

ABOUT 1 MAY '85

Admiral Eccles —

These two pieces are generally
regarded as the best unclassified
sources on the Maritime Strategy.

I would be interested in your
critique of it.

John Hattendorf

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985**

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1984

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEA POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

MARITIME STRATEGY

The subcommittee met in executive session, pursuant to notice, at 3:07 p.m., in room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator William S. Cohen (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Nunn, Stennis, and Kennedy.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; L. Wayne Arny III, William E. Hoehn, Jr., Bruce D. Porter, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Douglas R. Graham, research assistant; and Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistant.

Also present: James H. Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Bernard R. Toon, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Matthew H. Murray and James Steinberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WILLIAM S. COHEN,
CHAIRMAN**

Senator COHEN. The subcommittee will come to order.

I would like to welcome Secretary of the Navy John Lehman; Admiral Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations; and General Trainor, representing the Commandant of the Marine Corps. They will present testimony on U.S. naval strategy.

Because of the classified nature of much of the information being presented here today, we will remain in executive session for the afternoon.

This is the first Sea Power and Force Projection Subcommittee hearing in review of the fiscal year 1985 Department of Defense budget. During the last few years, this hearing has focused mostly on the maritime threat. We enlarged the scope of the hearing last year so that we could discuss both the threat and the balance of U.S. and allied forces.

This year we are taking an additional step in this hearing by asking the Secretary, the CNO, and the Commandant to discuss the current maritime strategy and its relation to the national strategy.

This extension of the subcommittee's past policy I think is useful in this year's budget authorization deliberations. This discussion should highlight our current plans and intentions as they derive from the current and expected capabilities of the threat, the current and expected capabilities of our own forces, and our national objectives and the goals of the administration.

We then should have a better understanding of the reasoning behind the procurement, R&D, and readiness programs that we have to review and must necessarily pass judgment upon.

I expect Senator Nunn to arrive later.

Senator Kennedy, if you have any opening remarks, we would be glad to receive them at this time.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is my first hearing as a new member of this subcommittee and I am looking forward to the work of the subcommittee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to participate with you and other members of the subcommittee, our witnesses who are here today and who will be here in the future.

I am delighted to have the chance to involve myself in these issues and hopefully to play a constructive and positive role.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, would you like to begin?

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LEHMAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, USN, CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND LT. GEN. BERNARD E. TRAINOR,
USMC DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND OP-
ERATIONS (HQ/MC)**

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask your indulgence for a somewhat unorthodox approach to the briefing.

I would like to propose that we give you a presentation that should be seen not as a straight briefing, but as a framework for discussion. In it, we are going to try to tie together strategy, resources, force structure, readiness, and as we go about preparing our budget through the year, how it coincides with operations and long-range planning.

Senator COHEN. I think that would be very helpful.

Let me tell you that the nature of the problem, as you will hear from many of us around the table, is that we are constantly being told that we have extended commitments and underfunded resources and capabilities.

In today's paper, for example, I think the GAO released a story indicating that we are \$323 billion, or \$343 billion, short on existing programs. Not to coin any phrases, but some people are going to ask, "Where's the beef?" [General laughter.]

The question "where are we going to find the military capability to back up the commitments?" will be asked.

As Senator Nunn might say, you can either change your commitment and start withdrawing forces and redrawing lines; you can beef up your capability—and nobody is proposing an increase over and above what the President is talking about, but probably a reduction instead; or you alter the strategy.

I think it would be helpful to view this matter in the larger context of exactly where we are committed, why do we have these commitments, and do we have the resources necessary to back them up, or should we make alternate plans, strategy and resources.

Mr. LEHMAN. That is our purpose today.

I think you will see that the way we use the term "strategy" is not quite the way some of the critics and the press use the term. There is no attempt in our use of strategy as an intellectual framework to guide the actions of a commander or for programming and planning to be a substitute for a commander's judgment on the scene in the inherent unpredictability of any future conflict.

Too often, the strategic analyst tends to try to usurp the function of the man, the commander on the scene. That is not the way we use the term "strategy."

If it would be acceptable, I would like to stand and informally present part of this brief, with the CNO and our deputy commandant.

If it is acceptable to you, I would like to have it so that anytime you want to expand on any of the points on any of the slides, we do it then that way or we can leave it to the end, if you wish.

Why don't we start with the first slide.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

National military strategy;
Maritime objectives;
Force posture;
Global naval warfighting strategy;
Exercises;
POM building.

First, one way to look at this is as an outline of what we want to cover with you today. The way we run our Navy planning starts with national military strategy. From that strategy we derive our maritime objectives. From those objectives, we establish a force posture, a 600-ship Navy or whatever other force posture is recommended. Then, we derive through a process that we will explain to you, the actual warfighting strategy and the role of exercises which are so crucial to the development and validation of strategy, theater by theater. Then, from all of this, we will show how we build our budget in the request that ultimately comes to you.

There is a perception that somehow it sort of grows, but it really derives from this process.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Deterrence;
Forward defense,
Global coalition warfare.

The national military strategy is primarily based on deterrence, on deterring nasty things from happening to our national interest. It is based on forward defense.

We are deployed throughout NATO. Our fleet and air forces and ground forces are roughly where our vital interests are. We are forward deployed, and that development is fundamentally based on

coalition approaches to all of our threats, not go-it-alone approaches, as an organizing framework.

NSADD-32 (20 MAY 82)

"US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY"

Signed by the President;
Soviets the threat;
War likely to be global—sequential operations necessary;
Increasing importance of conventional forces—balanced forces;
Increasing importance of allies;
Forward peacetime posture.

This is the current guiding national security strategy. Obviously we all have heard the criticism that there is no strategy. But, while in a valid intellectual critique, there may be room to disagree with the current strategy, but it is simply not valid to say that there is no strategy.

This [indicating] is it. This embodies the framework of our national strategy today, national security design document, NSDD-32, and these are the elements.

As you will see, the problem we have to deal with is a global problem. We have to deal with its elements sequentially. We cannot deal simultaneously with every theater.

The conventional forces are the critical mass below the strategic umbrella. These forces must be balanced, land-based and sea-based, and the allies are sine qua non. We simply cannot approach any strategy without assuming very substantial allied participation, and a forward peacetime posture. Whatever starts is going to start from our forces being forward deployed.

[Slide deleted.]

Mr. LEHMAN. This is just a quick, rough schematic of a global war, which would be any war we become involved in with the Soviets, since they are engaged globally and their naval forces exist globally.

These SLOCs are a rough presentation of what we must keep open. These are our principal maritime objectives. We have to use them in order to survive, even for the first week, and to get deployed.

[Slide deleted.]

Mr. LEHMAN. This is a rough schematic of our alliances, treaties, and agreements.

Admiral WATKINS. If I may make a point, on the last slide, I think it is important to know that the whole issue around the Strait of Hormuz has two different aspects to it. The two aspects are that in peacetime, keeping the strait open is far more significant than in the early days of conflict.

So, what you are talking about under the President's initiative to keep the Strait of Hormuz open is the peacetime military mission which we are involved in today. The peacetime mission is much more important for the economic posture of the Western World than the wartime one.

In wartime, our analysis shows the strait could be closed for about 2 months without necessarily impacting severely the war-fighting capability of either the United States or the allies.

I am bringing this up because SLOC protection has a different value in peacetime than in wartime, particularly oil SLOC.

So I think it is important to put this into context because sometimes we get our peacetime and wartime missions mixed up. We can survive in wartime with this strait closed for a period of time. I would say for 60 days, but this is theoretical. Certainly, it is not something for which we need to send large numbers of naval forces at the same time we are trying to take on the Soviet Union in the various fronts in northeast Asia and Europe.

Senator COHEN. If the Iranians should seek to close down the strait, is that peacetime or wartime?

Admiral WATKINS. Well, that is a political decision. Unfortunately, we call things that used to be acts of war, "adventurism" today. So I am not sure how it would come out.

Senator COHEN. I am just wondering about your statement, about the significance of keeping it open in peacetime as opposed to allowing it shut in wartime. If the Iranians seek to close the strait, and we go in to keep it open, what are you talking about in political terms?

Admiral WATKINS. I merely am pointing it out because I think it very clearly is involved in the whole discussion around the southwest Asia strategy.

The southwest Asia strategy was derived from a peacetime concept, far more than a wartime. Yet it is a very strong focal point for deterrence for the nation. There is no question about that.

We have to generate the capability to go in there in a regional conflict, which is not easy.

So, there are lots of good pieces of rationale that fit into a southwest Asia strategy in peacetime. I am merely bringing it up because it gets into the implementation of the contingency plans for the nation when you go to war, in a global sense with the Soviet Union. You don't go rushing over there with large forces and draw down all your logistic support and everything else to open that strait on day 1 of conflict because it really is not that necessary.

So I think those two points are very important as we deal with the variety of crises that we have in the world and the different strategies that take us from peacetime, say, to low levels of conflict, into crisis, into conflict with the Soviet Union.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

40 DIFFERENT TREATY PARTNERS

Mr. LEHMAN. You are familiar with and we often speak of the 40 different treaty partners that we have in a web of some seven security agreements. They form the political matrix of our military strategy.

The broad maritime warfighting objectives resulting from this national strategy are, first, to secure the critical sea lanes of communication; next, is to defeat the threat to interdict them, to neutralize the Soviet ability to interdict our SLOCs.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, may I interrupt you to ask a question.

I wish to detain you here for just a moment.

What percent of the oil that comes through the straits goes to Western Europe and what percent comes to the United States, Admiral?

Admiral WATKINS. That is variable. I believe the United States is 8 percent, depending on which figures you look at. It can go up to as high as 12 percent. It depends on how you work it out.

Thirty percent, nominally, is what is going to Europe, to some of the allies there, the West Germans and so forth. A larger percentage is going to Japan.

I could provide more accurate figures on that, but that nominally is the range.

Mr. LEHMAN. There has been a tremendous reversal in the last 3 years.

Senator KENNEDY. That's right. I am aware of that. I was just interested in being current on those figures.

Also, I would be interested in what those particular countries are doing, if anything, in terms of supporting the President's statement in regard to keeping the lanes open.

What can you tell us about that?

Admiral WATKINS. Clearly the French, the United Kingdom and the Persian Gulf States themselves provide support as does Australia to a degree. Japan has done little save their move toward providing a 1,000-mile SLOC protection, which improves our capability to project forces into the Indian Ocean. We would not be able to do that without some real support from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. For the most part support for strait protection is rather nominal, except from France and the United Kingdom. France would give us significant help in that region were there to be any attempts by Khomeini to close the gulf.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING

Mr. LEHMAN. Strategic positioning, of course, is a fundamental role. Ninety-five percent of the logistics has to go by sea, and the navy has the responsibility to provide that logistics support for the land battle. Much of the support, particularly in the early phases of a conflict, in most theaters, must come from a sea-based platform.

So, it is from that tasking, those maritime objectives, that the force structure is derived. It is looking at what is required in each theater, given the fact that we cannot be everywhere at once, even to meet our vital interests, and we have to move sequentially. That force structure is the 600-ship Navy. These are the principal components: 15 carriers, a complete MAF lift capability plus an independently deployable Marine amphibious brigade, 100 attack subs, 45 cruisers, 70 destroyers, 100 to 110 frigates, minesweepers, and the balance of support that goes with it.

BATTLE GROUP COMPOSITION

PEACETIME	WARTIME
1 CV/CVN	2-4
1-2 CG/CGN	4-8
2-3 DDG/DDGX	4-8
2-3 DD	4-8
1-3 SSN	3-4

JFK AIRWING	
24	F-14
24	A-6
5	KA-6
10	S-3
8	SH-3H
4	E-2C
4	EA-6B
<u>77</u>	

NEW AIRWING	
20	F-14
18	F/A-18
20	A-6
10	S-3
8	SH-60F
5	E-2C
5	EA-6B
<u>88</u>	

MIDWAY (F/A-18) AIRWING	
48	F/A-18
10	A-6
4	KA-6
10	S-3
6	SH-3H
4	E-2C
4	EA-6B
<u>86</u>	

Let me say one word about the term "battle group."

There is a lot of distortion in what a battle group is. A battle group can be almost anything that includes an aircraft carrier, as opposed to a surface action group, which does not.


In peacetime, a battle group may be as small as one carrier and two surface combatants, such as a destroyer and frigate or a destroyer and cruiser. This is sort of an average peacetime battle group [indicating].

But, if we were to go to a general wartime conventional conflict, we would almost never be operating a single carrier battlegroup. They would have anywhere from two to four carriers using CINC warplanes as a guide. Of course, the size of a battle group is significantly larger for actually fighting in a conflict situation than our normal peacetime forward deployments.

This gives you an idea of the different types of airwings that we have today for different classes and sizes of ships. The *Midway*, of course, is a 40-year-old ship. We are transitioning that to an all F/A-18 wing. This gives you the mix of aircraft [indicating].

This would be the *Coral Sea* and *Midway* class.

The long-term plan, is to have anywhere from 8 to 12 of the new notional airwings. That is the mix of fighter, strike fighter, attack, antisubmarine, SAR, airborne early warning, and electronic warfare aircraft. This is the current *John F. Kennedy* wing [indicating] of which we will probably have from two to four. This is a heavy one for long-range operations, with F-14's and A-6's.



This is just a busy slide, specifically designed to be busy, to give you a schematic of everything that goes on simultaneously in the battle group. There are four dimensions: under surface, surface, air, and projection to shore.


A battle group is a complex piece of machinery.

[Slide deleted.]

This slide gives one a slight misconception of what a battle group looks like, similar to what you see on the recruiting posters with the carrier and two destroyers, next to it, and so forth. There is this cluster of ships [indicating]. The normal, as we call it "4 Whiskey" configuration, covers roughly this much area [indicating] and controls an area about out to here [indicating]. This shows where the normal fighter CAP stations are. As you can see, it goes from Boston to Indianapolis, when you transpose it on to a map.

This is a typical operating formation for that kind of normal battle group operation.

ASW DEFENSE IN DEPTH



This just gives you a quick schematic of the kind of simultaneous warfighting and surveillance operations that go on constantly, 24 hours a day.

You hear in our budget presentations terms like the outer zone, the inner zone, Barrier Ops and so forth.

This shows you the kind of operations that go on the closer you get to the centroid of the operating group. Of course, the defenses get thicker as you move from way out with aerial and satellite kinds of surveillance, into the thick, close-in defenses.

[Slide deleted.]

This is the same thing applied to anti-air warfare, the way we have the outer, long-range surveillance coming into the outer defense zone, and then the area defense and inner defense zones. The battle group has systems targeted to each of these different zones.

The closer you come in, the thicker your defenses get. The concept is a layered defense.

None of our systems have 100 percent PK, probability of kill. But the synergism of the overlapping layers is what the whole concept of defense is based on.

NOTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS FORCE COMPOSITION

MAF-MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (DIVISION/AIR WING NUCLEUS)

MAB-MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (REGIMENT/AIR GROUP NUCLEUS)

MAU-MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (BATTALION/AIR SQUADRON NUCLEUS)

COMBAT FORCES

	TROOPS	TANKS	FIXED WING AIRCRAFT	HELICOPTERS	ARTILLERY
MAF (ASSAULT ECHLEON)	32,600	70	280	340	100
MAB	15,500	15	110	120	30
MAU	2,500	5	6	30	5

This is our notional amphibious force composition. This is what a MAF would look like; 32,000 combat troops, with that many tanks, and with its organic aircraft, helicopters and artillery. We are carrying with it, in the assault echelon, 15 days of sustainability before the follow-on echelon arrives.

[Slide deleted.]

This slide has been downgraded to confidential. It is taken from the JCS warplans just to show how overcommitted our Marine amphibious forces are.

Of course, they cannot be everywhere at once, so it would depend on how the war starts and what the theater commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide as to where the allocation of resources should be. Every Marine unit is committed in some war plans to be several places at once.

Admiral WATKINS. I think it is important to stop here a minute to talk a little bit about that because one of the problems we are going to have as a Nation if we are coming into conflict with the Soviet Union is the willingness to deploy forces early. All of our war games, all of our exercises that we have run, where we have the very best people playing the roles, either on the Soviet side or the United States side in our games, indicate that, in fact, we will not make the political decision to move forces early.

This is how important it is. In war gaming efforts at the Naval War College we have analyzed the impact of delaying the forward and early deployment of Marines and Canadian forces with the air echelon, and the Air Force F-15's to Norway.

A matter of a few days may make the difference of the loss of Norway to the Soviet Union. Timing would be extremely critical. Therefore, with that kind of fragility in any contingency plan, it is essential that we develop a concept that deals with the crisis build-

up phase that insures that we are forward deploying forces. We are practicing that concept in exercises; for example in TEAMWORK 84 today off Norway. But we must get those marines over there, get them into a fighting mode, and get them out of the contingency plans for the defense of Iceland. We are working on that in the JCS, and the defense of Iceland has been given to the Army. Instead of having the Army come in at D plus 30, 30 days after conflict begins we are now saying that the Army must be mobilized to the point, say, in the 100,000 callup authority, to be able to quickly move into the Azores, Iceland, and the Aleutians. As a result, at D plus 30 we would not have the disruption and the need for heavy sea and air lift which is no longer available because it is now committed to the resupply of central Europe.

