

23 May

From the point of view of High Command, these letters and proposed operational plans form a curious-melange of the spirit of the offensive coupled with strategic naivete and professional ignorance.

~~Sound foundation~~

They reflect the harmful effects of the struggle for bureaucratic power and the failure of the Naval War College to ~~conduct~~ ^{conduct} assemble a competent staff and create a coherent curriculum which emphasizes well established strategies and ^{other} military fundamentals. ~~Technology Responsibility ETC~~

H E Eeles

A few excerpts from
Mahan's 1911 book Naval Strategy
~~for~~ ~~set~~ provides the perspective
from which I discuss Maritime
Strategy.

~~June copy.~~

A ~~—~~ B or C of Quotes

"Mahan" "The search for and
establishment of leading principles ~~about~~ -
- always few - around which considerations
of detail group themselves will tend to
reduce confusion of impression to simplicity,
and directness of thought, with consequent
facility of comprehension." P. 118

and

"On the principles of the art of war
are few, while embracing many features,
so the principle of the War College is one,
namely, the study of the art of war
and the exposition of its principles." *

P 119

~~Mahan: Naval Strategy 1911 Little Brown.~~

Whether this opinion of one man is right or wrong,
however, is a very small matter compared with the
desirability of officers considering these subjects on
proper lines of thought, and with proper instruments of
expression; that is with correct principles and correct
phrasesology."

* Alfred Mahan "Naval Strategy" Boston
Little Brown 1911 pp 118, 119, 384.

From the standpoint of the practical working of bureaucratic and service politics the statement is about as good as should be expected.

From the standpoint of high level military education and of fundamental military theory and knowledge, at best it is only reasonably good.

In the first place it is ~~semantically~~ merely a "declaratory" strategy, so hedged with reservation and qualification that no good estimate of logistic requirements can be made and therefore it is operationally practically cannot be judged.

In the second place it is theoretically and semantically ~~is~~ defective.

Maritime Strategy is a national strategy, not a separate or sub entity of national strategy. What is here called a "maritime" strategy is in reality only the naval aspect of a maritime strategy or what

might be called "Naval
Strategy."

This is explained in
detail on pp 202-207 of
"My Military Power in a Free
Society" and by the two
attached charts - "The Essence
of Strategy" and "A Structural
Outline"

DRAFT

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30 APR 1984

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THIS IS THE NAVY'S MARITIME STRATEGY. THE MARITIME STRATEGY IS THE U.S. NAVY'S CURRENT DETERMINATION AS TO THE BEST OVERALL CONVENTIONAL MARITIME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR. IT IS THE ONE WE PREFER TO FOLLOW, CONSIDERING NATIONAL AND COALITION GUIDANCE, THE THREAT, FORCE LEVELS, AND TRADE-OFFS AMONG CONFLICTING AIMS. IT IS A "BASELINE" STRATEGY.


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USES OF NAVAL POWER



BEFORE DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN GLOBAL WAR, IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE NAVY SERVES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACROSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF CONFLICT POSSIBILITIES: FROM PEACETIME PRESENCE THROUGH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR. WHILE OUR STRATEGY FOCUSES ON GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WAR, THE NAVY'S ROLE IN IT CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY WITHOUT SOME MENTION OF OTHER KINDS OF CONFLICT. WE WILL INITIALLY FOCUS BRIEFLY ON ITS TWO OTHER MAJOR ROLES: PEACETIME PRESENCE AND CRISIS RESPONSE.

U.S. NAVY MAJOR EXERCISES FY83



OUR PEACETIME PRESENCE IS CONSTANT AND WORLDWIDE. NAVAL FORCES UNDERLINE AMERICAN COMMITMENTS AND INTERESTS AROUND THE GLOBE EVERY DAY. THEIR PRESENCE IS A PHYSICAL DEMONSTRATION OF OUR WILL: ENCOURAGING ALLIES AND FRIENDS, DETERRING AND REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF ENEMIES, INFLUENCING NEUTRALS, AND ASSERTING AND REINFORCING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. 95% OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION LIVES WITHIN 600 MILES OF THE 20 FATHOM CURVE.

AT THIS MOMENT, OVER 110 THOUSAND NAVY MEN AND WOMEN ARE AT SEA, IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, PLUS 3 TO 4 THOUSAND CIVILIAN MARINERS PROVIDING AFLOAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

THROUGHOUT THE YEAR WE CONDUCT A DEMANDING SERIES OF EXERCISES, OFTEN WITH OUR ALLIES AND OTHER SERVICES. THIS CHART SHOWS ONLY SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ONES LAST YEAR. THESE EXERCISES CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIANCE COHESION, ENABLING US TO OPERATE ROUTINELY WITH OUR SISTER SERVICES AND ALLIES, AND TO TEST MUTUAL PROCEDURES.


U.S. NAVY PEACETIME PRESENCE PORT VISITS FY 1983 (BY COUNTRY)



ANOTHER MEASURE OF OUR PEACETIME PRESENCE ROLE IS OUR NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC PORT VISITS. NOTE THAT THE DOTS ON THIS CHART REPRESENT COUNTRIES VISITED --OVER 65. TO SHOW THE PORTS THEMSELVES WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE ON SUCH A SMALL CHART.

THESE ROUTINE PORT VISITS ARE CONDUCTED NOT ONLY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CREW REST AND RELAXATION; BUT ALSO TO PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND ALLIED, FRIENDLY, AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES VISITED; AND TO DEMONSTRATE OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, PROFESSIONALISM, AND SUPPORT.

USES OF NAVAL POWER



CRISIS RESPONSE IS THE NEXT MAJOR U.S. NAVAL ROLE. SINCE WORLD WAR II, U.S. NAVAL FORCES HAVE BEEN USED FOR THIS PURPOSE OVER 200 TIMES, IN MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE CRISES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN INVOLVED.

U.S. NAVY CRISIS RESPONSE CAN RANGE FROM VARYING OUR DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS TO EXPRESS SPECIFIC CONCERN AND SUPPORT, THROUGH CLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS OF OUR WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES, TO THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. NAVAL FORCES CAN BE USED ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF RESPONSES TO CRISES, FROM COUNTERING ACTS OF STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM, TO ENGAGING IN REGIONAL WARS.

U.S. NAVY/SOVIET NAVY CRISIS RESPONSE

FY 83




★ U.S. NAVY

☘ SOVIET NAVY

DURING THE LAST FISCAL YEAR ALONE, U.S. NAVAL FORCES WERE USED AT LEAST SIX TIMES, AS PART OF THE U.S. NATIONAL RESPONSE TO CRISES OFF CENTRAL AMERICA, IN GRENADA, OFF LIBYA, IN LEBANON, OFF KOREA IN RESPONSE TO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN BURMA, AND OFF NORTHERN JAPAN TO HELP LOCATE THE KOREAN AIRLINER DOWNED BY THE SOVIETS.


FORCE EMPLOYMENT MAJOR ELEMENTS JAN-MAR 84



WE ARE ABLE TO CONDUCT SUCH EXTENSIVE PEACETIME AND CRISIS OPERATIONS, WHILE PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF GLOBAL WAR, BECAUSE OF OUR GREAT MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY. THIS CHART SHOWS THE MOVEMENTS OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES DURING JUST A 3-MONTH PERIOD THIS PAST WINTER.

UNDER THE "FLEXOPS" DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT, WE HAVE COMPLETELY REORDERED OUR METHODS OF PEACETIME SCHEDULING. THIS ALLOWS FOR MORE REALISTIC MULTI-CARRIER AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, GREATER FLEXIBILITY FOR THEATER COMMANDERS, AND FAR MORE USEFUL TRAINING; WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REDUCING THE TIME OUT OF HOMEPORT FOR OUR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL. THIS NEW CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NAVY TO UNDERTAKE THE MAJOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN LEBANON AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY OPERATION IN GRENADA WITHOUT DISRUPTING OR REDUCING OUR PEACETIME DEPLOYMENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.


THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A DYNAMIC CONCEPT



PEACETIME DEPLOYMENTS AND CRISIS RESPONSE, WHILE LOWER IN INTENSITY THAN THE NAVY'S GLOBAL WARFIGHTING ROLE, NEVERTHELESS AFFECT OUR STRATEGY FOR CARRYING OUT THAT ROLE. WE CONTINUALLY TEST AND EVALUATE OUR MARITIME STRATEGY THROUGH OUR EXERCISE PROGRAM, WAR GAMES, AND FROM "LESSONS LEARNED" FROM CRISIS AND SINGLE-THEATER WAR OPERATIONS SUCH AS THOSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE FALKLANDS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR GLOBAL DETERRENT AND WARFIGHTING STRATEGY INFLUENCES OUR PEACETIME AND CRISIS ACTIVITIES.

FEEDBACK FROM THESE OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS THE STRATEGY ITSELF, HIGHLIGHTS THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF OUR FORCE STRUCTURE AND, IN TURN, INFLUENCES OUR R&D AND PROCUREMENT PLANS. CONVERSELY, OUR ACTUAL PROCUREMENT - - THE FORCES AVAILABLE -- ACTS TO BOUND OUR STRATEGY.

USES OF NAVAL POWER



THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY IS ON FIGHTING A GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WAR WITH THE SOVIETS. AT THE END WE WILL ALSO TAKE A LOOK AT SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR, BOTH THEATER AND STRATEGIC.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

THIS IS AN OVERVIEW. INITIALLY, WE UNDERScore THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARITIME STRATEGY AND NATIONAL STRATEGY. MARITIME STRATEGY IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT STRATEGY, BUT IT CAN BE DESCRIBED INDEPENDENTLY. MARITIME STRATEGY FLOWS FROM AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY, AND IS SENSITIVE TO SOVIET STRATEGY. IT IS NOT DETERMINED, BUT IT IS DEFINITELY BOUNDED BY FORCE CAPABILITY. CONSIDERATION OF THESE FACTORS, THEREFORE, IS NECESSARY AS A PRELUDE TO DISCUSSING THE STRATEGY ITSELF. BEFORE CONCLUDING, THE "UNCERTAINTIES" INHERENT IN THIS STRATEGY WILL BE CONSIDERED. THE UNCERTAINTIES ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. THEY MAY WELL PREVENT US FROM CARRYING OUT THE STRATEGY AS WE WOULD LIKE.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

- DETERRENCE
- FORWARD DEFENSE
- GLOBAL COALITION WARFARE

THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO NATIONAL STRATEGY ARE SIMPLY WRONG. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY IS CONSTRUCTED UPON THIS FOUNDATION: DETERRENCE FIRST, BUT IF THIS FAILS, THEN DEFENSE AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE, WORLDWIDE. IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ALLIES.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

SOURCES


- NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DOCUMENTS (NSDD)
- DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DG)
- JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT (JSPD)
- JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)



- THE SOURCES OF OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY ARE DIVERSE. THIS IS A LIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THEM AS THEY RELATE TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY.

- THE NSDD'S ARE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY. THE DG IS ANNUAL SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE ON STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS. THE JSPD AND JSCP ARE ANNUAL JCS DOCUMENTS WHICH RECOMMEND STRATEGY TO THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY, AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS, RESPECTIVELY.

- THE NAVY CONTRIBUTES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE DOCUMENTS, AND NAVAL FORCES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR EXECUTION.

ALLIANCES, TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS



 U.S. ALLIANCES, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS  SOVIET BLOC

BESIDES THESE STRICTLY NATIONAL DOCUMENTS, WE ALSO HAVE ALLIANCES, TREATIES, AND FORMAL AGREEMENTS THAT TOGETHER FORM THE SKELETAL FRAME OF GLOBAL COALITION WARFARE, ANOTHER OF THE BASES FOR OUR NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL TENET THAT BY DEFENDING OUR ALLIES, WE DEFEND OURSELVES. IN ADDITION TO THE STATES SHOWN HERE WITH WHICH WE HAVE FORMAL DEFENSE TREATY RELATIONSHIPS, THERE ARE OTHERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE COMMON MILITARY INTERESTS AND WHICH AFFECT THE MARITIME STRATEGY. THESE WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER. THE MARITIME STRATEGY TAKES THE REQUIREMENTS OF COALITION WARFARE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: GOALS

- DETER WAR/ESCALATION
- IF DETERRENCE FAILS:
 - DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
 - PROTECT US/ALLIED SEA LINES
 - SUPPORT US/ALLIED LAND BATTLES
 - SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION


ALL OF THE GUIDANCE THE NAVY HAS RECEIVED CAN BE DISTILLED INTO A FEW BASIC GOALS, SHOWN HERE. IT IS TO IMPLEMENT THESE THAT THE MARITIME STRATEGY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

WE SHALL NOW CONSIDER SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY. THIS IS A NECESSITY.
SINCE STRATEGY IS NOT A GAME OF SOLITAIRE.

SOVIET NAVY ACTIVE GLOBAL PEACETIME POSTURE



THIS CHART SHOWS SOVIET WORLDWIDE FORCE LEVELS IN FISCAL YEAR 1984. NOTE ESPECIALLY THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE NORTHERN AND PACIFIC FLEETS. THE POSITION OF SOVIET SSBN'S. -- THE WORLD'S LARGEST FLEET -- AND THE WORLDWIDE DISPOSITION OF THE SOVIET NAVY. APPROXIMATELY 15% OF THE SOVIET NAVY IS NORMALLY DEPLOYED AWAY FROM HOME WATERS. THESE NAVAL FORCES ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY A FLEET OF OVER 1700 OCEAN-GOING MERCHANT SHIPS, ALSO DEPLOYED GLOBALLY. THE MOST MILITARILY ADAPTABLE IN THE WORLD.

	SURFACE	SUBS	NAVAL AIR
NORTHERN	414	190	440 16
BALTIC	546	32	270
BLACK	557	24	400
PACIFIC	<u>681</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>520</u>
TOTALS	2198	371	1630

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME NAVAL STRATEGY

- WAR WITH WEST GLOBAL
- PRIMARY SOVIET TASKS
 - ENSURE SOVIET SSBN SURVIVAL
 - PREVENT US SSBN STRIKES
 - PREVENT OTHER NUCLEAR-CAPABLE FORCE STRIKES
- METHOD
 - SEA CONTROL IN CONTIGUOUS WATERS
 - SEA DENIAL BEYOND THESE AREAS
- OTHER TASKS
 - CUT SEA LINES

THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT WAR BETWEEN THE COALITIONS WILL BE GLOBAL IN SCOPE. THERE IS AN EMPHASIS UPON STRATEGIC STRIKE, INCLUDING DEFENSE OF THEIR SSBN FORCE AND DEFENSE OF THE MARITIME APPROACHES TO THE USSR AS PRIMARY TASKS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY, LIKE OUR OWN, IS EXECUTED UNDER AN OVERALL UNIFIED MILITARY STRATEGY, AND CANNOT BE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD OUTSIDE THAT CONTEXT.

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME POTENTIAL MARITIME AREAS OF OPERATION



■ U.S. ALLIES/FORWARD DEPLOYED GROUND/AIR FORCES

INITIAL ESTIMATED SOVIET WARTIME SEA CONTROL AND SEA DENIAL AREAS EXTEND OUT TO 2000 KILOMETERS. THEY ENGULF MOST OF OUR FORWARD DEPLOYED GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES. THEY WOULD, IF ACHIEVED, SEVER THE VITAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

CLOSE TO THEIR COASTLINE, THE SOVIET THREAT WOULD BE MULTI-PLATFORM (TO THE EXTENT SEA ICE ALLOWED); FARTHER OUT LARGELY AIR AND SUBSURFACE; BEYOND THESE AREAS, LARGELY SUBSURFACE.

