

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-16-FE

16-3

NAVY DEPARTMENT
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~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 1, 1943

SRNS 0353-
0443

I. General

1. Intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours was somewhat less in volume than on the previous day, but operational traffic showed an upward trend in the New Guinea-Solomons area. In the High North, nothing of apparent importance was noted.

2. At 1022I, March 31 an unidentified Japanese originator sent a contact report which, though only partly readable, indicated "enemy transports and DD's in position on course 120°".

3. Associations of addressees in various dispatches suggest aircraft movements out of the Empire. Surface ship movements are also likewise indicated.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. With reference to the Operation mentioned under this heading in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement, it is now indicated that "I" has been assigned as its name. For the present, therefore, this operation will be referred to as the "I Operation".

2. The following miscellaneous items are interesting because of their apparent relevancy to the "I Operation".

(a) Fairly strong evidence of the probable direction of "I Operation" is indicated by a list of abbreviations for place names promulgated in a (fragmentary) message dated 1324I, March 31. Among the places listed as reference points in contact and sighting reports are the following: Savo Island, Tulagi, Lunga, Koli Point, Buna, Collingwood Bay, and Port Moresby. Furthermore, the message contained a list of abbreviated contact and tactical signals for use in this operation.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

7th CFB - 12/1/77

(b) ~~At 2100I, March 31~~ ~~in C~~ Combined Fleet assigned Desdiv 17 and 1 DD to the Southeastern Area Force.

(c) Beginning at 0645I, April 1 a flood of aircraft traffic began in the Solomons area with at least 7 planes sending in reports.

(d) Chief of Staff 17th Army was addressed at Ervanta (about 4 miles E.S.E. of Kahili Airfield, in the Shortland Group).

(e) Submarine I-16, upon arrival at Rabaul after completion of its Lae supply operation, is assigned to the Advance Expeditionary Force (tactical title for Subforce) and will take part in the "next operations".

(f) At 0825 I, April 1, 11th Air Fleet ordered an unidentified activity (information to 1st Air Attack Force) to "carry out _____ on the morning of April 3".

(g) On March 31, 13 Zero fighters and 2 other planes were sent from Rabaul to Buin.

(B) New Guinea

Submarine I-20 is scheduled to arrive off Lae on a supply mission at 1900I, April 3.

III. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. Traffic associations strongly suggest that HINODE Maru (unlisted), SEIA Maru (6,658 gross tons), and KAGU Maru (8,708 gross tons) will shortly depart from Yokosuka for the Rabaul area.

2. GOKOKU Maru (XCL) arrived Surabaya at 1200I, March 31.

IV. Economic

Japanese plans call for shipping 380,000 tons of coal from North China to Japan during the month of April and 30,000 tons to be shipped to Korea.

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R.A. Boone

R.A. Boone.

In reply refer to Initials

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 2, 1943

SRNS 0354

I. General

1. An analysis of intercepted Japanese radio traffic reveals an increase of priority traffic and a higher overall volume. Both administrative and operational-type traffic was evident in Japan, the High North, Marianas, and in the Solomons-New Guinea areas, with tactical traffic noted in the latter. Traffic in the Marshalls-Gilberts was purely administrative. As compared with the previous report herein, D/F traffic rose about 200%.

2. Strong indications continue of a southward movement from the Empire of aircraft and equipment via Saipan, and further indications were noted of a movement southward of important surface units (see below).

3. It is indicated that Chief of Staff Combined Fleet arrived Saipan at 1800I, March 31. C-in-C 11th Air Fleet and Comdr. Southeastern Sub-force are both at Rabaul. Flagship of 8th Fleet is believed to be at sea or in the Northern Solomons.

4. Batdiv 3 (KONGO and HARUNA) and a number of DD's departed Kure for Truk at 0900I, April 1. These units were recently assigned to the Main Body of the Striking Force.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. Additional place names listed in the special list of area designators for use in the "I Operation", mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement (paragraph II (A), 2 (a)), are Russell Islands and Sealark Channel in the Solomons, and Goschen Strait, Ward Hunt Strait, Nelson Cape, Oro Bay, Goodenough Bay, East Cape, and Milne Bay - all in the S.E. New Guinea area.

2. Based upon the Japanese system of naming prior operations, it appears reasonable to assume that the "I" of "I Operation" refers to Santa Isabel Island. The following items tend, in part, to confirm this assumption:

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BY: [Signature]

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(a) Comdr. Outer South Seas Force (C-in-C 8th Fleet) at 1124I, April 1 directed the escort (air or surface?) of transportation forces to Rekata Bay Seaplane Base on April 2 and to (an unidentified place) on April and on April 7.

(b) It is indicated that a convoy of an undetermined number of ships was to arrive at Kolombangara Air Base on April 1, thence to return to the Buin area. A later message reported the completion of the first stage of this transportation operation by its arrival in the Buin area at 0540I, April 2. It was indicated that 155 patients were evacuated. In this connection, a Japanese radio intelligence unit relayed a plain language intercept from an Allied plane reporting the sighting of 6 ships, including 3 DD's, in Vella Gulf at 2215I, March 31.

(c) 6th Air Attack Force is to provide air coverage for 3 DD's which will carry out a transportation operation during the morning of April 3.

(d) At 1815I, April 1 Subchaser # 18 reported an attack by 9 B-24's, adding that no damage was incurred by the originator.

(e) Possibly arising out of the above, considerable high precedence operational traffic appeared in the Buin-New Georgia-Rekata Bay area.

(B) Movements of Japanese Aircraft

1. At 0550I, April 2, 21 Type-1 land-based fighters departed Tenian (Marianas) for Kavieng. It was also indicated that 11 Type-96 land-based attack planes (twin-engined bombers?) arrived at (an unidentified place) on April 1.

2. At 1230I, April 1 a 3rd Fleet Comdr. reported that Rabaul Air Base and Vunakamu Air Base are now completed. In the same message, Kavieng # 1 Base was designated as the shipboard attack plane Base and weather reports were requested from 0200I to 1000I, (April 2?)

III. Northwest Pacific

A slight indication has been noted that a unit of the Japanese Attu Task Force is damaged and is proceeding to Yokosuka Navy Yard for repairs. Other indications suggest the departure on March 31 of two (probable) cruisers and Desdiv 21 (less 1 DD) from Paramushiro for Yokosuka.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
6/1/79
Date: [Signature]

IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. Additional shipping is indicated in the Saipan area, with Truk and Rabaul as the ultimate destination.

2. At 1400I, April 4 a convoy of unknown size is scheduled to be in Lat. 2° 00' N., Long. 148° 08' E. This location is about 48 hours steaming distance from Rabaul.

3. An unidentified MARI carrying 3,000 tons of (construction materials?) and 600 workmen was scheduled to depart Yokosuka for Truk at 1300I, April 2. Expected time of arrival at Truk is 0800I, April 10. Daily noon positions are available.

V. Tojo's Travels

Some evidence of a possible divergence of views in the Japanese High Command concerning fundamental policy to be followed in the conduct of the War is furnished by Premier Tojo's visit to Nanking on March 12-14 and his present visit to Hsinking. During the former visit he conferred with General Shunroku Hata, C-in-C of Japanese Forces in China. At present, meetings are taking place with Lieut. Gen. Yoshijiro Umezu, C-in-C of the Kwantung Army. A reasonable inference to be drawn from these conferences is that possibly the Commanders on the continent and their henchmen in Tokyo are pressing for further continental advances, in opposition to the Tojo faction's apparent policy of placing major emphasis upon the war against the Democracies in the Pacific.

R.A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MS *CAF* Date: 12/21/79

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

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SRNS 0355

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 3, 1943

I. General

1. The general appearance of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours presents some similarity to the traffic picture preceding engagements in the past. Overall volume was at a peak since November 14 and administrative traffic was the highest on record. Although Army traffic was high, it was practically limited to the Palao to Tokyo and Palao to Rabaul channels. Except for some plane reports from the general Solomons area, few operational-type dispatches were noted.

2. Indications concerning Japanese carrier movements are somewhat confusing but associations clearly indicate that at least 1 carrier (or Cardiv) is at Truk or further south. By the same method, the departure of 3rd Fleet units from the Empire is indicated. Slight indications by association suggest that 2nd Fleet and Cardiv 1 (or 3rd Fleet) may be involved in impending operations.

3. At 1245 I, April 3 it was reported that 8 land attack planes arrived at Tenian (in the Marianas), probably en route south. Indications also suggest reinforcements or replacements from the Empire to Saipan and Truk for Air Group # 902.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Two operation orders directly involving Comdr. Outer South Seas Force (C-in-C 8th Fleet) furnish a possible clue concerning "X-Day", previously mentioned in connection with "I Operation", and shed further light on the scope of this operation:

(a) At 0758I, April 1 Comdr. Outer South Seas Force issued an order to a number of unidentified units to provide direct escort for 6 Marus departing Palao on April 6 for Wewak (?), conforming to the schedule for "X-Day" landing. (It should be noted that this is the same movement reported in the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of March 27, paragraph II(B), but that it has now apparently been advanced one day).

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date:

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(b) At 1623I, April 1 Comdr. Outer South Seas Force was directed, for training purposes, to participate in night attacks on Guadalcanal and (an unidentified place in the Solomons area). It was stated that the greatest emphasis is to be placed on the attacks to be made during the early morning of "X Day". On X-2 and X-1 day, aerial reconnaissance is to be carried out over (place unidentified, but is in the Solomons-New Guinea area).

(B) New Guinea

It is now indicated that the second phase of the destroyer transportation operation from Kavieng to Finschhafen has been somewhat delayed, as a message timed at 0724I, April 3 directs that 3 DD's will be used for this purpose. (See the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of March 29, paragraph II, 2(a)).

(C) N.E.I.

A partly readable message of March 30 addressed to the East Indies Force indicates that a Japanese troop movement of considerable size was scheduled to commence on March 31 from Surabaya to Ambon, via Makassar.

(D) New Britain

Traffic associations gave strong indications of the arrival of a convoy in the Rabaul area on April 1. Radio traffic also suggests the presence of several other convoys in the Rabaul area.

A (fragmentary) dispatch dated March 29 refers to a convoy of 5 ships sent from Surabaya to Rabaul, via Wewak. No dates are available.

III. Northwest Pacific

On April 1, one of the Japanese cruisers recently engaged W. of Attu reported that it will proceed to Yokosuka. It requested delivery of a float reconnaissance plane by April 15.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. According to a message at 1835I, March 30 an unidentified ship was torpedoed and sunk at 0500I, March 29 about 20 miles from an undetermined place. (Note: available information indicates that a large Japanese tanker was torpedoed at 0500I, March 29 on the Equator at Long. 118° 19' E., about 20 miles off the coast of Borneo).

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2. A message at 0122I, March 3 stated that (?) Maru was attacked by a submarine in Noda Bay (Lat. 40° 15' N., Long. 141° 50' E.) No other information is available.

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R.A. Boone.

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~~This document is classified as secret and that in the meantime it is to be placed in any general file.~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities of April 4, 1943

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SRNS 0356

I. Southwest Pacific:

(a) General.

Japanese fleet activity appears to be slowly building up in the Truk-New Britain-New Guinea-Solomons theatre. Cardiv 2, Crudiv 8, and two Desdivs now are reliably learned to have arrived Truk from Japan Proper on March 27 and the CinC, 2nd Fleet, is believed to be at Truk also. Possibly one or more of the above CV's from Cardiv 2 have recently left Truk for the Rabaul-Kavieng area, but in any case certain 2nd Fleet units and plane groups from 3rd Fleet (carriers) appear involved in operations in this theatre. It is not yet clear whether this activity is connected with the previously reported "I Operation", but it is of interest to note that the "X Day" of this operation has been postponed one day by the CinC, 11th Air Fleet, that is, possibly from April 11 to 12.

It is clear that reinforcements in personnel, aircraft, equipment and stores continue to be concentrated in this theatre, not only for New Guinea, but also to build up bases in the Solomons.

(b) New Guinea.

Desdiv 22 less 1 DD was ordered to depart Kavieng for Finschaven on April 3. This division was originally scheduled to make this, her second trip, on April 1. However, on her first trip she was attacked by our air force which reported damaging 1 DD. Possibly this explains why her second trip is being made a couple of days later than per schedule less 1 DD.

The presence of Jap army units at Hansa Bay, between Madang and Wewak, near Vulcan Island, including staff officers of the so-called Hansa 18th Army, and units of the 5th and 9th regiment of shipping engineers is now learned for the first time. The future landing of reinforcements and supplies at this location may be expected.

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(c) Solomons-New Britain:

A large number of U.S. plane contacts in this area has been reported recently, and there was one slight indication of contacting one allied force near Rekata Bay.

It is of interest to note that at 1811I, January 23, the Japanese reported that a strong U.S. surface force would probably attack Munda that night. Several SS's in that area were directed to intercept and attack this hostile force. The U.S. task force bombardment of Vila (not Munda) occurred at about 0200L, January 24.

(d) Australia.

I-16 was ordered on March 31 to proceed to an area off the N.E. coast of Australia to reconnoiter and attack enemy transport shipping.

II. Convoy Movements:

Information has been received in connection with a number of Japanese convoys.

(1) One convoy of unknown strength bound for Takao, Formosa was at noon, April 3, in Lat. $20^{\circ}-50'$ N., Long. $116^{\circ}-00'$ E.

(2) A convoy of 5 merchant ships at noon, April 3, appeared to the north of Palao headed toward it.

(3) A second convoy headed for Palao on course 154° was in Lat. $10^{\circ}-47'$ N., Long. $132^{\circ}-56'$ E. at 0600I, April 4.

(4) A convoy of several ships is scheduled to arrive Yokosuka on April 5.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations:

NATORI (CL) is reported to have received a torpedo attack of 4 torpedoes at 1012I, January 23 in Lat. $5^{\circ}-42'$ S., Long. $120^{\circ}-35'$ E. The AOTAKA (CM) pressed home an attack on the hostile submarine. NATORI, prior to the above attack, was afire from a 500 lb. bomb hit made on her by attacking planes on January 21. Thereafter she was ordered to proceed to Makassar in company with AOTAKA, and these two ships were scheduled to arrive on January 23 in the evening. It was apparently enroute to Makassar, therefore, that NATORI was again struck, this time by a submarine. In spite of these attacks, there is no indication that she sank, and in fact there was some evidence that she later was towed to Singapore for repairs.

A message transmitted at 1715I, April 3, reported a submarine action. Mention was made by one ship of taking aboard the master and 63 men of another ship, apparently a merchantman which sank. Although unidentified,

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS -

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Date: 12/21/79

this lost merchantman is known to have departed Balikpapan at 1100I, March 30, with a cargo of heavy oil for Truk. Her noon position on April 3 was given as Lat. 10°-30' N., Long. 135°-10' E. Following the engagement a total of 26 depth charges were dropped by the Japanese.

Another despatch of 1035I, April 4, reported a submarine attack on a merchantman near Jabor, on the north end of Jaluit. The SS was attacked by two other merchant type ships, but there was no indication of the fate of the ship which was hit.

IV. Midway:

During the past week there have been six or seven Japanese despatches intercepted which have reported on flying conditions at Midway. Japanese radio intelligence appears to have reported information on Midway patrols in connection with some form of a sortie which is possibly connected with the Aleutian area. Although the full message has not yet been recovered the portion that is known appears to have some significance.

V. General:

Japanese authorities in Hsinking have been directed by Tokyo to take strong measures to prevent espionage in order to cut down Jap shipping losses from submarines.

for *L. Waits*
R. A. Boone.

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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~~SECRET~~

~~It is requested that...~~
~~Persons need...~~

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~~SECRET~~ SUPPLEMENT

SRNS 0357

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 5, 1943

I. General

1. Indications derived from intercepted Japanese radio traffic of the past 24 hours are somewhat lacking in definiteness, but the general impression gained therefrom continues to be one of intense Japanese preoccupation with the alignment of forces for an impending operation. Radio intelligence indicates that the Solomons Area would most likely be the scene for such operations, although the prominence in traffic of Wewak and Finschhafen, as well as convoy movements in the N.E.I., suggest the possibility of coordinated operations in the entire Solomons-Bismarck-S.E. New Guinea area. From available information to date, it is clear that land-based aircraft and submarines will play a prominent role in carrying out Japanese intentions. No further information concerning the part which carriers may be expected to play is available beyond that mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement.

2. Japanese D/F traffic has continued at a high level, despite a considerable drop in overall volume and a decline of 50% in operational traffic.

3. Strong indications have been noted of a number of arrivals at Truk, and Rabaul continues to display its importance as the principal Japanese advance base in the Southern Area. Staff of C-in-C Combined Fleet appears to be partially split between Truk and Rabaul, with a representative indicated at Tokyo.

4. A Jap DD, apparently damaged by Allied air attacks recently on the Kavieng-Finschhafen run, reported emergency repairs practically completed and scheduled departure from Kavieng at 1600I, April 4 for Truk at 12 knots speed.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Fleet Movements

1. During the afternoon of April 5 (LZT), UNYO (ACV), escorted by 2 DD's, is scheduled to depart Truk via North Channel. Its destination is unknown.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

4/19/43
Date: *MSD/CAS*

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2. A DD or Desdiv was ordered at 1023I, April 4 to screen a CV (unidentified, but may be HOSHO). At 0700I, April 5 a total of 7 planes were to take off for the Shortlands from this CV, KAMIKAWA Maru, and KUNIKAWA Maru, indicating that the CV in question is in the Rabaul-Shortlands area, probably in use as a plane ferry.

3. GOKOKU Maru (XCL) was scheduled to depart Surabaya (?) at 0700I, April 4 for Ambon, arriving April 7. Her approximate route and daily positions are available.

4. A number of (probable) DD's are to rendezvous with an unidentified ship at 0800I, April 5 in Lat. 0°, Long. 150°E.

(B) Solomons

A transportation unit probably composed of Desdiv 16(?) is scheduled to leave the Shortland area on April 5 (LZT) and to arrive at Vella Lavella Island in the New Georgia Group at 0600I, April 6.

Desdiv 10 less 1 DD was ordered on April 4 (LZT) to transport 250 men per destroyer from Kolombangara (or Vella Lavella) to Rabaul. The kind of personnel to be evacuated is unknown.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. On January 18, # 2 FUMI MARU reported being attacked by a submarine in Lat. 2° 00 S., Long. 150° 38 E. One torpedo was fired, but no damage resulted. The submarine was reported as having surfaced after firing the torpedo, whereupon the FUMI MARU opened fire, resulting in smashing the submarine's bridge. The submarine was depth charged when it subsequently submerged. The Jap patrol boat concluded that it believed the submarine sunk.

2. (a) At 1000I, April 4 the KOA (?) Maru was torpedoed and sunk in Lat. 13° 10 N., Long. 162° 05 E. It was reported that some 750 persons were rescued.

(b) A Japanese dispatch at 1300I, April 4 reported a ship torpedoed and sunk in Lat. 13° 30' N., Long. 161° 56' E. (It is unknown whether this sinking is the same or additional to that of the KOA (?) Maru).

IV. Japanese Air Raid Precautions

A number of reports broadcast by Takao and commencing at 2045I, April 4, indicate that the entire Japanese Empire, from Takao to Ominato, was placed on precautionary alert against air attack. The alerts appear legitimate although no amplifying reports were noted.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
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Op-16-EE

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 6, 1943

SRNS 0358

I. General

1. Despite numerous indications noted during the past week of obvious preparations on the part of the Japanese for an operation of some scope in the probable southeastern Melanesian area, overall volume of intercepted traffic has continued relatively light during the past 48 hours and no significant fluctuations were evident. D/F traffic decreased substantially and few operational messages were noted.

2. (a) Of possible great significance is a Northern Force Operation Order which, in part, directed the addressees to carry out deceptive communications. It was indicated that TAMA (CL) and other units would be assisted in daily traffic for this purpose by an (unidentified) communication unit.

(b) At 0938I, April 6 an unidentified originator sent a message to a number of addressees, including Air Attack Forces # 1 and # 6 and Air Detachment # 405 (all in the Melanesian area), stating that "X Day" is postponed to April 7. It should be noted that it hardly appears logical to postpone an operation as late as 0938I of the day prior to that set for execution. A recheck of the message in question, however, fails to reveal any acceptable alternative decryption.

II. Solomons

1. A revised schedule of the Desdiv 16(?) transportation operation mentioned in yesterday's Secret Supplement indicates that the DD's were scheduled to arrive at Kolombangara Air Base at 2300I, April 5 and to depart shortly after midnight, arriving Oema Island in the Shortland Group at 0700I, April 6.

2. Japanese reconnaissance planes were quite active in the Solomons-Rabaul-New Guinea area but no sightings were indicated.

III. Japanese Aircraft and Fleet Movements

1. OTAKA (ACV) and 1 unidentified ACV (RYUHO?) escorted by

0740

by SERVICE, INNAV/CHIEF, USS
Date: 12/14/43
M.A.S.

4 DD's departed Yokosuka at 1000I, April 4 and are scheduled to arrive Truk at 0630I, April 10. Their position at 0000I, April 10 will be on bearing 220°, distant 104 miles from Truk, West Channel, and at 0545I they are scheduled to pass through the South Channel. Their cargoes are indicated as follows:

OTAKA: a total of about 60 planes (including 54 Type 3 fighters for the Army), belly tanks, miscellaneous cargo, and passengers.

Unidentified ACV: about 51 planes, belly tanks, miscellaneous cargo, and passengers.

2. Tenian Air Base in the Marianas is still prominently associated with Air Units in the South, suggesting continued aircraft movements southward. Comdr. Air Group # 252 at Rabaul ordered a detachment of planes, probably at Tenian, to postpone departure until 0600I, April 6.

3. KONGO (BB of Batdiv 3) arrived Truk at 1030I, April 6, escorted by 2 DD's. KONGO and HARUNA planes were ordered to carry out an "inner anti-submarine patrol" on April 6, probably in conformity with this movement.

IV. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. A convoy of 3 Marus, escorted by CHOAN Maru, departed Truk at 0600I, April 4 for Kure and Yokosuka. Daily 1200I positions are available.

2. An Army convoy of 3 Marus departed Palao on March 31 for Japan, via Bungo Channel. Daily 1200I positions from April 1 through April 8 are available.

3. An Army convoy, probably composed of DD's is en route to (probable) Dobo in the Aroe Islands from Makassar, the course being laid north of Ceram. The last 12 hours of the run are to be made at 26 knots, time of arrival being indicated as 1800I, April 7.

V. Japanese Air Raid Precautions

No cancellation has been noted of the precautionary alert in Japan against air attack as mentioned in yesterday's Secret Supplement. Both Yokosuka and Ominato originated high precedence messages to off-shore surface units and air patrol units.

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R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 12/21/78
M.A. O.H.

Op-16-FB

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

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SRNS 0359

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 7, 1943

F-φ ✓ F-31 ✓
F-φ1 ✓ F-30 ✓
F-φ2 ✓ F-31 ✓

I. Southwestern Pacific

(A) General

1. (a) An operation order at 1815 I, April 6 from 11th Air Fleet to #1 and #6 Air Attack Forces directs these Forces to carry out "tomorrow's X attack" with designated times 2½ hours later than previously scheduled. This would appear definitely to fix "X" day for "I Operation" as April 7. The objective of this attack is unknown but from the list of addressees it appears to be in the Solomons.

(b) A 6th Air Attack Force order at 1820I, April 6 directs "A" Air Attack Force to use about 3 squadrons of land-based attack planes on "X plus 2" day, to take off early in the morning and to search out and attack Allied vessels in an area extending about 60 miles from Guadalcanal (?).

3. Based primarily upon information derived from radio intelligence, it is estimated that the following Japanese naval surface forces are located in the Southern theater:

Type	Total Strength	Truk Area	Truk-Melanesian Area	Melanesian Area
BB	10	5	-	-
CV	6	3	1	-
ACV	4-5	2*	2	-
CA	15	4	3	-
CL	16	-	2	2
DD	78	13**	5	14
SS	89	7	-	13

* Due at Truk on April 10
** Includes 4 due at Truk on April 10

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 12/21/79
97nd C/AS

Op-16-FE

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~~This document is to be read in connection with the instructions on the reverse side of this document and that all the instructions it contains are to be read in any general instructions.~~

~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

SRNS 0360

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 8, 1943

I. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

F-0 ✓ F-3 ✓
F-01 ✓ F-30 ✓
F-02 ✓ F-31 ✓

Date: 12/21/43
7nd C-18

1. The appearance in Japanese radio communications of abbreviated contact signals specified for use in the "I" Operations indicates that these operations have commenced (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 1). Radio intelligence suggests that the initial phases, namely, air operations, are under the command of Comdr. # 6 Air Attack Force (who may be C-in-C 11th Air Fleet). As further indicated below, it appears clear that the Japanese have committed air forces of considerable magnitude to these operations

3. As yet few definite indications have been noted which might suggest that heavy Japanese surface forces are to take a direct part in the "I Operations".

4.

On April 7, Southeast Area Submarine Force was very active broadcasting apparent orders and intelligence to submarines in the southeastern area. At 1035I, April 7 a strong indication of an important contact by a Jap submarine was furnished by the wide and repeated dissemination of a dispatch originated by a submarine. Addressees included C-in-C's Combined, 6th, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets, I Operations Force, and others.

