

DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS BASES

Presentation by

Captain H. E. Eccles, USN

0830 - 13 September 1947

LOGISTICS LIBRARY  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

L38/HEE:ks  
9/11/47

DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS BASES

Presentation by

Captain H. E. Eccles, USN

0830 - 13 September 1947

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

OUTLINE OF STAFF PRESENTATION

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED BASES

by

Capt. H . E. Eccles, U.S.N.

Saturday 13 Sept. 1947 at 0830

- I Introduction.
- II Command Relations and Organization.
- III Planning.
- IV Development of Unloading Facilities.
- V Transportation.
- VI Allocation of Real Estate.
- VII Construction.
- VIII Psychological Aspects.
- IX Personnel.
- X Sanitation.
- XI Floating versus Shore Facilities.
- XII Future Developments.
- Conclusion.

*Allan E. Smith*  
ALLAN E. SMITH  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Chief of Staff

## DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS BASES

### I INTRODUCTION

A study of the directives governing our offensive operations in World War II discloses that the majority of these operations were undertaken for the purpose of seizing and establishing advanced bases from which further offensives could be mounted and supported. In no case was a major offensive blow struck until a large advanced base development had been accomplished.

While the future will undoubtedly bring many new weapons and techniques into play, there is no immediate prospect of weapons or situations which will make it possible to win a major conflict without the establishment of advanced bases.

Therefore, it is fitting to examine the problem of Development of Overseas Bases and to select principles which may be expected to persist regardless of future changes in techniques and weapons.

I wish to point out that it is necessary to distinguish between general principles, and those unilateral features, technical specialties, or transitory situations, which are subject to frequent changes and special treatment. Furthermore, while tons of papers reflect service opinion of combat operations, and individual logistics problems, relatively little coordinated thought has been given to the overall problem of Base Development and comparatively little authoritative written material dealing with this problem and its proper integration with other military problems is available.

The kind of bases we must be prepared to build will be determined by many factors such as: the identity of the enemy, the characteristics

L38/ks  
9/11/47

of the theaters, the general strategic plans, the tactical plans, the logistic plans, the date of the war, the development of new weapons, the strength and disposition of enemy forces, etc.

The most complex type of advanced base is that in which Ground, Air, and Naval Forces must share limited real estate which has been the scene of intensive combined amphibious combat, and while still subject to enemy attack, rapidly develop thereon major facilities for the support of further offensive operations.

Many officers are likely to feel that the development of complex joint bases should not be attempted, but that each arm of the service should build, supply, and operate its own bases independently. While such a proposal certainly seems attractive, many factors inherent in most types of warfare effectively prevent its adoption as standard practice.

The target area is limited and certainly must be captured and defended by a joint command. Even with a large target area it is likely that few sections of this area will be suitable for development of ports, airfields, storage areas and camps.

The logistics of a joint overseas operation must be under a strong centralized control. In the early stages of such an operation the problems of shipping allocation and control, unloading, and construction, which arise between the assault and garrison forces are so closely intertwined that strong centralized control of all the garrison forces is mandatory. Naturally each unit in a large operation feels that it could perform its mission better if it had independent control of its own bases and logistics.

However, the overall requirements rather than the admitted needs of

L38/ks  
9/11/47

an individual unit, must be the governing factor.

Furthermore, since most successful campaigns follow a progressive pattern, what may be an advanced area today, may well be a rear area tomorrow, and while the combat forces are greatly interested in the efficiency of support derived from rear areas, they do not desire nor normally should they assume, the responsibility for the operation of the rear areas.

#### COMMAND RELATIONSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Base development is by nature an activity beset by troubles. In general troubles arise from: Poor Planning, Bad weather and difficult terrain, Untrained and inexperienced personnel, Technical deficiencies, Enemy action, Faulty Command Relationships and Organization.

Of all these problems, that of Command and Organization is the most difficult to solve and in my opinion is the most fruitful cause of trouble.

The problems of Command relationship and organization caused difficulties in practically every base development project. These were by no means confined to differences of opinion between the Army and the Navy.

