

OPERATIONS PROBLEM I-27 (CHART MAN II-27) 1926-7
(TACTICAL MANEUVER II-27)

Played pd 13 Oct - 22 Nov 26 Issued 12 Oct.
Solution 14-25 Oct. 29 Oct game started.

- Motives:
- (a) Study of screening a base preparatory to sortie of a convoy.
 - (b) Movement of a convoy across uncommanded sea.
 - (c) Study of convoy defense.

B-O war. B wants to move a convoy out of Guam. Orange wants to attack it.

B had to come up with CHART MANEUVER II, the safe conduct of convoy from Guam to Malampaya Sound.
O had to come up with CHART MANEUVER II, the observation and tracking of the convoy until the Raiding Force can attack.

(OVER)

Spruance acted as COMFSDIV II, ^(DDI 42) Blue forces. Capt
Kalbhus was CinC. Capt Pope was CinC Orange.
Capt Greenblade was Director of Maneuver.

Emphasized need for AIC as scout, for intelligence on
what enemy is doing, interesting O solution. 16 put a ring
of ships around Guam 160 - 330 plus flying planes over
Guam to see what was up. B used a 3-wide concentric
ASW-cruising screen.

-2-

OPERATIONS PROBLEM I-27 (CHART MAN II-27) 1926-27
(TACTICAL MANEUVER II-27)

Summary of Action

On 29 Jan O^{CV} planes scout Guam, harbor empty.

On 30 Jan O^{CV} AIC scout Guam, convoy & escort sighted. Both convoy & escort just arrived. B realizes he's been observed by O AIC, send VF to intercept, no joy.

On 010630 Feb O AIC again rpt harbor filled w/ ships.

On 020645, O AIC rpt harbor empty. Some contact between B & O screen AIC, SS, & ships. B convoy & escort moving SE.

3 Feb, B convoy S of Guam, now heading SW into O screen.

4 Feb, B convoy still headed SW, many O patrols but no contact.

051600. O CL sights convoy & is quickly sunk. Convoy now headed W. (over)

6 Feb. O ALC sight B convoy. B ALC sight O unit. More contact. O ALC start tracking convoy. B goes into approach formation. Contact. Melee. Ships sunk. Spruance's DIs busy. Battle rages into the night.

This was an Operation Problem in that op orders had to be ground out in advance. When it was played it then became a Chart Maneuver

History of Maneuver:

This was to be a combined OP PROB/CHART MANEUVER/TACTICAL (BOARD) MANEUVER. GI became a tactical maneuver when the forces had closed on 061200Zeb/081400 Nov (real time). GI was terminated on 061945Zeb (191600 Nov real time). Total game time was 7hr 45 min (155 moves). Students played for 45 hrs from 8-19 November. They played morning & evening because they had to wrap up by 20 Nov Sat for critique in order to get ready for Int'l Law pd starting 22 Nov. Players got fatigued. Students felt comparisons of their problem solutions w/ those of staff were unfair. They were incensed that the solution of a single staff officer was considered superior to anything the students had produced. GI wasn't even a "staff" solution! ~~So the WWC came up w/ a compromise~~

As the critique says, "They [the students], therefore, are not impressed with the shortcomings of their own estimates."

Capt Snyder decided in the future to select the best solution submitted by a student and using it. If a staff solution is used, it must be the best opinion of the staff and carry the authority of the Head of C2.

Capt Snyder conducted the critique from informal notes and memoranda. TAC II-27 was unique in that it was played throughout as a chart maneuver. This was due to the fact O deployed his forces for a night attack and didn't force contact w/ B during daylight hours. Game was terminated after 1 1/2 hrs of night action. w/ O the victor w/ DDO & subs, "... due to the excellent position attained by these forces around the BLUE formation just prior to nightfall." Kalbfus loses again.

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1926-27 FIRST PD

Divided into 4 periods. Period #2 missing. Was taught by George Bragton Wilson of Harvard. Needed to solve complex problems during war (particularly w/ neutrals) as well as having to act as only Govt rep in time of peace [See NWC MISSION & CURRICULUM AS SEEN BY PRAIRIE] Looks like Wilson visited occasionally for lectures, but wasn't available for consultation.

FIRST PD - issued 1 July 26, Wilson seminar 5 Oct, solutions due 12 Oct, mailed to Wilson, & critiqued when he next visited NWC on 22 Nov 26. Problem concerned application of international law wRT neutral ports, neutral ships & enemy ships in time of war between X & Y.

Prof Wilson will present situations for 3rd Pd on
6 Dec 26. Will hold critique & discuss 2nd Pd
solutions on 31 Jan 27

Class divided into X, Y, & Z committees. Solutions will be
collected & mailed 7 Feb 27. Will critique #3 on 11 Mar 27.

THIRD PD

Same situation. Problem concerned DD stopping
unarmed ^{neutral} merchantmen under varying circumstances of
type of cargo & destination. Also DD needing fuel at
neutral ports.

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1926-27 FOURTH PD

Pres Wilson presents situation 1 Feb 27. Solutions from X, Y, and Z committees due 28 March for mailing to Pres Wilson.

Wilson will critique 3rd Pd 11 March 27 and 4th Pd 11 April 1927

FOURTH PD - Same war between X & Y.

Situation - CV in neutral port w/ cruiser. Problems concerning try of aircraft in port, overflights, and refueling in port, repairing A/C.

POLICY THESIS MEMO 1926-7

Memo gave these guidelines:

include a discussion on

- I The foreign policy of the U.S.
(a) Economic aspects
(b) Political aspects

- II The foreign policy of the U.S. in Central America
and the Caribbean.

Memo gave a two-page bibliography. Sponsored
by Policy & Command Division D

Sure as hell didn't give much guidance.
Pres NWC had said that these work would be
deemphasized.

POLICE THESIS

1926-7

p1 began thesis by quoting Washington telling Congress that relations between nations is governed by self-interest. Feels American believe altruism governs our foreign policy, but foreigners think otherwise. Doesn't say what he thinks until p 30, where he says it's self-interest. Must study history to ascertain current foreign policy. Influence of past rather than arguments for future will most shape public opinion support of foreign policy.

Americans accept two foreign policies

- (1) Monroe Doctrine - Political
- (2) Open Door - Economic

p1-3 Then he began w/ history & events leading up to Monroe Doctrine.

