

# The Maritime Strategy

An aerial photograph of a ship's deck, likely an aircraft carrier, viewed from a high angle. The deck is dark and features white markings, including a long, narrow runway-like path. The ship is surrounded by a vast expanse of blue ocean with white-capped waves. The sky is a pale, clear blue. The overall tone is monochromatic, dominated by blues and greys.

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# The Maritime Strategy

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## From the Executive Director

Naval strategy has recently received more attention than in any peacetime era since Alfred Thayer Mahan dominated the scene. This unusual prominence stems from the Navy's attempt to think through and spell out a maritime strategy within the national military strategy. Because the best developed and most detailed statements of "The Maritime Strategy" have been available only in classified versions, public debate between its supporters and detractors has often suffered from misinterpretations or exaggerations.

This supplement provides the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified form. They are the nearest thing to a British "White Paper"—that is, an official statement of policy—that we are likely to encounter in the American political system.

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
*By Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN*

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# The Maritime Strategy





# The Maritime Strategy

By Admiral James D. Watkins, U. S. Navy

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The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy is to use maritime power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination on favorable terms.






The United States is inevitably a maritime nation, and the United States and its Navy have inescapable global responsibilities. A carefully designed strategy has always been an imperative, but the need for a sound strategy has grown all the more important as the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge U. S. interests worldwide. Accordingly, three years ago, we reviewed our extant strategy—a strategy with broad contours reasonably well understood, but one which had not been submitted to the rigor inherent in codification. The result of that effort was the Maritime Strategy.

The Maritime Strategy, the maritime component of the National Military Strategy, helps us think and plan intelligently for the global use of naval forces from peacetime through global war to war termination. It is a strategy for

timelines, tactical doctrine, or specific target sets. Instead, it offers a global perspective to operational commanders and provides a foundation for advice to the National Command Authorities. The strategy has become a key element in shaping Navy programmatic decisions. It is of equal value as a vehicle for shaping and disseminating a professional consensus on warfighting where it matters—at sea.

#### *National Military Strategy and the Maritime Role*

Our national military strategy is designed: to preserve this country's political identity, framework, and institutions; to protect the United States, including its foreign assets and allies; to foster the country's economic well-being; and to bolster an international order supportive of



today's forces, today's capabilities, and today's threat. It also is a dynamic concept. We continually gauge its adequacy through our everyday operations, exercises, and war games, and we apply the lessons learned from these experiences to improve and enhance the strategy.

Before discussing the strategy in detail, it is important to define its bounds and perspective. The Maritime Strategy is firmly set in the context of national strategy, emphasizing coalition warfare and the criticality of allies, and demanding cooperation with our sister services. Moreover, the Maritime Strategy recognizes that the unified and specified commanders fight the wars, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and thus does not purport to be a detailed war plan with firm

the vital interests of this country and its allies. To achieve these ends, our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity.

Deterrence simply means convincing a potential aggressor that the risks involved in aggression are greater than its possible benefits. The Soviets, or any other potential aggressors, will not be deterred by empty threats and rhetoric. A credible deterrent must have ready and capable forces behind it and the commitment to use them if necessary. Our formal alliances and treaties with 43 nations also require forward posture to reaffirm United States resolve and bolster alliance solidarity, which redounds to the credibility of our deterrence.

As the naval component of the National Military Strat-





U. S. COAST GUARD (B. VOULGARIS)

egy, the Maritime Strategy is designed to support campaigns in ground theaters of operations both directly and indirectly. Its success depends on the contributions of our sister services and allies. Accordingly, we place great emphasis on joint operations. In addition to our historic relationship with the Marine Corps, we have strengthened our partnerships with the Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the planning, exercising, and executing of joint operations.

An important part of our cooperative effort has been the Memorandum of Agreement I signed with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in September 1982. This agreement accelerated such ongoing efforts as routinely including Air Force units in fleet exercises, developing doctrine and procedures for employment of AWACS and B-52s in maritime missions, and identifying aerial refueling requirements. It also led to several new initiatives such as data link and communications interoperability, and joint air combat training ranges.

A similar example of cooperative efforts to correct combat deficiencies is the Memorandum of Agreement with the Coast Guard establishing Maritime Defense Zones. Under this agreement, Coast Guard units combined with naval forces, both active and reserve, will defend harbors and shipping lanes along our coasts in time of war.

The Navy has also identified 11 areas in a Memorandum of Agreement signed last year between the Army and Air Force where we can contribute to enhanced joint operational effectiveness, and we are pressing ahead to do so. Efforts like these complement vigorous Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) initiatives including JCS-directed joint exercises and pilot projects on tactical and strategic air support to maritime operations.

### *The Era of Violent Peace*

Preparation for global war is the critical element in ensuring deterrence, but our peacetime operations and response in time of crisis are also crucial contributions to deterrence and stability. Therefore, while the peacetime presence and crisis response components of our Maritime Strategy are less detailed and formal than the warfighting component, they are no less important. In fact, the volatil-

The planning, exercising, and executing of joint operations strengthen the Navy's partnerships with the Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard and enhance the value of the Maritime Strategy's contribution to the National Military Strategy. An Air National Guard tanker refuels a Navy F-14 north of Sicily, facing page, and the Coast Guard works with SEAL teams to clear the way for a convoy's departure from Boston during Exercise Ocean Safari 85.

ity of today's international situation suggests that we must expect to employ these elements of our Maritime Strategy in an expanding set of the world's trouble spots. To understand the scope of their worth, we must recognize the chief characteristic of the modern era—a permanent state of what I call violent peace.

The Soviets do not desire a superpower confrontation, for two principal reasons. First, they recognize that there would be no easy victory and the costs would be high. Equally important, though, and consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they believe that history is on their side and that the West will collapse because of the "natural dialectic." To channel the course of history, the Soviets foster evolutionary—as well as revolutionary—change, and support proxies and surrogates—such as Cuba, Libya, Angola, and North Korea—who do their bidding. This results in worldwide challenges to the United States and our allies. We may be technically at peace, but the period since 1945 can be characterized as an era of violent peace.

A principal feature of this era is the continuing and widespread existence of localized conflicts and crises, mostly in the Third World, but often with global implications. This profusion of crises and conflicts has been a feature of the international environment since World War II. In 1984, millions of people were involved in more than 30 armed conflicts throughout the world. These ran the gamut from civil unrest in Sri Lanka, to insurgencies in Central and South America, to civil war in Chad, to direct conflict between states in the Persian Gulf.

These conflicts and other crises with the potential to break into hostilities frequently involve U. S. and allied interests. Transcending the interests of states directly involved, these confrontations often serve as backdrop for potentially more serious conflicts between major powers. A fundamental component of the nation's success in deterring war with the Soviet Union depends upon our ability to stabilize and control escalation in Third World crises.

As a result, our Navy devotes much of its effort to maintaining this stability. Potential crises and the aftermath of crises have increasingly defined the location and character of our forward deployments. We now maintain a continual presence in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean, as well as our more traditional forward deployments to the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. Although we are not at war today, our operating tempo has been about 20% higher than during the Vietnam War. This indicates increased need for forces-in-being during peacetime, a need made more acute by the probability that, should war come, there will be only a brief time for mobilization. In this age of violent peace, the Navy is on the front lines already, and will be for the foreseeable future.



# VICTORIA

## VICTORIA DE SIMBOLIO DE LA JUSTI



SYGMA (L'ESPRESSO)

**To channel the course of history, the Soviets foster evolutionary—as well as revolutionary—change, and support proxies and surrogates—such as Cuba, Libya, Angola, and North Korea—who do their bidding. True to form, the chief Soviet surrogate in Latin America, Fidel Castro, was at Daniel Ortega's right hand during the Nicaraguan president's inauguration last year.**

The international setting is complicated by the proliferation of modern, high-technology weaponry in the Third World. Certainly the most alarming aspect of this proliferation is the growing numbers of nations in positions to acquire mass annihilation weapons—chemical, biological, and even nuclear. Even in the absence of such weapons, impressive conventional arsenals possessed by Third World nations pose an immediate concern. While these weapons do not fundamentally change the causes of instability, they do change the nature of conflict and the threats we face. Naval forces must be prepared to encounter high-technology, combined-arms threats in virtually every ocean of the world.

The rise of state-sponsored terrorism is a new and disturbing phenomenon. Its unpredictability, worldwide scope, and anonymity render it one of the most insidious threats we face today. Terrorism is not new, but the threat has increased because terrorism has, in some cases, become a preferred arm of state action. If not countered, it can be effective against targeted forward-deployed forces. By placing at risk forward-deployed forces, terrorists (and their state sponsors) hope to be able to intimidate us into withdrawing, thereby undermining our credibility.

At the same time, the Soviets exploit instability in the Third World to promote governments that support Soviet ideology, improve the Soviet strategic position, and re-

duce Western influence. Soviet methods include support and encouragement of limited warfare by Cuban, Libyan, and North Korean proxies as well as direct crisis response by their own forces.

Since 1948, the Third World has been the most common arena for United States-Soviet competition, and this pattern will continue. U. S. interests and commitments are worldwide, and increasingly focus on the Third World. Our economy and security require oil from the Persian Gulf and Caribbean, and strategic minerals from southern Africa. Our trade with nations of the Pacific Basin now surpasses that with Europe. Obviously, we have vital stakes in what happens in these and other key areas.

As the challenges to peace and stability increase, so do the Soviets' capabilities for global military reach. Their military airlift and sealift have grown significantly. The Soviet Navy, with a large deck aircraft carrier under construction, is increasingly capable of sustained distant operations. In addition, the Soviets continue to expand and improve their attack submarine force, making it a formidable global threat. They also have enhanced their access to air and naval facilities in key strategic locations, including Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and Vietnam.

Moscow recently established its first fully developed overseas base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. These facilities can support a large concentration of Soviet naval forces, maintaining a permanent naval force astride key sea-lanes to our Pacific allies and friends. From this base Soviet forces can strike key United States and friendly forces and installations as far north as Hong Kong.

Improved power projection forces and global access provide the Soviets a growing capability to intervene militarily in the Third World. They steadily improve their ability to sever vital sea lines of communication, while im-



proving their ability to counter U. S. crisis reaction moves. Responding effectively to Third World crises may well require that U. S. Navy units bring the range of capabilities necessary to deal with Soviet as well as Third World threats.

### *Soviet Military Strategy*

The Soviet Union has an integrated strategy which seeks to use all Soviet military forces in a coherent fashion to meet Soviet national goals. While we are uncertain of the details of Soviet strategy, its broad outlines are clear. The Soviets appear to assume a future war with the West will be global in scope, violent, and decisive. In such a war the total military power of the state will be expected to serve clearly defined political goals.

Even in such a war the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons lightly, preferring to achieve their goals with conventional means. Nuclear weapons nonetheless have a central place in Soviet military thought. A war between the superpowers may not involve immediate nuclear weapons use, but it is, in Soviet eyes, still a "nuclear" war in the sense that the nuclear balance is constantly examined and evaluated in anticipation of possible escalation. Because of this aspect of Soviet doctrine, the Soviets place a high priority on changing the nuclear balance, or as they term it, the nuclear correlation of forces, during conventional operations.

The probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in global war would be a combined-arms assault against Europe, where they would seek a quick and decisive victory. As prudent military planners, the Soviets would, of course, prefer to be able to concentrate on a single theater; a central premise of U. S. strategy is to deny them such an option.

Soviet overseas clients and surrogates outside the Warsaw Pact may join in an attack. Figure 1 shows that some of these clients sit astride critical sea lines of communication. Any Western strategy must, of necessity, hedge against such third country involvement. Naval forces are ideally suited to provide such a hedge. Routinely forward

Figure 1 *Soviet Clients and Surrogates*



deployed in the vicinity of these nations, naval forces possess the required warfighting capability to accomplish the task and move on to more demanding requirements.

While Soviet ground and air forces conduct a massive offensive, a critical Soviet Navy role in a future conflict would be to protect the Soviet homeland and their ballistic missile submarines, which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic reserve. Consistent with its overall stress on the nuclear balance, Soviet doctrine gives high priority to locating and destroying Western sea-based nuclear assets, including aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and Tomahawk-equipped platforms. The Soviets would particularly like to be able to destroy our ballistic missile submarines, but lack the antisubmarine warfare capability to implement such a mission. Other roles, such as interdicting sea lines of communication or supporting the Soviet Army, while important, will probably be secondary, at least at the war's start.

This view of the Soviet Navy's role in overall Soviet strategy suggests that initially the bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small fraction deployed forward. Soviet exercises confirm such an interpretation. Figure 2 shows the areas in which these exercises take place. It is important to recognize that these arcs encompass Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Thus, the option some advocate, of holding our maritime power near home waters, would inevitably lead to abandoning our allies. This is unacceptable, morally, legally, and strategically. Allied strategy *must* be prepared to fight in forward areas. That is where our allies are and where our adversary will be.

### *The Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Presence*


Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable component of our forces for deterring strategic nuclear war. The Maritime Strategy provides a framework for considering all uses of maritime power. Among the greatest services we can provide the nation is to operate in peacetime and in crises in a way that will

Figure 2 *Soviet Naval Exercise Areas*





Figure 3 *The Spectrum of Conflict*



deter war. Figure 3, which illustrates the spectrum of conflict, draws attention to the importance of the lower levels of violence where navies are most often the key actors.

By its peacetime presence throughout the world, the Navy enhances deterrence daily. Our forward deployments maintain U. S. access on fair and reasonable terms to oil, other necessary resources, and markets, and deter and defend against attempts at physical denial of sea and air lines of communications critical to maintenance of the U. S. and allied economies. They provide a clear sign of U. S. interest in a given nation or region, and of U. S. commitment to protect its interests and its citizens.

One key goal of our peacetime strategy is to further international stability through support of regional balances of power. The more stable the international environment, the lower the probability that the Soviets will risk war with the West. Thus our peacetime strategy must support U. S. alliances and friendships. We accomplish this through a variety of peacetime operations including naval ship visits to foreign ports and training and exercises with foreign naval forces.

In 1984, for example, the Navy and Marine Corps visited 108 countries and conducted joint exercises with 55 foreign countries. Often taken for granted, port visits and joint training and exercises have a material impact around the world in stabilizing peace, reminding friend and foe alike that we are able and have the will to defend the interests of ourselves and our treaty allies.

#### *The Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response*

The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with the Soviets ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control. Our ability to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability to prevent global conflict.

Crisis response has long been the business of the Navy and Marine Corps. Between 1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of American military forces, naval forces constituted the principal element of our response in about 80% of the crises. Reasons for selecting naval forces as the instrument of choice for crisis management and deterrence of conflicts are illuminating:

▶ Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make

naval forces readily available at crisis locations worldwide, providing significant deterrent value and reducing the likelihood of ambiguous or short warning.

▶ Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.

▶ Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister services.

▶ Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.

▶ Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence. Capabilities demonstrated in actual crises include maintaining presence, conducting surveillance, threatening use of force, conducting naval gunfire or air strikes, landing Marines, evacuating civilians, establishing a blockade or quarantine, and preventing intervention by Soviet or other forces.

▶ Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control. Naval forces can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn. The flexibility and the precision available in employing naval forces provide escalation control in any crisis, but have particular significance in those crises which might involve the Soviet Union.

The peacetime and crisis response components of the Maritime Strategy are evolving, robust, and designed to foster a stable international setting. This is important for deterrence. Although deterrence is most often associated with strategic nuclear warfare, it is a much broader concept. To protect national interests, we must deter threats ranging from terrorism to nuclear war. This requires a credible peacetime and wartime capability at the level of conflict we seek to deter. Our national interest also requires an extended deterrent capability. Perhaps most importantly, protecting national interests while preventing war requires the ability to control escalation, and naval forces and our peacetime strategy are ideally suited for that purpose.

If our peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well, deterrence is far less likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the Navy would be used in a global war against the Soviets.