They existed in high echelons, and in scope and intensity, varying with many imponderable circumstances, went down the entire line in all branches of the services. I am confident that no matter what may transpire in the field of Armed Forces unification, these problems will persist and will especially plague us in base development.

A faulty Base Command Structure produces trouble in every field of base activity and in turn has a direct adverse effect on combat operations.

There are no ready made or positive solutions. All that can reasonably be done is to invite your attention to certain problems which always arise in base development and trust that you will ponder the sub-

L38/ks  
9/11/47

ject and thereby attain such understanding that in future operations the harmful effects of these inherent difficulties may be reduced. In this connection I urge you to study the preface and first three pages of "National Security and the General Staff" by Major General Otto Nelson, U.S. Army, copies of which are in the library.

A basic element in the differences of opinion which have arisen in the field of Command is that the Amphibious Forces have a primary interest in establishing the landing force ashore and thereafter have natural desire to leave as soon as possible to prepare for the next operation.

Normally, therefore, they have little continuing interest in Base Development. Yet, during the assault, the Landing and Attack Force Commanders are the Key Commanders and their authority must not be unnecessarily abridged. Their decisions during that critical period have a strong effect on subsequent Base Development; and the Command Organization existing during that period must be satisfactory to them.

Yet subsequently, the Expeditionary Troops Commander controls Base Development. In the case of a large land operation he will normally have his primary interest in the forward lines, which should rapidly leave the base far behind.

The Shore Party Commander has very great responsibilities. As far as I know, his position has not yet been completely clarified.

The position of the Base Commander is Crystal Clear--He is definitely behind the Eight Ball. In all cases he must meet exacting deadlines for completion of the facilities necessary for the support of subsequent operations, and he must adjust himself to shifts in Command.

The Command relationships under such circumstances can be drawn up only by an officer who has studied all aspects of the situation and who

L38/ks  
9/11/47

views the problem from Theater level.

One of the most controversial issues revolves around the question of whether the Base Commander merely has a "Housekeeping" responsibility and authority. This one question can and has been argued bitterly and extensively.

In my opinion, if the Base Commander is merely a "housekeeper", not only will there be continual argument as to authority and responsibility in the Base Area, but the inevitable lowering of the prestige of the job will result in it being handed out to second rate officers. The best results will be obtained if the logistic and other responsibilities are clearly defined, the Base Commander carefully selected, and given a first class staff.

#### PLANNING

The Plan of a large joint overseas base in a combat zone is a part of the overall logistics plan for the operation. It involves in one way or another most of the Commanders taking part in the operation.

The general base plan is either outlined or approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it is an essential part of the overall strategic plan. The theater Commander develops the plan with some detail, and depending on circumstances, delegates further detail to appropriate subordinates such as Type Commanders, Commanders of the Operation, Joint Expeditionary Force Commander, and Base or Garrison Force Commander.

In some instances the theater Commander will delegate the task of assembly of sub plans into the completed base development plan, in other instances he will do this himself.

Experience has demonstrated that the use of standard planning forms and procedures greatly increases the speed, accuracy and coordination of



L38/ks  
9/11/47

planning.

Security is always a problem and in the past war the high classification applied to all Advanced Base plans and terminology was a serious handicap. Terminology and nomenclature, except in rare instances should be unclassified. Naturally the logistic and base plans contain much vital data which must remain top secret or secret. However, by careful thought, the Logistic and Base plans can be prepared with the vital highly classified material in the body of the secret or top secret operation order or plan, and the bulk of details in annexes or appendices of much lower classification. This maintains proper security and provides for the rapid and thorough distribution of the necessarily tremendous mass of detail to the tens of thousands of individuals on whom the success of logistic effort rests.

An everpresent problem in planning is that of the distance which so often separates the headquarters of the Commanders involved in a major operation. The loss of time, and physical and nervous energy, and the frequent misunderstandings, that arise from this separation, are great and can never be eliminated; even the best of communication systems becomes clogged during the planning period. This emphasizes the importance of standing operating procedures and standard planning forms and procedures.