(a) Entanglement in European conflicts. Prompted Washington's Farewell Address

p4 "The purchase of Louisiana and Florida and the overthrow of Spanish rule left the United States in the fortunate position of having no near European controlled neighbors except Canada and the West Indies; and she was naturally pleased with this development, and desired no backward steps be taken." p5-6 This led Monroe to establish Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Then he explained Doctrine's aims. Then he discussed its implementation & effectiveness p7 He justified US interference w/ Latin America's domestic affairs as necessary to help Europeans fm landing troops to enforce demands on shaky govts. This it is "... unfortunate, but inevitable..." that Latins resent Monroe Doctrine. "The strong and stable governments now resent it as patronizing, and the weak and unstable regard it as a cloak for American imperialism and fear for their independence."

p8 Start-up w/ Seny Blaine in 1889, Pan-American movement tried to foster friendlier relations, but many Latins prefer to identify w/ Spain & European Latin countries. Felt that as they became "Americanized" they'd loosen European ties. p9 Pan-Americanism "... is a tender plant with many adverse influences, and it must be carefully nourished by the promotion of mutually beneficial commerce and other interests." p10 Felt anti-imperial sentiment, always strong, was extremely strong in 1926. He felt "... the United States has attained to the position of the strongest single country in the world and hence has little to fear..."

p12 He generally condoned American imperialism; although he understood we created ill-will, it was morally justifiable: EXAMPLE (OVER)

" President Roosevelt's denial to Colombia of the right to land troops on the Isthmus to suppress the revolt was perhaps an arbitrary act [1903], and it certainly created much ill will and suspicion of the United States in Colombia and throughout the rest of Latin America; but Colombia had been holding up the building of the canal by refusing to agree to terms, and the United States may be said to have exercised an international right of eminent domain, which was morally justifiable, even if its strict legality was debatable."

p¹³ Opening of Panama Canal gave US renewed interest in Caribbean stability & exclusion of foreign powers. Again, US stepped in to supervise Latin American financial management to keep out foreigners. Much opposition by everyone, esp. Senate.

Cuba

p15 Deplored instability of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Was very prophetic in saying "The history of the countries bordering on the Caribbean makes it appear probable that a dictatorship tempered by revolution is the only kind of government to which their people aspire." p15-17 Was also pessimistic about Central America stability. p17 Had little hope for ^{WILSON'S} policy of recognizing new govts only if elected, because violent revolution was the normal way of changing govts. p17-18 Seemed torn by fear Monroe Doctrine causes US to constantly meddle in Latin's affairs even though we preach. "The long-standing American policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states has, thus, in the Caribbean come into conflict with the interests and safety of the United States as set forth in the Monroe Doctrine." He obviously wants the US to be altruistic and is disturbed that it isn't.

Comment: Row Mall Study would emphasize strategic
importance of Western Hemisphere countries.

In regard to our promise ^{eventual} of Philippine independence p19 "No
other country in the world has ever taken such an altruistic
stand in connection with a territory which it has acquired by
conquest or purchase. Whether this policy would stand if the
Philippines were to develop into a great rubber producing country
and every American had a personal interest in their retention
under the American flag, is another question." The idealist
tempered by a pragmatic realism!

So much for the political aspect of our
foreign policy

Now for the economic side of our policy.

p19-21. Began by recalling trade barriers between G. Britain & her colonies, much resented; bringing in the Revolution. Afterwards, America thwarted by Europeans in search for foreign trade. p21 "The United States in its attitude toward neutrality has always been in favor of a strict observance, and of extending the rights of legitimate neutral trade and limiting the interference with it by belligerents."

p23 So he raises here, or what? ^{usually in conjunction w/ European powers} After recounting our use of armed force against Chinese on numerous occasions, he says, "while the United States has been ready in the past to use force in the Far East - either alone or in conjunction with other Powers - it has always done so without any feelings of hostility toward the people or countries involved, (cont)

"and without any desire to take unfair advantage or to obtain territorial concessions." Kind of contradicts p 21 quote! He justifies above by US conciliatory actions later on China & Japan. p 23, 24 Says US forced agreement from Europeans & Jap for Open Door policy. Did we do it to preserve China or to preserve our own interests?

p 25 Japanese 21 Demands to China in 1915 violated open door made all Powers but esp. US very suspicious of Japanese motives p 27 This led to 1921 Naval Arms Limitation Conference, but also had Pacific & Far Eastern probs on agenda. Resultant Nine-Power Treaty was to protect Open Door & China integrity. Spruance believed this conference was successful in stopping Japanese aggression in Far East.

p27 He says wishfully that Japan "... apparently has decided upon a different and more benevolent policy toward China." But then in contradiction, "Her hold on Manchuria, it is true, has not been relaxed, but rather strengthened." Chaotic condition of China greatest threat to open door. If China nationalist policy goes anti-foreign it would "... force the Powers to intervene to protect their treaty rights and the safety of their nationals." Thus Spruance is saying Powers justified in keeping China under subjection, as long as they don't capitalize her.

Then he looks to the future

p28 US now greatest world power. No longer needed foreign military assistance as before. Yet fear of foreign alliances kept us out of League of Nations.
(over)

p29 However: "... her interests throughout the world are becoming greater each year with her increasing foreign trade and investment, and she is bound to take a larger part in world affairs. She will do this in the interests of peace and justice."

Oh, yes? Then, it is "unfortunate" that current foreign policies "... have combined to make the United States most unpopular in certain countries of Europe." Then, again wishfully rationalizing

p29, 30 "Time will serve to soften this [animosity], and then it is to be hoped that the real purposes of American policy will be everywhere appreciated." p30 He hopes things will stabilize in the Caribbean so W. Hemisphere countries will have friendlier relations

Conclusion

p30 Again, contradicting himself, "The foundation of American foreign policies in the past has been self-interest, but the adoption of most of these policies by an unwilling and skeptical world has proved that their authors were far-sighted statesmen, who were content to seek a permanent benefit rather than a temporary advantage."

See p17-18 for contradiction, also p21. And why will we do things in interests of "peace and justice", p29, when in the past he says it has been "self-interest", supra?

p30.1 He concludes by saying Secretary Root "... expressed the purposes underlying American policy in an address delivered before the Third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro on 31 July, 1906: 'We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; (cont)

for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves, we deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations equal to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and deem the observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every other American republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together. "

CONOLLY AT NWC CIRCA 1930

TOPIC

REF. NO.

CONOLLY (113)

NOTES

69-70 CWO Pratt insisted that Laning give his opinion on disarmament, Dec 30. Conolly & staff officer worked over & was investigating relative strengths of 8 & 6 in cruisers. 8 in won.⁷¹ NWC also inclined to outlaw subs, but Capt Taylor & Conolly opposed. Conolly saw it as first & only weapon in first part of war against Japs. Taylor & Conolly prevailed.⁷² Naval air generally accepted. In 1932-33 Laning recommended converting CA hulls to CVL, which eventually worked.⁷³ NWC active in studying types & employment of ships & planes. [Get Holloway's memoirs] Many CV war games. Amused that in CV vs CV one air group would be lost & one CV would be lost. Later this often happened.⁷⁴ Employment of A/C was understood. LTA had no future.

LOCATION

(over)

75 Lenin's feelings on CVLs discounted in Wash but understood & accepted by staff & students 1930-33. - Some war games against Red, but only to be able to say we weren't always fighting Orange. 76-8 Navy suffered two pay cuts, 1928-32, but at lower prices & lower cost of living, no great hardship. Officers just happy to have a job. Actually things looking up in 30s. Got better job-hungry enlisted men. Navy smaller, more elite, better trained.

CC LogBook

History of Correspondence Courses Together With
Names of Personnel in Charge of, and Periods of
Duty.

This is a running log from 1914 to circa mid 1960s on significant events, recorded by Bradford W. Langley, for 40 years an administrative civil servant in the CC dept.