THE SOVIET NAVY HAS SOME CAPABILITIES IN EXCESS OF THESE AREA DEFENSE NEEDS. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF THEY WERE TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT STRATEGY THAN THAT DEPICTED HERE WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER. IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIETS INTEND, WITHOUT DOUBT, TO CHALLENGE OUR FORWARD STRATEGY.

- **STRENGTHS TO BE ATTRITED/AVOIDED/NEUTRALIZED**
 - SUBMARINE NUMBERS
 - UNDER-ICE OPERATIONS
 - LAND-BASED AVIATION
 - CRUISE MISSILES
 - MINE WARFARE
 - CHEMICAL WARFARE
 - MERCHANT SHIP ADAPTABILITY
 - OVERSEAS ALLIES/CLIENTS

- **WEAKNESSES TO BE EXPLOITED**
 - GEOGRAPHY
 - FLEET FRAGMENTED
 - LONG TRANSIT TIMES TO OPEN OCEAN
 - CHOKE POINTS
 - SUBMARINE QUALITY
 - SEA-BASED AVIATION
 - AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
 - UNDERWAY SUSTAINABILITY


THE SOVIETS ARE A FORMIDABLE FOE. YET THEY ARE NOT INVULNERABLE, AND HAVE WEAKNESSES THAT CAN BE EXPLOITED DURING WAR.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

OUR CURRENT FORCE POSTURE IS A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE BASIS FOR OUR MARITIME STRATEGY. THE U.S. NAVY IS, OF COURSE, THE CENTERPIECE, BUT ALL U.S. MILITARY SERVICES, OF NECESSITY, CONTRIBUTE TO OUR STRATEGY, AND OUR ALLIES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS WELL.

USN/USMC ACTIVE PEACETIME POSTURE MAJOR UNITS FY 84



	ATLANTIC FLEET	PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	7	6
BATTLESHIPS	1	1
CRUIS./DESTR. /FRIGATES	100	91
ATTACK SUBMARINES	57	42
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS	28	31
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES	1 193	2 171
PATROL SQUADRONS	12	12


193
 171

 364

TO ENSURE OUR CONSIDERATION OF STRATEGY ADDRESSES FORCES WE ARE SURE WE CAN COUNT ON, THE MARITIME STRATEGY ADDRESSES CURRENT FORCES. THAT IS, THOSE AVAILABLE AT THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 84. THIS ALLOWS US TO AVOID UNCERTAINTIES AS TO THE ACTUAL MAKE-UP OF FORCES NOW PROGRAMMED FOR OUT-YEARS. THE MAJOR END FY 84 NAVY AND MARINE CORPS GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES ARE ASSIGNED TO FLEET COMMANDERS AND ARRAYED AROUND THE WORLD IN APPROXIMATELY THE FASHION DEPICTED HERE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY, A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF OUR FORCES ARE ROUTINELY FORWARD DEPLOYED. THE CARRIER FORCE LEVELS INCLUDE THOSE IN OVERHAUL, BUT NOT IN THE SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM (SLEP).

WE INITIALLY ASSUME HERE THAT ALL HULLS AND AIRFRAMES COULD BE USEFULLY EMPLOYED IN WARFIGHTING. READINESS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND ATTRITION DECREMENTS WILL BE ADDRESSED LATER.

PEACETIME POSTURE US ARMY/US AIR FORCE



- ① ARMY UNITS
- ⊕ USAF TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS
- ✈ USAF BOMBER SQUADRONS
(ANTI-SURFACE/MINE WARFARE CAPABLE)
- USAF AWACS AIRCRAFT

THE PREVIOUS CHART DEPICTED THE WORLDWIDE MOBILITY OF USN AND USMC FORCES. THE MORE THEATER-ORIENTED U.S. ARMY AND AIR FORCE ALSO PLAY IMPORTANT ROLES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR MARITIME STRATEGY. THIS CHART SHOWS SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR WORLDWIDE POSTURES, AS THEY RELATE TO THAT STRATEGY.

THE ARMY IS NOT ONLY A MAIN BENEFICIARY OF THE NAVY'S ACHIEVING MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN VITAL OCEAN AREAS, BUT ALSO HAS ROLES TO PERFORM IN SECURING ISLAND AND LITTORAL AREAS. THESE ROLES ARE IMPORTANT TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY.

USN-USAF MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA)

(9 SEP 1982)

JOINT EFFORTS TO "ENHANCE USAF CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME OPS"


MISSION AREAS

- ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW)/COUNTER-AIR OPERATIONS *
- ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW)
- INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W)
- SURVEILLANCE AND TARGETING
- COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C³)
- AERIAL MINELAYING
- ELECTRONIC WARFARE
- SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES DELIVERY
- AERIAL REFUELING

* USAF PROVIDES MOST IMMEDIATE GAINS

THE AIR FORCE CAN ALSO BE A SIGNIFICANT ASSET TO US, ESPECIALLY ITS POTENTIAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) CAPABILITY IN FORWARD AREAS. IN DRAWING UP THE NAVY-AIR FORCE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, THE NAVY IDENTIFIED AAW AS THE MOST IMPORTANT AREA IN WHICH THE AIR FORCE CAN MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR OPERATIONS AT SEA. THE AIR FORCE IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH ENHANCING ITS ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE CAPABILITY. BUT THERE ARE OTHER BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED, AS SHOWN HERE, AND WE ARE PURSUING THEM AS WELL.

PEACETIME POSTURE ALLIED NAVAL FORCES






OUR GLOBAL ALLIANCE FORCE STRUCTURE MUST ALSO BE COUNTED WHEN WE TALLY UP THE NAVAL FORCES AVAILABLE TO FIGHT. WE ASSUME FULL COMMITMENT OF ALL OUR FORMAL ALLIES.

THE ALLIES WILL BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IN ROLES UTILIZING THEIR LARGE NUMBERS OF SMALL SURFACE COMBATANTS, MINE COUNTER-MEASURES VESSELS, AND MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT. ALLIED MERCHANT MARINE ASSETS WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED. IN CERTAIN AREAS ALLIED COASTAL DEFENSE FORCES WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

ALLIED FORWARD LAND-BASED ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) FORCES



	ANTI-AIR WARFARE FORCES
	AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING ORBITS
	GROUND RADAR

AND THAT INCLUDES FORWARD LAND-BASED ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES, CERTAIN OF WHICH COULD HELP SIGNIFICANTLY IN REDUCING THE AIR THREAT TO OUR MARITIME EFFORTS. NATO AIR FORCES COULD ASSIST ON THE EUROPEAN FLANKS, AS COULD THE JAPANESE AND KOREANS IN EAST ASIA.

ALLIED GROUND RADARS AND AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT -- RAF SHACKLETONS AND NIMRODS, NATO AWACS, AND JAPANESE E2'S -- ALSO COULD PROVIDE US WITH ADDITIONAL SEARCH AND TARGETING CAPABILITIES. LIKewise, THE BRITISH AND FRENCH HAVE SIGNIFICANT AERIAL REFUELING CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD ASSIST NAVAL AIR FORCES IF MADE AVAILABLE. AND SEVERAL ALLIES HAVE AIRCRAFT USEFUL IN AN ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE ROLE.