0745

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Correction: The date of the scheduled attack on shipping in the Guadalcanal area, reported in yesterday's Secret Supplement as "X plus 2" day should read "X plus 1" day.

(B) Japanese Air Forces

1. It is estimated that the following land-based Japanese aircraft are presently in the Melanesian area. This estimate does not include probable land-based carrier planes, nor are about 114 planes scheduled to arrive at Truk on April 10 included:

	VF	VB	VOS	Seaplanes	Patrol Boats	Total
NAVY	120	96	16	55	25	312 ✓
ARMY	140	108	24	-	-	272 ✓
				Grand Total		584 ✓

2. Fairly strong indications have been noted from radio intelligence that the Japanese plan to have Striking Force Carrier Group planes operate from shore bases in the Solomons-Bismarck area. It is interesting to note that at Munda, on April 7 (LZT), small numbers of planes from HAYATAKA (4 planes), ZUIKAKU (4 or 5 planes), and HITAKA (1 plane) made forced landings. Nothing in this message suggests that these planes were flown from the mother carriers.

3. There are strong indications that Airflot 25 is about to begin its scheduled southward movement from the Empire to the Rabaul area.

4. During April (exact date unrecovered) KUNIKAWA MARU (or KIMIKAWA MARU), an XCVS, is scheduled to carry 30 Type Zero fighters from Truk to Rabaul. On April 20, 2 XCVS's (MOGAMIGAWA MARU and 1 other) and in May, GOSHU Maru, are to depart from Yokosuka for Truk.

(C) New Guinea

The radio traffic picture in the New Guinea area continues approximately as previously reported, with transportation operations to the Wewak and Finschhafen areas constituting the main interest.

(D) Marshalls

1. At 0645I, April 8, 10 Zero fighters departed Truk for Brown (Eniwetok, the nearest definitely known airfield to Wake) en route to (possible) Buotto.

II. Northwest Pacific

The continuation of high radio traffic volume from the High North suggests deception traffic of the diversionary type, similar to that observed in the Marshalls in January and February.

Date: 12/21/79
714 CES

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III. Japanese Submarine Operations

1. Submarine I-26 on March 31 reported having sighted a total of 9 AP's or AK's upon four different occasions, and also a total of 5 escorts. In each case, however, the submarine explained that it was unable to close for an attack. This submarine is apparently operating along eastern Australian convoy routes.

2. At 1000I, April 7 submarines I-178, I-180, and 1 (probable) unidentified submarine departed Truk via North Channel.

3. Traffic associations suggest Japanese submarine operations to the south and east of the Marshalls-Gilberts area.

IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping Movements

1. A vessel chartered by the Japanese Army and carrying 1600 passengers was scheduled to depart Bako (in the Pescadores) for Manila at 1700I, April 7, arriving 1000I, April 9.

2. A convoy of 4 Maru's arrived Takao on April 5. Two additional vessels of the same convoy broke down en route and headed for Keelung.

3. A 6-knot convoy composed of 17 vessels (including escorts), probably small ships, departed Sasebo for Takao, via Keelung at 0830I, April 7.

4. A convoy of 5 Maru's which departed Takao at 1900I, April 7 is scheduled to arrive Saigon at 1700I, April 12. Two of the ships are subsequently proceeding to Singapore. Daily noon positions from April 8 to 12 are available.

5. A convoy, which together with escort vessels is composed of 14 vessels, arrived Saipan at about 1800I, April 4.

for *A. Watts*
R. A. Boone.

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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SRNS 0361

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 9, 1943

F-φ ✓ F-3A D
F φ 1 ✓ F3φ D
F-φ 2 ✓ F-31 C

I. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

1. A message on April 7 contained the address "All Comdrs. and All Chiefs of Staff, 'I' Operations Force"

2. Although the attack on shipping in the Tulagi area was referred to as the "X" attack, a Base Air Force (C-in-C 11th Air Fleet) Operation Order at 2247I, April 7 specified April 10 as "Y Day". Comdr. 6th Air Attack Force was ordered to cooperate with ZUIKAKU (planes?) in connection with an unidentified place (probably in the Solomons?).

3. Although radio intelligence indicates considerable Japanese aircraft activity in both the Solomons and Marshalls-Gilberts areas, overall traffic volume was down somewhat and nothing of an abnormal nature was noted.

4. Associations of addresses indicate that Army Air Squadron # 208 is at Truk and may shortly be moving to Rabaul.

(B) Solomons

1. In his first report concerning "I Operations", C-in-C Combined Fleet stated that "X" attack was advanced 2 days and that on April 7 (LZT) the bomber group executed the planned attack on enemy forces with the following results:

Allied Ships Sunk

- 2 Large AK's
- 6 Medium AK's
- 2 Small AK's
- 1 Tanker (?)
- 1 Large DD

Allied Plane Losses

- 36 destroyed
- 12 damaged

Japanese Plane Losses

- 12 VF Shot down and missing
- 9 VB " " " "

2. During the evening of April 8 (LZT) to 0200I, April 9 aerial protective patrols were ordered over 2 unidentified places which apparently are already in Japanese hands.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 2/11/49

CVS

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3. Although at least 10 different flights of planes were observed in the Solomons area between 0450I and 0930I, April 8, apparently no contact with U.S. forces was reported.

4. Traffic routing indicates that parts of Airflot # 26 (# 6 Air Attack Force) are operating from bases at Buin, Ballale, Buka, and Kolombangara, all in the Solomons.

(C) Marshalls-Gilberts

During the past few days some supply-ship activity has been noted in the Gilberts, with 1 fast (17.5 knots) Maru proceeding to Makin. At least 10 planes were heard in this general area on April 8 (LZI) and 1 grid position, indicating a possible sighting, was noted.

(D) New Guinea

An Outer South Seas Force (8th Fleet) Operation Order of 1807I, April 8 indicates that an (unknown) number of DD's under the command of Comdesdiv 2 are to depart Rabaul on "Y" day (April 10) for Finschhafen, arriving at 0100, "Y plus 1" day. The ships carry an unknown number of men and landing barges. It is indicated that the DD's are possibly to be divided into 2 groups, one proceeding north of New Britain and the other south of the same island. In any event, however, the time of arrival for all DD's is identical.

(E) N.E.I.

GOKOKU Maru (XCL) reported having completed a disembarkation at Ambon at 1100I, April 7. She indicated her departure for Babo at 0645I, April 8 with expected time of arrival at 1000I, April 9.

(F) New Ireland

A fragmentary Japanese message of April 3 describes an air attack on Kavieng at 0330I, April 3 and gives indications that a cruiser was set on fire by bomb hits and is to be towed to Truk by a DD of Desdiv 22.

II. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 2055I, April 2 the # 2 TOYO Maru (4,163 gross tons) was torpedoed by a U.S. submarine and sank 5 miles E. of Enderby Island in the Carolines. It was indicated that Subchaser # 10 was carrying out a gunfire attack on the submarine.

2. Possible damage caused by submarine action to a Jap man-of-war is suggested by a 2nd Fleet order at 1021I, April 8 to Comdesron 4(?) to proceed in NAGARA (?) and 1 DD to tow a damaged (unidentified) ship to Truk.

by Director, NSA/CSS, USS
Date: 12/21/79
md CFB

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III. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. Convoy "B" (AZUMA Maru, 6,646 gross tons) departed Singapore for Truk at 1000I, April 8 with scheduled time of arrival indicated as 1200I, April 19. 1200I positions are available.

2. A convoy of 6 MARU'S departed Truk for Rabaul at 0700 I, April 8. Scheduled time of arrival is indicated as 1300I, April 16. 1200I positions are available.

3. A convoy composed of NISSHO Maru (6,527 gross tons), TAKE Maru (1,264 gross tons), and ERIE Maru (5,493 gross tons) departed Takao for Manila at 1100I, April 8, arriving 1400I, April 11. The convoy is escorted by 2 submarine chasers.

IV. Economic

1. Considerable stores of bauxite are reported to be accumulating in Hanoi, French Indo-China, because of shipping difficulties. During the 1st quarter of the fiscal year, Tokyo has decided to ship 42,560 tons of bauxite from Hanoi by sea.

2. For want of shipping space, Canton has reported a serious shortage of coal and pleaded for 5,000 tons to be used by vital utilities, this amount to last 6 months.

DECLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 10/26/79
HMA [signature]

R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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SRNS 0362

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities of April 10, 1943

I. Southwest Pacific:

(a) General.

Of particular interest and in possible explanation of the heavy Jap air raid on Allied shipping in the Tulagi area on April 7 is a recent despatch sent from Tokyo to Buenos Aires. It stated that allied ships are streaming into the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area in large numbers; that although there were about 200 planes based on Guadalcanal at the beginning of March, by the end of the month this strength had been increased to from 250 to 300, the additional planes being principally of small types. It also stated that their air reconnaissance had disclosed the fact that the U.S. was constructing a seaplane base on Ontong Java (Lord Howe Islands), north of Santa Isabel Island in the Solomons.

It is evident that the heavy Jap air raid of April 7 was only the preliminary operation of a somewhat extensive plan. It now appears that not only the Solomons but also the Eastern New Guinea area is involved. In this supplement of yesterday, it was reported that a certain number of DD's would depart Rabaul for Finschafen on April 10 (Y-day). It is now learned that this Y-day has been postponed, but that some unspecified attacks, including one on the Milne Bay area, would be carried out from April 10. The CinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet, also has sent out a warning of expected Japanese attacks, probably by air, on April 11, 12 and 13 in the Solomons, probably against the Tulagi-Guadalcanal-Russell area. Whatever may be the full extent of these operations, it does not at present appear that any strong surface forces are involved, but, of course, their advance to the southward may have been hidden by radio silence. There is some indication that ZUIKAKU (CV) may be involved in the above-mentioned attacks with shore-based aircraft, but very possibly it is her shore-based planes which are to participate rather than the carrier herself.

(b) Truk-Rabaul area.

A Jap despatch has reported the probability that an unspecified Orange force was sighted by allied units early on April 10 in approximate Lat. 4° N., Long. 150° E.

(c) Solomons.

At about 2200L, April 7, a U.S. screening force located a surfaced Jap submarine in Lat. 10°-10' S., Long. 162°-10' E. and destroyed

~~It is requested that this document be buried in the vault of the Navy Department and that in the meantime it not be placed in any general file.~~

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Date: 12/21/79

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if by gunfire. The sub settled slowly and finally sank stern first. It was believed to have been of the I-121 class.

II. U.S. Submarine Operations.

(1) A U.S. submarine has reported scoring seven hits on two auxiliary carriers near Truk on April 9. Since it was known that OTAKA (ACV), CHOKAI (CA) and 4 DD's were scheduled to reach Truk early on April 10, it may be assumed that OTAKA and CHUYO were the ships which the submarine reported hitting. The results of this propitious attack cannot yet be given, but present indications are that they both reached Truk where they were scheduled to unload a number of aircraft.

(2) The unknown ship reported in par. II(2) of yesterday's ~~secret~~ supplement as being under tow following an assumed submarine attack is now reported to have sunk at 1309I, April 9. All personnel were rescued.

(3) An unidentified Jap merchantman was reported to have been torpedoed and sunk at about 1400I, April 10, in an approximate location, Lat. 3°-00' N., Long. 148°-? E.

(4) An unknown vessel was ordered out to tow in a ship in distress at 1315I, April 9 (____ TORO MARU) in a position bearing 310°, distant 4 miles from an unrecovered location. At 1730I contact was made with the disabled vessel and her crew were reported to have been taken aboard ships of Desdiv 27.

III. Blockade Runners.

A Japanese despatch from Berlin to Tokyo reports a meeting in which a German representative stated that since the blockade runners (referred to as Yanagi ships) had recently been so unsuccessful Germany contemplated using old large submarines hitherto employed in the Mediterranean for this purpose. The Japanese representative suggested that such submarines might also be used to exchange officials between Japan and Germany. The despatch recommended that Japan also revamp old submarines to use for transportation of personnel and needed materials between the two countries.

IV. New Jap Construction.

MATSUWA, a new ship tentatively classed as a minelayer, now appears to have been ordered on escort duties. It is noteworthy that Japan is assigning an increasing number of small combatant craft to escort duties to relieve the destroyers whose attrition losses have been large.

V. Japan-Soviet Relations.

A Japanese despatch to Kuibyshev has reported that Russian officials had protested to the Japanese Government that two Soviet steamers had recently

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been temporarily seized in the Straits of Tsushima, and that the Japanese had displayed outrageous behavior toward the Russian personnel of these vessels.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

for *C. Watts*
R. A. Boone.

MS *QTB* Date: 12/21/79

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F0 ✓
F01 ✓
F02 ✓

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 11, 1943

F3A ✓
F3B 2
F31 C

SRNS 0363

I. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

1. Japanese objectives in the current "I Operations" are not yet clarified from intercepted radio traffic, nor have any new indications been noted which might shed further light on the participation (or non-participation) of major Japanese surface units in these operations. To date, it would appear that Japanese air forces, light craft (including submarines), and MARU's only have been assigned to undertake at least the preliminary phases of these operations. On the other hand, however, past experience indicates the probability that heavier units, including carriers, may be acting in the capacity of a support force, to be directly employed in operations as circumstances dictate or possibly to carry out later phases of the planned operation.

2. Although the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic rose only about 10% during the past 24 hours, weather traffic showed a marked increase, suggesting further air force movements and possibly continued air operations. Operational traffic was relatively light, and Jap aircraft reconnaissance was normal, with no evidence of contacts noted.

(B) New Britain

Radio intelligence continues to indicate that Rabaul is the main center of concentration of Japanese forces currently engaged in operations in the New Guinea-Solomons area. The following items, involving Rabaul, have been noted:

(a) CHOKAI (CA) is scheduled to depart for Rabaul from Truk after taking on 2300 tons of fuel oil.

(b) On April 10, KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS) was ordered to report to Comairflot # 25 for duty and to assist in shifting Airflot # 25 from the Empire to Rabaul (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 8, paragraph I, (B), 4).

(c) It was indicated at 1045I, April 10 that 2 (possible) DD's departed from Rabaul for Finschhafen. This is probably the transportation group previously mentioned in the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 9 (paragraph I, (D)).

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Date: 12/21/79

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(d) A convoy, apparently composed of several ships, is en route to Rabaul from the North. 1200I positions from April 9 to 16 are available.

(C) Solomons

At 1920I, April 10 MOCHIZUKI (DD) was ordered to report to Comdr. #2 Surface Escort Unit for duty in escorting vessels in the vicinity of Oema Island (in Bougainville Strait).

(D) New Guinea

1. Comdesdiv 17, apparently in command of the 6-MARU convoy en route from Palao to the Wewak (?) area, reported his position to various air commands as Lat. 1° 53' S., Long. 142° 37' E. at 0500I, April 11. Course was given as 140°, speed 8. It is this convoy which was directed to conform to the "X Day" landing schedule (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 7, paragraph II, 1).

2. At about 1800I, April 10, 2 MARU's arrived at Wewak.

(E) N.E.I.

1. associations suggest the strengthening of western New Guinea air bases by Army air units drawn from Malaya.

2. GOKOKU Maru (XCL) arrived at Babo at 0900I, April 9. After completion of landing operations she is scheduled to depart for Surabaya at 1630 I, April 10, arriving at 1400I, April 14.

(F) Marshalls-Gilberts

Nothing of significance was noted from radio intelligence in the Marshalls-Gilberts area.

II. U.S. Submarine Operations

(a) A dispatch from Base Force # 4 (Truk) reported that OTAKA (ACV) sustained a torpedo attack in position bearing 227°, distant 123 miles from an (undetermined) reference point. It was intimated, however, that no damage was incurred. This attack is undoubtedly the one reported in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement (paragraph II (1)). Although the report of "no damage" does raise some doubt as to hits having been obtained, this report should not be taken too literally, previous instances having been noted of a "no damage" report being made to cover actual damage. If damage was incurred, however, it does not appear to have disrupted OTAKA's schedule.

(b) Possibly arising out of the above attack, a Combined Fleet Operation Order at 1106I, April 10 stated that "current rampages of enemy submarines in Truk waters must be halted". Comdr. Advance Force (2nd Fleet), Inner South Seas Force (4th Fleet), and Striking Force (3rd Fleet) were ordered to cooperate in anti-submarine plane patrols in the Truk area for about 10 days and Comdr. Striking Force was ordered to place about 18 scout seaplanes at the disposal of Comdr. Advance Force for this purpose.

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nd call
Date: 12/11/79

(c) OTAKA (ACV) and CHUYO (ACV); escorted by 2 DD's were ordered to proceed to Yokosuka at 1700I, (date unrecovered). A previous operation schedule indicated that these ACV's would remain at Truk at least until April 15.

III. Japanese Convoys

1. Radio intelligence indicates a recent Japanese practice of convoys from Palao to Rabaul making rendezvous with convoys from Rabaul to Palao for the purpose of interchanging their respective escorts.

2. "B" Convoy, composition unknown but probably carrying raw materials, was scheduled to depart Singapore at 1400I, April 10 and to arrive Sasebo at 1100I, April 19. Approximate daily 1200I positions are available.

IV. Economic

1. In an economic report from Tokyo to Berlin on April 8, the need for increasing Japanese shipping was pointed out. It was explained that wooden ships do not require the high technical skill necessary in building other vessels and that standardized wooden craft of 250 tons, 150 tons, and 100 tons would therefore be built. Larger craft of 500 tons and 300 tons are planned in the future. Straight lines will be employed as much as possible and, through monopolistic control, it is hoped that ample lumber can be obtained.

2. A partially readable message of April 9 indicates that a German ship was scheduled to depart from Yokohama on April 10 for Penang, via Kobe, Balikpapan (?), and Singapore, arriving May 5.

V. Japanese Intelligence

On April 6, Minister Morishima in Lisbon reported to Tokyo that the United States is using 200 experts in the Japanese language to question prisoners of war and to decipher code messages.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

ms *csb* Date: 12/21/79

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 12, 1943

SRNS 0364

I. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

1. During the past 24 hours, intercepted Japanese D/F traffic rose sharply, with Tokyo, Rabaul, and Jaluit as the principal centers of activity in this regard. Operational traffic from Tokyo, Truk, and Surabaya was higher than usual. The prominent association of Airflot 23 and Southwestern Area Fleet with "I Operations" suggests the possibility of coordinated air attacks from the eastern N.E.I. area upon Allied bases and shipping in S.E. New Guinea. Considerable intelligence traffic was noted. In the Solomons-Rabaul-New Guinea area, at least 17 different plane calls were intercepted

2. An order at 1617I, April 11 fixed April 12 as "Y" Day ("Y" attack). In a separate order, the scheduled time for "Y" attack was advanced 3 hours and it was indicated that the attack unit would take off from (Rabaul area?) at 0700I. At least 2 observation planes were ordered to take off prior to 0700I, April 12.

3. In what is apparently the Battle Report of the Jap air forces which took part in the April 7 raid on shipping in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area, it is interesting to note that the great majority of the planes were carrier units. It is not evident, however, whether the planes were homed on the carriers or were operating from shore bases. It was indicated that the following planes took part:

<u>Shipboard Fighters</u>	
ZUIKAKU	26
ZUIHO	25
HAYATAKA	21
HITAKA	24
(?) Air Group 14 (?)	
Total	110

<u>Shipboard Bombers</u>	
ZUIKAKU	17
HAYATAKA	17
HITAKA	18
(?) Air Group 18	
Total	70

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

12/2/43 Date: *MS*

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(B) Solomons

A message at 0650I, April 10 from (tentative) New Georgia Area Defense Force to #1 Special Base Force (at Buin) for action requested a report on the condition of the "second phase" landing barge Striking Unit.

(C) New Britain

On about April 13, IBOKI (approximately Lat. 5° 32' S., Long. 149° 10' E.) on the northern coast of New Britain and one other point probably in the same area are to be occupied by the Japanese. About 2 companies, transported by 2 DD's, are to effect the landings.

(D) New Guinea

At 2045I, April 10 it was indicated that a Jap submarine was in the Lae area, probably on a transport mission.

(E) Guam

An order at 0700I, April 12 directed the establishment of an anti-submarine air patrol in the vicinity of Apra for about 10 days.

(F) Marshalls

A radar is in process of installation on the Northern (Island?) of Mille.

II. Japanese Aircraft Transportation

OTAKA (ACV) is scheduled to transport 43 planes from Yokosuka to Surabaya. UNYO and CHUYO (ACV's) are to transport 58 and 60 planes respectively between (unrecovered) points. The dates of the scheduled transportation involving these auxiliary carriers are not known, but it is interesting to note that the great majority of the planes involved are carrier planes.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. Further doubt is thrown on the probability of hits having been obtained on ACV's OTAKA and CHUYO by a U.S. submarine in its attacks on April 9 by a directive on April 11 setting forth an aircraft transportation schedule for OTAKA, CHUYO, and UNYO (see paragraph II). On the other hand, however, considerable activity in the Truk area, has been noted.

2. Base Force # 4 (Truk) issued an operation order wherein it was pointed out that at 1300I, April 11 a U.S. submarine approached to a position bearing 25°, distant 5 miles from North Channel, Truk and made a torpedo attack

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 12/24/79
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MSB Date: *12/1/79*

on a Japanese submarine. The originator of the dispatch stated that the enemy appears to be planning some sort of operation against the Truk area and all activities were ordered to maintain a strict watch, particularly against aircraft. This order resulted in considerable activity among auxiliary vessels.

3. KLYONAMI (new DD of 2300(?) tons displacement) apparently was attacked by a U.S. submarine in the vicinity of Truk on April 11. Results are unknown.

4. It is indicated that a convoy in Lat. 5° 40' N., Long. (unrecovered) sustained a torpedo attack at 0640I, April 12. Results are unknown.

IV. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. Recent indications give strong evidence that Takao, in southern Formosa, is assuming greater importance as a stop-over and make-up point for convoys proceeding between Japan and points in French Indo-China, Thailand, and Malaya.

2. A convoy of 8 ships was scheduled to depart Takao at 1600I, April 12 and to arrive Saigon (?) at 1000I, April 18, speed of 9 knots. Daily 1200I positions are available.

3. A 4-ship convoy was scheduled to depart Manila at 1100I, March 12, arriving Takao at 1200I, April 15, speed 9 knots. Noon positions are available.

4. Convoy "A" departed Singapore at 1300I, April 11 for Osaka. Daily 1200I positions from April 12 to 19 are available.

5. # 3 TONAN MARU (19,210 ton tanker, ex-whaler) is to depart Truk for Singapore to load fuel oil, thence to return to Truk. The schedule of this ship is not yet available.

R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 13, 1943

SRNS 0365

I. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

1. Intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours indicates above-normal volume in intelligence, D/F, and aircraft (including some abbreviated contact-type) traffic. Operational-type traffic was prominent in the New Guinea-Solomons and Truk areas.

2. Beginning at 0700I, April 12, intercepted traffic indicated that air attacks were about to take place against Allied bases or units. One Jap plane reported 2 medium transports and 1 large transport in unrecovered locations, and at 0915, a Jap plane ordered "commence attack". Use of the previously noted abbreviated code indicates that these operations are part of "I Operations". On the other hand, from about 1600I, April 12 Japanese radio traffic gave the appearance of Allied air attacks involving Wewak and from associations it is likely that a Jap convoy bound for northern New Guinea from New Britain was under attack. Allied attacks on Jap shipping in the northern Solomons are also indicated.

3. At 1615I, April 12, 11th Air Fleet gave an order to carry out the "Y-1" Attack (on April 13?). It will be recalled that a "Y-2" attack, which includes Milne Bay is also on the Japanese program.

(B) New Guinea

1. At 0715I, April 12, the previously noted 6-Maru convoy (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 11, paragraph I, (D),1) from Palao reported its arrival at (probable) Hansa or Bogia, about 75 miles N.W. of Madang.

2. Comdesdiv 8 at 2243I, April 10 reported having completed unloading at (Finschhafen?) and at 0825I, April 11 indicated his arrival at Rabaul.

(C) New Britain

CHOKAI (CA) was scheduled to depart Truk at 0530I, April 13 and to arrive Rabaul at 0415I, April 15. She is carrying 14 landing barges.

by Director, NSA/Chief, GDS

Mc Coy Date: 12/21/79

(D) Truk

1. ZUIKAKU (CV) shipboard attack wing at Kavieng was ordered to return to Truk as soon as possible after April 13.

2. On April 10 Comdr. Reinforcement Force was ordered to Truk, to stand-by there and to carry out training. No information is available as to the composition of this Force.

(E) Marcus Island

Associations suggest that aircraft are being ferried from Yokosuka to Marcus via Chichijima,

II. Northwest Pacific

Comdr. Ominato Defense Force reported that at 0625I, April 12 a suspicious merchant ship appeared about 12 miles E. of Kokutanazaki (Lat. 50° 51' N., Long. 156° 29' E.) At about 0900I, April 12 a plane appeared from about 1 1/2 miles E. of Shimushiru Island in the Kuriles, circled for about 30 minutes above the merchant ship and departed to the northward. The ship headed southward.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 2115I, April 12 Commanding Officer of MATKAZE (DD) reported that SHOKAKU (CV) received 2 torpedo hits and that she was proceeding at 16 knots. (It will be recalled that a U.S. submarine reported sighting 6 medium and 1 probable SHOKAKU in approximately Lat. 35° N., Long. 143° E. during the night of April 9-10, obtaining 2 possible hits on the carrier).