BASIC CC CURRICULUM

Two basic courses in the late 20s and early 30s. Strategy & Tactics (S&T) and International Law (IL). In a constant state of revision. CC directors concerned with grace periods, relationship of CC to NWC, who would sign directives & correspondence, and shifting students in mid-course from the old course to the revised one. Also who would grade papers, who would review and sign comment sheets, if they would substitute for promotion exams, and if student could work on second assignment before receiving comment sheet on first assignment. Motivator officers to get assignments in on time was also a big problem.

Lampley

WAR COLLEGE STUDENT'S MOOD

1933

"In war the nation will rightly demand not indecision but smashing triumph. It is to those who have studied here at the Naval War College that the statesmen will look for guidance in the times that try men's souls, when public opinion clamors for the avenging of initial defeats, for war on the enemy's coast, for victory, and through victory, for peace. Knowing full well how heavy will be the burdens of high command, the student officer turns again to his books, here where the afternoon sun strikes athwart the stacks in the quiet college library. Glancing up, his eye rests on the portraits of officers who have gone before, those who greatly thought and greatly achieved in the supreme test of battle." p 505.

(over)

Talbot

(9)

a NWC, ^{LCDR} student, hating war, reflects why the
NWC must exist none the less.

How perfectly he describes Spruance!

PHILOSOPHY ON WAR COLLEGE

When promoted to higher flag rank in WWII, Mr. Bradford W. Langley, Admin. Asst, Correspondence Course School, wrote him a letter of congratulations.

Spruance wrote reply saying NWC grads were one of his greatest assets, and spoke in the highest terms of the worth and value of the WC.

~~1834~~ Note: Langley spoke

LANGLEY (43)
~~Telephone conversation w/
Mr Langley on 9/9/70~~

CORRECTING CORRESPONDENCE COURSE SOLUTIONS 1931-3

Spruance corrected all solutions on Strategy & Tactics. International Law problems were referred to an Army Colonel.

TOPIC

MOORE/ SPRUANCE CORRESPONDENCE
COURSE

REF. NO.

MOORE (115)

NOTES

484 Moore kept putting off correspondence course since 1929
 Finally in July 31, Spruance answered "I am indeed sorry to
 learn that you have been working under such handicaps, and hope
 that they will soon be removed and you will be returned to normalcy."
 Then he disenrolled him, no more chances.

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE HEAD CORRES CSE

REF. NO.

HISTORY (15)

1931-2

NOTES

p365 618 enrolled in Strategy & Tactics & Intl Law. ~~to~~ Advised XOP of larger ships of 1931 course revision (Aug 31). Also gave course synopsis to all graduating students to "pass the word." Cdr Carrall had revised SET in Spring 31. Spruance had not changed anything because he approved of Carrall's work.

p367 Shortage of books for new course
(over)

LOCATION

Completion of S&T course substituted for promotion exams. Would like to do same for I's, but this would increase no. of students taking use, & would need additional officers & more clerks. But Navy short of funds & couldn't foot the bill.

Enjoyed his tour as a student. "...a wonderful period." Said that Spruance and Turner were recognized as deep thinkers and students of war.

Tell that NWC was games severely penalized students taking the offensive. \$ NWC created in people the idea that you needed a vast superiority, otherwise "... you had to go crouch in a corner and wait for help to come."

TOPIC

HALL ON NWC

1937-40

REF. NO.

HALL (114)

NOTES

92- Kallifus & Turner asked him to stay on as staff. Eventually relieved Turner as head of strategy. Kelly Turner one of greatest combat naval officers in naval history. Outspoken, frank, intelligent, industrious, brilliant. — Learned more as instructor than as student 93-4 Enjoyed duty & felt it prepared him for war.

93-4 War games most interesting part. Prepared everyone for war in Pacific. 94 "We anticipated a great many ^{of the} things and the needs that came about in World War II." 95 Gave Turner credit for upgrading strategic thinking at NWC.

LOCATION

Motives: To further familiarity w/ the TRUK area. BLUE
 at war 6 mos on strategic offensive in Pacific.

BLUE Mission: Get convoys to offensive BLUE Fleet w/
 supplies and to destroy ORANGE force threatening convoys.
 Fleet cannot proceed until convoys supplies rec'd.

BLUE Plan Leave convoys in Truk and sally forth w/
 major force to defeat ORANGE.

ORANGE Mission Interrupt BLUE's OAHU - DUMANQUILAS
 line of communication & keep BLUE Fleet immobilized

ORANGE Plan Meet and destroy BLUE force from Truk
 who will be coming forth to destroy him

Forces

Type	BLUE	ORANGE
BB	5	7
CA/CL	10	11
CV	1	1
DD	36	36

BLUE Solution: Great discussion of gunnery comparisons. Then a discussion on possible tactics. Decision.

Phase I: Reduce enemy BB & destroy carrier deck by air & SS attack

" II Engage battle lines

" III Close range and attack w/ torps for DD.

My comment: CV sent off w/ no BB/CA AA protection. Assume OCV can be sunk by land-based horiz VPBs. BCV A/C merely "soften up" BBA. Use VT & VO planes for bombing. VF strafe prior to bombing. No CAP. Absolute unre-
alism in use of BCV. Whole thing assumes surface engagement decision.

Problem set up shows emphasis on surface combatants
vise air warfare.

ORANGE Solution Again, many gunnery comparisons. CV's guns considered useful in secondary "CA" role! CV deployed away from Main Body! O Acknowledges BLUF's greatest element of strength is her A/C. Will first seek & destroy O CV. Feels B will have CAP! (B made no provision for this).

Decision: Seek B forces & engage in decisive surface engagement. Felt O CV could launch only one attack before being hit by B A/C, so use O A/C against B main body. No CAP! VF attack B A/C while on CV or airfield deck rearming/refueling. Surviving O A/C land on island & destroy over A/C, since O CV will probably be OOC. My God! O VF A/C will follow B A/C after initial strike & hit them on deck! Did, however, keep O CV w/ main body (M) for additional AA protection & "CA" use.

Phase I AC & SS attack BMB II Long range gunnery, III Short range gunnery
 (12) TAC. 3.37 gunnery

Situation: Red (England) declares war against Blue (U.S.)
 Green (Canada) allies w/ R. B decides to capture
 Halifax, R wants to retain as a fleet base. Fleet action
 ensues.

Fleet

Type	Red	Blue
BB	12	15
CV	3	2
CA/CL	20	21
DD	63	44

Red Mission: Gain control of WESTLANT north of 43 to assist in
 denying B operations against Maritime Provinces, by destroying B
 fleet.

Blue Mission: Retain control of WESTLANT by defeating
 R fleet as approaches to Halifax

Red Plan: Attack B CVs ^{w/ A/C} as seen as found. Soften B battle line w/ AC & SS. Close for main engagement. Weakness. No VF for CAP on first strike. Used CV ACC for search.

Blue Plan Feared attacks from R AC. Wanted CAP & AA protection. Seems very conversant w/ carrier warfare. Wants to destroy R CV flight decks. Doesn't assign quite enough to do job, though*. Assigned 18 VF for battle line CAP. Still separate CVs. No CAP for CV. Did consider AA protection for CV w/ plane guard DDA. Theme into Main Action again! Also located R fleet by CAP & their A/C. No scouts from CV! *However, did use the rule of thumb of 9 planes per ship per squadron against CV/BB (see ⑭)

CVs detached from main body. Main engagement still predominates. CVs detached to avoid detection & stay away from range of attacking AC. Didn't meet CVs around when battle lines joined main engagement.