SUMMARY

STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE

● NATIONAL POLICY

- GLOBAL
- FORWARD
- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
- MINIMUM WAR AIMS: PRESERVE/ RESTORE US/ALLIED TERRITORY
- CRISIS/SMALL WAR ORIGINS
- ALLIES/OTHER SERVICES
- CEDE NO AREA BY DEFAULT

● SOVIET STRATEGY

- GLOBAL
- ESCALATION
- SEA CONTROL/SEA DENIAL AREAS
- STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

● FORCE LEVELS

- USN/USMC/USCG
- USNR/USMCR
- ALLIES
- USAF/USA
- MERCHANT MARINE

BOTTOM LINE: FULL FORWARD PRESSURE STRATEGY

TO SUMMARIZE THE FIRST THREE SECTIONS OF THE BRIEFING. THEY COMPRISE AN ARCHITECTURE FOR BUILDING A MARITIME STRATEGY. NATIONAL POLICY GIVES IT DIRECTION. BUT SOVIET STRATEGY AND THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES PROVIDE THE BOUNDARIES. THE PRODUCT IS A FULL FORWARD PRESSURE STRATEGY.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

WE WILL NOW PROCEED TO DEVELOP THE STRATEGY. AFTER WHICH WE WILL ADDRESS THE IMPORTANT UNCERTAINTIES -- MANY OF THEM ALREADY NOTED -- THAT CAUSE US TO BE MORE RESERVED ABOUT IT THAN WE WOULD LIKE TO BE.


RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION

- MEET FORCE WITH LIKE FORCE HEAD-ON
- ESCALATE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT
- ◎ ALTER GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT
- ◎ CONTROL DURATION OF THE CONFLICT

THE MARITIME STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO HELP ACHIEVE THE NATIONAL GOAL OF WAR TERMINATION ON FAVORABLE TERMS. IN THE EVENT DETERRENCE FAILS. OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY TO ACCOMPLISH THAT -- LIKE ALL STRATEGIES IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION -- CAN TAKE FOUR FORMS: (1) WE CAN MEET FORCE WITH LIKE FORCE AT THE POINT OF ATTACK; (2) WE CAN ESCALATE THE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT; (3) WE CAN ALTER THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT; OR (4) WE CAN CONTROL THE DURATION OF FIGHTING.

HOLDING AT THE POINT OF ATTACK DOES NOT BY ITSELF GENERATE PRESSURE TO END THE WAR. ESCALATION IS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT OPTION. BUT IF USED IS FRAUGHT WITH ENORMOUS RISK. IT IS THE LAST TWO FORMS THAT GIVE FLEXIBILITY AND MANEUVER OPTIONS TO THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. AND AT THE HEART OF THESE TWO FORMS IS THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE EARLY ON IS TO LIMIT EXPANSION OF ANY CONFLICT. IF IT CANNOT BE LIMITED, HOWEVER, OR CATASTROPHIC LOSS IMPENDS, THEN CAREFUL ATTENTION TO SCOPE AND DURATION WILL BECOME NECESSARY. THESE ARE THE TWO DIMENSIONS IN WHICH THE MARITIME STRATEGY MAKES THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE.

THE U.S. NAVY: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE



- DEFENDING/ATTACKING ON THE FLANKS WORLDWIDE
- TAKING PRESSURE OFF THE CENTER IN EUROPE
- PROTECTING/MAINTAINING THE SLOCS

MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE BY ALTERING THE GEOGRAPHICAL BREADTH OF THE CONFLICT MEANS THAT -- WITH MARITIME SUPERIORITY -- WE CAN DENY THE SOVIETS ANY ADVANTAGE THROUGH EXPANSION AND PERMITS US, IF WE CHOOSE, TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO AN AREA OR AREAS WHERE THEY DO NOT WANT TO FIGHT.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY IS A MOBILE, FORWARD, FLANKING STRATEGY OF OPTIONS. WHILE THE BATTLE IS JOINED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE MARITIME STRATEGY ENABLES THE WESTERN ALLIANCE TO SECURE THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, DEFEAT ATTACKS ON THE EUROPEAN FLANKS AND IN THE FAR EAST, AND TO CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY. THIS WILL HINDER SOVIET REINFORCEMENT OF THE CENTER WHILE ENSURING THE BUILDUP OF OUR OWN COUNTERVAILING POWER THERE.

MARITIME STRATEGY

- PHASE I : TRANSITION TO WAR
- PHASE II : SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
- PHASE III : CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

THE MARITIME STRATEGY BREAKS OUT INTO THREE PHASES. THERE ARE DELIBERATELY NO TIME FRAMES ATTACHED TO THEM, SINCE THEY REPRESENT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE PREFER TO GO, NOT A TIMETABLE.

MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE I

TRANSITION TO WAR

- WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR
- DETER ESCALATION
- PREPARE FOR GLOBAL WAR
 - POSITION FORWARD
 - INCREASE READINESS
 - DECREASE VULNERABILITY
 - AVOID MALDEPLOYMENT
 - HUSBAND RESOURCES
 - MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME
 - CEDE NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT

THE TRANSITION PHASE INCLUDES RISING TENSIONS, AND COULD INCLUDE ONE OR MORE CRISES, AND/OR A REGIONAL WAR INVOLVING U.S. OR SOVIET FORCES. HERE ARE THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE OUR STRATEGY IN THIS PHASE. CLEARLY WE WOULD PREFER THIS PHASE TO BE THE FINAL PHASE. BY CONTROLLING A CRISIS OR KEEPING A SMALL WAR FROM SPREADING. THE PRINCIPLES WILL BE TEMPERED BY THE OBVIOUSLY CONFLICTING DEMANDS OF EACH, AND TRADEOFFS ARE INEVITABLE. SINCE EARLY WARNING AND SUFFICIENT REACTION TIME ARE VITAL, TIMELY POLITICAL DECISION MAKING WILL BE CRUCIAL.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EVEN "SMALL WARS" CAN INVOLVE THE NAVY IN OPERATIONS IN HIGH-THREAT AREAS, GIVEN THE LARGE AND SOPHISTICATED FORCES OF MANY THIRD WORLD STATES.

PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE




➔ DEPLOYMENTS

✈ SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION DISPERSAL
● OTHER DEPLOYED ELEMENTS

IN THIS PHASE WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO IMPLEMENT A VERY COMPREHENSIVE DISPERSAL SYSTEM. SOVIET AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FLEET UNITS WOULD DEPLOY TO AREAS THAT WOULD DECREASE THEIR VULNERABILITY TO DETECTION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION ELEMENTS WOULD BE FLOWN TO ALTERNATIVE AIRFIELDS. SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WOULD DEPART FROM THEIR MAIN OPERATING BASES.


RAPIDITY OF MOVEMENT (20 KNOTS SPEED OF ADVANCE)



U.S. NAVAL FORCES WOULD DEPLOY, FORWARD. THIS GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATES SOME TIMEFRAMES INVOLVED IN CONSIDERING MOVING NAVAL AFLOAT FORCES INTO POSITION, AND IS HELPFUL IN DISCUSSING WHAT FOLLOWS.

NOTE ALSO THAT NOT ALL THE FORCES IN THE TOTAL ORDERS OF BATTLE OF OURSELVES OR OUR ALLIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGY IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR. A CERTAIN NUMBER WOULD BE IN OVERHAUL OR CONVERSION STATUS, AND OTHERS WOULD BE CARRYING OUT OUT-OF-AREA DEPLOYMENTS.

PHASE I.
TRANSITION TO WAR
MOVEMENT OF USN/USMC FORCES



- | | | | |
|----|----------------------------------|------|-------------------|
| → | SUBMARINES | ● | PATROL AIRCRAFT |
| ○→ | CARRIER BATTLE FORCES | → | MARINES |
| ▶ | BATTLESHIP SURFACE ACTION GROUPS | ---▶ | PATROL HYDROFOILS |

AVERAGE WINTER/SPRING ICE EDGE

THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION TO WAR THERE WOULD BE GLOBAL FORWARD MOVEMENT OF US NAVAL FORCES. A COMPLICATED OPERATION.

ELEMENTS OF OUR SSN FORCE WOULD MOVE INTO FAR FORWARD POSITIONS.

