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DEAR ADMIRAL ECCLES,

THE ENCLOSED IS FROM A SPEECH I
GAVE LAST MONTH. I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT
ENJOY IT.

THE WAR COLLEGE CONTINUES UNDER
NEW QUIETER AND DEEPER LEADERSHIP.
WE MISS YOU IN THE HALLS!!

JERRY HAS TAKEN "AMEN" TO
JACKSONVILLE AND WILL ENTER THE
CHARTER BOAT BUSINESS.

WE JUST HEARD FROM JOHN & CAROLE
MORSE. HE GRADUATES MONTEREY IN
DECEMBER AND WILL TAKE COMMAND OF
A SPRUANCE CLASS DD NEXT SUMMER.

OUR VERY BEST TO YOU BOTH.

SINCERELY,
Dave Clark

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY

by

Captain David G. Clark, U.S. Navy
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The time has come the walrus said
To talk of many things,
Of shoes and ships and sealing wax,
Of cabbages and kings,
Of why the sea is boiling hot,
And whether pigs have wings.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Land of the SLOCs. That quote from behind the looking glass may come to seem quite appropriate at times this year. Things are different on Coasters Harbor Island, even though this land of the SLOCs is right here in Narragansett Bay, only a stone's throw from the real world of Bellevue Avenue and Newport tourist traps, and about 20 miles south of the Fall River factory outlets.

The inhabitants here often speak in a strange tongue which makes the world of Lewis Carroll seem almost logical. You will encounter many mythological beasts as you pass through the looking glass into the land of the SLOCs--alphabet monsters from all the seas--CVBG, C², C³, C³I, C³M,--all those seas--along with many others.

The cement that has bonded all this together, at least for the past few years, is called The Maritime Strategy. It is a concept for employing maritime force which is new to our generation, but harkens back centuries in its derivation. My Royal Navy teaching partner gave me a quote from Sir Francis Drake in 1587. He pointed out, "The water gates of England are in the ports of her enemies." That was his rationale for sacking Cadiz. Today's maritime strategy reflects that same policy of taking the offensive, and carrying the fight to the enemy, rather than only taking defensive measures and warding off blows.

Let's start with some definitions. I mentioned the SLOCs, the sea lines of communication, ocean highways that are critical to our interdependent nations for economic strength in peace, for mobility in wartime and, in fact, for survival over the entire spectrum of violence found in the world today.

Another definition comes to us courtesy of Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, one of the finest minds this War College has seen over the past 40 years. We named the library in his honor last spring. --Any strategy (national, military, or maritime) is the comprehensive direction of power.

We need a comprehensive plan to employ all forms of national power cohesively, not just naval or military force but power in all its dimensions. These all must be balanced and used in a timely manner in execution of national policy:

- Military Power - Joint and Combined
- Economic Power - Resources, Industry, and Currency
- Diplomatic Power - Alliances and Agreements
- Political Power - Democracy and Government Stability
- Moral and Psychological Power - Strongly based on ethics

You will find yourself working in all these areas during your year of study here. You will be required to raise your perspective well above the bridge, outside the cockpit, and far from the battlefield. Politicians argue that "War is too important to be left to the generals." But Clausewitz said that war is an extension of policy--of politics, and we have found that politics and diplomacy are too important to be left to the politicians. You must think and plan at levels well above those you are used to, so that you may advise our leaders. Don't forget that, as Robert Louis Stevenson said, "Politics is perhaps the only profession for which no preparation is thought necessary" by those elected to office.

"Return with us now to those thrilling days of yesteryear" when, in 1884, Admiral Steven B. Luce took a perfectly good asylum for the infirm, situated near scenic Newport, and turned it into the Naval War College. He thereby established the Land of the SLOCs. The premier warship of that day was the monitor. It could not be sunk by gunfire. That had been proven at Hampton Roads. The bad news was that it could only operate in inland waters. It would roll over and sink any sort of open sea. It was only good for defense.