2. Captain of OTAKA (ACV) reported a torpedo attack at 2155 I, April 9 in Lat. 5° 59' N., Long. 150° 23' E. Although the message is scarcely readable it reports "no damage". It also appears that 1 torpedo exploded about 100 meters off the OTAKA's beam.

3. An unidentified ship, carrying a cargo of oil from Balikpapan to Truk, was torpedoed in the vicinity of Lat. 10° 12' N., Long. 134° 35' E. at 1305I, April 3. It was indicated that the Master and 63 men were taken off and that the ship was afire, but the final result was not made clear.

4. Base Force # 4 (Truk) on April 11 indicated that it is possible that enemy submarines may have released floating mines in the vicinity of Truk.

5. In addition to the remarks previously made in the Secret Supplement concerning anti-submarine operations in the Truk area, a number of other dispatches clearly indicate that U.S. submarines will be faced with counter-measures of increased severity in that area.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

4/12/19
Date: PFD
MK

IV. Japanese Submarine Operations

The possibility of Allied surface units having been sighted is suggested by several operational-type messages noted on April 11 from Jaluit to submarines in the S.E. area.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MJ CS Date: 12/21/79

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 14, 1943

SRNS 0366

I. General

1. Intercepted Japanese radio traffic volume fell off somewhat during the past 24 hours, with a general decline in operational traffic and greatly lessened D/F activity noted. Code contact reports, however, were much higher than usual. In the Empire area, a carrier-plane circuit has been active on April 12 and 13, the context of readable messages indicating training exercises. The carrier involved is possibly the new converted carrier RYUHO, which on April 8 was ordered to carry out exercises for about 10 days.

2. On April 13 C-in-C Combined Fleet sent a message to the effect that a conference will be held (date unrecovered) in the Flag Office of the South-eastern Fleet to discuss operations, defensive measures, etc. C-in-C Combined Fleet also indicated that he will be on Ballale Island (in the Solomons) on April 18 (LZT), suggesting that he will be present at the conference.

3. Consideration of Airflot # 25's southward movement schedule leads to the conclusion that this Airflot (less Air Group # 801) will have been transported to the Rabaul area by April 30. About 30 pilots (possibly 30 crews) are scheduled to arrive at Truk by flying boats on April 15 for training purposes.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) New Guinea

1. At 0935I, April 13 Comdesdiv 17 reported that 4 DD's and 5 MARU's departed (Hansa or Bogia?),

It will be recalled from earlier information that this convoy (6 MARU's) departed from Palao, carrying 5,500 men and supplies. Apparently 1 MARU has been detached or may have been damaged or sunk.

2. Using "I Operations" code, a Jap plane at 0715I, April 14 reported 3 (or 10?) medium Allied transports in the Milne Bay area. It also reported 11 large type and 20 fighters at one Allied airfield and 20 fighters at another. At 0735I, April 14 a second Jap plane reported 3 cruisers and 2 DD's bearing 70°, distant 15 miles from East Cape (S.E. New Guinea), speed 18.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

date 12/21/79
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3. During the night of April 10-11, a Japanese unit of 2 DD's carried 103 Army personnel and 54 tons of material from Rabaul to Finschhafen. A second unit carried 50 tons of provisions and additional (unknown). A third unit was unsuccessful and returned to Rabaul.

4. A Japanese report indicates that B-17's and B-24's raided Newak from 0630I to 0700I, April 10. Jap Navy casualties were 25 dead and 4 petty officers and 19 warrants and above (wounded?). KOYO Maru (500 tons) was sunk and minor damage caused to unidentified ships. In a raid on Bogia, 1 unidentified ship was damaged but no damage was caused to other equipment or personnel. At Hamsa, 2 landing barges were bombed (or strafed?) by B-17's but no damage was incurred.

5. In "Y" Attack (on April 12), #1 Air Attack Force employed 18 bombers and 18 fighters. At 1600I, April 12 Air Attack Unit #1 reported that 6 land-attack planes were still missing.

(B) New Britain

At about 1201I, April 13, 2 DD's departed Rabaul to undertake the occupation of Iboki and (possibly) Garowe Island, on the north coast of New Britain and north of the same island respectively (see the ~~S~~ Supplement of April 12, paragraph I, (c)). The DD's will separate in Lat. 4° 34' S., Long. 150° 36' E.

(C) Marcus-Wake

The appearance of Marcus in Japanese radio traffic during the past several days suggests the increased importance of this island. Wake also appears to be the destination of aircraft supplies or replacements from Yokosuka.

(D) Truk

At 0904I, April 13 a message to Base Force # 4 (Truk) and to the Northern Section Truk Surface Force stated that 1 enemy plane flew over from the S.W., reconnoitered to the S.E., and departed.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

Comdesdiv 19 reported that while escorting an Army convoy of 4 ships, a U.S. submarine made 5 attacks in Lat. 5° 32' N., Long. 123°(?) 10' E. Although the message is only partly readable, it is indicated that the SHONAN Maru (unlisted) sank at 1323I, April 11.

IV. Japanese Submarine Operations

Throughout April 12 submarine traffic continued exceptionally heavy, with most dispatches broadcast to the southeastern area.

AM CAS Date: 12/21/79

V. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. A 4-MARU convoy with escort departed Takao for Japan at 1400I, April 12, speed 9. Expected time of arrival at destination is indicated as 1400I, April 17.

2. It is indicated that a convoy (composition unknown) is to depart Yokohama for Truk on April 20 (LZT).

3. Radio intelligence indicates considerable convoy and shipping activity in the Mandates area, with a number of DD's engaged in escort duty. A possible shortage of escort vessels in this area is suggested by a request for the schedule of Subchaser # 20, it having been expressly stated that she is needed for a convoy.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

7/18/79 Date: 12/21/79

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 15, 1943

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SRNS 0367

DECLASSIFIED per Sec 1.3, E.O. 12065
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 12/12/44

I. General

1. The outstanding feature of intercepted Japanese radio traffic on April 14 (LZT) was the relatively high volume of weather traffic, suggesting further movements of aircraft reinforcements and replacements. This is, in fact, merely a continuation of the recently noted trend of aircraft movements southward from Japan to the Southern theater, chiefly via Tenien and Truk. Indications have also been noted of plane reinforcements being sent to the Mandates area, particularly to the eastern Marshalls.

2. As intimated in yesterday's Secret Supplement, C-in-C Combined Fleet (Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto) will visit Ballale, Buin, and 1 unidentified place on April 18 in accordance with the following schedule:

Depart Rabaul at 0800L, April 18 in a medium attack plane, escorted by 6 fighters. Arrive Ballale Island at 1000L and proceed by a minesweeper to , arriving at 1040L. At 1145L depart in a minesweeper and arrive at Ballale Island at 1230L(?). Depart Ballale Island at 1300L by plane and arrive Buin at 1310L, departing at 1600L by plane for Rabaul, arriving at 1740L. In the event of bad weather, the trip is to be postponed 1 day.

3. Further evidence of radio deception in the High North has been noted.

4. The address "G' Operations Force" was noted in two messages on April 13. One slight indication could place this Force in the N.E.I., but further information is at present unavailable.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) New Guinea

1. Comdr. 6th Air Attack Force reported that 27 land attack planes, 2 land reconnaissance planes, and 39 Type Zero fighters participated in the "Y" attack. Added to Comdr. 1st Air Attack Force's report as contained in yesterday's Secret Supplement, this indicates that a total of 45 bombers, 57 fighters, and 2 reconnaissance planes took part in the Port Moresby attack on April 12.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MS
Date: 12/21/79

2. Associations suggest that a Jap submarine on a transportation mission may soon call at Lae.

3. Some evidence of the presence of a convoy in the Wewak area early on April 12 (LZT) is indicated.

(B) New Ireland

Comdr. Air Striking Force, apparently in command of only the Aircraft Detachments of the Striking Force (carriers) based in the South-eastern Area, advised Commander Cardiv 1 Detachment that the base at Kavieng is to be strengthened. He directed certain equipment to be loaded on DD's at Truk on April 14 (LZT). Ground personnel (at Truk?) is to be embarked on NAGARA (CL) as soon as the scheduled date of arrival of planes at Truk is known.

(C) New Britain

Comdesdiv 22 reported having arrived Iboki at 2300I, April 13, departed at midnight, and indicated his arrival at Rabaul at 0800I, April 14, thus apparently completing the Iboki landing operation (see yesterday's Secret Supplement, Paragraph II, (B)).

(D) Truk

1. OTAKA and CHUYO (AGV's) are to be escorted by 4 DD's when they leave Truk at 1600I, on (probably) April 15.

2. On April 15 (LZT), 2 minesweepers were ordered to conduct anti-submarine detection duties in the North and South channels at Truk, relieving 2 other minesweepers apparently similarly engaged.

(E) Solomons

1. Munda Base reported a raid by 26 Allied shipboard bombers and 10 fighters from 0810L to 0834L, April 13. It was indicated that 7 bombers (3 uncertain) and 1 fighter were shot down.

2. An unusual amount of Japanese aircraft traffic was noted in the Solomons-Rabaul-New Guinea area on April 14 (LZT). At least 25 plane calls were intercepted.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

Base Force # 6 (Jaluit) in reporting the deaths of 2 men stated that they were drowned while engaged in attacking a U.S. submarine which was torpedoed and sunk at 0415I, April 11(?) in Lat. 7° 14' N., Long. 159° 44' E.

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ms *CSS* *12/1/79*
Date:

IV. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. An escorted convoy of 3 Maru's departed Truk at 1200I, April 13 for Palao to arrive at 0800I, April 18. Daily 1200I positions are available.

2. A Rabaul-bound convoy departed Truk at 1500I, April 14. It is indicated that the convoy will be in Lat. 1° 38' S., Long. 153° E. at 1400I April 17.

V. Economic

About 28,500 tons of rice are to be shipped from Thailand in 4 Maru's during the month of April. 2 Maru's have Tokyo and Kobe as their respective destinations.

R. A. Boone

R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 16, 1943

SRNS 0368

I. General

1. At 0000I, April 15 the Japanese naval code from which the major portion of information has been derived during recent weeks was changed. It is impossible at present to estimate the time required to solve the new system. Once again, for the time being, at least, increased reliance must be placed upon reconnaissance and searches if a steady flow of information is to be available to our operating forces. (See also the remarks contained in the Secret Supplement of February 16, paragraph I,1.)

2. With the expected temporary cessation of specific information derived from radio intelligence, it may be well briefly to summarize the situation as it appeared from information available as of April 15.

(a) The Japanese have undoubtedly committed large forces of aircraft to operations in the eastern Melanesian area, and numerous indications have been noted that a steady flow of aircraft reinforcements and replacements will continue southward during the next few weeks. These reinforcements were preceded by feverish activity on the part of the Japanese to build up a network of well-integrated and substantial air bases. Likewise, the Marshalls-Gilberts area has been greatly strengthened defensively.

(b) Considerable reinforcements of ground troops have been sent to points along the northern coast of New Guinea, among the Islands of the Eastern N.E.I., to New Britain (particularly in the Rabaul area), and to some extent in the northern Solomons. Indications have also been noted of further convoys en route to some or all of these areas.

(c) Major Japanese surface forces in some strength, including 4 CV's, have been concentrated in the Truk area. The air striking units of the carriers, however, have been shore-based in the Kavieng-Rabaul areas and have taken an active part in the recent heavy Japanese air strikes. There is some reason to believe, in the light of recent indications, that these planes will, in the near future, be relieved by land-based units such as Airflot # 25 and later, by Airflot # 24. In this manner the carrier air forces most probably will re-

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

12/21/49 Date: MLC CFE

vert to their true function of mobile air forces.

(d) Based on available information to date, the "I Operations" appear to have been primarily reinforcement operations in which heavy reinforcements were brought into the actual and strategic zones of operations under the cover of offensive-like air and submarine activities.

(e) Whether the greatly increased Japanese ground and air forces now installed in the Eastern N.E.I. and in Melanesia foreshadow a determined Japanese offensive effort in this theater is not known. Conversely, these forces are undoubtedly of sufficient strength to afford the Japanese some degree of security should the Allies undertake even a major offensive move in this area. In either event, the key to the riddle of future Japanese intentions would appear to be the employment of Japanese naval surface forces. These forces now have the choice of (1) joining with the air and ground forces herein mentioned in a joint coordinated offensive operation to the southeastward or southward, (2) engaging in offensive operations of the hit-and-run type against objectives far removed from the South Pacific, or (3) adopting the purely defensive attitude of keeping open the Japanese supply lines to their wide-spread newly-won empire.

3. In anticipation of the visit to the Shortland area by Admiral Yamamoto, C-in-C Combined Fleet, mentioned in yesterday's Secret Supplement, various local defense measures have been ordered, including the moving of a (command?) post, building slit trenches, bringing up 13 mm machine guns, etc.

4. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic has continued its recently noted gradual rise, with Truk indicated as the chief center of activity. The Jaluit to Truk channel was extremely busy, suggesting increased Japanese submarine activity. Merchant vessel traffic was the highest on record, indicating widespread MARU activity.

5. Aircraft training activity continues in the Empire area, and on April 15 (LZT) night torpedo practice maneuvers involving planes and 28-knot high speed targets were noted.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

An unidentified ship, apparently part of a convoy en route from Palao to Rabaul, reported a torpedo attack in Lat. 1° 25' N., Long. 148° 22' E. at 0408I, April 14. Although the ship was shipping water it was indicated that she could still navigate at 0618I.

IV. Japanese Aircraft Movements

The following items furnish further indications of the current Japanese trend of shifting air forces to the Southern area:

(a) Comdr. 4th Air Attack Force has been named Comdr. Combined Air Attack Force. This shift in command undoubtedly has resulted from the imminent departure for the South of Airflot # 25

(b) The Captain of the UNYO (ACV) has been ordered to take command of CHUYO (ACV) in the forthcoming aircraft ferry trip from Yokosuka to Truk. It is estimated that these ACV's, with about 118 planes aboard, will depart Yokosuka during the latter part of April. It will be recalled that OTAKA is also scheduled to depart Yokosuka for Surabaya at approximately the same time, carrying about 43 planes.

(c) KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS) departed Yokosuka on April 14 and is scheduled to arrive Truk on April 20. She carries a total of 11 planes destined for the Marshalls and # 2 Special Base Force (probably) at Wewak.

V. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. "K" Convoy of 6 MARU's and 1 escort vessel departed Kobe on April 13 for Palao and is scheduled to arrive at its destination at 1500I, April 21. 1200I positions for April 19 and 20 are available. 4 MARU's of this convoy are to proceed from Palao to Rabaul.

2. "A" Convoy, composition unknown, departed Manila on April 14 (LZT) for Singapore. The convoy is to be escorted as far as Lat. 12° N., Long. 116° E.

VI. Economic

1. A message from Berlin to Tokyo on April 13 indicated that no more blockade runners would operate until November.

2. The use of small craft for transportation purposes in the N.E.I. area is indicated by the arrival at Ambon on April 14 of two sailing vessels, both chartered by the Japanese Army (or Navy).

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

md cjb Date: *12/21/79*

for *P. Watts*
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 17, 1943

SRNS 0369

I. General

Although the overall volume of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours increased slightly, no definite conclusions can be drawn therefrom in view of the previously mentioned code change. D/F and Army traffic over Navy circuits fell off considerably. In the Empire, continued aircraft exercises were noted, and in the Solomons-New Guinea area the principal Japanese preoccupation appeared to be one of continued supply and reinforcement.

II. Southwest Pacific

(B) New Britain

Further strengthening of Iboki (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 15, paragraph II,(c)) is indicated by another landing operation at that point, scheduled for 2300I, April 16. It will be noted that Iboki and Garowe Island lie almost exactly on the direct air route from Port Moresby to Kavieng.

(D) Truk-Palao

Possibly in direct consequence of C-in-C Combined Fleet's recent order concerning the operations of U.S. submarines in the Truk area, a "Mopping-up" Force has apparently been organized to counter submarine action along the Truk-Palao convoy route.

Date: 7/11/43
7114-1711-1711

III. Japanese Convoy Movements

It is indicated that "K" convoy, mentioned in yesterday's Secret Supplement as en route Palao (with 4 ships bound for Rabaul), is transporting about 3600 men and large quantities of military stores.

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Secret Supplement

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 18, 1943.

F-0	F-3A
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I. General

Virtually no new developments have been noted in the past twenty four hours. Evidence continues of aircraft exercises in waters of Japan Proper not far from Tokyo Bay, and two carriers are strongly indicated to be participating, but their identifications have not yet been made. In the Melanesia area there is considerable air activity by the Japanese, but their principal preoccupation apparently remains in the reinforcement and supply of their advanced bases.

SRNS 0370

II. Southwest Pacific

(a) New Guinea

There is a slight indication that another Japanese convoy under escort in the Wewak area may have been attacked in the early morning of April 16.

Lae appears to be continuing to receive supplies by submarines, and possibly hospital patients are being evacuated on their return trips.

It is now learned that following the successful U.S. air attacks on the ill-fated Lae convoy on March 3 the Comdr. of the Japanese 1st Air Attack Force reported having shot down 25 U.S. planes and 10 more probables. Actual losses were 1 B-17 and 3 P-38's. From this it once again appears evident that the Japanese do not require a high standard in crediting losses inflicted on their enemies.

(b) Gilbert Isl.

Although details are lacking the strengthening of the defenses of the Jap occupied islands in the Gilberts is being maintained with vigor under the direction of the C-in-C, 4th Fleet.

(c) Truk

The previously reported anti-submarine campaign in this area is being prosecuted with the utmost energy and the employment of all available forces, but with no apparent success.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 19, 1943

SRNS 0371

I. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

1. The overall volume of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours declined somewhat from the previous report. Despite the present inability to read most of this traffic, associations of call signs suggested nothing of an important unusual nature.

2. The possibility that Admiral Yamamoto's plane may have been shot down over Kahili is suggested by the meeting of P-38's with a Jap formation of 2 bombers escorted by 6 Zeros at about 0930L, April 18. The 2 bombers and 3 Zeros were shot down. It will be recalled that Admiral Yamamoto was scheduled to arrive Ballale Island at 1000L, April 18 in a bomber, escorted by 6 fighters (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 15, Paragraph I,2).

3. A number of dummy Zero fighters were shipped southward from the Empire during the early part of February.

(B) Marshalls-Gilberts

1. Although no contact reports of an unusual nature were noted, considerable radio traffic involving bases and forces in the Marshalls-Gilberts area, particularly Makin Air Detachment, was noted between 0558I and 1316I, February 19.

2. Further strengthening of Greenwich Island is suggested by the scheduled arrival there on April 21 of a convoy of 3 Marus which departed Kusaie at 0400I, April 18.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
per Sec. 3, E, O 12065

Date: 2/21/49
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(D) Solomons

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 3, E. O. 12065
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MS CAS Date: 12/21/79

II. Japanese Torpedoes

As long ago as April, 1940 it was reported that the latest Japanese destroyers carry 24" torpedoes, with an 850 lb. war head. Since that date, a number of additional unconfirmed reports to this effect have been received. The latest report of this nature is contained in a prisoner-of-war interrogation report in which two prisoners, survivors of FURUTAKA (CA), definitely stated that the FURUTAKA was equipped with 2 quadruple mounts for 24" torpedoes. In view of the proven efficacy of Japanese torpedoes it is considered that the prisoner-of-war report should be given a very high evaluation.

III. Political-Economic

Difficulties have arisen between the Japanese Army and French Indo-China authorities over the requisition by the latter of 5 Mekong River boats previously purchased by the O.S.K. (Osaka Shosen Kaisha). The local Japanese authorities insist that these boats are needed not only to keep open and develop traffic with the proposed Thai-French Indo-China connecting railroad, but also as a connecting link between Saigon and the Burma-Bangkok-Phnompenh overland route.

- R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 20, 1943

SRNS 0372

I. General

1. During the past 24 hours, the general picture of intercepted Japanese radio traffic remained substantially unchanged. The amount of radio intelligence traffic to air units and commanders was high, and a flurry of contact traffic which apparently led nowhere was noted. In the High North, indicated activity was practically nil; chief activity appeared to center in the Marshalls-Gilberts area, aside from the usual activity of Truk-Rabaul.

2. Traffic routing indicates that at least part of Combined Fleet Staff is at Saipan and from associations of addressees some important move in this area appears as a possibility.

3. Increased Japanese communications security is again indicated by a change in a subsidiary code on April 19, and by an indication of the adoption of a changed aircraft code shortly.

4. A message on April 9 ordered the OSHIMA (AR) from Apra, Guam to Kavieng via Truk, to assist in repairs to the AOBA (CA). Another dispatch on April 10, only partly readable, involved AOBA (CA) and NAGAURO (ARS) and clearly implied that AOBA is in trouble. In this connection, it will be recalled that an Allied plane reported having sighted a wrecked CA, believed AOBA, near Kavieng on April 16.

5. A Japanese message on April 13 indicated that 13 shipboard bomber crews are engaged in fighter training. The same message also requested the views of C-in-C Combined Fleet concerning the schedule (?) of SHOKAKU, in view of the necessity of bolstering strength in the Southeast Area.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Gilberts

Increased Japanese interest in the Marshalls-Gilberts area is indicated by fairly definite evidence of the location in that area of C-in-C and/or Chief of Staff 4th Fleet and C-in-C and/or Chief of Staff 6th Fleet (Submarines). The Command of 3rd Base Force is also located at Tarawa, having previously been at Palao where it handled logistics.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 12/21/79
JMS

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(B) Solomons

1. On April 19 (LZT), Wickham Lookout Station was ordered to investigate and report upon the strength and disposition of enemy forces suspected of having penetrated into Gatakai Island (S.E. end of New Georgia Group).

2. Slight indications by association suggest the arrival (or departure) in the Rabaul area on April 18 of Army units possibly destined for Munda or Rekata.

(C) Rabaul

It is indicated that a series of convoys of about 4 MARU's each, all provided with escorts, are scheduled to move between Rabaul and Palao and vice versa. These convoys are scheduled for the latter half of April and early May and, by reason of their number, suggest the possibility of a reshuffling of Army forces. Wewak convoys are also indicated. On the whole, however, information is as yet too fragmentary to suggest definite conclusions to be drawn from the convoy schedule.

(D) New Guinea

At least the AIKOKU Maru (XCL) and 1 unidentified (large) Maru are proceeding from Palao to Wewak, carrying relatively large numbers of Army personnel and equipment. The former vessel departed Takao on April 19, carrying about 1,000 men and 18 guns.

III. Japanese Convoys

1. Although details are unavailable, a report received by the British from a source said to be reliable indicates that 60 Japanese transports carrying about 40,000 troops arrived Manila on April 10. In view of the known Japanese policy to limit convoys to small numbers of ships, the lack of any indications whatsoever of the presence of strong escort forces in the Philippines area at that time, and the total absence of radio intelligence indications that such a force is at sea, it is believed that the report is exaggerated and should be treated with great reserve.

2. At 1100I, April 20, 5 MARU's were scheduled to depart Truk (North Channel) on course 314°, destination unknown.

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F3A ✓

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 21, 1943

F3R ✓
F31 ✓

SRNS 0373

I. General

1. Greatly increased Japanese communications security is evident from the recent change of a majority of codes previously in use and by the elimination of a number of procedural weaknesses. It is interesting to note that the 1st Combined Communications Unit (radio intelligence unit) now uses a machine cipher for its radio intelligence dispatches and that collective calls of undetermined scope are employed in place of the former wide lists of addressees.

2. During the past 24 hours, the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was approximately unchanged, but Army traffic over Navy circuits was substantially higher, with practically all traffic intercepted on the Palao-Tokyo and Palao-Rabaul channels. D/F traffic continued to drop and reached a low for a period of about 2 months.

3. Carrier/plane exercises in the Japan area are apparently still in progress. The context of messages noted indicates that the exercises involve night attacks with surface lights and parachute flares.

4. On April 3 (LZT) it was indicated that NACHI (CA), MAYA (CA), Desdiv 21, ARASHIO (DD), and HATSUHARU (DD) arrived at Yokosuka. The date of arrival coincides with previous indications that at least the CA's mentioned probably took part in the engagement W. of Attu on March 27 (I-time).

II. Southwest Pacific

2. A rather fragmentary message on April 17 from the Civil Engineering Section at Truk concerns various materials to be sent to Wake, Tarawa, Imieji (Jaluit), and Harushima (Truk) by the end of April. The list of materials includes bomb stowages, torpedo sheds, barracks, toilet facilities,

by Director, NSA/CHIB, CSS
12/10/79

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etc.,

(B) Bismarcks-Solomons

Indications continue of Japanese ship movements from Truk to Rabaul or the Solomons area. Japanese air activity on April 20 (LZT) was limited and no contact reports were intercepted.

(C) Japanese Anti-submarine Measures

Further indications have been noted of probable increased anti-submarine operations along the Palao-Truk-Rabaul convoy routes.