FORWARD DEPLOYED BATTLEGROUPS WOULD INCREASE READINESS. ADDITIONAL BATTLEGROUPS WOULD FORM UP AND MOVE OUT, AS WOULD BATTLESHIP AND OTHER SURFACE ACTION GROUPS, SPECIAL WARFARE GROUPS, AND THE PATROL HYDROFOIL SQUADRON. THE CINCS WOULD MATCH MINING TARGETS AND STOCKPILES WITH AVAILABLE PLATFORMS AND COMMENCE LOADOUT. VP AIRCRAFT WOULD REDEPLOY FORWARD AND STEP UP SUBMARINE MONITORING.

FORWARD DEPLOYED AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUPS WOULD INCREASE READINESS, AND LEAD PORTIONS OF A MARINE MAB WOULD BE AIRLIFTED TO NORWAY TO MARRY UP WITH THEIR PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AND AWAIT FOLLOW-ON ELEMENTS. MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES (MAGTF'S) WOULD BEGIN LOADOUT ON AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING, AND MSC SHIPS FOR MARINE FOLLOW-ON ECHELONS WOULD MOVE TO EMBARKATION PORTS SEALIFT OF REINFORCEMENTS WOULD COMMENCE.


**PHASE I:
TRANSITION TO WAR:
MOVEMENT OF FORCES: USCG/USNR/USMCR**



COAST GUARD:	HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTERS
NAVAL RESERVE:	SURFACE COMBATANTS
	AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
	MINESWEEPERS
	LOGISTICS FORCES
	PATROL AIRCRAFT
MARINE CORPS	CARRIER AIR WINGS
RESERVE:	DIVISION-WING TEAM

DURING THE TRANSITION PHASE, WE ANTICIPATE ACTIVATION OF RESERVES, AND COAST GUARD CUTTERS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE CINCS FOR SLOC PROTECTION DUTIES. MARINE RESERVES WOULD ALSO BE ACTIVATED.

PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR MOVEMENT OF FORCES: KEY ALLIED NAVIES/MPA



OUR KEY ALLIES WOULD INCREASE THEIR READINESS AND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS, DEPLOY SOME OF THEIR FORCES. THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC WOULD INCREASE READINESS, AND THE NAVAL ON-CALL FORCE, MEDITERRANEAN WOULD BE CONSTITUTED. THE ROYAL NAVY WOULD SEND SSN'S FORWARD AND ASW TASK GROUPS WOULD SET SAIL. FRENCH CARRIER TASK GROUPS AND SUBMARINES COULD BE EXPECTED TO PUT TO SEA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHILE THE WEST GERMAN NAVY WOULD MOVE TO CONDUCT FORWARD OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC, AND THE TURKISH NAVY WOULD DO THE SAME IN THE BLACK SEA.

A SPANISH ASW CARRIER TASK GROUP WOULD ALSO GET UNDER WAY AND BRITISH AND DUTCH MARINES WOULD REINFORCE NORWAY. THE JAPANESE AND OTHER ALLIES WOULD SORTIE ALSO.

ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS COMBINED ASW TRACKING WOULD INTENSIFY, AND READINESS WOULD BE INCREASED.

NATO AND OTHER ALLIES WOULD BEGIN TO MARSHAL SEALIFT ASSETS, TO SUPPORT U.S. REINFORCEMENT MOVEMENTS.

PHASE I

TRANSITION TO WAR:

MOVEMENT OF FORCES: U.S. ARMY & U.S. AIR FORCE



US AND ALLIED ARMY AND AIR FORCES WOULD BE ACTIVE AS WELL IN MOVING TO SUPPORT THE MARITIME STRATEGY. WHILE THE U.S. ARMY'S CENTRAL FOCUS WOULD BE ON REINFORCEMENT BY AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL REGION, SOME ARMY UNITS WOULD REINFORCE KEY ISLANDS AND LITTORAL AREAS.

U.S. AIR FORCE TACAIR WOULD ALSO FOCUS ON THE CENTRAL REGION, BUT IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT REINFORCEMENTS WOULD GO AS WELL TO THE NATO FLANKS AND ISLANDS, THE FAR EAST, AND ELSEWHERE. ALLIED GROUND FORCES AND TACAIR WOULD REINFORCE NORWAY; AND U.S. AND ALLIED AEW AIRCRAFT WOULD TAKE UP STATIONS.

MARITIME STRATEGY

- PHASE I : TRANSITION TO WAR
- ➔ ● PHASE II : SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
- PHASE III : CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

WITH ENEMY AND ALLIED FORCES MOVING INTO PLACE GLOBALLY, AT SOME POINT A MAJOR SOVIET ATTACK COULD OCCUR AND ACTUAL LARGE-SCALE WARFARE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. WOULD COMMENCE. IF SO, IT WOULD PROBABLY SPREAD AMONG A NUMBER OF THEATERS, ESPECIALLY AT SEA. STRATEGICALLY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WOULD FIND IT TO ITS ADVANTAGE TO EXPAND THE WAR GEOGRAPHICALLY -- EITHER TO CONCENTRATE ITS FORCES OR TO PREVENT ITS ENEMY FROM DOING SO. IT IS HARD TO VISUALIZE U.S. NAVAL UNITS FROM YOKOSUKA AND SOVIET SHIPS FROM VLADIVOSTOK, FOR EXAMPLE, PROCEEDING TO THE INDIAN OCEAN OR BEYOND WITHOUT INCIDENT, WHILE FIGHTING WAS OCCURRING ELSEWHERE.

THIS IS PHASE II, IN WHICH WE WOULD SEEK TO "SEIZE THE INITIATIVE", AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE. IT IS PREPARATORY TO CARRYING THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY.

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME POTENTIAL LAND/AIR AREAS OF OPERATIONS



POSSIBLE ATTACKS

THE WAR AT SEA CANNOT BE DISCUSSED WITHOUT SOME CONSIDERATION OF THE LAND/AIR BATTLE. THIS CHART SHOWS POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIAL LAND/AIR ATTACKS ONCE THE SITUATION CLEARLY TRANSITIONED TO GLOBAL WAR. IT COMPLEMENTS THE EARLIER GRAPHIC ON SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY. THE SOVIETS ENVISION AS MANY AS THREE MAIN THEATERS FOR THE EURASIAN LAND MASS: WESTERN, SOUTHERN, AND FAR EASTERN. SOVIET THRUSTS COULD OCCUR IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NORTHERN NORWAY, THE TURKISH STRAITS, EASTERN TURKEY, IN THE FAR EAST, AND/OR SOUTHWEST ASIA. NORTH KOREA MIGHT TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK THE SOUTH.

MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE II SEIZE THE INITIATIVE


● GOALS :

- ATTRITION OF THE ENEMY
- FORWARD PROTECTION OF THE SLOCS
- SURVIVAL OF USN/OTHER SERVICES/ALLIES
- FAVORABLE POSITIONING
- MAINTAIN INITIATIVE

AT SEA, SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT AND OTHER ALLIES ATTACK, OUR INITIAL COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO COUNTER THAT ATTACK, ATTRITE ENEMY FORCES, AND SEIZE THE INITIATIVE. VITAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION WOULD BE DEFENDED AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE. OUR AIM, AT THIS STAGE, WOULD BE TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, AND ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF OUR OWN FORCES AND OF U.S. AND ALLIED REINFORCEMENT AND RESUPPLY SHIPPING, IN ANTICIPATION OF PHASE III.