At that time there was a U.S. Navy captain in command of a cruiser off the coast of Peru. He had been criticized in his fitness reports (his OER's) for always staying in his cabin and "scribbling", rather than posing majestically on the heaving quarterdeck. The U.S. Navy has always preferred men of action to theorists and authors.

Admiral Luce invited this captain, Alfred Thayer Mahan, to Newport, offered him prime waterfront housing with a scenic view of the Bay and even gave him a year's basket leave in New York City enroute to do research and write. The result of Mahan's work was a series of lectures, later published as The Influence of Seapower Upon History. He built a case for "Command of the Sea." He provided this nation a rationale to build a worldwide Navy.

In the U.S. today his views would be called jingoism. To the Soviet Navy it appears to be gospel. Mahan wrote of seapower in its broadest sense; he spoke of maritime power, not just naval power. He included fishing fleets, merchant ships, and bases. Today you see the Soviets' massive fleets all over the world. They are building bases in Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam and in the

Indian Ocean. The USSR May be a continental power, but Soviet naval leaders believe in Mahan.

The writings of Mahan, reinforced by studies and gaming at this War College, guided our formulation of strategy through two world wars and influenced two generations of our leaders--both political and military. Those leaders fought two very different campaigns in WWII, one of carrier battles and amphibious landings in retaking the Pacific, and the other of onerous convoy escort against the U-boats and air raids in the Atlantic. Too often since then the politicians, lawyers and economists who control the military have tried to limit the U.S. Navy to forces which would only provide for a third version of the Battle of the Atlantic. For many reasons it became popular for awhile to ignore offensive warfare such as conducted in the battles across the Pacific. In Great Britain, the Royal Navy had the same problem, as did navies in other free nations. Events in Korea, Vietnam and the Falklands have shown the error of such foolishness.

After WWII we made many compromises in strategy, trying to maintain some modern naval capability on the cheap. In the nuclear era, war was seen as too horrible to imagine, so we disestablished the Department of War and formed the Department of Defense. The cynics point out that we haven't won a real war since then. We saw ourselves as the biggest guy on the block so didn't need a strategy--only short-term reactive policies. This hip-shooting philosophy inhibited planning and strategic thinking.

In the Korean conflict and in Southeast Asia the Navy still didn't face a real threat to our forces, except for those few young men who fought in the Mekong Delta and the rivers of IV Corps, and the pilots who faced the SAMs and "triple A" up north. Most units were well off the coast in the Tonkin Gulf, and wondered at a strategy--a policy--which permitted ships full of enemy cargo to pass by with impunity--ships which could have been sunk with one cheap bullet. Then our politicians required pilots to attack that same cargo, one truck at a time, with multi-million dollar airplanes at night in the jungles, all the while being shot at with missiles and guns. The politicians failed as generals and we failed as strategic advisors.

After Vietnam, here at the War College and in Washington, the Navy commenced some serious examination of missions and functions. We articulated four things that a navy must be able to accomplish if we are to earn our pay in peace and war. A Navy must be able to:

- Deter an intercontinental nuclear exchange
- Control the sea including the air above
- Project power ashore, and
- Provide a persuasive presence wherever sent.

But that was an era of cutbacks and money was scarce. The Defense Department gave lip service to strategy, but economics and public

dissatisfaction with military commitments were the primary driving factors. Our definitions were turned against us:

"Presence" - That was too fuzzy a concept. Few people really understood gunboat diplomacy using Marines and Carrier Battle Groups. Many thought that presence did more harm than good. Besides, Hollywood could build a presence Navy out of plywood, then add a few sound effects and that would do the job.

"Power Projection" - That sounded too offensive and smacked of commitments on foreign soil - not very popular in the seventies. This nation also tried using moral power--self righteousness--as a weapon. That did not provide great leverage against adversaries who were either immoral or amoral.

"Strategic Deterrence" - Money for this was fenced and treated separately. There was still a feeling that strong strategic forces permitted weak conventional ones; the rationale was not very persuasive.

That left "Sea Control" - a nice open-ocean mission to be conducted far from peace-loving civilians. Besides that, it was clearly defensive, and thus much cheaper than using aircraft carriers and Marines.