CIRCULAR TACTICAL FORMATIONS & CAPT MACFALL 1923

" One of my classmates (both in the War College Class of 1923 and USNA 1905) Captain R.C. Mac Fall - now retired & living in La Jolla - Calif - devised the circular tactical formation used so successfully during WW II. These formations I personally took to the Pacific Fleet in late 1923 when I became Asst Chief of Staff & Fleet Tactical officer for Admiral S.S. Robinson - USN - who was then C-in-C Battle Fleet. . . ."

Comment:

Mac Fall Head Tactics in 1931-33 & may have influenced Adm Laning w/ tactical ideas including circular formation.

I The Mission

- (a) Summary of the Situation
- (b) The Formulation of the Mission

II Survey of Opposing Strengths (Emphasizes capabilities in great detail)III Enemy Courses of Action (Emphasizes intentions, but takes into account capabilities)

- (a) Enemy Mission
- (b) Statement & Analysis of Enemy Courses of Action

IV Commander's Own Courses of Action

- (a) Appreciation of the Mission
- (b) Statement & Analysis of Possible Courses of Action

V Determination of Commander's Best Courses of Action

VI The Decision

- A. Measures of Execution of the Decision
- B. Formulation of Tasks and Organization of Means
- C. Special Orders
- D. Bombing Instructions

Comment: An illustration of NWC emphasis on clear thinking & rational problem solving.

2-400
2-425, 6, 7

AIRCRAFT TACTICAL DOCTRINE 1938

Aircraft Torpedo Doctrine (VTB) Mission is to destroy enemy ships or slow them up for main engagement. (Emphasis mine) Use leading ship as main tgt. Attack w/o support, in daylight, is hopeless. The VTB the heaviest CV striking arm

2-450
Aircraft Navy Bombing Doctrine (VTB) Torpedo bombers carry bombs and attack from high altitude, usually > 4K ft. Do from max alt for AA protect when possible.

3-112 Distribution of Targets

CV, BB	- 9 planes per ship per Squadron
CA/CL	6
DD	3

In general, tgt priority between BB & CV same. Stresses coordinated attacks in Part III. Also stresses that tactics are not static & frequent revision needed.

Part II Ch. 3 Fighting Squadrons Mission is destruction of enemy A/C. (1) As fighter screen while attacking (over)

(2) As CAP when under attack (3) By attacking scout, spotters, etc.
Secondary Missions (1) attack SS & light surface forces w/
guns & bomb (2) AA suppression on heavier prior to bombing attack.

Part II Ch 2 Bombing Squadrons VB Primary Mission is dive
bombing heavier. One gain control of the air by sinking enemy
CV rather than shooting his AK. VF normally cannot thwart VB
attack. However, still talks about supporting the main engagement.

(1) Concentrate attack on individual ship (2) Suppress AA & render ineffective
against principle element of attack? (3) Deliver attack when target restricted
in maneuvering.

2-177. PATROLS (1) Outer air Patrol: Protection ^{VS} against low altitude air
attacks (2) Intermediate: ^{VS} ASW (3) Gunner: ^{VS} SS & mine (4) Aerial Pickets: ^{VF} Protection
against high altitude attacks. Covered also in 2-330. COMBAT PATROL
fly while aerial pickets track and report.

" An unsupported torpedo attack upon the enemy main body in the daytime with good visibility is hopeless "... " A torpedo attack that can be met by strong gun-fire can never be successful. "

" It must be remembered that Raymond Spruance was a brilliant student, a great leader, and a widely experienced naval officer. His extensive War College training had been absorbed and was used unconsciously. His technical knowledge and experience contributed much to his appreciation of supply and maintenance problems, and led to the establishment of the Mobile Service Forces which were so valuable in the Pacific operations."

See also "PRATT'S GRADUATION ADDRESS"

TOPIC

RECORD OF INSTRUCTION FOR THE
SR CLASS 1936-37

REF. NO.

HISTORY

15

NOTES

Identical to course preceding year. Used some
 Operation, Tactical, & QDPs. "Sound Military
 Decision" issued Jan 1937. Required many
 staff presentations for clarification. Kalbfus left
 just before, & Moore says that Snyder modified it.

Nothing on Logistics. Quotes Patten that course
 eliminated in late 20s.

Lots of lectures by staff.

LOCATION

TOPIC

ADVANCED CLASS

Late 30s

REF. NO.

HISTORY (15)

NOTES

Initiated 1934-35. (No pp. no. Important incidents
1934-1935)

Class of 1936-37 divided into two committees,
which studied economic, political and military
situations of Japan & US respectively. Prepared
national strategic plan for a US/Jap war.
Also prepared a National Strategic Estimate
(over)

LOCATION

and a Grand Strategic Plan for the Military
Forces of the United States.

CURRICULUM, OPERATIONS, 1937-38

Staff Lectures & Presentations (First time this was done on such a grand scale, a Spruance innovation?)

NOTE: What influence did Spruance have on these? Did he review them? Try contacting members of his staff who may still be living. Look into USNA Reg of alumni. Did he attend lectures? Again, check w/ his staff.

Operations Problem	I	Tactical
"	II	Strategical
"	III	Strategical
"	IV	Tactical
"	V	Strategical
"	VI	Tactical
"	VII	Strategical
"	VIII	Tactical

Tactics

Jutland

Demonstrative Tactical Exercises

Gunfire

Quick Decision Problems

Strategic Problem 1-37

Order Writing Exercise
Cruiser Warfare -

Strategic Problem 2-37

Tactics 1. The Naval Battle 2. Fire Control of the Battle
Line 3. Cruisers and Destroyers in the General
Action 4. Elements of Submarine Tactics

Jutland

Demonstrated Tactical Exercises

Tactical Problem 1-37

Tactical Problem 2-37

Tactical Problem 3-37

Quick Decision Problems

Operations Problems I-37

" " II-37

" " III-37

" " IV-37

Sr & Jr.

"

TOPIC

SPRUANCE AS PRES NWC

REF. NO.

SEPT 46

MOORE (125)

NOTES

Enjoyed swimming at Third Beach (Toli: a continuation of his 1930 pro practice) Mentioned Fletcher Pratt's article had been in house for some time but he hadn't read it. "As you know, I do not like personal articles about myself." Assumed the article, as with most, would be misleading and inaccurate. Hoped official histories would be more accurate. Mentioned interrogations had revealed Jap plan for Leyte, but nothing was known for Saipan. (over)

LOCATION

Asked Moore to come up to sit for a group
portrait by Cdr Murray

TOPIC

SPRUANCE TO BE
PRES NWC

REF. NO.

MOORE (123)

NOTES

Speculating on future assignments. "I have told everyone that, when my services are no longer needed in the Pacific, I want to be President of the N.W.C." (SOD 45) Heard that Turner might go straight away. Was willing to stay at sea as long as necessary, but didn't want anyone joined to him to become his loss.

LOCATION

TOPIC SPRUANCE ON PERSONAL
DANGER

REF. NO.