III. Allied Submarine Operations

A message on April 15 from Bangkok to Tokyo indicated that Transport # 777, en route Penang from Rangoon, was sunk by an Allied submarine in the vicinity of Raja Island (Lat. 7° 37' N., Long. 98° 23' E.). A South Thai Company steamship was also sunk in the same vicinity prior to April 15, causing a warning to be sent to all ships proceeding in the general area of Raja Island.

IV. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. Associations of a message on April 20 suggest the departure of a convoy on approximately that date from Japan, with eventual destination indicated as Singapore. Possible stops at Takao, Hongkong, and Sama (Hainan Island) are indicated.

2. A convoy of 3 or 4 Maru's departed Japan on April 14 for Truk, arriving April 25. Daily 1200I positions are available.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 22, 1943

SRNS 0374

I. General

A considerable increase in intercepted Japanese radio traffic volume was noted during the past 24 hours, but this was principally caused by increased administrative and Merchant/Navy traffic. Operational traffic continued low and Army traffic, though considerably less than yesterday, is still abnormal. Nothing of particular significance was noted in the High North, except that increased submarine activity is suggested.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) New Guinea

1. During the past several months Meranke, on the southeastern coast of Dutch New Guinea, has been raided a number of times by Japanese planes and it has previously been suggested herein that Meranke may perhaps be on the Japanese schedule for occupation in the future. In this connection, a message dated March 27 may be of some significance. Although the message is largely unreadable, it is interesting because of the mention therein of an island between the mouths of the Bian (approximately Lat. 8° 05' S., Long. 140° E.) and Koembe (approximately Lat. 8° 20' S., Long. 140° 20' E.) Rivers, distant 35 and 12 miles from Meranke respectively. The Island mentioned was apparently indicated as suitable for a submarine base. Gelieb Village (Lat. 8° 07' S., Long. 139° 05' E.) is also mentioned. In the same message, some indication of the practicability of an overland route using a trail connecting the headwaters of the Sepik and Fly Rivers is suggested.

2. There are strong indications from Japanese radio traffic that Jap submarines are still being employed to transport supplies to Lae.

3. Wewak continues to appear in Japanese traffic

(B) Solomons

Reconnaissance plane traffic was at a low ebb and only 2 reports originated by the same plane, apparently in the Solomons, were noted.

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(C) N.E.I.

Traffic associations suggest the reinforcement of Babo Air Base by planes from Kendari, via Ambon.

(D) Truk

The Civil Engineering Section at Truk on April 19 addressed a wide list of Civil Engineering detachments in the Carolines, Marshalls, and Gilberts, reminding them of the anti-submarine campaign carried on since April 10.

III. Northwest Pacific

On April 20 (LZT), Shimashiru and Uruppu Weather Stations (in the Kuriles) were directed to send hourly weather digests for the next 10 days to Matsuwa-Shima Weather Station between the hours 0500I and 1700I. Matsuwa-Shima was ordered to broadcast collated reports 10 minutes after each hour. As a result, a sharp increase in weather traffic from the Kuriles was noted on April 21 (LZT).

IV. Political

On April 20, Premier Tojo undertook the most drastic Cabinet shake-up since he came into power. The appointment of Mamoru Shigemitsu, Ambassador to Nanking, as Foreign Minister (relieving Masayuki Tani) appears to indicate an effort on the part of the Japanese Government to pursue with greater vigor the recently adopted policy of "conciliation" and "collaboration" in regard to the Wang Ching-wei regime. Shigemitsu, as Ambassador to Nanking, has been instrumental in devising and executing this policy, one aim of which is obviously an effort to win over Chungking leaders.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 23, 1943

SRNS 0375

I. General

1. During the past 24 hours the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic declined considerably (28%) and only D/F and Army traffic maintained the previous day's volume. The Southeastern Area was quiet, with practically no operational or aircraft traffic noted. In the Northern Area, although traffic was unusually quiet, one dispatch heading suggests a departure from Ominato toward Kiska, with a DD escort to be provided.

2. Traffic routing gives strong indications that C-in-C Combined Fleet is at sea in the Saipan area. C-in-C 2nd (or 3rd?) Fleet is likewise indicated in the same vicinity. It is also indicated by traffic routing that at least a part of Airflot # 21 has been withdrawn from the Southeastern Area and is now at Tenian (near Saipan).

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Nauru

On April 21 (LZT) considerable traffic was originated from Nauru and Ocean Islands, including an apparent battle report at 1918I, April 21, probably reporting the results of an attack by a force of B-24's.

(B) Truk

Two minesweepers, apparently engaged in a magnetic sweep, were directed to sweep the North and South Channels at Truk on April 22.

(C) Solomons

A number of important messages, with addressees including Navy Minister, Naval General Staff, and high commands, were originated in the Northern Solomons. Considerable Army traffic has also been noted during the past several days involving Munda Army, 8th Army (at Rabaul), and New Georgia Area Force.

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III. Economic

It is estimated that about 50,000 tons of rice per month will be shipped to Japan from French Indo-China during 1943, as opposed to some 81,000 tons per month during 1942. This rice has previously been shipped directly from Saigon to Japan. Preparations are now underway, however, to ship the rice by rail to Haiphong in northern Indo-China, thus saving about 800 miles of shipment by sea and obviously reducing the submarine peril.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 24, 1943

SRNS 0376

I. General

1. The overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic rose only 5% from the marked decline first noted in yesterday's "Secret Supplement". Administrative traffic dropped another 7% and operational and contact traffic remained low. Army traffic maintained a high level and Merchant/Navy circuits rose to former levels. A small amount of drill traffic was noted in the Japan Proper area, but there was no further indication of carrier exercises.

2. There continues to be some indication that the C-in-C, Combined Fleet is in the Saipan area, and an uncertain suggestion that his flagship, believed to be MUSASHI (BB), may be enroute to Kure.

II. U.S. Submarine Operations

Although very little can as yet be recovered from reports of U.S. submarine attacks on Japanese shipping due to their recent change of cryptographic system there yet are definite indications of continuing attacks. One such attack appears to have been launched on a convoy of some strength while passing through the Formosa area from 1730 to 1800, April 22, but there is no information available on what damages may have been suffered.

A Japanese report of March states that the U.S. submarine which was located on the surface in Lat. 26° 10 N., Long. 121° 45 E. on March 23 (?) was attacked, and that her subsequent sinking appeared certain.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 25, 1943.

SRNS 0377

I. General

Except for a sharp increase in weather traffic,

little change in the general

situation is evident from intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Gilberts

Throughout April 24 (LZT) considerable traffic was originated by Base Force #3 (at Tarawa), undoubtedly following an attack reported by Tarawa to have been made by 9 or 10 B-17's from 2345 I, April 23 to 0006 I, April 24. The suggestion arises from the same report that a Jap vessel may have been caught in this raid.

(B) Solomons

1. A Japanese reconnaissance plane report at 0910 I, April 24 gave a position which is believed to be Lat. 10° 52' S., Long. 163° 38' E.,

2. A Jap message on April 8 requested the delivery of Type Zero fighters to Karinge Lagoon (Santa Isabel Island)

3. Erventa (about 6 miles N.E. of Buin) appears to be assuming the status of an Army concentration point.

(C) New Guinea

1. Associations and traffic routing suggest submarine RO-102 to be en route Lae.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 12/24/79
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2. From traffic associations there is apparently no let-up in convoy movements from Palao to Wewak and in the general New Guinea-Bismarck area.

III. Northwest Pacific

In the Northern Area, considerable Army-Navy liaison traffic, originated either by Paramshiro or Attu, was noted on April 23 and 24, with 5th Fleet as the addressee.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 0907 I, April 9 HINAN Maru was torpedoed out of an escorted convoy in lat. $5^{\circ} 32' S.$, Long., $123^{\circ} 10' E.$, subsequently sinking at 1335 I. Another (unidentified) ship of the same convoy was torpedoed at 1407 I, and sank at 1459 I in lat. $5^{\circ} 25' S.$, Long. $123^{\circ} 46' E.$

2. Radio intelligence suggests a U.S. submarine attack in the Kavieng area at about 1042 I, April 24 and another attack south of Truk at about 1300 I on the same day.

V. Japanese Naval Casualties

1. It is indicated that KIYOKAWA Maru (XCVS of 6,863 gross tons) sank off Iae at 0830 I, March (?) 3, probably as a result of an air attack.

2. A Japanese report concerning an Allied air attack on Kavieng on April 3 indicates that at 0352 I a DD was hit and set afire by bombs and at 0415 I received a torpedo attack (skip bomb?). At the time of the report she was unable to navigate. Another DD was hit and speed reduced to 15 knots (Note: this DD entered a drydock, location unknown, on April 12). AOBA (CA) received a torpedo (skip bomb?) attack and was taken in tow. Subsequent reports indicate that AOBA was beached. In the same message it was reported that each DD carried 350 troops and 50 tons of supplies to Finschhafen.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 27, 1943

SRNS 0379

I. General

1. A slight increase (7%) in overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was noted during the past 24 hours but nothing of any particular consequence was apparent. Weather traffic continued fairly high on the Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan channels.

No information is available concerning recent movements of any major Japanese forces or units.

2. A report by Comdr. Air Striking Force concerning the attack on Oro Bay on April 11 is interesting because of its obvious attempt to minimize losses. When considered in conjunction with collateral information on the subject of losses as promulgated by the Japanese High Command after Midway, it appears reasonably certain that Japanese Commanders minimize their losses in radio dispatches, possibly to prevent leaks among their own personnel. Except possibly in urgent cases, it is suggested that the real losses may be transmitted by letter or perhaps in the more secure "High Command Code". The report follows:

(a) Planes taking part:	Fighters	Bombers
ZUIKAKU	27	14
HITAKA	21	8
ZUIHO	15	
HAYATAKA	9*	
Total	72	22

* Separate mission

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(b) Allied ships sunk:

- 1 medium transport (Port Harvey)
- 1 medium
- 1 small
- 1 DD (15 miles east of Oro Bay)

MJL CRTS Date: 12/21/79

(c) Plane losses:

Allied planes shot down: 21 fighters (9 uncertain)
Jap planes lost: 4 bombers, 2 fighters.

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Note: As ~~()~~ ~~st~~ the above, GHQ SIFPA reported 2 small fr ~~aters~~ hit and beached, 1 corvette damaged, 1 P-38 shot down (others slightly damaged), 12 Zeros and 5 bombers definitely destroyed, plus 6 probables. It should also be noted that the Japanese report tallies exactly with official Japanese announcements, including reports to their diplomatic representatives, presumably for propaganda purposes.

II. U.S. Submarine Operations

The Jap ship mentioned as sunk in the last paragraph of yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement is now identified as the TOHO Maru. Although 3 TOHO Maru's of 9,987, 4,717, and 4,092 gross tons are listed in Iloyds, the fact that the submarine commander made three separate attacks strongly suggests that the largest ship (a tanker) was the one involved.

III. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. There are strong indications by associations that a convoy is headed for the High North, probably for the Kuriles area.

2. On April 26 (LZT) there were indications that an important Army convoy may be proceeding from Palao to Northern New Guinea.

IV. Economic

On April 14 Japanese authorities in Canton indicated a 70% shortage of coal for the month of April and strongly requested an additional 7,000 tons as originally planned.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 28, 1943

SRNS 0380

I. General

1. Although the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was below normal, operational traffic continued to maintain moderate activity. In the Northern Area, considerable Army-Navy and weather traffic were noted, giving the general appearance of abnormal activity in the Ominato-Kuriles area, with continued evidence of increasing submarine associations. Army traffic was heavy between the Empire, Palao, and New Guinea areas. Nothing of particular significance was observed in the Marshalls-Gilberts sector.

2. A message from C-in-C 11th Air Fleet on April 7 indicated that AOBA (CA) was under emergency repairs as a result of bombing damage, but that she would probably be in a condition to be towed within 10 days. The ship was reported as camouflaged to make her appear as sunk. Total casualties were reported as 33 killed and 52 wounded. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 20, paragraph I,4).

3. An important Japanese officer, possibly from the Navy Ministry, arrived Rabaul on April 25 from Tokyo and is proceeding to an unknown place in the Solomons, thence to Kavieng (?) on April 29. The object of the tour is to hold conferences.

4. Airflot # 25 in the Empire has been directly concerned with Tenian and requested that station to furnish weather reports from 0200I, April 28,

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. An operational dispatch at 0554I, April 26 from New Georgia Area Force suggests an actual or expected attack on a Japanese base in the New Georgia Group. The message was passed to submarines

2. In a Japanese report on the results of the U.S. destroyer bombardment of Kolombangara Air Base on March 16, it was indicated that a Communication Unit was unable to communicate for about 4 hours, and that the total casualties (including laborers) were 6 dead and 7 wounded. It was also stated that (planes were unable to?) land temporarily but beyond that, there was absolutely nothing.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

12/21/79

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3. There are fairly strong indications by association of a convoy movement from the Truk area to the Solomons, with air cover provided.

(B) New Guinea

On April 26 (LZT) there were strong indications by associations that 1 Jap submarine was leaving Lae for Rabaul and another preparing to depart for the same destination.

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for E. Mats
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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 29, 1943

SRNS 0381

I. General

1. Intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours showed a large increase (28%) in overall volume, although much of this traffic was administrative in character. Weather traffic increased sharply (72%) from the previous day's low volume. Merchant/Navy traffic continued high, with the Northern and Mandates areas accounting for the major portions, indicating shipping movements in these general areas, with Ominato and Saipan as the respective indicated centers of activity.

2.

Airflot # 26 in eastern Melanesia is preparing to receive units of Airflot # 25 which are possibly being ferried from Yokosuka to the Solomons-Bismarck area.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. During the past several days there has been a considerable increase in Japanese radio activity in the Ominato-Kuriles-Aleutians area and on April 28 (I-time), the Ominato-Aleutians area produced the largest amount of traffic of any area since late last year.

To date, however, the principal mobile force in the Aleutians appears to be submarines only, but this conclusion is not final. Regular broadcasts are now made to northern submarines by Tokyo, Ominato, and Kiska, but no transmissions from submarines in this area have been noted during the past 24 hours.

III. Solomons

1. Radio traffic between Rabaul, Munda, and Kolombangara suggests army movements in or out of the Northern Solomons. Rekata Bay and Buin were also active, with indications that float planes are being flown to Rekata from Truk,

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via Rabaul.

2. Japanese reconnaissance plane reports between 0500I and 1130I, April 29 gave the appearance of shadowing operations, probably in the central Solomons area.

IV. Diplomatic

1. From information at hand, it is clear that the problem of Russian shipping in the Pacific continues to present an extremely vexatious problem to the Japanese. The Germans are putting what pressure they can on the Japanese to stop or further restrict Russian shipping movements, but so far have met with little success. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that the Japanese are now seriously considering the advisability of making inquiries into the registry of Russian ships, possibly with a view to preventing the further transfer from U.S. to Russian ownership, by ruling that ships so transferred are to be considered as enemy vessels.

2. On April 28 it was announced by Tokyo that former Foreign Minister Masayuki Tani was appointed Ambassador to Nanking. (See also, ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 22, paragraph IV).

V. Economic

A message from Bangkok to Tokyo on March 31 indicated that about 100,000 tons of rice had accumulated there. With the addition of rice to be available during April, May, and June, it was estimated that about 60,000 tons of shipping space would be required monthly. During 1943 it was estimated that the Japanese southern armies would require about 234,000 tons of shipping, including 50,000 tons of munitions.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of April 30, 1943

SRNS 0382

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic decreased somewhat during the past 24 hours. Operational traffic continued low, but a flurry of contact reports was noted on the Tokyo, Truk, and Rabaul broadcasts. In the North, the volume of traffic continued relatively high and several slight indications by associations suggest the existence of a probable convoy destined for the Aleutians.

2. Inability to read practically all Japanese codes since April 15 has placed a greater burden upon traffic analysis. Unfortunately, conclusions reached as a result of analyses of this kind are often based upon indications inherently vague and subject to constant enemy efforts to deceive and distort the inferences which would normally be drawn therefrom. For these reasons, and pending a solution of at least one of the principal Japanese codes, it appears inadvisable to place too much reliance upon intelligence derived from this source.

3. On April 26, "G" Operations Force" calls again appeared on China Coast circuits. No information is available concerning "G" Operation, but it appears to be of a long-term nature. (See also, ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 15, paragraph I,4).

4. An urgent contact report was sent by Truk to Guadalcanal Operations Force at 0915I, April 29, reporting the sighting of 3 cruisers and 3 destroyers. The position, course, and speed are unrecovered.

II. Solomons

1. A number of Japanese reconnaissance plane reports were noted between 0700I and 1200I, April 30. These reports were passed to the Southeastern Subforce, suggesting the locality as the general Solomons area and the possibility that Allied surface units are involved.

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2. A number of radar reports, apparently from Rekata, were noted tracking U.S. planes on April 29 (LZT). Recent indications strongly suggest the growing importance of Rekata as a Japanese advanced base.

3. An old report dated February 27 indicates that an unidentified Jap vessel, most probably a transport, was attacked at about 1600I by 30 U.S. planes east of Vella Lavella (New Georgia Group), was set afire, and sank at 1840I, February 27.

III. Japanese Merchant Shipping

KAMAKURA Maru (17,526 gross tons) was at Balikpapan on April 28 (LZT), apparently en route to Singapore via Makassar and Surabaya.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 1, 1943

SRNS 0383

I. General

1. Intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours showed no appreciable change in overall volume and no particular trends are discernible. D/F traffic rose to normal volume, after the unusual low of the past several days. Palao radio was active suggesting continued Army convoy movements, but traffic from the Marshalls-Gilberts area appeared of a routine nature involving transportation, construction, and supplies. In the Northern area, volume continues relatively heavy.

2. Further strong indications have been noted of the southward flow of aircraft from Japan to Truk and Rabaul, via Tenian.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

During the past several days there have been a number of indications that some sort of reinforcement operation involving DD's, Army units, # 1 Base Force (at Buin), and aircraft is under preparation in the Solomons area, most probably involving the New Georgia Group.

(B) N.E.I.

As of April 1 the Naval Administrations of Borneo, Celebes, and Ceram were changed to Civil Administrations.

(C) Truk

Radio traffic in the Truk area is indicative of considerable shipping movements, with air coverage apparently provided by Truk.

(D) New Guinea

An old dispatch dated March 3, only partly readable, indicates that 2 DD's with 2700 (survivors?) departed for Rabaul at 1650I, March 3. In addition, 3 DD's turned back and were reported to be rescuing large numbers of men. (Note: this dispatch undoubtedly refers to survivors of the ill-fated

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Jap Lae convoy attacked by Allied planes on March 2 and 3. See also, ~~Secret~~ Supplements of March 4 and 5).

III. Northwest Pacific

On April 29 (LZT) further indications were noted of probable arrangements being made for shipping military stores and supplies to Kiska and possibly other bases in the Northern area.

IV. Japanese Shipping

A Japanese message on March 16 indicates that the Japanese are employing auxiliary sailing vessels for transshipment purposes in the Mandates area. At the time of the dispatch concerned, a group of 15 such vessels were reported as having departed from Saipan under escort.

V. Axis Strategy

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on April 28 sent an important dispatch to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin, outlining the whole problem of Axis strategy during the coming year. The opinions expressed undoubtedly represent the views of the Japanese High Command as well as of the Foreign Office and also apparently reflect the views of Germany. Briefly, Japan fears that an all-out drive against Russia will only result in the dissipation of German strength allowing the Allies time in which to become strong and to launch a great offensive against Europe. The Japanese feel that Allied military strength in Tunis and Gibraltar should first be destroyed and that Germany should in the interim pass to the strategic defensive vis-a-vis Russia. As for Japan's plans, the drive in the South Pacific will be against Anglo-American counter-attacks, and at the same time as much enemy shipping as possible will be destroyed. It is thus suggested that Japan by and large will continue on the strategic defensive, although the message is somewhat ambiguous in this regard.

Oshima was warned to present Japan's opinions not as a criticism but rather as a frank exchange of views, in order to reach an agreement on how the three Axis nations can best prosecute joint warfare from now on. He was instructed to call on Hitler in person, together with the Naval and Military Attaches, who are to be allowed, if desirable, to add their explanations of the Japanese stand.

In a separate message to Oshima on the same day, the Japanese conclusions concerning Russia's probable strength during 1943 were stated to be, in effect, that Russian strength will be approximately the same as during 1942. These conclusions are based on an exhaustive study made in Tokyo as a result of numerous reports received during the past 5 months.

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for R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities of May 2, 1943

SRNS 0384

I. General:

1. The overall volume of Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours increased slightly over the previous day with administrative traffic accounting for most of the rise. Volume increased in the Northern Area due partially to flurries caused by a U.S. submarine attack on a Japanese convoy. Aside from these flurries the bulk of northern traffic was delivered to the Northern Subforce, at least for information. D/F traffic and contact reports decreased while Empire air and personnel dispatches were quite heavy. On April 30 operational traffic was extremely light and confined to the Solomons area.

2. Japanese aerial reconnaissance from Marcus Island is apparently being undertaken daily by the Marcus Island Force. A distance of 150 miles (possibly indicating the range of search) is mentioned in one report.

3. An imminent move of Air Group #802 from the Empire South, possibly via Marcus, is indicated.

II. Northwest Pacific:

1. Japanese submarines were located by D/F at widely separated points (Lat. near 52° N., Long. 178° W.) on April 30, and (Lat. near 54° N., Long. 176° W.) on April 29, giving further indication of the possible presence of Japanese surface craft in the general area to the north of Adak.

2. There were several indications of increased Japanese activity in the Aleutians including:

a) Several destroyers believed to be en route to the Aleutians, probably as escorts.

b) The departure of #1 Convoy of 5 ships from an unrecovered place in the Northwest Pacific, possibly Horomashiro.

c) By association of addressees a probable movement of part or all of 12th Pioneers from Kavieng to Kiska.

d) The appearance in traffic of #52 Base Force, presumably at Attu. (#51 Base Force is at Kiska).

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III. Southwest Pacific:

(A) Solomons.

"Solomons Area Air Force" appeared in traffic for the first time and is apparently a newly organized command. Its composition is as yet unknown.

(B) New Guinea.

A movement of army supplies or reinforcements from Singapore to Newak through the N.E.I. was suggested by traffic analysis.

(C) Bismarcks.

The movement of Airflot 25 to the Southeastern Area appears to be proceeding as planned and indications point to the Commander of this Airflot having arrived at Kavieng with part of his command still underway from the Empire.

IV. Burma:

An idea of the strength of #12 Special Base Force, Rangoon, is given by a report dated April 4:

Warrant and above	123
Enlisted	1975
Miscellaneous	21

2120 (apparently should be

2,119). Included in the above was a detachment of #11 Base Force, Saigon.

V. U.S. Submarine Operations:

Several fragmentary messages indicated that on May 1 an escorted 5 ships convoy was attacked by a U.S. submarine in the northern area. It appeared that there were two attacks, the first taking place at 0835I to 0840I and resulting in the sinking of one ship (apparently the #5 EBLSU MARU, unlisted), and the second at 1412I, which was reported to have caused no damage. A patrol vessel of the Northern Patrol Force, sent to the rescue, gave its position as Lat. 37°-24' North, Long. 154°-50' East, presumably near the scene of the attack.

VI. Japanese Convoys:

The seriousness of U.S. submarine forays on Japanese coastal shipping is indicated by a proposal of the Maritime Commission that vessels plying Japanese coastal waters (except the Sea of Japan) be organized into 5 convoys of regular steamers. The decision has already been made to provide added escorts for ships navigating these waters.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 3, 1943

SRNS 0385

I. General

1. The general reaction to Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours is one of routine activity, with the greatest emphasis placed upon traffic of an administrative nature. Truk was the center of activity involving merchant shipping-type traffic.

The Marshalls-Gilberts area appeared quiet. The High North on May 2 (LZT) was again the center of interest with traffic continuing on a relatively heavy scale.

2. A message dated February 20, partly unreadable, suggests that a number of Army passengers, in addition to patients, were carried in a Japanese Hospital Ship which departed from the Shortlands area at 1900I, February 20 for Rabaul, via Cape St. George.

II. Northwest Pacific

Traffic associations between Yokohama Air Station, 5th Fleet, and Paramushiro afford strong indications that aircraft have moved as far North as Paramushiro. In addition, evidence has been noted of a Northward convoy movement.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

Traffic for Munda on May 1 gives indications of the probable reinforcement of Japanese garrisons in the New Georgia Group.

(B) Bismarck Archipelago

1. Traffic associations between the 3rd (Carrier) Fleet and the Southern Area give some slight indication of possible carrier activity in the Bismarck area. One message heading suggests a carrier transporting planes to Rabaul under destroyer escort.

2. Traffic routing indicates the presence at Rabaul of Comdr. Airflot # 25 and at least part of his command.

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3. An old message dated March 10 indicates that HATSUSHIMA and TATEISHI, both cable layers, were assigned to the Bismarck Area Defense Force.

(C) Mandates

On May 2 it was reported that the construction of the runway extension of Kussie airfield (between Ponape and Jaluit) is 80% complete.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 4, 1943

SRNS 0386

I. General

1. Nothing of an unusual nature was noted from intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours. Administrative traffic was above normal on the Singapore-Tokyo and Takao-Tokyo channels, but overall volume was unchanged, operational-type traffic remained at a low level, and Army and D/F traffic were light. In the High North traffic volume continues high and associations suggest that the Japanese bases in the Aleutians urgently require reinforcements and supplies.