It is a very critical issue. It is one of those areas where we have competing requirements for the Marines. The Marines are in demand everywhere. They are the first to fight. So, therefore, we should be putting them into positions early, say at D minus 30, when we have a lot of warning, a lot of world unrest, a lot of indicators that we are moving toward conflict. That is the time to run some exercises and pre-position our forces into selected areas, not worldwide, but in small enough groups to move into areas that indicate to the Soviet Union that we have the resolve and the will to carry out the plan. Perhaps that is the final element of deterrence, so that we can avoid conflict if at all possible. This concept would be expensive, costing perhaps, close to \$100 million in exercise funds that were not previously budgeted.

This whole concept of early deployment and movement of the Marines has become very critical. They are out there in ships. They are ready to go. They are ready to fight, and we don't want to have them tied down to policing roles when the fighting begins. That is included in this effort within the Joint Chiefs to straighten out, modernize, and make our contingency plans more dynamic.

Senator COHEN. In view of what you said, do you think it is a wise decision to have deployed the Marines for all that time in Beirut?

Admiral WATKINS. Well, I would defer to General Trainor to answer that.

[General Trainor starts to answer.]

Senator COHEN. You don't really have to answer that.

Senator KENNEDY. I have one question.

FORCE QUANTITY AND SEALIFT CAPABILITY

How do you relate the relationship between force quantity and sealift capability, or support capability, in this timeframe?

You have indicated that there is a flow line in terms of time, getting people over there. What is the variance between force and sealift and supply?

Admiral WATKINS. We have some recent analyses that the entire southwest Asia concern over the past 4 years, Senator Kennedy, which address that very issue—not just in southwest Asia, but worldwide. From these we have developed what are called time phased force and deployment data.

We probably have tested those more than any other in our defense exercises over the past 4 years. They have revealed serious weaknesses in our ability to meet the time lines in the contingency plans.

So, obviously, what we have to do is not only modernize our lift, but refine our time phased deployment force and data schemes so that they can be flexible and not rigidly tied to one scenario or another.

So, within the next year, we will have a whole new modernized deployment scheme that permits the kind of actions I was talking about earlier, where some elements that might be deploying after D-day to Europe would be deployed at D minus 30. And yet that would not disturb the latter time phased deployment system.

Now, when you get into this kind of concept, then lift does not become so critical as it is not required all at one time. You can begin sequentially to employ lift so as to minimize the gap between the needs and the ability to lift it to the theater.

We are working on that concept and feel that we will just about be there by the 1988-89 timeframe; with the nearly \$5-plus billion that we put into sealift, and with what the Army and the Air Force are trying to do with intra-theater lift to move supplies from depots to the forward edge of the battle line.

This probably is one of the most aggressive, most positive contributions that Khomeini has made; to further energize us in this whole area of logistics support. But, still strategic lift is inadequate for the Nation as a whole.

¹ We can meet our military requirements but the Nation is lacking in sealift for many other requirements, such as movement of strategic raw material and other commodities across the ocean all at the same time.

[Slide deleted.]

Mr. LEHMAN. In a peacetime posture, as the CNO has said, this is really the critical matrix from which any conflict will spring.

These are the friendly states and the friendly ships that we count on as part of our naval force. As you can see, the number is quite substantial. That is why we say that we can achieve naval superiority. It is quite a realizable goal even though we are not going to match the Soviets in numbers of combatants and other types of ships. We feel that taken together, our allied navies, along with our own 600-ship Navy, are clearly superior. They can do the task that we need them to do against the Soviets' ability to interdict. But, as you can see, and as every war we have been engaged in with allies has shown, all of these forces are not going to be there simultaneously. There will be a considerable time lag and variations in the allied navies joining into the conflict, depending on how it breaks out and where it breaks out. But, in any given area, all of our planning assumes a matrix of very efficient, good navies, like the Royal Navy or the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, in which our battle groups are designed to operate.

REDUCTION IN NAVAL CAPABILITY

Senator COHEN. Hasn't there been a reduction in the naval capability of our ally, Great Britain, because of the reduction in num-

bers of their ships, particularly after what happened in the Falklands? Hasn't there been a diminution of their capability?

Mr. LEHMAN. The Falklands demonstrated the extent of the erosion of naval force throughout the western alliance, that had taken place during the 1960's and 1970's. There, we had a navy deployed without any air cover, or any 3-D radars or any close-in defenses. That, hopefully, has been reversed to a certain extent in the United Kingdom's defense program since then.

But if it has not been reversed, at least it has been arrested. They still carry the 50 destroyer-frigate number and there has been more funding.

But I would have to say that with the exception of France, the trend in all of the allied navies is disappointing. They are not keeping up sufficiently with modernization, with the ability to interoperate with us. They don't have the defenses to deal with the threats the Soviets are deploying. But, as the Falklands also demonstrated, we have damn good navies on our side, with very good professional sailors. They have a long tradition and excellent capability.

U.K. DEBATE ON TRIDENT FUNDING

Senator COHEN. What has been the state of the debate in Great Britain with respect to funding Trident versus more of the conventional surface ships?

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, it is a debate that in many ways parallels the debate that has gone on here regarding the amount of money going into strategic versus conventional weapons. For this period of time, in which the building, developing and deploying of four Trident submarines, is looming as a larger lump to swallow for the Royal Navy than our own strategic expenditures, it is a legitimate issue there.

Senator COHEN. Do you have any sense of what is going on over there? Are they still fully committed to the Trident?

Mr. LEHMAN. We see no indication of any flagging in their commitment to the Trident program. It is going along very well.

Senator COHEN. I am only raising this in the context of what they are doing in terms of tradeoffs between the strategic deterrence and a cutback of their surface fleet.

Mr. LEHMAN. They have not modernized their fleet as they would have hoped to and should justify, given the commitment to ASW they have in the eastern Atlantic.

Senator COHEN. My understanding was that they were reducing their number of ships and were going to try to compensate with air patrols.

Admiral WATKINS. Following the Falklands war, I think, Mr. Chairman, they backed off on that, at least partially, and restored the numbers of ships in their last budget.

Now what they do from this point on, we are not sure. They are coming over here for discussion with us in the near future, and I hope to find out just exactly what is going on there because it is very critical to the alliance. They play a very important role in SLOC protection across the North Atlantic and into the Benelux ports.

So we were most concerned about the prospective demise of a part of the Royal Navy even before the Falklands war. That down trend has turned around, and now they are going to have to face the budget realities of the new Trident missile vis-a-vis their other forces.

I believe they will hang on to their strategic objectives, irrespective, and I think there is going to be tremendous British national pressure to build up the Royal Navy.

I really do think a very strong lesson has been learned there, and I cannot see them falling off the current numbers of 50 that the Secretary mentioned.

Mr. LEHMAN. Here is the maritime warfighting strategy. There are three phases to look at it in an analytical way.

MARITIME STRATEGY

Phase I: Transition to war.

Phase II: Seize the initiative.

Phase III: Carry the fight to the enemy.

The transition to war is perhaps the most crucial of all. How we position ourselves in the transitional phase, what Admiral Gorskov calls the "battle for the first salvo" is critical. How we handle rules of engagement and the willingness of the political authority to deal realistically with the potential threat is crucial. In every crisis we get into, we see just how determinant that can be.

At sea, seizing the initiative is essential for reasons we will get to later.

Then, the final phase is war termination, to bring the conflict to a close as early as possible on favorable terms.

Senator COHEN. Would you distinguish between what the Admiral said about the war gaming—how we do not plan on taking the initial aggression or steps—with what you just said in terms of moving, of seizing the initiative.

Admiral WATKINS. It is very difficult to persuade the National Command Authority to call up the Reserves. It is very difficult to declare war. It is very difficult to read ambiguous signals and move forces based on those signals.

There is great consternation during the game on the part of the players about whether we are sending more of a deterrent signal by moving forces, or whether we are actually tearing down deterrence and encouraging adventurism.

That debate goes on and on.

Now it is a very realistic debate. I am not criticizing it. I am merely saying that the results have shown that the day we mobilize is the day we deploy, the day we commence conflict. It has developed that way in the games now for 20 years. I believe that this pattern of political inaction prior to receiving the first blow will be devastating in the next conflict.

Somehow we have to build up in this crisis period, the transition to war, in a new way. We have to think more aggressively in terms of the pre-positioning of forces. The rules of engagement must change to meet emerging circumstances. We now have rules of engagement out there in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean that are very essential. Those have been announced to the

world, to Syria and to Iran. The zones have been set up because if we are threatened we have to respond.

So, as we approach conflict, it becomes much more difficult politically to allow a commander in the field to make his own judgment call as to when, for example, he is being targeted by an incoming missile with its fire control radar locked on. With all the other things in the world that are taking place to indicate that we are on the verge, does he allow the first missile to sink his ship, or does he sink the other? That is a very critical decision.

Senator COHEN. That is what I was trying to get at in terms of what is the line that is drawn between seizing the initiative and acting first.

Mr. LEHMAN. This [indicating] is post hostilities.

Senator COHEN. But I am not so sure that that is what the Admiral is saying. You are saying that it may not be possible to absorb that first shot and maybe we ought to take some action first.

Admiral WATKINS. Not just that it may or may not be possible to absorb it, but it may be wrong for the Nation to do that if, in fact, we have a responsive system that is really alert to the information and warning indicators.

It turns out that information and warning indicators I think are very good, even in an ambiguous form, and we can make moves during those periods of time—not unlike what we are doing today—but as a Nation we need to make the moves early. That, we found in our wargaming, is very difficult in any reasonable timeframe, like 30 days.

MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE I

TRANSITION TO WAR

- WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR
- DETER ESCALATION
- PREPARE FOR GLOBAL WAR
 - POSITION FORWARD
 - INCREASE READINESS
 - DECREASE VULNERABILITY
 - AVOID MALDEPLOYMENT
 - HUSBAND RESOURCES
 - MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME
 - CEDE NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT
- WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR

Mr. LEHMAN. The first phase, the transition to war, is the most crucial. In preparing for that phase there are certain critical positions where we must have forces. We have to get the readiness up. We have to move from the peacetime posture.

You are all familiar with the cross-decking issue where, when a carrier comes into the Mediterranean, we often will cross-deck built up arms from the outgoing carrier over to the incoming carrier.

A lot of that makes sense in peacetime. Because even if all of your stocks are full it is just very inefficient to build up a Harpoon missile at Yorktown, carry it to the Mediterranean and then bring it all the way back and tear it down and put it back in the stocks. Once you get it built up, it is far more sensible to keep it built up and in theater. But, if you moved, in the transition phase, to an alert status, then all of your carriers have to have those Harpoons. You have to deal with that readiness need, fill the squadrons up, get the repairs done, and the spare parts lockers you have to do that have to be ready to transition from a peacetime operating posture to a wartime posture.

The other issues involved here will be gone into in more detail by the CNO.

[Slide deleted.]

Again, phase I. This is just another schematic to show where, under the CINCS' plans, things have to get to, plans before the war starts, from their normal peacetime deployment.

This is a critical problem which is much less of a problem for us in the naval service than it is for the land services. If you tried to get all of those mal-deployed Netherlands units into their FEBA positions, that is very different and much more than moving your carrier group from the west coast to the Pacific.

[Slide deleted.]

This is not a very good graphic, but it is drawn directly from the latest theater CINCS' concepts of operations.


This shows where and how many carrier battle groups they feel they must have in each area to carry out the tasks that are currently assigned to them in the war plans.

So, as you can see, this is what is based on the CINCS' war plans right now.

Again, this is phase II, seizing the initiative after the war has begun.

MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK BY U-BOATS

JANUARY - JULY 1942



This is just one illustration to show how critical going on the offensive at sea is.

This just shows January to July in 1942, when we had virtually lost the war. These are merchant ships lost in just this one phase, in the Caribbean and the North Atlantic, to a total of 57 German submarines—only 57 submarines.

This is strategic sea lift. This is Army tanks. This is the aircraft and ammunition that most experts believe had even three-quarters of this not gone to the bottom, the war would have ended at least a year to a year and a half sooner.

But, unfortunately, we had no way to prevent it at that time, because we had not gotten into a fully mobilized position. We had no air cover. We had insufficient destroyers to convoy. And so, just 57 submarines were allowed to prey on our sea lanes.

If that were to be the case this time—now—I hasten to add that in 1941, we were building one merchant ship a day in the United States. The day of Pearl Harbor, we were fully mobilized in ship building. We were doing even better than that in the year 1942 and we could not keep up with this attrition.

Today we have one merchant ship under construction in the entire United States, for the whole year, and we have no attrition.

So it is all very well for some critics to say that the Navy should stop worrying about new destroyers and more aircraft and buy sea-lift to move the Army; but it does not make very much sense to move the Army if they end up there [indicating]. We have been unable to force the Soviets into a defensive posture by moving out early to show them that they have to worry about protecting their assets, and use their attack submarines here [indicating], rather than here [indicating].

ESCORT AND COMMERCIAL SHIP RATIO

Senator COHEN. What was the relationship, the ratio between the escort ships—the cruisers and the destroyers—and the merchant marine ships that were sunk, the commercial ships? What were the numbers, compared to where they are today?

You said that we did not have enough to protect the merchant cargo lanes.

I would suspect it was a lot higher than it is today. You are still talking about building up to a 600-ship Navy. How many Navy ships did you have in the inventory in 1942?

Mr. LEHMAN. In early 1942, we did not have that many. They really started to come in in the latter part of 1942 and early 1943, when the combatants that were laid down just before and after Pearl Harbor started to come into the force.

We were hurting. We had no escort carriers. We had virtually no effective maritime air through most of this segment here [indicating]. Most of the air cover was basically just coastal. We did not have what we have today, and that is an attack submarine to counter submarines preying on merchant ships.

I think that there were only two submarines sunk by other submarines in the whole Second World War. Isn't that right?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, and that was on the surface.

Mr. LEHMAN. And they were on the surface.

Today our attack submarines are primarily focused on their submarines. That is why offense, with our submarines first pushing or forcing them into a defensive posture, is so critical.

SUBMARINE RATIO

Senator COHEN. What is the ratio between our attack submarines and their attack submarines?

Mr. LEHMAN. In nuclears, they have 116 nuclear attack subs and we have 94. They have about 150 diesel electric subs, which are useful to them in blocking our convoy routes putting them there as floating mines if you will. The diesel electrics are just as much a threat to an unescorted group today as they were in 1942.

So, their diesel electric threat is a threat to us.

Senator COHEN. What are the numbers?

Mr. LEHMAN. About 150 on their side and zero on our side. But there are about 150 allied diesel electrics. So we are not that far away from rough equality in numbers, given all of our allies. This includes the Japanese, the Australians, and all of the Europeans.

If they are all generated and at war, then they are part of our force.

Admiral WATKINS. I think it is important to know that is the way we play the war game in peacetime. Because of our sophisticated systems, we can act as the water manager for the allies in submarine operations and we do that. We know where each of our submarines is located. We control them to avoid mutual interference. We have communications links established. We have intelligence exchanges established. We know what their contingency plans are for wartime. They know ours. The missions are clearly defined, and there is no doubt in my mind that they are going to be very effective at the choke points of the world, which happen to be the exact same choke points that we would identify were we to have our own diesels and have to go it alone.

In other words, if we had a diesel submarine force the same size as our allies, 140 submarines of high quality, then we would position them exactly where they are, in the Skagerrak and Kattegat, down in the Straits of Gibraltar, in the Straits of Sicily. We'd be in all the right spots, down in the Straits of Malacca and throughout the world. That is where they are today. That is where the Japanese will be. That is where the United Kingdom and the West Germans will be, in the right spots. The Norwegians will be in similar locations.

We have the optimum relationship with the alliance in that they have the forward deployed diesels at the choke points doing the sea denial roles against the Soviet Union. That means that we can project our submarines forward into the areas where the diesel submarine cannot really penetrate.

The combination of the two forces that the Secretary mentioned earlier are absolutely critical to the equation and the balance, as to whether or not we can win the war at sea.

Mr. LEHMAN. Let me put back the earlier slide, merchant ships sunk by U-boats, for you.

There is one little point that I want to touch on here, and that concerns what is going on in Cuba.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell us when they moved toward that type of deployment, and do you have any conflicts on the demands that these countries want to protect what they consider to be a more limited national interest, rather than a total allied interest?

Admiral WATKINS. Senator, my observations have been, and we have operated with them for many years since World War II, and very aggressively in the last 10 years, that the commitment to the alliance is a very serious one for them. I do not see them dropping this commitment for other, you might say regional, conflicts with neighbors, if that is what you are referring to.

I have never seen that in any of the war games, in any of the exercises we have run, or even any of the back room discussions.

We have been very open about that because certainly we are not interested in the Spanish Navy being focused on an invasion from Portugal. Our allies are willing to talk about those things very openly. Our feeling is that their commitment is real and they are going to carry it out as long as the national leadership in their countries want to play the game. This includes France.

You always have that "if," but there is not any question at the military to military level where those forces will be in wartime.

Mr. LEHMAN. Notice the cluster of sinkings in the Straits of Florida, the Straits of Yucatan, and the Windward Passage. It would be exactly the same problem today as it was then because today, 85 percent of all Army logistics has to come out of the gulf. You notice the cluster around New Orleans and Galveston. This is crucial to the resupply of Europe, or to anywhere, to the Army, because here is where they embark for the resupply of the units committed.

It has to come through the 60-mile Straits of Florida or the 40-mile Straits of Yucatan. That is why the Soviets have been so smart in the way they have built up the Cuban Navy. They just got their third new Foxtrot diesel electric, which would be very good for sinking merchant ships trying to get through those straits, until we could neutralize them.

