrupted by British CA & SS operating out of WESTLAND bases. Alternative routing through Straits of Magellan & Panama Canal.

- p3,4 Subrouter: 3(a) Orient & Australia, controlled in south by Japs in Philippines & Brits in Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and SOPAC islands
 3(b) Hawaii

Conclusion (3) (a) a total loss. (b) Hawaii could come under attack after Philippines & Guam captured by R.O of B fleet kept in Laul. However, Hawaiian sugar not vital. (although its use as a base sure as hell is!) (OVER) RAW MAT'LS (30)

p4 Discussion Until Brit Fleet defeated, best hope in Western Hemisphere trade routes & strengthening Hawaii to discourage Jap aggression. Australian, New Zealand, & Canadian neutrality because of hostility toward Japan desirable but not probable.

p4.5 In view of R-O ability to close trade routes external to Western Hemisphere, US must (1) Stockpile or (2) use neutral bottoms or (3) procure indirectly through resale of Western Hemisphere neutrals. Where belligerent has a practical monopoly of raw matl, he would ration to neutrals based on earlier consumption data. Felt we could still induce neutrals to resell even rationed goods.

p5 War w/ R-O is most imaginable. To provide raw matls for such a war US should (1) stockpile (2) develop new sources in Western Hemisphere (3) develop processing & manufacturing plants in COMUS or Western Hemisphere.

- 3 -

STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS, BLUE VS RED-ORANGE 1926-7

p 5.6 Summation:

- (1) In onset of war, ^{only} Western Hemisphere trade routes secure w/ P. coast S. America in jeopardy.
- (2) No U.S. cruiser avail to convey up P. Coast S America
- (3) British interdiction difficult due lack of focal point.
- (4) Capture British naval bases in Western Hemisphere, securing for good Western Hemisphere trade routes.
- (5) Use U.S. cruiser raiders against British focal points, tying up British forces that ~~could~~ would otherwise be used in W. Hemisphere.

Concluded w/ appendices of raw matl statistics & chart of the world.

(OVER)

RAW MAT'L'S (30)

Comment: This report does not address blockade and submarine warfare. As w/ all reports, it is obsessed w/ cruisers and the effect of the ¹⁹²² Washington Treaty. Rather than saying what materials would be denied U.S., it concentrates on which trade routes would be denied. Using appendices one could determine which mats would be affected. It does not go into detail on every mat, but rather gives a summary, a guideline, from which desired details could be derived. For instance, a staff could then develop where new sources must be found, what refining plants must be established, what ships must be used for conveyance and which for raiding & offense. Also, it was intended for oral presentation, giving only the essentials, in a short period of time.

STRATEGIC RAW MATLS, BLUE & RED - ORANGE 1926-7

Lt McClellan was scheduled to ~~deliver~~^{present} this rpt in 15 min, although the rpt indicates it was submitted by Capt Brumby. Again, perhaps Spruance didn't want to take credit.

On comparing this report w/ others, the B vs R sub-committee (Woods & Dayle) is burdened w/ details & is too rambling. A clear, concise picture does not emerge. The B vs O & A is better. Clearly, the sub-committees varied greatly in the content and organization of their reports. Spruance's came through beautifully. Well organized, logical, and clear, the reader knows exactly what the US would face in a war w/ Japan & England.

Typical, perhaps, that Spruance allowed Lt McClellan to do the talking. Also, not much thought given in these studies to denying raw matls to enemy, except for B-O study.

A very thorough study by Commander Ernest J. [unclear]
McWhorter of Comm # 2, studying "Major Naval
Operations Conducted by the Germans in the World War."

p22 16 came to 8 conclusions, the gist being that the Ger-
mans had a potent weapon which they failed to properly use
or appreciate, and that the British had no defense for it
initially — Based on the German success in sinking war-
ships, he felt capital ships rather than commerce attacks
was the proper objective. Wonder if others shared that
belief. All through their 1926-27 studies, not once was
the submarine considered a threat against commerce. It
was always an arm of the Main Body. — In his final
page of conclusions, he again points out how subs were never
properly used. He recognized that subs nearly starved GB,
but still concludes they should be used against warships, and
he covered Germany's vacillation on sub warfare rules SUBS (82)

Mr Wharter also commented that this same study had been done the year before and that he had little new to add. It would seem that Jutland, WWI, & Tsushima must have been hashed & rehashed ad nauseum.

Make this a point in article.

Could it be that the success of the convoy system lulled them?

Three WWII concepts - How did NWC develop?

- (1) Carrier warfare
- (2) Amphibious warfare
- (3) Submarine warfare

Spruance acted as Communication Umpire BLUE forces.
 Capt Greenslade was director, assisted by Cdr Stewart
 who had formulated problem. ~~Some Jr. Cdr's were given~~
~~key commands. Some sr officers were "observers."~~

Again B vs O. Again O is setting out to raid a B
 convoy. B must intercept & engage Raiding Force.