The question of time required for planning is important. A considerable amount of planning for the bases on Okinawa was accomplished prior to 1 October 1944, well in advance of the distribution of the formal planning directive. This was made possible by the excellent understanding that existed between CincPOA Staff and the various Type

L38/ks  
9/11/47

Commander Staffs. It permitted sending reasonably accurate forecasts of personnel and material to the Washington logistics agencies. In Base development such a practice is vital.

Of equal importance is the early reporting of the Base or Garrison Force Commander and his Staff, and the Subordinate Unit Commanders and their Staffs.

These all should be completely assembled and functioning at least ninety days prior to mounting. It does not suffice to bring in the Senior Officers at D-90 and then permit their Staffs to dribble in until D-15!

The problems of staff organization, indoctrination, and interstaff liaison are great, and the necessary detailed planning, which can be accomplished only by those staffs, cannot be done effectively until after the organization has been completed.

Unfortunately, it is not likely that many of the garrison forces will have had previous advanced base experience. Throughout the reports of Advanced Base Units in the Army and Navy, rings the plea "Give us more time for planning and give us officers and men with previous experience."

Two essential elements of Base Planning are the construction schedule, and its mate, the Echelon Schedule -- these can be "married" only through trial and error in the planning stage.

Many people will comment that no Base Development Plan ever has been carried out. This is, of course, true. Changes in the tactical situation and unforeseen conditions of all sorts at the target, combine to modify greatly, any base plan. However, unless the Base Commander and the Unit Commanders have the understanding of their missions and problems and those

L38/ks  
9/11/47

of their associated units, the type of understanding that comes only from the preparation and study of a detailed plan, the inevitable changes may be haphazard and ill considered.

I wish to invite your attention to two very important factors in planning: flexibility and momentum.

Change is inevitable; the echelon system plus thorough training and knowledge of material and of the task, combine to provide flexibility with efficiency.

A major base development plan acquires tremendous momentum. Unless this momentum is visualized by both the operational and logistic planning officers, and by the Commanders of the theater, and the operational forces, serious difficulties are bound to ensue.

All mounting points, both advanced and continental become jammed with material and personnel long before the target date. Depots, railheads, and railines, (that is, storage tanks, surge tanks, and pipe-lines), are full. If too many changes are ordered late in the planning stage, it becomes a physical impossibility to make the changes, regardless of the peremptory nature of the orders issued. If too much insistence is used, the changes may be made on papers but they may not be made in fact. It is quite possible that the desperate efforts to make these late changes will not only destroy the usefulness of the units involved, but may also impair the usefulness of units which otherwise would not be affected.

In every operation, therefore, there comes a time when we must say "Let well enough alone". It takes intimate knowledge of an operation and of a specific proposed change to say just when that time comes.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF UNLOADING FACILITIES

Regardless of the type or size of the base under consideration, the

L38/ks  
9/11/47

rapid development of adequate unloading facilities is of the utmost importance. This problem cannot be separated from the problem of storage and distribution of the supplies unloaded. In consideration of these intimately related problems we are sure to find divergence of informed opinion. Command relations, service prerogatives, and internal organization are all involved. During the past war the imperfect solutions achieved worked, in some cases well and other cases badly. In every case considerable waste resulted, in some cases major waste and confusion became dangerous.

As modern weapons improve, the problem will become more difficult and more important.

The initial reaction of some officers may be to say: "This is a problem for the Combat forces to solve." To a large extent this is true--however, the solution achieved must take into consideration the fact that, normally, base personnel participate in the resupply of the combat forces while fighting still continues in the immediate area and that, normally, base personnel assume full responsibility for the unloading and initial distribution of supplies when the front lines are expanded. Furthermore, the rapid establishment of base facilities is essential to the "follow through" that makes the offensive effective.

In the initial stages of a joint amphibious operation, command and logistic support of the landing force is a Naval responsibility; however, as the operation progresses and as the Naval attack forces withdraw, both Command and immediate logistic responsibility are assumed by the Commander Landing Force or the Commander Expeditionary Troops.