2. Another illustration of the greatly exaggerated reports usually made by Japanese commanders is furnished by the battle report of the New Georgia Defense Force on February 21. In this report it was indicated that of 54 U.S. planes which attacked Munda and Kolombangara, a total of 50 planes were shot down (11 uncertain). Our report stated that 62 planes took part and that 1 plane only was forced to land because of damage by AA fire. The Japanese report also stated that preliminary reports indicated that 7 men were killed and 1 gun destroyed.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Melanesia

Indications continue of Army convoy movements into the Bismarck-Northern New Guinea area from Palao.

(B) Marcus Island

On March 15 Imperial Headquarters requested Combined Fleet to take immediate steps to strengthen the defense of Marcus, in view of possible enemy attacks, by ordering daily air patrols of 9 planes. The Army was instructed to increase the land forces by about 1 battalion.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 5, 1943

SRNS 0387

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours was the highest recorded since April 21, 1943 and continued to reflect increasing administrative and personnel activity. Operational traffic, however, remained at a low level.

2. "G" Operations Force, last noted in traffic on April 26, 1943, was associated on May 3 with fairly intense unexplained activity in North China, apparently involving only small units. The Hankow area is also frequently seen in this traffic, the nature of which remains unclarified.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Traffic analysis yielded continued indications of reinforcements for the Aleutians area, including army troops apparently to be sent from Tokyo, additional air personnel, and the transfer of one or more submarines from Southern waters.

III. Southwest Pacific

(B) Solomons - Air Operations

An analysis of air operations in the South Pacific for March, 1943 made by Commander Air Force, (U.S.) Pacific Fleet points out that from the viewpoint of air operations, the Japanese possess a powerful defensive position in the Solomons. Bomber strength at Rabaul and Kavieng is free from heavy air attack, but is available within a few hours to attack valuable targets which may appear

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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in the Southern Solomons. Munda and Vila extend the Japanese potential of using torpedo and dive bombers, except as harassed by our forces. On the other hand, there are no valuable targets available to our carrier aircraft types within range of Henderson Field. Likewise, interception of enemy bombing attacks, although effective in so far as it imposes heavy attrition on the attacking force, has not prevented damage to the target. It therefore follows, the report continues, that until some method is devised to neutralize Japanese airfields to the northwest, it is within the capabilities of the Japanese to sustain an effective air offensive against valuable targets in the Southern Solomons without exposing their principal air concentrations to counter-attack.

IV. Psychological

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu sent a communication to his Minister at Berne to the effect that the Japanese Army maintains the position that Japanese prisoners of war do not exist. The Minister was encouraged to protest vigorously about the New Zealand prison camp riot, but was warned not to give out anything about it inside Japan, as all matters regarding Japanese who are prisoners of war are handled with great secrecy by the Japanese authorities.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 6, 1943

SRNS 0388

I. General

1. During the past 24 hours overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued its recent increase, reaching the highest level since April 16, 1943. The most striking gain was in the auxiliary ship code, indicating increased activity of naval auxiliaries, which however was deprived of special significance by the continued low level of operational traffic and scarcity of high precedence messages.

2. Some indication of a possible new carrier in the fitting-out stage in the Empire has appeared recently in traffic in association with the 3rd(Carrier) Fleet. This may be one of the vessels believed to be undergoing conversion to carriers, of which the ex-German "Scharnhorst" (18,184 gross tons) and the former Japanese submarine tender "TAIGRI" (10,000 tons displacement) are two.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) New Guinea

About 1500 Army troops and 10 guns were scheduled to depart Singapore aboard the KIYOSUMI Maru (XCL), GOKOKU Maru (XCL) and one unidentified Maru for Wewak. It will be recalled that the AIKOKU Maru (XCL) recently participated in the transportation to Wewak of 1,000 men and 18 guns. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 20, paragraph II,D). It is also indicated that a convoy may be en route from the Philippines to Wewak via Palao, and though its cargo is not revealed, it is likely that Army troops are being carried. There were also indications of possible Army reinforcements being sent to Finschhafen.

(B) Solomons

There was considerable Army traffic on May 3rd (LZT) involving the New Georgia Area Force, Adjutant 8th Area army at Buin, and Commander 38th Division at Rabaul.

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III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 1800L, May 5 a U.S. submarine attacked and sank an unidentified Maru at an unknown point (possibly Kii Channel) off the Japan coast.

2. At 0845L, April 3 in the Java Sea (Lat. 6°-4'S., Long. 112°-26'E.), a Japanese patrol plane dropped 4 depth bombs on an unidentified submarine (presumably U.S.) which reportedly resulted in large quantities of oil and air bubbles (?) coming to the surface. The attack was continued later by 2 ship-board attack planes and a (patrol boat?) and was reported to have been successful.

IV. Diplomatic

(A) In messages dated April 10 and April 24, 1943, from Tokyo to Buenos Aires concerning U.S. activities in the South Pacific, the following reports were included:

1. The number of warships which the U.S. is now (April 10, 1943) sending into the New Guinea and Guadalcanal area is diminishing, although the air forces are being strengthened. Air strength is estimated by aerial reconnaissance of April 12 to 14 at 450 planes, including a marked increase around Port Moresby of small types.

2. The enemy has begun to use a part of the Karema Air Base (138 miles northeast of Port Moresby) and has extended the area of his reconnaissance as far as Greenwich Island.

3. Our aerial reconnaissance has shown that a small detachment of the enemy is located in the central part of Choiseul Island (Solomons) perhaps as a lookout station, and that enemy scouts have also appeared in the vicinity of Gatakai Island (south of New Georgia Island).

(B) A message dated April 17, 1943 from Tokyo to Hanoi stated in part that the Japanese Navy is withdrawing its (forces?) from the Kwangchow Bay area.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 7, 1943

SRNS0389

I. General ~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued to rise, but its principal emphasis was upon administrative-type messages. Very little operational traffic was noted, and D/F reports declined moderately.

2. Inability to read practically all Japanese naval codes, as well as difficulties in the identification of calls, makes it evident that estimates of the locations of Japanese naval units are becoming less and less reliable. For some time now, the dispositions of Japanese naval forces have been determined almost solely upon the inherently uncertain associations of known calls, traffic analysis, and the relatively few positive sightings made by Allied aircraft in the Southwestern Pacific. It therefore appears highly desirable, during this period of radio intelligence uncertainty, to obtain as much reconnaissance data as possible in an endeavor to increase our knowledge of current Japanese fleet dispositions.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. In the High North, traffic volume has diminished

By traffic routing on May 6, C-in-C 5th Fleet appears to be in the Paramushiro area.

2. At 1810I, May 6 a fairly long, high precedence, operational dispatch was originated by 5th Fleet and broadcast by both Ominato and Paramushiro. The message mentioned "enemy vessel(s)", but it is not known whether this was based upon sighting, D/F, intercept, or mere conjecture. No noticeable flurry followed these broadcasts.

3. A slight indication by association suggests the possibility that 2nd Fleet is also interested in Northern operations. If this supposition is correct, it is not unlikely that additional Japanese surface units have been dispatched to the North.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 2/21/49

4. A news broadcast from Berlin on May 5, stated in effect that considerable American forces have gathered in the Alaska-Aleutians area, apparently for the purpose of undertaking imminent offensive action against the Japanese bases on Kiska and Attu. The information was allegedly based on Japanese reconnaissance reports.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Japanese Mandates

Japanese radio traffic gives the impression of considerable shipping activity in the Truk and Jaluit areas. Nothing of particular significance, however, was apparent.

(B) New Guinea

Further definite indications by association were noted of continued supply operations by Jap submarines between Lae and Rabaul.

IV. Hainan Island

At 1415I, May 4 Sama (Hainan) transmitted a contact report of 3 Allied bombers and at 1435I reported 11 bombers. These are undoubtedly reports concerning the raid made by B-24's of the China Air Command who reported the first flight of bombers over the target at 1415I.

V. Diplomatic

According to a message from Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to Kuibyshev on April 30, the Japanese Navy has given orders to its units to give special attention to the matter of Soviet ships of former American registry and now engaged in carrying shipments between the U.S. and Russia. He stated that the Kamenetz-Podolsk and the Ingul were seized on April 28 and 29, respectively, for investigation on this ground. It was intimated in the message, however, that the Jap Navy is taking Soviet-Japanese relations fully into account and is dealing most cautiously in the problem. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 29, paragraph IV,1).

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 8, 1943

I. General: ~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

SRNS 0390

1. There has been a further rise in overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic. A flurry of contact traffic was noted on the Tokyo and Rabaul broadcasts, but its significance is unknown. D/F traffic continued its decline and reached the lowest level for more than 3 months. Except for the High North (treated separately below), the only definite impressions gained from Japanese radio traffic are of continued aircraft movement southward from Japan, and the possibility of the shift southward of some major units.

2. An old message dated February 20 from an unidentified unit reported that the originator had docked at the Sasebo Navy Yard for Radar installation. This is the first definite indication that Japanese ships are supplied with Radar equipment, although prisoner-of-war interrogations and conclusions derived from the tactical behavior of Japanese ships had previously suggested that such installations do exist on at least the major Japanese units.

II. Northwest Pacific:

(a) On May 6 and 7 the High North produced the largest volume of Japanese radio traffic of any area, making it evident that Japanese interest in the Aleutians is increasing. A fair amount of submarine activity was noted, and many dispatches were addressed to them. A number of dispatches of an operational or preoperational nature, between the Japanese High Commands, were noted. No identified interest of 3rd (Carrier) Fleet with the Northern Area was indicated, but on May 6 there was a slight indication that C-in-C, 3rd Fleet, was in the Empire. Traffic routing indicates that Cardiv 2 (HITAKA, HAYATAKA) is not in the Southern area, and by association it is possible that HITAKA may be in the northern Empire area. Flagship 5th Fleet appears to be either at Paramushiro, or at sea between that point and Ominato. At 0325I, May 7, an apparent lengthy intelligence message was sent to Jap units in Northern waters.

(b) Japanese Army dispatches observed during the past several days offer good evidence that troop reinforcements have been requested by the Aleutians bases and may be en route in the Northern Area.

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(c) In general, it may be commented that the Japanese are undoubtedly alive to probable prospective danger of deterioration in their position in the Aleutians, and radio intelligence clearly furnishes evidence that important Japanese moves in that direction are under preparation, if not already under way.

III. Southwest Pacific:

(A) Solomons.

1. Associations on May 6 (LZT) suggest that Jap submarines are being used for the transportation of Army supplies or reinforcements to Kolombangara and Munda.

2. From 0625I to 1140I, May 7, a Jap reconnaissance plane sent a series of 5 short tactical messages, followed by a short directive from 6th Air Attack Force

(B) New Guinea.

Wewak continues as the apparent center of Jap activity on the northern coast of New Guinea. On May 6, convoy activity in the Wewak vicinity was indicated by traffic associations.

(C) Japanese Mandates.

1. It is indicated by radio intelligence that detachments of Air Group #902 are located at Truk, Saipan, and Palao. This Air Group is apparently responsible for the air coverage of convoys and for the handling of transit ferry flights.

2. Relative quiet continues in the general Mandates area, except for the usual Maru movements.

3. KYOKUTO MARU (10,052-ton tanker) arrived at Truk on April 29 with a full load of fuel oil from Singapore.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 9, 1943

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued its recent rise, due principally to further expansion in administrative traffic, the total of which for the past 5 days is now the highest for any 5 day period of the past 6 months. D/F traffic showed a substantial increase and operational traffic also expanded due to flurries involving the Solomons. (Separately reported below).

2. Continued movement of planes from Yokosuka to Rabaul via Chichijima and Tenian is indicated.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. A U.S. air strike in the Munda area on the morning of May 8th was apparently responsible for a series of operational messages originated by Kolombangara, one of which included as action addressees the Combined and 8th Fleets.

(B) Marshalls

Japanese Navy Transportation Section originated a dispatch to Base Force # 6 (Marshalls) with an imposing list of information addressees including CinC's 2nd, 3rd, 4th and Southeastern Area Fleets, and Comcardiv 2.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 2/2/43

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. A Japanese (Patrol Boat?) reported being attacked by a U.S. submarine at 1310I, March 20th, in position Lat. 03° 48 N., Long. 144° 12 E., and receiving 1 torpedo hit out of 5 fired, which did not seriously damage her.

2. A more complete translation of an item reported in the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of March 22, 1943 (par. III,4) indicates that as a result of the depth charge attack (presumably on the AMBERJACK), various objects came to the surface, including structural members and escape apparatus with parts of bodies attached, giving the appearance that the ship and its complement were completely crushed.

3. At 1130I, April 20th a Jap plane reported sighting a U.S. submarine heading north in position Lat. 28°- 50 N., Long. 128°- 50 E.

V. Diplomatic

1. A message dated May 5, 1943 from Lourenco Marques to Berlin states in part that recently 2 Japanese submarines were attacked 45 miles off East London (South Africa) with unknown results. This report tends to confirm the operation of Japanese submarines in South African waters.

2. A message from Hanoi (Yoshizawa) to Canton states that in the early afternoon of May 5th 12 or 13 Allied planes machine-gunned Yenbai and Viettri (northwest of Hanoi) and bombed the area around Haiphong, resulting in no casualties among the Japanese or French but an estimated 50 or 60 casualties among the Annamese.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 10, 1943

SRNS 0392

I. General

1. Though the volume of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours continued above normal no significant conclusion can be drawn from it except that recently noted activities continue. Northern traffic remained heavy but was for the most part administrative. There was a further increase of 3rd (Carrier) Fleet traffic, a large proportion of which appeared to be concerned with personnel and aircraft supply activities.
2. An item dated Feb. 1, 1943 indicated that the Japanese have radar for use in aircraft.

II. Japanese Aircraft Movements

1. The UNYO and CHUYO (ACV's) have completed their latest plane ferry trip from Yokosuka to Truk scheduled for latter April, (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 16th, par. IV, b) and apparently are now returning to the Empire. An unusual weather report originated by Rabaul and broadcast by Truk suggested an important plane movement from Truk to Rabaul, probably of the planes landed by these ACV's.
2. Association of 3rd Fleet units with Palau and the N.E.I. suggests further aircraft reinforcements for the Indies area. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 5, par. III A for last previous reference).

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Rismarcks

The AOBA (CA), damaged by bombing April 3 near Kavieng, is indicated by traffic analysis as being at Rabaul, apparently to undergo temporary repairs prior to proceeding to Truk.

(B) New Guinea

An unusual volume of Army traffic involving Palau and Wewak indicates considerable Army convoy activity between these points. A recent move-

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ment of troops to the Wewak area was reported in the Secret Supplement of May 6, par. II, A.

(C) Eastern N.E.I.

The presence of a seaplane base at Maikoor village in the Aru Islands, previously reported by reconnaissance, was confirmed by the appearance in radio traffic of "Maikouru Air Base".

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

A flurry of dispatches originated between 0531I and 0810 I, May 10th by a northbound convoy apparently consisting of the KUNIKAWA MARU (XCVS), MAYASAN MARU, unidentified maru and HIYODORI (TB) in the general Saipan area suggested that an attack may have been made on these ships by a U.S. submarine. No further information concerning the incident was recovered.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 11, 1943

SRNS 0393

I. General

1. The general picture of intercepted Japanese radio traffic is almost the same as yesterday's report, with overall volume continuing high, maintenance of administrative traffic at a high level, and relatively low volume of operational traffic. The contact code, however, was the highest it has been for more than 3 months. Volume concerned with the Aleutians is still greatly above normal, although there has been a noticeable drop during the past 24 hours. Other above-normal channels were concerned with the Southern Area, particularly Palao, Takao, and Truk. The Marshalls-Gilberts are appeared normal.

2. A Japanese message on January 15 stated that the crew of the NICHIMEI Maru (4,704 gross tons) was taken aboard the MOJI Maru which then departed for Moulmein (lower Burma). It was indicated that 500 prisoners were among those missing, suggesting that not much effort was made to save prisoners, as only 4 crew members were lost.

3. A precautionary air raid alarm was sounded in the Takao (Formosa) Guard District area at 1445I, May 10.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

Comdr. New Georgia Area Force was a frequent originator of reports concerning the movements of U.S. aircraft on May 10

On May 8 and 9, Japanese radio traffic indicated that the U.S. air strikes were against a Reinforcement Force probably composed of DD's and possibly bound for Munda or Kolombangara.

(B) New Guinea

Wewak has been associated with various Naval ordnance and munitions activities

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(C) Truk

At least 4 Maru's and 9 auxiliary sailing vessels were scheduled to arrive Truk at 1400I, May 10. The mention of auxiliary sailing vessels indicates that progress is being made in the Japanese plan for the construction of large numbers of wooden vessels in yards located throughout conquered territory. In this connection, on May 9, Comdr. # 22 Base Force (at Balikpapan) was directed to assign the # 17 KITA Maru to tow timber for the construction of wooden vessels (probably at Surabaya).

III. Northwest Pacific

1. Kiska radio has been busy with the dispatch and receipt of radio intelligence traffic. Kiska Base Force was an addressee of several Army dispatches which were also addressed to Combined and 5th Fleets.

2. Associations give slight indications that Japanese air-personnel are moving to the Aleutians, presumably in anticipation of the completion and use of the airfields on Kiska and Attu.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. Further analysis of the traffic concerned with KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS), HIYODORI (TB), and the Maru's mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement (paragraph IV) suggests that only HIYODORI was attacked but apparently was not damaged.

2. A message on April 9 indicates that SHANGHAI Maru (5,259 gross tons) sank in position bearing 102°, distant about 11 miles from (unrecovered) Light. Note: TAUTOG reported sinking a 7,000-ton freighter out of a 5-ship convoy in Buton Passage on April 9.

V. Economic - Blockade Runners

A somewhat cryptic message from Berlin to Tokyo on May 6, referring to another dispatch which is not available, strongly implies that 3 German submarines are to leave (for Japan?) during May, with an additional 4 submarines to leave during June. Presumably these submarines are to be utilized as blockade runners.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 12, 1943

SRNS 0394

I. General

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1. Intercepted overall volume of Japanese radio traffic for the past 24 hours was 21% above the current normal and was exceeded only upon two occasions, viz., on October 15 and November 14, 1942. The increase was chiefly caused by administrative and weather traffic, the former having reached a new peak. The German/Japanese liaison code was above normal on the Tokyo broadcast, suggesting increased cooperation, possibly with submarines, between the principal Axis members. The center of activity in the Southern Area appeared to be Saipan, probably caused in part by an intense hunt for U.S. submarines in that area (see below). Operational traffic in the N.W. Pacific area is treated separately below.

2. Traffic for 6th Fleet (Submarines) and Chiefs of Staff Combined and 4th Fleets was routed to Truk for delivery, indicating the whereabouts of these Commands. No Japanese carrier activity was noted on May 11 (I-time).

3. All clear from the air raid alert in the Takao Guard District, mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement, was sounded at 1600I, May 11.

4. On February 28 the Chief of Staff # 1 Surface Escort Unit requested that radars be installed in 3 vessels of his command.

II. Northwest Pacific

(a) Attu was prominent in Japanese radio traffic, beginning with a most urgent dispatch addressed to 5th Fleet and Kiska at 1410W, May 11. This message was retransmitted to Paramushiro at 1722W, with information to 5th Fleet, Tokyo, Ominato Guard Force, and Combined Fleet. Kiska sent a most urgent at 1430W, and Attu at 1700W, 1705W, and again at 1711W to approximately the same addressees plus Commandants of all 1st Class Naval Districts. At 1800W, Kiska originated an operational dispatch, information to a submarine unit in the Aleutians, probably a stand-by warning.

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(b) Thereafter, a heavy file of high precedence operational dispatches emanated from this general area, with the latest from Attu noted at 0201W, May 12, at which time Attu signals faded out on the West coast. The principal originators of this traffic were 5th Fleet, Attu, Kiska, and several unidentified activities. The chief identified addressees were Yokosuka Chief of Staff, All Flagships of Combined Fleet, Tokyo D/F Control, Special Duty Group Naval Staff (Radio Intelligence), and a Northern Area Command (unidentified).

(c) From the above traffic, it is clear that U.S. operations in the Attu area have stirred up considerable reaction in the Japanese Navy and that the utmost endeavors are being made to obtain intelligence concerning U.S. Forces by radio intelligence and D/F. It also appears probable that Japanese Forces in the Empire area were alerted and that units in the Northern area have received orders of some kind. The fact that Attu radio was heard as late as 0201W, May 12 however, suggests that the element of surprise was lost and that considerable warning had been given to the Japanese High Commands of an offensive operation by Blue Forces. One urgent operational dispatch in the Southern Area (Bismarck-Solomons), which had # 1,2,4,5, and 6 Air Attack Forces as information addressees, had the appearance of an alert against possible coordinated moves in the South.

III. Japanese Convoys

Traffic associations indicate a convoy movement from the Empire to the N.E.I. area, via Bako and the Philippines. It is also indicated that preparations are being made for a convoy to depart Takao for the Rabaul area, possibly via Manila and Palao.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. As a result of U.S.S. PLUNGER's attack on a convoy on May 10 (LZT), 5th Base Force at Saipan continued active anti-submarine measures on May 11. TANIKAZE (DD) appeared on the scene and apparently took over from HIYODORI (TB) and was joined by additional sub-chasers and aircraft, all of which engaged in the hunt. Apparently only the escort vessels originated traffic, indicating that some MARU's were undoubtedly sunk.

2. CHIFUKU Maru (5,857 gross tons), which received 1 torpedo hit at 0915I, January 16 in position bearing 295°, distant 11 miles from Watom Island (N.W. of Rabaul), was reported to be listing 30° to port at 1050I on the same day. In view of the possibility of sinking, the crew was ordered to abandon ship.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 13, 1943

SRNS 0395

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued the reported high of yesterday, but its complexion was changed by the greatly increased activity of the Northern Area and by violent up-swings in operational and joint Army/Navy traffic in that area. Administrative traffic dropped sharply and its place was taken by a heavy volume of operational-type traffic, particularly among the Northern stations at Kiska, Ominato, and Paramushiro. Tokyo was busy with traffic to All Major Commands and to Northern Force, suggesting considerable concern and positive reaction to our Attu operation. In general, priority traffic was voluminous, indicating urgency in whatever counter-moves the Japanese may be planning. In the South, Saipan has continued its radio activity and apparently is still concerned with U.S. submarine operations.

2. Practically no Japanese carrier activity was noted on May 12 (I-time). No new information is available concerning the activity of Japanese major naval units. The remarks contained in the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 7 (paragraph I,2) are still applicable to the general problem of the location of major Japanese fleet units.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. In so far as can be determined from Japanese radio traffic, the first reaction on the part of the Japanese resulting from our attack on Attu was a series of alerts in the Empire and Kuriles areas. This was followed by a number of apparent orders which suggest that for the present at least, submarines are to be the principal offensive fleet weapon. An urgent dispatch at 0538W, May 12 from 6th Fleet has the appearance of a directive to submarines at Yokosuka.

Defensively, considerable traffic strongly suggests that aircraft reinforcements from Airflot # 24 are being rushed northward, probably from Kisarazu, via the airfield at Lat. 43° 03 N., Long. 144° 51 E., near Akkeshi Bay in Hokkaido. Dispatches from Attu at 0600W and 0755W, May 12 suggest that weather and battle information was being sent to a submarine approaching Attu, either for attack or for evacuation purposes.

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2. At 1315W, May 12 Kiska included Attu as an information addressee in a most urgent operational dispatch to 5th Fleet, and at 1700W, there was a fair indication that Attu Army was still in communication with Kiska.

3. The following items are interesting because of their direct connection with the Attu operations:

(a) At 1930W, May 11 Comdr. Kuriles Defense Force reported that a U.S. Fleet had appeared off Attu.

(b) A general warning was passed to All Naval Commands (Jap) at 2035W, May 11. All Empire Defense Forces were apparently also alerted at about this time.

(c) A priority operational dispatch at 2209W, May 11 suggests contact with a U.S. Force by a Jap submarine.

(d) At 2230W, May 11 Kiska challenged Attu, apparently fearing deception.

(e) At 0051W, May 12 a priority message was sent by 5th Fleet to a Northern Command associated with submarines, suggesting a directive of some kind.

(f) Ominato Guard Force was alerted at 0055W, May 12.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

Administrative radio traffic has continued in fair volume in this area, but the only activity noted were some plane contacts. Associations in a C-in-C 8th Fleet dispatch at 2043I, May 11 suggest that Jap submarines are being used as supply vessels to Kolombangara and Munda.

(B) Chichijima-Marcus

The inclusion of Chichijima and Marcus as information addressees in High North traffic gives the appearance of an alert having been ordered in these areas.

(C) Mandates

Except for the usual amount of shipping activity, the Marshalls-Caroline area appeared quiet. One convoy of 3 MARU's was to rendezvous with an escort vessel in Lat. 6° 3' N., Long. 151° (?) 04 E. on May 13 (I-time).

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IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

Considerable Japanese radio traffic continued to be caused by U.S. submarines in the Saipan area. Activity of this nature was also apparent in the vicinity of Truk, Yokosuka, and Kii Channel, but nothing unusual was observed.