No matter how strongly we argued or how eloquently we spoke, our statements were not persuasive. The attitudes formed during the frustrations of Vietnam went too deep. As one Admiral said, "In Washington we were being nibbled to death by geese." Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy increased in size and visibility throughout the world, and the Soviets became bolder in their adventurism.

In 1980, a new administration came to office, bringing to office a Secretary who recast Navy roles, functions and missions. Today, the stated mission of the U.S. Navy is that found in Title 10 U.S. Code "to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interests . . ."

Under that are three functions:

- Sea Control
- Power Projection
- Strategic Sealift


And three roles:

- Strategic Deterrence
- Forward Deployment, and
- Protection of the SLOCs

Better than this statement of purpose by our leadership was the permission, in fact the encouragement, to look at unified strategies including offensive actions. The Naval War College was again placed in the van for formulation of strategy.

We are now encouraged to look at the uses of military power across the whole spectrum of conflict--at all the levels of violence on which communism thrives--because the black or white states of "War" or "Peace" may never exist again. On the left (in Figure 1) of low probability is the utopia of peace with freedom--of the lion lying down with the lamb--of Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny and "The Big Rock Candy Mountain." On the right, hopefully of even lower probability, is the chimera of a strategic nuclear exchange where there can be no victor.

The Maritime Strategy works on the right half of this curve, providing us options short of nuclear war to achieve "war termination on favorable terms"--the unsatisfying euphemism for victory in this nuclear age. There have always been and will always be conflicts; deterrence means we must execute national policy while minimizing the level of violence.



The Maritime Strategy reflects national military strategy as published by the White House, by DOD, and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Portions of the Strategy are highly classified, but it wouldn't be fair for any War College student to set off on this year of study without at least a quick glimpse inside.

The Maritime Strategy is first one of deterrence. Working to execute national policy in a world filled with conflicts, at the lowest level of violence possible. But if that deterrence fails, we will defend U.S. and allied interests as far forward, as close to the enemy as feasible, at the other end of those vital SLOCs. It is a coalition strategy which depends on our allies worldwide. We cannot build sufficient forces to combat the Soviets alone. No free nation can deprive its citizens to the extent required to match the Soviet build-up.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

- Deterrence
- Forward defense
- Global coalition warfare

If our deterrence fails, if the Soviets insist upon further additions to their empire, then there are four possible courses of action, four options in response to aggression:

RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION

Strategic options

1. Meet force with like force head-on
2. Escalate intensity of the conflict
3. Alter geographic scope of the conflict
4. Control duration of the conflict

Suppose a swarm of bees gets into part of your house, you can try to sting them in return--not too productive, or you can go after them with a fly swatter, if that's all you have on hand. You could escalate by using chemical warfare or even a machine gun in the house, but you may do more harm than good. You could even burn that part of the house. A better option might be to go outside, find the hive, and destroy it or move the queen. Or you can move yourself for a week and let professional exterminators handle the problem.

Seriously, attempts to meet force with like force at the point of attack are sometimes most difficult, especially if the Soviets do make the unlikely move of driving their tanks into Western Europe. One should think twice before fighting the enemy at his point of strength. Today, warfare is in a state similar to that in 1914, with firepower so dominating mass that mobility is in question. I'm afraid that, if we tried today to fight a European land war with old strategies and tactics, the result might be similar to that of World War I, with a massive attrition, a frustrated

public, fleets in being--withheld from action, and trench warfare in the mud. That's one of the reasons why we need new strategies.

The second option would be to escalate the intensity of the conflict, horizontally or vertically. We could either use conventional means, or bring in tactical nuclear weapons as we have threatened. But to me that option seems fraught with enormous risk. I'm not sure when our "tactical" weapons become "strategic" and in whose eyes. There is no agreement on such definitions, nor do we fully understand the linkages.

The other two options are to alter the geographic scope or the focus of the conflict, and to change the duration of the fighting.