They have about 50 patrol, cruise missile, and torpedo boats, throughout the bay and estuaries around Cuba. It will be a real problem to get merchantmen moving through this area, in the early stages of a conflict, until Cuba is taken care of either politically or militarily.

I just wanted to make that point. The Soviets have been very intelligent in the way they have used their resources in Cuba on a maritime basis.

So, seizing the initiative is essential.

We have to move up north of the GIUK gap. We have to control the Norwegian Sea and force them back into the defensive further north, under the ice, to use their attack subs to protect their nuclear missile submarines, to use their attack subs to protect the Kola and the Murmansk coasts, and similarly their Pacific coast as well.

If we try to draw a "cordon sanitaire" and declare that we are not going to go above the GIUK gap or we are not going to go west of such and such a parallel, then, obviously, they have the capability to use their attack subs offensively against our SLOCS.

[Slide deleted.]

This is one issue that people keep raising, the GIUK gap versus the North Cape. It should be clear to everyone that if the NATO treaty means anything, it means that we have to protect and to hold Norway. The minimum reinforcement plans require both the Marines and the ACE mobile force to move by sea. They all have to go by ship, to Norway, after the conflict breaks out. If we allow the

Norwegian Sea to be controlled by the Soviet Union, Norway is untenable.

That is one important issue.

CONTROLLING THE NORWEGIAN SEA

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I have a question on this point.

The big question is not whether we try to control them, but with what forces do we try to control them, and whether you really are putting those carriers up there from the point of view of protecting that area and sea control, or whether you are going to take the battle to the Soviet homeland, which is what you had said.

Nobody is disputing the importance of that area, but the assumptions that we heard before, that we would not begin to put carriers up there—we heard this from the naval testimony, the military testimony—were unless we had control of Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Of course, then the logical question is if you have control of that, why don't you use land-based air to a much greater extent than what you talked about.

I found a great disparity between your view on this particular point and that of the uniformed Navy.

Mr. LEHMAN. I would be interested in your pointing out what that disparity is, because I have not been able to find it.

Senator NUNN. I have not had an admiral yet who told me he would be willing to put those carriers on a mission to go right out to the Soviet homeland in that area.

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, you keep saying that, but when did you hear me say it?

Senator NUNN. I heard you say over and over again that we were going to go after the Soviet naval ports and so forth with our carriers.

Mr. LEHMAN. I don't think so. I know that Bob Komer and others have said that I have said that, but I have looked in vain for where.

Senator NUNN. Why you have told me that.

I have heard you say it in hearings.

Mr. LEHMAN. I would be interested in seeing the transcripts of that. What I have said is, we cannot control the Norwegian Sea, if we cannot operate carriers there. In order to put forces into that area, we have to provide air support for them. So, we cannot control that area without carriers in the subsequent phases of the operations. I think that speaks for itself.

I have found no admiral that disagrees with me on that, except for those like Stan Turner and some others.

The fact is that I have never said we were going to steam carriers up there to lob A-6's into the Kremlin's men's rooms, as Barry Goldwater says. What I have said is that we have to go on the offensive early. We have to send submarines up there. It has to be premised on land-based air, substantial use of P-3's and Nimrods operating out of Iceland and the U.K. Our submarines have to go and nullify the Soviet submarine force before we can send any surface ships, certainly before we send the Marines up there in amphibious craft. And, once we have secured that, we have to be able to use carriers in the area to provide air support to the forces

there, so that they can do those tasks that are necessary to secure Norway.

Now, to take that one step further, for us to say that we have to prohibit any strikes for mining or for closing the naval bases and air bases in the Soviet Union seems to me nonsensical.

Senator NUNN. It is a question of what forces you do it with.

Your assumptions are that we control the United Kingdom, Norway, and Greenland. The question is do you put those kind of assets, the carrier assets, right up there in the heart of the Soviet area when you could do it with land-based air.

Mr. LEHMAN. How could you do it with land-based air? The range of most tactical aircraft in the U.S. inventory is about 300 miles.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator NUNN. What are you going to do if they start popping tactical nuclear weapons in that area of the world with your huge carriers in there?

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, what do you think is going to happen to our land bases when they start popping tactical nuclear weapons?

Senator NUNN. Well, I think there is a lot of difference between starting a land-based or sea-based attack.

Mr. LEHMAN. I think a carrier will survive a lot longer than, for instance, Ramstein, when tactical nuclear weapons are raining down.

Senator NUNN. Well, I have found there is a heck of a lot of difference between starting a land nuclear war and starting a sea nuclear war. If the Navy is so foolish as to put a whole group of carriers together and throw them right toward the Soviet heartland, if you put a huge number of your whole resources in there, why one theater nuclear weapon could wipe out your carriers and wipe out a substantial part of your fleet with no collateral damage at all.

If the Soviets ever were going to use tactical nuclear weapons, it seems to me that is such a target that they could not avoid it.

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, there are far more valuable assets already ashore, and you have to defend them. The ability to put a nuclear weapon on a carrier, or a cruiser, or an amphib that moves at 30 knots is considerably more difficult than putting one on a land base that does not move at all. So, if the nuclear threshold is crossed, it is going to be a lot bigger problem than just worrying about the survivability of the carrier. Those carriers are going to be just as able to be hit by nuclear weapons if they are below the GIUK gap as if they are above it.

Senator NUNN. What I am saying to you is if you put all those resources together into one task force and head right toward the Soviets very strategic targets in that area, I think the very tactics you are describing will lower the nuclear threshold and make it much more likely that that nuclear threshold will be crossed, because you will have such a huge, lucrative target. It will pose such a threat to them that I think it will be almost irresistible.

Mr. LEHMAN. It is entirely dependent on how and when the operations are taken.

I think the Marine amphibious force is a far more juicy target than a carrier task force. If you think we can keep Norway without using resupply vessels and amphibs and other ships, then you have not looked at the war plan. And if you think we can defend them more easily than we can defend a carrier, then I don't understand you.

How are you going to get your forces to Norway?

Senator NUNN. Well, the forces landing in Norway are essentially to defend NATO territory.

Mr. LEHMAN. And the Soviets won't shoot at you, is that it?

Senator NUNN. You are not going to knock out any Soviet naval bases with a Marine landing force. I haven't seen any war plans that puts the Marines ashore in Russia.

Mr. LEHMAN. Are you suggesting that they won't shoot at the amphibs?

Senator NUNN. No. I am suggesting that that is not anywhere as lucrative a target and is nowhere nearly the threat to them.

Mr. LEHMAN. But you are saying that you want to send the amphibs without carrier cover—that's what you're saying, right?

Senator NUNN. No. I'm saying that your plan to take the carriers in and attack the Soviet land base—

Mr. LEHMAN. Now where did I say that. You keep saying that I said that. Komer keeps saying that I said that.

Senator NUNN. You told me that in my own office. Over and over again I have heard you say it.

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, I said that we cannot preclude the capability or disavow the capability to hit their forces that are threatening our forces with carrier air and land-based air.

Senator NUNN. Well, I think you have changed a good bit, and I am gratified, because what you are saying now is not the same thing I heard before. I think you are evolving in the right direction.

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, I have not changed my tune since I came into this job. I have not changed it one iota.


Senator NUNN. Well, then, my hearing is bad. I am usually pretty good at that.

Mr. LEHMAN. I would be interested in seeing those citations.


Senator NUNN. Well, I know what you said in my office. I know what you said to me. I don't have any doubt about that. I have it up on the map, and you showed me exactly what your plans were. I do not agree that you haven't changed, but I am gratified that you have changed.

Senator COHEN. Well, as long as we are all at the same point and are in agreement, maybe we should proceed.

Senator NUNN. I would like to see the war plans, though. I think that would be interesting.



Mr. LEHMAN. Similarly, this is the same phase transposed to the Pacific: forward deployment of the SSN's, moving them forward and putting the Soviets on the defensive in the first phase.




Similarly, as we did in RIMPAC we have been making maximum use of land-based assets, AWACS, F-15's, KC-10 tankers, and F-4's. This has been a key aspect, during the last 3 years, of the integration between the Air Force and the Navy that the CNO will speak to in some detail. That integration is now an essential part of the CINC war plans and has proven to be very successful in the exercises where we have used them.

[Slide deleted.]
Phase II is seizing the initiative.
Again, this is more readily illustrated and in more detail when we talk about the exercises theater by theater.

[Slide deleted.]
This demonstrates the use of amphibious forces, the Marine amphibious unit, MAB or MAF, in this phase of the war, depending on where you put them. They will be used for SPECWAR operations, reinforcements and seizing key terrain.

[Slide deleted.]
Again, war projection options are shown. These are derived from various exercises and war plans. We could go into them in more detail.

COMBINED ARMS STRIKE MISSION



This is drawn from a war game that was based on some fairly interesting intelligence. It is the use of a combination of land-based and carrier based air to strike the Soviet Union, to catch the Backfires on the ground. This one is based on Alekseyevka. In the war game, the exchange ratio that resulted from the computer analysis looked quite favorable. The fact is that Soviet naval bomber bases are not hardened. They are revetted, but not hardened, quite lucrative targets for both carrier and, in this case, land-based strikes.

[Slide deleted.]
This is a schematic of a projection mission in Central Europe based on the use of the Tomahawk. At most, some 70 main operating bases within the Warsaw Pact are within land-based Tomahawk range from the periphery of Europe, including the Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, and elsewhere.

[Slide deleted.]
This is another schematic showing the strike ranges of a DDG-51, a 963 or an Aegis cruiser with VLS, from a standoff point out to

here [indicating], they are capable of attacking these bomber bases with conventional Tomahawks.

[Slide deleted.]

TOMAHAWKS

This shows you the current plan in the budget for Tomahawks at sea including the SSN-688's. We now have 688's deployed with Tomahawk. With the 637 class submarines and eventually CG-47's, the 963's as you can see, you will have quite a few Tomahawk launchers at sea. We increase the number every year from now on.

Right now, we have them on four SSN 688's and one battleship.

SOVIET VIEW OF TOMAHAWK



This is a Soviet view of Tomahawk. The fact is that it is not just the carriers that the Soviets have to worry about now. Because, we now have many deployed ships that, from a strike point of view, are a potential threat to the Soviets in a wartime situation.

All of our destroyers and eventually, all of our cruisers and all of our attack subs will be potential Tomahawk shooters. This will complicate tremendously the targeting problems of the Soviets. They now have to worry as much about a destroyer as they do about a carrier from the point of view of transition to strike operations.

The final strategy is to carry the fight to the enemy and bring the war to a close. It is that ultimate end around which we have to do all of our planning, to give the Soviets an incentive to come to terms and terminate hostilities.

[Slide deleted.]

This, again, is a schematic use, in this final phase of carrier operations, of Marine amphibious assault for striking the Soviet homeland, their military assets, and their bases, mining their harbors, and giving them every incentive to—

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question at this point?

Senator COHEN. Sure.

Senator NUNN. Now, if that does not show the Navy carrier attacking the Soviet homeland, what does it show?

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, I said that in the first phase, that we never intended to steam carriers up to strike the Soviet Union in the early phases of the war. However, I also said, and have never changed my tune, that we must never put our theater commanders into a position of giving the enemy sanctuaries, by saying that we are never going to do this under any circumstances.

We must have the capability to do it. The Soviets are very vulnerable there. They have very ill-defended, high value assets that we have the capability to strike. Every theater commander ought to be able to think about using those capabilities to bring the war to a swift close on favorable terms.

PHASE I TO PHASE II TIMEFRAME

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, what is the timeframe in going from phase I to phase III?

Mr. LEHMAN. No one has tried to put a timeframe on it because of the inherent unpredictability.

Senator COHEN. But you have to have some parameters on it because you have some real reinforcement problems and I assume some other logistical difficulties. You just can't have it open-ended just from day 1 to day 60 or 90.

Mr. LEHMAN. Again, I want to emphasize that our whole approach to strategy is not to try to fight the war for the CINCs. It is simply to provide for them the kind of capabilities, training, and planning for options to fight the war on their terms in whatever the timeframe might be.

War is inherently unpredictable, one can't easily determine how it will break out or how long it will take, for instance, to nullify the submarine force in the Norwegian Sea. That is a tough area to operate in. It may take a week or it may take a month or 3 months.

Senator COHEN. The reason I asked that question is it may help to clarify some of the questions that Senator Nunn has with you and statements that you made in the past about taking the battle to the enemy. It depends. If it comes in phase I, then it falls into Senator Nunn's area of real concern, as to whether we have the capability or the wisdom. If it comes in phase III, which is after you have neutralized their various submarine forces and have

them bottled up and now on the defensive back home, that is something else.

Mr. LEHMAN. I believe that from the very start I have been consistent in saying that I am not going to try to tell any CINC how to run the war. I don't know when we should use it. He has to determine that but he should know that he can use the capability when he determines that he needs it.

Senator COHEN. But you would tell the CINC not to put the aircraft carriers up there, in phase I?

Mr. LEHMAN. No. It is really up to him, and, of course, the National Command Authority.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, you can't find a CINC who would ever do that. I haven't. I have had Harry Train in here asking me that very thing, and this chart makes exactly the point I am talking about, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral WATKINS. Senator Nunn, I think maybe I could talk about that during my portion.

Senator NUNN. He said he would not think about doing that.

NORTHERN WEDDING EXERCISE

Admiral WATKINS. I can address that in my presentation.

When we do the Northern Wedding exercise, for example, we essentially do sequential operations to roll back the enemy's defenses. We know how to do that. We know when to make our moves up into those regions. We have to know how effective the SSN surge would be against the Soviet bastion force around the SSBN's. It is very critical to force them back up in there. That is going to be watched very critically.

We will be positioning our forces down south of Iceland initially to rendezvous there and to ensure that we defend Iceland, and we will move those forces early to Norway, including the Marine amphibious brigade, the F-15's and the Canadian forces. If we move them early, move them right on schedule or before, then we have the chance to mount a synergistic effort—which I will illustrate—between Norwegian forces, U.S. forces, U.K. forces in the south, the defensive forces in Iceland—including AWACS, the F-4's and hopefully the F-15's in time—and then the Navy battle group forces.

That is a powerful combination of force to deal with the Soviets and I would like to tell you a little later how we would do that and roll back their defenses.

We are going to pick our time, pick our opportunities to go up there. But we are going to be very aggressive about it.

We think we could do that, but we can't tell you the time. I can't begin to tell you because so much of it surrounds the discussion when you were not here earlier, of early movement of forces and placing them in critical positions so that we have an opportunity to use our F-15's out of Bodo and the Norwegian F-16 aircraft to help us in the sea control mode.

I will show you an exercise where I think we feel fairly comfortable that we know how to move those forces up at the right tempo, so that we do not rush off willy nilly doing something that certainly we are not in actuality going to do. No CINC will do that.

Senator NUNN. Well, I would submit that by the time those carriers in one big group, as one lucrative target, start pulling close to the Soviet ports of crucial interest, if a nuclear war has not started at that stage, it certainly will by then.

Admiral WATKINS. Senator Nunn, one carrier battle group takes up 56,000 square miles. The neighboring one is 250 miles away. He also takes up 56,000 square miles. The other is off in another direction, another 250 miles. This is not a World War II kind of disposition. These dispositions cover an area equivalent to all of central Europe.

So we are not talking about ships that can be taken out with nuclear weapons in some kind of barrage attack. All the studies have shown this thinking to be unsound. The last administration used to talk about them being taken out with nuclear weaponry. It cannot be done, even statistically.

Most of the good analysts will tell you that tactic would be a loser when you have the disposition of forces that we are talking about.

It is not carriers all bunched together.

Senator NUNN. How are you going to attack the Soviet home port without having them close enough to launch your airplanes?

Admiral WATKINS. Again, I would like to put that in the context of sequential rollback of the Soviet defenses, so that we can get to the point where that is possible. That means we must cement Norway, cement Iceland—

Senator NUNN. But I am not talking about rolling back. I am talking about the last part on the chart up there, when you are attacking that home port of the Soviets. Are you going to have them spread so far that you can't even launch and get your planes there?

Admiral WATKINS. Oh, no. By that time we will move those forces forward, Senator. We are going to move them up. We are not going to sit there below Iceland.

Senator NUNN. Well, you just gave us the hypothetical example about them being spread out.

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, you will see that in our exercises, we are now regularly running strikes 1,500 miles from the carrier with the A-6. We have integrated the Air Force into naval operations. So, there is a tremendous amount of flexibility as to where you launch and where you recover.

We think the exercises show that you can do it.


Senator NUNN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have said enough on this. I just would submit that that chart is exactly what we have been hearing.

Mr. LEHMAN. That chart is exactly what I have been saying for 3 years.

Senator NUNN. I agree with that. That is what disturbs me.

GLOBAL WAR

LIFE MUST GO ON IN WARTIME



- VITAL RAW MATERIALS COME FROM OVERSEAS
- POL FROM SWA CRITICAL TO JAPAN/EUROPE

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, one aspect of a global war is that life has to go on. The commerce, the resources, and the economy of our country still are dependent upon commercial sealanes.

So, quite apart from all the planning about resupply of the military, we still have to keep these sealanes moving, just to keep the economy going.

[Slide deleted.]


War termination, which I have already talked to, is shown here, to bring it to a close on our terms.

STRATEGY REFINEMENT AND VALIDATION

Fleet exercises;
Amphibious exercises;
War gaming;
SSG.