Eventually a Base Area or a Base Command is established and the Base

L38/ks  
9/11/47

Commander assumes certain responsibilities for logistics support of combat forces. In the meantime the base forces have been working with and possibly under the Shore Party Commander, assisting in handling the ever mounting flow of supplies and equipment. This transition of effort and responsibility is, I believe, inevitable. To the best of my knowledge no officially approved manual or doctrine as yet completely solves this problem by prescribing the procedure for this transition.

The transition is complex, variable, and exasperating, and contains seeds of serious misunderstanding.

As an officer who has been primarily concerned with base development I do not pretend to know the whole or perfect answer, yet I do know that the uncertainties that prevailed caused plenty of grief in the past.

I wish to emphasize at this point that the Base Commander normally does not wish to dictate these transitional procedures; he merely wants to have them settled in order that he may conform to the decisions of his Superior Commanders. If he is unable to obtain clear directives, he is placed in the difficult and unwarranted position of having to reconcile differences of opinion between his Superiors. Furthermore, the base Commander must be given these decisions in time for him to organize and thoroughly indoctrinate his own units. A glaring example of this uncertainty took place in the Okinawa campaign.

Airborne operations will differ somewhat, but I believe that the same fundamental problem will arise, and will be particularly noticeable during and after the linking up of the airborne attack target and the final ground or sea support.

The problem deserves continuous thorough and coordinated study by all arms of the services.

L38/ks  
9/11/47

I, therefore, submit the following as the principles upon which a sound unloading plan can be built;

The organization must be thoroughly understood by all combat and support forces prior to the operation.

Combat forces must be assured of adequate resupply and must have positive control of that supply system in the combat zone.

The units engaged in unloading and distributing supplies must be well equipped, completely self sufficient, thoroughly trained, and expertly led. The use of reserve and replacement combat troops for handling cargo and supplies is not satisfactory and should not be permitted except in unforeseen emergency.

The larger the scope of operations and more protracted the fighting is expected to be, the more important it is to bring material handling equipment and construction equipment into use quickly.

In Base Development a single authority should have control of cargo handling and cargo handling facilities from the holds of the cargo ships to and including the beach head supply dumps.

#### TRANSPORTATION

The problems of transportation are intimately connected with practically all aspects of Base Development and logistics. Air and Sea Transportation are best discussed on the Theater Logistic level rather than on the Base level, except to say that the problems of harbor operation and unloading, which are matters for the Base Command, have a vital effect on the operation of a theater Shipping Control Organization.

In an overseas Naval Base, land transportation problems are usually confined to the vicinity of the harbor area. However, an Army Base in most instances is supporting combat operations many miles overland, and

L38/ks  
9/11/47

then special problems in land transportation arise. These involve the Commander of the combat forces, the Commander of the Service Forces, the Commander of the Communication Zone, the Base Commander, and usually the Theater Commander. Almost always the age old problems of the limits of Staff control and Supervision versus Command Responsibility arise. None of you should be so optimistic as to think that these have been solved to the satisfaction of all concerned.

#### ALLOCATION OF REAL ESTATE

Tinian is the only Combat Zone Advanced Base of which I know, where the allocation of real estate was not a serious problem. In all other bases the competition for favorable sites was intense.

The immediate necessity for speedy construction of suitable airfields, and many other factors such as prevailing wind, terrain, drainage, accessibility, sources of suitable foundation and surface material, etc., makes it imperative that they be given priority in the choice of sites. Yet the very land most suitable for airfields is also usually most desirable for the location of supply dumps, and camp sites. Transit depots should be near the water-front, ship and boat repair facilities must be on the water-front. Refrigerator storage should be on the water-front, particularly in the tropics or else large refrigerator trucks are required to prevent spoilage of food during the transit. Camps for all personnel should be as close as possible to their place of work to prevent loss of time and undue demands upon transportation equipment. Hospitals should be away from the dirt and confusion of waterfront and supply areas and, in the tropics, should be high.