#### *The Maritime Strategy: Warfighting*

Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy the United States must counter. The key to doing so is to ensure that they will have to face the prospect of prolonged global conflict. Maritime forces have a major role to play in this regard. The strategy setting forth their contribution consists of three phases: deterrence or the transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy. There are no fixed time frames associated with these phases; they provide a broad outline of



what we want to accomplish, not an attempt to predict an inherently unpredictable future.

*Phase I: Deterrence or the Transition to War:* The initial phase of the Maritime Strategy would be triggered by recognition that a specific international situation has the potential to grow to a global superpower confrontation. Such a confrontation may come because an extra-European crisis escalated or because of problems in Europe. In either event, this phase of the Maritime Strategy deals with a superpower confrontation analogous to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where war with the Soviet Union is a real possibility.

The goal of this phase is deterrence. Through early, worldwide, decisive use of sea power we—along with sister services and allies as appropriate—would seek to win the crisis, to control escalation, and, by the global nature of our operations, to make clear our intention to cede no area to the Soviets by default and to deny them the option to engage in hostilities on their terms. While seeking to enhance deterrence at the brink of war, we must also consider that deterrence may fail. Thus preparing for the transition to war, specifically to global war, is an integral aspect of this phase.

Keys to the success of both the initial phase and the strategy as a whole are speed and decisiveness in national decisionmaking. The United States must be in position to deter the Soviets' "battle of the first salvo" or deal with that if it comes. Even though a substantial fraction of the fleet is forward deployed in peacetime, prompt decisions

are needed to permit rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis. Table 1 indicates the times required for illustrative movements of combatants and support ships throughout the world and illustrates the importance of the Panama and Suez Canals in facilitating repositioning. Such early deployment is reversible and not necessarily provocative.

The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be prepared to fight. Aggressive forward movement of anti-submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines. This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive, early attempt to interdict our sea lines of communication and counters such operations against them that the Soviets undertake.

Early embarkation of Marine amphibious forces takes advantage of their flexibility and would be matched with forward movement of maritime prepositioning ship squadrons toward most likely areas of employment. Moving one Marine amphibious brigade by air to rendezvous with its

**Because U. S. naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces—the USS *Iowa* (BB-61) steams with the British frigate *Brilliant* and the Canadian frigate *Nipigon*—we are better prepared to use sea power early and worldwide, to deter the Soviets from war.**

U. S. NAVY (J. HILTON)





Table 1 *Combatant Repositioning Steaming Times*

<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>Steaming Days</i>
U. S. East Coast	Northern Atlantic	7
U. S. East Coast	Mediterranean	10
U. S. East Coast	Indian Ocean	24 <sup>1</sup>
U. S. West Coast	Northern Atlantic	31 <sup>2</sup>
U. S. West Coast	Western Pacific	9
U. S. West Coast	Indian Ocean	24
Mediterranean	Northern Atlantic	6
Mediterranean	Indian Ocean	21 <sup>3</sup>
Indian Ocean	Northern Atlantic	24
Western Pacific	Indian Ocean	14

<sup>1</sup>Subtract 6 days by using Suez Canal <sup>2</sup>Subtract 13 days by using Panama Canal

<sup>3</sup>Subtract 15 days by using Suez Canal

Note: Based on closure times at 20-knot speed of advance.

repositioned equipment and reinforce Norway provides a convincing signal of alliance solidarity.

Early forward deployment of sea-based air power also is essential to support our allies, particularly Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Early forward movement of carrier battle forces provides prudent positioning of our forces in order to support the requirements of the unified commanders and to roll back Soviet forces, should war come. It does

U. S. NAVY (W. W. BOLLINGER)



not imply some immediate "Charge of the Light Brigade" attack on the Kola Peninsula or any other specific target.

Forward deployment must be global as well as early. Deployments to the Western Pacific directly enhance deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe, by providing a clear indication that, should war come, the Soviets will not be able to ignore any region of the globe. Should deterrence fail, such deployments tie down Soviet forces, especially strike aircraft, limiting the Soviets' ability to concentrate their forces on Central Europe. Thus, even in its earliest phase, the Maritime Strategy, by exerting global pressure on the Soviet Union, can help ease the burden for NATO forces in Europe.

In addition to allowing rapid deployment, speed and decisiveness in national decisionmaking are crucial to the strategy's overall execution. As more functions are transferred to the reserve forces, execution of the President's authority to call up reservists (currently limited to 100,000 in number) becomes increasingly crucial to successful implementation of the strategy. Virtually the entire Navy cargo-handling capability, for example, and all Navy combat search and rescue capability depend on reservists. Their prompt call-up is imperative. In a similar fashion, an early decision to place the Coast Guard under Navy command and control will have a major impact on the rapidity with which the strategy can be implemented.

An important aspect of the strategy's initial phase is





Submarines (the USS *San Francisco* [SSN-711] pictured) and maritime patrol aircraft, like this Naval Reserve P-3 preparing to take off, will force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines.

sealift. In 1984, the Secretary of the Navy established sealift as the third primary mission of the Navy, along with sea control and power projection. This increased emphasis recognizes the importance of both economic and military resupply. By the end of the decade, we will have adequate sealift for the movement of military forces. But we will neither be able to tolerate attrition typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we will require. For this reason, early and effective uses of existing sealift are essential.

*Phase II: Seizing the Initiative:* We cannot predict where the first shot will be fired should deterrence fail, but almost certainly the conflict will involve Europe. If war comes, we will move into the second phase of the strategy in which the Navy will seize the initiative as far forward as possible. Naval forces will destroy Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients if required, and fight our way toward Soviet home waters.

Seizing the initiative is vital for several reasons. First, it demonstrates to our allies this country's determination to prevail and thus, contributes to alliance solidarity. Second, the history of war tells us that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying an opponent's forces. Finally, seizing the initiative opens the way to apply direct pressure on the Soviets to end the war on our terms—the new goal of our strategy once deterrence has failed. Indeed, it is possible that, faced with our determination, the Soviets can be induced to accept war termination while still in this phase.

The Soviets will probably focus their offensive on Central Europe, while attempting to maintain a defensive pos-

ture elsewhere. Instead, we must dilute their effort, divert their attention, and force them to divide their forces. We must control the type and tempo of conflict, making sure the Soviets understand that they can take no area for granted. To accomplish this, maritime forces must counter a first salvo, wear down the enemy forces, protect sea lines of communication, continue reinforcement and resupply, and improve positioning. We must defeat Soviet maritime strength in all its dimensions, including base support. That converts to classic Navy tasks of antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, counter command and control, strike operations, antiair warfare, mine warfare, special operations, amphibious operations, and sealift. Each is essential if the strategy is to succeed.

One of the most complex aspects of Phase II of the Maritime Strategy is antisubmarine warfare. It will be essential to conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as well as to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using maritime patrol aircraft, mines, attack submarines, or sonobuoys, to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the open ocean where the Western Alliance's resupply lines can be threatened. Maritime air and anti-submarine warfare units will be involved, along with offensive and defensive mining. As the battle groups move forward, we will wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. This aggressive action ensures that we prevent such losses as the Germans inflicted on allied shipping between January and July of 1942 when 14 of 50 then-operational German U-boats sunk 450 ships, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4 *U-Boat Victories, January–July 1942*







L & L GINDESEN

**While the West German Navy will bear the brunt of the antisurface warfare campaign in the Baltic, Turkish forces like the Penguin missile-armed *Sahin* will be doing the same in the Black Sea.**

Antiair warfare is equally complex and equally important. It demands both offense and defense in depth, long-range indication and warning, long-range interception and surveillance, and base neutralization, and is an area where the contribution of our allies and sister services is particularly important. The overriding goal is to counter the Soviets' missile-launching platforms, to shoot the archer before he releases his arrows. Not only is it easier to destroy bombers than missiles, but the bomber destroyed today cannot return with more missiles tomorrow. Our strategy envisions making extensive use of jamming, deception, and decoys to counter the enemy's targeting capability. Area defensive weapons will deal with in-bound missiles or, in some cases, aircraft that leak through our offensive thrust. No single approach will be sufficient; countering the Soviet air threat through offensive antiair warfare demands a layered approach.

Antisurface warfare involves carriers, submarines, cruise missile-equipped surface ships, and land-based forces eliminating forward-deployed Soviet surface ships at the outset of conflict. This requires appropriate rules of engagement at the brink of war to avoid losing the battle of the first salvo which is so important in Soviet doctrine. Our allies also have a critical role to play in antisurface warfare. Germany, for example, will bear the brunt of the campaign in the Baltic while the Turks will be key players in the Black Sea. As our forces move forward, antisurface warfare will continue, with a goal the elimination of the Soviet fleets worldwide.

Successes in antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare are crucial to effective prosecution of offensive strike warfare. The battle groups are central to defeating Soviet air, submarine, and surface forces. To apply our immense strike capability, we must move carriers into positions where, combined with the U. S. Air Force and allied forces, they can bring to bear the added strength needed on NATO's Northern or Southern flanks, or in Northeast Asia. Further, selective use of naval forces on the Central Front could have an important stabilizing impact. The strike power of carrier battle forces can also be augmented with conventional land-attack Tomahawks launched from submarines or surface ships. All of these

would be brought to bear as the unified commanders direct. The strategy does not envision automatic attacks on any specific targets, but the main threats to our fleet during this phase are the "Backfires" and other missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. The United States cannot allow our adversary to assume he will be able to attack the fleet with impunity, from inviolable sanctuaries.

The nature of these battle force operations is not always understood. One often hears self-appointed strategic experts suggest that elimination of a carrier battle group would be a simple task and that such a group represents a single target. In attempting to explain the evolution of battle force formations since World War II, I sometimes use pictures like Figure 5, showing the Eastern United States on the same scale as the 56,000 square miles that a typical carrier battle group formation might occupy.

In amphibious warfare, the United States has the flexibility of conducting a Marine amphibious brigade size raid or forcible entry by the 55,000 men of a Marine amphibious force. Such operations could be conducted alone or in conjunction with the allied marine forces, as directed by the unified commanders. The principal requirement would be to seize a beachhead for the introduction of follow-up forces, either from other services or from other countries.


Mine countermeasures form yet another important aspect of the strategy. The West must be ready to clear mines whenever and wherever necessary. Mine warfare provides a striking example of the importance of our allies to the Maritime Strategy. The Commander, Mine Warfare Command, executes a very aggressive cooperative program with our allies, traveling to roughly 40 nations every year to ensure that we integrate both allied mine-clearing and allied offensive mine-laying operations.

In addition to these traditional combat tasks, implementing Phase II of the Maritime Strategy depends on other efforts. It is crucial that we counter the Soviets' capability both to control their forces and to locate and target ours. Maritime forces, working with other assets, must confuse, deceive, and disrupt Soviet command and control. They must also deny the Soviets a targeting capability through platform destruction, jamming, dispersal, and emission control.

Finally, we must support our forces as we fight. Mobile logistic support forces, sustained sealift, and the use of Navy Seabees to establish advanced bases all play a role in a forward logistic support concept which is a prerequisite for seizing the initiative. Logistics and sustainability are



Figure 5 *Carrier Battle Group Dispersed Formation*



integral to the success of any strategy; they are especially vital in one such as ours which demands aggressive, sustained, forward operations.

*Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy:* The tasks in this phase are similar to those of earlier phases, but must be more aggressively applied as we seek war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Our goal would be to complete the destruction of all the Soviet fleets which was begun in Phase II. This destruction allows us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters, with both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite credible to the Soviets. At the same time, antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.

During this final phase the United States and its allies would press home the initiative worldwide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sealift, and keeping sea lines of communication open. Amphibious forces, up to the size of a full Marine amphibious force, would be used to regain territory. In addition, the full weight of the carrier battle forces could continue to "roll up" the Soviets on the flanks, contribute to the battle on the Central Front, or carry the war to the Soviets. These tough operations close to the Soviet motherland could even come earlier than the final phase.

I have discussed various tasks separately, but they must be implemented simultaneously on, over, and under the sea. Our forces combine in a synergistic way, both to deter and to win if deterrence fails. One of the truly unique aspects of naval warfare is its awesome complexity, as forcefully portrayed in Figure 6.


The complexity of the tasks makes it essential that we not attempt to micro-manage the war from Washington, but rather that we provide options and broad concepts to assist the unified commanders in implementing their detailed plans. Command, control, communications, and intelligence combine to form the glue that binds this entire effort together. And space is an essential factor in command, control, communications, and intelligence. The Navy is the number one tactical user of information from space. We recover the information, fuse it in real time, and continuously disseminate it to all tactical users at sea. Although we have long understood the importance of space intuitively, the Maritime Strategy clarifies the essentiality of space for a Navy with global responsibilities.

#### *Maritime Strategy and War Termination*

The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy, particularly of Phase III, is to use maritime power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination on favorable terms. In a global war, our objectives are to:



Figure 6 *The Complexity of Modern Naval Warfare*



- ▶ Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the conflict will be neither short nor localized.
- ▶ Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and a necessary step for us to realize our objectives.
- ▶ Influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power.
- ▶ Terminate the war on terms acceptable to us and to our allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces.

The Soviets place great weight on the nuclear correlation of forces, even during the time before nuclear weapons have been used. Maritime forces can influence that correlation, both by destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines and by improving our own nuclear posture, through deployment of carriers and Tomahawk platforms around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Some argue that such steps will lead to immediate escalation, but escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable, given the Soviet land orientation. Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no useful purpose for the Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the United States' retaliatory posture would be enhanced. Nei-

ther we nor the Soviets can rule out the possibility that escalation will occur, but aggressive use of maritime power can make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day.

The real issue, however, is not the Maritime Strategy is influenced by nuclear weapons, but the reverse: how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation. As our maritime campaign progresses, and as the nuclear option becomes less attractive, prolonging the war also becomes unattractive, since the Soviets cannot decouple Europe from the United States and the risk of escalation is always present. Maritime forces thus provide strong pressure for war termination that can come from nowhere else.

Our strategy is not without risk. The strategy depends on early reaction to crisis and the political will to make difficult decisions early. It will require flexibility to meet the inevitable changes in Soviet strategy. To some, that aspect of the strategy which focuses on altering the nuclear balance may seem dangerous. But the risks exist for both sides; that is the nature of deterrence.

#### *Executing the Maritime Strategy*

Strategy is a design for relating means to ends. The ends are clear: deterrence or—should deterrence fail—war ter-



mination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. The means are also clear: the 600-ship Navy. The warfighting capabilities of our ships, aircraft, and submarines, and the immense advantage of American sailors with their well-known pride and professionalism, provide powerful means. But can the design work? Will the means be sufficient? My answer to both questions is yes.

I am confident that we can succeed if put to the test because of the vast intelligence and experience that has been brought to bear in the Maritime Strategy's development. It is based on the collective professional judgments of numerous flag officers, especially those in command positions in the fleet. It has benefited from the efforts of the Strategic Studies Group, top-performing Navy and

Marine Corps officers who spend a year in Newport working directly for me in refining and expanding our strategic horizons. It has been reviewed, examined, and improved by military and civilian scholars inside and outside of government. Thus, our strategic thinking represents the collective judgment of the very best thinkers.

I also have confidence in the Maritime Strategy because we test it in exercises, in war games, and in real-life scenarios. In 1984, for example, the Navy participated in 106 major exercises, 55 of which involved our allies. Such exercises are an integral part of our deterrent strategy and a major source of my confidence that, should deterrence fail, maritime forces will have the skill, capability, and experience to prevail.

## The Real Reformers

The development and application of maritime strategy profoundly affect today's Navy in many ways. Perhaps the most important of these is the way in which our revitalized emphasis on strategy provides a focus for substantial reform of the Navy from within. The Navy has changed; the Navy is changing; and the Navy will continue to change. This change, however, is neither mindless or directionless, nor is it a defensive reaction to criticisms from outside the Navy. The evolution of our Navy is today based on the recently developed Maritime Strategy, consciously adopted by the Navy's leadership. We are, in fact, the real reformers.