A strong defense at the point of attack would not by itself create pressure to end the war. Escalation is an effective deterrent option but very, very risky. It is these last two forms, changing scope, locale, and duration of a conflict that give flexibility and maneuver options to national decision makers. At the heart of these two forms are maritime forces.

Our primary objective early in a conflict is to execute national policy while limiting expansion of the battle. If it cannot be limited, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and duration will become necessary. After gaining maritime superiority, we can deny the Soviets any advantage through expansion. If we choose, we can expand the conflict to areas where the Soviets do not want to fight.

The Maritime Strategy can be described as mobile, forward and flanking--providing options. For example, if a battle is joined on the Central Front, a Maritime Strategy would enable the Western Alliance to secure the sea lines of communication, to defeat attacks on the European flanks and in the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy. This will hinder Soviet reinforcement of the center while we change the balance of power on the ground there.

We must compare our strategy to likely Soviet courses of action. This is one estimate of their priorities:

POSSIBLE

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME STRATEGY

WITH NAVAL FORCES

- Assumes war with West global
 - Primary Soviet tasks
 - Ensure Soviet SSBN survival
 - Prevent US SSBN strikes
 - Prevent other nuclear-capable force strikes
 - Methods
 - Sea Control in contiguous waters
 - Sea denial beyond these areas
 - Cut sea lines
-

They would integrate strategic and tactical systems and attempt to maintain maritime superiority near their shores. They would attempt to frustrate our use of the seas beyond. They would try to cut the lines by which we would be supporting the land war in Europe.

The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases if deterrence fails. There is intentionally no time line attached to them. Since they represent the direction in which we prefer to go, not a timetable. We must be flexible. This parallels closely some of the Pacific campaign of 1942 to 1945.

MARITIME STRATEGY

- Phase I: "Transition to War"
 - Phase II: "Seize the Initiative"
 - Phase III: "Carry the Fight to the Enemy"
-

The transition phase includes rising tensions. It could include one or more crises, maybe even a regional war involving U.S. and Soviet or surrogate forces. Those crises might cause us to maldeploy our forces for a war against the Warsaw Pact.

MARITIME STRATEGY

(Phase I)

"Transition to War"

Goals

- Win in a crisis or small war
 - Deter escalation
 - Prepare for global war
-
- Position forward
 - Increase readiness
 - Decrease vulnerability
 - Avoid maldeployment
 - Husband resources
 - Maximize warning time
 - Cede no vital area by default
-

Clearly we would prefer this to be the final phase by controlling a crisis or keeping a small war from spreading.

Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely political decision making will be crucial. Dr. Henry Kissinger pointed out that what could have been done with one battalion or even one bullet in the mid-1930's took combined armies and navies in the 1940's. But early decisive military actions like Grenada are frowned upon by the lotus eaters and those who only want peace in their time.

In this phase Soviet and other Warsaw Pact fleet and aviation units might deploy to areas that would decrease their vulnerability. At this point U.S. Naval forces could deploy forward and join up with allied navies. Don't forget, it takes 10 days to get from Norfolk to the Med, about the same from California to North Pac and 24 days to the I.O. from either coast. With enemy and Allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major Soviet attack could occur, and actual large-scale warfare between the Soviet Union and Free World forces would commence at sea.

This commences Phase II, in which we would seek to "seize the initiative" as far forward as possible.

MARITIME STRATEGY

(Phase II)

"Seize the Initiative"

Goals:

- Attrition of enemy forces
 - Forward protection of the SLOCS
 - Survival or allied joint forces
 - Maneuver for favorable position
 - Take the offense
-

Note that, while this strategy describes each warfare area separately, they would actually occur more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may well move to Phase III very quickly.

Fundamental to our eventual success is destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet. U.S. and allied submarines would conduct ASW operations far forward. U.S. and allied mine and submarine barrier operations would be initiated at key choke points. Forward deployed allied patrol aircraft would operate to the extent they could without suffering unacceptable losses, in traditional barrier operations. Allied task groups would perform area ASW operations.