Now, I would like to turn the discussion over to the CNO at this point to talk about how we tie strategy in with the fleet exercises and the amphibious exercises that we run year-round. He will discuss war gaming, where we take the experiences from Ocean Venture or Teamwork 80 or whatever, put them into the computer, and run them through with variations. We use the results in both the annual war game and the subsidiary war games. We also have a strategic studies group that we have developed to bring together the operators fresh from the fleet and give them the luxury of spending a year at the war college to contemplate in tranquility the lessons of their recent operations. And it has worked extremely well.

So, Admiral, why don't you take over.



Admiral WATKINS. What we do is take the national strategy, convert it to the maritime strategy under the defense guidance system, and then through our war gaming and through our exercises in real world situations test it on a global basis. We try to formulate not only the programmatic aspects of our budget submission but, more importantly, the strategic and tactical employment of our forces.

So, we can see from all of these events that we in the Navy and Marine Corps are uniquely involved in a wide range of worldwide exercises from which we can extract an awful lot of information that can help us get ready for potential conflict with the Soviets. Certainly our exercises add to our deterrent posture if he sees us as a credible force.

Now, last year we were involved in dozens of exercises, the Navy and Marine Corps, worldwide. These exercises are conducted with our major allies multilaterally and bilaterally, and they involve all kinds of sophisticated operations. I will talk about a few to give you an idea of what we do.

These exercises are extremely important because, unlike any other service the Navy runs eyeball to eyeball with the Soviets daily, either in the air, on the surface or under the water. We share common territory in the international waters of the world.

So, we have a very special opportunity to view first hand the Soviet war fighting capability.

These exercises, then, bring out the Soviets and in many cases the Soviets actually act as our target forces, our orange forces, as we call them. They provide very effective exercise services to our forces because we can really see what we are up against.

This gives us greater confidence as we move into the war scenario events.

Senator COHEN. Do you ever have any suspicion that they may be employing the "Jim Brown technique?" He always used to get up very slowly after getting hit and you never knew whether or not he was hurt. Is there any indication that the Soviets, when they partake in surveillance of some of our activities are only showing you half or a quarter of what they have?

Admiral WATKINS. No, sir. [Deleted.]

So we have enough feedback from our intelligence network today to know exactly how we are doing relative to them, and that scenario that you just ran through is not applicable to the Soviet mentality.

[Slide deleted.]

WAR GAMING

War gaming, then, is one of the critical test beds that we use to check our maritime strategy.

As Chester Nimitz indicated after World War II, he never conducted a campaign in the Pacific that he had not already run in a war game. I think that is a very good lesson for all of us to take aboard. We have the sophistication in the war gaming centers today to be able to play very sophisticated games and test our contingency plans and give us a base knowledge. This precludes a newly appointed commander coming to command of a fleet and doing something with that cherished group of resources that has already been proven wrong.

So, the war gaming center is not only a way to test our plans, but it also serves as a data base for lessons learned.

We don't allow any exercise to take place at sea today that we have not war gamed. And now, with the \$18 million war game center at Newport, linked to the fleets at Norfolk, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor, and closely controlled by the naval postgraduate school software center, we can begin really to work these combined parts. Remember, we are talking not just about the Navy data base, but we are talking about employing the McClintock model that comes out of the Air War College and the Army War College data base as well.

So, because we have combined services represented at each of our war colleges, we are now coupled together in a much more synergistic way running these tests.

We fight every war with all forces and if it is a scenario in Central Europe, then, of course, what we try to do is maximize the leverage of the maritime strategy in countering the Soviet strategy and affecting the outcome of the war in Central Europe. We have been very effective, I think.

Senator COHEN. Has there been any compromise in those war gaming operations with the Norwegian spy?

Admiral WATKINS. To our knowledge, at this point, no, sir. But I have no idea of the depth to which he was involved in the military operations. Obviously we are very concerned about it.

But war gaming is a temporary thing. It is timely for today. What we war game next year may be just a little bit different.

[Deleted.]

ARCTIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

For example, we have run over the past 2 years a number of war games focusing on arctic antisubmarine warfare. [Deleted.]

This we know is their strategy.

How do we know it? [Deleted.]

Now you can say that perhaps it is a cover, a deception technique [deleted].

Again, you have to understand [deleted].

So we are ready to move in a flexible way [deleted].

So we are doing lots of work up there to see the degree to which naval forces can make a difference in the outcome of a conflict in Central Europe, [deleted].

We also can play with penetration aids. These are very important.

[Deleted.]

Now we have done that, and that is why we are putting more dollars in electronics of all kinds. [Deleted.]

We can test all those in the war games and it gives us additional confidence that our budget is properly balanced.

U.S. NAVY MAJOR EXERCISES FY83



What I have here is a series of exercises. You won't be able to read this side over here [indicating], but don't worry about it. I am going to go through about six exercises of the major types that we run, that we have run in the past 15 months, and I will bring you right up to date with the current exercises and talk a little bit about them, because it gets into the areas that Senator Nunn brought up.

In each of the exercises, I have tried to list the main events, the objective of the exercises, and the lessons learned. Then I will talk about how they impact upon our budget decision.

Because this is so far away from your sight, let me talk from my notes.

[Slides deleted.]

This is Northern Wedding 82. There are 160 ships involved, 250 aircraft, 10 nations, a carrier battle group, air force in Norway, and so forth. I will go through the scenario.

The idea was initially, just before Northern Wedding exercise itself, to protect the Reforger resupply lines to Central Europe. We had six merchants going that way, and we defend them up along the Portuguese coast, France, and the Benelux ports.

AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE

So I am going to talk about the next part of the exercise, which is the amphibious task force landing at Jutland, and how we dealt with rolling back the Soviet air defenses during that exercise.

We optimized the various sensors that we had when we went into this position of the exercise to see if we could defeat our B-52's who were acting as Bear aircraft. As you know, B-52 radar is very much like Big Bulge radar on the Soviet Bear. So we could use them very nicely. We used jammers, including the EA-6B Prowler jammer, the super RBOC, the rapid blooming chaff off the ship, and for the first time we used rapid blooming chaff dropped in canisters from S-3 aircraft. It worked very effectively.

Now, we saw Soviets as well as our own B-52's. We had 102 Soviet sorties against this force, so we had plenty of exercise activity from the Soviets as well. We know they did not overfly our forces. We escorted them all the time.

Were we giving our tactics away? Well, maybe so. That is a problem we always have, of giving away some of our tactical procedures early. But it is still going to be very hard with their sensors whether they know we are going to use deception or not, and they think we will do it. They have for years. They know we are going to try to deceive them by these kinds of techniques.

The point is that they did not make any approaches on us that we did not intercept outside 200 miles, and they never did find the carrier because of the techniques we used.

[Deleted.]

TECHNOLOGY LEAKS

Senator COHEN. Admiral, may I interrupt you for a moment?

In view of the technology leak that we have in this country going to the Soviet Union, is there any reason to believe or not to believe that if we had a wartime situation they would not employ similar techniques against us?

Admiral WATKINS. They will employ similar techniques. We know, in fact, from our intelligence sources, that they have a setting for wartime and a setting for peacetime in many of their electronic systems, including radar. Their radars will shift to a different frequency, they will shift to different modes of operation, and we are going to have to be ready in our systems to shift with them.

Senator COHEN. What about their dropping of chaff or their dropping of acoustic devices?

Admiral WATKINS. We have watched them with their acoustic devices and chaff all the time. I will talk about one in which they utilized extensive chaff corridors in one of the operations off the Aleutians. We are very familiar with their techniques and we know how to deal with them. In fact, we have counter signal. [Deleted.]

So, there is a constant concern on their part that we are riding close behind them on all of their techniques.

Again, uniquely, the naval forces, due to our operating right next to each other, eyeball to eyeball every day of the year, we can, you might say, give away each other's tactics.

Now, some things we try to protect very carefully, obviously. Some of our electronics we do not use when the Soviets are around. There are some very select jewels in our crown that are protected very carefully.

Senator COHEN. Do they not have the same jewels they want to protect from you?

Admiral WATKINS. Of course, of course. That is why we have to be very wary. We have designed our systems to be flexible recognizing that we are going to have to shift modes, to be able to reprogram the various programmable systems, to be able to counter them. We think we can do that.

In fact, when they have changed modes and we caught them doing this, particularly in submarine surveillance, when they don't know we are there, we can then put that in our system and be ready to shift gears ourselves.

So I believe that we have some very unique sources that keep us pretty well on top of it. Special intelligence tells us that we are really making headway on them in this area.

The important part of this exercise, though, was the defense in depth—with respect to Senator Nunn's comment.

We had Norway, here, cemented. We had the marines there. We had the F-15's at Bodo, Norway. We were then able, with our defenses secured in Iceland, to bring the battle group up here [indicating], and when we brought the battle group up to protect the amphibious task force. Making one of the largest landings we have ever made at Jutland, we began to get this large volume of Soviet air coming down including Badgers and Bear aircraft.

We knew we would get that, so we positioned our forces, in a unique way, because we wanted to test our ability to pass sequentially the target aircraft to the various controllers in our layered defense and get many constructive kills before the Soviet aircraft got down into the area.

We had the *South Carolina* up here [indicating] in [Emcon] emission control for some time, and no Soviets picked it up, and we know that. So it was sitting there.

The Norwegian F-16's were put under the positive control of the *South Carolina* and were then making intercepts on Soviet aircraft out to 167 to 200 miles.

The next tier, then, were the F-15's out of Bodo, which checked in with the NATO AWACS. They were transitioned from the *South Carolina* to the NATO AWACS and brought to intercept the Bears.

Then we had F-4's working with the Air Force AWACS out of Iceland making the next intercept.

Then we had NATO AWACS making intercepts out of the United Kingdom with F-4's, and then our own E-2C organic to the carrier picked it up from the AWACS and intercepted it with the F-14's—all between 250 and 1,000 miles from the carrier.

So, if we can cement these regions, and if we can operate air out of Norway and Iceland and the United Kingdom and our forces here, synergistically we will have a very powerful mechanism to rollback.

Now, obviously, you could say the *South Carolina* is vulnerable out there. We know that. We probably would not position her there without a lot of concern about it. But we wanted to see if she could get up there in a total Emcon against the Soviets and not be detected. She was not detected.

So, it is kind of interesting for us to watch some of the real world events taking place.

These give us a lot of lessons, both strategically and tactically, that we feed back into our data base.

The Norwegians for the first time allowed these F-15's to fly against the Soviets. Heretofore, it had been against their national policy to allow any of their land-based air to go out against the Soviet Union. It was a very important operation.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, if I may ask one question, was there anything that tested the concept in the exercise, as shown on the chart, that we were discussing a while ago, of taking way beyond the *South Carolina* and turning the bend and going up right next to the Soviet homeland? What did you do to test that? To me it sounds like you are talking about two different scenarios altogether.

Admiral WATKINS. Well, we have one underway today. Teamwork 84 lands a Marine brigade at Tromsø, in northern Norway, almost on the border with the Soviet Union. Today the Soviets have [deleted] nuclear submarines surrounding the battle group up there. The battle group is up supporting the marine landing.

[Deleted.]

So, what we are doing is exercising that final phase that perhaps you need to project power ashore with marines somewhere in cold weather. We are not necessarily saying that is in anybody's scenario. But I think it is very important that we run that operation, and it is very important that we find out what the Soviet response is.

Senator NUNN. Again, that is not the same scenario or exactly the same location that you'd have if you were going after the Soviet home ports. I am talking about two different things. I'm not talking about protecting the marines. Anybody who says I am not for protecting the amphibious forces is totally misreading what I am saying. I am talking about carrying the battle to the Soviet homeland and basically using the carrier task force to go after the Soviet home ports.

I have seen nothing in anything of these scenarios to indicate to me that you have tested that at all.

Admiral WATKINS. Well, we don't test it by flying into the Soviet Union, Senator. We test it all of the time, though, just as the Soviets do with us in the Caspian.

Every operation we have run we gear our land mass to perhaps a Soviet site. For example, we may run a Crimean scenario in the Caribbean.

You may not see that, but we simulate running strikes into the Crimea, low level strikes across the Black Sea using AWACS and F-15's and naval forces.

We know how to do that.

Would we do that at the front end of a conflict? Maybe we would. In the Northwest Pacific our feeling is that at the very front end of conflict, if we are swift enough on our feet, we would move rapidly into an attack on Alekseyevka, and we think we could get away with it, because we know what the Soviet real capability is.

They are not 10 feet tall, but there are a lot of them about 5 feet 10. We know where those weaknesses are up in Alekseyevka today. So we might put a carrier strike in there along with the Air Force. We know how to do that. We test that with the Air Force.

We did an exercise that I will talk about later on.

But I would not preclude an opportunity to go in and clobber the Soviets at the right time and the right place. Whether northern Norway access is going to be available is another matter. But we need to be ready to do that, and perhaps not there, but in the Crimea and in the Northwest Pacific. It is a very real opportunity up there for us to make a difference.

[Slide deleted.]

Senator NUNN. But, as I understand it, you are saying that it is very unlikely in this area?

Admiral WATKINS. I think it is unlikely at a very early state, and I just don't think any of our unified commanders at this point see it as anything but a very carefully planned and coordinated rollback operation with heavy SSN to SSN combat in the upper Norwegian Sea. That is where the action is going to be in the early stages. Would the attrition be how well would we do against the surface ships. If we can eliminate the bulk of the surface ships and submarines in the northern fleet, which is our objective then the Soviets will have a heck of a problem with their land-based air as the only real mechanism remaining to deal with us.

TESTING AGAINST BACKFIRES

Senator NUNN. Did you mention the Backfires? Were you testing against Backfires?

Admiral WATKINS. We did in this slide. This was the only time we had Backfires fly out against us. But you will see, probably in a few days, the Soviets using Backfires for the first time against our carrier battle group because of where we were located, which was at the very tip of Norway, right at the top of the northern end of Norway.

They are forward deploying those Backfires today to the cape, and I expect they will fly out for the first time over our forces here in a few days. We are expecting them to come out and we hope they do. We want to intercept all their communications, their radar, and all of the things they do to target us. When we can tell that, then we know how effective we have been, and that might tell us now is the time to strike.

So, I would not rule out anything in the early stages. But I am telling you the normal scenario in the Northern Atlantic-Norwegian Sea is characterized by aggressiveness, and also care, in selecting our timing for moving those forces up into the region. It is very well planned, in my opinion, with SSN's being up there before the conflict starts.

We are working on that today. You may not see it, but in time you will see surge deployments of SSN's worldwide. We are getting into it again.

We just surged out of one port. This month we will surge out of two ports, Hawaii and San Diego. Later on in the year we are going to surge in all ports, and that would be something that we will discuss with the National Command Authority and possibly with the President, to see if we need to alert the Soviet Union that we are doing that, because we have not done it for about 30 years.

So, we know how to surge, and this may be the tool in the President's kit bag 30 days or so, 10 days, before a conflict starts. At least he can do that because that is not provocative. You know, get your SSN's on the way.

Senator NUNN. I agree with you on the SSN's completely.

Admiral WATKINS. They will have a very powerful impact in the northern fleet and up in the sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Bering Sea.

This exercise last year was one of the best exercises that we have run with the Air Force. We had 30 F-15's, AWACS and KC-10 tankers, working together with three battle groups.

The *Enterprise* battle group was returning from WESTPAC. We brought the *Midway* out of Japan. We were deploying *Coral Sea* to the Western Pacific. We rendezvoused up here [indicating] and we tested our ability with the Air Force to coordinate strikes at Petrovlosk or Alekseyevka.

One of the important elements of this exercise was to test our ability to detect and kill the *Victor III*. It was also to test our ability to operate in terrible weather. It was zero degrees up there the whole time, with 50 to 70 knots of wind. We couldn't even fly off the small deck carriers. We could only fly off *Enterprise* at certain times. And, if we hadn't had our Air Force KC-10 tankers on two occasions, we'd have mixed up the wings by having *Midway* and *Coral Sea* aircraft forced to go to *Enterprise* instead of to a divert field.

AWACS were controlling F-14's, surface ships were controlling F-15's, we had total integration, and this was one of our objectives in the Navy-Air Force memorandum of agreement signed by General Gabriel and me. We intend to pursue aggressively this land-based, tactical air and support maritime operation. We are doing that worldwide now in all exercises.

It has extended our ability to project our combat air patrol another 300 miles forward. This is very, very useful in areas where we can be reached by a land-based tanker. Of course, this is a very aggressive operation, and our AWACS aircraft link with Navy units when they can't link at all with Air Force units. The Air Force has not gone into data exchange, and we have. So the AWACS controllers love to work with our F-14's.

LESSONS LEARNED ON NORTHERN WEDDING

Senator COHEN. Did you cover the lessons learned in Northern Wedding?

Admiral WATKINS. The Northern Wedding lessons learned were primarily in a certain area.

Senator COHEN. Excuse me, the one question I had was on the Nimrod.

Admiral WATKINS. Nimrods were very effective in Northern Wedding. The Searchwater radar was the sensor that detected every one of the snorkels from the NATO diesel submarines that were out there. We had six NATO diesels out there, and every one was conclusively killed before the carrier battle group got to the GIUK gap.

So, it was an extremely effective sensor.

Now, we have the new radar that is going into the P-3 being tested today at Pax River. It is very much like the Searchwater. It is compatible with the P-3 system. Its initial operational capability [IOC] will be 86. And we are accelerating that as a result of some of the lessons learned on Searchwater performance, which has been impressive, particularly in the imaging area. It was very effective. Most of the others were mentioned in the discussion in terms of the tactical lessons learned.

