

ADDRESS

By

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*NWC/ICAF*

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(GENERAL McPHERSON: Introduced the speaker.)

ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: General McPherson, Admiral Smith, Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be back to see again my Chief of Staff from NAV-4V, Captain Rizza, here--and to see also in the audience Captain Bill Fisher, who was my Operations Officer on the USS Dewey, one of the sweetest operators and navigators you have ever seen. I well recall one episode that occurred with Bill, when we were in Europe together. One Sunday morning I decided that it was time to go to church and be forgiven for our corporate sins, so I asked Bill to come along. It was raining and he could not find his overcoat, so we made him come along anyway. We got in the church and the British preacher was, for his sermon, covering the Ten Commandments. When he came to "Thou shalt not commit adultery," Bill stood up and started to leave and I said "Where are you going?" He said "I just remembered where I left my overcoat." (Laughter) I hope that takes care of you for the rest of the year, Bill. (Laughter)

What I want to try to do today is to cover, very briefly, the Naval capabilities and trace how they have been played in a series of

crises, manifestly to do so quickly I will be speaking in shorthand and over-stating, for simplification, and then we can try to broaden and sophisticate the picture in the question and answer period; so I will ask you to keep that in mind if I make black and white instead of gray statements as I go along.

I like to break our Naval capabilities into four. The first of these is the Navy's contribution to the nation's strategic second strike capability. As you know, this has been the Polaris submarine for the last decade. We are in the process, for the 70's, of converting the Polaris system into Poseidon by MIRVing it, Multiple Independently Retardable Vehicles being put into these Polaris missiles. We could put as many as 14. We plan to deploy 10, and we are already at work designing, for the 80's, the Underwater Long-Range Missile System, the ULMS submarine, which will be a follow-on boat, much less detectable, a much longer ranged missile and, therefore, much more survivable because it will hide out in a much larger area of water and its detectability, even per given square area, will be much better. Now the reason for this is becoming desperately more important as the enemy improves his accuracies and as the enemy brings more and more missiles to bear close off our coasts, so that warning time is less and less and it becomes increasingly important for the Navy to rely--for the country to rely more on the Navy portion of the TRIAD, therefore.

The second major capability of the Navy is the Sea Control CAPABILITY. THESE FORCES, designed to control the seas, consist of four

aircraft carriers with their STRIKE aircraft, capable of sinking surface ships, submarines on the surface, shooting down aircraft, and with the F-14 aircraft shooting down the missiles. It is important for everyone to be aware of the fact that no other aircraft on the drawing boards can shoot down the FOX BAT aircraft at 75,000 feet, except the F-14. Sea Control Forces include our attack submarines, capable of sinking the enemy submarines, our destroyers, getting their aircraft, their missiles and their submarines, and our anti-submarine aircraft, both land based and sea based. As a third capability, we have the capability to project power, and there are three elements to this: the Amphibious Forces, projecting the Marines; our carriers, again, with their aircraft capable of projecting power 600 miles or more inland; and, frequently overlooked, our Merchant Marines which in the Southeast Asia war has carried 96 per cent of the millions of tons necessary to support our allies and which, even in the mid and late 70's in any war, any place, even after the procurement of all the current airlift, will have to carry 94 per cent of the millions of long tons. You should remember that the C-5 A aircraft can only get home, having flown a useful load into Europe or Asia, if aviation gasoline has traveled across the surface of the seas to refuel it.

Our fourth major capability is the overseas presence in peacetime, permanently, in the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, and where needed by

the President in other areas throughout the world. It is made up of elements of our Sea Control Forces and our projection capability.

Now let us go back and see how those four capabilities have been used. In World War II we lacked strategic power until the very end. We fought a war to regain control of the seas for those first terrible months when, as you recall, for a period of time England was down to a two or three weeks supply of food and it was a situation of just barely hanging on against those German submarines. In the Pacific we had the problem in the Navy and Marine Task Forces of recapturing the islands in the center of the Pacific, the Army hopping along the major spots to the South, until we came together in the Philippines and Okinawa and Iwo Jima and were ready to make the final leap forward that would permit the projection of power into the enemy's mainland, as was previously done in the case of Europe. The projection of power into Europe then changed the war from one in which sea control was the basic emphasis to one in which projection was the basic emphasis and Europe was brought to its knees. In the case of Japan, strategic power at the very last minute came to bear and the two atom bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima ended the war relatively quickly. At the end of that war our country demobilized over-night, turned itself from the major super-power into the world's second-best. Stalin retained his forces and, therefore, his capability to have impact and relatively rapidly over-ran Eastern Europe until, as Mr. Churchill described, the Iron Curtain