MOORE (121)

NOTES

Described Kamakaizee hit on New Mexico.
"The most curious part of the whole business..." was
ammo falling into boilers. Gave a detailed
description of the damage and casualties. Seemed
unconcerned about his own safety, but was
professionally concerned about its capability
against his ships.

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON WAR, PIO,
& POST WWII

REF. NO.

MOORE (120)

NOTES

"This continues to be a very interesting war out here, and I wish you were along. If we get away with our next two operations with acceptable losses, we shall have moved the war steadily forward towards its successful conclusion."

Told of his troubles w/ PIO people who wanted to send copy from ships. Spruance refused to break radio silence. - also wanted to retain and develop Marshalls, Marianas, & Carolines

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE LECTURE
ON TACTICS

REF. NO.

TACTICS

130

NOTES

Delivered 27-28 July 36. Looked to history for teaching art of war. Quoted heavily. Then pushed & elaborated on 9 principles of warfare. Concluded by pointing out ~~what~~ advantages of war gaming.

LOCATION

TOPIC

NOTES OF OFFICIAL
SPRUANCE ^{WAR} CORRESPONDENCE

REF. NO.

NOTES

Hill & Turner unhappy w/ ability to unload stores & equipment on beachhead. Hill hopes on unloading merchant ships. Spruance discussing need for development of islands. Hoover telling of problems developing bases. Logistics always a problem.

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE AS PRES NWC

REF. NO.

MOORE (127)

NOTES

Approved of Nimitz's early March 47 speech to naval historians. Regretted Penn Carroll's ^{imminent} retirement. "He has done a grand job for us in getting the course reoriented, and I hate to lose him."

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE IN RETIREMENT

REF. NO.

MOORE

(138)

NOTES

Was happy with life in Palible Beach. Birds, animals, ocean, trees, friends, weather. "all things considered, I believe this is an ideal place for retired people to live, provided the local climate suits them, and they don't crave the life of a big city." Was learning about gardening. "I read Holland Smith's three articles in the S.F.P., and am sorry he saw fit to cut loose like that... However, I am not going to engage in any controversies with him.

LOCATION

(over)

He is a very able general and he did a magnificent
job for us in the Pacific."

TOPIC

SPRUANCE PRFS NWC

EST OF SIT

JULY 46

REF. NO.

MOORE (124)

NOTES

Thanked Moore for efforts to expedite the "Estimate
business," Spruance intended to use Navy Dept
recommendations, mimeograph & mark tentative,
& issue so classes wouldn't have to change in
mid-stream. (obviously eager to call "Sound
Military Decision")

LOCATION

TOPIC

LANING

REF. NO.

LANING (131)

NOTES

p291-4 Believed strongly in mission of NWC & was fascinated by the war games. p294 Sims admired his work &, to Lanning's surprise, made him head of Tactics Dept. He had been quite successful in winning war games (Recall his conflict w/ E.I.K.). p304 NWC used his thesis on tactics as a text when he worked on staff. Chapter 36. Did much to develop study of tactics. Was full of enthusiasm!

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON
AMBASSADORSHIP

REF. NO.

MOORE (129)

NOTES

Wondered why he got it. Suspected he was a compromise by State Dept to deter undesirables who wanted the job. Hoped he could bear up under physical strain. His wife was delighted with the prospect.

No mention of his personal feelings. Recall, however, his concept of duty.

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON WEATHER

REF. NO.

NOTES

In all his letters he talks about how he hated the hot Washington weather. He must have dreaded Manila.

LOCATION

- 2 -

SECNAV/MOORE/SPRUANCE ON PUBLICITY 1966

A man's judgment is best when he can forget himself and any reputation he may have acquired, and can concentrate wholly on making the right decisions. Hence, if he seems to give interviewers and publicity men the brush-off, it is not through ungraciousness, but rather to keep his thinking impersonal and realistic. "

BIOG (37)

(See SECNAV 1927 GRADUATION SPEECH)

"His attitude towards news correspondents was based primarily on his dislike of personal publicity. He felt there was a possibility which he intended to avoid, that in his decisions he might be tempted to live up to a glorified public image, rather than being guided by his best military judgment."

Moore # 19 (59)

p62 "His reasons for shunning the spotlight are summarized in a discussion of the subject with a classmate, in which he expressed himself in the following general tenor:
Personal publicity in a war can be a drawback because it may affect a man's thinking. A commander may not have sought it; it may have been forced upon him by zealous subordinates or imaginative war correspondents. Once started, however, it is hard to keep in check. In the early days of a war, when little about the various commanders (such)

is known to the public, and some Admiral or General does a good and perhaps spectacular job, he gets a head start in publicity. Anything he does thereafter tends towards greater headline value than the same thing done by others, following the journalistic rule that 'Names make news'. Thus his reputation snow-balls, and soon, probably against his will, he has become a colorful figure, credited with fabulous characteristics over and above the competence in war command for which he has been conditioning himself all his life.

His fame may not have gone to his head, but there is nevertheless danger in this. Should he get to identifying himself with the figure as publicized, he may subconsciously start thinking in terms of what his reputation calls for, rather than of how best to meet the actual problem confronting him. (cont)

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON WAR

REF. NO.

SPRUANCE (133)

NOTES

" Winning this war in the shortest possible time is the thing that matters, and our personal desires have to take a secondary place. "

add - just a good war
£

duty to president

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON JAP WAR
CRIMINALS & JAPS IN
GEN'L

REF. NO.

MOORE (123)

NOTES

Was unhappy w/ Japs treatment of prisoners.
" When he [Mac Arthur] gets Japan thoroughly under control, I think those responsible for the mal-treatment of our POWs will get what is coming to them." I felt this would eliminate the worst Japanese militarists, and most common Japs would approve.
Was impressed that Japanese ~~were willing to fight to last man~~ "fought to the last ditch." despite grievous shortages in weapons & mail.

LOCATION

" This is a very interesting time to be in Japan,
and I hope I can stay around here until things
have become settled into the pattern they are
going to take."

Interesting again

TOPIC

SPRUANCE IN RETROSPECT
ABOUT THE WAR 1963

REF. NO.

MOORE

130

NOTES

" I must say that I enjoyed the operations that you and I planned together and carried out in the Central Pacific. I think our Marshalls Operation turned out as the best one we had - on the basis of getting the most for the least cost. Of the Marianas Operation the capture of Tinian was a classic for which Holland Smith and his Marines deserve full credit."

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON JAPANESE &
POST-WAR PROBLEMS

REF. NO.

MOORE (122)

NOTES

Admired Mac Arthur's handling of Japanese after war's end. He was firm but allowed Japs to save face. "The Japanese are an excitable race, but they are accustomed to obeying orders and are well disciplined in the mass." Fell nice to keep Emperors. Fell US must set an example rather than treating Japs harshly. They would regret losing war but would not have guilt. Wanted to punish Jap war criminals. Wanted them permanently disarmed. Could foresee Russian & communist influence in Korea, Manchuria, & China. (Obviously he was looking to future). "Russia is going to be a very powerful country..." (How he could

LOCATION

look at world scene while involved in chaos just after war (30 Aug 45). Spornance had lunched w/ MacArthur & was obviously influenced by him.