Interesting to read the ^{manuscript} Estimates of the Situation by the
 players as game progresses. Good try for WWII.

Director became unhappy w/ B. all his A/C were
 sent out to scout w/ none in reserve for contingencies and was
 unable to find a single O scout. (Greenslade lighting
 into Kalkfus, B offensive screen cdr). also Greenslade
 unhappy w/ visiting between rooms for unauthorized
 info. (over) CHART I-27 (E9)

Greenlade felt BLUE offensive screen was operating defensively. Should he charge out to find ORANGE!

This noted at Move 3. By Move 7 Kalbfus still hadn't found anyone.

Note that this was a Charl Maneuver only because students did not have to develop OP ORDER.

This was played by Class of 1925 w/ much better results.

(Tremendous practice in searching & scouting for units.)

Putting salt into Kalbfus' wounds "It is believed that the unanimous opinion of the officers attending the [1925] discussion and critique of this maneuver was that the BLUE Offensive Screen had been

(cont)

exceedingly well handled and that insofar as was in their power had nullified the enemy search on the northern flank of the convoy."

— GOOD COLOR —

An example of the clash and exchanges at the critique. Recall in ~~War College history~~, the ~~Operations Dept said~~
See CHART MANEUVERS 1926-27.

We also have a record of the critique. Kalbfus didn't come out too well. Capt Pope also took lumps as O C in C for poor communications.

In this, Spruance was Communications Umpire for BLUE Critique showed that poorly written communications caused confusion and errors & missed opportunities. "Simplicity in plan and in transmission to be sought" (over)

→ The old, old story. Do I search enemy
out or do I let him come to me. [Expanded]

[Expanded]

Midway, Phillips Sea Target

Cross reference this to Interview # 19 on Spruance's clearly-written orders, also 6 Nov interview on how Spruance liked to write dispatches himself.

The report contains the "Umpire's Communication Record" in Spruance's handwriting. Very neatly kept, with a sharp pencil. Orank this in somehow.

Eventually Kalkfus' cruiser closed w/ a raiding force & melee ensued. Looks like Kalkfus wanted enemy raiding force to come to him while he screened convoy, rather than charging off looking for Orange. Really nothing wrong w/ this, although it was "defensive."

PURPORTED JAPANESE WAR PLAN

1936-7

Hearst newspaper, "Baltimore American", claimed it had
purloined TS Jap war plans, purporting to exploit
resources of Manchuria & Korea, maintaining friendship
w/ China.

Hearst said this was proof Japs prepping for war
w/ U.S.

JAP VS AMERICAN CHARACTER. 1926-7

Extracted from OP II - 27.

Conun B3 Japs submissive to autocratic control. Will give loyal & unquestioning support. Centralized govt a fundamental element to successful conduct of war.

Americans More independent, some pacifist & political meddling, some chaffing under war restraints, but patriotism will make us good fighters.

B2 Japs High morale, high sense of nationalism, desire to demonstrate national superiority, highly developed military skill; frugal people, simple diet, leading to military ops at low cost. Her morale & military skill equal to U.S. She must not be underestimated ←

Two opposing views

(OVER) B1 US possesses greater military skills. Japs work well in harness, are persistent & fatalistic, not adaptable to new ideas. US aggressive when aroused, ability to stand reverses, do not like discipline, act individualistically. OP II - 27 (90)

Japs sure of moral position. Oriental trait of willing to play a waiting game. Will act as expediency dictates w/o qualms of conscience. Believes "nothing succeeds like success." Can sustain great hardships w/o lessening morale. American mechanically skillfull, very adaptable; sure of moral position as a people.

Comm 0-1. American will unite against "The yellow Peril" Japs will respond w/ "Asia for the Asiatics." Japs central over the man power and organization for war are superior to US. Americans tenacious, self-reliant, bold, & efficient. Japs can meet any foe on equal terms and "certainly no race will fight harder for their homeland..." American have greater mechanical aptitude.

JAP VS AMERICAN CHARACTER - 2 - 1956-7

~~or~~ Japs are nationalists due to Shinto, believe loss to US means national ruin; US doesn't understand effort regard to win and "as a rule they are self-sacrificed and confident that failure is impossible."

STRATEGIC PROBLEM I-27 / JULY 1926

This problem was given to class almost upon arrival. Motive:
Exercise in conduct of search operations. This is a charl game.

War exists between B & O. Each holds some central Pacific islands. B sallies forth w/ invasion force convoy. O must intercept and destroy convoy. But first, he must find convoy. So this problem is to teach search methods, plugging "The Service of Information and Security," a basic pub containing principles of search, scouting, and screening which have been adopted as standard, and methods giving the best chance of success.