The lessons learned here were that we had misjudged the absolute sound and pressure levels of the Soviet *Victor III*. We had made an estimating error, and found that they were quieter than we had thought.

This required all of our forces, and we had six SSN's on our side, to be in direct support of the three carrier battle groups, along with surface towed arrays and land-based maritime patrol aircraft [MPA]. We had LAMPS MK-1 helicopters on Canadian oilers. We had a whole range of forces being brought to bear in the antisubmarine warfare area just to work over the *Victor III*'s that they sent out after us. We learned that they are very hard to find.

But, what we also learned was that where we had the towed array that covers the low frequency band it was effective every time.

So, we had one sensor that was effective in detecting the *Victor III*. What does this tell us? The lesson learned is if it gets hot, is very successful, then we need to get the low frequency end developed and accelerate its introduction into the fleet.

Now we are working on that. We have put extra dollars into the low frequency end so that we can go after the propeller blade rates and the other things we have to get on a quiet submarine.

So, that was one of the lessons learned out of the operation. Also, many lessons were learned in terms of cold weather operations.

Senator COHEN. Do those same lessons apply, say, to the Mediterranean or off the coast of Lebanon? Do you have a difference in water temperature which interferes with that kind of detection?

Admiral WATKINS. Oh, very significantly. Every place is different.

The [deleted] will, in the process of selling a ship, like the [deleted] class, take a customer out on a sonar run in an excellent area sonarwise. When the customer, say [deleted] buys that ship, and

takes it home, they can only get about one-tenth the range that was experienced in the test sonar run. The customers get upset, but actually sonar ranges are quite predictable. The ranges vary all over the map—passive and active. The Mediterranean is extremely noisy, the North Atlantic in some areas where there is heavy traffic is extremely noisy, the marginal ice zone is extremely noisy, and yet, under the ice it is very quiet.

So, we have to go into every single spectrum. We have excellent sensors to give us the information. We are actually building new sensors, called the Navy Oceanographic Surveillance Satellite, to go airborne and help us find those areas of the world, not only to hide in but also to better detect the Soviet submarines. That is another lesson learned.

We are seeing how important real-time data on the environment is. We can't have the information next month, that is, what it was a month ago. We have to know it today, to be able to hide in it and to be able to exploit it in terms of antisubmarine warfare.

All these things we have learned.

[Slide deleted.]

By the way, this is the first time we have been off the Aleutians since World War II. It is very important that we get back up there. It is part of the new, and rejuvenated, Pacific Basin strategy of the Unified Commander. Let's get back into the Aleutians and demonstrate to the Soviet Union that they don't have a free ride and divert their attention away from Japan which has been so intense of late. They are going to worry a lot more about looking east instead of south to Japan. We can make a difference. Kamchatka is a difficult peninsula. They have no railroads to it. They have to resupply it by air. It is a very important spot for them, and they are as naked as a jaybird there, and they know it.

[Deleted.]

[Slide deleted.]

United Effort was a major transit exercise across the ocean. Again, we were trying to defeat the Soviet ocean surveillance system.

This is a bone of contention between Jim Gracey of the Coast Guard and myself. He keeps thinking that he is going to get blown out of the water because he is a simulated carrier, but he has agreed that that is a good role for them to play. [General laughter.]

The integrated intelligence analysis system was put in the United Kingdom. This is the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center which receives real time downlink information from our satellites. That proved to be extremely successful and gave us some clues as to how we could accelerate the intelligence input into our carrier battle group.

We had cover and deception throughout the exercise, and not once did we allow any of the Soviet or our own orange aircraft to get in on us undetected. They were not able to target us because of the same systems that we used.

We used the 4 Whiskey formation nominally 56,000 square miles inside that one battle group, nominally, in that area. I will talk a little bit more about that later because it is a very important concept.

[Deleted.]

[Slide deleted.]

READEX 2-83 was a very special exercise in which we prepared *Independence* and *JFK* carrier battle groups for operation in the eastern Mediterranean.

Because things were heating up over there, our scenario then was built around the concept of using the Puerto Rican island of Vieques and the Dominican Republic here—this is really west—for running a scenario involving Damascus and Lebanon. Crises building up there could degenerate into conflict with the Soviet Union.

We do this rather religiously. We pick out where Tel Aviv, Haifa, Damascus, where those sites are, Nicosia and so forth are, and we run operations, escalating the scenario with more and more conflict as time goes on in order to better prepare our ships.

This is a very important exercise because many of the features that were in this plan that we exercised on in the Caribbean were actually seen by both of the battle groups when they actually had to put in aircraft over the beach.

We know all of the electronic warfare order of battle. We know the forces. We know where the radars are. We know what the threats are, and so we were able to do our strike work, do our planning, and so forth, in a very realistic way in this sort of picture.

That is how we run our exercises. I pointed out that it was rather unique.

In addition, in this particular one, we fired Harpoons, seven Harpoons, seven hits against a hull. For the first time, we had an integrated strike of Shrike, Harpoon, and Standard ARM that all hit the target at the same time, which is in the scenario of our standard operating procedure for running coordinated strikes against ships.

Now the next slide, and we are closing it out here, is the real world.

[Slide deleted.]

REAL WORLD SITUATIONS

The real world situation is also every bit as important for us as exercises. The real world would include Grenada, Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Falkland Islands. From the Falkland Islands experience we accelerated our electronic warfare assistance because we saw how easy it was to use some of the low cost systems to ensure that our fleet was not put at risk. As a result of the Falklands conflict we accelerated our mine countermeasures ship program. We have to ensure that we have the capability to move quickly into the region with adequate airborne and surface mine countermeasures systems.

The point defense system was probably the biggest lesson learned. We put \$167 million into accelerating delivery to the fleet of our close-in weapons support system. This, by the way, was almost \$500 million [indicating] of refocused resources to move into a whole variety of electronic warfare systems.

In Lebanon we have just purchased decoys and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's) from the Israelis. We are not as proficient today as we were in Vietnam. We have to get back into the business, and perhaps we can avoid employing our TARPS aircraft in Third

World regions where the RPV can go in and survey, and send back signals as to what to bomb, what the damage assessment might be, for example.

On the tactical reconnaissance pod, we learned how to use our TARP missions very effectively over there, and we will be making certain recommendations and changes in our program to optimize our ability to do standoff reconnaissance. For example, optical standoff reconnaissance equipment is now being accelerated in research and development.

Ship/shore intelligence fusion: we found that we could provide the marines with a lot more offshore sensor information by taking information from a warship and patching it into the short-range intelligence network. We are doing that more and more now. In fact, we were doing that with the current intelligence that came out of Lebanon.

In the future, we will be able to fuse to the marines condensed information so they don't have to sift through the volume of data that is more chaff than wheat.

We learned a most important lesson about rules of engagement in Lebanon, and that was, get aggressive with your rules of engagement so you don't take the first hit from "crazies."

We are doing that now there and in the Persian Gulf. I think that is a major step forward for the President to allow us to do that, so that we give the commander on the ground some feeling that he does not have to take a kamikaze attack before he brings down that kamikaze.

That is a very delicate balance, so that we don't end up with a KAL-007-type problem on our hands.

Senator COHEN. Or a Czechoslovakian airlines.

Admiral WATKINS. Exactly.

But the way that is handled, of course, is that we announce through demarches to the nation that is making the threat, and to the world that in this region, around American ships, we have these rules, and to stand clear, to come up on guard frequency, talk to us, don't come charging at us from 2,000 feet and 5 miles away and expect not to get a bunch of tracers shot across your bow. And if you come much closer than that, you are going to be brought down.

That is the game we are playing in the gulf and eastern Mediterranean. We will raise those rules elsewhere in the world as necessary to respond to irresponsible nations who are using this as their mechanism to get the United States.

In Grenada, we have a working group convened now to compile all of the lessons learned. One of the quick lessons learned was to give our SEALs \$5 million. We had no idea that their equipment was not completely up to snuff. The system does not protect the SEALs well enough.

We have completely revamped our organization structure and brought decisions concerning the SEALs up to my level. All they needed was \$5 million to put them in 4-O shape. They had engines that had broken down during their operations and that sort of thing, which was really devastating to the operation. We can fix that quickly. That was a lesson learned. This means that we can get photographs from overhead, transmit them to the shore system,

back to the carrier, and they can actually use them for targeting. It is a very, very effective system. We will be able to use that information for targeting today. It is very important in a strike mission and is a very effective system, so we are accelerating its development.

[Slide deleted.]

NAVAL STRATEGY

The last slide is a summary of our naval strategy, the end result being war termination without use of nuclear weapons. A large portion of that derives from our maritime strategy which says there is an opportunity to provide the President with a nonnuclear option to put at risk their nuclear force. Whether you use it, under what circumstances, how you play that game, all is another matter. But we are very conscious of the fact that we can make a difference in the outcome of war without the use of nuclear weapons.

We understand their weaknesses. We know what they are, and we go for them. We go for the jugular on those weaknesses.

It is an aggressive operation vice defensive. We talk about defensive, but that is the national posture. Our feeling is that an aggressive defense, if you will, characterized by forward movement, early deployment of forces, aggressiveness on the part of our ships, is the greatest deterrent that we can have. And the Soviets really understand that. We can get their attention with that concept.

The forward areas on all three flanks of the homeland are extremely important. They are every bit as important to the Soviet Union as Central Europe. That is extremely important to know. They are going to continue to put one-third of their entire military in Northeast Asia, where they have them today—and this is a very fine military force. The best and the largest of their fleets are in the Northeast Asian area and Northwest Pacific.

Our operations are going to be sequential. We are going to perform traditional naval missions in addition to the global war strategy. This takes in all levels of conflict we see in the world today, and we have to have the capability to deal with those.

But we have some shortfalls in our strategy, and those are covered in the next slide.

[Slide deleted.]

This is critical to us and it is paying off more every day, what the Congress has done to help us get our feet back on the ground. We need the new design SSN to be able to continue to outdo the Soviets who, as I said, have 15 SSN's and SSGN's surrounding the battlegroup today as we conduct the amphibious landing up in northern Norway. We know how to get inside there and find them, trail them, and kill them. But we cannot keep doing that forever without getting into the next generation of SSN. The new design surface combatant, the DDG-51 with vertical launched Tomahawk, will be able to strike ashore and improve our power at sea. It provides a tremendous capability in anti-air warfare and suitable capability in other areas to support the forces that she will be serving with; underway replenishment groups, surface action groups, and amphibious support as well as carrier battlegroup support.

We have upgraded our medium attack aircraft, the A-6E/F. It is very important to get into the modern age, to get the commonality, to get the digital systems such as we have on the F-18 transition over here.

[Deleted.]

The towed arrays, an SQR-19's, are extremely important. I talked about those. I would accelerate the low frequency end of that array, which is critical as the Soviets get quieter.

STANDOFF WEAPONS

Everything we see drives us toward more standoff weaponry. We can have survivable aircraft if we can standoff, but we don't have to have excessive range to standoff. We know how to work the tactics, providing we don't have to go right in overhead a la World War II.

The Air Force and allied AAW support is extremely important. We have an aggressive program worldwide, and we are going to be great supporters of AWACS, land-based tankers, and our interface with the F-15 and F-16 in a land battle. We are going to be in the same area, the littoral nations, and we are working very closely with them to insure that we have the best possible operational interface.

And we have C³ interoperability with not only our sister services, but all allies, but it is not good enough yet. We need to improve that. We have a lot of resources devoted to that.

I personally am trying to help our allies and encourage them to improve their C³ interoperability. That is critical. I have just sent some equipment to Japan to help do that.

Senator COHEN. Admiral, thank you very much for that overview, and Secretary Lehman, thank you very much.

I will take about a 10-minute break. Otherwise I will have a shortfall on constituent support back home. I have some people who have been waiting outside for me for half an hour. I will take about 10 minutes. Then I would like to go into another level of classification, to perhaps address a couple of questions to Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins.

We will stand in recess for about 10 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

[An off-the-record compartmentalized briefing followed:]

Senator COHEN. Gentlemen, thank you all very much for your appearance here today and for your briefing.

[Subsequent to the hearing, the following questions were submitted to the witnesses to be answered for the hearing record:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS

E-2C

Senator QUAYLE. As I understand it, one of the top priorities of our naval strategy is to protect the U.S. fleet from Soviet Backfire bombers and cruise missiles. Are you comfortable with the Navy's current capabilities for surveillance and early warning to the fleet?

Admiral WATKINS. Soviet Backfire bombers and cruise missiles constitute a threat which our forces must be able to counter successfully in order to carry out assigned missions. Current surveillance systems support fleet long range early warning re-

quirements to counter Badger and Backfire bombers and cruise missiles. There are various wide area surveillance and warning sensors available to the fleet, including national sensors and USAF and NATO land assets. When combined with organic battle group assets, they provide sufficient depth in wide area surveillance and warning to the fleet.

Senator QUAYLE. How does the E-2C aircraft fit into your mission of early warning against cruise missiles and hostile aircraft?

Admiral WATKINS. We use the E-2C to provide long range detections and electronic signals intercept of both air and surface launch platforms and anti-ship cruise missiles beyond the battle group's surface radar horizon. The E-2C's early warning capabilities are used with other horizon extension systems such as the EA-3B, the EP-3, land based USAF and NATO E-3A AWACS aircraft and the surface picket units, to provide an integrated and well balanced fleet early warning system.

We also use the E-2C to vector fighter interceptors and coordinate employment of countermeasures against hostile aircraft at the extreme reaches of the outer air battle and direct strikes against surface cruise missile capable ships before they are able to launch their missiles. Once anti-ship cruise missiles are launched from either air or surface platforms, the E-2C can detect and track threats beyond the surface radar horizon and provide track information to other units which would concentrate surface to air missiles against the threat.

Senator QUAYLE. I understand that the E-2C is the Navy's only carrier-based early warning aircraft in the inventory. Do you have plans to expand the existing fleet of E-2C's and expand their use as our fleet becomes more and more vulnerable to Soviet cruise missiles?

Admiral WATKINS. First, I would take issue with the statement that "our fleet becomes more and more vulnerable to Soviet cruise missiles". As I indicated above, we are continuing to improve our wide area surveillance systems in order to detect cruise missile launch platforms at longer ranges. We have a series of improvements across the spectrum of detection, targeting, destruction, and deception which allows us to keep pace with or exceed the pace of Soviet cruise missile developments. Regarding the E-2C, we plan to procure sufficient E-2C aircraft to achieve an all E-2C force by 1988. We have 74 E-2C's now and need a force level of 100 to equip fourteen fleet squadrons, two training squadrons, and two reserve squadrons. We have completed an Air Wing Composition Study and are considering expansion of the existing four plane E-2C squadron to five planes to provide the air wing with greater surveillance and multiple mission assignment capability. We expect to address this plan in the FY 1986 budget.

E-2C EARLY WARNING INVENTORY

Senator QUAYLE. I understand that the E-2C is the Navy's only carrier-based early warning aircraft in the inventory. Do you have plans to expand the existing fleet of E-2C's and expand their use as our fleet becomes more vulnerable to Soviet missiles?

Admiral WATKINS. The Navy's stated objective is to procure [deleted] E-2C aircraft and to achieve an all E-2C force by 1988. This will provide E-2C's for 14 fleet squadrons, 2 training squadrons, and the Navy's two reserve E-2 squadrons. The Navy has recently completed an Air Wing Composition Study which recommends the present 4 plane E-2C squadron expand to 5 planes. The fifth E-2C provides [deleted]. The procurement implications of this study will be addressed in the fiscal year 1986 budget. While the E-2C is the Navy's only Early Warning Aircraft, planned improvements to its weapon system and engine will ensure that it remains capable of countering the projected threat through the 1990's.

U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY

Senator QUAYLE. How satisfied are you today with the Navy's ability to support U.S. forces in keeping open the Strait of Hormuz? Do you see any major limitations on the U.S. being able to respond effectively?

Admiral WATKINS. [Deleted.]

SOVIET NAVAL THREAT

Senator QUAYLE. What would you characterize as the two or three most significant developments in the Soviet navy over the last decade? What new threats out into the future pose the most serious threats to our fleet?

Admiral WATKINS. The three most significant developments of the past decade are:

Long-range, submarine launched ballistic missiles armed with MIRV's aboard DELTA and TYPHOON Class SSBN's.

[Deleted] submarines—*Typhoon*, *Oscar*, *Mike* and *Sierra*—which are [deleted] and [deleted] than their predecessors.

Improvements in fleet air defense, including the deployment of long range, area AAW missile systems and Forger VTOL aircraft aboard *Kiev* Class carriers.

In the future, we anticipate the most serious new threats will be in the area of Undersea Warfare. Soviet efforts to quiet their submarines will continue and could result in erosion of our acoustic advantage. Additionally, Soviet ASW improvements in platforms, sensors and tactics could further diminish our advantage.

The use of space for surveillance and command and control. Improved systems and better networking will provide real-time locating and targeting data to major naval forces and provide Moscow the means to coordinate closely the employment of their forces.

Sea-based air power. The Soviets are building their first conventional take-off and landing aircraft carrier. It will embark modern, high performance aircraft, capable of carrying out offensive and defensive missions much more effectively than the current Forger VTOL.

ALPHA CLASS SUBMARINE THREAT

Senator QUAYLE. Much has been made of the new Soviet *Alpha*-class sub and its titanium hull. I know Jack Anderson has written that the sub is "one of the noisiest vessels ever to churn the ocean". Still, I am told the sub may be able to dive deeper and run faster than some of our subs. Can you give us your assessment of the threat posed by the *Alpha*-class ship and what we are doing to counter it?