NOTE THAT WHILE THIS STRATEGY DESCRIBES EACH WARFARE AREA SEPARATELY, THEY WOULD ACTUALLY BE IMPLEMENTED MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY. ALSO, WHILE OPERATIONS IN ONE GEOGRAPHIC THEATER MAY CONTINUE IN PHASE II FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD, THOSE IN ANOTHER MAY WELL MOVE TO PHASE III VERY QUICKLY. THESE CONSIDERATIONS CONFIRM THAT OUR FOCUS MUST ALWAYS REMAIN GLOBAL. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LOOK EXCLUSIVELY AT ANY SINGLE THEATER.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW)



- ★ FORWARD SUBMARINE OPS
- PATROL AIRCRAFT
- ⊘ BARRIER OPS
- ▧ AVERAGE WINTER/SPRING ICE EDGE
- ASW TASK GROUPS


FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR EVENTUAL SUCCESS IS DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET SUBMARINE FLEET, AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE. AS SHOWN HERE, A COORDINATED ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) INITIATIVE IS A COMPLEX UNDERTAKING, INVOLVING A WIDE VARIETY OF PLATFORMS, WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND TACTICS.

SSNS WOULD CONDUCT ASW OPERATIONS FAR FORWARD. US AND ALLIED MINE AND SUBMARINE BARRIER OPERATIONS WOULD BE INITIATED AT KEY CHOKE POINTS.

FORWARD-POSITIONED PATROL AIRCRAFT WOULD OPERATE TO THE EXTENT THEY COULD WITHOUT SUFFERING UNACCEPTABLE ATTRITION, ESPECIALLY IN BARRIER OPERATIONS. ALLIED TASK GROUPS WOULD PERFORM AREA ASW OPERATIONS.


MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK BY U-BOATS

JANUARY - JULY 1942



FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE FORWARD ASW PROTECTION EARLY ON IN THE WAR WOULD OPEN UP OUR REINFORCEMENT AND RESUPPLY SHIPPING TO LARGE-SCALE DIRECT ATTACKS. SUCH AS HAPPENED IN WORLD WAR II TO THE U.S. IN THE ATLANTIC (DEPICTED HERE, AT THE HEIGHT OF THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN AGAINST U.S. SHIPPING), AND TO JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW)



IN THE INITIAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) CAMPAIGN, CARRIER BATTLE FORCE THRUSTS WOULD SEIZE THE INITIATIVE, ENGAGING SOVIET AIR ATTACKS AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE IN OUTER AIR BATTLES, TO CAUSE MAXIMUM ATTRITION. AVAILABLE LAND-BASED TACAIR WOULD COMPLEMENT THESE EFFORTS IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA, THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND/OR THE NORTHWEST PACIFIC. JOINT OPERATIONS WOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ELSEWHERE.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT OUR AAW CAPABILITIES ARE ENHANCED BY THE PRESENCE OF TWO INITIAL AEGIS CRUISERS IN THE ATLANTIC AND THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1984.


PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW)



THE INITIAL INTERMINGLING OF SOVIET AND U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND ELSEWHERE WOULD ENSURE EARLY AND INTENSE ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW) ENGAGEMENTS IN THOSE AREAS.

WEST GERMAN AND DANISH NAVAL AND NAVAL AIR FORCES WOULD LIKEWISE MAKE IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT FORCES MOVING ACROSS THE BALTIC. SURFACE ACTION GROUP AND/OR PHM BATTLES MAY ERUPT IN THE CARIBBEAN, AND SIMILAR EARLY SURFACE CLASHES ARE POSSIBLE IN THE BLACK, SOUTH CHINA, AND OTHER SEAS. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING SHIPS AND MERCHANTMEN WOULD BE ATTACKED.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE: INITIAL PROJECTION OPTIONS



EVEN THOUGH THE CAMPAIGN WOULD STILL BE IN PHASE II AND THE MASSES POWER OF THE CARRIER BATTLE FORCES AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES WOULD NOT YET BE IN A POSITION TO STRIKE THE SOVIETS FAR FORWARD, CERTAIN INITIAL PROJECTION OPERATIONS WOULD NEVERTHELESS OCCUR. THIS CHART SHOWS VARIOUS OPTIONS THAT COULD BE MOUNTED FROM THE MARITIME THEATERS IN THIS PHASE.

SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY, AIR STRIKES AND OFFENSIVE MINING MAY BE CONDUCTED AGAINST CUBA, VIETNAM, NORTH KOREA, AND OTHER SOVIET ALLIES, POSSIBLY BY CVBG'S ENROUTE TO HIGHER THREAT AREAS. STRIKES WILL BE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT FORCES REPELLING SOVIET ATTACKS IN NORWAY, THRACE, JAPAN, AND ELSEWHERE. USAF AND ALLIED SUPPORT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL HERE. U.S. AND ALLIED MARINE OPERATIONS IN NORWAY AND -- POSSIBLY -- AMPHIBIOUS INSERTIONS ELSEWHERE ARE ALSO OPTIONS.

MARITIME STRATEGY

- PHASE I : TRANSITION TO WAR
- PHASE II : SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
- ➔ ● PHASE III : CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

SUCCESS IN PHASE II WOULD ALLOW US TO CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY.

MARITIME STRATEGY

PHASE III:

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

GOALS:

- PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE
- DESTROY SOVIET FORCES
- RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
- KEEP SLOCS OPEN
- SUPPORT LAND/AIR CAMPAIGN

IN THIS THIRD PHASE WE WOULD WANT TO PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE. AGAIN, SOME GEOGRAPHIC THEATERS MAY SEE US MOVE INTO PHASE III OPERATIONS MORE QUICKLY THAN OTHERS.


**PHASE III:
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY:
CARRIER BATTLE FORCE
STRIKE OPS/ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE**



HEAVY STRIKES ON THE FLANKS WOULD BE CONDUCTED AS BATTLE FORCES
MASSED AND MOVED FARTHER FORWARD WITH REDUCED RISK AND HIGHER CONFIDENCE OF
SUCCESS.

WE WOULD SEEK TO APPLY FULL GLOBAL PRESSURE.


PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPTIONS



THE COMBINED ASSETS AVAILABLE IN OUR AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS AND FOLLOW-ON MSC SHIPPING PROVIDE US WITH THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT MARINE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN MORE THAN ONE FORWARD OCEAN AREA SIMULTANEOUSLY. ADDITIONALLY, MARINE OPERATIONS UTILIZING NEAR-TERM PREPOSITIONED FORCE AND NEWLY DEPLOYED MARITIME PREPOSITIONED SHIPS COULD BE CONDUCTED IN APPROPRIATE THEATERS.

OUR TWO BATTLESHIP SURFACE ACTION GROUPS COULD BE EMPLOYED TO GOOD ADVANTAGE IN A NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT ROLE. SURFACE COMBATANTS, SEABEES, AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND MINE WARFARE FORCES HAVE IMPORTANT ROLES TO PLAY HERE AS WELL. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WOULD HAVE THE PURPOSE OF SECURING STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS OR RECOVERING TERRITORY LOST TO SOVIET ATTACK.


GLOBAL WAR: CRITICAL SLOCS



IN ALL THREE PHASES, THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION WOULD BE UTILIZED TO SUPPORT THE WAR EFFORT. SEALIFT OF MILITARY REINFORCEMENT AND RESUPPLY FROM CONUS TO DEPLOYED U.S. FORCES IS, OF COURSE CENTRAL TO AMERICAN AND ALLIED SUCCESS IN TAKING THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY. OVER 90% OF AMERICAN REINFORCEMENT AND RESUPPLY CARGOES TO THE FORWARD THEATERS GO BY SEA. THESE SLOCS MUST BE DEFENDED. ALSO, THE OIL AND OTHER ECONOMIC SHIPPING SLOCS ARE IMPORTANT FOR LONG-TERM PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, ESPECIALLY BY OUR ALLIES.

THE PRIMARY DEFENSE WOULD BE MADE WELL NORTH OF THE MAJOR TRANSOCEANIC SLOCS, AS WE HAVE SEEN, BUT A CERTAIN CLOSE-IN THREAT WOULD ALWAYS BE PRESENT, ESPECIALLY BY SOVIET LAND-BASED AIR AND SUBMARINES.