In the staff solution, students were told what search method to employ for each search group. Later students would figure this out for themselves. Search methods are cut & dried, screens much more complex (over)

The types of search employed & explained:

- (1) Search from Ahead
- (2) Sector and Independent Methods
- (3) Retiring Search Patrol Method
- (4) Search from the Rear Method
- (5) Direct Search

Amusing that American methods were used for O Fleet.

Cdr RR Stewart, Div C-1, made up problem & staff solution.

Handed out 1 July. Handed in 15 July.

Also that problems were most always concentrated in the Pacific. NWC staff & students constantly thinking in terms of Japan & the Pacific & the Pacific islands.

DEMONSTRATIVE PROBLEM # 1

JULY 1926

MOTIVE: To derive the Mission from Orders.

A rather basic exercise. The student is given a one-page ORDER and from it he must state the mission of the three commanders involved.

Issued 6 July. Date of solution turn-in unknown.

MOTIVE: To derive the Mission from Instruction.

Most interesting. The student puts himself in Commodore David Porters shoes and must derive the mission from an LOI issued him by SECNAV on 1 Feb 1823. The basic mission was to repress piracy in the West Indies & Gulf of Mexico.

NWC interested in this for several reasons. First it was an exercise in reasoning and determining a mission from an ambiguous LOI. Second, Porter had been court-martialed for allegedly violating one of the LOI injunctions. Third, if ^{LOI} restriction hampers the LOI mission, go to originator for clarification. Fourth, LOI arrangement of topics is unsound, emphasizing need for clear, well organized orders & instructions. (This again holds the imperial RRS for (Lt Stewart) issued 14 July.

DEMONSTRATIVE PROBLEM #3

JULY 1926

MOTIVE: To illustrate how a Mission may be changed by a change in the situation.

War between B & O. Fleet to concentrate in Hawaii. B CA forces transiting Canal zone to San Diego finds O CV force approaching CZ. What to do?

FFT Hawaii

Solution: attack O CV force! "There is no question now what is the duty of every BLUE force that can get at this enemy menace in time. It is to prevent at all hazards the launching of an enemy air attack on the CANAL. No force must wait for orders. Every force that can be used must take the initiative." [Spruance at Midway] "His decision must be instant. There is no time to lose. From this we draw the lesson that a commander must constantly apprehend a change in the situation, (can!)"

must constantly have his mind ready for a surprise from any quarter, must keep in mind always the plan of higher command, must be ready with a quick decision to meet an infinite number of changed situations, must be ready to suit his actions to contribute towards carrying into effect of the plan of the higher command."

How true, & Spruance practiced this

DEMONSTRATIVE PROBLEM # 4

JULY 1926

MOTIVE: Exercise in Formal Order Writing. Note: Discussion or consideration of the decisions and plans stated is not a part of this problem. Taking them as they are, write the orders to carry them out.

Sit: War between B & R. R wants to invade WESTLAND. Decisions & missions stated. Problem was to write OPORDS

STRATEGIC PROBLEM A

AUGUST 1976

Given 16 Aug. Solution due 18 Aug

Situation: War between B & B. BLACK intends to invade CONUS w/ superior fleet & many troops.

Required: Derivation of Mission

Mission of BLACK C in C on given date

RRS again!

This looks at a B-O war from the O viewpoint. O wants a war of attrition, gradually retreating westward, so that B, ever more extended, finally stops from exhaustion & war is stalemated. B wants to continue push westward, isolate O, and finally force O to submit. The entire strategic situation is discussed from every viewpoint. The importance of lines of communication and logistic support is emphasized. The need for bases to support offensive operations is evident. The location and characteristics of islands for bases is recognized. Anyone participating in this study would become familiar with the Japanese & the Pacific. Interesting that students must act as O commanders, and thus try to think as Japs do. In fact, this prob is from the Jap viewpoint. . . . The solution is in the format of the Estimate of the Situation.

Derives Orange Mission: To reduce B flt to a condition favorable to O in a Jt action, in order to maintain O control of the Eastern Asiatic Seas. OAR

Summary of Strengths & Weaknesses

Strength

More & better ships & top ability to concentrate forces on strategic offensives

LIKE AN INVADER PLUNGING MORE DEEPLY INTO RUSSIA

Strength

Position (interior lines)
Short communication lines
Bases
Good road conditions
Better intelligence
Superior total air because of land bases

BLUE
mmmm

ORANGE
mmmmmm

Weakness

Position (exterior lines)
Logistics problems
Lack of bases
Worsening road conditions
Need to provide combatants for convoy duty
Long communication lines

Weakness

Inferior ships & top

B occupation of Truk important because of central location.
(Truk comes up again & again)

Then O looked at B probable intentions: "To gain command of the sea in the areas vital to O supply, in order to effect her isolation." Then a long discussion how this would be done. First, what sea areas are vital to O. Long discussion. (A preview of WWII planners dilemma in how to invade Japan) ~~XXX~~ ← NOTE

Concludes B will move an invasion force to capture a base between the Bonins and the Southern Philippines.