Admiral WATKINS. The Soviet *Alpha* Class submarine enjoys speed and depth advantages over our SSN's, but these advantages are offset by the high acoustic noise level it generates and the inefficiency of its sensors at high speed. It is a fast, deep diving, special purpose submarine that does not have sufficient warfighting capability for a long duration engagement. Although we possess the technology to build submarines capable of very high speeds, we have emphasized the tactical advantage of stealth and devoted considerable technical efforts to quieting. Our modern SSN 688 is designed for covertness, endurance, mobility and reliability and is tactically superior to the *Alpha*. Our Improved SSN 688 Class builds on this superiority and will maintain it through the 1990's with improvements in quieting and warfighting capabilities designed to counter Soviet advances in quieting, sensors and weapons. These Soviet advances are more disturbing than the *Alpha*'s speed and depth advantages and dictate the development of our new Design SSN to maintain our superiority in the decade beginning 1995.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY HON. JOHN LEHMAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; AND ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

CARRIER AIRCRAFT STUDY

Senator NUNN. Do you expect to operate multiple-carrier battle groups in which the carriers would have different aircraft loadings? What is the underlying philosophy, and how far can such specialization be carried?

Secretary LEHMAN. We already operate multi-carrier battle groups in which carrier air wings (CVW's) with different compositions are embarked. USS CORAL SEA and USS MIDWAY carry F-4's since they can't accommodate F-14 aircraft. We sometimes structure CVW's for specific missions and threat scenarios and some CVW's transition as a new type of aircraft is introduced. We need to continually refine the composition and employment of CVBG's and CVW's for the different missions and threat scenarios we may face. Specialized CVW's have advantages and we are learning effectiveness and cost implications by deploying them. We're not sure exactly how far specialization can be taken and still increase effectiveness. We will continue to employ different aircraft mixes to see whether certain changes would enhance our capabilities.

GRENADA—LESSONS LEARNED

Senator NUNN. The Navy did an excellent job in studying the experiences of the United Kingdom in the Falklands and preparing an extensive document and presentation on the "Lessons of the Falklands." I am just wondering if the Navy is prepar-

ing any similar document on the "Lessons of Grenada" which our forces were directly involved in. In particular, I am interested in how the various service components worked together and the relationship of the JCS to the planning done at CINCLANT, a major naval command. I am also interested in the intelligence aspects. Is the Navy doing any formal analysis of Grenada and when can the committee expect any formal written "lessons learned?"

Secretary LEHMAN. We are analyzing Operation Urgent Fury to develop Lessons Learned which may be useful in improving the capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. We intend to publish a formal, classified report in early summer of this year and will forward a copy of the Navy report for your review.

CARRIER AIRCRAFT STUDY

Senator NUNN. The Navy is experimenting with several new aircraft mixes on various carriers. Would you supply for the record the following information.

What are the objectives or hypotheses being tested in each variant?

What information or data will be evaluated?

When will the evaluation be completed?

Secretary LEHMAN. We are attempting to determine which carrier air wing (CVW) mix of aircraft will provide the optimum flexibility and capability for different missions and threat scenarios. We are gathering operational data, including mission effectiveness in each of the primary warfare areas, as well as maintenance and availability rates. For instance, we are examining the effectiveness of a CVW with just medium attack aircraft (A-6) for strike missions. Other CVW's will test various mixes of strike fighters (F/A-18) and air superiority fighters (F-14). This process is part of a continuing evolution to have the most capable force at sea to meet ever-changing commitments and threats, while at the same time finding the lowest cost ways to deploy an effective air wing.

SUBMARINE PROGRAM

Senator NUNN. In terms of reaching the Navy goal of 100 attack submarines, what difference does it make as to whether three or four 688's are funded in fiscal year 1985 and in the next few years ahead.

Admiral WATKINS. We cannot achieve and maintain a force level of 100 first line nuclear attack submarines if only three SSNs per year are authorized. At least 100 SSNs are needed to give us reasonable assurance that we could prevail in conflict with the Soviets.

I would also like to point out that the Improved 688s requested in fiscal year 1985 are far more capable than our earlier SSNs. Since we would rely on our qualitative advantage in any conflict with the Soviets, it is crucial that our SSN force include as many of these highly capable ships as possible.

Senator NUNN. Will the 688's now being requested be capable of meeting the Soviet threat and could you briefly describe any planned component improvements?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes sir. The improved SSN 688s will have a clear advantage over any submarine or surface threat introduced by the Soviets in the next ten years and should be highly effective against the Soviets for the rest of the century.

The improved SSN 688 will be far more effective in mission performance than older SSN 688s because of quieting modifications and increases in sensor and weapons capabilities. Major improvements include:

[Deleted.]

Vertical launch system [deleted].

Arctic modifications [deleted].

Mining modifications [deleted].

Sensor and combat system upgrades including an advanced sonar and combat system (SUBACS).

Senator NUNN. Will all four of the submarines in this budget be the improved version of the 688?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes sir.

Senator NUNN. Discuss some of the older classes of U.S. attack submarines which will be only marginally capable of meeting the threat of the 1990's.

Admiral WATKINS. In the year 1990, we will still have in service over 50 attack submarines built prior to the introduction of the *Los Angeles* class. While these ships will be fully capable of opposing the 1960's and early 1970's vintage Soviet submarines, they will be only marginally capable of opposing Soviet attack submarines introduced since the mid-70's.

In the last ten years the Soviets have developed twelve new classes of submarines. Between the introductions of the *Los Angeles* Class in 1976 and our New Design

Attack Submarine in 1995, the Soviets will put fourteen new classes of attack submarines to sea. Each of these classes will incorporate new capabilities thus making our older ships less capable of opposing the Soviet fleet. Quite clearly, the rate at which the Soviet attack submarine force is being modernized is unprecedented and represents a growing threat to our maritime superiority.

For this reason, the Improved 688 is vital to our interests. Each Improved 688 will give us a significantly improved capability for dealing with the Soviet submarine force of today and that projected for the immediate future. As our older ships lose their advantage against the more modern Soviet submarines, it is essential that we introduce new submarines with the warfighting capability to prevail.

Senator NUNN. Is the issue of procurement of four submarines in fiscal year 1985 related to the new submarine for which there are R&D funds in this budget? What is the linkage if any, between the new submarine and the question of whether there should be three or four 688 attack submarines in the fiscal year 1985 budget?

Admiral WATKINS. The number of SSN 688s authorized in fiscal year 1985 is not linked to the R&D work. We must build up our SSN force level now with Improved SSN 688s, but still be looking to the future when a new SSN design is needed.

Senator NUNN. The stated Navy Policy is to maintain two shipyards for producing attack submarines. In terms of the attack submarine industrial base, if this program is to be maintained at three per year, what is your assessment as to the effect on the industrial base if there is an average of only 1.5 submarines per yard per year?

Admiral WATKINS. Maintaining an industrial base for attack submarine construction requires a workload that will adequately maintain an acceptable experience level of all shipbuilding personnel, transfer that experience to new personnel through training and adequately utilize shipbuilding equipment and facilities. In terms of shipbuilding experience and training, the industrial base for submarine construction in the two shipyards would be maintained with the authorization of only 1.5 submarines per yard per year, however, both shipyards would be operating well below capacity, thereby increasing the unit cost of building submarines.

Shipbuilding capacity in both shipyards is, in fact, underutilized and has been for the last several years. Nevertheless, each shipyard is improving its facilities for submarine construction to implement modern shipbuilding techniques and to enhance producibility. Electric Boat Division has, over the past several years, significantly upgraded its production equipment and methods resulting in an increase in capacity and improved productivity. Newport News Shipbuilding plans to implement similar improvements in its shipbuilding capabilities in the near future. As each shipyard modernizes its industrial plant, the imbalance between shipbuilding capacity and utilization of that capacity will grow leading to manning reductions. The industrial base will be maintained, but without full realization of the producibility and productivity improvements.

Senator NUNN. In addition to the shipyard, is there a requirement for a specialized base for supply of naval nuclear power equipment? In terms of the naval nuclear power industrial base, what is your assessment of the impact of limiting 688 construction to three rather than four per year?

Admiral WATKINS. There is a requirement for a specialized base for supply of naval nuclear propulsion equipment as well as for shipyard industrial facilities. This nuclear industrial base is currently underutilized and would remain so with a three per year building program. At the projected shipbuilding of our SSNs and one SSNB per year there is only enough business to sustain two suppliers of major items of heavy equipment with the two suppliers operating in the neighborhood of 50 percent capacity. With a limited base such as this it is difficult to maintain competition between the two suppliers. Reducing the proposed program to 3 SSNs per year would exacerbate the present condition of underutilized capacity leading to less efficient production and higher unit costs.

Senator NUNN. What connection do you draw between the submarine construction rates funded in the budgets of the last seven years and this request for four SSNs in fiscal year 1985?

Admiral WATKINS. For the past seven years, the attack submarine authorization rate has been only 1.9 per year which is far too low to reach the goal of 100 attack submarines by 1990. Indeed this building rate would not even sustain a force level of 60 SSNs. In order to meet the force level goal by 1990, four SSN-688 Class submarines must be authorized in fiscal year 1985. Any number less than four SSNs in fiscal year 1985 would delay achieving the 100 SSN force level.

In 1978 and 1979 only one SSN was authorized each year. The authorizations increased to two per year for the next four years and last year the Congress author-

ized three SSN-688's for construction. This upward trend must be continued into fiscal year 1985 if we are to achieve our goals.

Another very important consideration is that the submarines to be authorized in fiscal year 1985 will be significantly improved over earlier ships of the class. Major quieting and mining modifications, incorporation of the Advanced Combat System (SUBACS), enhancement of arctic warfare capabilities and incorporation of the Vertical Launch System markedly improved the warfighting capabilities of the class. It is very important that we accelerate fleet introduction of SSN-688s with the improvements if we are to satisfactorily counter the threat of the 1990s.

Senator NUNN. Will the Navy be able to sustain a four per year attack submarine production if the real growth in the Navy budget for the FDYF is less than planned, say on the order of 3-5 percent average real growth?

Admiral WATKINS. Both Secretary Lehman and I are committed to a four SSN per year building program even at lower rates of real growth in the navy budget.

Senator NUNN. Last October in the Appropriations cycle, Senator Cohen and I worked to include long-lead funds to preserve the options for four submarines in the fiscal year 1985 program which you have now requested.

How important is the number four, and is there any link between the need for three or four submarines in the fiscal year 1985 budget and the new design attack submarine?

Admiral WATKINS. The number four is very important. We must build four SSNs per year to achieve our SSN force level objective of 100, which is the minimum number needed to carry out our missions.

The Soviet Union currently outnumbered the United States in attack submarines by a ratio of 3 to 1 and will maintain that ratio by building three times as many submarines as we do. Moreover, the Soviets are introducing new classes of submarines at a rate nearly seven times greater than the United States. In short, the Soviets are rapidly modernizing their submarine force by building a large number of new and more capable ships.

To maintain undersea superiority, we must keep our qualitative edge. Our Improved 688 Class submarines, such as the four in the fiscal year 1985 budget, must be introduced to the fleet as rapidly as possible—and in numbers—to redress the shrinking margin of supremacy for our attack submarine force.

There is a limit, of course, to the improvements we can incorporate into the 688 Class. A New Design SSN must be developed. The New Design SSN is the next step in the process of modernizing our force at a rate adequate to maintain our margin of undersea superiority and address the projected threat from the Soviet fleet in the 1995 time frame.

CARRIER BATTLE GROUP ESCORTS

Senator NUNN. When carriers operate in multiple formations, do the battle groups require the same ratio of escorts as when operating independently?

Admiral WATKINS. The force structure of individual CVBG's is not affected by employing them in a multiple CVBG force. Although dictated by the tactical situation, the special disposition of multiple CVBG forces is generally such that there is a physical expansion of coverage requirements, rather than an overlap. Thus multiple CVBG's require the same ratio of accompanying surface combatants and submarines as single CVBG's to meet the demands of expanded battle space. The improved capability which we achieve is a function of the aggregate of all the multiple CVBG forces.

NAVY BUDGETS

Senator NUNN. As these budgets are inevitably adjusted downwards, what priority do you place on the submarine portion and anti submarine warfare part of the Navy budget?

Admiral WATKINS. All of our forces are mutually supportive and our budget submission reflects a balanced approach to meeting all our requirements. Any downward adjustments must also reflect this balance or run the risk of destroying the mutually supportive nature of our force. For this reason, it is very difficult to set priorities among the surface, sub-surface, and airborne components of our defense requirements. Our strategic submarines are a vital part of this nation's deterrence strategy. Our tactical submarines and our Anti-Submarine Warfare forces contribute to the total war fighting capability of our fleet and are essential to our ability to keep open sea lines of communication in time of war.

Senator NUNN. What percentage real growth will it require in the Navy budgets this year and for the next 4 fiscal years to execute the Navy's program?

Admiral WATKINS. We need the real program growth of 12.7 percent contained in the fiscal year 1985 budget for the Department of the Navy. Assuming approval of the fiscal year 1985 budget as requested, the projected real program growth amounts for the DOD (9.2 percent in fiscal 1986, 3.5 percent in fiscal year 1987, 3.8 percent in fiscal year 1988, and 3.9 percent in fiscal year 1989) will enable the Secretary of Defense to allocate to the Department of the Navy sufficient resources to meet our 5 year plans and achieve the required force levels.

CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS (CVBG)

Senator NUNN. If carriers are primarily going to fight in groups in wartime, does this mean 15 carriers no longer equal a 15-carrier battle group Navy?

Admiral WATKINS. Combining CVBG's is a matter of tactical employment instead of force composition. Fifteen Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) are the minimum required to accomplish our warfighting maritime strategy and maintain our flexibility in peacetime. Combining groups is sometimes prudent in a high threat environment to reduce risk and increase the probability of success while projecting power ashore and providing mutual self defense.

Senator NUNN. Recently, we see two CVBG's operating together such as off Lebanon. You talk in your briefings about multiple carriers operating together. Are the force objectives changing?

Admiral WATKINS. Our force objective of fifteen deployable carrier battle groups (CVBG) has not changed, but we are continually refining the employment strategy and tactical use of CVBG's. Based on joint exercises and operational experience in the Indian Ocean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Western Pacific, we have found that two CVBG's operating together complement each other's capabilities and their combined capability is much greater than two CVBG's operating singly. To increase our chances of success and reduce risk in establishing control of the sea in those areas where U.S. interests are vital, we have combined CVBG's into a carrier battle force.

Senator NUNN. Have you changed the definition of what constitutes a carrier battle group? I recall that it used to mean one carrier and its escorts.

Admiral WATKINS. No, a carrier battle group (CVBG) is comprised of the carrier and the surface warships and submarines required for its direct support and is tailored to a given threat and mission scenario. The classes of ships and the mix will also change as our force composition changes and more capable ships such as CG-47 and DDG 51 take the place of our aging DDG-2/DDG-37 Class ships. Multiple CVBG's will retain all of the support ships that each had individually.

SOVIET FORCES IN FAR EAST

Senator NUNN. What capabilities would be needed to suggest to the Soviets, primarily through deterrence, that their forces in the Far East might be "isolated" in the context of a NATO scenario?

Admiral WATKINS. Powerful strike forces in the Far East (e.g. aircraft-carriers, cruise missile platforms, and attack submarines) force the Soviets to commit and maintain forces there. The Soviets measure the threat we present and attempt to counter it, reducing the forces they can commit to an attack against NATO and thereby helping to deter such action. Our forward deployed forces also assure our allies—Korea and Japan—of our support and could ensure that other regional powers, (primarily the Peoples Republic of China) maintain a posture that is at least neutral.

Senator NUNN. What capability does the Navy have, or planned, to contribute to a mission—if required—to tie down Soviet forces in the Far East?

Admiral WATKINS. Our Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) give us the mobility and capability we need to exert pressure from the sea on the geographic area of the Soviet Union most vulnerable to attack. The Soviets would likely respond with their Pacific Fleet Naval Forces and their land and air forces. This pressure would deny the Soviets a [deleted]. We need strong, offensive forces in the form of CVBG's, cruise missile platforms, and attack submarines as well as the support of our sister services and allies to accomplish this.

Senator COHEN. The subcommittee is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

June 3 1985

How one of Washington's slickest operators keeps the Navy afloat.

FOOL OF SHIPS

BY TINA ROSENBERG

"GLOBAL NAVAL SUPERIORITY" was John Lehman's goal when he became secretary of the Navy in 1981, and expanding the Navy from 12 to 15 aircraft carrier groups and from 479 to 600 ships was his way to achieve it. But few people outside the Navy agree with Lehman's strategy. Even the Navy's chief sailor, Admiral James Watkins, has criticized one of Lehman's major justifications for the buildup: a dangerous plan to sail up the Norwegian Sea and attack Soviet naval bases early in a war. Others question the value of strengthening the Navy when the most important battle arena in the Big War, as defense analysts call it, would likely be Europe. "When they came in, the Reagan people were mostly exercised about Soviet ballistic missiles and battle tanks," says Barry Posen, assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School. "The one area where we had complete, dominant superiority was in aircraft carriers that launch strike aircraft. There, we were ahead 12-0. Then we spent tens of billions of dollars to go ahead 15-0."