Facilities should be so grouped as to permit adequate service by the

L3E/ks  
9/11/47

shortest possible road net. The future great need for dispersal further complicates this problem.

The General Prudential Rule is: "Carefully consider the rainfall in the worst season of the year and both the natural drainage and the possible impounding of drainage water by construction of roads, before locating any activity."

#### CONSTRUCTION

There should be no need to reiterate that one of the major weapons the United States had during the last war was its ability to perform miracles of construction. This ability was the result of a high degree of mechanical aptitude, experience in heavy construction of all sorts, industrial productive power, a high level of morale in our construction and engineer troops, coordinated planning, and ability to improvise. The command of the sea, the availability of ships, and the establishment of unloading facilities were essential elements in delivering the construction personnel and equipment to the target. Our construction philosophy was essentially sound; it was to bring into action the largest possible amount of heavy construction equipment. While light equipment undoubtedly has valuable specialized uses, these are very limited. In general it takes weight and variety of equipment to produce rapid construction.

In a major base development the question of the degree of centralization of construction control is important. In some areas, notably Central Pacific, there was complete centralization of construction control. In other areas, practice varied to almost complete decentralization.



L38/ks  
9/11/47

The advantages claimed for complete centralization are:

It permits the rapid application of the maximum effort on the most pressing problems.

It puts construction control in the hands of the best qualified officer.

It prevents local unit commanders from wasting construction effort and material on luxuries and nonessentials.

It facilitates adherence to construction standards and development plans.

It provides the maximum flexibility to deal with plan changes and emergencies.

It provides the most efficient use of the Construction and Engineer Battalions, which are designed and equipped to work as completely integrated units on major jobs.

The disadvantages set forth are:

A Unit Commander may have little to say as to the construction of his establishment and may be forced to accept certain operating handicaps, which could have been avoided had he been granted authority.

The difficulties of transportation and communication, during the first months of the development of a major base, are such that the discussions necessary to get important work started and to meet new situations are difficult to arrange and sometimes carry on for weeks.

The Construction Commander and his staff may bog down dealing with too many people and too much detail.

Construction units are frequently pulled off important jobs while they are still incomplete. It frequently deprives units of the ability to make any progress whatever in setting up minimum facilities which, while minor in

L38/ks  
9/11/47

size in comparison to the major construction tasks, are of vital importance to the functioning of the unit concerned. Such occurrences can wreck an echelon schedule and if they are widespread they will most certainly do so.

Here we come to the keystone of good Base Planning and execution. The echelon schedule is vital to the smooth, orderly, and economical control and flow of shipping. The echelon schedule is based on the construction schedule. It is essential that all planning officers and commanders understand this relationship. The two schedules are "married" by laborious trial and error. True, in the field, the construction schedule will certainly be modified. However, if each major modification is considered in the light of its effect on the echelon schedule, and if the shipping pipe line valves provided by a sound echelon schedule, a good system of shipping control, and staging anchorages, are understood and properly manipulated by the same commander who alters the construction schedule, no serious harm should result.

Let me reiterate and reemphasize that the understanding necessary to the intelligent manipulation of these important controls cannot be found in a staff which has been hastily assembled from people who have no previous knowledge of the problem and its essential mechanisms.

I believe that the best solution of the problem of Construction Control is:

To maintain the general principle of centralized control of construction with adequate decentralization within the construction command;

To recognize that major construction and construction of common use facilities are best accomplished by a highly centralized and completely

L38/ks  
9/11/47

equipped joint construction force;

And to recognize that maintenance of individual facilities, and construction of small individual facilities which are necessary to the operation of an individual command, are best accomplished by smaller and less heavily equipped construction units operating directly under the using command.

There are three further essential principles to be followed to insure smooth progress of construction:

First: No unit should be permitted to reach an advanced base in the first ninety days which is not self sustaining both in equipment and ability to build its own initial housekeeping establishment.

Second: A unit should never be separated from its essential housekeeping equipment. No cry from the W.S.A. or other authority, that this results in the uneconomical use of shipping should have any weight whatsoever.