GLOBAL WAR: STRATEGIC SEALIFT



● STRATEGIC SEALIFT ASSETS

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND FLEET
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
READY RESERVE FLEET


U.S. FLAG MERCHANT FLEET
EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROL FLEET
ALLIED MERCHANT FLEETS

▲ PREPOSITIONING SHIPS

REINFORCEMENT AND RESUPPLY SEALIFT FOR ALL SERVICES AND OUR ALLIES WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE U.S. NAVY MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND NUCLEUS FLEET, AUGMENTED BY THE READY RESERVE FORCE, OTHER SHIPS OF THE U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET, AND OTHER U.S. AND ALLIED VESSELS.

ALSO, RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE, PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT ABOARD THE NEAR-TERM PREPOSITIONING FORCE (NTPF) AND MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) REMAINS AN IMPORTANT INGREDIENT IN OUR FORWARD STRATEGY, ESPECIALLY FOR MARINE UNITS.

GLOBAL WAR: WARTIME ECONOMIC SHIPPING



MINERAL IMPORTS

% OF U.S. PEACETIME CONSUMPTION

ASBESTOS	80%	COBALT	91%	NICKEL	72%
BAUXITE	94%	DIAMONDS	100%	PLATINUM	85%
CHROMIUM	90%	MANGANESE	98%	TIN	80%
OIL		34%			

ECONOMIC SHIPPING WOULD ALSO NEED TO FLOW. NOT ONLY OIL, BUT STRATEGIC MINERALS AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS WOULD HAVE TO PASS BY SEA TO SUPPORT THE WESTERN ALLIANCES.


IN PEACETIME, THE U.S. IMPORTS OVER 12% OF ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, AND FIGURES FOR EACH OF OUR ALLIES ARE CONSIDERABLY HIGHER. THE CHART SHOWS OUR PEACETIME DEPENDENCY ON STRATEGIC MINERAL IMPORTS. ESTIMATES OF OUR WARTIME DEPENDENCY VARY, BUT WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT SOME LEVEL OF IMPORTS WOULD BE NECESSARY, BECOMING INCREASINGLY MORE VITAL AS A WAR PROGRESSED. TO SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THIS SHIPPING IS TO GIVE THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES THE UPPER HAND IN DETERMINING HOW LONG A WAR WOULD LAST.

GLOBAL WAR: NAVAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING




PROTECTION OF SHIPPING COULD INCLUDE A VARIETY OF OPTIONS--CONVOYS, PROTECTED LANES, INDEPENDENT SAILINGS FOR FAST STEAMERS, ETC. FORCES REQUIRED ARE PRIMARILY U.S. AND ALLIED DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES (ACTIVE AND RESERVE), COAST GUARD HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTERS, AND MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT.

GLOBAL WAR MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM)



BESIDES THE THREAT OF OPEN-OCEAN ATTACK, A MAJOR THREAT TO THESE SLOCS WOULD BE MINES AT THE TERMINALS. THE PRIMARY MINE COUNTERMEASURES CAMPAIGN WILL BE AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE, TARGETING DELIVERY PLATFORMS TO PREVENT MINES FROM BEING SOWN AT ALL. FOR THOSE THAT GET THROUGH AND MUST BE SWEPT, ENVISIONED US AND ALLIED MINE COUNTERMEASURES RESPONSIBILITIES ARE DEPICTED HERE. ALSO, AS YOU CAN SEE, MANY ADDITIONAL CRITICAL CHOKES POINTS AND PORTS WOULD BE UNCOVERED AS WELL. ANY THREATS TO THOSE AREAS WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTERED BY REDEPLOYMENT OF SCARCE ASSETS FROM ELSEWHERE. IT IS A FORMIDABLE PROBLEM.

GLOBAL WAR: COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES: AFLOAT/ASHORE



MOBILE, FLEXIBLE NAVAL COMBAT OPERATIONS CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AT GREAT DISTANCES, OR AT HIGH RATES OF ENGAGEMENT, WITHOUT MOBILE AND SHORE-BASED FORWARD LOGISTICS SUPPORT, BACKED UP BY SEALIFT AND BASES IN CONUS.

U.S. AND ALLIED MOBILE LOGISTICS SUPPORT FORCE SHIPS WOULD BE FORMED INTO UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUPS (URGS), SUPPORTED IN TURN BY MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND "CONSOL" TANKERS. FORWARD BASES, ESPECIALLY FOR P-3'S AND MARINES, REQUIRE REINFORCEMENT, INCLUDING NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION (SEABEE) SUPPORT.

THE GOAL: WAR TERMINATION ON FAVORABLE TERMS



THE DESIRED CULMINATION OF OUR STRATEGY IS WAR TERMINATION ON FAVORABLE TERMS. WAR TERMINATION REQUIRES SUFFICIENT CONVENTIONAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS, TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NO GAIN IN CONTINUING AGGRESSION AND IN FACT SHOULD RETREAT, WHILE GIVING THEM NO INCENTIVES TO ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR. FOR THE NAVY, THIS MEANS NEUTRALIZATION OR DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET NAVY AND OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES ON THE NATO FLANKS AND IN THE FAR EAST; AND SEA CONTROL AND DECISIVE INTERVENTION IN THE LAND BATTLE.

WHAT HAPPENS AT SEA IS IMPORTANT PRIMARILY AS IT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE LAND BATTLE ASHORE OR TO A FAVORABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. FOR EXAMPLE, PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS SHOULD PROVE CRITICAL TO KEEPING JAPAN IN THE WAR AND DEFENDING KOREA. THIS ALSO TIES DOWN CONSIDERABLE SOVIET FORCES WHICH COULD OTHERWISE MOVE WEST. THE OUTCOME OF THE LAND WAR IS PROBLEMATIC; SUPERIOR SEAPOWER MUST BE CORRECTLY EMPLOYED IN ORDER TO MAKE THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE.

THE U.S. NAVY: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

- DEFENDS THE UNITED STATES
- SOLIDIFIES WESTERN ALLIANCE
- INFLUENCES NEUTRALS
- FORECLOSES SOVIET OPTIONS
- MULTIPLIES SOVIET UNCERTAINTIES
- BLUNTS SOVIET ATTACKS
- CARRIES WAR TO SOVIETS
- HINDERS SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS TO CENTER
- PROVIDES WAR CONTINUATION MEANS
- PROVIDES WAR TERMINATION LEVERAGE

THE "STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE" THAT THE NAVY MAKES IS, AS HAS BEEN SHOWN, MULTI-FACETED.

THE NAVY PROVIDES THE VISIBLE AND ESSENTIAL LINKAGE BETWEEN OURSELVES AND OUR FORWARD ALLIES AND FORCES, AND BOLSTERS THE POSITION OF NEUTRALS. THE NAVY, BY FORECLOSING OPTIONS AND MULTIPLYING UNCERTAINTIES FOR THE SOVIETS, FORCES THEM TO FOCUS ON ONLY A NARROW RANGE OF STRATEGIC CHOICES. THE NAVY PRECLUDES SOVIET FLANKING OPERATIONS, SURROGATE SUPPORT, AND SLOC INTERDICTION, AND PROTECTS AGAINST ATTACKS ON OUR SHORES. THE NAVY LIKEWISE FORCES THE SOVIETS TO COMMIT RESOURCES TO THE DEFENSE OF OTHERWISE SECURE FLANKS, AGAINST THE ENTIRE RANGE OF NAVAL OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. THIS HINDERS SOVIET ABILITY TO REINFORCE THE CENTRAL FRONT IN GERMANY.

THE NAVY IS ALSO THE SERVICE THAT PROVIDES THE NATION WITH THE ABILITY TO CONTINUE THE WAR FOR AS LONG AS THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY DESIRES, AS WELL AS LEVERAGE AT WAR'S END.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

WE WILL NOW TURN TO THE UNCERTAINTIES INHERENT IN THE STRATEGY AS IT HAS BEEN OUTLINED.