descended, and the second major crisis about which I want to speak had to do with that era, 1947 and after, in which as a result of the courageous decisions of Mr. Truman the Marshall Plan came forward, the Truman Doctrine was enunciated, billions of dollars were poured into the reconstruction of Europe, the armies of Europe reconstituted, the Alliance of NATO came in being, the insurgency in Greece was fought, because we controlled the seas and had the capability to project our power around the peninsula of Greece to bring Army advisors into the support of that insurgency and their efforts there, plus the defection of Yugoslavia from Stalin's camp liquidated the insurgency in Greece and the pressures against Turkey were abandoned. We now know from Milovan Djilas' book, "Conversations With Stalin," that Stalin had warned his Presidio members that the Anglo-American powers would not suffer their sea-lines of communication to be severed but at the time, of course, that was not known and it was only when we made our declaration of intent and showed our intent that the situation changed.

The next crisis with which I need to deal is that of Korea. Here we had an overseas presence, in the form of our Army and Air Forces on the peninsula of Korea. As you recall, they were rapidly overrun. We lost all our air bases in South Korea. The capability of the U.S. Navy's carriers with some assistance, I am prepared to admit, from the Air Force in Japan, made it possible to hang onto the Pusan perimeter and then, because we controlled the seas and they were absolutely uncontested, the

Navy--Marine Task Force was able to make its remarkable landing at Inchon, which cut off the North Koreans, threw them out of South Korea. The Chinese came in and drove us down and then, again, the projection of power operated to move the whole thing North and the uneasy peace resulted. All of this was fought under the umbrella of strategic power, which constrained the nature of the war and limited it to that perimeter.

The next crisis about which I would like to speak is the Cuban missile crisis. Here, of course, the communists had for years suffered under this strategic superiority of ours. Khrushchev sought by this bold gamble to double the megatonnage he could bring to bear and cut in half the warning time, when he was caught "with his missiles down." The United States faced him with a tremendous strategic nuclear superiority. I happened to be in ISA at the time and was asked to do the calculations. My recollection is that I estimated we would lose 20 million Americans and 100 million Russians would have been killed had an exchange ensued at that moment. I think it is important to remember that a rational, democratic, life-loving nation, like the United States, gambled on 20 million American lives in that crisis, counting on the rationality of the other side not to lose 100 million; and we should be very aware of this as the strategic balance proceeds to change and go against it. The Soviets, having made the rational

calculation, as Mr. Rusk suggested, to blink, with regard to the strategic imbalance found themselves also unable to bull through because, again, the United States Navy had an overwhelming superiority around Cuba and all of the projection power of the United States--the Marines, the Army, and the Air Force--was within reach of that island and they were simply incapable of bulling through and so they withdrew. They embarked then on two fantastic building programs, the super position of a strategic force superior to ours, on top of their always superior army and air force in Europe, and the super position of a navy superior to ours, on top of their always superior army and air force.

The next crisis about which I would like to speak is the Southeast Asia crisis in which, as you recall, again our control of the seas was contested only briefly at the outset when the torpedo boats from North Vietnam made one or two efforts, depending on which set of Senators you believe, to strike at us--and since that time our carriers have operated with communist territory on three sides of them in the Gulf of Tonkin, the control of the seas never contested, and while air bases were being built in South Vietnam during that first year it was Air Force air from Thailand and Carrier air from the Gulf of Tonkin which carried the day. And as we are in the process of winding down, again it will be the Carriers projecting their power inland which will carry the brunt of the action as we wind down our forces in Southeast Asia, under the Nixon

doctrine. Here, again, it is important to recognize that the nature of the game was constrained because the Soviets and the Chinese, having discovered that they were deterred at the strategic nuclear level, having discovered that they were deterred at the conventional level, invented what Mr. Khrushchev called "wars of national liberation," or what Defense Minister Lynn Powell, God rest his soul, described as the "strategy of the surrounding of the city continents of the world by the capturing of the rural continents of the world," just as they had taken over China proper, an area in which they sought to avoid the conventional opposition by feeding an alleged war of national liberation, initially, with agents and money and, finally, with outright invasion; and it was constrained by those previous levels of power--strategic and conventional--and it was turned from a potential debacle into what I personally believe will, over the long haul, be a relatively respectable balance by virtue of the fact that we had uncontested control of the seas and capability to project rapidly our power into the Eurasian rimland.