Third: Construction material pool ships should be placed at appropriate intervals in the echelon schedule.

#### THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF BASE DEVELOPMENT

Base Development is not glamorous. It involves tough thinking, the drudgery of thousands of details, the hardship, dirt and discomfort of rough living and danger. It lacks the compensation of actually seeing the direct effect of your effort upon the enemy. It offers no path to promotion or special recognition. As a result, in common with other logistic duties, it is frequently avoided by those men of ambition and drive who so frequently become outstanding leaders.

In the past there was seldom any adequate recognition of its com-

L38/ks  
9/11/47

lexity and importance. Peacetime training operations almost completely ignored it.

In World War I the great overseas bases of the Army were built on friendly undamaged territory that was immune to enemy action.

In World War I and II, we had both the time and the great material resources to tolerate inefficiency and waste.

I doubt that any future war will permit us that luxury.

We cannot permit an officer or man to say to himself, "I am in a second rate outfit", and still expect him to develop the Esprit de Corps which is essential to efficiency.

#### PERSONNEL

The impression that has prevailed in some quarters that inferior quality personnel is adequate for Advanced Base work is erroneous. It is extremely important that the officers and men who participate in the initial establishment of bases be of the highest possible quality and that they be thoroughly trained and adequately equipped. It is true that after about sixty to ninety days base conditions may stabilize to the point where standards may be somewhat relaxed, and a limited number of men of lower qualifications and less versatility may be usefully employed. But this should be approached cautiously.

Let us consider the results of shipping poor quality personnel to a base: It has been conclusively demonstrated that a small, selected group, of highly trained, well organized and well led men can do more useful work than several times their number of mediocre to poor men. In addition, one poor man requires as much housing, as much food, more medical attention and more supervision. If 500 good men can produce as much work as

L38/ks  
9/11/47

1000 poor men, (and this is a conservative comparison) the presence of the extra 500 men requires that the direct allocation of real estate, food, water, housing, hospitalization, personal equipment, administration, and shipping space, for their unit, be commensurately increased. In addition, the poor outfit will certainly require support and help from other units, which in turn increases the similar requirements for those units. Thus, in effect, poor quality of personnel inevitably produces a snow balling of logistic requirements. Rushing low grade personnel into a base not only fails to accomplish the objective of increasing the total productive work of the base, but may actually reduce it.

Morale, of course, is vital. A most regrettable feature of the last war was that we had to send to the combat zones many officers who had been insufficiently indoctrinated in the basic principles of military leadership. On the other hand, there were instances where the high morale and efficiency of certain splendidly led units aroused the admiration of combat commanders. In general, where officers knew their jobs and where the housing, messing, and recreation facilities for enlisted men were completed before those for the officers, morale was high. Where the converse was true, morale was low.

The problem of living standards is important, for it affects construction, command relations, and morale. Unseemly luxury in some places aroused resentment which sometimes was directed at an individual or group and sometimes at a whole service.

#### SANITATION

Fine sanitation is essential to the operation of any base. The fact that during the last war our deaths from disease reached an all time low

L38/ks  
9/11/47

should not lull us into the belief that sanitation can be taken for granted, or that the problem can be left solely to the Medical Officers, with confidence that the rapid advances of science will solve it.

As a matter of fact, in the Pacific, the wastage of manpower due to malaria and various enteric diseases was tremendous. While modern equipment and methods have accomplished miracles, let us remember that the surest protection comes from thorough training of all officers and men in individual sanitary discipline. The possibilities of bacteriological warfare make this even more important.

#### FLOATING vs SHORE FACILITIES

One of the most important and difficult aspects of Fleet Support Logistics is to determine the proper balance between floating and shore based support facilities.

In a forward area, other things being equal, it is best to provide the maximum possible support from self propelled floating sources and to build as few as possible shore based facilities. The reasons for this are: Floating facilities can be put into full operation very shortly after D-Day and can be moved and reestablished in a more favorable location, with much greater speed and with much less effort.