V. Japanese Hospital Ships

A message dated August 11, 1942 from the Japanese Naval Attache in Thailand states that the originator obtained permission to send, via a hospital ship en route Saigon, about 128.5 tons of non-ferrous metals which he had purchased. The goods were to be shipped "F.O.B. Osaka Warehouse Co". Note: this message was sent in a code which has been completely recovered and the only doubt in its translation arises from the somewhat remote possibility that the encoder may have made a mistake in encoding the words "hospital ship".

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 14, 1943

SRNS 0396

I. General

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1. The outstanding feature of intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past day was the heavy volume of joint Army/Navy traffic, most of which was directly concerned with the High North and noted principally on the Kiska-Ominato, Tokyo-All Major Commands, and Ominato-Northern Force channels. Operational traffic dropped sharply, suggesting at least a partial completion of Japanese counter-plans in the Attu operation. Priority traffic was again very heavy and was chiefly concerned with Northern Area operations.

2. AOBA (CA), damaged in an air attack at Kavieng early in April, was scheduled to arrive at Truk at 1300I, April 24.

3. A Japanese message on February 19 indicated that aircraft RADAR equipment was being installed in Japanese planes in the Rabaul area.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. As noted above, Japanese radio activity clearly indicated primary concern with the Northern area. Attu was heard as late as 2130W, May 13 when a long operational dispatch was sent to Combined Fleet, 5th Fleet, Tokyo, Kiska, Kuriles Defense Force, Submarines, and others. Routing of Attu traffic indicates that Kiska relays the messages, but delays in retransmission suggest considerable communications difficulties between the two bases.

2. Practically no definite call identifications, from which Japanese reinforcements ordered North might be identified, are available. The following items, however, give some hints in this regard:

(a) At 1452W, May 12, Japanese Naval Staff in Tokyo sent a message to 11 unidentified calls, information to Combined and 5th Fleets, Yokosuka Chief of Staff, a MARU, a tanker, and others

(b) At 2150W, May 12 Matsuwa Shima in the Kuriles was directed to broadcast flight weather information hourly throughout 24 hours. Furthermore, traffic analysis furnishes abundant evidence of unusual air operations

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off Honshu and in the Kuriles. Airflot # 24 has been involved in a series of reports, possibly from patrol planes.

(c) Dispatches carrying the highest urgency were sent by 6th (Submarine) Fleet to 6 submarines at Kure and Yokosuka and were associated with the 5th Fleet, the Aleutians, and other activities,

(d) A slight indication suggests the association of HAYATAKA (CV) with 5th Fleet on May 12, although this identification is uncertain.

III. Southwest Pacific

(a) An analysis of relatively heavy Army traffic on May 12 indicates an impending heavy movement of Army troops southward from the Empire to Rabaul and Wewak, probably via Palao and points in the Philippines. It is also indicated that experienced troops will be drawn from the Philippines, the N.E.I., and Malaya for the Melanesian theater.

(b) For the second successive day Tokyo has been broadcasting directly to Rabaul, and the volume of priority traffic from Rabaul to the Guadalcanal Operations Force was above normal.

(c) Although an analysis of probable Japanese intentions in the Southwest Pacific is greatly handicapped by our present inability to read practically all Japanese radio traffic, it is suggested that prior heavy reinforcements of air and ground forces sent into the Eastern N.E.I. - Melanesian area, as well as the additional reinforcements indicated above, indicate considerable Japanese concern regarding Allied intentions in this theater. Alternatively, it is not improbable that the growing Japanese strength in this area possibly foreshadows another Japanese effort to dislocate and neutralize our footholds and air bases in the Solomons and in S.E. New Guinea. Such an operation might well be planned to counteract our offensive move in the Aleutians.

(A) Solomons

A violent flurry of Japanese tactical traffic occurred in the northern Solomons between 1800I and 2200I, May 13. Lookout stations made numerous reports of unidentified aircraft and the sound of PT-Boat engines. At least 8 different Jap aircraft calls were heard, but no Japanese surface units were noted.

(B) Carolines

The presence of 6,700 laborers at Kusaie Air Base on May 1 suggests considerable development and improvement of the airfield on that island.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

7/11/21 Date: 12/21/79
JND

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IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

A Japanese message which alerted a patrol boat division reported that a (U.S.) submarine had shelled Pagan Island (in the Marianas) at 1900I, May 9.

V. Subversive Activity

On May 8, Subhas Chandra Bose, former President of the Indian National Congress, arrived at a Japanese base in the South Pacific (probably Singapore), having left Kiel in a German submarine on February 9 and presumably transferred to a Jap submarine in April, S.E. of Madagascar. He is now scheduled to arrive in Tokyo by the end of May. Together with Rash Behari Bose in Japan, there are strong indications that these two extremists will shortly be played as trump cards by the Axis propaganda machines in an endeavor to cause turmoil and confusion in India. Both men are rabidly anti-British.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MS *CS* Date: *12/21/79*

W. T. Boone
for R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 15, 1943

SRNS 0397

I. General

1. Despite some reduction in operational traffic, the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continues considerably above normal and reached a new peak since November 15, 1942. Administrative and Army traffic continued to rise, and joint Army/Navy code use was still abnormally high. The center of immediate Japanese concern appears to continue in the High North, as is indicated by the high volume of priority traffic on the Northern communication channels.

2. At 2010I, May 14 Saipan called C-in-C Combined Fleet, indicating the presence in the Saipan area of that command. Although the latest information indicates that MUSASHI (BB) is the flagship of Combined Fleet, the fact that YAMATO (BB) left Truk at 1430I, May 8 suggests the possibility that C-in-C Combined Fleet's flag may have been shifted to the YAMATO.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. A circular message from Tokyo to all Japanese Military Attaches abroad reported that a powerful American force had landed on Attu during the afternoon of May 12. The Japanese defense force was stated as composed of only 2 infantry battalions* which were engaged in fiercely resisting "the enemy's surprise attack". The strength of the U.S. force was estimated to be about 1 division. The message ended with the observation that there is no sign of an immediate invasion of Kiska.

* MIS reports that 1 Japanese infantry battalion is composed of 984 combat troops. Special engineering troops and labor troops are not included in this total.

2. Radio intelligence has furnished ample evidence of the northward movement of Japanese air units, and traffic associations and routing clearly indicate that new aircraft units have now arrived at Paramushiro. Some slight indications have been noted that Jap aircraft, probably seaplanes, may be operating from Attu. It also appears that plane flights are now being carried out between Paramushiro and the Attu-Kiska area.

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3. Urgent traffic, including many Army communications, in the High North continued well above normal. By traffic routing, C-in-C 5th Fleet or his Chief of Staff was indicated in the Paramushiro area on May 15 (I-time). The latest message (at the time of writing) noted from Attu was at 2100W, May 14, indicating that the Japanese radio on Attu was still operating at that time.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 0600L, May 8 a convoy composed of KUNIKAWA Maru (6,863 gross tons), TATSUTAKE Maru (7,068 gross tons), KINAI Maru (8,360 gross tons), and MANZAN Maru (unlisted) departed Truk, escorted by HIYODORI (TB). As HIYODORI was prominent in radio traffic which arose out of the U.S.S. PLUNGER's attack in which 5 Maru's were definitely claimed sunk, it appears probable that at least the four ships mentioned were sunk.

2. An unidentified Japanese originator reported that a Rabaul-bound convoy was attacked by a (U.S.) submarine in position bearing 102°, distant 15 miles from Rabaul at 1735I, May 4 and that 1 ship was feared sunk.

3. On May 12 (I-time), the passage through San Bernardino Strait (Philippines) was temporarily closed because of the reported presence of a U.S. submarine.

IV. Japanese Hospital Ships

In its routine report of a communication zone shift from Truk to Rabaul on March 2, a Japanese Hospital ship stated that radio silence would be maintained.

V. Economic

1. On April 14, Ambassador Oshima in Berlin sent a message to Tokyo concerning the shipment of gold to Europe for the purpose of acquiring Swiss francs (probably to cover trade balances). He advised that transportation difficulties in this regard can easily be overcome in view of Germany's plan to inaugurate a submarine transport service to the Far East. For this purpose, 9 submarines are being assigned and each submarine is to make 2 round trips per year.

2. On May 8 it was indicated that 7 Maru's had recently sailed from French Indo-China to Japanese ports (4 ships) and Shanghai (3 ships). The rice carried by these ships aggregated about 34,000 tons.

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for R. A. Boone.

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Secret Supplement
Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 16, 1943

SRNS 0398

I. General

1. The overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours returned approximately to normal owing chiefly to continued contraction in both operational and contact traffic. Though Attu continued an active originator, principally of Army and weather messages, both Attu and Kiska settled down into a more or less routine pattern as contrasted with their recent feverish activity.

2. At 1600 I, May 15th, Yokosuka cancelled the precautionary alert for that district.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Known indications of immediate Japanese counter-moves against our occupation of Attu continued limited to submarine and air activities. It is estimated that approximately 6 Japanese submarines will arrive in the general Attu-Kiska area about May 18 to 20 (W time), which combined with possibly an equal number that have been operating in the Aleutians area for some time constitutes a large submarine force. Comairflot 24 is believed to have arrived in the Paramushiro area

2. The Northern Patrol Force (believed to consist of about 45 armed merchant patrol vessels) is associated in traffic from and to Airflot 24.

III. Southwest Pacific

Association in movement report-type dispatches of Tenian, Truk, and Kavieng Air Bases, and other air activities in the Rabaul area indicates continued movement of planes from the Empire southward via the chain of Island bases.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 01/02/88

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IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 1115 I, May 16th, an unidentified Japanese ship reported receiving a torpedo attack, and subsequently, at 1255 I, indicated that there was a possibility of sinking. The attack apparently took place in the Kavieng area but further details were not recovered.

2. A U.S. submarine was reported on the surface at 2300 I, May 14th, in position Lat. 7° 34' N., Long. 143° 04' E.

V. Diplomatic

1. A Japanese diplomatic dispatch from Harbin to Manchukuo (relayed to the Japanese Foreign Minister) quotes the Soviet Ambassador at Tokyo as having reported on April 28th to his home government in substance that if the Japanese people had been allowed to exert any pressure on the government in the recent cabinet reorganization, or if any delay had taken place in the choice of new men, internal political strife would have broken out. The Harbin official continued that in addition to such reports as the above, the Soviet Union is violating its neutrality pact by cooperating with the U. S. and Chungking in actions hostile to Japan, that the Russians have assumed an unjust position toward Japan in the fishing ground negotiations and that in view of all these facts Japan should consider revising her present policy toward Russia.

2. Harbin also advised Tokyo that propaganda urging a Japanese-Russian alliance was circulating in Soviet quarters; the arguments being advanced on the one hand that as an Axis partner Japan's position will become hopeless as soon as Germany is defeated, and on the other hand that Russia will need an ally, as America and England will surely oppose her after the war.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 17, 1943

SRNS 0399

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued to decline, although operational traffic maintained a fairly high level. Administrative, weather, Army and joint Army/Navy codes decreased substantially in volume. The general reaction from radio traffic is that all areas, except in the Northwest Pacific (see below), remain about the same and no apparent changes are indicated.

2. At 1200L, May 17 the following Japanese Fleet units were scheduled to depart from Truk via the North Channel on course 300°:

- MUSASHI (Flag of C-in-C Combined Fleet)
- KONGO and HARUNA (Batdiv 3)
- TONE and CHIKUMA (CA's of Crudiv 8)
- HITAKA (CV of Cardiv 2)
- 5 DD's

No conclusions should be derived from "course 300°", as this is most probably the sortie course.

3. It now appears reasonably well established that the following Japanese combatant ships participated in the action west of Attu on March 26:

- CA's: NACHI, MAYA
- CL's: TAMA, ABUKUMA
- DD's of probably IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA, WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO
- Desron 1:
- XCL: ASAKA Maru.

4. It is indicated that the Japanese DD's sunk by our Vila-Munda bombardment group shortly after midnight March 5 were the HARUSAME and MURASAME (both of 1,368 tons displacement).

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Reinforcement of the Northern theater, chiefly by air and submarine units, becomes more strongly indicated. It is interesting to note that 0833 radio traffic from Attu and Kiska was passed to the 3rd, 6th, and possibly 1st

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and 2nd Fleets.

the association of 3rd Fleet with the Aleutians is more definite, although it is not yet apparent whether the association involves combatant carriers or merely land-based planes.

2. Beginning at 1300W, May 15 Attu Air Base originated hourly weather reports solely to Paramshiro Air Base. The last report was noted at 2100W, May 15.

It is believed that Air Group # 703, composed of fighters and bombers, is now based at Paramshiro.

3. The latest intercepted traffic (at the time of writing) from Attu was at 1555W, May 16.

4. Dainichi Maru (5,813 gross tons) is damaged and taking on water in the Ominato area, cause unknown.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 1835I, May 16 Yokosuka broadcast a warning of an attack by a U.S. submarine. It appeared that the attack was successful in the Yokosuka-Chichijima area, but details are not available.

2. Palao reported that TOYOMITSU Maru (unlisted, but estimated at about 5,000 gross tons) was attacked by a U.S. submarine in Lat. 6° 30' N., Long. 130° 30' E. at 1735I, May 4. No details are available.

R.A. Boone
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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 18, 1943

SRNS 0400

I. General

During the past 24 hours the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic increased somewhat, with administrative and weather traffic mainly responsible for the increase. Operational traffic was still moderately heavy, with no change in volume. All areas produced a good volume of traffic, although the Northern area again predominated. Air activity appeared light and no carrier activity was noted. Japanese radio intelligence and D/F messages continue in considerable volume.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. The Japanese radio on Attu was still working as of 2100 W, May 17. Indications are fairly strong, however, that only 1 Jap radio on Attu is still working as against 2 radio stations several days ago. In general, no new associations were noted in Japanese operational traffic from and to Attu, except for individual submarine calls.

2. The close association of a Jap Staff Officer, apparently on Attu, with submarines gives fairly strong indications that submarines are to run in supplies to the Jap forces on Attu. The submarines addressed are already in the Northern area, and one (fragmentary) message gives the appearance that he is asking for landing craft to be sent by submarine from Kiska to Attu.

3. A Japanese dispatch at 1205W, May 16 suggests that Kiska is intercepting U.S. plain language transmissions from the Attu area and is rebroadcasting them to various addressees.

4. At least 2 Jap submarines were definitely indicated as en route northward from Japan. Traffic associations indicate that Desdivs 15 and 21 were operating in the Kuriles area as of May 17 (I-time). C-in-C 5th Fleet apparently continues in the Paramushiro area. Although various major Japanese forces continue to be indicated as information addressees in Japanese traffic from the Aleutians, no definite indications have as yet been noted to suggest that heavy units are en route northward.

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III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Wake Island

At 0815 I, May 16 Wake broadcast a message which indicated an air raid. Five minutes later, a plain language dispatch reported 7 enemy planes, but normal traffic was apparently resumed at 0830I.

27 torpedoes were also to be sent in the same shipment.

(B) New Guinea

From traffic associations between 2132I, May 16 and 1028I, May 17 it appears that Desdiv 8 made a transportation run from the Bismarck area to Lae and return. There have also been recurrent indications in Japanese radio traffic that submarines are continuing their supply operations to Lae.

(C) Marshalls

At 1300I, May 9 Cardiv 2, in a message to Eniwetok postponed the transfer of its planes to the Marshalls area. The reason for the contemplated transfer is not apparent.

IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. At 1133 I, April 30 a Japanese message indicated that the KAMAKURA Maru (17,526 gross tons) was 6 hours overdue, apparently from Balikpapan where she was definitely indicated by traffic routing on April 28. The ship was maintaining radio silence.

2. At 2050I, May 17 fear was expressed for the safety of KIYO(?) Maru (7,251-ton tanker?) which left Ponape at 0825I, May 15 for Kusaie but had not arrived. It should be noted that the distance between Ponape and Kusaie is only 293 miles.

3. KENBU Maru, which took part in the March 2-4 Lae convoy, arrived Takao on April 14 and on May 5 arrived Camranh, probably carrying coal.

V. Economic

1. It is indicated that during April, 1943 the Japs expected to transport to Balikpapan about 20,000 tons of oil produced in Java.

2. At 1600I, May 17 restrictions were lifted by the Japanese on passage through Verde Island Passage and San Bernardino Strait in the Philippines. Ships passing through the northern part of the Sibuyan Sea were ordered to proceed via Mompog Pass and Burias Pass.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 19, 1943

SRNS 0401

I. General

~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

1. During the past 24 hours overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic showed a slight decline, with the most apparent drop indicated in administrative and weather traffic. Operational traffic increased somewhat and the Northern area again reflected an above-normal volume. On the other hand, the Southern area was also quite busy with increased Army traffic on the Truk, Palao, and Rabaul broadcasts. Tokyo to All Major Commands, Truk to Guadalcanal Operations Force, and Palao to Rabaul (Army traffic) channels were all above-normal.

2. (a) C-in-C's Combined, 1st and 3rd Fleets continue traffic relationship with the Northern Area, principally as information addressees, but evidence that these Fleets are moving northward is slight or non-existent. At 0214I, May 19 Saipan called and delivered traffic to Combined Fleet

No further information of the whereabouts of YAMATO (BB) which departed Truk on May 8, is available. As the ACV's UNYO and CHUYO were in company with YAMATO at the time of departure, however, it appears reasonable to conclude that this Force was north-bound.

(b) Radio intelligence indicates that 2nd Fleet continues to be based on Truk and that 4th Fleet is committed to the defensive protection of shipping in the Mandates area. Southeastern Area Fleet (commanded by C-in-C 11th Air Fleet) is charged with operations in the Southeastern theater. Despite the apparent departure of considerable naval strength from Truk for the North or for parts unknown, therefore, the Japanese continue to hold surface forces of some strength for required operations in the Southern Area. The tremendous commitments made by the Japanese in Melanesia would appear to allow no alternative, despite the seeming urgency of the threat in the High North (see also paragraph V, below).

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Japanese radio traffic in the Attu region has revealed nothing new of particular significance, except for several reports concerning U.S. shipping originated by a Staff Officer Emoto who apparently is acting in the capacity of Naval liaison officer. His latest noted report at 1715W, May 18 gave the locations of U.S. men-of-war (types unrecovered) north of Holtz Bay,

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
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2 ships in Holtz Bay, and 1 AP and 1 DD at anchor in Massacre Bay.

2. Air Group # 703 (believed to contain 27 VF's and 27 VB's) at Paramshiro was actively addressed by Attu on May 17 (W-time) in what appear to be short weather reports.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons Area

1. On May 18 (I-time) there was a marked increase in aircraft traffic in the Rabaul-New Guinea-Solomons area and on the Rabaul, Truk, and Tokyo broadcasts.

On May 17 (I-time) a large volume of traffic involving air bases at Buin, Buka, Rabaul, and Tenian was also noted

2. At 0650I, May 8 Kolombangara reported that 3 DD's rescued survivors at about 0300I, May 8 from an unidentified ship (or ships), presumably in the immediate vicinity.

(B) Wake Island

A message from Wake at 0930I, May 16 reported that 1 U.S. plane was down on the water. This undoubtedly refers to one of the attacking B-24's.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. Between 1500I and 1600I, May 18 an unidentified Japanese vessel in the Marshalls area received 1 torpedo hit, apparently causing great damage, but details are unrecovered.

2. A message at 1349I, May 7 from the Ominato Guard Force reported that a sustained attack was carried out against a (U.S.) submarine, distant about 7 miles from Esan Saki, on the Hokkaido side of the entrance to Tsugaru Strait. It was claimed that the submarine was sunk.

3. A depth-charge attack was carried out against a (U.S.) submarine with unknown results at 2210I, May 17 in Lat. 8° 30' N., Long. 150° 30' E.

4. There are strong indications that various Air Groups now guard MARU frequencies in order to provide for more rapid aircraft anti-submarine measures.

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V. Diplomatic

1. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on May 16 sent a message to the Japanese Ambassador at Kuibyshev concerning the American attack on Attu. He stated that apparently one division of troops, backed by a very powerful force of capital ships, carriers, and cruisers attacked and that there are indications which make the Japanese believe that the U.S. forces are going straight on to attack the Kuriles. The Ambassador was instructed once again to obtain immediate assurances that the Russians will not grant bases to the U.S. in the Komandorski Islands or on Kamchatka. The urgency of the situation was stressed.

Comment: It should be noted that this message was sent 4 days after the attack began. While it is possible that this delay may have been occasioned by the necessity to obtain more accurate information, the all too obvious note of alarm and the known boldness of Shigemitsu's diplomacy suggest the possibility that the Ambassador in Kuibyshev is being employed to plant among the Russians the suggestion that powerful Japanese naval forces are being shifted northward.

2. It appears that a new Soviet-Japanese fisheries company, known as the North Pacific Company, is to be organized in August, 1943. Apparently fishing boats owned by nationals of both parties are to be transferred to this company which presumably will be organized under Japanese law.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 20, 1943

SRNS 0402

I. General

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1. Although overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic remained practically unchanged, all types of traffic were approximately normal, with operational traffic still moderately active. Merchant/Navy traffic was considerably above normal, but was scattered in small volume among widespread areas. Traffic from the Aleutians dropped off considerably but High North traffic continued to predominate, with the center of greatest activity indicated in the Kuriles-Paramushiro area.

2. A number of indications, somewhat nebulous in character, suggest the possibility that there has been a reorientation of major Japanese surface forces in the Southern area. It appears likely that C-in-C 2nd Fleet is now the SOP in the Mandates area as a result of the departure of C-in-C Combined Fleet. The possibility also exists that 3rd (Carrier) Fleet has been withdrawn from the South and is no longer operative as such in that area. If these shifts have been made, no specific evidence is available which might suggest that they were caused by our Attu operations. On the contrary, available information indicates that these moves were planned and partially executed prior to these operations.

3. On April 18 there was an indication that # 2 NISSHIN Maru (17,579-ton ex-whaler) was in trouble in Lat. 23° 40 N., Long. 124° 50 E. Two patrol boats were ordered to the position mentioned.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Attu radio was still operating at 0200W, May 20.

2. As of 0000W, May 18 further evidence was noted of Japanese interception of U.S. plain text transmissions in the Attu area.

3. A Japanese dispatch from Attu at 1735W, May 18 included 9 possible submarine addressees (of which 6 were known submarines), 5th Fleet, Air Group # 703, and Kiska, confirming previous indications of submarine and air reinforcements to take part in the Attu operations.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 4/10/80

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4. SHACHIRO (CM) was ordered at 1802W, May 18 to proceed to Misashi Bay (about Lat. 35° 02' N., Long. 155° 22' E.) to screen and escort ships in that area. A special submarine warning also indicated that the Misashi Bay area requires special attention.

5. On May 18 (I-time), # 31 Garrison at Kiska was incorporated into the Kuriles Defense Force. A new command known as the 12th Air Fleet was also noted for the first time.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons Area

Nothing unusual was apparent in the Solomons-New Guinea area except that Jap aircraft activity appears to have increased during the past two days.

(B) Marcus

Traffic associations and routing strongly suggest a reinforcement of the Marcus surface defense force by the addition of units from the Yokosuka Local Defense Force.

(C) Philippines

Some 31 fishing boats and 1 mother ship, escorted by a 267-ton trawler departed Manila at 1400I, May 19 en route Cebu via Verde Island Passage, Momog Pass, and Ticao Pass, arriving at 1000I, May 22.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 0450I, May 20 navigation was prohibited within a 30-mile radius of Lat. 22° 12' N., Long. 114° 50' E. by reason of a vessel having been torpedoed in that locality.

2. At 0146 I, May 18 ASANAGI (DD) was ordered to Lat. 8° 30' N., Long. 150° 30' E. to take charge and assist the subchaser which had depth-charged a U.S. submarine (mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement) in that locality. ASANAGI was ordered to destroy the submarine.

3. U.S.S. GUDGESSON reported having sunk the KAMAKURA Maru (17, 526 gross tons former luxury liner) on April 28.

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for R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 21, 1943

SRNS 0403

I. General

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

1. The overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic remained practically unchanged from yesterday's report, but operational traffic, present on all major broadcasts, rose moderately. High North traffic was still prominent although its volume declined somewhat. Submarine activity appeared dormant except for frequent associations with the Aleutians, particularly Kiska, and the possibility of supply operations by submarine of Attu and perhaps Kiska was suggested. No carrier activity was noted, possibly giving some negative information that carriers are at sea.

2. One of our submarines reported a large Japanese Task Force in Lat. 32° 42' N., Long. 136° 35' E. on course 70°, speed 15 knots at 2245 I, May 20. Information concerning the composition of this Force is not available, but it appears unlikely that it is the force, headed by MUSASHI (BB, Flag of Combined Fleet), which left Truk at 1200I, May 17. It is more likely that the sighted Task Force is composed of units from Kure and/or Sasebo. No 1st or 3rd Fleet identified calls were noted as associated with the Northern area on May 20. C-in-C Combined Fleet is indicated by traffic routing as apparently en route to Japan. At 0134I, May 20 Chichijima was asked by Saipan to deliver a dispatch to Combined Fleet, indicating that MUSASHI had probably entered Chichijima Communication zone.