Now the sixth crisis about which I would like to speak is the Jordanian crisis of 1970. Here the Syrian tanks went into Jordan. By this time the strategic balance was much closer to parity; the conventional balance was much closer to even; the President found himself unable to count on the use of Army or Air Forces because we were told by the State Department that we must not count on having available to us a single base,



with the possible exception of the Greeks. Had it been necessary to fly Army forces in, they would have had to fly out of Germany into the North Sea, around through the British Channel, through the Straits of Gibraltar and 2200 miles across the Mediterranean that was impossible without one refueling stop, and so the relevant power available to the President was the Navy-Marine Corps team reinforcing the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet with a third Carrier Task Force, the JOHN F. KENNEDY, and with USS GUAM, with embarked Marines and vertical HELO lift, and this show of force, coupled with the respectable showing of the Jordanian Army which destroyed a number of Syrian tanks, coupled with movement North of the Israeli forces, led the Soviets to make the rational calculation that they should recall the Syrian tanks. Relevant power, maritime power, but a very, very near thing--but this time I can assure you that we badly needed the help of the U.S. Air Forces and the U.S. Army; and as a member of the JCS, I felt very, very naked that the only forces that we could bring to bear in that crisis were the members of the Navy and Marine team. We badly needed the assistance of our sister services in that crisis. My estimate, at the time, was that we barely had something better than a 50 per cent probability of success with the initial two Carrier Task Forces there.

Now I want to talk, finally, about a crisis that has not yet come to pass. The Soviets are continuing to build--in the last five years they have built 237 per cent of the number of ships that we have

built. They have exceeded the numbers of ships in every category, major warships, minor warships, support ships, except for amphibious ships. The Soviets have three times the number of attack submarines that we have. They exceeded us in the number of nuclear propelled attack submarines in Fiscal Year 1963. By Fiscal Year 1973 they will have more nuclear attack boats than the total diesel and nuclear attack boats in the United States Navy, while maintaining their three to one superiority by virtue of their diesels. More ominous, one kills submarines by hearing them first. The Soviet submarines have always been noisier than ours. In the 1960's we reckoned that we would kill five of theirs for every one that we would lose. At the present time it is down to more nearly a trade ratio of two to one, and they are out-building us at the rate of two and a half to one, with the three to one superiority in numbers. The Soviets will have more sea-based missile submarines, YANKEE's, than we have Poseidon submarines, by the end of 1973. They are proceeding to build surface ships at a much faster rate. It is absolutely inevitable, if present trends continue, absolutely inevitable that we will be a second-class naval power in the United States--and it is absolutely inevitable that they will be the world's greatest maritime power. Now the question that leads to is: What happens when that as yet unhappened seventh crisis comes to pass? Will there be a strategic nuclear war? In my judgment, the answer to that is "No." The Soviets are much too rational, and so are we. They backed down in the Cuban

missile crisis rather than face a strategic nuclear exchange. We must, as they continue to gain their superiority. They are ahead of us in total megatonnage; they are ahead of us in total number of launchers; only in the total number of warheads and vehicles do we exceed them, temporarily, as a result of our MIRVing of the Polaris missiles and of the Minuteman. They will overtake us in that third category of strategic power in the mid 1970's, in my judgment. The next question then is: Will there be a conventional war with the Soviet Union? In my view, the answer to that, again, is "No." Both sides are too rational--they will expect us to back down, just as we have expected them to back down in each crisis in which we have confronted them with our superior power for the last 20 or 25 years; when it was a direct U.S. versus USSR confrontation they have backed down--in many cases where it was an indirect confrontation, but in which we linked our power directly to it they have caused their client to back down. They have got to count on us doing the same thing. We must do so, in my judgement. In that crisis which has not yet happened, my recommendation if I am still in this job is going to be: Bluff as long as you can and the minute it becomes apparent that your bluff will not work, back down, because if you do not you will lose the war. That is the situation we face. The Soviets have a brilliant strategy; they are patient; they are careful; they are painstaking; they are prepared to take set-backs, as they did recently.

in the UAR when Sadat cleaned out all their communists. They came back, within four days, with a 15 year base rights agreement, at the cost of probably a couple of billion dollars worth of aid, and they are digging back in to get their communist penetration going. They will structure these crises in such a way that we will have a sophisticated face-saving way to back down, perhaps tossing just one ally out of the sled, like a baby to the wolves. Their objective will be to Finlandize the Maritime Alliance, move our allies from alliance to neutrality to rapprochement with the other side. They will restructure over a 10, 15 or 20 year period the commercial relationships, the economic relationships in their mold and we will, at the end, if trends continue, stand alone.

Gentlemen, I am ready for your questions.