"This should be an interesting time for the next couple of months, and I hope and shall endeavor to see that everything goes smoothly."

Interesting

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON WAR

REF. NO.

SPRUANCE

132

NOTES

"... we really have a most interesting war going on in the Pacific, and I know you would enjoy it."

"Each one of our operations differs enough from the previous ones to present a lot of new problems. Foresight is never as competent in solving these problems as hindsight, regardless of what the habitzers say."

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE AS PRES NWC

REF. NO.

JAN 47

MOORE

126

NOTES

Speaking or talking to British, he used six large charts and did not read from text. "I took your advice and tried to put a little more life in my talk than in what I had written." Harry Hill had asked him to speak at Natl W.C. on future role of naval forces. "I have written a paper which is dull and cannot compete in interest or excitement with the A.A.F.'s visions of the future."

LOCATION

TOPIC

SPRUANCE ON GUAM

REF. NO.

CONOLLY (113)

NOTES

239/10 Turner told Conolly that Spruance didn't want any indiscriminate bombardment of Guam on account of the natives. Spruance agreed with a good, prolonged bombardment, however.

LOCATION

TOPIC

CONOLLY ON TURNER/SPRUANCE

REF. NO.

CONOLLY

113

NOTES

230 " The relationship between Spruance and Turner was excellent. There existed a very close cooperation, with no question about it. I think Spruance was responsible for bringing him into the Central Pacific and responsible for keeping him there, all through the war."

LOCATION

TOPIC

CONOLLY ON TURNER & HILL

REF. NO.

CONOLLY (113)

NOTES

226-7

Turner ten times the officer Hill was. Superior in imagination, drive, & boldness of concepts. But Conolly didn't want to work for him; they clashed. Admired his professional competence, high intelligence, drive to get things done, & determination to drive right on through regardless of anything. Had small staff & Turner did lots of detail work.

LOCATION

TOPIC

KINKAID ON SPRUANCE

REF. NO.

KINKAID (112)

p4339

- 2 -

NOTES

" ... I have a very high opinion of Spruance. He's a peculiar man, in lots of ways. He's very quiet. He doesn't use too many words. He's intelligent. He knows his business, and he has plenty of courage. He's the kind of man that everyone has confidence in, and that you would like to see in command if you were working in an organization."

Approved of Spruance at Midway & Philippine Sea.
Emphasized carrying out mission & element of luck.
also ability to make decisions

LOCATION

TOPIC

ANDERSON ON NWC
CIRCA 1950

REF. NO.

ANDERSON

(111)

NOTES

Had a desire to go there. Recalled in earlier days that some officers had poo-pooed NWC calling it a "Brain Trust." Felt NWC was very useful & well-conducted. Approved of war games & order writing. Japan always the enemy. Wrote six theses to show what they had gained from reading assignments. Enjoyed routine. All students had asked for NWC but weren't the elite necessarily. Enjoyed social life, library, & professional associations. Used to academic life because he had to study for promotion.

LOCATION

TOPIC

KIRK ON NWC 1928-31

REF. NO.

KIRK (110)

NOTES

Admiral Alan G. Kirk was NWC 1928. Battle of Jutland was biggest event, war game lasted 3 months. Remained for two more years on faculty. Recalled she worked under Capt Wright and w/ Ben Dutton & Paul Hemmitt. Wright, w/ Pringle's approval, introduced innovations to war gaming. Ex: Submarine high-speed surface transit, or AIC attacking DDs w/ good effect. More conservative types protested. Generally productive tour. Had to stay ahead of students & engaged library.

LOCATION

Columbia U.

TOPIC

KINKAID ON SPRUANCE

REF. NO.

KINKAID (112)

NOTES

74

166⁻ Served as screen cdr of Midway. Emphasized Spruance's urgency to get off first launch. Said Spruance criticized for 4 June retirement, but he approved. ¹⁸¹ Said Spruance broke the back of Japanese naval aviation at Battle of Phillipine Sea. ^{331.2} Very critical of Halsey at Leyte. Felt Halsey's mission to keep Japanese Fleet away from landing force. Nimitz had given Halsey primary mission to destroy Jap Fleet. (Morison felt Halsey had insisted on this because of Spruance action @ Phillipine Sea) ³³⁵ Again, strongly approved of Spruance @ Phil Sea &

LOCATION

feels he never would have chased Japs at Leyte as Halsey did. Tell Spruance criticized because he was non-aviator & everyone wanted complete success. Spruance kept his primary mission in mind. Again approved of Spruance @ Midway. —

^{354, 5} Said Halsey could get men to cheer him & respond to his leadership.

"He got that sort of thing from his men, whereas an old rain-in-the-face, like Spruance and myself, didn't go in for that sort of thing. Maybe it would have been better." — ³³⁴ ^{35, 6} Also emulated Spruance's philosophy of trusting subordinates to get job done. Mac further this way. ⁴²⁸⁹ He would have liked Syst USN or Pres NWC after war. Only time he spoke @ NWC was when Spruance asked him to present diplomas & give a short talk.

TOPIC

HALL ON SPRUANCE &

REF. NO.

FIRST BATTLE OF PHILIPPINE SEA

HALL (114)

NOTES

66-8 Fell strategic problems at NWC were practical. Fell Spruance sent his planes out farther than would have been allowed at war game. OZ, 8 " But I would have tremendous confidence that Admiral Spruance would do the wise thing in any event, because he's a very wise man. And a fine commander, too. But that night they did let those planes get a little too far out, and they saved them by the skin of their teeth at the last minute. "

LOCATION

TOPIC

CONOLLY ON NWC
AS PRES

REF. NO.

CONOLLY

113

NOTES

34(7) : Low morale. Upgraded prestige & reputation. Some competition of Natl War College. Started logistics course for senior officers. Envied Army policy of educating their officers.

Gives impression Spruance didn't do much, and man after Spruance (Bieri) did even less.

LOCATION

TOPIC

CONOLLY ON MANY
THINGS

REF. NO.

CONOLLY (113)

NOTES

56.7 NWC realized that limitation on naval armaments would bring about war w/ Japan, & thus they studied war against Japan which they felt was inevitable. Naval profession in low esteem - objections against disarmament incl w/ charges of war manning & job security etc. esp in the 20s before the crash. 62 Naval officers against disarmament but would be silent because genl public was for pacifism, isolationism, & disarmament.

LOCATION

TOPIC

DIVISION OF COMMAND
CONOLLY

REF. NO.

CONOLLY (113)

NOTES

254 A commander should not exercise command at two levels. Kincaid did at Leyale & Conolly disapproved.

LOCATION

TOPIC

SUPPORTING/COVERING
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS

REF. NO.

CONOLLY (113)

NOTES

255 Universal confusion on definition of "supporting" & "covering" a landing. Leyte worst example.

256.7. Spoke of standard clause in 3rd & 5th JEL OPORDS of the Phil Sea to "let nothing interfere with the destruction of major enemy forces." "If Spruance was not quite bold enough, Halsey was a little over eager. But Halsey had this in his orders, and Spruance did it. If it was any good at all, it should have been in Spruance's orders and not in Halsey's, to my mind."