3. There are very strong indications by traffic routing that 1st Combined Communications Unit (Radio Intelligence) has been shifted from Rabaul to Tokyo. Previous experience has shown that this Unit usually is placed in or near the center of Japanese operational interest.

The previous move which this Unit made was from Truk to Rabaul between November 23 and 30, 1942.

4. The appointment of Admiral Mineichi Koga as C-in-C Combined Fleet to succeed Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, deceased, raises an interesting speculation concerning future Japanese naval policy. Yamamoto's background was largely one of aviation; Koga, on the other hand, is a "big-ship" man whose experience is predominantly with battleships and heavy cruisers. He is also believed to be a

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more cautious and orthodox commander, which traits may be partially responsible for the shifts of major Japanese naval forces suggested above. (For details of how Yamamoto most probably met his death, see Secret Supplement of April 19, paragraph I, 2).

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Japanese radio on Attu originated a dispatch as late as 1913W, May 20.
2. Preparations have been made by the Japanese for increased radio activity in the High North by a change of frequency plan, with additional overload circuits provided at Ominato and Tokyo.

3. (a) A number of messages, only partly readable, from Staff Officer Emoto on Attu to Air Group # 703 mention U.S. vessels, including an aircraft carrier and torpedo attacks.

(b) A Jap message at 1815W, May 19 quoted a (Jap) radio report of 0214W, May 18 to the effect that an apparent (almost certain) aircraft carrier was in position Lat. 51° N., Long. 159° E. As a result, Kuriles Defense Force was placed on anti-aircraft alert.

4. A typhoon was centered at Lat. 27°N., Long. 132° 05'E. at 2200I, May 19, moving northeastward at the rate of 50 Km. per hour.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

From 0525I to 1120I, May 20 there were indications that a Jap plane was shadowing an Allied unit in the general Solomons area. Grid positions were unrecovered. Throughout May 20 there was a considerable increase of Jap plane reconnaissance noted.

(B) Marshalls

1. On May 20, at least 7 flights of planes made reconnaissance reports which appear to concern the Marshalls-Gilberts area.

2. Traffic associations suggest the formation of a convoy at Kure, to depart shortly for the Marshalls via Saipan with supplies for Wake, Rottom, and other bases in the Marshalls.

(C) Marcus Island

Marcus was again prominent in Japanese radio traffic. An operational dispatch was addressed to Marcus Force by the Yokosuka Defense Force at 1155I, May 20.

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IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. A Japanese message concerning an unidentified ship reported a torpedo attack in Lat. $5^{\circ} 40' N.$, Long. $169^{\circ} 40' E.$ and stated that the ship was sinking.
2. Another message reported a torpedo attack in Lat. $2^{\circ} 42' S.$, Long. $150^{\circ} 31' E.$ at 2315 L, May 19 but stated that no damage resulted.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 22, 1943

SRNS 0404

~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

I. General

1. A higher volume of Japanese radio traffic was intercepted during the past 24 hours than for any one day period since October 10, 1942. The increase was well distributed among the various types of traffic except for a striking expansion in Auxiliary Ship volume, which reached a new high. The bulk of this Auxiliary Ship traffic was found on the Tokyo broadcast. Operational traffic maintained the substantial peak of the past 10 days. The general impression gained is one of intense activity as would be expected to accompany the major shift in the locations of principal fleets and commands apparently underway. The shift of the 1st Combined communication unit (Radio Intelligence) from Rabaul back to Tokyo, (reported in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement) combined with the recent exodus northward from Truk (May 8th and May 17th) of most of the major units of the 1st and 3rd Fleets then at Truk, leaves little doubt that for the time being at least the strategic disposition of the Japanese fleet contemplates principal operations in the North or Central Pacific areas, or in the areas of immediate approach to Japan proper.

3. An escorted 6 ship convoy is indicated to be leaving Truk for Yokosuka via Saipan. Two vessels of the convoy, the YAMAGIRI Maru and MOGAMI-GAWA Maru (APV) were associated with Airflot # 21

II. Northwest Pacific

2. A dispatch originated by CinC 5th Fleet at 1959W, May 20th, may indicate that he is underway in the northern area but destination is unknown.

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4. A dispatch apparently originated by a Japanese submarine off Attu was retransmitted at 1829W, May 20th by 5th Fleet to Staff Officer Emoto on Attu. The mention of "landing barges" in the dispatch suggests imminent efforts by the Japanese to evacuate by submarine some part of their Attu Forces.

5. Japanese radio on Attu was still active at 1710W, May 21st, at which time a weather report was originated.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Greenwich Island

At 1130I, May 21st Greenwich Island Air Base reported that a B-24 on photograph reconnaissance flew over Greenwich Island, was attacked by a patrol plane, and made off to the southeast unscathed.

(B) N.E.L.

ASHIGARA (CA), flagship of the Southwest Area Fleet, apparently arrived at Soerabaya on May 20th, thus completing its recent trip to Sasebo for overhaul.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

The HOKUREI Maru (2,408 gross tons) on May 13th was 5 days overdue at Balikpapan. She left Yulinkan (Hainan Island) on April 25th, routed via the west coast of Borneo.

V. Diplomatic

1. On May 17th Madrid (Suma) reported to Tokyo that Ambassador Cardenas had informed Foreign Minister Jordana that the letter being carried by Davies from Roosevelt to Stalin is a request for Soviet bases from which to blast Japan. This message was also sent to Berlin, Rome, Ankara, and Lisbon.

2. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu informed Kuibyshev that the Japanese have decided not to operate certain fishing lots in the Sakhalin and Kamchatka areas because of conditions relating to ships and materials.


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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 23, 1943

SRNS 0405

I. General

1. Although overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued slightly above normal, operational traffic declined considerably and Auxiliary Ship traffic returned to normal after its previous all-time high. Administrative traffic, however, rose sharply and accounted for 60% of all intercepts. D/F traffic also showed a substantial increase. Singapore and Surabaya channels to their respective area fleets were unusually active with administrative traffic. High North traffic is treated separately below.

2. C-in-C's 4th and 6th Fleets are still indicated at Truk
 C-in-C 2nd Fleet is now the senior officer in the Mandated area

A further indication of the northward shift of Japanese Fleet Commands is furnished by the location of Supply Officer, Combined Fleet at Yokosuka

(See also yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement, paragraph I, 1).

There is also some slight indication by traffic routing that part of Combined Fleet Staff is at Paramushiru

3. One of our submarines at about 2100I, May 22 reported the arrival at Sagami Nada (Yokosuka vicinity) of a Japanese Task Force similar to that which left Truk on May 17. In addition, he reported the entry on May 21 of 2 DD's and 2 (possible) SHOKAKU CV's.

4. "G" Operations Force, previously noted but concerning which no information is available, again appeared in traffic and definitely appears to be concerned with the Yangtze River area.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Staff Officer Emoto on Attu continues to be the principal originator of traffic from Attu, chiefly addressed to Air Group #703 (at Paramushiru) and submarines. His latest noted dispatch was at 1815W, May 22, addressed to 5th Fleet and Air Group #703. In a number of messages during the morning of May 22 (W-time), Emoto gave the disposition of U.S. Surface Units, mentioned Chichagof Bay, ship types, and gave weather information.

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2. Aircraft movements to the Kuriles area apparently are continuing and it appears fairly definite that patrol planes are operating out of Paramushiru. A number of MARU's reported their arrival in the Kuriles area on May 21 (I-time),

3. Japanese submarines (number unknown) are scheduled to pass through Kuriles waters as follows (all dates are local):

Afternoon of May 25, eastward of Etorofu Island (Lat. 45° N.,
Long. 147° 30' E).

From afternoon of May 26 to morning of May 27, west of Kuriles.
May 26, west of Kuriles.

Morning of May 27, eastward of Etorofu Island.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) General

Active plane reconnaissance was noted in the Solomons and Marshalls areas on May 22 (I-time). The Carolines area was relatively quiet, except for the usual air patrols out of Truk. Traffic to and from Tenian appears to verify previous indications that Airflot #21 has been shifted northward to that point.

(B) Wake Island

Long-range reconnaissance planes appear to have been moved to Wake. One of these planes sent a contact report concerning a submarine in approximate Lat. 24° 32' N., Long. 174° 14' E. The submarine reported apparently was Japanese.

(C) New Guinea

Associations on May 21 (I-time) indicate that preparations were being made for the arrival of a convoy at Hansa and Wewak from Palao.

IV. Engagement of March 26 (I-time) west of Attu

Japanese Northern Force, on March 27, sent a report to Combined Fleet and Naval General Staff concerning the action west of Attu on the previous day. This report may be summarized as follows:

(a) First contact was made at 0308I, March 26 in Lat. 53° 25' N., Long. 168° 40' E. while en route to Attu escorting the second convoy of

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"A" Operations.

(b) The U.S. Force consisted of 1 PENSACOLA class CA, 1 OMAHA class CL, and 4 DD's (2 of SOMERS class and 2 others).

(c) The order of the Japanese force was: NACHI (CA), MAYA (CA), TAMA (CL), and ABUKUMA (CL) and Desron 1. Commenced firing at 0342I and continued closing until the range was 14,000 meters.

(d) Action was continued for about an hour but as NACHI and MAYA had expended practically all their main battery ammunition, the Japs were forced to break off the engagement. The convoy was picked up again and although it was attacked by 1 to 3 PBV's, no damage was sustained. The Jap force returned to Paramushiro Strait to escape U.S. planes.

(e) Ammunition expended:

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Main Battery</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>Torpedoes</u>
NACHI	800	200	16
MAYA	911	10	8
ABUKUMA	135	—	8
TAMA	96	—	—
DD	6	—	—
DD	13	—	—
DD	—	—	6
DD	—	—	5

(f) Results of battle:

(U.S.) CA was hit 35 times, fairly heavily damaged, afire forward, after turrets damaged.

(U.S.) CL was hit 13 times, slightly damaged, afire amidships for awhile.

(U.S.) DD was hit more than 31 times, fairly heavily damaged, 15° list, main engines out of commission.

(U.S.) DD was hit at least 5 times, slightly damaged.

NACHI suffered 7 hits which in no way impaired her ability to make way. 14 killed, 21 wounded. No other (Jap) ships damaged.

V. U.S. Submarine Operations

Makassar Base Force reported that at 0140I, May 22 a (U.S.) submarine

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straffed a netive sailing vessel with machine-gun fire in lat. 3° 15' S., long. 118° 45' E., killing 5 persons.

for *W. T. Boone*
R. A. Boone

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 24, 1943

I. General

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

SRNS 0406

1. There was practically no change in the overall volume of intercepted Japanese traffic during the past 24 hours. Operational, D/F, and administrative traffic all registered slight declines. Army traffic was about the same, but the joint Army-Navy code gained noticeably, with much of this traffic concentrated in the Northern Area as well as on the Tokyo broadcast. No carrier radio activity was noted.

2. A message at 1358I, May 23 and subsequent routing bears out the previous indications mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement that Combined Fleet Administration is now in Japan.

3. An old Japanese message dated November 4, 1942 states that the Naval General Staff had decided to convert CHIYODA (AV) and CHITOSE (AV) into aircraft carriers. The conversion of the former was scheduled to be begun by January 1943 and of the latter, by October 1942. Actually, however, CHITOSE did not arrive in Sasebo until November 15. The characteristics of these ships prior to conversion were as follows:

Displacement:	9,000 tons	Normal Draft:	19'
Length:	577' 5"	Max. speed:	20 knots
Beam:	61' 8"		

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Attu originated a number of messages on May 23 (W-time), one of which at 1335W mentioned 1 DD at (Holtz Bay?), 3 DD's at another place, and 3 DD's at Chichagof. It also mentioned attacks by fighters at 0900W, by 2 or 3 fighters at 1000W, and by B-25's at 1230W. The latest noted dispatch from Attu radio was at 2305W, May 23.

2. Although various Jap planes were heard in the High North, associations make it most probable that they are based on Paramushiro. One association with Kiska, however, suggests the possibility that the airfield on that island may now be ready for use.

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3. Air Transport Unit #1 (previously noted) continues to appear in traffic.

4. A message from Tokyo to Kuibyshev on May 20 advised the latter post that 2 Jap ships had been withdrawn from Kamchatka and that fishing operations there would be discontinued because of the Aleutians' situation. The two vessels, together with a third ship at Ominato, were diverted to the northern Kuriles where their cargo and laborers are to be unloaded, and where "more extensive and arduous work is to be done".

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

Considerable Jap patrol plane activity took place in the Solomons area on May 23 (I-time), with a number of indications that a U.S. force was being shadowed. These reports were broadcast to submarine units. Contact signals suggest an attack on a U.S. Force by Jap aircraft but opposition by U.S. planes is indicated.

(B) Bismarck Archipelago

1. Associations suggest that Desdiv 22 may be engaged in a transportation operation from Rabaul to Sulumi (near Gasmata).

2. A Japanese message on April 23 reported that Allied planes, flying at low altitude, had planted parachute mines during the previous night off Kavieng. Various activities were warned to report similar operations promptly.

3. Indications continue of the movement of Army units from Singapore and Manila to Rabaul via Palao.

IV. Japanese Hospital Ships

On May 3, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu advised his Minister at Berne of a number of attacks on Japanese hospital ships. He stated that notification had been given in all cases and that the ships were lighted in accordance with Treaty stipulations. The alleged attacks follow:

Date	Ship	Attacked by	Area
Jan. 4	ARABIA Maru	3 planes. Ship damaged but repaired.	Rangoon
Jan. 30	AMERICA Maru	1 plane at 0420I	Rabaul
Apr. 15	FUSO Maru	Aircraft, upon 3 occasions at night (flares were dropped, etc.)	Shortland Is.
Apr. 16	FUSO Maru	Aircraft, at 1813I and again at 2022I. (Straffed and bombed)	Shortland Is.
Apr. 25	BUENOS AIRES Maru	Torpedoed by submarine; ship damaged, 7 injured.	Hongkong

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V. Diplomatic

On May 16, Tokyo instructed its Ambassador at Kuibyshev to ascertain from Russia the date of transfer of registry of the Russian ship at present held by the Jap Navy. On May 19, Shigemitsu advised Kuibyshev that the ship would be released as soon as the reply to the previous message is received, because of his desire to iron-out difficulties with the Soviets. He stated, however, that a prerequisite to this is a promise, preferably in writing, by the Russians not to grant bases to the United States.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 25, 1943

SRNS 0407

I. General

During the past 24 hours, little of an unusual nature was noted from intercepted Japanese radio traffic, although overall volume increased slightly and Army traffic was heavy on the Tokyo to Palao channel. D/F traffic was heavy from Truk, Saipan, and other stations, indicating efforts on the part of the Japanese to track U.S. transmissions. In the Southwest Pacific, considerable Jap reconnaissance plane activity was noted and during the forenoon of May 25 (I-time), a number of these reports were re-broadcast to submarine units.

II. Northwest Pacific

2. The continued movement of air reinforcements from Honshu to the Hokkaido-Kuriles area is suggested by traffic between Airflot # 24, Akkeshi Air (or weather) Station, Paramushiru, and a Northern Air Base. Matsuwashima (Lat. 48° 05' N., Long. 153° 10' E) radio on May 23 and 24 actively reported weather to Akkeshi Bay (E. coast of Hokkaido), a rather unusual routing but suggesting aircraft movements northward.

3. At 1750I, May 24 Ominato Guard Force ordered a screen and alert disposition, and Kuriles Defense Force was apparently placed on anti-submarine alert.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 6/10/43

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RETURN TO T-11

III. Economic

1. During the month of May, about 20,000 tons of French Indo-China coal was to be shipped to Japan in 3 MARU's assigned for this purpose.

2. A message dated May 20 from Saigon to Tokyo intimated that 6 MARU's had recently sailed for Shanghai, Hongkong, and Japan ports carrying a total of about 35,750 tons of rice from French Indo-China.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 26, 1943

SRNS 0408

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued slightly above normal, but administrative traffic reached a new high. Operational traffic declined somewhat, with the majority of this traffic on the Tokyo and Ominato broadcasts and in the Northern area. Paramushiru was busy with weather traffic to Ominato and Tokyo.

2. On May 17, Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet advised that Cardiv 1 (?) (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU), Crudiv 7 (CA's KUMANO, SUZUYA), AGANO (CL), and Desron 10 would sortie at 1100I, May 20 and at 2000I, May 20 would be in Lat. 32° 12 N., Long. 135° 36 E. on course 70°, arriving Yokosuka at about 1500I, May 21.

Note: this is undoubtedly the Task Force sighted by one of our submarines in Lat. 32° 42 N., Long. 136° 35 E., course 70° at 2245 I, May 20 and again reported in SAGAMI NADA on May 21.

3. Palao Radio Intelligence Unit recently complained about its personnel turn-over and suggested that better work could be done with more permanency of personnel.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. There is some indication by traffic routing during the past 2 days that the 5th Fleet Command has left Paramushiru, probably for the Ominato area. Except for the usual air traffic, principally from Paramushiru Air Base, and a report of U.S. ship dispositions by Attu at 2000W, May 24, no unusual traffic was noted in the Northern area.

2. Some slight indication has been noted on May 25 that 1st Combined Communication Unit (radio intelligence) may be operating at or near Ominato. (See also, ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 22, paragraph I, 1).

3. Associations suggest that NAGAURA (AR) is ultimately bound for the Northern area from Truk, suggesting an expectation of increased operations in that area.

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4. In the interest of clarity, it should be noted that Paramshiru has been adopted herein as standard spelling. Variants are Paramshire and Horomshiro (Japanese version of the same name).

III. Southwest Pacific

1. A Jap plane at 0530I, May 25 reported sighting 1 enemy cruiser and 1 DD in an unrecovered grid position, probably in the general Solomons area.

2. Radio intelligence indicates the presence of considerable Japanese shipping in the Marianas-Carolines area.

IV. Diplomatic

A number of Japanese diplomatic messages during the past fortnight suggest growing concern on the part of the Japanese Foreign Office of the possibility that Russia might place bases at the disposal of U.S. Air Forces. Although available messages in this regard give the appearance of genuine concern that such bases might be used to bomb Japan, it is not inconceivable but that Shigemitsu is attempting to gather material for the purpose of placing Russia upon the diplomatic defensive to justify future Japanese action vis-a-vis that country.

V. Economic

On May 14 an unidentified Jap ship reported that only 1,000 tons of fuel oil were available at Palembang and that 5 days would be required to obtain the balance of 4,000 tons.

Tokyo on May 18 complained to Bangkok about the latter's failure to ship 600 tons of scrap iron (?), although it was scheduled for 1942. It was indicated that this scrap is needed for the 1943 steel program and the hope was expressed that a ship would be found to carry it.

VI. Subversive Activity

Subhas Chandra Bose and his secretary arrived in Tokyo from Berlin on May 21. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 14, paragraph V).

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 27, 1943

SRNS 0409

I. General

1. Little of particular significance can be drawn from Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours. Overall volume decreased to slightly below normal due partially to a sharp drop in Administrative traffic following yesterday's record peak. Of interest was the fact that German-Japanese Liaison traffic was the highest on record, with all messages broadcast on the Tokyo to Ships circuit.

2. In a message dated March 15 it was indicated that the AGANO, one of Japan's 4 new light cruisers concerning which no details are known, carries 4 seaplane reconnaissance planes as compared to 1 for the older Japanese CL's.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Radio traffic decreased in the Northern area. The latest dispatch noted from Attu was originated at 0810W, May 26.

2. The NACHI (CA) was ordered to depart Yokosuka May 10th (prior to our invasion of Attu) for an unknown point in the Kuriles area. This is the first positive recent indication of a heavy unit in the Northern area, but sight should not be lost of the fact that the bulk of the striking power of Japan's Navy (7 out of 10 BB's, 7 out of 13 CA's, 8 out of 10 CV's and ACV's) appeared recently to have concentrated in the Yokosuka area - slightly more than one day's steaming from Ominato and the southernmost Kuriles.

3. Association with the recent air attacks on Attu indicates that land-based planes of Airflot 24 participated in these raids.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

An important transportation operation, apparently to reinforce Kolombangara, is to take place during the 10 day period from May 28 to June 6. 3 destroyers are scheduled to arrive on May 28 and May 31, while landing craft are scheduled to arrive on May 28, May 30, June 4, and June 6 (all dates I time). Special precautions are to be taken against U.S. aircraft and submarine operation particularly minelaying.

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(B) Marshalls-Gilberts

1. A convoy from Kure carrying military supplies for Wake, Ruoetto and other bases in the Marshalls, is scheduled to depart Truk about May 28 for Kwajalein.
2. Active aerial reconnaissance was noted in the Marshalls-Gilberts area on May 27 (I-time), with at least six flights reporting during the morning.
3. Ten Zeros are to be flown from Truk on June 12 (I-time) to Taroa via Brown Island.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

Three Japanese reports were noted of attacks by U.S. submarines on Japanese shipping in central and southern Empire waters. The first report, at 1039I, May 26 to Sasebo and Oshima addressees, stated that an unidentified Maru in a convoy had received a torpedo attack and was sunk (position not recovered). The second report, at 1445I, May 26 (originated by a vessel in the Chichijima-Yokosuka area), indicated only that a vessel had been hit by a "torpedo attack". The third report, originated at 1540I, May 26th by an unidentified vessel probably in the Yokosuka area, indicated that "the attack was successful" but no details are available. At least two of the above reports are believed to be of separate attacks.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 28, 1943

SRNS 0410

I. General

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

During the past 24 hours overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic declined somewhat (8%) but the traffic of practically all major codes remained unchanged. In the North, weather reports were above normal in volume on the Ominato-Tokyo and Paramushiru-Ominato channels

II. Northwest Pacific

1. No evidence is available which would indicate the presence in the Kuriles area of Japanese heavy forces or carriers, but indications continue to accumulate that considerable air forces have been shifted to the Kuriles and Northern Japan.
2. On May 22 Japanese radio intelligence sent a message in which it was stated that it is believed that a powerful U.S. surface force is operating in the Aleutians area and is maintaining radio silence. This conclusion was based on voice transmission and the general communications technique of U.S. forces in that area.
3. Attu radio was still operating at 0700W, May 27 at which time Staff Officer Emoto sent a long operational dispatch to a list of submarine units, Air Group # 752 (at Paramushiru), 5th Fleet, and others. Routing indicates that I-2, formerly active in transportation operations in the South Pacific, is now in the Aleutians area.
4. A slight indication of a troop movement in the High North is suggested by an Army message from Hiroshima to Kiska Shipping Communications Unit.
5. A submarine was reported by 2 Jap patrol vessels in Lat. 37° 50' N., Long. 148° E. At 0410I, May 28 this report was changed to a "friendly" submarine.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. At 1550I, May 27 Rabaul Intelligence sent what appeared to be an urgent report concerning U.S. activities in the southeastern area. At

By Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

714 dds Date: 01/02/86

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1835I, May 27 New Georgia Area Force referred to an intelligence report stating that there is a probability that the U.S. Force heading north in the area S.E. or E.S.E. of Guadalcanal may engage in unusual activities in the New Georgia area. All lookout stations and batteries were alerted.

2. KAMIKAWA Maru (XCVS) departed Truk at 1030I, May 26 under escort. Traffic associations suggest that this ship is carrying aviation supplies and/or planes for Seaplatendiv 11, with probable destination as the Buin-Rekata area.

(B) Mandates Area

1. Radio intelligence indicates that a well-escorted convoy is at sea in the Truk area.

2. Nothing unusual was noted in the Marshalls-Gilberts area, and except as noted above, the Marianas and Carolines appeared quiet. Wake patrol planes continued their activity.

(C) New Guinea

There are fairly strong indications from radio intelligence that Jap submarines are still being used on a considerable scale for the transportation of military stores between Rabaul and Lae.

(D) Nauru

A Japanese message on May 21 estimated that about 380 cubic meters of materials would be required to fill in 24 holes in the Nauru runway caused by the bombing attack on April 21.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At about 2300I, May 27 TAKACHI Maru (unlisted) was torpedoed and sunk in Lat. 8° 28' N., Long. 134° 06' E.

2. At 2250I, May 27 Chief of Staff Sasebo Naval District ordered (unidentified) ships to take shelter in Tomie Bay (approximate Lat. 32° 37' N., Long. 128° 47' E.) because of U.S. submarine activity.

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R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 29, 1943

1. General

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SRNS 0411

1. Although the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours was virtually normal, the composition of this traffic is of some significance. Operational traffic, of which about 60% was priority, rose abruptly and was the highest for 8 days. The majority of this traffic was on the Tokyo broadcast and in the Northern Area, but Rabaul and Truk broadcasts each accounted for about 15% of the total volume. D/F traffic was double that of yesterday and joint Army/Navy code also rose noticeably, principally in the High North from Kiska to Paramushiru.

2. Radio traffic routing for the past 2 days indicates that the principal Japanese Fleets are located as follows:

<u>Fleet</u>	<u>Location</u>
Combined	Empire. Flagship probably at Yokosuka
1st	No identified calls noted
2nd	Appears to be in Truk area
3rd	No routing noted
4th	Truk
5th	Apparently at sea, Paramushiru area
6th	Jaluit area
8th	Rabaul
11th Air	Rabaul
12th Air	Ominato
S.W. Area	Surabaya

3. At 0500I, May 26 (?), an inspection party which included Admiral Koga, C-in-C Combined Fleet, departed Yokosuka for Paramushiru in 2 Type 97 flying boats, apparently on an inspection tour. No further details are available.