Lehman got everything he wanted. Today the count stands at 530 ships. Contracts for the rest are locked in and will hit the magic 600 in 1989. Three new aircraft carriers are under construction and will be finished in 1991, at a cost of \$3.7 billion apiece. Even as Congress votes to freeze the defense budget, it's full steam ahead for the 600-ship Navy.

John F. Lehman II, 38 years old when he took office, is one of the youngest Navy secretaries in history. He is also one of the most effective. "If you think of the service secretary's role as promoting his service, you have to admire him," says one of his detractors. "He has been a very effective salesman for the Navy. He's ingratiated himself with the brass, who are usually unimpressed with civilians. He's an activist and a charmer."

Lehman had an unfair advantage over most service secretaries: he was qualified for the job. The post is traditionally a rest home for ribbon-cutters, which is just the way the brass like it. As Richard Nixon once said: "Hell, anybody can do that job. We've had John Warner." Lehman, by contrast, had studied naval strategy and history and served in the Reserves—he still spends two weeks a

year as a Naval Reserve helicopter pilot and jet bombardier/navigator.

More important, however, Lehman is cocky enough to believe he could create a Lehman Navy. "He's all business and his wife is all business," says one foreign policy analyst who has known Lehman 15 years. "They're not the kind of people you schmooze with. You just don't get the feeling there's anything there other than drive, ambition, and aggressiveness." He was co-author of two books by the age of 24, a National Security Council staffer at 26, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at 32.

When asked about his future, Lehman has a stock response. "I have the best job in the world," he says. "I'll stay here 28 years, just enough to outlast Admiral Gorshkov," his Soviet counterpart. Friends, however, doubt his ambition stops at the water's edge. "He is not unaware of the fact that former secretaries of the Navy are in politics—John Warner, FDR," says one. In the Marine Corps they call Lehman "young Winston," after a certain British First Lord of the Admiralty who went on to higher office.

Lehman's ambitions are not unusual; his tactics are. He has wrecked careers, snookered Congress, and lied to his bosses. He has used a dazzling array of creative tricks to get what he wants. He is famous for knifing his enemies. "He is one of the two or three slimiest men in Washington," says one veteran of three administrations. His genius for bureaucratic politics is the most important reason for Lehman's success with the Navy—and with every other project he's tried. Vicious he is, but in 14 years in government Lehman has never lost a big fight.

Lehman comes from a Catholic family prominent in Philadelphia society; the late Princess Grace was his cousin. He had a comfortable childhood where talk often ran to the Navy. His father, a plant manager for Continental Can, had skippered a gunship in the invasion of Okinawa and the house was filled with model ships and planes. Lehman was an avid rower, winning the national championship in Intermediate Double Sculls in 1963, while he was an undergraduate at St. Joseph's College in Philadelphia.

He was of draft age during Vietnam, but served for only seven weeks during three active duty tours while in the Reserves. After graduating from college he studied inter-

Tina Rosenberg, a frequent contributor to TNR, wrote on nuclear proliferation in "Bumbling Bomb Squad" (December 17, 1984).

national law and diplomacy at Keyes College in Cambridge, England, and spent vacations at his cousin's palace in Monaco.

After Cambridge, Lehman worked at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, then a part of the University of Pennsylvania. While at FPRI he met several conservative foreign policy scholars who occasionally wandered through, including Henry Kissinger and Richard V. Allen.

Lehman got a job on the Nixon campaign in 1968 through Allen, and after the election joined Kissinger's National Security Council staff to do congressional relations and anything else Kissinger wanted. There Lehman started building his contacts in earnest.

His Georgetown housemate was Edwin Feulner, future head of the Heritage Foundation, who was then working in Melvin Laird's Pentagon. Lehman made friends with several important conservatives in Congress, such as John Tower, who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee when he retired last year. Lehman's most important job, however, was to cultivate Democratic senator Henry Jackson, the leading opponent of leading détente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. It didn't take long for Lehman to run off and marry the natives—his views on arms control matched those of Jackson, not Kissinger, and he soon became friends with a young Jackson staffer named Richard Perle.

Lehman and Perle waged a guerrilla war against SALT I and the treaty's proponents in the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In June 1972 Jackson met with Nixon in the Rose Garden and asked him to clean the arms control supporters from ACDA and the State Department. Jackson wanted only hard-liners left to enforce SALT I and negotiate SALT II. In return, Jackson promised to refrain from picking a nasty Senate fight on SALT I ratification before the election. Nixon, with his fatal tendency to overreact where his reelection was concerned, agreed.

The project fell to Perle and Lehman. It was an extraordinary situation reminiscent of the "who lost China" firings in the 1950s: Kissinger's staffer fingering and firing the men who negotiated Kissinger's greatest diplomatic achievement, simply because they did their jobs well. Lehman and Perle attacked the project with great zeal; of 16 senior staffers at ACDA in 1972, only three remained two years later. Lehman's reward was the deputy directorship of ACDA in 1975. He was 32.

Nixon and Jackson were satisfied with ACDA's new personnel, but Lehman was not. He continued the purge


to the junior levels of the agency. "He has a tendency to classify people as for us or against us," says Leon Sloss, Lehman's friend who was acting ACDA director in 1977. "If you were against him, he tried to isolate you or move you out of the agency."

Lehman left ACDA at the end of Gerald Ford's administration. In an unusual career move, he and Perle decided to open an omelet restaurant in Georgetown. Perle, a passionate chef, would cook, Lehman seat guests. "We had extensive discussions with the real estate people," he says. But Perle decided not to leave Jackson's staff and Lehman found a more profitable venture. He opened a consulting firm called the Abington Corporation,

named for his Pennsylvania township. The firm studied market opportunities for defense contractors in the United States and abroad. He paid himself almost \$200,000 a year. Perle signed on for a year before going into the Reagan administration. When he left, the two men fought over Perle's compensation and have not been friends since.

While president of Abington, Lehman served as a foreign affairs adviser to the Reagan campaign and conducted two campaigns of his own: one for the post of secretary of the Navy, and the other to preserve the ideological purity of Reagan's policies.

He had enough clout to ensure that Republican moderates at least pretended to listen to him. In the summer



DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

of 1979 he accompanied Bush to a briefing on SALT II by Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron at the White House. According to Aaron, it was clear that Bush suffered Lehman's presence merely for political reasons. "At one point John had launched into a diatribe and Bush turned to him and told him to shut up," says Aaron.

Lehman's willingness to lie, even to his boss, to promote his views also came out during the meeting. Lehman told Bush that the Carter administration was the first to consider limits on cruise missiles. It was a flat lie. Lehman knew the Ford administration had proposed strict limits—because he had helped to sabotage the plan, fearful that Kissinger would reach a SALT II agreement. "The truth isn't very important to him," says Aaron. "He makes whatever arguments he wants to make." Lehman denies the incident. "Whatever I said was factual and true," he says. "I have a very good relationship with George."

UPON TAKING OFFICE in 1981, Reagan and Caspar Weinberger knew they wanted to increase the defense budget, but their entire strategy was summed up with the word "more." One of Weinberger's first decisions, thanks largely to lobbying by campaign adviser Lehman, was to reverse the reforms of Secretary Robert McNamara in the 1960s, which centralized power in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the services. And more influence for the secretaries quickly came to mean more influence for Lehman.

Lehman took advantage of Reagan's honeymoon to pack his most controversial programs into the initial two Reagan budgets. In his first budget, he won two aircraft carriers, at a cost of \$3.67 billion apiece. The second year, Lehman won authorization to refurbish two mothballed World War II battleships. His five-year plan for 1983 to 1987 almost doubled spending for shipbuilding and Naval aircraft procurement. Because of Congress's reluctance to cancel weapons once money has been spent, Lehman could boast at a Brookings Institution seminar in December 1982, "It's too late to stop it . . . we've got the 600-ship Navy."

Told by David Stockman in the fall of 1981 that he would have to make some cuts, Lehman struck from his budget the \$1.6 billion he had planned for cargo ships. Instead, he arranged to have the ships built privately. Investors could take advantage of Reagan's new tax laws; the Navy would pay to rent the ships when they were completed. Because the government paid to lease the ships and lost tax revenue from the investors, the ships actually cost about 12 percent more than they would have if the Navy had built them, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. But Lehman managed to get his ships—on time—without spending a cent of his 1983 budget.

Lehman's ships came in despite the objections of two of his bosses, former undersecretary for research and engineering Richard DeLauer and especially Paul Thayer, who

became deputy secretary early in 1983 and resigned a year later to face insider trading charges. Thayer believed Lehman was getting too much money—money better spent on modernizing the Army. In 1983 he lobbied in Congress against Lehman's plans and proposed cutting eight billion dollars from shipbuilding and ten billion dollars from Navy aviation in the next five years.

Thayer did not reckon with Lehman's political skills. When Lehman's cost figures came in one billion dollars over budget, he simply inserted a line in the 700-page document that read "unfunded requirements—negative \$1 billion," and presto, the budget was balanced. When Thayer complained, Lehman played the part of the mayor who coyly tells his city council, "Gosh, there's just no money for the fire department this year." Lehman cut the one billion dollars from the Trident submarine, the sea leg of the nuclear triad.

On August 11, 1983, in a statement naming the new *George Washington* and *Abraham Lincoln* nuclear aircraft carriers, President Reagan also announced his firm support for a 15-carrier, 600-ship Navy. Lehman had simply bypassed Thayer and Weinberger, and walked into the White House waving a press release in the president's face. Reagan signed. When the battle was over and Reagan's budget came out in October, money for the Trident was restored, taken largely from the Army and Air Force budgets. The Navy did not lose a ship.

LEHMAN HAS CLAIMED great success for his reforms of the Navy procurement process. He has increased the number of competitive bid contracts and fixed price contracts where the government splits the cost overrun—or underrun—with the contractor, providing incentive to finish under budget. Lehman says these reforms have saved the Navy \$2.4 billion in three and a half years.

But military reformers disagree about Lehman's sincerity. According to the Pentagon's own figures, negotiated profits have risen 75 percent in the last eight years. And even on a fixed price project, a low negotiated profit can become a high final profit. The problem is the Pentagon's practice of "contract nourishment"—design or schedule changes adding to profits. "Ships come in under budget? Under what budget?" says Peter Stockton, an investigator for a House subcommittee. "The baseline changes so much and there's so much contract nourishment you can't even tell how they're measuring it."

Lehman adeptly uses these reforms for his own purposes. He testified before the House sea power subcommittee in April at the height of congressional outrage over \$640 toilet seats and contractors who charge the government to board their executives' dogs. Predictably, the representatives' first round of questions centered on procurement abuses. Lehman's response: allow us to achieve economies of scale by building lots of ships, give procurement decisions back to the service secretaries, and plow the savings back into the Navy budget to provide incen-

tives for managers—all measures that would increase his power.

Lehman has little tolerance for criticism. Shortly after Christmas 1982 Lehman called Robert L. Sproull, the president of the University of Rochester, down from New York for a chat. At the time, Rochester administered a \$19 million contract for the Center for Naval Analyses, an independent think tank. Lehman was displeased that CNA conclusions sometimes differed from his own. He asked Sproull to fire CNA's president by the end of the month, and replace him with Assistant Secretary of Defense Francis J. (Bing) West, a man whose enthusiasm for Lehman's strategy earned him the nickname "Maritime Bing" in the Pentagon. Sproull refused.

Back in Rochester, Sproull began hearing rumors that Lehman intended to retaliate by taking the contract away from Rochester and awarding it to the conservative Hudson Institute, which presumably would write papers that Lehman found more agreeable. Sproull raised a stink on the Hill. At a hearing about the matter in the spring of 1983, Lehman told Senator Sam Nunn he didn't like one-source contracts and wanted to hold a competition. "That was news to everyone, including Lehman's staff," says one man who was connected with the incident. Not surprisingly, after the "competition" Lehman awarded the contract to the Hudson Institute. Bing West soon joined Hudson as vice president for national security affairs. Tom Bell, the president of Hudson, became head of CNA in October 1983. According to a former CNA staff member, Bell convened a meeting of CNA two months later and said, "You can be bold and innovative up to the point the secretary of the Navy takes a decision. Then you get on board."

When the Heritage Foundation recently completed a study proposing that the power of the service secretaries be reduced, Lehman acted to kill it. According to Colonel Theodore Crackel, who directed the Heritage study, Lehman called up his old friend Feulner and persuaded him not to publish a policy paper on Crackel's findings. (The completed project eventually became a chapter in a Heritage book.) Lehman denies asking Feulner to spike the study; Feulner says he can't recall the details of the episode.

LEHMAN'S bureaucratic success obscures the flaws in his case for a 600-ship, 15-carrier Navy. One of Lehman's premises for the naval buildup is that if the Soviets attack anywhere, we will wage an offensive war to bottle up the Soviet navy in its home ports.

This idea has never become U.S. policy, for three good reasons. First, surface ships would have to spend several days in hostile waters in full range of Soviet shore aircraft. They would become beach balls for the Soviets long before they reached a Soviet submarine base. Second, most Navy commanders are not willing to risk losing a \$17 billion carrier battle group when many think a submarine could launch a cruise missile to do the same

job. Third, and most important, striking at the Soviet homeland early in the war could provoke a strong response, possibly escalating a conventional war into a nuclear war.

Lehman's other justification for 15 carrier groups is that the Navy should be perpetually ready "to go in harm's way"—to fight "simultaneously with conflicts in the Far East, Near East, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, the oil lifelines around Africa to the United States and Europe, the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, Caribbean, and Eastern Pacific." Naval experts disagree about the usefulness of aircraft carriers, but almost everyone agrees that no matter how effective they are, there is little real advantage in having 15 as opposed to 12. In peacetime carriers spend half the time in or sailing around their home ports in the United States. The extra three carriers mean that we can deploy five overseas at any time instead of four—hardly worth the \$51 billion those carrier groups cost.

IN WARTIME the 15 carriers wouldn't be nearly enough to fight in every area on Lehman's list. And in any case we are less likely to go to war with Japan, an island vulnerable to naval siege, than with the Soviet Union, a land power. Carriers would be little more than an annoyance to the Soviet Union during a conventional war in Europe. A carrier group is the carrier and the cruisers, supply ships, submarines, and destroyers that protect it. Of the 90 aircraft on a carrier, 56 merely protect the ship. This leaves only 34 planes to attack targets. "The Soviets wouldn't even notice them," says Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author of *The Pentagon and the Art of War*. "With our hundreds of land-based aircraft, why should carrier aircraft bother them?"

What would help deter the Soviets in Europe is ground troops. But according to former Carter under secretary of defense Robert Komer, over the past five years the Navy's investment budget—money for weapons, construction, and research and development—averaged nearly double that of the Army. Luttwak says, "The Navy's share of our resources on average has not changed since World War II and in the last few years has increased, even though the Soviet Union, not Japan, is the enemy. But even the total defeat of the Soviet navy would not seriously impair the Soviet Union's capacity for invasion."

In the event of such an invasion the United States would be sorely outnumbered. "The Soviets could build up to 120 divisions in the course of an offensive," Luttwak says. "The United States could contribute 36 and a third—and that's including the National Guard of New York State." We could buy, equip, and man four armored divisions for the price of just the hardware in one carrier battle group. Unfortunately, Lehman has prevailed over all his rivals in the Pentagon. It is hard not to marvel at his skill while wishing he weren't quite so successful. □

REMARKS BY
ADMIRAL JAMES D. WATKINS
CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
19 JUNE 1985

"WE ARE THE REAL REFORMERS"

ABOUT A HUNDRED YEARS AGO, A RELATIVELY UNKNOWN OFFICER SERVING IN A NAVY OF SECOND-CLASS STATURE WROTE A BOOK ON MARITIME HISTORY AND STRATEGY. THIS BOOK SHOOK THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF NAVAL THOUGHT, AND GAINED A WORLD-WIDE REPUTATION FOR AN OBSCURE OFFICER, WHICH INCLUDED ACCOLADES FROM HIGH-RANKING AND INFLUENTIAL OFFICERS OF THE WORLD'S LEADING NAVAL POWER, GREAT BRITAIN.

THE OFFICER WAS THEN CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN. HIS BOOK WAS THE INFLUENCE OF SEAPOWER UPON HISTORY, PUBLISHED IN 1890 WHILE CAPTAIN MAHAN WAS SERVING ON THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE FACULTY HERE IN NEWPORT. AND, AS HISTORY HAS PROVEN, OUR NAVY WOULD NEVER BE THE SAME AGAIN, FOR MAHAN'S OPUS PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A STRATEGIC VISION WHICH PROFOUNDLY CHANGED THE WAY THIS NATION WOULD GO DOWN TO THE SEA IN SHIPS.

TODAY, ALMOST 100 YEARS LATER, THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF MARITIME STRATEGY IS AGAIN PROFOUNDLY CHANGING OUR NAVAL PROFESSION. AFTER A LONG HIATUS, A PERIOD WHEN STRATEGY WAS OFTEN LEFT TO IVORY-TOWER PLANNERS, WITH LITTLE NAUTICAL EXPERTISE, MARITIME STRATEGY IS AGAIN INFUSING EVERY ASPECT OF OUR NAVY'S THINKING, PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND OPERATING. TODAY, BECAUSE OF THIS REJUVENATION IN NAVAL THOUGHT, BY NAVAL OFFICERS, WE AGAIN HAVE A CLEAR SENSE OF PURPOSE AND RAISON D'ETRE, PERHAPS THE CLEAREST SINCE THE FINAL SHOTS OF WORLD WAR II.