It appears, however, that these fundamental and substantial developments are invisible to those outside the profession. Public perceptions frequently seem to be shaped by the superficially appealing manifestos of self-proclaimed civilian defense reformers, who assert that those of us in uniform have become bureaucrats rather than strategists and tacticians, that we have no strategy, and that we are incapable of reforming ourselves from within. To be sure, we carefully and repeatedly rebut unfair criticisms and specific arguments which we find objectionable. But to many people, our rebuttals seem to show us to be against a great many things without being for anything other than the status quo. There is a real danger that our critics have gained the intellectual high ground, too often causing us to appear defensive and reactive, rebutting their arguments in the perceived absence of clearly enunciating an alternative vision.

This is why it is important to understand the nature of reform itself, and the relationship of change and continu-

ity in the naval profession. Reform is almost by definition a good thing, and continual reform is essential to the vitality of the Navy. Indeed, most naval officers can point with pride to some reforms in which they have personally participated, ranging from changes in the way a particular ship or squadron is run, to major changes in the Navy as a whole.

But continuity and stability are also important. We cannot lightly undertake reforms and endure a high percentage of failures. The consequences of failed reforms are not simply economic; they can manifest themselves in personnel and organizational turbulence that may persist for many years, even resulting in significant damage to military preparedness. Some Navy experiences of the early 1970s provide object lessons in damage caused by well-meaning reforms that failed in execution.

Further, tradition and continuity are crucial to our organizational culture and identity, and to our ability to perform consistently. Our professional ethic, standards, and codes of behavior are the legacy of 200 years of naval tradition. We depend on this legacy to provide us perspective, help us through difficult periods, and bind together the community of seagoing men and women. Over the past several years, we have seen the payoff of programs to rebuild a once mislaid sense of pride and professional competence. Interestingly, most of these programs were simply a return to our traditional values and ideals.

Recent emphasis on the Maritime Strategy as the focus for our profession represents a significant change in the contemporary naval establishment and a continuation of the traditions of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and the great

naval reformers of a century ago. It is worthwhile to consider how reforms have been tied to the strategy.

The most striking and far-reaching trend within the naval profession in recent years has been the emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval thought, planning, resource allocation, and operational employment. Since its beginning, development and application of the Maritime Strategy have been and continue to be efforts by naval officers. After decades of abdicating strategic thinking to civilian academicians and armchair strategists, naval officers are again at the forefront of developing strategy and strategic concepts.

Further, development of the Maritime Strategy has been an internally generated, active effort to understand new global realities, and to relate means and resources to national objectives in a changing world. In struggling with this formidable task, the Maritime Strategy has developed several important characteristics, some of which represent a substantially changed strategic vision from that which existed five or ten years ago:

- ▶ The Maritime Strategy is fully consistent with the national strategy documents and directives of this administration which emphasize the importance of maritime superiority to our national defense.
- ▶ It is a global strategy designed to meet a global and diverse threat, embracing all possible theaters of operation and their complex interrelationships, in peace, crisis, or war.
- ▶ It is a forward strategy, keeping with the national policy of forward defense and drawing on the forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility of naval forces.



We augment these exercises with war-gaming, especially at the war-gaming center in Newport. These games stress the combined-arms nature of war and involve our allies and our sister services. Recently, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a crisis war game in which all the joint chiefs and all unified commanders personally participated.

Finally, I am confident we can implement our strategy because we measure it against the real world. For example, recent lessons from the Falklands, air action in the Bekka Valley, Grenada, and the mining of the Red Sea have all been incorporated in our dynamic approach to strategy implementation. To give but one example, in 1984 Secretary Lehman and I instituted the Naval Strike

Warfare Center ("Strike University") in recognition of our need to develop more aggressive strike capabilities in implementing our forward strategy.

### Summary

The basic strategy of the United States, fully supported by the Maritime Strategy, is deterrence. Through worldwide peacetime operations and the ability to react in crisis, maritime forces play a major role in binding together alliances in preventing escalation. If we continue to do our job properly, our strategy for global conventional war will remain a theoretical topic.

In establishing the maritime component of national

► It emphasizes the importance of alliances and coalitions, relying on their major contributions to national security. Further, the Maritime Strategy recognizes the crucial role that naval forces play in binding together our alliances and coalitions.

► It emphasizes the criticality of joint operations with our sister services, an emphasis reflected in exercises and operations, and in a growing number of interservice memoranda of agreement.

► It focuses primarily on the central strategic issue of deterring and, if deterrence fails, fighting a global war against the Soviet Union.

► It increasingly grapples with the issue of diversified violence in an era of violent peace, and considers how to provide deterrence across the entire spectrum of possible conflicts.

► It presents a cohesive menu of global

options for controlling escalation, drawing on the flexibility and range of capabilities inherent in naval forces, avoiding reliance on nuclear weapons, and recognizing potential impacts of altering the balance by conventional means.

Clearly, the Maritime Strategy has generated substantial interest in maritime forces both within the naval profession and beyond. It has helped us explain the Navy's purposes to a number of audiences. Most important, it has produced substantial—though not highly visible—reform of the Navy from within. These reforms can be divided into three general categories.

*Program development.* First, the Maritime Strategy has rationalized, disciplined, and focused Navy program development, budgets, and procurement to a degree that would have seemed remarkable five years ago. Since 1982, the annual Navy program development cycle has commenced with a presentation of the Maritime Strategy. Strategy now drives the entire process and the resulting procurement and research and development decisions. The strategy presentation raises a number of key issues that must be resolved in the budget process. The strategy also provides the foundation for subsequent warfare appraisals, which identify critical requirements to execute the strategy in terms of anti-air warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and other warfare areas as well. Finally, the strategy provides a clear framework against which all budget proposals are judged and a common reference point for all related discussion.

This process of applying the Maritime Strategy to program development has produced a number of important or-

ganizational and programmatic spinoffs. For example, we recently consolidated responsibility for all electronic warfare programs into a single office under the Director of Naval Warfare. The impetus for this reform came from appraisals of electronic warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy.

These appraisals had clearly shown the need for a cross-platform viewpoint—one that avoided piecemeal solutions.

Another example is the recent Master Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy. A review of long-range antisubmarine warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy showed the need for a comprehensive reexamination of our antisubmarine warfare programs to deal with the rapidly advancing Soviet submarine threat. This process has already led to significant changes in antisubmarine warfare research and development programs, and will provide the rationale for our assignment of cross-platform organizational responsibilities.

Yet another example is a growing awareness of the importance of space-based systems to maritime forces. For too many years, we viewed space as a technological and scientific playground outside the mainstream of naval warfare. But the process of developing a global, forward strategy and using it to drive Navy programs has brought into sharp focus the essential tactical contributions of space-based systems across all mission areas and platforms. This awareness led to the establishment of the Naval Space Command to direct space-related operations, the formation of a Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command to manage procurement and research and development, and formulation of programmatic actions to develop new systems and make better



U. S. NAVY (P. J. SALES)

**Once again, the Naval War College is the crucible of strategic and tactical thought that it was at the turn of the century. Its facilities provide the tools to help "the real reformers" make their reforms.**



strategy, we have been guided by several principles:

▶ Maritime Strategy is derived from national military strategy and is an integral component of that strategy. The purpose of our strategy is deterrence; should deterrence fail our strategy relies on forward defense and allied cooperation to bring about war termination on terms favorable to ourselves and our allies.

▶ Maritime Strategy must counter Soviet strategy and deny the Soviets the luxury of fighting the type of war they choose. Our strategy must accomplish the difficult feat of using sea power to influence the result of a land battle, both directly and indirectly. To do this, the Maritime Strategy effectively integrates all elements of United States military power in the maritime arena in order to

make the greatest possible contribution to the unified commanders' mission.

▶ Maritime Strategy must consider the nuclear balance even during the conventional phase of the war. Our strategy must seek war termination leverage; maritime power may be the only source of such leverage.

Despite the violent peace which characterizes our age, we have been able to maintain our security while avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence has worked. Our goal is to ensure that it continues to do so. Should deterrence ever fail, maritime power, imaginatively employed, can help bring about war termination and restore the freedom and security of the United States and our allies.

tactical use of existing ones.

*Strategic and tactical thought.* The Maritime Strategy has produced significant reform in a second fundamental way, by stimulating strategic and tactical thinking among the Navy's leaders. Strategic matters now infuse the informal, everyday discussions among senior naval officers. This simply was not the case five years ago, and it represents a noteworthy change in our organizational culture.

Further, we are building institutional reinforcements for this revival of strategic thinking. Many involve the Naval War College, which once again is the crucible of strategic and tactical thought that it was a century ago. Within the past several years, we began sending virtually all of our commanding officers to the Naval War College on completion of their command tours. This enables these officers to reflect on strategic issues in light of their recent operational experience, and also offers the benefits of their experience to students in other programs.

We have also invigorated the War-gaming Center at the Naval War College. This is the most advanced such facility in the world, and allows us to test alternative strategies and tactics. It is heavily used both by shore- and sea-based organizations.

Also important is the work of the Strategic Studies Group, associated with the Center for Naval Warfare studies at the Naval War College. During the past five years we have selected a small group of Navy captains and Marine Corps colonels who have distinguished themselves as strategists and tacticians. These officers deal with major issues of direct relevance to Maritime Strategy for a full year. They

report directly to me and have full access to top Navy leaders, including the fleet commanders-in-chief. Through this interaction, their work has materially affected the ongoing development of the strategy.

The Naval War College's role in strategic thinking illustrates an important point. Development of the Maritime Strategy has consistently benefited from a wide variety of opinions and perspectives from multiple and disparate centers of thought. The operating Navy—commanders-in-chief and fleet commanders—has contributed as much as the Washington headquarters and such research centers as the Naval War College. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust strategy—one that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic issues and the validity of multiple perspectives. This experience is directly relevant to the development of *national* strategy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reform issue. The process of national strategy development and advice must involve multiple centers of thought and plurality of advice if the resulting thinking is to be truly vigorous and reflective of the complexity of issues involved. The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly American. It works, and it must be preserved.

*Emphasis on warfighting.* A final way in which the Maritime Strategy has served as a focus for reform is by shaping an emphasis on tactics and warfighting at the operational level. For too many years, our fleet exercises suffered from a lack of realism and focus, and our routine operations seemed to be lacking in purpose. But the Maritime Strategy now forms a framework

for planning realistic, purposeful exercises, and provides a strategic perspective for daily fleet operations in pursuit of deterrence.

Largely as a result of the Maritime Strategy, we have begun emphasizing exercises with multiple carrier battle forces, which would be required in a major war. We have increased our exercises in the Northern Pacific and Norwegian Sea, to build our base of experience in these key areas. We have begun exercising our submarines in Arctic waters, where they might be called upon to execute portions of the Maritime Strategy.

Thus, the Maritime Strategy has produced substantial reform. It has focused Navy program development, stimulated strategic and tactical thinking, and engendered an emphasis on tactics and warfighting in the fleet. The Navy can take considerable pride in the substance of these reforms, and in the strategic vision that they represent. We can also take pride in the fact that these reforms are clearly ours. We initiated them, and we sustain them—without much hoopla and without the help of self-appointed military reformers outside our profession, who are more adept at criticism than at proposing realistic solutions.

We have met the real reformers, and they are us. We have implemented, and will continue to implement reforms, to meet new realities based on a continuously evolving strategic vision. Our critics may take issue with our strategy. We welcome such debate. But they cannot argue that we have no strategy, or that we are not capable of reform.

The Maritime Strategy is a powerful statement of what we stand for, and a focus for reform that is in keeping with our finest traditions.




# The Amphibious Warfare Strategy

By General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and  
Major Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps

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Marine air-ground task forces, operating with supporting battleship surface action groups, could land on the North Cape, the eastern Baltic or Black Sea coasts, in the Kuriles, or on Sakhalin Island—thereby adding a crucial measure of leverage to the successful conduct of the maritime campaign—in the final phase of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy.










*"I also predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never occur again."*—General Omar N. Bradley, 19 October 1949.

When these words were uttered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before a House Armed Services Committee hearing on unification and strategy, many in the audience must have concluded that the day of the amphibious assault, and perhaps of the Marine Corps, was fast drawing to a close. General Bradley's pronouncement not only carried the credibility of his position as the nation's senior military officer, but was reinforced by the fact that he had led the great amphibious

oes of Bradley's words from other corners, mostly characterized by a cynical scorn for a form of warfare which these critics deride as being outmoded or suicidal in the modern age. Some of these wolves have even tried to don sheep's clothing by maintaining that the Marine Corps didn't need to be tied to the Navy and that there was plenty for the Corps to contribute in the battles for Central Europe without being shackled to an amphibious mission. Absent such a change in mission and focus, we were told, the Marine Corps would become strategically irrelevant.

Fortunately, this siren's song went unheeded. The last six years have witnessed a reawakening to the strategic need for both U. S. naval power and its capability to con-



assaults onto the beaches of Sicily and Normandy.

Omar Bradley's prediction mattered little to General Douglas MacArthur when his United Nations forces were being pummeled by the North Korean Army less than one year later. Within days of the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, MacArthur knew that an amphibious assault in his enemy's rear would create the opportunity for decisive victory that a frontal offensive could never offer. On 15 September 1950, the hastily assembled First Marine Division spearheaded MacArthur's landing at Inchon, breaking the back of the North Korean offensive and reaffirming the effectiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious striking arm in support of the national military strategy.

The 35 years since Inchon have reverberated with ech-

duct amphibious forcible entry operations. Where once Marine participation in NATO training exercises was only thinly tolerated, we now have Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) exercising in Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Turkey, on a regular basis. Where once there were no new amphibious assault ships scheduled for construction—to replace a rapidly aging and deteriorating fleet—we now have a solid program of shipbuilding that will give us an expanded and modernized amphibious lift capability by the mid-1990s. Where once there were initiatives that would have "heavied-up" the Marine Corps to create a mechanized clone of existing Army divisions, today we are in the middle of an expansive modernization program that will allow MAGTFs to be lethal and mobile, but still light enough to maintain their amphibious character.





COURTESY ALL HANDS

What has caused this resurgent emphasis on maritime and amphibious power? Why are naval forces now being viewed as central—rather than secondary—elements of our military strategy? What role will the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team be called upon to play in the execution of this strategy across the spectrum of conflict? Is the Marine Corps capable of fulfilling the requirements a maritime-oriented strategy has thrust upon it?

We believe that an examination of the issues underlying these questions will illuminate the reasons behind the re-discovery of the strategic utility inherent in the Navy-Marine Corps team. Although the demands and responsibilities of our strategic role are great, Marines have been long accustomed to the challenges and hazards associated with being our nation's force-in-readiness. We would have it no other way.

### *The World Environment*

The greatest threat to the security and well-being of the Western Alliance lies in the quest for world domination by the Soviet Union. Emerging from the devastation of a valiant and costly victory over the German Wehrmacht in 1945, the Soviets have constructed a military machine that is equaled only by our own. This gives substantial credibility to their stated goal of eventual global conquest.

The Soviet military effort has gone through a number of stages since the end of World War II. Until the time of Stalin's death, the focus was on relearning the lessons of the Great Patriotic War, building massive conventional armies, and playing catch-up in the development of nuclear weapons. Soviet deficiencies in nuclear armaments and naval power caused them to fear the might of the U. S. Strategic Air Command and the flexible striking power of U. S. amphibious forces above all other possible threats.

Khrushchev dispensed with much of Stalin's political style and brought radical reform to the arena of military affairs, as well. Believing that nuclear weapons had made conventional forces an expensive and useless commodity, he placed top priority on the formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces; cut the numbers of ground formations; and brought a halt to the construction of new naval warships. As a consequence—lacking the naval capability to counter a U. S. maritime blockade—the Soviets suffered the humiliation of having to withdraw their missiles from Cuba.

After years of being criticized as no longer being a viable form of warfare, the amphibious forcible entry operation is again a key element in our Maritime Strategy. New amphibious warfare ships—like the *Whidbey Island* (LSD-41)-class dock landing ships, facing page—are joining the fleet, and the Marines exercise regularly in places where they would be called to fight—here, U. S. forces operate in Norway's fjords during Exercise Teamwork 84, which involved forces of 11 other countries.

Dissatisfied with the entire focus of a nuclear-only defense program, the Russian military subsequently played a central part in the removal of Khrushchev from power in 1964.

The changes in Soviet military strategy since 1965 have been both profound and troubling. Continuing Khrushchev's expansion of strategic nuclear forces, Brezhnev also launched a massive modernization program for both ground and naval forces. While the United States had its attention focused on Vietnam, the Soviets soon surpassed us in the numbers of nuclear launchers and warheads and boosted the existing imbalance of conventional forces even more in their favor. Huge naval complexes in the Kola Peninsula and the Northwest Pacific indicated that the Soviets intended to use their new fleet to actively contest American maritime supremacy on the high seas.

After Vietnam, as America withdrew into an isolationist shell, forever forswearing any future foreign involvements, a new and distinctly more ominous Soviet capability began to appear: power projection. No longer satisfied with being a "continental" power, the Soviets began to use their navy for the battles of political influence that have come to characterize the Cold War. Naval bases in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Libya, and Angola provided stark reminders that the Russian bear had gone to sea and was prepared to use his naval power—both in general war and for crisis leverage—much as we had for the previous 30 years.

The picture that confronted the West in the late 1970's was not at all comforting. Somewhat belatedly, we realized that we were faced with a multidimensional superpower with ambitions beyond the continent of Europe and with the military means to carry them out. Without the element of nuclear superiority, which we had enjoyed



The Soviets have the capability to project military power. Here, Soviet troops come ashore during a Warsaw Pact exercise in air cushion landing vehicles and helicopters.



EASTFOTO



EASTFOTO

until 1970, the conventional might of the Soviet Union, now including its expansion to the world's oceans, took on a menacing import that demanded serious consideration by Western military planners.

Related to the extension of Soviet global military reach has been the growing number of conflicts in the Third World. Wars of national liberation, whether in Central America, the Middle East, or Asia, have received varying degrees of support and encouragement from the Soviets. We may have been soured by our Southeast Asian experiences, but we still recognize the fact that many of these countries are important to the economic health of the West. We have also recognized the need for a means of rapid U. S. response, should a developing crisis in one of these countries worsen.

Another element of instability in the world environment has been the emergence of terrorism as a means of achieving political ends. The shocking murders during the Munich Olympics in 1972 were a foretaste of the wanton violence we have subsequently witnessed in Europe and the Middle East. Whether seeking political anarchy, a homeland to call his own, or the overthrow of a hated regime, the international terrorist has exhibited a devotion to his cause (even unto death) that respects neither social mores nor rules of law. His reach is global, and his targets are rarely involved in the immediate resolution of his struggle. The demonic unpredictability of this threat makes it perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all to counter and negate.

How, then, has the world environment changed as it relates to Western interests? We are now engaged in competition with a Soviet Union that has emerged from a landlocked view to stake a credible claim for its interests, through a global military capability. Soviet instigation of revolutionary fervor in the Third World also threatens key Western economic interests, and aids the expansion of Russian power and influence. If one adds the "wild card"

of terrorism to this already worrisome picture, the absolute requirement for a rapidly deployable and flexible U. S. military capability becomes self-evident.

#### *National Military Strategy*

As World War II came to a close in September 1945, the Marine Corps could look with satisfaction and pride on its contribution to the Allied victory in the Pacific. Successful amphibious assaults by both Marine and Army forces had led the way to Tokyo through the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters. The development and use of the atom bomb signaled a new era in military affairs, but—at the time—few would have questioned the utility of maritime/amphibious power in the postwar defense of the Free World.

As soon as the guns went silent, however, a new and radically different slant on America's strategic needs began to emerge. Atomic weapons delivered by long-range bombers would provide our principal means of defeating future aggression. This became a strategy with some measure of appeal in an era of American nuclear monopoly. Dependence on strategic assets soon called into question the need for conventional forces, and particular attention was directed toward the Marine Corps. Army and Air Force leaders questioned the need for a "second land army" and recommended that the Marine Corps be limited—both in size and responsibilities—to a police force equivalent.

It was well for the defense of the nation that the Congress and the American people were somewhat more farsighted than the President and his military leaders in sensing the continuing need for an amphibious force-in-readiness. In passing the National Security Act of 1947, Congress ensured that there would be no piecemeal destruction or limitation of Marine Corps roles, functions, and missions:



"The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

This new legislation went on to assign principal responsibility to the Marine Corps for the development of amphibious tactics, techniques, and equipment. An additional charge, unique to the Marine Corps, required the performance of "such additional duties as the President may direct: Provided, that such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized."

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 served notice to the proponents of atomic strategy that not all wars would entail direct confrontation between the major powers. Despite Omar Bradley's belief that atomic weapons had made amphibious operations obsolete, MacArthur's brilliant landing of a combined Marine Corps/Army force at Inchon clearly countered the limited vision of such dire pessimists. Marine units went on to fight effectively as part of the United Nations command for the next three years, performing these additional non-maritime duties at the direction of the President.

American national strategy continued to emphasize the massive use of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Korean War. The United States still had a substantial measure of nuclear superiority through the 1950s and ground force levels overseas were reduced to provide a minimal conventional "trip wire," to trigger massive nuclear retaliation. Congress had amended the National Security Act in 1951, to mandate that a minimum of three combat divisions and three air wings would be actively maintained by the Marine Corps. Without this legislative floor, the "New Look" proponents may have turned their force-cutting cleaver on the Marine Corps as well.

The 1960s brought forth a revision to the national military strategy, initiated by a rejection of the rigid nuclear orientation of the massive retaliation policy. The two-and-one-half war basis of the new strategy of flexible response called for the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent force, along with the conventional capability to fight major wars in Europe (against the Soviets) and Asia (against the Red Chinese) simultaneously with a smaller war at another unspecified location. Due note was taken of the proliferation of revolutionary wars around the world, and concrete programs were instituted to deal with these conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum as well.

Flexible response showed that America recognized that its global responsibilities could not forever be discharged through the threat of nuclear Armageddon, particularly in light of rapidly growing Soviet strategic capabilities. A truly global strategy requires the ability to dominate the world's oceans, and the flexibility of force employment that only naval forces can provide.

The two-and-one-half war strategy ran aground in the 1960s when America became involved in the fight for South Vietnamese independence. In seeking to quell what may have started as a revolutionary war, we became involved in a large-scale conflict which siphoned off significant numbers of our conventional forces, bringing into serious doubt our ability to support simultaneously major conflicts against the Soviets and the Chinese. Though initially employed in an amphibious expeditionary mode, Marine forces were once again to engage successfully in sustained land combat at the direction of the President.

The Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s reduced the scope of our strategy from a two-and-one-half to a one-and-one-half war commitment. The United States would be prepared to fight a major war in Europe and a minor conflict elsewhere. Our intention was to train and equip regional surrogates to defend our interests in areas outside of Europe. The cry of "No more Vietnams" had found its reflection in this narrow, ostrich-like strategic world view which all but abandoned historic, economic, and strategic ties. In seeking defense on the cheap, we basically told many of our allies and friends that they were "on their own."

Making a case for an offensively oriented Navy and Marine Corps is not an easy undertaking if Europe is the primary U. S. area of interest. By the middle 1970s, the Navy's role was cast primarily in terms of sea control and convoy escort for the reinforcement flow to Europe. Talk of maritime superiority was roundly discounted as the United States opted to abandon its geostrategic naval advantages in order to combat the Soviets on the continental ground of their own choosing.

The Marine Corps was also subject to the ordeal of justifying its existence as an amphibious force, while our Europe-oriented strategy demanded more armored and mechanized divisions. Several noted pundits proclaimed that never again would we have interests worth defending in the Pacific, and that Vietnam had made expeditionary forays a politically unacceptable option to the American people. We were told not too gently that we had better abandon our identity as a naval service, buy some more armored vehicles, bring our MAGTFs home from the Pacific, or risk being viewed as a useless anachronism.

By the late 1970s many national security analysts had come to the conclusion that the one-and-one-half war strategy was fatally flawed. Colin Gray and John Erickson warned of the tremendous buildup of Soviet naval power on the Kola Peninsula and in the Northwest Pacific, as an indication that the Russians were prepared to take the war to sea on a major scale. Soviet gains in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Cambodia were indicative of a power that was clearly seeking a global sphere of influence. The fall of the Shah, the seizure of American hostages by the Iranian revolutionary government, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally alerted our leaders to the fact that Europe was not the only region whose loss could pose a threat to the United States and its allies.

The proclamation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980, declaring the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf to be a vital American interest, was the first step along a continu-



ing path that has led to the revalidation of a global military strategy for the United States. While trying to form a Rapid Deployment Force to implement the Carter Doctrine, our governmental leaders soon found that carrier battle groups and amphibious forces were the only military assets capable of establishing an American presence in the Arabian region. The equipment for a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) was quickly put aboard a set of near-term prepositioning ships and rushed off to Diego Garcia. Budgets for the naval services, which had previously been cut to fund a ground buildup in Europe, were now increased significantly in recognition of their capability to protect our global interests.

The military strategy that has evolved over the last five years recognizes the importance of Europe and the Pacific—and the energy resources of Southwest Asia—to U. S. security interests. Wrapped around the principles of deterrence, forward positioning of forces, and coalition operations with our allies, our strategy has come to recognize, once again, the necessity for a maritime nation to control vital sea lines of communication through naval superiority. Though our primary threat may come from the Soviet Union, modern and ready Navy-Marine forces give our decision makers the capability to address a wide spectrum of possible challenges, from an all-out Soviet attack to a hostage seizure in a Third World country. Clearly, it is the unexpected crisis that presents us the greatest difficulties and most urgently requires rapid application of the discreet power inherent in naval forces.

That our strategy has once again returned to its maritime focus is no surprise to those of us in the naval services. For the Marine Corps, our refusal to renounce our naval heritage and our amphibious nature has been more than vindicated

by the renewed confidence and trust our leaders feel in having a uniquely ready, hard-hitting, and sustainable forcible entry capability from the sea.

### *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy*

The development of strategic concepts for the employment of naval forces is an ongoing joint effort by the Navy and Marine Corps. Three years ago, the first edition of what has come to be called "The Maritime Strategy" addressed the role of naval forces in the execution of the National Military Strategy. Though classified in its initial iteration, the Maritime Strategy has now been publicly briefed to the Congress and has been published in an unclassified form in open sources.

Derived from pertinent policy and strategic directives and taking into account the warfighting requirements of the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (CinCs), the Maritime Strategy provides a planning and programming baseline for the employment of naval forces in a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Currently divided into three phases, this strategy provides a coordinated, sequential framework which seeks to:


- ▶ Deter war, if at all possible.
- ▶ If deterrence fails: destroy enemy maritime forces; protect allied sea lines of communication (SLOCs); support the land campaign; and secure favorable leverage for war termination.

In June 1985, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the publication of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. Developed as a subset of the Maritime Strategy, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy outlines the employment of Navy-Marine am-

A. P. RODRIGUEZ







U. S. NAVY (G. G. BALLARD)

phibious forces in support of our global National Military Strategy. Though oriented to address the phased employment of amphibious forces in a global conventional conflict, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy fully recognizes the utility of these forces in the unexpected and more likely crisis scenarios at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

*Low-Intensity Conflict:* B. H. Liddell Hart, the great British military thinker, expressed the following thoughts on the effectiveness of amphibious forces in low-intensity conflict:

“Since Russia has developed nuclear weapons in quantity to match America’s, a nuclear stalemate has developed. In such a situation, local and limited aggression becomes more likely, and amphibious forces become more necessary, both as deterrent and as a counter to aggression—a counter which can be used without being suicidal and a deterrent which is therefore credible.”

The role of the Marine Corps in the realm of low-intensity conflicts makes maximum use of the inherent flexibility amphibious forces offer to the National Command Authorities. Congress had this fully in mind when, in passing the 1951 act which dictated the current Marine Corps force structure, it directed that the Marine Corps would be a “ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.” It is from these roots that the term “force-in-readiness” first appeared, and it is in this arena of rapid and effective crisis suppression that amphibious forces can perform perhaps their greatest service in preventing minor conflicts from growing into major confrontations.

The forward peacetime presence of amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their deployed MAGTFs in the Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian oceans serves as a visible and credible indicator of American capability to react to sudden, unforeseen crises involving U. S. interests. These groups possess the combined ground/air combat power of a Marine amphibious unit (MAU), which can provide a rapidly available military presence, to put out a brushfire incident before it has a chance to spread.

The advantages which these amphibious groups enjoy over forces which must be deployed from the United States—or be permanently based in the region—are obvious. Many Third World governments are understandably reluctant to grant permanent basing rights to U. S. forces

The forward peacetime presence of amphibious ready groups, facing page, operating in the Mediterranean, serves as a visible and credible indicator of American capability to react to sudden, unforeseen crises. This capability is enhanced by the ongoing addition of maritime prepositioning ships—*PFC Dewey T. Williams* loads a utility landing craft.

because of the destabilization it could cause to the ruling regime. Without regional bases, forces deploying from the United States must deal with long flight times en route, limited lift capacity for support units and their equipment, and refueling and overflight clearances.

Amphibious forces, on the other hand, can be stationed over the horizon at sea, need no basing or overflight clearances, and provide their own sustainment. A MAU can fight its way ashore if required and can be swiftly extracted back to the waiting ships of the ARG. Often, however, the mere presence of the ARG offshore is enough to deter a would-be aggressor from initiating trouble.

A new and innovative development in the crisis response arena has been the procurement and fielding of three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), each carrying equipment and supplies to sustain a MAB for 30 days. Strategically positioned in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, MPSs will add a significant expansion to our response capability when the program reaches completion this year. When married with its airlifted troops and organic aircraft, an MPS-MAB can provide another means of demonstrating American resolve, when employed either preemptively into a friendly port/airhead or as reinforcement for a forward-deployed ARG.

An additional asset worthy of note is the capability of our deployed MAUs to conduct naval/amphibious special operations. Amphibious raids and other special naval missions have always been a part of the Marine Corps repertoire and may well become likely assignments for deployed MAUs in this era of international terrorism and instability. We intend in the near future to include the training for such missions in the standard pre-deployment workup for all of our MAUs and to have them designated as MAU (Special Operations Capable).

These force projection options from the sea provide a flexible and valuable national asset, in the effort to address and contain potential strife at the low end of the conflict spectrum. The frequency with which we recently have had to face incidents of this type shows that the investment of our defense dollars into amphibious forces is a wise use of scarce resources.

*Phase I—Deterrence or the Transition to War:* The first phase of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy postulates a growing crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the first sign of deepening tension or possible preparation for a Soviet general attack, U. S. and allied naval forces would surge from their home ports and deploy as far forward as possible. Carrier battle groups and attack submarines would attempt to position themselves for maximum advantage in the event that deterrence failed. The objective of this phase, however, is to assume a deterrent posture so convincing to the Soviets that they



would abandon any plans for a general offensive.

Marine forces will be extremely active in this initial phase, and can contribute significantly to the credibility of our deterrent efforts. The very regularity of our amphibious exercises enables us to load our available amphibious ships and deploy them from the United States early in the crisis buildup, without unduly arousing suspicion. This will allow for the massing of amphibious assets in the Atlantic and Pacific to at least MAB size, and will thus give the CinC an in-theater capability for amphibious forcible entry.

While our amphibious forces are sailing to their forward operating areas, MPS squadrons will be repositioning themselves to best support anticipated requirements. The airlifted MAB elements could be joined with their equipment at a preliminary staging location or could be employed as a follow-on element to reinforce the massing amphibious MAGTFs.

Although our Norway land prepositioning program—for a MAB set of equipment and supplies—will not be completed until 1989, the Marine Corps will nonetheless deploy a MAB via amphibious shipping to assist in the defense of Norway. The importance of this region to the defense of the North Atlantic SLOC and its reinforcing flow to Central Europe could dictate the eventual employment of a Marine amphibious force (MAF) to NATO's Northern Flank.

The deployment of amphibious task forces from the United States, movement of MPSs to crisis areas, and the commitment of a MAB to the defense of Norway will materially assist other Western efforts to dissuade the Soviets from launching a general war. If the Soviets attack despite these efforts, however, we will be deployed to engage the aggressor far forward and to blunt his assault.

*Phase II—Seize the Initiative:* Should the Soviets commence a full-scale invasion of Central Europe, the initial NATO strategy will be to counter the attack, to wear down the enemy, and to seize the initiative. Attack submarines will quickly engage Soviet naval forces in the Norwegian and Barents seas, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific Ocean. Carrier battle groups will seek to negate or neutralize Soviet surface and air threats, while allied antisubmarine warfare forces will seek out and destroy the Soviet subsurface force.

The naval battle at sea will be fought to keep forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in the northern region of Europe, the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific, thereby preventing any significant shift of Soviet forces to Central Europe or interdiction of NATO's reinforcing SLOCs. Allied naval superiority in these maritime theaters, gained through the destruction of Soviet naval forces, will set the stage for a series of counteroffensives aimed to ease the pressure on the land battle in the central region.

Amphibious forces could play many parts in this phase. One likely mission could be the seizure of advanced naval bases. Amphibious raids of MAB size or full-scale MAF amphibious assaults could be conducted for the follow-on introduction of U. S. and allied forces. Although deployments may initially be made by MABs, every effort will be made to combine amphibious, MPS, and follow-on

MAGTFs so that employment will be on a MAF scale.

NATO's Northern Flank will be the scene of tense drama, in which amphibious forces can play a key role. As allied naval forces fight for control of the Norwegian Sea, they will be supported by the air component of MAGTFs ashore. As the Soviet invader is worn down, opportunities will develop for amphibious assaults along the Norwegian coast to his rear, to reclaim any airfields and ports that may have been lost in the war's initial days.

Other areas that may lend themselves to amphibious operations are the North and Baltic seas, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. Operations in these areas offer possible opportunities to exert pressure on the Soviet Rimland, which might in turn divert Soviet energies from the struggle for the heartland of industrial Europe.

While NATO's armies are containing the assault in Central Europe, every effort will be made to retain amphibious forces for employment at the decisive point and time when the Soviets have lost their momentum and are therefore most vulnerable. This does not preclude the use of MAGTFs to support a NATO defense which is *in extremis* on the English Channel coast. As always, Marines will fight where they are needed most. We believe, however, that the employment of amphibious MAGTFs in a sustained land warfare role compromises their unique capability for flexible maneuver and, therefore, should be avoided.

*Phase III—Carry the Fight to the Enemy:* Exhausted and contained by a stout NATO defense in the central region, stripped of his naval forces through a bold and decisive allied maritime campaign, and harried by NATO pressure on his flanks, the Soviet invader will now be pounded by a succession of NATO sea, air, and land counteroffensives.

Massed naval task groups will undertake attacks on Soviet forces and their supporting infrastructure in Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland. Naval offensives into the Kola Peninsula and Northwest Pacific regions could attack key Soviet military targets, thus helping to induce a measure of fear, uncertainty, and paralysis into the Soviet warfighting machine.

Amphibious forces will once again play a prominent part in this final phase. Massed amphibious task forces, together with supporting battleship surface action groups, will now undertake landings to retake conquered territory and to seize key objectives in the Soviet rear. Operating as a component of the naval campaign, MAGTFs could land on the North Cape, the eastern Baltic or the Black Sea coasts, in the Kuriles, or on Sakhalin Island—thereby adding a crucial measure of leverage to the successful conduct of the maritime campaign.

The ultimate objective of our Alliance efforts is to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table as quickly as possible, on terms that are favorable to the West. Maritime forces offer the opportunity to avoid a long, costly, and uncertain land effort to push the Soviets back in Central Europe. Naval operations on the exposed Rimland flanks present the option of striking quickly at key Soviet pressure points in a campaign of nautical maneuver. Used in this manner, our naval forces can make the strategic difference.



## The Amphibious Team

No matter how pressing the need or sound the strategy may be, the lack of a ready, well-equipped, and professional amphibious force will make all else irrelevant. The profession of arms is a very unforgiving taskmaster. Good intentions count for far less than does superior battlefield performance.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a viable and meaningful concept because of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team that will put it into execution. Improvements in our amphibious capability in the last six years allow us to be supremely confident about the health of this much-needed and frequently used military capability.

*People:* The quality of the Marines and sailors in service with the fleet has never been higher. Our ranks are filled with well-educated, physically fit, and spirited young men and women who are proud of the important role they play in the country's defense. The victors of Iwo Jima, Inchon, and Khe Sanh would be proud to serve with today's young Americans in the uniform of their country.

*Forces:* The amphibious assault fleet of today is in its best shape, in recent memory, and it is going to get even better. Six years ago, not a single amphibious ship appeared in the Navy's five-year defense program. Today, we are well into the production of the LSD-41 and LHD-1 classes of amphibious assault ships and have sound programs for the maintenance and upgrading of the amphibious ships currently serving with the fleet. By the mid-1990s, we will have a total of 76 amphibious ships, which will be capable of lifting the assault echelons of both a MAF and a MAB. The combination of the increase in strategic lift we will realize from both an expanded amphibious fleet and our MPS squadrons will significantly enhance our capability for global response.

Naval surface fire support for the landing force is criti-

cally needed in the early hours of an amphibious assault, before our artillery is established ashore. The reactivation of the four *Iowa* (BB-61) class battleships, along with programmed improvements in the accuracy and lethality of our naval gunfire munitions, will ensure that Marines hitting an enemy-held shoreline will have the accurate and responsive gunfire support they require.

The Navy has made major commitments to improve the readiness and availability of amphibious assault support forces. Construction battalions, cargo-handling groups, and fleet medical support are often overlooked when novices discuss amphibious operations; the professionals know how easily an operation can founder without these

**A sound strategy also requires a ready, well-equipped, and professional amphibious force to succeed. The quality of our people has never been higher, and new ships like the *Wasp* (LHD-1), now under construction, promise to keep the amphibious assault fleet healthy for many years.**

U. S. NAVY (J. S. BARON)





naval support elements.

We in the Marine Corps are looking to improve the effectiveness of our MAGTF concept through the establishment of permanent headquarters. Instead of creating MAGTF headquarters by drafting personnel from subordinate units on an "as-needed" basis, we are now assigning Marines to our MAGTF headquarters on a permanent basis, so that the teamwork and experience we gain will not be lost after every series of exercises. Based on the feedback received from several recent exercises, this concept is already proving its worth and will markedly improve our capabilities for effective command and control of amphibious operations in the coming years.

*Equipment:* If our amphibious forces are to triumph over a tough and determined foe, they must be provided with effective and modern tools of war. Our modernization program is geared to satisfy long-standing warfighting requirements for present and future battlefields.


Improvements in expediting the movement of Marines from the ship to the enemy shore will be realized with the acquisition of the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and the MV-22A "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft. These platforms will allow for a much more rapid closure to the beach, giving the amphibious task force the option of operating from over the horizon, out of the range of many enemy weapon systems.

In addition, because the LCAC rides on a cushion of air, many beaches that were previously unsuitable for as-


sault landings can now be considered. The significant strategic impact of this development is that it considerably widens the range of possible landing sites that an enemy must defend.

We have modernized the assault rifle, artillery, mortars, and the prime movers organic to the MAGTF. In the next several years, we will be introducing a new tank and a series of light armored vehicles which will improve the mobility and firepower of our MAGTFs without making them too heavy to retain their expeditionary character.

The cumulative impact of our modernization initiatives



U. S. NAVY (W. GERRARD)



The LCAC's and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft's speeds, ranges, and operating characteristics will widen the range of possible landing sites that the enemy will have to defend, and afford the amphibious task force more seaward operating margin between it and a defended beach.

will result in a MAGTF that will be light, mobile, and lethal.

*Doctrine:* Although we have sound joint doctrine for amphibious operations, we are constantly seeking to develop and refine improved operational concepts that will foster the best use of our modern warfighting systems. The formulation of an operational and tactical framework for amphibious operations from over the horizon is a high-priority project, combining the efforts of Navy and Marine Corps planners. We have chosen some of our brightest, most operationally experienced, and talented officers to work on this endeavor. Their initial proposals show considerable promise and will be subjected to operational validation in future amphibious exercises.

Boldness and innovation accurately describe the Marine heritage in putting forth new warfighting concepts. Our development of amphibious doctrine in the 1920s, close-air support for ground troops during World War II, and the use of the helicopter for vertical envelopment in the 1950s are prime examples of this desire to develop new and imaginative solutions to battlefield problems.

So too, today, Marines are working on the refinement of tactics that will increase the effectiveness of the MAGTF ashore. Our schools have become hotbeds for the development of new initiatives, and the volume and quality of the tactical debate in our military journals indicate that the scope, depth, and enthusiasm of this effort runs deeply throughout our Corps. We take pride in the fact that our Marines have taken seriously their responsibility to enhance and advance the amphibious art. They have had,



and will continue to have, a positive impact on the combat effectiveness of our MAGTFs.

*Training:* Nothing hones the fighting edge of our amphibious forces better than realistic and demanding training exercises. An increase in funding to support a high operational tempo has enabled Navy-Marine Corps amphibious forces to conduct dozens of exercises around the world, with frequent participation by our allies and by other services.

Conducted in the cold and snows of Norway and Alaska, the heat and sand of Oman and Somalia, and the jungles of Honduras and the Philippines, these exercises allow for the validation of our operational concepts, tactics, and procedures. Feedback from these exercises shows where our concepts are sound and where they require additional attention.

For the MAGTF ashore, our Combined Arms Exercises at our desert base at Twentynine Palms, California, provides the Marine air-ground team with the most realistic live-fire training short of actual combat. Since their inception in 1975, these exercises have broadened in scope from an initial MAU orientation to the point where we now conduct live-fire training on the MAB level.

*Readiness:* The payoff we get from having superior people, necessary levels of force capability, modern equipment, sound doctrine, and meaningful training is a Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team that truly is a force-in-readiness. Tasked to respond to a wide range of possible missions, from a show-of-force to a full-scale assault into a hostile beachhead, amphibious forces must be prepared to respond rapidly and effectively when the seemingly hypothetical suddenly becomes reality. The Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team is ready, eager, and able to accept that challenge.

### *Renaissance and Revolution*

A global Soviet menace, Third World instabilities and threats to key U. S. allies or trading partners, and the specter of international terrorism have combined to force a readdressal of our National Military Strategy. Though we tried to pretend during the decade of the 1970s that European security was our only vital overseas interest, we have since relearned that a maritime nation in an ever-shrinking world has vital interests in nearly every region. The protection of our allies and access to key economic resources demand that we command the seas and possess the capability for maritime power projection.

The National Military Strategy recognizes the requirement for a Navy and Marine Corps capable of reacting quickly to a myriad of possible threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Deployments in low-intensity or crisis situations are the most likely happenstance. The Navy-Marine Corps team has been the force of choice in Lebanon in 1958 and 1982, Thailand in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Grenada in 1983. We are thankful that global war with the Soviets is the least probable scenario, but we are prepared to contribute in a meaningful way to the attainment of allied victory should that unhappy conflict be forced upon us.



COURTESY LEATHERNECK

**Twentynine Palms or Oman or Somalia—it doesn't matter; the heat and the sand are the same and so are the realistic and demanding training exercises which keep our forces credible.**

The importance of an amphibious forcible entry capability and its role in national strategy were eloquently described by Liddell Hart:


“The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibility. In tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy's power of concentration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ and the resources they possess.”

When reviewing the plans for the invasion of Sicily in 1943, General George Marshall is said to have commented that a landing against an organized and highly trained opponent is “probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called upon to face.” The conduct of forcible entry from the sea remains to this day an exacting and complex endeavor, in which our central goal is most often the seizure of an objective whose value is just as clearly evident to the defender as it is to us.

It is only through the dynamic synergism of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious brotherhood that risks are minimized, obstacles are overcome, and victory is achieved. Those who seek to put Marines on the front in Central Europe or in other sustained inland roles as land force division equivalents not only demonstrate their total lack of appreciation for the effectiveness of our Marine air-ground team; they also convey the most profound misunderstanding of the proper use of maritime power, the depth of our naval heritage, and the pride with which we bear the title of “Soldiers of the Sea.”

Though some military commentators regard World War II to be the high point in the development and conduct of amphibious warfare, we take a very different view. We believe that there is ample evidence to suggest that we have entered a renaissance period in the evolution of amphibious operations, with the broadening of our vistas through the introduction of the LCAC and Osprey yet to come. Indeed, the incremental advances we have experienced in the art of amphibious warfare will soon be giving way to an exciting era—in which the rapid pace of strategic, operational, and tactical improvements will transform the current renaissance into nothing less than an amphibious revolution.





# The 600-Ship Navy

By John F. Lehman, Jr.

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Geography, alliances, and the Soviet threat combine to dictate the actual numbers of ships—the “size of the Navy”—required to fulfill our commitments in each of our maritime theaters. And this accounting adds up to a 600-ship Navy.







Clemenceau once declared that war was too important to be left to the generals. But if war is too important to be left to the generals, it is also too important to be left to the civilian experts. In the United States, with our constitutionally mandated civilian control of the armed forces, we forget sometimes that hard-earned military experience must leaven the theories of civilians if our system is to work.

We would do well to keep this in mind as we near our goal of a 600-ship Navy. Media-anointed experts have raised questions about the size, character, and complexity of the Navy: Do we really need so many ships? Are the Navy and Marine Corps effective in helping to deter Soviet aggression—across the full spectrum of violence, from terrorism to nuclear war? Do we have a strategy that guides the planning and training of our forces? Is it the correct strategy? If it is, are we building the right types and numbers of ships to execute it? Finally, can this nation afford to sustain a 600-ship fleet—not only well-equipped but properly manned—for the long term? When defense restrictions become law in the zero-growth 1986 budget, and retrenchment is the theme of the hour, the answers to these questions take on added significance.

#### *Why 600 ships?*

To understand how we arrived at the size of our planned fleet of ships, we must begin by discarding the idea that this number has sprung, full blown, from the brow of some would-be Napoleon of the high seas.

Since World War II, maritime force planners have found themselves at the mercy of three enduring elements. First is geography. Water covers three quarters of the world; and the United States is an "island continent" washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Second are the vital interests of the United States, expressed in the web of more than 40 treaty relationships that bind us to mutual defense coalitions around the world. These relationships shape our national security requirements—together with the energy and commercial dependencies that support our economy in peace and in war.

The third element is the Soviet threat. Whatever its original rationale, the Soviet Navy's postwar expansion has created an offense-oriented blue water force, a major element in the Soviet Union's global military reach that supports expanding Soviet influence from Nicaragua to Vietnam to Ethiopia. From the Baltic to the Caribbean to the South China Sea, our ships and men pass within yards of Soviet naval forces every day. But familiarity, in this case, is breeding a well-deserved respect.

The Navy's recently updated *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments* provides the facts about the Soviet Navy. Every American should be aware, for example, that Soviet nuclear submarines operate continuously off our coasts. "Victor"-class nuclear attack submarines are routinely found lurking near many of our principal naval ports. Soviet surface units are now making regular deployments to the contentious and vulnerable chokepoints of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Worldwide, we find the Soviet Navy astride the vital sea-lanes and navigational chokepoints, through which most of the Western world's international trade must pass.

This is the new reality. The pattern of Soviet naval deployments has revealed itself in only the last several years. These deployments constitute a post-World War II change in the global military balance of power that has been surpassed only by the advent of thermonuclear weapons. No planner, civilian or military, can ignore the growing dimensions of Soviet maritime power.

Geography, alliances, and the Soviet threat combine to







While Soviet nuclear submarines, like this "Victor" watched closely by the USS *Peterson* (DD-969), require us to build large, capable ASW forces, our allies' diesel submarines, frigates, coastal patrol craft (six German "Type-143" guided missile patrol boats at Terneuzen, left), and minesweepers relieve the United States of the requirement to field these necessary forces by itself—thus holding down the size of the U. S. Navy.

dictate the actual numbers of ships—the "size of the Navy"—required to fulfill our commitments in each of our maritime theaters. Before reviewing in detail the forces we need in each theater, some observations are in order:

▶ Any view of the global disposition of the U. S. Navy reveals that we often deploy in peacetime very much in the same manner as we would operate in wartime. For purposes of deterrence, crisis management, and diplomacy, we must be present in the areas where we would have to fight if war broke out. Of course, the operational tempo is different—a roughly three-to-one ratio in wartime, as compared with peacetime.

We also train as we intend to fight. A full-scale general war at sea would rarely find a carrier battle group operating alone. So we train often in multiple carrier battle forces in such exercises as FLEETEX, READEX, and NATO exercises, like Northern Wedding, which we conduct in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.

▶ Our maritime security depends on significant assistance from allies in executing our missions. Fortunately, we count among our friends all of the world's great navies, save one. Clearly, in areas such as diesel submarines, frigates, coastal patrol craft, minesweepers, and maritime patrol aircraft, allies of the United States have assets absolutely essential to us for sea control in war and peace. In some regions, such as the Eastern Atlantic and the waters surrounding the United Kingdom, our allies supply a significant portion of the antisubmarine capability to counter the Soviet threat. In fact, if we could not count on our allies, we would require a U. S. fleet much larger than 600 ships, to deal with the 1,700 ships and submarines that the Soviets can deploy against us. But the world's greatest navies are on our side, and this gives a tremendous advantage to the U. S. Navy and a significant cost savings to the U. S. taxpayer.

▶ America's increasing commercial and energy interdependence with Asia, and the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet—now the largest of the four Soviet fleets—have negated the so-called "swing strategy" of the Sixties and Seventies, which planned to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet with combatants from the Pacific in time of crisis. Today, the United States has an Asian orientation at least equal to its historic engagement in Europe. Existing treaty relationships in the Pacific have been augmented by growing commercial connections. For example, in 1980, the value of

U. S. trade with the Pacific rim nations was roughly equal to trade with the country's Atlantic partners. Four years later, Pacific trade exceeded that with Western Europe by \$26 billion.

Similarly, oil dependencies have shifted tremendously in the last five years. This forces America to reconsider the priorities of naval deployments in the Northern Pacific and Caribbean regions. The reorientation of U. S. sources for crude oil—on a hemispheric axis—is a long-term geopolitical reality that has gone largely unnoticed. Western dependency on Middle Eastern oil is still debated at length, for its impact on our military thinking and force planning. But we must also take into account that, in 1985, the United States imported eight times as much oil by sea from the Western Hemisphere as it received from the entire Middle East. Oil from Mexico has increased to almost 25% of our imports, while oil from Saudi Arabia has dropped to only 2.6% of the U. S. import market. We no longer depend primarily on the Middle East and Persian Gulf supply for our vital energy needs. Instead, the locus of our oil trade is in the Western Hemisphere: Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Caribbean area.

With these observations as background, let us review our forces in the main geographic areas: the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf. The numbers used are "notional." They illustrate force packages constructed for peacetime tasks now assigned to our naval forces. But they are capable of expansion or contraction, should war break out—a flexibility characteristic of naval power.

*The Atlantic:* The large Atlantic theater encompasses the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, the Northern Flank of NATO including the Baltic throat, the South Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. It includes the coasts of South America and the west coast of Africa, all vital sea-lanes of communications. And it involves the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The U. S. Navy operates in the Atlantic theater with two fleets, the Sixth and the Second. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is the principal fighting force of the NATO Southern Europe Command and provides strike, anti-air superiority, antisubmarine, and close air support for the entire Southern Flank of NATO—a principal makeweight in the balance in the Central Front.

In addition, the Sixth Fleet is the principal naval force that supports our friends and allies in the Middle East. The threat there is significant. The Soviets maintain a fleet in the Black Sea and a deployed squadron in the Mediterranean. In wartime, we expect to see also Soviet naval strike aircraft, aircraft carriers, a formidable number of diesel





**In peacetime, the U. S. Navy deploys to forward operating areas and trains as it would fight in wartime—in multiple carrier battle group operations like this FLEETEX—because our forces must be present and ready in the areas where we would have to fight if war broke out.**

and nuclear submarines, and a full range of strike cruisers, destroyers, and other smaller combatants.

To deal with this threat, as we do in all our planning, we start with a base of allied forces in the areas under consideration. The navies of our allies are good. For example, we count on them to provide about 140 diesel submarines, which are effective for coastal and area defense, for establishing and maintaining barriers, and for certain other useful missions.

In wartime, purely U. S. forces in the Sixth Fleet would have to include three or four carrier battle groups, operating to meet NATO commitments. We would also need to deploy a battleship surface action group and two underway replenishment groups. In peacetime, we average over the year one and one-third carrier battle groups deployed in the Mediterranean.

The Second Fleet is the heart of the Atlantic strike fleet for NATO. It is responsible for naval operations in the North Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, Iceland, the Norwegian Sea, the defense of Norway, and the entire Northern Flank including the North Sea and Baltic throat. It must simultaneously accomplish any naval missions required in the Caribbean, where we now face a very large Soviet and Cuban naval presence; in the South Atlantic, where we have vital sea-lanes; and along the West African sea-lanes, where the Soviets now deploy naval forces continuously.

For the Second Fleet, in wartime, we must plan to have four or five carrier battle groups, one battleship surface action group, and three underway replenishment groups.

This is the equivalent firepower of 40 World War II carriers and can deliver accurate strike ordnance on target equal to 800 B-17s every day. In peacetime, we generally run higher than this, because most of our principal training occurs in the Second Fleet's operating areas.

Today, we have six carrier battle groups cycling in the Second Fleet at one time or another. We have exercises underway with our NATO allies, with our South American and Central American allies, and with other nations, on an ad hoc basis, in every season of the year.

*The Pacific:* Clearly, our increasing commercial interests and historic security ties in the Pacific impact on our naval planning for the area. If we are to protect our vital interests, we must have forces available to deploy—not only to the Atlantic theaters and the Sixth and the Second fleets—but also to the Pacific simultaneously, to the Seventh and the Third fleets and the Middle East Force of the Central Command. We cannot abandon one theater in order to deal with the other. The great paradox of the 1970s was the reduction of the fleet's size so that it could only be employed in a swing strategy—just as that strategy was being rendered obsolete by trade, geopolitics, and the growth of the Soviet Navy.

The Seventh Fleet is our forward Western Pacific fleet, which meets our commitments to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand, and in the critical straits of Southeast Asia, as well as the Indian Ocean. In wartime, we would need to deploy five carrier battle groups to the Seventh Fleet, two battleship surface action groups, and four underway replenishment groups. In peacetime, we average over the year the equivalent of one and one-third carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific. That, of course, helps us maintain a peacetime fleet-wide operational tempo that provides for at least 50% time in home port for our people and their families.

We do not have a separate fleet in the critical area of Southwest Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, although some have proposed the re-creation of the Fifth



Fleet for that purpose. In peacetime, we have the Middle East Force of the Central Command and elements of the Seventh Fleet, normally a carrier battle group.

In wartime, we plan for two of the Seventh Fleet carrier battle groups to meet our commitments in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, East Africa, the Persian Gulf area, and Southeast Asia. Notionally, a Seventh Fleet battleship surface action group and one underway replenishment group would also be assigned to operate in these areas.

The Third Fleet has responsibility for operations off Alaska, the Bering Sea, the Aleutians, the Eastern Pacific, and the Mid-Pacific region. In wartime, there would be considerable overlapping and trading back and forth between the Seventh and Third fleets. This happened in the Pacific during World War II. To cover that vast area, we must assign two carrier battle groups and one underway replenishment group.

These requirements compel us to deploy a 600-ship Navy as outlined in Table 1. In peacetime, we deploy in the same way to the same places we must control in war,

but at one-third the tempo of operations. This allows a bearable peacetime burden of six-month deployment lengths and 50% time in home ports. Looked at either way, we require the same size fleet to meet peacetime deployments as we do to fight a war. Taken together they add up to the following:

- ▶ Fifteen carrier battle groups
- ▶ Four battleship surface action groups
- ▶ One-hundred attack submarines
- ▶ An adequate number of ballistic missile submarines
- ▶ Lift for the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amphibious brigade

When escort, mine warfare, auxiliary, and replenish-

**Growing U. S. commercial and energy interdependence with Asia and the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet properly negated the "swing strategy." In 1985, the United States imported eight times as much oil by sea from the Western Hemisphere—tankers at Valdez, Alaska, below—as it received from the Middle East.**

T. THOMPSON





Table 1 *Current Navy Force Requirements*

	<i>Peacetime Maritime Strategy</i>	<i>Wartime Maritime Strategy</i>
	<i>Sixth Fleet</i>	
CVBG	1.3	4
BBSAG	.3	1
URG	1	2
	<i>Second Fleet*</i>	
CVBG	6.7	4
BBSAG	1.7	1
URG	4	3
	<i>Seventh Fleet**</i>	
CVBG	2	5
BBSAG	.5	2
URG	1	4
	<i>Third Fleet*</i>	
CVBG	5	2
BBSAG	1.5	—
URG	4	1

\*Includes forces in overhaul

\*\*Includes Indian Ocean forces

Note: CVBG = carrier battle group; BBSAG = battleship surface action group; URG = underway replenishment group.

ment units are considered, about 600 ships emerge from this accounting—a force that can be described as prudent, reflecting geographic realities, alliance commitments and dependencies, and the Soviet fleet that threatens them. Unless Congress reduces our commitments or the Soviet threat weakens, there is no way to reduce the required size of the U. S. fleet and still carry out the missions assigned to the Navy.

#### *Does the Navy have a role in the national strategy?*

While the Carter administration questioned whether the Navy could influence a "short war" in Central Europe, such a proposition is indefensible today. The coalition of free nations bound together in NATO must have maritime superiority as a prerequisite for any defense strategy. Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory but the loss of it will certainly assure defeat—and sooner rather than later. The chronicles of warfare from the classical era forward are a consistent testament to the influence of sea power upon history, in which great continental powers do not long prevail against an opponent with mastery of the seas. Today, continental defense in NATO rests on early achievement of maritime superiority. The Soviet Union, as evidenced by its ongoing naval expansion, understands the experience of history far better than our trendier military reformists.

#### *Does the Navy have a strategy? Is it the right one?*

Now, consider the charge leveled by some parlor room Pershings that our current naval buildup lacks an underlying strategy.

Not since the days of Theodore Roosevelt have the

Navy and Marine Corps exhibited such a strong consensus on the comprehensive strategy which now forms our naval planning. Briefly stated, our strategic objectives are the following:

- ▶ To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United States and its allies
- ▶ To ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our allies, our forward-deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, and our trading partners
- ▶ To be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support combat ashore, should deterrence fail

To achieve these objectives, we need a strategy at once *global, forward deployed, and superior* to our probable opponents. Global, because our interests, allies, and opponents are global; forward deployed, because to protect those interests and allies, and to deter those opponents, we must be where they are; superior, because if deterrence fails it is better to win than lose.

But do we have the correct strategy? Today's debates would benefit from a more precise understanding of the role of strategy. Strategy is not a formula for fighting each ship and deploying each tank in the battles that may take place around the world. That is not the function of the military establishment inside the Washington Beltway. Such is the proper function only of the theater commander who is given the responsibility to carry out the defense objectives set by the national command authorities.

Beyond the central concept of global, forward-deployed, and superior naval forces, strategy's role is to give coherence and direction to the process of allocating money among competing types of ships and aircraft and different accounts for spare parts, missile systems, defense planning, and the training of forces. It provides guidelines to aid us in allocating both resources and shortages.

Title 10 of the U. S. Code charges the Secretary of the Navy with ensuring the highest level of training appropriate to the responsibilities placed upon both the Marine Corps and the Navy. That is what strategy provides to us—a framework within which to train. For example, U. S. naval forces recently conducted a major training exercise, "Ocean Safari 85," with our NATO allies and the U. S. Coast Guard and Air Force. The "Safari" assembled off the East Coast of the United States and fought its way across the Atlantic, moved north of England and east of Iceland, and ended up in the Norwegian Sea. Approximately 155 ships and 280 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operated for four weeks in this environment, against 19 real Soviet ships and submarines and 96 Soviet aircraft sorties.

That is very effective training, and it is being carried out as part of a coherent training operational plan—linked to the way that the theater commanders intend to fight a war. One will search in vain, however, for a Navy cookbook that tells those on-scene commanders when to move aircraft carriers, or how or where to move attack submarines or Aegis cruisers at any given point after a conflict commences. There should never be any such cookbook and certainly it should never come from Washington. Those who criticize our strategy for being the wrong cookbook or



for not having a cookbook do not understand strategy.


Other critics argue that our Navy should be less global, less forward-deployed, or less superior, with the resources saved to be poured into a stronger continental defense. To be less global means to abandon some area of our vital interests. To believe that in the case of the Northern Flank of NATO, for example, a "passive" defense line thrown across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap will somehow protect our sea-lanes or defer an engagement with Soviet forces demonstrates a lack of understanding of the fundamental mechanics of war at sea and the workings of NATO and the Soviets' own operational requirements. No coalition of free nations can survive a strategy which begins by sacrificing its more exposed allies to a dubious military expediency. To suggest that naval support of Norway or Turkey is too dangerous because it must be done close to the Soviet Union is defeatist. To suggest that such a strategy is provocative of the Soviets just indicates the lengths to which some critics will go, in order to portray Soviet intentions as solely defensive.

As for strengthening our continental defenses, we and our allies are also doing just that. To discard maritime superiority in an attempt to match the larger Soviet ground

tion. Instead, the fleet evolves over time with policy and technology. The fleet today reflects the wisdom of the deck plates, the labs, and lessons learned from our exercises. The size and design of our ships and weapons reflect the inputs of sailors in contact with Soviet "Victor" submarines, *Kiev*-class carriers, and "Bear" aircraft. The wisdom of common sense and the highest available technology are tremendous advantages, brought to the design of today's Navy and Marine Corps.

Of course, there are many kinds of ships not in the fleet today that could do very well. The British *Invincible*-class vertical or short take-off and landing (VSTOL) carriers are quite capable antisubmarine warfare ships. It would be nice to have some of them in the U. S. Navy. There are many attractive European frigate designs, and we could make good use of them. There are also diesel submarines in our European alliance navies that fulfill very effective roles.

If the taxpayers of our allies around the world were not buying these vessels, the burden would fall upon us. But happily, they are carrying a considerable share of the cost of naval defense and American taxpayers do not have to fund a Navy greater than about 600 ships.



ROYAL NAVY (D. O'BRIEN)

forces, however, would give us neither conventional deterrence on land nor secure access by sea unless the Western democracies are prepared to militarize their societies to an unprecedented, and unwise, degree.

#### *Are we buying the 'right' Navy for the strategy?*

Because research and development projects span decades, and ships take many years to build, the makeup of our fleet can not change radically with each administra-

There are many other kinds of ships that the U. S. Navy would like to have—for example, the Royal Navy's *Invincible* vertical or short take-off and landing carrier steaming here with the USS *Ranger* (CV-61)—but it is staying with the 600-ship fleet because it is prepared to bet that U. S. allies will continue to maintain modern, effective navies.