O reasoning

Governing principle: to attack in large local superiority and to retain the initiative so as to be able to engage, to close, or to withdraw before the local superiority changes sides. Let B come to O. Final decision: Harass B during transit. Attack in force when B in near destination

The Japanese attack Pearl Harbor!!

Situation: Deteriorating international situation. Light B forces in Pearl. Main B fleet in CZ. Convoy about to transit SFRAW to Pearl. Then O begins unusual military activity. Hostile O movement expected.

p3 Derivation of Mission: "The Mission in this problem comes under the classification of those which are 'derived through study of a . . . situation developed by national policy or (and) naval operations.' This, as set forth in 'The Study of Strategy' is the normal one for naval advisers to the government and for the higher grades of command." Pearl is inadequately defended and must be retained as a major base.
(over)

p5 "Furthermore we are justified, from a review of past history, together with the censorship just established, in the conclusion that, on the part of Orange, acts will precede words; that reports of hostile and vigorous operations will be our first news that war is on." p10 Orange will have excellent intelligence on B military maneuvers in Pearl & Conus, being "... amply supplied with individuals who may be secret agents, in positions of responsibility..." However, "BLUE sources of information in ORANGE country are sparse and will be subject to interruption."

p11 Bad January weather will cover the movement of the O forces from Japan & Pearl

p11 " We have explained that effective action without warning is to be expected on the part of ORANGE. We have not however taken into account the fact that ORANGE personnel are not used to such long cruises as the one in contemplation, that such a bold conception as is involved in an expedition against OAHU is not in conformity with their previous history, but in view of the great advantage that would accrue to them from an attempt even partly successful in the initial phase of the war and of the great harm the destruction of our dock and other facilities at PEARL HARBOR would do to us we are bound to assume that some attempt against OAHU will be made."

p13 Raid by surface forces not probable. " Air raid however conducted from a plane carrier at a distance from OAHU is a very different matter and is to be expected."

(Over)

STRAT C-27 (73)

p14. "CV-1 could, after reaching a position 150 miles from OAHU conduct a surprise air attack on the vulnerable parts of the base with a reasonable chance of crippling it for a considerable time." Would proceed to NW alone and launch when in range.

Then B must split his forces to defend both Pearl & the convoy.

p20 Must set out scouting forces to find O CV before it can launch attack.

p20 also interesting that Cinc should stay ashore in Pearl to direct & coordinate B forces.

p 195

Left National Policies, International Law, and Logistics to other divisions. Apparently Div. C handled this.

Work development progressive "The early part of the course is devoted to learning how to solve the problems which occur later." Problems progressively more difficult, culminating in the "Joint Army and Navy Problem", dealing w/ overseas campaign of a large fleet.

Problem solutions tested by chart maneuvers. "This is in conformity with the applicatory system whereby the student learns the merits and defects of a solution through the actual demonstration of a problem."

Emphasized thorough critique, impersonal criticism, and that staff solution not infallible

p 194

Strategy study broken into 5 periods

First Period

1. Study of pamphlets (a) The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form
(b) The Study of Strategy
(c) The Service of Information & Strategy
2. STRATEGIC PROBLEM I - Various Methodology Search

Second Period

1. Pamphlet review
2. Demonstrative problems 1-4
3. Strategic Problem A - Destroying mission from Atlantic strategy
4. Strategic Problem C - San Francisco - Oahu convoy defense
5. Chart Maneuver I - Exercise in Scouting, Screening, & Convoy Protection - Pacific

Third Period

Strategic phase of operation Problem I. Base screening, convoy protection, & scouting Pacific.

continued

CHART MANEUVERS 1926-27

P195 "after the completion of a chart maneuver a history and critique is prepared and presented in conference for discussion. It is certain that decisions and criticisms of the director of the maneuver will not be acquiesced in by everybody. It is proper and desirable that such disagreement be expressed freely. It is better that such feeling be voiced than that it be kept repressed.

It must be borne in mind that all criticism is impersonal. We are all striving to ascertain the truth and apply it correctly. The members of the Staff are not infallible. The only difference between the Staff and the students is that the former, having presumably spent more time in the study of the subjects concerned, are, other things being equal, merely more apt to be correct in their reasoning and attitude." Recall Greenblade/Kalbfus in CHART MAN I-27 and Mc Clellan or Pratt/Spruance.