IT WOULD APPEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THESE FUNDAMENTAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE OFTEN INVISIBLE TO MANY OUTSIDE OUR PROFESSION. AND, UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE ALLOWED PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ABOUT OUR NAVAL STRATEGY TO BE SHAPED TOO MUCH BY RUMOR AND INNUENDO, BY THE SUPERFICIALLY APPEALING MANIFESTOS OF SELF-PROCLAIMED DEFENSE REFORMERS.

THESE ARMCHAIR STRATEGISTS, WHO HAVE LITTLE EXPERIENCE AT SEA AND LESS COMMON MILITARY SENSE, ASSERT WE ARE BUREAUCRATS RATHER THAN STRATEGISTS AND TACTICIANS; IN FACT, THAT WE HAVE NO STRATEGY, AND THAT WE ARE INCAPABLE OF REFORMING OURSELVES FROM WITHIN.

WHILE WE CAREFULLY AND REPEATEDLY REBUT UNFAIR CRITICISM AND ARGUMENTS WITH FACTS, TO MANY PEOPLE, OUR REBUTTALS PERHAPS SHOW US ALWAYS AGAINST RATHER THAN FOR THINGS, OTHER THAN THE STATUS QUO.

BUT, LET THERE BE NO DOUBT, OUR REVITALIZED EMPHASIS ON MARITIME STRATEGY OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS PROVIDED A FOCUS FOR SUBSTANTIAL REFORM OF THE NAVY...AND FROM WITHIN. THIS REFORM IS NOT MINDLESS OR DIRECTIONLESS OR CHANGE FOR CHANGE'S SAKE. NOR IS IT A DEFENSIVE KNEE-JERK REACTION TO PRESSURES FROM WITHOUT. EVOLUTION OF TODAY'S NAVY IS BASED ON A DEVELOPING, LIVELY AND RELEVANT MARITIME STRATEGY, CONSCIOUSLY ADOPTED BY OUR NAVY'S LEADERSHIP. WE, IN FACT, ARE THE REAL REFORMERS.

NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS DANGER THAT OUR CRITICS HAVE GAINED THE INTELLECTUAL HIGH GROUND, CAUSING US TO APPEAR DEFENSIVE AND REACTIVE. SO, WE NEED TO ENUNCIATE MORE CLEARLY OUR STRATEGIC VISION. WE NEED TO CONVINCING THE NATION WHO THE REAL REFORMERS ARE.

ABOUT REFORM...TODAY, REFORM IS INVARIABLY DEFINED AS A GOOD THING, AN ANSWER TO A MAIDEN'S PRAYER...AS THOUGH "REFORM" ALONE WILL ELIMINATE ALL PROBLEMS AND SOURCES OF FRICTION. SURE, CONTINUAL, INTELLIGENT REFORM IS ESSENTIAL TO THE VITALITY OF OUR NAVY. BUT, CONTINUITY AND STABILITY IN BALANCE WITH REFORM ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT CONCEPTS TO ENSURE GOOD AND LASTING CHANGE.

THE NAVY IS NOT A VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANY. WE CANNOT LIGHTLY UNDERTAKE REFORM BECAUSE WE CANNOT ENDURE A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF FAILURES. CONSEQUENCES OF JUST ONE FAILED REFORM INITIATIVE COULD BE DEFEAT ON TOMORROW'S BATTLEFIELD. NAVY'S EXPERIENCES OF THE EARLY 1970s PROVIDE AN OBJECT LESSON IN THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY EVEN A HANDFUL OF WELL-MEANING REFORMS THAT FAILED.

FURTHER, TRADITION AND CONTINUITY ARE ALSO CRUCIAL TO THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND IDENTITY, AND TO OUR ABILITY TO PERFORM CONSISTENTLY. PRIDE IN TRADITION IS OFTEN THE GLUE THAT HOLDS A COMMUNITY OF SEAGOING MEN AND WOMEN TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY WHEN TIMES GET TOUGH. THERE MUST BE A PROPER MIX, THEN, OF REFORM TEMPERED IN EXECUTION BY SENSITIVITIES TO CONTINUITY AND TRADITION. OUR RECENT EMPHASIS ON MARITIME STRATEGY AS A FOCUS OF PROFESSIONALISM REPRESENTS NOT ONLY A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CONTEMPORARY NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT, BUT ALSO A CONTINUATION OF THE TRADITIONS OF ALFRED THAYER MAHAN AND THE GREAT NAVAL REFORMERS OF A CENTURY AGO. SO TODAY, I AM GOING TO DO SOMETHING WHICH OUR CRITICS WOULD FIND RELATIVELY UNIQUE. I AM GOING TO DESCRIBE WHAT THE MARITIME STRATEGY INVOLVES, WITHOUT EVER MENTIONING HOW WE SUPPOSEDLY PLAN TO TAKE SHIPS UP THE VOLGA RIVER!

TO START OFF, THE MARITIME STRATEGY IS CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL STRATEGY DOCUMENTS AND DIRECTIVES SIGNED OUT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. FURTHER, IT FLOWS FROM THESE UNDERPINNINGS, EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND CONTAINING ALL MARITIME ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.

IT IS A GLOBAL STRATEGY WHICH ADDRESSES A GLOBAL THREAT. AND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STRATEGY IS MISTAKENLY CARICATURED AS A SLUGFEST IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA, IT IS A DIVERSE STRATEGY EMBRACING ALL POSSIBLE THEATERS OF OPERATION AND THEIR COMPLEX INTERRELATIONSHIPS.

IT IS A FORWARD STRATEGY, WHICH IS IN KEEPING WITH THE NATIONAL POLICY OF FORWARD DEFENSE THAT DRAWS ON FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES AND RAPID MOBILITY OF NAVAL FORCES.

IT IS A DETERRENT STRATEGY, BUT IF DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL, IT PROVIDES FOR A DEFENSE AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE.

IT IS A STRATEGY OF ALLIANCES, EMPHASIZING THE ESSENTIALITY OF COALITIONS OF WESTERN WORLD NATIONS WHO SHARE COMMON IDEOLOGIES AND GOALS FOR THEIR PEOPLE.

IT IS A JOINT SERVICE STRATEGY, NOT A NAVY-MARINE CORPS ATTEMPT TO GO IT ALONE, AS IS SOMETIMES ALLEGED. SO, IT IS NOT PAROCHIAL; IS FULLY SUPPORTED THROUGHOUT THE JOINT SERVICE LEADERSHIP; AND IS ONE WHICH EMPHASIZES CRITICALITY OF JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS.

FINALLY, IT IS A FLEXIBLE STRATEGY, ONE PROVIDING A COHESIVE MENU OF GLOBAL OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING ESCALATION, DRAWING ON THE RANGE OF CAPABILITIES INHERENT IN MOBILE AND CAPABLE NAVAL FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT AVOIDS RELIANCE ON RESORTING TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND GRAPPLES WITH EVENTS ALONG THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT...FROM PEACETIME PRESENCE, TO CRISES RESPONSE, TO GLOBAL WAR.

WHAT HAVE BEEN THE RESULTS OF THIS STRATEGY? CLEARLY, IT HAS GENERATED SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN MARITIME FORCES, AND HAS SERVED AS SOURCE MATERIAL FOR NUMEROUS DEBATES. IT ALSO HAS HELPED US EXPLAIN THE NAVY'S PURPOSES TO A NUMBER OF TOUGH CRITICS AND AUDIENCES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT; BUT, MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT HAS CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL REFORM OF THE NAVY FROM WITHIN.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY HAS RATIONALIZED, DISCIPLINED AND FOCUSED NAVY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, BUDGETS AND PROCUREMENT TO A DEGREE THAT WOULD HAVE SEEMED REMARKABLE ONLY FIVE YEARS AGO. SINCE 1982, A FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY BEGINS EACH ANNUAL NAVAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT CYCLE. THE STRATEGY PROVIDES A CLEAR FRAMEWORK AGAINST WHICH ALL BUDGET PROPOSALS ARE JUDGED AND A COMMON REFERENCE POINT FOR ALL DISCUSSION.

THE STRATEGY ALSO PROVIDES THE FOUNDATION FOR FOLLOW-ON WARFARE APPRAISALS WHICH IDENTIFY CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS TO EXECUTE THE STRATEGY IN TERMS OF ANTI-AIR WARFARE, ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND OTHER WARFARE AREAS.

THIS PROCESS OF APPLYING THE MARITIME STRATEGY TO PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT HAS PRODUCED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC SPINOFFS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE RECENTLY CONSOLIDATED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) PROGRAMS INTO A SINGLE OFFICE UNDER THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL WARFARE. AN EW MASTER PLAN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. THIS IMPETUS CAME FROM APPRAISALS OF EW REQUIREMENTS TO EXECUTE THE MARITIME STRATEGY FROM A CROSS-PLATFORM VIEWPOINT THAT AVOIDS PIECEMEAL SOLUTIONS.

A REVIEW OF LONG RANGE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS TO EXECUTE THE MARITIME STRATEGY INDICATED THE NEED FOR A DYNAMIC ASW MASTER PLAN. THIS COMPREHENSIVE, CROSS-PLATFORM RE-EXAMINATION OF OUR ASW PROGRAMS WAS DEVELOPED AND IS ALREADY HELPING US DEAL WITH A RAPIDLY ADVANCING SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT.

FOR EXAMPLE, THIS PROCESS HAS LED TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ASW R&D PROGRAMS. AND, A SIMILAR EVALUATIVE PROCESS WAS UNDERTAKEN WHEN ANTI-AIR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS WERE REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY, RESULTING IN A MASTER PLAN FOR NAVAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE.

AND THIS EFFORT HAS REACHED THE ENTIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS AND I HAVE JUST SIGNED OUT A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROMULGATING A MODERNIZED AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY. THIS STRATEGY, WHICH DEALS WITH POTENTIAL CONFLICT ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBILITIES, SETS FORTH THE ROLE OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY AS TECHNOLOGIES AND THREAT ENVIRONMENTS INCREASE IN COMPLEXITY.

YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY IN APPLICATION IS A GROWING AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS TO MARITIME FORCES. DEVELOPING A GLOBAL, FORWARD DEPLOYED STRATEGY, AND USING IT TO DRIVE NAVY PROGRAMS, HAS BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS THE ESSENTIAL TACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE. A NAVAL MASTER PLAN FOR SPACE SYSTEMS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. ADDITIONALLY, THIS AWARENESS LED DIRECTLY TO ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NAVAL SPACE COMMAND TO DIRECT SPACE-RELATED OPERATIONS; THE FORMATION OF A SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND TO MANAGE PROCUREMENT AND R&D; AND FORMULATION OF PROGRAMMATIC AND OFFICER DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS TO DEVELOP NEW SPACE SYSTEMS AND MAKE BETTER TACTICAL USE OF EXISTING ONES.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY HAS PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT REFORM IN ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL WAY BY STIMULATING STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL THINKING AMONG NAVY LEADERSHIP. FURTHER, WE HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES TO BUILD INSTITUTIONAL REINFORCEMENTS FOR THIS REVIVAL OF STRATEGIC THINKING.

MANY OF THESE INITIATIVES INVOLVE TAKING BETTER ADVANTAGE OF THE SUPERB INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES HERE AT OUR NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, WHICH IS ONCE AGAIN THE CRUCIBLE OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL THOUGHT IT WAS IN MAHAN'S TIME. EACH YEAR FOR THE PAST FOUR YEARS, WE HAVE SELECTED A SMALL GROUP OF NAVY CAPTAINS AND MARINE CORPS COLONELS, WHO HAVE DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES AS OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND TACTICIANS, AND BROUGHT THEM TOGETHER UP HERE FOR A YEAR OF INTENSE INTERACTION. THIS IS OUR STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP, AND THEIR WORK HAS PROFOUNDLY AFFECTED THE ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF OUR STRATEGY.

FROM OUR POST-COMMAND COURSE, WHICH NOW COMPRISES MOST OF OUR BEST AND PROVEN WARFIGHTERS COMING BACK REFRESHED FROM COMMAND AT SEA, TO OUR INVIGORATED WARGAMING CENTER, THE MOST ADVANCED FACILITY OF ITS KIND IN THE WORLD, THE WAR COLLEGE IS A KEY LINK BETWEEN OUR CONCEPTUAL STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE REALITIES OF THE OPERATIONAL WORLD. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE LEAN HEAVILY ON OUR UNIFIED COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF AND NAVY FLEET COMMANDERS TO HELP STRENGTHEN, MODERNIZE AND THEN PUT INTO PRACTICE OUR NAVAL STRATEGY. THIS PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVE, AND THE RESULTING COMPETITION OF IDEAS, HAVE MADE FOR A ROBUST AND DYNAMIC STRATEGY THAT RECOGNIZES AND REFLECTS THE COMPLEXITY OF STRATEGIC ISSUES AS VIEWED BY ALL KEY U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WORLD-WIDE, NOT AS VIEWED BY A PAROCHIAL NAVAL BUREAUCRACY IN WASHINGTON AS IS SO OFTEN THE ALLEGATION BY THE UNINFORMED.

THIS EXPERIENCE, I BELIEVE, IS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE CURRENT ISSUE OF JCS REFORM. THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND ADVICE MUST INVOLVE MULTIPLE CENTERS OF THOUGHT AND PLURALITY OF ADVICE IF THE ADVICE RENDERED IS TO BE TRULY USEFUL. IT IS A COMPLEX PROCESS AND MAY EVEN BE SOMEWHAT UNTIDY FROM TIME TO TIME; BUT IT IS DISTINCTLY AMERICAN, IT WORKS, AND SHOULD BE PRESERVED.

A FINAL WAY IN WHICH THE MARITIME STRATEGY HAS SERVED AS A FOCUS FOR REFORM IS BY SHAPING AN EMPHASIS ON TACTICS AND WARFIGHTING AT THE SHIPBOARD LEVEL.

FOR TOO MANY YEARS, OUR FLEET EXERCISES SUFFERED FROM A LACK OF REALISM AND FOCUS, AND OUR ROUTINE OPERATIONS SEEMED LACKING IN PURPOSE. BUT, THE MARITIME STRATEGY NOW FORMS A FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING REALISTIC, PURPOSEFUL EXERCISES, AND PROVIDES A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE FOR DAILY FLEET OPERATIONS.

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY, WE HAVE BEGUN EMPHASIZING JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES WITH MULTIPLE CARRIER BATTLE FORCES WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED IN A MAJOR WAR. WE ARE BUILDING OUR BASE OF EXPERIENCE IN KEY OCEAN AREAS BY INCREASING OUR JOINT SERVICE AND ALLIED EXERCISES IN AREAS SUCH AS THE NORTHERN PACIFIC AND NORWEGIAN SEA. WE ALSO HAVE BEGUN EXERCISING OUR SUBMARINES MORE AGGRESSIVELY IN ARCTIC WATERS, AREAS WHERE THEY MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO EXECUTE PORTIONS OF THE STRATEGY.

THUS, THE MARITIME STRATEGY HAS PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL REFORM; IT HAS FOCUSED NAVY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT; IT HAS STIMULATED STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL THINKING; IT HAS ENGENDERED AN EMPHASIS ON TACTICS AND WARFIGHTING IN THE FLEET.

I TAKE CONSIDERABLE PRIDE IN THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR REFORMS, AND IN THE STRATEGIC VISION THEY REPRESENT. I TAKE EQUAL PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT THESE REFORMS HAVE COME FROM WITHIN. WE INITIATED THEM; WE SUSTAIN THEM -- WITHOUT MUCH HOOPLA AND WITHOUT THE HELP OF SELF-APPOINTED MILITARY REFORMERS WHO ARE OFTEN ADEPT AT SPOUTING CRITICISM, ILL-FOUNDED ON OLD DATA, AND SEEMINGLY UNINTERESTED IN HEARING OF OUR REFORM MOVEMENT OF TRYING TO PROPOSE CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE NEWLY REFORMED CONTEXT.

SO, NOW YOU HAVE MET THE REAL REFORMERS... "THEY ARE US" -- NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OFFICERS HERE AND ELSEWHERE AROUND THE GLOBE. SURE, OUR CRITICS CAN TAKE ISSUE WITH OUR WELL-ARTICULATED STRATEGY, AND IN FACT WE WELCOME SUCH DEBATE. BUT, THEY CANNOT LEGITIMATELY ARGUE THAT WE HAVE NO STRATEGY OR THAT WE ARE NOT CAPABLE OF REFORM FROM WITHIN.

IN CONCLUDING HIS BOOK, ALFRED THAYER MAHAN WROTE, "HERE CONCLUDES THE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS WHICH AFFECT...THE GROWTH OF SEA POWER IN NATIONS. FROM TIME TO TIME THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF TACTICS HAS TO BE ALTERED OR WHOLLY TORN DOWN; BUT THE OLD FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY SO FAR REMAIN, AS THOUGH LAID UPON A ROCK."

TODAY, ALMOST A HUNDRED YEARS LATER, THIS STATEMENT IS STILL TRUE. FOR WHILE THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF TACTICS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ALTERED, WILL BE CONTINUALLY REFORMED, OUR MARITIME STRATEGY WILL REMAIN A SOLID ROCK, A FOUNDATION UPON WHICH WE CAN CONTINUE TO GROW. YOU SHOULD EXPECT NOTHING LESS FROM REAL REFORMERS.

THANK YOU.