LOCATION

MIDWAY

1942

By turning east an evening of 4 June he avoided
a night battle against greatly superior forces.
(Lesson - Stick to your objective - try to minimize
rather than avoid danger) p 24

Patten (10)

Spruance a tactician rather than a strategist p23
 Spruance remote, austere, methodical, and intellectual, and little known to public. Shunned publicity because it may affect his better judgment.
 (See 23.4 for quote)

He was a "capabilities man." Wrote Potter that NWC Estimate of the Situation was changed to read "capabilities" vice "probable intentions" p24 (Check Curator's file on Est of Sit to see when it changed). p24 "91 goes without saying that a capabilities man with a vivid imagination can be paralyzed into a permanent defensive posture, but of course Spruance was much too intelligent to fall into that trap. 'In making war,' he said, 'we try to minimize rather than to avoid danger.'" (OVER) Potter (10)

Spruance inspired great confidence in his subordi-
nates because you knew how he operated and
what to expect p 25

PRATT & SPRUANCE - LAZINESS

p39

Pratt had an innate untidiness when he recognized but never attempted to remedy. While at NWC 1911-13 he was impatient w/ precision movements, but was concerned w/ the results of such maneuvers. "He felt this was another evidence of his sloppiness and disinterest in detail, yet he never really tried to correct this flaw. He justified his unconcern for details by concluding that leadership was the most important factor in military accomplishment."

PRATT (SS)

"Many have considered that Admiral Spruance was a tireless worker. Actually he was lazy. He disliked and avoided the kind of detailed work that had to be done in both planning and execution. He hated to write and only did so when it couldn't be put off

over

any longer, and then he did it very well. However he
was always prepared to express himself or to take
precise action when required in the field of his
responsibility, the command of large naval forces."

Moore # 19

Spruance had reviewed a book called "The Last Tallyho" on the request of Walter J. Minton of C.P. Putnam's Sons. It was written with lots of sex and foul language. He said "My principle criticism of the book is that it is too full of foul language to make me want to read it. The incidents involving sex impress me as detracting from the pictures of the war as I saw and remember it." He defended the virtue of the Waves & said whore houses were cleaned out. A whore house was a "place of business of the ladies of negotiable virtue..." He also deplored foul language in a wardrobe. He did admit that American pilots' closing in for the kill would, in their radio transmissions, use language that "... was vivid and picturesque and appropriate for the occasion." He felt that the author and publisher should have taken "... a red pencil out clean up the book." SPRUANCE (56)

SPRUANCE ON WRITING & SPEAKING

In interview with author in 1963, Spruance said he avoided writing and public speaking whenever possible. In examining his speech manuscripts, while President NWC, it appears he would take pencil in hand and w/ simple lined paper, would start writing with a pencil. Very few corrections needed. Used an economy of words and stressed accuracy and conciseness. Moore says he hated to write, but when he did would go off by himself

MAHAN ON STUDYING HISTORY

6 Aug 88

"In short, the great warrior must study history." p 633

Maintained history lessons independent of weapon technology.
Did Spruance? - yes! Quote his own sources in the 1927
thesis and the 1937 lecture.

Mahan spent 3 previous years studying history, and obviously his claim to fame was his study of naval history. First major book 1890 (all his major works were wholly a result of the author's connection with the U.S. Naval War College as lecturer upon naval history and naval tactics. See his preface on book on French Naval War.)

Use as comparison on Spruance's study of history

Mahan ①

SPRUANCE ON MIKES BROWNING

1963

Said he was brilliant. Spoke of one instance when Browning realized an emergency situation and barked out an order that saved the day. Spruance very animated on this, raised his voice and snapped his arm to illustrate. Said Browning never promoted because of trouble w/ women and associated complications. He perhaps mentioned his nature also, somewhat abrasives.

PERSONALITY

Mr. Bradford W. Langley said that Spruance is the finest officer he had ever known in 40 years of service at NWC. A perfect officer and gentleman.

Now several examples such as helping to push sailor's car out of the snow while Pres NWC, insisting that Wed night movie start without him, and visiting Mahan library, resting on chair arm, reading paper, then folding & replacing it, pushing chair back in, and turning off light.

Telephone conversation
of Langley on 9/9/70

SPRUANCE ON SPRUANCE

He enjoyed visiting his son & daughter.

He had many interests & activities at home.

He delighted in gardening. But didn't start 'til he retired.

He had a poor memory (I don't believe it)

He didn't keep files, except for Medway rpt.
(Again, wrong, witness his papers)

TOPIC

MORISON ON SPRUANCE

REF. NO.

MORISON (98)

NOTES

p 82, v. IV ~~That~~ Nimitz appoints Spruance to relieve Halsey for Midway. "a happy choice indeed, for Spruance was not merely competent; he had the level head and cool judgment that would be required to deal with new contingencies and a fluid situation; a man secure within."

p 158 "So, too, it [Midway] might have ended differently but for the chance which gave Spruance command over two of the three flattops. Fletcher did well, but Spruance's

LOCATION

performances was superb. 'Lord of himself' yet receptive to advice; keeping in his mind the picture of widely disparate forces yet boldly seizing every opening - Raymond A. Spruance emerged from this battle one of the greatest fighting and thinking admirals in American naval history.

~~p. 235 v. VIII "Victor at Midway, subsequently chief of staff to Admiral Nimitz and deputy Cincpac, Spruance was tried by experience and unspoiled by victory. Not Modest and retiring by nature, he had a healthy prejudice against publicity in any form; he shut up like a clam in the presence of news correspondents, who were apt to find him 'colorless.' Power of decision and coolness in action were perhaps Spruance's leading characteristics~~

(cont)

KING ON SPRUANCE

KING (91)

TOPIC

REF. NO.

NOTES

p491

"Spruance, who had commanded with distinction one of the task forces at the Battle of Midway and had, more recently, been Chief of Staff to Nimitz, was in intellectual ability unsurpassed among the flag officers of the United States Navy."

LOCATION

TOPIC

MORISON ON SPRUANCE

REF. NO.

MORISON (93)

NOTES

p 235.6 " Victor at Midway, subsequently chief of staff to Admiral Nimitz and deputy Cincpac, Spruance was tried by experience and unspoiled by victory. Modest and retiring by nature, he had a healthy prejudice against publicity in any form; he shut up like a clam in the presence of news correspondents, who were apt to find him 'colorless.' Power of decision and coolness in action were perhaps Spruance's leading characteristics.

(over)

LOCATION

He envied no ~~man~~ one, rivaled no man, won the respect of almost everyone with whom he came in contact, and went ahead in his quiet way, winning victories for his country." Then recite what those victories were.

Refers to
course C,
S & T, circa
1928

The Correspondence Course was revised again by Commander Carroll as of 1 April 1931, and approximately on that date the new material of the early installments was issued. Those sending in solutions of the old course were transferred to the new course work as far as possible, the extent to which such transfers were made depending upon the availability of the new installments. Up to this writing, 2 June 1931, the seventh of the new course had been shelved, and the eighth being made ready. ~~Delay in~~ Assembling material for the new course was hampered because of the rush of work in the Academic Department, what with the preparation of material for the 1932 resident courses and the work attendant upon dismissal of the 1931 classes and the admission of the new.