WAR= UNCERTAINTY

- NUCLEAR ESCALATION
- WARNING/REACTION TIME
- SOVIET STRATEGY
- SOVIET ALLIES
- US ALLIES & NEUTRALS
- READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY/ATTRITION

HERE IS A LIST OF THESE UNCERTAINTIES--ALL THOSE TOUGH-TO-COME-TO-GRIPS-WITH ITEMS SET ASIDE EARLIER. SOME WE CAN CONTROL SOMEWHAT, AND ARE STRIVING TO DO SO. MOST WE CANNOT. THEY ARE NOT LISTED IN ANY PARTICULAR ORDER OF PRIORITY.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE UNCERTAINTIES WORK IN OUR FAVOR WE WILL BE ABLE TO EXECUTE THE STRATEGY WITH GREATER CONFIDENCE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY GO AGAINST US, WE WILL HAVE TO REVERT TO MORE DEFENSIVE, MORE SEQUENTIAL ACTIONS.

UNCERTAINTY: NUCLEAR ESCALATION

- **THEATER NUCLEAR LEVEL**
- **STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL**
- **POLICY: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE**

ESCALATION TO THEATER NUCLEAR WAR DIMENSIONS IS A POSSIBILITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR ADHERENCE TO NATO'S FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY. WHILE WE WOULD INITIALLY SEEK TO AVOID NUCLEAR ESCALATION, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE MUST HAVE THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES, OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND TACTICS TO HEDGE AGAINST A NUCLEAR ATTACK AT SEA BY THE SOVIETS. THE POSSIBILITY OF STILL FURTHER ESCALATION WOULD--IT IS HOPED--CONTINUE TO BE DETERRED BY OUR STRATEGIC FORCES, ESPECIALLY OUR INVULNERABLE SSBN FORCE.

UNCERTAINTY: WARNING/REACTION TIME

- WARNING TIME UNCERTAIN
- REACTION TIME UNCERTAIN
- INITIATING COMBAT THEATER UNCERTAIN


A SECOND UNCERTAINTY RELATES TO TIMING, AND--RELATED TO IT--LOCATION. A WAR STARTING WITH LITTLE WARNING TIME WILL INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF INITIAL MALDEPLOYMENTS ON BOTH SIDES, AS WOULD A WAR STARTING FROM A CRISIS IN A REMOTE AREA.

UNCERTAINTY SOVIET UNPREDICTABILITY



WOULD THE SOVIETS ACT AS WE DISCUSSED EARLIER? THEY HAVE CAPABILITIES THAT EXCEED THOSE NECESSARY JUST TO CARRY OUT THE INTENTIONS WE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM. SHOULD THEY OPERATE IN A MANNER DIFFERENT THAN THAT ANTICIPATED, IT WOULD PROVIDE NEW CHALLENGES, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD ALSO YIELD NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT. WE MUST HEDGE, THEREFORE, AGAINST THE RANGE OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS.

UNCERTAINTY: ASSISTANCE & OPPORTUNISM SOVIET ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND SURROGATES



WOULD THE SOVIET EUROPEAN SATELLITES STAY IN THE SOVIET CAMP? MORE IMPORTANTLY FOR THE MARITIME STRATEGY. WOULD CERTAIN KEY PRO-SOVIET STATES PARTICIPATE IN THE WARSAW PACT CAMPAIGN? ANY OF THE STATES SHOWN HERE-- ESPECIALLY CUBA, VIETNAM, NORTH KOREA, AND LIBYA--HAS THE CAPABILITY TO ALTER OUR STRATEGY--ESPECIALLY IF IT ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO WORK FROM IT--FORCING THE REALLOCATION OF SCARCE US AND ALLIED ASSETS URGENTLY NEEDED ELSEWHERE. CUBA, FOR EXAMPLE, NOW HAS MORE THAN 200 UP-TO-DATE FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT, THREE MODERN LONG-RANGE SUBMARINES, AND TWO NEW FRIGATES.

THAT WE WOULD EASILY PREVAIL OVER THESE STATES, WHATEVER OUR SITUATION IN THE WAR, IS CLEAR. THAT THEIR INTERVENTION WOULD IMPEDE OUR RATE OF PROGRESS IS ALSO CLEAR.

UNCERTAINTY: SUPPORT FROM STATES FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND NEUTRALS



■ FY 84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE/SALES RECIPIENTS (LESS ALLIES)

● OTHER NEUTRALS

REGARDING THE NEUTRALS, WE ARE COUNTING ON THEM TO EXERCISE--AT A MINIMUM--AN ARMED NEUTRALITY, AND TO OPPOSE VIGOROUSLY ANY VIOLATION OF THEIR TERRITORY.

ALSO, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF NON-ALIGNED STATES WITH WHICH WE ENJOY CLOSE MILITARY RELATIONS AND COMMON INTERESTS, AND WHICH THEREFORE MAY PROVE OF GREAT HELP TO US IN A GLOBAL WAR WITH THE WARSAW PACT.

UNCERTAINTY: READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY/ATTRITION

● MATERIAL

● EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

- AVIATION CONSOLIDATED ALLOWANCE LIST (AVCAL)

- AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

● EXPENDABLES

- THREAT ORDNANCE

- SONOBUOYS

- LEVEL-OF-EFFORT ORDNANCE

- MINES

● FORCE LOSSES

- AIRCRAFT ATTRITION

- SHIP ATTRITION

WE NOTED EARLIER THAT WE ASSUMED SUFFICIENT READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY AND NO ATTRITION, IN DISCUSSING THE STRATEGY. READINESS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND ATTRITION ASSUMPTIONS ACCURATE ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, HOWEVER, ARE LARGELY SCENARIO-DEPENDENT. THEY DEPEND UPON ESTIMATES OF THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT--NOT NECESSARILY OUR CHOICE--AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR WEAPONS, AS WELL AS UPON THE LEVEL OF OUR STOCKS ON HAND.

WE NEED TO CONTINUE INCREASING OUR STOCKS, BUT WE WOULD, IN TIME OF WAR, PRIORITIZE, POOL, SHARE, SUBSTITUTE AND OTHERWISE MANAGE OUR LIMITED ASSETS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS.

UNCERTAINTY· PERSONNEL READINESS

- MANPOWER STRENGTH
- TRAINING
- EXPERIENCE
- ATTRITION

THE FINAL UNCERTAINTY CONCERNS OUR PEOPLE. WILL WE HAVE ENOUGH OF THEM? WILL THEY BE TRAINED WELL ENOUGH? WILL WE HAVE EXERCISED THEM IN THE RIGHT LOCATIONS, IN THE RIGHT FORCE PACKAGES, AND UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS? RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA IS SPLIT BETWEEN THE NAVY, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, AND THE CONGRESS.

MARITIME STRATEGY

- TASKS ARE GLOBAL/DIFFICULT
- SOVIET STRATEGY/FORCES ARE FORMIDABLE
- EVEN WITH ALLIES/OTHER SERVICES,
MARITIME FORCE LEVELS LOW
- STRATEGY IS CLEAR: FULL FORWARD PRESSURE
- MARITIME FORCES MAKE A STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

TO CONCLUDE, HERE IS A RECAPITULATION OF THE MAJOR POINTS OF OUR MARITIME STRATEGY.

OUR STRATEGY IS CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL AND COALITION POLICY AND PROVIDES THE FLEXIBILITY OF RESPONSE THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN EXPECTED OF THE U.S. NAVY. FULL FORWARD PRESSURE IS REQUIRED OF US. IT IS RISKY, BUT IT IS DO-ABLE.

WE MUST, HOWEVER, HAVE THE FORCES, THE SUSTAINABILITY ASSETS, AND THE ASSISTANCE OF OUR ALLIES AND SISTER SERVICES.

IN THAT EVENT, MARITIME FORCES WILL MAKE THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE.