PROPOSED REMARKS BY ADMIRAL E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AT THE BULLOCK FORUM, NEW YORK, N.Y., 9 NOVEMBER 1971

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: (PERSONALIZED TO AUDIENCE)
II. TEXT:

I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING MY PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGING REALITIES OF AMERICAN MARITIME POWER -- AND THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS I SEE FOR THE FUTURE ASSUMING THE CONTINUANCE OF PRESENT TRENDS. I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE NIXON DOCTRINE WHICH SEEKS A GENERATION OF PEACE.

FIRST, BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, YOU ARE ALL AWARE THAT UNPRECEDENTED DEMANDS ARE TODAY BEING PLACED UPON THE ENERGIES AND RESOURCES OF OUR NATION AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLUENCE OF THE TWO GREAT CURRENTS OF WORLD AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS -- WITHIN THE NATION WE ARE BUFFETED BY TURBULENCE ARISING FROM WELL SPRINGS OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, WHILE IN THE WORLD BEYOND OUR SHORES, PONDEROUS FORCES ARE AFOOT, SLOWING TIPPING THE SCALES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY BALANCE TO A POSITION MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE PAST 25 YEARS.

MANY OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING FROM THESE DUAL PRESSURES ON THE NATION HAVE BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED, AND ARE THEREFORE KNOWN TO YOU -- BUT I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU TONIGHT OF A TREND WHICH IS NEITHER WIDELY KNOWN NOR CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD IN AMERICA.

THIS IS THE FACT OF THE DECLINING BALANCE OF THE NAVAL

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STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES AS COMPARED TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE WELFARE OF OUR COUNTRY.

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I BELIEVE THAT IT IS VITAL FOR ALL AMERICANS TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE CHANGE IN OUR MILITARY AND MARITIME SITUATION BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH HONEST MEN MAY DIFFER. IN THEIR CHOICES OF SOLUTIONS TO COMMONLY PERCEIVED PROBLEMS, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM BEFORE AN INFORMED CHOICE CAN BE MADE. THE ULTIMATE DECISION MAKERS ON THIS, AS ON ALL ISSUES, ARE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ACTING THROUGH THEIR ELECTED AND APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES. THUS, THEY NEED TO BE AS WELL-INFORMED ON THIS ISSUE AS THEY ARE ON THOSE NOW MORE WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE LAND IF A RATIONAL ORDERING OF PRIORITIES FOR OUR NATIONAL RESOURCES IS TO BE MADE.

SECRETARY LAIRD RECENTLY POINTED OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES IS THE NUMBER ONE NATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMICALLY AND WOULD MAINTAIN THAT POSITION IN THE FUTURE, HE COULD NOT SAY THE SAME THING ABOUT THE PROJECTED RELATIVE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARILY IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. HE ADDED "I'M STILL CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DO NOT WANT TO BE INFERIOR MILITARILY...AND I THINK THIS TALK OF BUDGET CUTTING WILL BE SOMETHING OF THE PAST...ONCE THEY REALIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREMENDOUS MOMENTUM OF THE SOVIET UNION".

THAT MOMENTUM ENCOMPASSES THE FULL SPECTRUM OF MILITARY POWER. WITHIN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD SPECIFICALLY, SOVIET

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NAVAL AND MARITIME POWER IS ON THE INCREASE, AND THE FACT THAT IT IS HAS ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO WORLD AFFAIRS. ONLY THE BEST INFORMED AND MOST PERCEPTIVE AMERICANS HAVE SENSED THAT IT HAS ALREADY CHANGED THE SECURE VIEWPOINT FROM WHICH WE HAVE OBSERVED WORLD AFFAIRS SINCE 1945. HERE IS WHY.

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THE SOVIET UNION EMERGED FROM WORLD WAR II AS THE GREATEST OF THE EUROPEAN LAND POWERS. WHEN THE SOVIETS SHORTLY THERE-AFTER TRIED TO USE THEIR SUPERIOR LAND POWER TO ACQUIRE EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN TERRITORY, WE AND OUR ALLIES UNDERTOOK TO HALT THEM BY EXECUTING A SERIES OF MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS. NATO WAS THE FOREMOST OF THEM, AND WAS FOLLOWED BY A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL PACTS WHICH NOW INCLUDE OVER 40 NATIONS IN WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE FREE WORLD ALLIANCE SYSTEM. THESE AGREEMENTS WERE BACKED BY AMERICAN ECONOMIC STRENGTH, OUR NAVY AND OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY. THEY WERE EFFECTIVE IN COUNTERING SOVIET THRUSTS AND ARE RESPONSIBLE IN LARGE PART FOR WESTERN STRENGTH AND PROSPERITY TODAY.

THESE ARE MARITIME ALLIANCES IN THE FULLEST SENSE. THEY DEPEND UTTERLY UPON THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FREELY USE THE SEAS TO SUPPORT ITS ALLIES AND TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING ENCIRCLED FROM THE SEA. THEIR MARITIME NATURE CAN BEST BE DEMONSTRATED BY CONSIDERING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF OUR FRIENDS AND OUR POTENTIAL OPPONENTS. ALMOST ALL OF OUR ALLIES ARE OVERSEAS, AS ARE ALL OF OUR POTENTIAL OPPONENTS.

THE PRESIDENT NOTED THE UNIQUE MARITIME DEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1970 WHEN HE SAID: "ONE OTHER POINT I WOULD MAKE BRIEFLY IS THIS: WHAT THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS IN TERMS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE NEED. THEY'RE A LAND POWER PRIMARILY, WITH A GREAT POTENTIAL ENEMY ON THE EAST. WE'RE PRIMARILY OF COURSE A SEA POWER AND OUR NEEDS, THEREFORE, ARE DIFFERENT".

THIS IS A MOST PERCEPTIVE AND TELLING OBSERVATION. SOVIET VITAL INTERESTS REQUIRE A LARGE ARMY AND AIR FORCE TO PROTECT THE EURASIAN HEARTLAND -- OUR VITAL INTERESTS REQUIRE A CAPABILITY TO CONTROL AND USE THE SEAS WHICH BIND TOGETHER THE MARITIME ALLIANCE OF WHICH WE ARE A PART.

WHY THEN ARE THE SOVIETS COMMITTING RESOURCES TO BUILDING A NAVY? BECAUSE, SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE BALANCE OF WORLD POWER HAS DEPENDED UPON A SERIES OF COUNTERVAILING WESTERN ALLIANCES, WHICH IN TURN DEPENDED TO A GREAT EXTENT UPON THE LARGE AND POWERFUL UNITED STATES NAVY WHICH CAME OUT OF THAT WAR.

AS IN THE PAST TWO CENTURIES, WHEN RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES OF EXPANSION WERE FORESTALLED BY THE BRITISH AND JAPANESE FLEETS, THE SOVIETS TODAY PERCEIVE THE U.S. NAVY AS THE KEY OBSTACLE STANDING IN THE WAY OF THEIR GOAL.

SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE U.S. NAVY, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS ALLIED FREE WORLD NAVIES, HAS BEEN THE GUARANTOR TO ALL THAT OUR SEABORNE COMMERCE AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS WOULD CONTINUE TO FLOW AND THAT OUR INTERLOCKING ALLIANCE SYSTEM WAS UNDERWRITTEN BY CREDIBLE NAVAL POWER.

THE SOVIETS SEE THIS FACT AS A POINT OF VULNERABILITY, AND SO THEY HAVE CAREFULLY OPTIMIZED THEIR FORCES TO BE

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MOST EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE U.S. NAVY.

OUR NAVY HAS FOUR PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WHICH IT MUST PROVIDE:

- FIRST, IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, IT MUST CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR.

- SECOND, IT MUST BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE AREAS OF THE SEA THAT WE WISH TO USE -- IN SHORT, TO KEEP OUR SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS OPEN.

- THIRD, WHEN IT IS OUR NATIONAL POLICY TO DO SO, IT MUST BE ABLE TO PROJECT U.S. POWER ASHORE ON FOREIGN SOIL AND AGAINST OPPOSITION TO PROTECT OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS OR SUPPORT OUR OWN OR ALLIED GROUND FORCES.

- FOURTH, IN PEACETIME IT MUST MANIFEST AN OVERSEAS PRESENCE DEMONSTRATING TO OUR ALLIES AND POSSIBLE ADVERSARIES THAT A CHALLENGE TO OUR OVERSEAS INTERESTS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES MAY RESULT IN A CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. ARMED FORCES.

AFTER THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ROLE, THE MOST ESSENTIAL OF THESE CAPABILITIES IS THAT OF SEA CONTROL, FOR IF WE ARE UNABLE TO USE THE SEAS AGAINST OPPOSITION, ALL OTHER MISSIONS ARE NEUTRALIZED -- THE SOVIETS ALSO PERCEIVE THIS AS VULNERABILITY, AND THEY HAVE CHOSEN THEIR WEAPONS WELL. THE SOVIET NAVY THUS FAR IS DESIGNED NOT TO OVERPOWER US ON THE SURFACE OF THE SEA AND TO ATTACK OUR SHORES, BUT TO DENY US THE USE OF THE SEAS AND TO DRIVE US FROM THE POSITIONS FROM WHICH WE SUPPORT OUR ALLIANCES. THE LARGE SOVIET SUBMARINE AND MISSILE FLEETS ARE ADMIRABLY SUITED TO THE TASK.

HAVING THUS SET THE STAGE, LET ME DEVELOP THE CASE

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FURTHER BY POINTING OUT FOUR REALITIES IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT WHICH INFLUENCE OUR NEED FOR AND GOVERN THE NAVY'S ABILITY TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS.

THE <u>FIRST</u> OF THESE REALITIES IS NUCLEAR PARITY. TODAY, WE NO LONGER POSSESS SUPERIORITY IN NUCLEAR ARMS. SOVIET ARMS ARE ON A PAR WITH OURS.

THE MAIN EFFECT OF THIS STAND-OFF IS THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST LOOK TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO PROVIDE THE MEANS OF PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS. WITHOUT SUFFICIENTLY STRONG AND MOBILE CONVENTIONAL FORCES WE MAY ONLY HAVE TWO OPTIONS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE THREATENED: TO ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR WAR, OR TO BACK DOWN. THESE, AS YOU RECALL, WERE THE ONLY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO KRUSHCHEV IN THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

THE <u>SECOND</u> REALITY IS THE NIXON DOCTRINE. ALTHOUGH UNDER IT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HONOR OUR COMMITMENTS, IT STRESSES INCREASED SELF-RELIANCE ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES AND PROMISES REDUCTIONS IN OUR OWN OVERSEAS BASES AND FORCES. AS SUCH IT CONTAINS IMPORTANT NAVAL IMPLICATIONS:

- <u>FIRST</u>, IF WE ARE TO REDUCE OVERSEAS FORCES AND BASES, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE CAPABILITY TO RETURN IN FORCE IF NEEDED -- EVEN IF OPPOSED -- FOR IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A CAPABILITY, BOTH OUR ALLIES AND POSSIBLE ADVERSARIES MAY QUESTION THE WORTH OF OUR COMMITMENTS.

- <u>SECOND</u>, OUR COMMITMENTS DEMAND ADEQUATE SEALIFT. EVEN WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF THE NEWEST CARGO AIRCRAFT, OVER 90% OF OVERSEAS MILITARY CARGOES MUST TRAVEL TO THEIR DESTINATIONS ON THE SURFACE OF THE OCEANS. FOR THIS REASON, THERE CAN BE

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NO PLAN FOR THE POSSIBLE ENGAGEMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS WHICH DOES NOT ASSUME THAT WE OR OUR ALLIES WILL BE IN CONTROL OF THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE THREATENED AREA.

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FINALLY, WE MUST MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT U.S. CAPABILITY TO PREVENT AN EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE TO OUR FREE USE OF THE OCEANS AND OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE. THERE WILL BE TIMES WHEN WE WILL BE CALLED UPON TO GO IT ALONE. CUBA WAS ONE SUCH INSTANCE, JORDAN IN 1970 WAS ANOTHER.

THE THIRD REALITY, AS I HAVE MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, IS SOVIET NAVAL AND MARITIME EXPANSION. SINCE WE NO LONGER POSSESS NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY, SOVIET NAVAL EXPANSION GIVES THEM THE POTENTIAL TO GREATLY DIMINISH OUR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OUR ALLIANCES AND TO PROTECT OUR COMMERCE.

AS WE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED, THIS SOVIET NAVAL GROWTH CAN BE TRACED DIRECTLY TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962, WHEN THE WEAKNESS OF THE SOVIET NAVY AND U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY FORCED THEM TO BACK DOWN IN THE FACE.OF A RESOLUTE U.S. STAND.

SINCE THEN, THE KREMLIN HAS ALLOCATED VAST RESOURCES TO GAINING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY AND TO NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAMS --RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE IN PART BY DRASTIC CUT BACKS IN THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE EFFORT. TO ILLUSTRATE THEIR RENEWED NAVAL EMPHASIS, BETWEEN 1966 AND 1971, WHEN THE U.S. PRODUCED 88 COMBATANT AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, SOVIET SHIPYARDS PRODUCED MORE THAN 200. THE SOVIET FLEET NOW APPROACHES THE U.S. FLEET IN TOTAL NUMBERS OF COMBATANT SHIPS.

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THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY OUR ALLIES --IN THE NEW EDITION OF THE PRESTIGIOUS NAVAL ANNUAL JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, ITS EDITOR MR. RAYMOND V. B. BLACKMAN SAYS:

"THE SITUATION FOR THE U.S. NAVY IS SERIOUS. BY ANY STANDARDS, THE SOVIET FLEET NOW REPRESENTS THE SUPERNAVY OF A SUPERPOWER".

TWO OF THE PRODUCTS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND SHIP-BUILDING ARE CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE THE SEAS. THESE ARE THE EXPANDING SOVIET ANTÍ-SHIP MISSILE FORCES, AND THEIR SUBMARINE FORCES. THEY EXIST AND ARE AT SEA TODAY, AND THEY ARE INCREASING AT A RAPID RATE.

ANTI-SHIP MISSILE LAUNCHING PLATFORMS HAVE INCREASED FOUR-FOLD SINCE 1960, WHILE THE SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE NOW NUMBERS OVER 300 ATTACK AND CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES AS COMPARED TO THE 57 WHICH THE GERMANS HAD AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II. NOT COUNTING BALLISTIC MISSILE TYPES, THE SOVIETS OVERTOOK AND PASSED US IN TOTAL NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES IN 1963 -- ALMOST EIGHT FULL YEARS AGO -- AND THEY ARE STILL BUILDING THEM AT A FASTER RATE THAN WE ARE.

THE FOURTH AND FINAL REALITY IS OUR OWN REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS AND STRENGTH OF OUR OWN NAVAL FORCES.

SINCE 1965, NAVY STRENGTH HAS BEEN REDUCED BY 25% OF ITS SHIPS, 20% OF ITS COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND 7% OF ITS TOTAL UNIFORMED AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

THUS, WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MAKING A SEEMINGLY FRANTIC EFFORT TO BUILD A NAVY CAPABLE OF CHALLENGING OUR

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OWN, EVEN TO THE POSSIBLE EXTENT OF CONCEDING THE MOON RACE TO US, WE HAVE BEEN SLIDING STEADILY DOWNHILL. TWO FORCES PROMPTED OUR DECLINE.

FIRST, TO REPLACE EVEN OUR PRESENT LEVEL OF NAVAL FORCES ON AN ORDERLY BASIS EVERY 25 YEARS, WE MUST INVEST \$3 BILLION EACH YEAR IN NEW CONSTRUCTION, AT 1972 PRICE LEVELS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO APPROACH THAT LEVEL OF INVESTMENT FOR THE LAST EIGHT YEARS.

THE HIGHER BUDGETS OF THE VIETNAM YEARS WERE COMMITTED TO REPLACEMENT OF LOSSES OR EXPENDITURE OF WEAPONS -- SHIP-BUILDING ALLOCATIONS WERE CUT BACK TO HELP PAY THESE DAILY OPERATING COSTS OF THE WAR. IN ESSENCE, WE WERE FORCED TO ACCEPT STEADILY GROWING OBSOLESCENCE AS ONE OF THE COSTS OF THAT WAR.

SECONDLY, ALTHOUGH THE DOLLAR LEVEL OF NAVY FUNDING TODAY IS HIGHER THAN IN THE YEARS BEFORE VIETNAM, OUR REAL PURCHASING POWER HAS BEEN CUT 13% AS A RESULT OF INFLATION. WE HAVE IN EFFECT LOST A WHOLE GENERATION OF SHIPBUILDING IN THE LAST DECADE -- AND, GIVEN THE ACCELERATED SOVIET EFFORT IN THE SAME PERIOD, THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED TREMENDOUS RELATIVE MOMENTUM.

IF THESE TWO OPPOSING TRENDS CONTINUE, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES NAVY WILL ONE DAY BE INFERIOR TO THE SOVIET NAVY.

IN MY OPENING REMARKS, I SAID THAT AMERICANS MUST UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CHANGES IN OUR MILITARY AND MARITIME SITUATION AND ALSO THEIR IMPLICATIONS WITH

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REGARD TO OUR WELFARE, FUTURE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING.

WHAT WOULD BE THE AFFECT ON AMERICANS IF THE RELATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE I HAVE SUGGESTED DOES ULTIMATELY COME TO PASS?

FIRST, ONE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE ABILITY TO MOVE COMMERCE ACROSS THE EARTH'S SURFACE, AND, IF NEED BE, TO PROJECT POWER BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, ARE FOREMOST AMONG THE ESSENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF A NATION'S INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. FOR THE UNITED STATES, BOTH OF THESE FACTORS ENTAIL MOVEMENT OVER THE WORLD'S OCEANS.

THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH OUR ALLIES AND OUR ADVERSARIES. TODAY, OUR ALLIES AND THE UNCOMMITTED NATIONS OF EURASIA AND AFRICA MAY WELL SEE THEMSELVES AS INCREASINGLY ENCIRCLED BY OFFSHORE SOVIET NAVAL MIGHT AS A RESULT OF VISIBLE AND FREQUENT SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE ATLANTIC, AND THE CONTINUOUS SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN. THEY ARE WATCHING THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH INTEREST.

ON ONE CAN FORESEE THE FUTURE, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE WHICH FITS THE FACTS AS THEY ARE AND WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LESSONS OF HISTORY -- A SCENARIO WHICH CAN BECOME REAL ONLY IF WE ALLOW IT TO. FIRST, THERE ARE CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS WHICH CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE FACTS AS THEY ARE KNOWN TODAY:

- FOR INSTANCE, IT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THAT, SO LONG AS AN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN NUCLEAR DELIVERY AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS EXISTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND U.S., NUCLEAR

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WAR IS NOT LIKELY BETWEEN THEM. THE AWFUL RESULTS TO THE POPULACES OF BOTH NATIONS WOULD MAKE INITIATION OF NUCLEAR ATTACK AN IRRATIONAL ACT.

- IF WE CONCEDE THE IRRATIONALITY OF A NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, WE MUST FURTHER HYPOTHESIZE THE IMPROBABILITY OF A NATO WAR. BECAUSE OF THE ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE OF THE OUTCOME OF A NATO CONFLICT, WE HAVE TIED OUR NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO NATO FOR THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. THE NEAR-CERTAINTY OF A NATO WAR TRIGGERING A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE IS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH PARTIES. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT BOTH PARTIES WILL TRY TO AVOID CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH COULD LEAD TO A NATO WAR.

AND SO, MY SCENARIO IS PREMISED ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE KREMLIN MAY THEREFORE BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES SHORT OF NUCLEAR WAR. AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MODERN HISTORY, THE DOOR IS AJAR FOR RUSSIA TO BREAK FREE OF THE ENTANGLEMENTS OF ENCIRCLING LAND ALLIANCES AND TO SPREAD POWER AND INFLUENCE TOWARD HISTORICAL OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ASIA AND EVEN IN EUROPE.

UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE KREMLIN COULD CHOOSE TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE:

- THEY COULD CONTINUE TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR, OR SITUATIONS WHICH THEY PERCEIVE COULD READILY RESULT IN NUCLEAR WAR.

- IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT AT THE SALT TALKS THEY MAY CONTINUE THEIR BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR PYSCHOLOGICAL EFFECT.

- THEY COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR

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NAVAL EXPANSION AND INCREASE "SHOWING THE FLAG" OR "GUN BOAT DIPLOMACY" ACTIONS IN EURASIA AND AFRICA.

- THEY COULD CONTINUE TO FOSTER COMMUNISM WORLDWIDE THROUGH AID AND SUEVERSION, EXPORTED ALONG WITH TRADE AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS TO KEY AREAS OF WESTERN VULNERABILITY.

FINALLY, POSSIBLY LATER IN THIS DECADE, IF THEY FEEL THEY ARE READY, THEY COULD BE FREE TO CONFRONT THE UNITED STATES WITH SUPERIOR FORCE IN A NON-NATO AREA OF THE WORLD WHERE WE MUST STAND ALONE, AND WE MIGHT BE FORCED TO BACK DOWN, AS THEY WERE FORCED TO DO OVER CUBA. UNDER MY HYPOTHESIS, IF AND WHEN THIS TIME COMES, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE VERY RATIONAL AND CAUTIOUS, AS WE HAVE BEEN WHEN THE PREPONDERANCE OF POWER LAY WITH US -- THEY WOULD BE CERTAIN TO ALLOW US THE OPTION TO BACK AWAY -- AND THEY WOULD CAREFULLY CALCULATE THE OUTCOME SO THAT OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD WILL CLEARLY PERCEIVE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BACKED AWAY.

AND, IF WE ALLOW THIS SCENARIO TO BECOME REALITY, OR EVEN TO BECOME A REALISTICALLY CALCULABLE OUTCOME, OUR ALLIES MAY THEN MAKE THE INTERPRETATION THAT OUR WEAKNESS REFLECTS A LACK OF WILL TO CONTINUE AS A GREAT POWER, AND THEY MAY CHOOSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE GAME IS OVER FOR US ALL.

IF THEY DID SO, THERE WOULD FIRST BE AN ACCOMMODATION BY SOME TOWARD SOVIET POWER, THEN GROWING NEUTRALISM, AND FINALLY, THE UNITED STATES COULD BECOME AN ISLAND, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY ISOLATED -- AND AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO STAND HELPLESSLY WATCHING AS THE FINAL SANDS OF OUR HOUR OF GREATNESS RUN OUT.

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BUT THE TRAGEDY TO AMERICA'S HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS I HAVE DESCRIBED NEED NOT COME TO PASS -- THERE IS YET TIME FOR YOU, AND YOUR FELLOW AMERICANS, TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME.

THE DILEMMA YOU FACE IS REAL -- THE NEEDS OF OUR CITIES; OF THE ENVIRONMENT; OF OUR MORE DEPRIVED CITIZENS AND OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE MUST ALL BE PROVIDED FOR -- AND OUR RESOURCES, ALTHOUGH VASTLY GREATER THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER NATION, ARE NOT LIMITLESS. BUT AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAS SAID:

"LET US NOT, THEN, POSE A FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN MEETING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES ABROAD AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF OUR PEOPLE AT HOME. WE SHALL MEET BOTH OR WE SHALL MEET NEITHER".

AMERICANS KNOW THAT THE PATHS OF HISTORY ARE LITTERED WITH THE REMNANTS OF GREAT NATIONS WHOSE STRENGTH AT CRUCIAL TIMES WAS PROVEN SECOND-BEST -- AND I BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY WITH SECRETARY LAIRD AND PRESIDENT NIXON THAT THE DYNAMIC IDEOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM ESPOUSED BY ALL AMERICANS WILL NOT PERMIT SUCH A TRAGEDY TO OVERTAKE US OR THOSE WHO HAVE STOOD WITH US.

PRESIDENT NIXON HAS DESIGNED HIS NIXON DOCTRINE AROUND THE THREE PILLARS OF STRENGTH, PARTNERSHIP AND A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. WE ARE IN OR ABOUT TO BEGIN MANY TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN LEAD TO A GENERATION OF PEACE AND WORLD STABILITY -- AND THE NAVY'S ROLE DURING THIS PERIOD IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTH OF OUR NATION AS WE NEGOTIATE.

WITH YOUR HELP THE NAVY IS READY TO DO ITS PART OF THE JOB.

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