In the initial anti-air warfare (AAW) campaign, carrier battle forces would engage Soviet air as far forward as possible in outer air battles, to cause maximum attrition. Available land-based air from the U.S. Air Force and our Allies would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea, in the Mediterranean, and in the Northwest Pacific. Joint and combined operations would also be possible in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. The initial intermingling of Soviet and U.S. and allied forces in such the places as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean would ensure early and intense engagements in those areas.

Should it be necessary, air strikes and offensive mining could be conducted against Soviet allies and distant bases. Strikes might be necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, Japan, and elsewhere. U.S. Air Force and allied support would be particularly useful here. U.S. and allied marine operations in Norway and possibly amphibious insertions elsewhere are also possible.

In this third phase we would want to press home the initiative. Again, some geographic theaters may see us move into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

MARITIME STRATEGY

(Phase III)

"Carry the Fight to the Enemy"

Goals

- Press home the initiative
 - Destroy Soviet forces
 - Retain/regain territory
 - Keep SLOCS open
 - Support land/air campaign
-

Heavy strikes on the flanks would be conducted as battle forces massed and moved further forward with reduced risk and higher confidence of success. We would seek to apply full global pressure. We will not permit the Soviets to fight only on the territory of our allies.

In all these phases, the sea lines of communication would be utilized to support the war effort. Sealift of military reinforcement and resupply from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is, of course, critical to our success in taking the fight to the enemy. Over 90% of American reinforcement and resupply cargoes to the forward theaters goes by sea. These sea lines of communication must be defended. Also, the oil and other economic shipping SLOCs are important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially by our allies.

The desired culmination of any wartime strategy is stated as "war termination on favorable terms." No one has defined victory since the invention of ICBMs. Successful war termination requires sufficient conventional pressure to convince the Soviets that they would have nothing to gain in continuing aggression, and in fact should retreat, while giving them no incentives to escalate to nuclear war.

These are what we see as the primary strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Pact navies we'll be facing. Our tasks are designed to exploit the weaknesses and avoid or tactically weaken their strengths. You will explore these during the year so I won't spend time on them here. These are areas where we could use student research efforts this year.

SOVIET NAVY

● STRENGTHS TO BE REDUCED, AVOIDED AND NEUTRALIZED

- Submarine numbers
- Under-ice operations
- Land-based aviation
- Cruise missiles
- Mine warfare
- Chemical warfare
- Merchant ship adaptability
- Overseas allies/clients

● WEAKNESSES TO BE EXPLOITED

- Geography
 - Fleet fragmented
 - Long transit times to open ocean
 - Choke points
 - Training
 - Sea-based aviation
 - Amphibious assault
 - Underway sustainability
-

In any war there are critical uncertainties--all those difficult items to forecast. Some we can control to a degree, and are expanding much effort to do so. Most we cannot. These are the tough questions:

- Will any of the nations with nuclear weapons choose to use them at sea or ashore? What is the linkage?

- Will our warning time be long enough and our reaction time short enough?

- Will we correctly perceive the Soviet strategy? We have not done well at all over the past 50 years.

- Will alliances hold together or will national interests serve to fragment them?

- Can we prevail through the Soviet advertised Battle of the First Salvo, sustain ourselves for the long term, and maintain both national will and credible capability despite attrition?

The answers to those questions may prove critical to the outcome of the war.

That's enough food for thought for one sitting. You will be presented a vast smorgasbord of issues and information during your year here. You can't consume it all. Focus on the important

strategic and tactical problems. Don't be distracted by bureaucrats, toilet covers, and ashtrays. Don't forget, the Maritime Strategy is one of joint and combined operations with our allies. It is mobile with flexibility in its options and it is, first of all, deterrent.

I opened this pitch with some lines from Lewis Carroll; let me close with a few lines from the author of Winnie the Pooh. Don't become like the nautical person described by A. A. Milne when he said:

There was an old sailor my grandfather knew,
Who had so many things that he wanted to do,
That whenever he thought it was time to begin,
He couldn't, because of the state he was in.