Allocations of installments, for review, were made on 2 June to Commander A.M.R. Allen, Intelligence Department, and to Commander McCloy, Assistant to the Officer in Charge of the Correspondence Course.

Copies of the Synopses of the Strategy and Tactics Course (regular and special combined) and the International Law Course, all as revised, were sent, together with requirement sheets of all the new installments, to the officers present at the College the latter part of May; the Senior Class personnel of the Class of 1930; staff officers at the College for the past four years; and to all previous officers-in-charge of the Correspondence Course. (For list see Correspondence File in Commander Carroll's office No. 37-8)

Commander P. L. Carroll relinquished duty in charge of Correspondence Courses to Commander Raymond A. Spruance on 15 June 1931. Commander Carroll took up duty in Strategy section in Operations on above date.

For purposes of bringing the new Correspondence Course in S&T to the attention of personnel on ships which were not then well represented in the membership of the course, Commander R. A. Spruance, on 25 August 1931, sent personal letters to Executive Officers on board certain of the larger ships asking them to inform the officers thereon as to what the College has to offer. A binder containing synopses and requirement sheets was sent to each. See file 37-9.

On 29 August 1931 Commander Spruance, anxious to determine as far as possible the effect of the new course on officers of the Service, as to enrollments, and progress, started a graph depicting in detail the elements of enrollments, reenrollments, disenrollments, graduations, installments received; the purpose being, particularly, to determine whether or not the new course was too large for the average officer to handle.

History of Correspondence Courses Together with
Names of Personnel in Charge of, and Periods of Duty
Bradford W. Saupley

In the 1920s

Strategy & Tactics } taught
International Law }

At this writing (29 Aug. 1931) the new 1931 course is almost completed. All material has been made completely ready with the exception of the essays, to go in the twelfth installment, by Admiral Mark Kerr, R.N.

Transfers have been made to the new course continuously, and will be made until all active personnel have been transferred.

On 22 September 1931 it was decided by the Staff to move the receiving and mailing section of the Correspondence Course Section (Mr. Langley) to the basement, Southwest, Room W-1, using the vacant hall for material shelves.

On 14th and 15th October 1931, the shipping and receiving section of Correspondence Courses (Mr. Langley) was moved from the annex to the basement, west. A decided improvement from point of view of handiness for all, and the health of Langley.

In February 1931, Commander P. L. Carroll, Officer-in-Charge Correspondence Courses, adopted the personal letter of inquiry to officers who had not sent in an installment for six months.

The first of the new diplomas for completion of regular Strategy and Tactics course was issued under date of 19 Oct. 1931, to Lieutenant Frank E. Vensel, Jr., U.S.N. These diplomas have been purchased from the Lowell Company, who engraved the general background, and the Station Printer inserted the name of the course and the proficiency.

Commander Thomas S. McCloy was detached Monday, 28 Mar. 1932.

Lieutenant Gilbert B. Myers, U.S.N. reported for duty in Correspondence Course, 31 May 1932, vice Commander McCloy.

On 6 June 1932, annual report of activities was addressed to the President of the War College

Commander C. H. J. Keppler, U.S.N., reported for duty in Correspondence Course, 17 October 1932.

Lieutenant Gilbert B. Myers transferred on 19 October 1932 from Correspondence Course to Research Department.

The first Staff Conference, looking to the co-operation and co-ordination of the work of the several departments of the College, was held in the lecture room at 1:30 pm. 4 Nov. 1932. Others are scheduled for each month hereafter.

See this

Captain Raymond A. Spruance, U.S.N., detached 15 May 1933, and was succeeded in charge of the Correspondence Courses by Captain R. A. Koch, U.S.N., Captain Koch went on leave of absence on 16 May 1933. Commander Williams C. Wickham, of the Senior Class 1933, who will be assistant to Captain Koch in the Correspondence Course, handled the Courses beginning 15 May 1933 during absence of Captain Koch.

Captain C. H. J. Keppler, U.S.N., who was assistant to Captain Spruance in the Course, was detached on 1 May 1933.
1933.

On 5 July, memorandum was included in the first installment, and to all those to whom material is being sent, giving consent to substitute book reviews, essays, discussions, in installments, when they could not obtain the book or material called for, or without great inconvenience.

Captain R. A. Koch detached 20 Feb. 1934. Commander W. C. Wickham remains in temporary charge of Correspondence Courses pending reporting of Captain McCandless.

Captain Byron McCandless, U.S.N., assumed charge of Correspondence Courses on 13 March 1934. Commander W.C. Wickham remains as Assistant Officer in Charge.

Captain McCandless, U.S.N. relinquished charge of the Course on 26 May 1934, and Commander Wickham assumed charge.

Commander Joseph M. Deem assisted Commander Wickham in the Course from 1 June 1934 to 15 June 1934.

Commander E. B. Nixon, who was originally ordered to the Advanced Class after his graduation from the Senior Class of 1934, took Commander Deem's place in the Correspondence Course from 15 June 1934.

15 March 1935. Started to put final touches on the revision of S&T Course by preparing Requirement Sheets, etc.

On 15 March 1935, attempt being made to have have one plate for all diplomas used by the War College. Doesn't appear as though the Correspondence Course plate could be further cut up and used in this way. We have about 150 diplomas in the C.C. now, including those printed-in. Chief of Staff (Captain Cooke) initiated the idea.

OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

<u>Name</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Captain William S. Pye (then Lieut.)	1 July 1914	October 1915
Captain Wm. D. Puleston	October 1915	January 1916
Captain Waldo Evans	January 1916	March 1917
<u>(Course suspended from March 1917 to June 1919, inclusive.)</u>		
Captain R.A. Dawes	July 1919	July 1921
Assistant: Capt. Halsey Powell	July 1919	June 1921
Captain B.B. Wygant	July 1921	May 1922
Assistant: Capt. I.C. Johnson	May 1922	May 1923
Captain R.P. Craft	June 1922	May 1923
Captain A.L. Bristol	May 1923	May 1924
Assistant: Comdr. A.C. Read	May 1923	June 1924
Captain B.B. Wygant	June 1924	July 1926
Assistant: Comdr. F.F. Rogers	May 1924	June 1925
Captain R.F. Zogbaum	July 1926	July 1928
Commander J.W. Rankin	July 1928	May 1929
Commander G.E. Baker	May 1929	May 1930
Commander P.L. Carroll	May 1930	15 June 1931
Assistant: LCDR T.S. McCloy	May 1930	28 Mar. 1932
Commander R.A. Spruance	15 June 1931	15 May 1933
Assistants:		
LCDR T.S. McCloy	May 1930	28 Mar. 1932
Lieut. G.B. Myers	31 May 1932	19 Oct. 1932
Comdr. C.H.J. Keppler	17 Oct. 1932	1 May 1933
Captain R.A. Koch, USN	15 May 1933	20 Feb. 1934
Assistant: CDR W.C. Wickham	15 May 1933	17 May 1935
Commander W.C. Wickham	15 May 1933	17 May 1935
Assistant: Comdr. E.B. Nixon	15 June 1934	22 May 1936
Commander Herbert R. Hein, USN	24 May 1935	29 Jan. 1936
Assistant: Comdr. E.B. Nixon	15 June 1934	22 May 1936