The work of building tenders, repair ships, and supply ships is done at home where manpower, tools, material are easier to obtain. The sustenance of the construction workers does not have to be transported overseas nor their housing have to be erected under combat conditions.

The competition for real estate and construction priority becomes a minor element and therefore the possible causes for inter-service friction are greatly reduced.

L38/ks  
9/11/47

It greatly simplifies the task of logistics planning on all echelons. The Service Squadron has much greater flexibility than the Naval Base and is easier to organize and administer.

I have no doubt but that many of you here present can give further good reasons.

However, other things are not always equal and before reaching a final conclusion it is necessary to take into consideration certain other factors which are:

The Relative availability and suitability of real estate, versus anchorage and harbor areas; protection from weather, vulnerability to new weapons, vulnerability to submarines, vulnerability to air attack, suitability of a particular facility to operation afloat or ashore.

Before you reach a final conclusion I wish to remind you that in planning for the invasion of Kyushu, the Base Development planners proposed that only minimum shore based Naval facilities be established, but the operation planners over-ruled the base planners, because of the results of Kamikaze attacks at Okinawa, and directed that the initial base plans be considerably augmented.

In my opinion we built too many Naval Bases in the Pacific. I feel that special study should be given to this important general subject and that in the future this question be carefully weighed in the light of the pertinent characteristics of each individual operation.

The future development of overseas bases is dependent on many factors. Any predictions now made will certainly be greatly modified. However, I believe that in general, bases will be smaller than in the past war; and they will be dispersed over a wide front. I believe that

L36/ks  
9/11/47

Fleet Support will be more mobile and that overseas Naval Bases will be built chiefly for the support of local operating units.

However, I should like to ask some questions - QUESTIONS OF THE FUTURE!

To what extent will the Air Force set up its own Logistic services? What will be the effect of the new long range bombers on Advanced Air Field construction? Will fuel economy permit them to operate from the continental United States? Will Atomic Warfare be effectively barred? What will be the practical development of guided missiles: Will it be possible to launch them from the U.S.? or will we be required to build advanced launching sites? What will be the requirements for advanced radio control stations for guiding rockets? What will be the requirements for advanced shore radio sites for - Warning - interception, jamming? Will new developments in ship propulsion make it practicable to get along without advanced submarine bases? Will we have to land troops in friendly or neutral territories to deny them to the enemy, or to protect important resources or lines of communication?

These questions are not easily answered, for what may be a good answer today may be wrong in ten years.

In conclusion, I wish to express my opinion that:

As long as warfare is of such nature that it is desirable to strike an enemy from a point as close as possible to his homeland, we shall require advanced overseas bases.

These bases will vary in size and type. They must be properly designed, rapidly built, well defended and efficiently operated.

Regardless of the organization of our armed forces, there will be honest conflicts of interest and differences of opinion as to the



L38/ks  
9/11/47

characteristics and operation of these bases.

The necessity for speedy establishment and efficient operation will increase as new and more destructive long range weapons come into use and as the tempo of warfare is increased.

Speed and efficiency can be obtained only by:

- (a) A clear understanding of the mission of each base and element thereof.
- (b) A sound and clearly understood command structure.
- (c) Timely, thorough, and balanced planning completely integrated with the strategic, tactical and overall logistic plans.
- (d) The maximum application of the results of technical progress and the use of technical specialists.
- (e) Well trained, well equipped, well organized personnel who have the high morale that comes from fine leadership and recognition of the importance of their job.

These characteristics can be achieved only if the Senior Officers of the Armed Forces not only recognize the existence of the problem but appreciate its relation to the other problems which are involved in the conduct of successful offensive warfare, and realize the amount of time, and the quality of thinking that is required for its solution. No individual or single small group can produce all the answers nor can all the ramifications of this subject ever be covered in a series of presentations or a book of rules. The satisfactory solution of the problems of Overseas Bases requires integrated and continued study, discussion, and experimentation.

The subject is alive and we must remain alive with it. Let us see

L38/ks  
9/11/47

the problem as a whole and recognize its relation to the broader fields of logistics, tactics, and strategy and to all branches of the services.