**The 600-ship Navy is a reality. All the ships necessary to maintain this Navy are either in the fleet now or under construction and fully funded.**

Perhaps the most debated issue on newspapers' front pages and television talk shows is whether our aircraft carriers should be large or small. There is no absolute answer to this question, but in my view, the evidence still seems overwhelmingly in favor of the *Nimitz* (CVN-68)-class carrier of 90,000 tons as the optimum size and design for putting air capability at sea.

Could we gainfully employ more mid-size carriers like our 64,000-ton *Midway* (CV-41) and *Coral Sea* (CV-43)? Yes, indeed. They would be very useful. The Navy would like to have five more of them if we could afford to buy them. At least, we will keep these two smaller carriers steaming in the force for a long time to come.

Similarly, with our nuclear attack submarines, we could buy more of them if we compromised on their capabilities. But our tremendous edge in technology is a permanent potential built into the nature of our culture and our economic system compared with the Soviets. We must build to this advantage, and not trade it away for cheaper, smaller, less capable ships built in greater numbers, which is the forte of a totalitarian, centralized, Gosplan economy.

It would be a great mistake for us to adopt a defense strategy at sea—any more than on land—that attempts to match totalitarian regimes in sheer numbers of cheap reproducible items. Time and again, the high-tech solution has proved to be the wisest investment, and by far the most advantageous one for the United States and its allies. This is true of our missiles, our aircraft, and our ships. We have the world's finest fighting equipment.

So we are getting the "right" Navy. Although there are plenty of other kinds of ships we would like to have, and we could certainly use the larger Navy long advocated by the Joint Chiefs, we have stayed consistently with the 600-ship fleet because we are prepared to bet that our allies will continue to maintain modern, effective navies and air forces. We are prepared to accept the risk that our nation will make the right decisions to prevent losses of forces early in a conflict, and we think that that is a prudent risk to run in order to have an affordable Navy.

#### Can we afford the Navy this nation needs?

Numerous studies and surveys, among them a tome by the Congressional Budget Office, suggest that we cannot afford to sustain, or properly man, a 600-ship Navy. Just the reverse is true. Consider the facts. We have now, under construction and fully funded, *all* of the ships necessary to attain a 600-ship Navy centered on 15 carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups, and 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Our long-term plans in a "zero growth" budget for fiscal year 1986 now reflect reductions in our shipbuilding and aircraft procurement programs. These reductions will be to levels we call the sustaining rate for the 600-ship Navy, an average 20 ships a year in new construction. The




actual number will be higher or lower in a given year, depending on the block obsolescence of various types of ships.

The 20-ship average is a sound basis for planning, in part because of improved maintenance and the corresponding increase in longevity. Instead of the average 26 years of life that we realized from our ships in the 1960s and the 1970s, we are now getting 30 years' service from our ships, because of better maintenance, the absence of a big backlog of overhauls, and the higher technology that we are putting into our ships.

This "good news" should not blind us to the requirements of the future. A steady 20-new-ships-a-year average will require 3% budget growth. A future of zero-growth budgets would mean that we will be unable to sustain a 600-ship Navy—or for that matter, a capable defense. We





INGALLS SHIPBUILDING


know from painful experience in the 1970s that the damage done by no-growth funding is far greater than the mere percentage budget loss would indicate. With zero- or negative-growth budgets, the industrial infrastructure vital to fleet construction and support shrinks dramatically. The result is a loss in competitive bidding and a return to sole-sourced monopolies. Rates of production must then be cut, individual unit costs increase dramatically, productivity falls, and, in the final accounting, the American taxpayer gets much less "bang for the buck." Even worse is the decline in the quality and morale of the people who man the fleet, as we saw in the late 1970s.

Is 3% real growth beyond our means? Throughout the past two decades, many commentators favoring a reduced defense effort have repeatedly predicted that the American people will not support sustained defense growth. That

refrain is now put forward by some, including the Congressional Budget Office, as a fact of life. While it may express their hopes, it is not supported by history. That view takes as its norm the flat or even declining figures of the immediate post-Vietnam War period. In fact, except for those years, post-World War II naval budgets maintained growth commensurate with our national economy. The middle and late Seventies, by contrast, are now being seen as an anomaly in U. S. history. It is not apparent, the Congressional Budget Office notwithstanding, that the American people wish to "restore" that aberrant pattern of declining numbers of ships, morale, and readiness.

In procurement, we should not assume that Congress will refuse to make the necessary legislative changes in the way we in the Department of the Navy are permitted to conduct our business. Indeed, I suggest that, in the current





MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

**A 3% budget growth will maintain the 600-ship Navy and keep the industrial infrastructure vital to sustain the benefits derived from competitive bidding and cost effective production rates—here, the F/A-18 production line.**

aura of public concern over budget deficits and government spending, there would be few more cost-effective and money-saving moves that Congress could undertake than the removal of excessive regulations and red tape that characterize the environment in which the Navy operates today. For example, there repose in the Library of Congress today no less than 1,152 linear feet of statutory and regulatory law governing procurement alone! That is the *real* Washington Monument!

Along with over-regulation, we are faced with excessive, layered bureaucracies, and the accretion of authority without concomitant responsibility into a confusing labyrinth of congressional oversight committees and federal agencies without end, creating tremendous inefficiencies.

The Congressional Budget Office staffers and others who look at the Navy's future costs assume that just because this bloated, inefficient congressional-executive system has been in place it will *remain* in place. I do not accept that. Moreover, we have shown in the Navy a historic reversal of the trend of inevitable cost increases.

Today, for example, the last contract that we signed for a follow-on Aegis cruiser was \$900 million. Four years ago, these cruisers cost more than \$1.2 billion each, and were projected to reach \$1.6 billion by the end of 1985. It did not happen, though, because we brought competition into the program. Both producing yards brought in new efficiencies and instituted strict cost discipline, while we in the Navy applied a new asceticism to our gold-plating lusts. All of our shipbuilding programs show the same pattern. We have gone from only 24% competition in 1981 to 90% competition in 1985, producing an average of \$1 billion in cost *underruns* for each of the last four years.

Contrary to what the nay-sayers predicted, the costs of Navy aircraft have been going down, not up. This is a sea change, a break with 30 years of uninterrupted cost escalation in naval aircraft procurement. During 1976–1981, growth in aircraft unit prices averaged about 10% in constant fiscal year 1980 dollars. In 1981, we implemented vigorous cost management programs which emphasized competition, no design changes, and firm fixed-price contracts. These efforts have paid off in reduced aircraft prices every year since 1982.

For example, we reached agreement with McDonnell Douglas on a fiscal year 1985 fly-away price of \$18.7 million for the F/A-18 strike fighter. In terms of fiscal year 1982 dollars, this is a price 32% below that paid in 1982. Purchases in 1985 represent a savings to the taxpayer of \$126 million for that year alone.

So, there is nothing inevitable about escalating costs and overruns in defense procurement. During the last four years we proved that it can be just as consistent to have underruns. And so if we just make prudent assumptions, not even optimistic assumptions, there is no question that we can maintain the size and the current mix of our force through the rest of this century with a 3% growth budget.

Just as significant, we can also maintain the tremendous turn-around in readiness that we have achieved with President Ronald Reagan's 7% growth budgets. During the past four years, the readiness of our ships and aircraft has increased nearly 40%. Even these statistics do not do justice to the palpable difference in the fleet itself, in morale, in readiness, and in safety—i.e., uncrashed airplanes and unbroken equipment and reduction of tragic accidents.

We know what we have accomplished during the past five years. Furthermore, we know we can maintain this record of success with the size budgets that are currently envisioned by the President.

The German military philosopher Clausewitz once observed that in the balance of power among nations, battle is to deterrence as cash is to credit in the world of commerce. One may live entirely by paper transactions *only* when there is no doubt about one's ability to settle accounts with hard currency when challenged.

Similarly, there must be no doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders that the United States and its allies can and will settle accounts, on both land and sea, if challenged. The 600-ship Navy is an essential element in this credibility. We *can*, and *must*, afford the naval power that will sustain the defense of this country's allies and interests around the world.



# Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography

By Captain Peter M. Swartz, U. S. Navy

This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the Department of the Navy. It includes criticisms of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating "The Mari-

time Strategy" to the overall national military strategy, and to historical precedents. It is organized topically and—within each topic—chronologically in order of publication or historical period treated to show the development of the strategy as well as its alternatives.

The Maritime Strategy has generated

enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that strategy. Absent are discussions which do not have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.

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## *The Maritime Strategy Debates: 1979–1985*

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American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns centered around antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and the Navy's role in nuclear strike warfare. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy"—strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate discussions.

In 1979, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influ-

enced by his experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U. S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, especially conventional.

Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the *Proceedings*. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he sparked continue to this day, fueled by

the statements and policies of the Reagan administration, especially Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., who took office in February 1981.

Under Lehman and Admiral Hayward's successor, Admiral James D. Watkins, the Navy organized its strategic thought into one coherent official declaratory statement, a classified briefing and publication, tested in games and exercises, and updated routinely, styled "The Maritime Strategy." General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and his staff participated in its creation, and—with the Navy—developed a component Amphibious Warfare Strategy.

The U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus Navy program-development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy



Four very visible architects of the Navy's revival of strategic thinking are: James Watkins, speaking at the Naval War College; John Lehman, explaining the threat in a press conference; Thomas Hayward, visiting a Coast Guard cutter; and P. X. Kelley, testifying before Congress.

planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released the initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public.

Contrary to much uninformed external criticism up to that point, it was presented by the Navy as only one—albeit a vital—component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also, contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice, to each other and to the nation and its allies.

Hayward, ADM Thomas B., "The Future of U. S. Sea Power," *Proceedings/Naval Review*, May 1979, pp. 66–71; Also Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R., Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103–106; and "Comment and Discussion," July 1979, pp. 23–24; August 1979, pp. 87–89; September 1979, pp. 89–91; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p. 88; January 1980, pp. 82–86. (Public debate on the new direction in U. S. Navy strategy begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Lind, Friedman, *et al.* See also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1979–1982.)


Turner, ADM Stansfield, "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," *Proceedings*, August 1980, pp. 66–69. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1980, p. 101; November 1980, pp. 124–127; January 1981, p. 77. (ADM Turner questions role of power projection in general war strategy.)

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U. S. Naval Strategy," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1981, pp. 9–15. (SecNav's views upon taking office. For more than two years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. See also Lehman "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981–1985, especially regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.)

Wemyss, RADM M. LaT., RN, "Submarines and Anti-submarine Operations for the Uninitiated," *RUSI Journal*, September 1981, pp. 22–27. (Restatement of classic Royal Navy arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts

\*Authoritative official statements of the Maritime Strategy.

\*\*Direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy.



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around expected afloat targets, instead of forward operations.)

Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo—Strategic ASW," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1981, pp. 4–14. (Call for anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.)

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," *Shipmate*, April 1982, pp. 18–20. (SecNav's charge to the officer corps.)

Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, RADM Robert J., *U. S. Strategy at the Crossroads*, Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982. (Two different arguments for shift to national maritime strategy.)

Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1,124–1,144. Also, Turner, ADM Stansfield, and Thibault, CAPT George, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp. 123–135; "Comment and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Winter 1982/3, pp. 453–457. (The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs Turner vs Lehman.)

Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment," *Orbis*, Fall 1982, pp. 583–589. (Argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.)

Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," *International Security*, Fall 1982, pp. 28–54.

(Claims forward U. S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere are a bad thing.)

Zakheim, Dov, "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on Strategy," *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1982, pp. 158–166. (Reagan administration maritime strategy in overall military context.)

U. S. House Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, *Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization For FY84: Part 4*, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 47–51. (COMO Dudley Carlson publicly unveils U. S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, Feb. 1983. Published later that year.)\*

Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981–1982," in Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), *The Reagan Presidency, An Early Assessment*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 82–116. (Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the context of the Maritime Strategy.)

Wilkerson, LTCOL Thomas, "Two if By Sea," *Proceedings*, November 1983, pp. 34–39. (On important role of the Air Force in Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps contributor to the strategy's development.)

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, William O., "Strategy for Survival," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1983, pp. 22–41. Also Komer and Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983–84, pp. 176–178. (Seeks to synthesize all points in





Washington: CSIS, 1984. (Expands arguments made in their *Foreign Policy* article.)

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of American Maritime Power," *Proceedings*, February 1984, pp. 47-51. (Refinement of Lehman's thought after three years in office.)

Zakheim, Dov S., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National Military Strategy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1984, pp. 35-



39. (An Assistant Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions and programs in context of overall administration strategy.)

Toyka, CDR Viktor, FGN, "A Submerged Forward Defense," *Proceedings*, March 1984, pp. 145-147. (Complementary German Maritime Strategy for the Baltic.)

Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Second Session, *Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY85: Part 8*, Washington: GPO, 1985, pp. 3851-3900. (SecNav and CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as component of national military strategy, March 1984, but not published until the following year. Further development of the Strategy presented by COMO Carlson a year earlier.)\*

Rivkin, D. B., "No Bastions for the Bear," *Proceedings*, April 1984, pp. 36-43. Also "Comment and Discussion:" June 1984, pp. 14-15; July 1984, pp. 14-20; August 1974, p. 101; September 1984, p. 164; October 1984, pp. 97-100; January 1985, p. 129. (The anti-SSBN mission debate.)

Turner, ADM Stansfield, "A Strategy for the 90s," *New York Times Magazine*, 6 May 1984, pp. 30-40, etc. (Argues for USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and more/smaller ships.)

Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the North-East Atlantic?" *International Defense Review*, 12/1984, pp.

1803-4. (USN and NATO naval strategy.)

Watkins, ADM James D., "Current Strategy of U. S. Navy," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 June 1984, p. 22. (USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert, "Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 May 1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs. Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1983-1985.)\*

Komer, Robert, *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense*, Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also book review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1984-85, pp. 721-722. (Komer's last salvo before November 1984 elections, with administration retort.)

Brooks, CAPT Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy," *Proceedings*, August 1984, pp. 33-37. Also "Comment and Discussion:" October 1984, pp. 28-29; November 1984, pp. 18, 24; December 1984, p. 174. (Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by a contributor to development of the Maritime Strategy. Focus of debate begins to shift to the strategy as it actually is, rather than the strategy as it is alleged to be.)\*

"Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on Offensive," *Navy Times*, August 20, 1984, pp. 25-26. (COMO William Fogarty outlines Maritime Strategy.)\*

Stewart, MAJ Richard A., "Ships That Can Deliver," *Proceedings*, November 1984, pp. 37-43. (Amphibious versus prepositioning issues.)

George, James L. (ed.), *The U. S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. (Papers delivered at a Center for Naval Analysis Conference, Fall 1984. See chapters by Dov Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare," Robert Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired Admirals Robert Long and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific Command "Concept of Operations" and his Pacific Command Campaign Plan were important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.)\*

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? . . . to Support the Land Battle," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1984, pp. 4-12. Also "In My View:" March-April 1985, pp. 96-97; July-August 1985, p. 83. (Mainstream U. S. Navy thinking.)

Zimm, LCDR Alan D., "The First Salvo," *Proceedings*, February 1985, pp. 55-60. Also "Comment and Discussion:" April 1985, p. 16; June 1985, p. 132; July 1985, p. 106. (See especially for timing of forward carrier battle group moves and for Soviet strategy issues.)

Bremer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," *RUSI Journal*, March 1985, pp. 18-26. (Includes useful review of literature.)

Ackley, R. T., "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2," *Proceedings*, April 1985, pp. 42-47. Also "Comment and Discussion:" May 1985, pp. 14-17; July 1985, p. 112. (More on the anti-SSBN mission.)



the maritime-continental debate.)

Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," *International Security*, Winter 1983/84, pp. 3-18. Also "Correspondence," Summer 1984, pp. 217-221. (Echoes Komer's and Turner's stated positions.)

Dunn, Keith A. and Staudenmaier, William O., *Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Paper #107)*,



Stavridis, CDR James, "The Global Maritime Coalition," *Proceedings*, April 1985, pp. 58-74. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, p. 177. (On role of allies in Maritime Strategy.)

Watkins, ADM James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," *Baltimore Sun*, 16 April 1985, p. 15. (USN rejoinder to a variety of critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," *Baltimore Sun*, 26 March 1985, p. 7.)\*

Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H., *Future Imperative: National Security and the U. S. Navy in the Late 1980s*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985. (See especially Ullman's critique of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21, & 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner, *Proceedings*, January 1981, p. 77.)\*

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, William O., "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," *Survival*, May-June 1985, pp. 108-118. (Shows Maritime Strategy similarities to Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offensive strategy on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both.)

House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, *Hearings on the 600 Ship Navy*, Washington: GPO (Forthcoming.) (SecNav, CNO, Commandant, VADM Lyons, ADM McKee, VADM Thunman explain strategy-program interface, June-September 1985. ADM Kidd, ADM Turner, RADM Carroll, CBO, GAO comment. Thorough airing of the issues, especially relationship to "600-Ship Navy.")\*\*

Holloway, ADM James L. III, "The U. S. Navy—A Functional Appraisal," *Oceanus*, Summer 1985, pp. 3-11. (Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by former CNO. Focus on sea control and on Soviet Navy as anti-SLOC force.)

Friedman, Norman, "U. S. Maritime Strategy," *International Defense Review*, 7/1985, pp. 1,071-1,075. (Analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy.)\*

Foley, ADM Sylvester R., Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," *Proceedings*, August

1985, pp. 34-38. (Retiring PACFLT commander discusses his task in context of overall Maritime Strategy. Shows one fleet commander's view of the strategy.)\*

Turner, ADM Stansfield, "U. S. Naval Policy," *Naval Forces*, No. III/1985, pp. 15-25. (Update of Turner's thoughts, emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC protection.)

Grove, E. J., "The Convoy Debate," *Naval Forces*, No. III/1985, pp. 38-46. (Update of classic post-war Royal Navy pro-convoy/anti-forward ops arguments.)

O'Donnell, Maj. Hugh K., USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive," *Proceedings*, September 1985, pp. 42-57. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, pp. 16, 20, December 1985, pp. 20-23, and subsequent issues. (USN/USMC global Maritime Strategy as applied to one region; comprehensive commentary on the Maritime Strategy debate.)\*

Collins, John M., *U. S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985*, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. (Compares strategy and policy as well as force levels. See especially Chapter 11. Also Chapters 9, 12, and 16.)

Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman's Navy Riding High, But Critics Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," *National Journal*, 21 September 1985, pp. 2120+. (Wide-ranging review of many aspects of the debate.)

"NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea," *Virginian-Pilot*, 9 September 1985, pp. 1+. (Another fleet view of the strategy. VADM Henry C. Mustin, Second Fleet Commander, on exercising and implementing Maritime Strategy in NATO Atlantic theater.) See also "Protection of Convoy Routes a Key Objective for Ocean Safari 85," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 5 October 1985, pp. 749-753.\*

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface With SECNAV," *Surface Warfare*, September-October 1985, pp. 2-10. (SecNav ties the strategy, surface warfare, and procurement issues together.)\*

West, F. J. "Bing" Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1985, pp. 5-19. (By a former Reagan administration official,

naval strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the strategy.)\*

McDonald, ADM Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy," *Proceedings*, October 1985, pp. 46-53. (Actually on relationship of Maritime Strategy to NATO fleet strategy in the Atlantic, with emphasis on mine warfare.)\*

Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" *Proceedings*, October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Surface combatants and the Maritime Strategy.)\*

Powers, CAPT Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," *Proceedings*, October 1985, especially pp. 62-63. (Central strike warfare theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.)\*

Watkins, ADM James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our National Willpower," *Sea Power*, October 1985, p. 71. (CNO describes utility and process of the Maritime Strategy.)\*

Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," *International Defense Review*, 10/1985, pp. 1587-97. (Maritime Strategy and North Atlantic ASW strategy: Open ocean vs close-in vs convoy strategies.)

Wood, Robert S., and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1985, pp. 5-18.\*\*

Heginbotham, Stanley, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1985, pp. 19-27.\*\*

Bowling, CAPT R. A., "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes," *Proceedings*, December 1985, pp. 92-98. (Argues for a return to SLOC protection focus for U. S. Navy.)

Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy;" Watkins, ADM James D., "The Maritime Strategy;" and Kelley, GEN P. X., and O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" in *Proceedings*, January 1986 Maritime Strategy Supplement.\*

### Soviet Views and Strategy

U. S. Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat—along with U. S. national interests and geo-political realities—is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. The focus in the works listed below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their navy and for ours, and whether these priorities will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this bibliography.

Sturua, G. M., "The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy," *USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology*, November 1982. (A prominent Soviet civilian defense analyst's views on the U. S. Navy's Maritime Strategy. He sees it as primarily a nuclear counterforce strategy, employing submarine and carrier-launched nuclear weapons.)


Stalbo, VADM K., "U. S. Ocean Strategy," in *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 10, 1983, pp. 29-36. (The Soviet Navy's leading theoretician writes in its official journal. Reaction to the *Proceedings* October 1982 issue on the Soviet Navy, and to statements by the Secretary of the Navy. Criticizes the "new U. S. Naval Strategy" for its geopolitical roots, its global

scope, and for its aims of "isolating countries of the Socialist community from the rest of the world.")

U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session. *Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY84: Part 6*, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 2935 and 2939. (RADM John Butts, new Director of Naval Intelligence, gives authoritative U. S. Navy view of Soviet navy strategy, April 1983. See also updates in Butts testimony of 1984 and 1985.)

McConnell, James M., "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional," Vols. I and II, Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CRC 490, June 1983. (Includes





**It likely comes as no surprise to the Soviets that the Maritime Strategy involves an aggressive campaign against all Soviet subs, including SSBNs.**

alternative views of Soviet naval strategy.)

Sturua, G., "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare," *USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology*, February 1985. (Strategic ASW viewed as a primary USN mission.)

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition)*, Washington DC: GPO, 1985. (Latest in a series of official U. S. Navy handbooks on the Soviet fleet. See also critique by Norman Friedman in *Proceedings*, November 1985, pp. 88-89.)

Fitzgerald, CAPT T. A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," *Proceedings*, January 1986, pp. 12-16. (Argues Soviets may use their navy as a risk fleet for a "Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial.)

### Antecedents and Background

The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is presented here are only two kinds of materials: a few books that show how strategy is made, was made, or should be made; and books that describe earlier strategies—planned or implemented—which are analogous to key aspects of the U. S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered. Snyder, Jack, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. Chapter I. (On how military strategy really gets made, and why. Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. Views military as predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies.)

Till, Geoffrey, *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age* (Second Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. (Basic one-volume historical and topical survey.)

Barker, A. J., *The War Against Russia, 1854-1856*. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1970; and Curtiss, John Shelton, *Russia's Crimean War*, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979. (Maritime global forward coalition strategy against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas, and off Kuriles and Kamchatka.)

Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1954. ("Maritime Strategy" of the 1980s was not first time this century U. S. Navy developed a coherent preferred strategy.)

Palmer, Alan, *The Gardeners of Salonika*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. See especially pp. 226-247. (Southern Flank Maritime Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube from beachhead in Greece in 1918, knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,

Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated.)

Roskill, Stephen W., *Naval Policy Between the Wars, Volume I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*, New York: Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920." (Multinational maritime global forward intervention in Russia's Civil War.)

Dyer, VADM George C., *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Retired)*, Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973. Chapter XIV: "War Plans." (Discusses development of Navy preferred strategy of the interwar period.)

Erickson, John, *The Road to Stalingrad* (Vol. I) and *The Road to Berlin* (Vol. II) Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1983. See especially Vol. I: pp. 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295; Vol. II: pp. 43, 132, 156. (Effect of Far East operations—or lack thereof—on Central/East Europe Front in World War II.)

Spykman, Nicholas John, *The Geography of the Peace*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. (Basic geopolitical reference. See especially maps, pp. 50-54.)

Love, Robert B., Jr. (Ed.), *The Chiefs of Naval Operations*, Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. (See sections on post-World War II CNOs' views on strategy, especially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh Burke. While certain Secretaries of the Navy, the Naval War College, the U. S. Naval Institute, the Center of Naval Analyses, theater commanders, and civilian thinkers have had roles to play in the development of overall naval strategy, the CNOs and their staffs have normally been the most important global strategists in the post-war U. S. Navy.)

Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience," in A. F. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart, et al, *Air Power and Warfare*, Washington,

GPO, 1970. (Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies; by the premier historian of U. S. Navy postwar strategy.)

Nimitz, FADM Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces," *Vital Speeches*, Jan. 15, 1948, pp. 214-217. Also, in *Brassey's Naval Annual: 1948*, and *Shipmate*, February 1948, pp. 5-6+, as "Our Navy. Its Future." (Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy capable of land attack early in a war.)

Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), *Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957*, New York: Dial Press, 1978. (1949 JCS study: good example of early postwar strategic thinking. See especially pp. 161-165, 206-211, 225-235.) (Not to be read without examination of review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III, *Naval War College Review*, Fall 1978, pp. 103-106.)

Wylie, RADM J. C., *Military Strategy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967. (Codification of views of USN's most prominent post-war strategic theorist.)

Gray, Colin S., *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution*, New York: Crane Russak, 1977. (Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory. Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature of Western security problems.)

Ryan, CAPT Paul, *First Line of Defense*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. (Mainstream USN perspective on post-war defense policies through Carter Administration.)

Hattendorf, John, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College*, Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1984. (Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U. S. Navy strategic thought. See especially pp. 201-202, 237, 312-319.)



Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet the U. S. Navy's *global* posture since World War II has often looked like a series of hard-and-fast *theater* commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. These articles and letters illustrate the current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime

trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.

Booth, Ken, "U. S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, Usability, and Credibility," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1978, pp. 11-28. (Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet.)

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom," *Proceedings*, July 1983, pp. 22-28. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1983, p. 26.

Ortlieb, CDR E. V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation," *Proceedings*, December 1983, pp. 36-40. Also "Comment and Discussion:" February 1984, p. 22.

Maiorano, LT Alan, "A Fresh Look at the



**There never seem to be enough ships available to meet the commitments—even in Pearl Harbor during a RIMPAC Exercise workup or wash-down.**

Strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely

Cole, CDR Bernard, "Atlantic First," *Proceedings*, August 1982, pp. 103-106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp. 86-87.

Deutermann, CAPT Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet," *Proceedings*, September 1982, pp. 46-49. Also "Comment and Discussion:" November 1982, p. 14; January 1983, pp. 17-20; February 1983, pp. 80-81; March 1983, pp. 12-17; July 1983, p. 89.

Bremer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," *Naval War College Review*, Nov.-Dec. 1982, pp. 27-32.

Sixth Fleet," *Proceedings*, February 1984, pp. 52-58. Also "Comment and Discussion:" July 1984, pp. 28-33.

Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G., "Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater," in James L. George (ed.), *The U. S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985.

Sestak, LCDR Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," *Proceedings*, January 1986, pp. 64-71.

#### *Naval Operations: Peacetime and Crises*

Most of the above works deal with use of the Navy in general war. What follows, in chronological order by publication date, are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U. S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and

"small wars" (the "Violent Peace"). Many of these derive from the increased visibility of peacetime presence as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. They build on the earlier

literature of the 1960s on the role of the U. S. Navy in limited war.

Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session, *Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier*. Washington: GPO, 1970, pp. 162-165. (List-





ing of uses of USN in wars/near-wars 1946–1969; takes negative view of same.)

Cable, James, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*, New York: Praeger, 1970. (First of a spate of useful books seeking to list, classify, and describe peacetime uses of navies. Surveys twentieth century activities of all major navies. Updated in 1981.)

McGruther, LCDR Kenneth, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1974. (Part of the 1970s Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN "Naval Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and a "cookbook.")

McNulty, CDR James, "Naval Presence—The Misunderstood Mission," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1974. (Another reflection of Zumwalt-Turner focus on presence. See also Turner, VADM Stansfield, "Challenge," in same issue.)

Luttwak, Edward N., *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. (Short treatment sponsored by VADM Turner. Typology and analysis based on concept of "suasion." Focus on the U. S. Navy in the Mediterranean.)

Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," *Survival*, November/December 1974, pp. 262–267. (Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy.)

Booth, Ken, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, London: Croon Helm, 1977. (Magisterial treatment.)

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U. S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975," Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977. (Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries of incidents and responses.)

Blechman, Barry M., and Kaplan, Stephen S., *Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. (Utility of USN vs other U. S. armed forces.)

Congressional Budget Office, "U. S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime Presence Mission," Washington: 1978. (How it could allegedly be

done with fewer CVs.)

Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., (eds.), *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. (Comprehensive surveys and analyses.)

Allen, Charles D., Jr., *The Uses of Navies in Peacetime*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Excellent short analysis, with typology. (Focus on postwar U. S. Navy, and on escalation.)

Kaplan, Stephen S., *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. (Does for the Soviets what Blechman and Kaplan did for the U. S.)

Cohen, Raymond, *International Politics: The Rules of the Game*, London: Longman, 1981, pp. 41–48. (One of the few general works on international relations by an academic political scientist to deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy force movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of international politics.")

Taylor, William J., Jr., and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Stability, Political Decay, and Navies," *Orbis*, Fall 1982, pp. 579–522. (Limitations of naval interventions.)

Wright, Christopher C., III, "U. S. Naval Operations in 1982," *Proceedings/Naval Review*, May 1983. (Includes general introduction to USN concepts of operations, deployment patterns, tempo of operations, as well as review of actual operations.) See also updates for 1983 and 1984 in *Naval Review*, May 1984 and May 1985.

Hickman, LCDR William J., "Did it Really Matter?" *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1983, pp. 17–30. (On limitations and misuses of USN naval presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to McGruther article a decade earlier, above.)

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
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19 March '86

The Editor  
The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

Sir;

While "The Maritime Strategy" published in January 1986 by the Proceedings is a great improvement over previous statements on that subject, several clarifications should be made. In the light of the planned Seminar at NASS Jacksonville in late May these such clarifications are particularly important.

First: As elucidated by Mahan, Maritime Strategy is a National or Grand Strategy, rather than a Military Strategy. Both Military Strategy and Naval Strategy are essential components of a Maritime Strategy.

Maritime Strategy is based on maritime power, not all of which is controlled by the Navy.

Second: As stated by Adm. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy is a 'Declaratory Strategy' rather than an 'Operational Strategy' and as such serves a valuable



purpose in guiding both force structure and deployment.

Nevertheless, one should be aware that the onset of overt military conflict (War?) seldom conforms to the expectations of the contingency planners and therefore major readjustments in plans and modifications in the various elements of the hierarchy of national and military objectives are normal.

Third Maritime power and hence Maritime Strategy rests upon Supporting Institutions and Supporting Machinery over which the Navy has no authority. These Supporting elements provide the basic logistics (The Creation and Sustained Support of the Combat Forces!) which make the Strategy operational. Currently the industrial base of Maritime Strategy has been so eroded by technological, industrial and economic and political events of the last thirty years that the industrial mobilization

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essential to a major war will be very slow and inadequate.

I strongly recommend that those attending the Jacksonville Seminar read the following works that clearly bring out the essential characteristics of Maritime Strategy.

C. J. MARCUS, THE AGE OF NELSON.

this is a highly readable comprehensive account of how the British Maritime System defeated Napoleon's "Continental System."

WILLIAM REITZEL, MAHAN ON THE USES OF THE SEA, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

MAY JUNE 1973. This is a terse informative analysis of Mahan's principal concepts with emphasis on their enduring applicability.

H. E. ECCLES MILITARY POWER IN A FREE SOCIETY, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS 1979, CHAPTER 8 Maritime Power specifically defines Maritime Power, Sea Power, and Maritime Strategy and places them in a coherent relationship to Strategy as the Art of Control and to the nature and pervasive influence of logistics.

Yours Truly,

*Henry E. Eccles*

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