4. JUNYO and CHUYO (ACV's) and 2 DD's were scheduled to arrive Truk at 0900I, May 29. The object of their call at Truk is unknown

5. A Japanese plain language notice to mariners warned that AA target practice is to be held to seaward from Uchiuni (Lat. 34° 45' N., Long. 136° 57' E) for 5 days from May 27. This locality is directly on the seaward approach to Nagoya, one of the aircraft manufacturing centers of Japan.

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II. Northwest Pacific

1. At 0220W, May 28 Kiska sent a long intelligence report to a list of addressees, including a possible carrier (RYUHO?),
2. (a) Commander Kuriles Base Force, usually afloat, has hoisted his flag ashore at Kataoka Bay (Lat. 50° 44' N., Long. 156° 11' E.)
(b) Commander Airflot # 24 was indicated at Paramushiru on May 28 (I-time)
3. Japanese radio on Attu was still operating at 0900W, May 28.

III. Southwest Pacific

(B) Rabaul

Associations on May 27 indicated considerable convoy activity in the vicinity of Rabaul, with the possibility suggested that 1 ship may have been sunk.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. At 1800I, May 28 AKITSUKI Maru (believed to be AKATSUKI Maru, a 10,216-ton tanker) reported having been torpedoed and unable to proceed or steer, but not in immediate danger of sinking. The ship complained that the submarine was continuing its attacks, even though she had already sunk one submarine. Assistance was requested. A previous message suggests that this attack took place in South China waters.
2. A series of urgent operational dispatches on May 28 from and to subchasers and involving Japanese activities in the Bismarck area previously associated with KAMIKAWA Maru (XCVS, mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement), strongly suggests that this ship ran into difficulties on her way to Rabaul.
3. At 0635I, May 8 ASAKA (?) Maru (XCL of Crudiv 22) was attacked by a submarine in position 20 miles distant, bearing 280° from Araida Island (Lat. 50° 52' N., Long. 155° 35' E.) No damage was reported.

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for W.D. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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SRNS 0412

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 30, 1943

I. General:

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1. During the past 24 hours the volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic reached a new all time high. Continued preoccupation of Japan with the High North was indicated by this region's prominence in operational traffic, which increased substantially to the highest level since May 12. However, the most striking rise was again in D/F traffic, in which the Northern area was also prominent. Administrative traffic was heavy, approaching the highest levels ever recorded, and joint Army/Navy traffic maintained its previous day's rise.

2. Attempted radio deception is again being practiced by the Japanese as evidenced in the past 2 days by a bogus plain language message, a fake contact report, and an urgent operational dispatch on May 28 from ComCrudiv 9, apparently meaninglessly ordering ... "Entire force attack at dawn without further orders."

II. Northwest Pacific:

1. Traffic analysis indicates that the #1 Combined Communication Unit (Radio Intelligence) may have moved to Ominato, but owing to the highly important strategic implications of such a move conclusions based on it should be withheld pending further research, the results of which will be available shortly.

2. 21 Type-1 landbased attack planes (equipped for carrying torpedoes) were ordered to depart Kisaratsu Air Station at 0700I, May 15 for Paramushiru. Apparently several hours out the entire flight was forced to return to Kisaratsu owing to foul weather, and the trip was ordered delayed 1 day.

3. The indication reported in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement (par. II, 1) that a carrier was possibly enroute to the Northern area is not borne out by further study of the call involved.

III. Southwest Pacific:

(A) Gilberts.

2 Type O Scout Seaplanes were sent on May 26 from the Marshalls to Commander #3 Special Base Force at Tarawa, who was instructed to use these planes to patrol the area eastward of Tarawa.

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L, Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 6/1/43
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(B) Solomons.

1. Japanese aerial reconnaissance from the Solomons was exceptionally heavy on May 28, probably due to Japanese intelligence reports that a U.S. Force was heading north into the New Georgia area. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 28, par. III, (A), 1).

2. Urgent operational dispatches originated between 1345 and 1930I, May 29, apparently in the New Georgia area, may be occasioned by U.S. attacks on the Japanese reinforcement force scheduled to arrive at Kolombangara on May 28 and subsequent dates (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 27, par. III (A)). It is indicated that ISOKAZE and SATSUKI are 2 of 3 DD's involved in the operations, and that possibly Munda as well as Kolombangara is scheduled to receive reinforcements.

IV. U. S. Submarine Operations:

1. Continued associations in high precedence operational dispatches on the afternoon of May 29 (I-time) of escort vessels in the Kavieng area, combined with the disappearance from traffic of the KAMIKAWA MARU (XCVS of 6,853 gross tons) make it appear probable that she was heavily damaged or sunk. (See yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement par. IV, 2).

2. Several operational dispatches, the first of which was originated at 1120I, May 29, may indicate a U.S. submarine attack on a Japanese convoy in the Palao-Manila area.

3. At 2116I, May 29, it was reported that a U.S. submarine bombarded Kema (shore opposite Manado, Celebes) 114 times.

V. Diplomatic:

1. On May 21 Ambassador Sato in Kuibyshev wired Tokyo (concerning the granting of Russian Air Bases to the United States) that assurances had been received from Russia that the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact of April 13, 1941 would continue to be adhered to. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 26, par. IV).

2. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu informed the Japanese Diplomatic Office at Madrid on May 26 that he has studied "the matter" from a number of angles, but he cannot believe "it" is the result of their solving our codes. The nature of the matter referred to is not known, but Shigemitsu's confidence in Japanese codes is of interest.

R. A. Boone
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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of May 31, 1943

SRNS 0413

I. ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECURITY~~

1. After the peak indicated in yesterday's report, overall volume intercepted Japanese radio traffic resumed a normal level, with operational and D/F traffic showing a decline of 50%. Administrative traffic continued its recent rise, however, and reached a new high. On the whole, Japanese radio traffic was colorless, except for heavy patrol plane activity in the Marshalls and South-eastern areas.

2. The possibility of a reversal of the recent Japanese trend of sending air units to the Southern theater is suggested by the northward movement on May 24 of a 3rd Fleet air detachment from Tenian to Kisarazu. As indicated below, the withdrawal of air units from Japan proper to the Northern area makes it probable that some units will be shifted from the Southern area back to Japan.

3. As intimated in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement (paragraph V,2) at least a suspicion has been raised in Japanese minds that we may be reading Japanese codes, although the matter to which Ambassador Suma and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu referred is unknown. It nevertheless would appear obvious that the security of radio intelligence cannot be stressed too greatly. The recently announced death of Admiral Yamamoto is a case in point, and the linking of his death with knowledge on our part of how it happened is fraught with danger to the war effort which cannot even be estimated. That dangerous rumors are circulating in this regard is well illustrated by the following excerpt from Walter Winchell's radio program of Sunday evening, May 30, 1943:

"The war correspondents' grapevine states that the Allied High Command definitely knows how Admiral Yamamoto died. In dramatic intensity the tale of Rudolph Hess is paled by comparison and the story of Yamamoto will probably never really be told."

II. Northwest Pacific

1. The continued prominence of air units in Empire and Kuriles traffic indicates the probability that strong air forces are being dispersed throughout Northern Air Bases. On May 23 (I-time), a unit of Air Group # 752 of 24 land-based attack planes and 4 transport planes left an intermediate Kuriles air base

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECURITY~~

BY DIRECTOR
DATE: MAY 31 1943
FILE

for Paramushiru

2. (a) The probability that a strong Japanese Naval Task Force may have been formed in the Kuriles area is suggested by the anchorage assignments on May 17 in Paramushiru Strait for the following vessels:

NACHI (CA)
MAYA (CA)
MYOKO (CA)
HAGURO (CA)
KIMIKAWA Maru (XCVS)

TAMA (CL)
KISO (CL)
ABUKUMA (CL)
At least 6 DD's
Several MARUS

(b) Traffic associations suggest the possibility that Crudiv 16 (NATORI, KINU, KUMA, ISUZU - all CL's), or some part thereof, is proceeding to the Empire area or is already there. Other dispatches in which Crudiv 16 appeared included 5th Fleet as an addressee.

(c) Considerable traffic involving patrol activities attached to the 5th Fleet area indicate that an extensive and advanced patrol line is being maintained to detect the presence of any U.S. units in that area.

(d) No identified Japanese battleship or carrier calls were noted during the past 24 hours. The previously indicated presence in the Empire area of powerful units of Combined and 3rd Fleets suggests the possibility that a strong Support Force may have been formed in the general Yokosuka area. No definite indications in this regard, however, are available and it is therefore problematical whether or not such a Force is at sea.

3. The latest noted Japanese dispatch out of Attu was noted at 1910W, May 28 and the latest dispatch to Attu was originated at 2358W, May 28

4. Several messages from Tokyo Army Headquarters to # 51 Base Force (Kiska) and Chief of Staff 5th Fleet suggests possible plans to reinforce Kiska.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) New Guinea

1. At least 2 MARU's were scheduled to depart Palao for Wewak at 1500I, May 29, speed 7.5 knots, expected time of arrival 0700I, June 4. Noon positions are available.

2. No Japanese naval activity in the New Guinea-Solomons area was noted during the past 24 hours.

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(B) Marshalls - Gilberts

Extensive Japanese air patrols to the eastward of the Marshalls-Gilberts are indicated by the large number of planes heard in that area during the past 24 hours. Base Force # 3 at Tarawa originated operational dispatches at 0843I and 0915I, May 29.

(C) Bismarck Archipelago

Operational traffic on May 30 (I-time) in the Bismarck area involving Subchasers and an Escort unit suggests attacks on Japanese shipping in the Kavieng-Rabaul area.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. An unidentified Japanese ship in the Kuriles area broadcast a submarine contact at 2030I, May 30 and reported having been hit by a torpedo.

2. At 1100I, May 28 HIRIKI (DD) reported having taken aboard 27 crew members of SHOKI Maru (unlisted). HACHUJO (CM) was ordered to the scene of the disaster, placing the casualty in the Kuriles area. It was reported that although the hull of SHOKI Maru is badly damaged, it may be possible to tow her to an uncovered port.

W. D. Boone
for R. A. Boone.

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~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 1, 1943

SRNS0414

I. General ~~SECRET SECURITY~~

1. In general, the pattern of intercepted Japanese radio traffic for May 31 continued unchanged, with overall volume substantially the same, except for a notable rise in administrative traffic which accounted for two-thirds of all volume and rose to a new peak. Operational and D/F traffic both continued their declines mentioned yesterday. A large amount of Army traffic was noted, involving Palao, Wewak, and Rabaul Army commands, with indications of important convoy movements in this area.

2. Another Tokyo plain language broadcast gave notice of AA practice firings in the Tokyo-Kisarazu area on June 1, suggesting increased Japanese preparations against expected air attacks.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. (a) A dispatch at 1018I, May 31 from C-in-C 3rd Fleet advised of the departure from Yokosuka of the following Fleet Units:

On May 30(?):

- Batdiv 3 - HARUNA only ✓
- Crudiv 7 - KUMANO, SUZUYA (CA's) ✓
- Desron 10 - AGANO (CL), and about 8 DD's. ✓

On May 31(?):

- Cardiv 1 - ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU
- Cardiv 2 - HITAKA, HAYATAKA
- Unidentified CL (?) and about 5 DD's

(b) On May 25, it was indicated that the following Fleet Units left Yokosuka:

- Cardiv 1, Cardiv 2 (less HAYATAKA), Batdiv 3,
- Crudiv 7, Crudiv 8, Desron 10.

Destination was not indicated, but in view of the dispatch mentioned in (a), these units probably returned to Yokosuka.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 01/02/80

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2. At 1510L, May 31 an unidentified command originated an apparent movement schedule or operation order, with Combined Fleet, Yokosuka, Ominato Guard Force, Naval General Staff, and others as information addressees.

3. At 1000L, May 31 possible ONDO (AO), associated with Crudiv 16 (4 CL's), was scheduled to depart Takao for Shimotsu (on Kii Channel) arriving June 7. It will be recalled that traffic associations have suggested the Northern area as Crudiv 16's ultimate destination.

III. Northwest Pacific

1. (a) A number of ship movements in the Kuriles area indicate the growing importance of Paramushiru as the principal advanced base of Japanese operations in the High North. Kataoka Bay (S. coast of Shimmshu Is.), Kakumabetsu Bay (W. coast of Paramushiru Is.), and Musashi Bay (S. coast of Paramushiru Is.) appear to be the principal destinations of convoys from Japan. Minesweeper Division # 28 and a number of patrol vessels have been added to the Kuriles Defense Force and were ordered to Kataoka Bay.

(b) On May 26 anchorage assignments in Paramushiru Strait were designated for 8 (MAEU) Patrol Force vessels, including AKAGI Maru, AWATA Maru, and ASAKA Maru (3 XCL's of Crudiv 22).

(c) AA Defense Units # 26 and # 27 were ordered to Musashi Bay on May 31, indicating a strengthening of AA installations on Paramushiru.

2. Associations suggest that a unit of carrier planes are, or shortly will be, based at Paramushiru.

IV. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

Associations on May 30 strongly suggest the probability that units of Kure # 7 Special Landing Force are being transported from the Buin area to the New Georgia area by DD's of a "Reinforcement Force".

(B) New Guinea

Further indications have been noted that Jap submarines are still carrying supplies to Lae from Rabaul.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 5/27/50



(C) Marshalls-Gilberts

1. Activity in this area has apparently been confined to aircraft patrols northward from Wake and to the S.E. of the Marshalls.

2. A progress report from Nauru indicates that a new runway is 19% completed (clearing 80%, surfacing 34%) and that preparations for paving are being made. Dispersal bays are also under construction.

V. Japanese Shipping Movements

Movements of important Japanese shipping noted are as follows:

(a) SANRAKU Maru (apparently a new tanker) is to take on a full load of heavy oil at Tarakan for Cebu where discharge is to be completed June 14.

(b) On about June 5, 2 escorted transports are to arrive at Menado and will remain about 3 days to unload their cargo.

(c) # 3 TONAN Maru (19,210-ton tanker, ex-whaler) was scheduled to arrive Truk at 1100I, May 31.

(d) GENYO Maru (10,000-ton tanker) departed Truk for Tarakan at 1500I, May 31, arriving 0800I, June 7. Noon positions are available.

(e) 3 Army transports were scheduled to depart Takao for Singapore at 1000I, June 1, arriving 1200I, June 7. Noon positions are available.

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Fd 1 ✓ F30 ✓
Fd 2 ✓ F31 ✓

~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 2, 1943

SRNS 0415

I. General ~~SECRET~~

1. A further rise above normal in overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was noted during the past 24 hours. This increase was principally caused by a continued high in administrative traffic, as operational traffic continued relatively low. Weather traffic was heavier than usual and was principally noted on the Saipan-Chichijima-Yokosuka circuits, possibly occasioned by an order to Cardiv 1 Air Group to fly to a base (in the Kyushu area?) on June 1.

2. (a) Nothing further has been noted concerning the Japanese forces which sortied from Yokosuka on May 30 and 31, nor have any significant indications of scouting or reconnaissance in the general Japan area appeared. Past experience with major Japanese Striking Forces suggests that the Japanese invariably place submarines on advance scouting lines and on station for coordinated attacks when Striking Forces are at sea with a definite mission, and that intensive aircraft reconnaissance precedes the advance of the surface force into combat zones. The latter, however, was apparently not the case just prior to Pearl Harbor. In short, the absence as yet of any indications that either submarines or aircraft are being employed in the usual manner suggests the conclusion that the sortie referred to above is nothing more than a local sweep, although lack of further information of the Striking Force's destination must perforce make this conclusion tentative.

(b) Of the ships included in the Striking Force mentioned above, it is interesting to note that docking schedules have been arranged as follows:

- 2 DD's - from June 7 to 10
- AGANO (CL) - from June 7 to 17
- ZUIKAKU (CV) - from June 17 to 23

3. HOSHO (old CV) is being used as a training vessel for aircraft landing exercises and as a target ship for torpedo plane firings. In one practice involving Kanoya Air Group Shipboard Attack Wing, 18 torpedoes were to be fired.

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Date: 01/02/80

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II. Northwest Pacific

1. A strong indication of Japanese strengthening of the Kuriles area is furnished by the departure at 0200I, May 27 from Wakkanai (northern tip of Hokkaido) of 4 Army transports for Paramashiru with scheduled time of arrival at 0900I, May 30. Japanese radio traffic has indicated that Wakkanai is assuming great importance as a make-up point for convoys to the High North.

2. During the past 2 days weather reports were requested from various weather stations in the Kuriles, indicating a continued northern movement of air units.

III. Admiralty Islands

Lorengan Guard Force on May 29 reported planes dropping flares and taking photographs. The Jap commander apparently suggested the possibility of invasion!

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

The sighting of a periscope at 0955I, June 1 in the vicinity of Ollan Island (Lat. 7° 13' N., Long. 151° 38' E.) brought forth a counter-attack by ONAMI (DD), aircraft assistance, and the summoning of at least 2 patrol craft. The counter-attacks were discontinued at 0700I, June 2 and presumably were unsuccessful.

V. Japanese Shipping

1. "A" convoy, including KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS), departed Yokosuka for Truk on June 1. Noon positions of this convoy are available. KUNIKAWA Maru was in the convoy which was so heavily attacked by U.S.S. PLUNGER on May 10-11 (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 15, paragraph III,1).

2. A 4-ship convoy escorted by HIYODORI (TB) is indicated by routing to be en route Yokosuka from Truk, via Saipan.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 3, 1943

SRNS0416

I. General

1. Intercepted Japanese radio traffic of the past 24 hours presented nothing unusual. Administrative traffic continued its excessively high level, but overall volume was approximately normal.

2. For the purpose of carrying on conferences concerning operations, Staff members of the Southwest Area Fleet and of the 1st and 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleets are scheduled to leave Surabaya on June 6 by flying boat, arriving Yokohama June 8 and Hiro (under the jurisdiction of Kure Naval Base) on the following day, departing June 18.

3. Radars are being installed in 3 Minesweepers of the Okinawa Defense Force.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. It is now indicated that a majority of the Japanese units comprising the Force which sortied from Yokosuka on May 30 and 31 are in the Kure-Inland Sea-Saeki area.

(a) The following ships arrived Kure on June 1 or 2:

- HARUNA (BB), AGANO (CL), and about 5 DD's;
- ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU (CV's);
- 1 CA of Crudiv 7 (MOGAMI?)

(b) Crudiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA, both CA's) and 1 CL are indicated at Saeki Bay (E. coast of Kyushu), carrying out exercises.

(c) A message of May 30 indicates that ZUIHO (CV) with 1 DD is proceeding to Sasebo.

(d) This leaves Cardiv 2 (HITAKA and HAYATAKA), 2 CA's of Crudiv 7 (KUMANO, SUZUYA), and from 5 to 8 DD's unaccounted for, and though these units may also have proceeded to the Inland Sea area, no indications to this effect have been noted.

Director, INM/VINM, USS
 Date: 6/10/43
 CM

2. On May 29 (I-time) it was indicated that UNYO and CHUYO (ACV's) were about to proceed from Truk to Yokosuka with DD escort.

III. Northwest Pacific

1. Traffic for the 1st Combined Communications Unit (Radio Intelligence) has been routed to Ominato. Traffic to this Unit was routed to Rabaul through May 20, to Tokyo from May 21 to 24, and to Ominato since May 25 (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 30, paragraph II,1).

2. Two transports were scheduled to depart from Kataoka Bay (N. coast of Paramushiru) at 0300L, June 3 with ultimate destination indicated as off Nakashiretoke Misaki (S.E. tip of Sakhalin Is.)

3. C-in-C 12th Air Fleet arrived in Kataoka Bay (N. coast of Paramushiru) during the late afternoon of May 28. Subsequent routing of radio traffic indicates the continued presence of this command in Paramushiru.

4. Otaru, on the W. coast of Hokkaido is also an important make-up point for convoys proceeding to the Kuriles.

IV. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

In accordance with the schedule set forth in the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 27 (paragraph III, (A)), a number of Japanese DD's (probably 3) made a successful transport run to Kolombangara during the night May 31-June 1. Zero fighter cover was provided from about 2300L, May 31 to 0300L, June 1.

(B) Wake Island

At 1704L, June 2 a Jap message advised Wake to be on the alert because of a flight of planes on June 2 (I-time) from Hawaii to Midway. During June 2 extended air patrols were maintained eastward from Wake and Buotto.

(C) New Guinea

Lae radio sent a message to Finschhafen stating that 2 landing barges were to leave at sunset June 2 (local time). The barges were to carry 5 tons of provisions, military stores, and 2 boxes of secret documents. They were to return at sunset, June 7. Point of departure, destination, or purpose of the trip are unknown. It may be suggested, however, that a partial evacuation of Lae is perhaps underway, possibly in part occasioned by recent heavy bombings.

V. Japanese Shipping

A Japanese escorted convoy of 12 MARU's, possibly aggregating about 60,000 tons of shipping, was scheduled to depart from Hongkong (?) at 1000L, June 2 for Japan ports. Noon positions from June 2 through June 6 are available. One MARU carries 900 prisoners and is bound for Moji.

BY DIRECTOR, NSA/CSS, USA
Date: 01/02/80

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VI. Diplomatic

Despite the rather circuitous source of the information (Ambassador Steinhardt to Premier Saracoglu to the Spanish Ambassador at Ankara to the Jap Ambassador at Ankara), Tokyo advised its Ambassador at Kuibyshev that the note carried by Special Envoy Davies was tantamount to an ultimatum to Russia that bases from which Japan can be bombed be granted to the United States.

R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 4, 1943

SRNS 0417

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F01 ✓ E
F02 ✓
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F30 ✓
F31 ✓

I. General

There was no change in the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours, and although some additional activity was noted in operational traffic, its volume is still relatively low. Administrative traffic dropped sharply but is still above the current normal. In general, the overall picture presented by radio intelligence remains unchanged. Japanese submarines appeared quiet.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. In the High North, principal Japanese emphasis continues to be on air movements in the Kuriles area, but general radio traffic shows a decline.

2. # 5 Weather Central, formerly at Ominato, has been split and its headquarters moved to Paramshiru.

3. A message on June 2 ordered Air Group # 452 to be moved to Shimshu Advance Air Base. KIMIKAWA Maru (XCVS), which sailed on May 31 apparently for Paramshiru, is to assist in the transportation. An interesting side-light is furnished by the desire, expressed in this message, that float-plane fighter ground personnel now on Kiska and who hold good conduct awards also be returned to Shimshu at the earliest date. This suggests that perhaps duty on Kiska is not especially attractive even to the Japanese.

4. A converted submarine tender and a tanker were apparently en route to the Kuriles on June 1.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls

1. (a) A Japanese message of June 2 gave instructions for Cardiv 2 squadrons to move to the Marshalls area in accordance with the following schedule: Cardiv 2 Headquarters and HITAKA squadrons are to go to Wotje;

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 01/02/80
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HAYATAKA squadrons to Enotto. These shifts are to be made in June (date unrecovered). Each group is composed of about 500 men and preparations are to be made at once for the acquisition and transportation of consumable supplies.

2. "14th Division", composition unknown but presumably composed of surface ships, has been shifted to the Marshalls. 4th Fleet commented upon the difficulties of fuel oil supply in the Marshalls area in a message dated May 18, and urgently requested that work be expedited upon SHIRETOKO (AO of 15,050 tons) and that this tanker be reassigned to the 4th Fleet.

3. Japanese aircraft reconnaissance activity in the Marshalls-Gilberts area appeared normal.

(B) Solomons-Rabaul

1. Desdiv 22 (less 2 DD's) departed Buin area for Rabaul on June 4, carrying 162 naval (38 patients) and 172 army (98 patients) personnel.

2. It is indicated that about 8 DD's of Desron 3 are in the Shortland Island - Rabaul area.

3. AIKOKU Maru (XCL of 10,500 tons) departed Truk for Rabaul on June 4. She was escorted by 1 DD for 150 miles from Truk.

4. Solomons-Bismark-New Guinea area Japanese air reconnaissance activity appeared normal.

(C) N.E.I. (Kei Islands)

Portable radars are to be installed in the Kei Island Group.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

On May 27th the Captain of an unidentified Japanese man-of-war (possibly a large auxiliary) reported a submarine attack at 2325I, May 25 in position Lat. 14° 17' N., Long. 144° 54' E., resulting in a hit in the ship's stern and her quick sinking.

V. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. There are recurrent indications that Takao (Formosa) is assuming great importance as an arrival and departure point for Japanese convoys en route to and from Japan and the Southwest Pacific.

2. ASAMA Maru (16,975 gross tons) was scheduled to depart Makassar for Singapore at 0600I, June 3 and was to be escorted as far as

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Lat. 4° 10' S., Long. 116° 20' E.

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R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 5, 1943

F302
F31
SRNS 0418

I. General:

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic remained approximately at the average level of the past 10 days, but operational traffic decreased sharply. Gains were registered by D/F, Personnel, and Auxiliary Ship traffic. Administrative volume declined slightly but continued its upward trend in relation to other types of traffic.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements:

1. It is now indicated that the KONGO (BB of Batdiv 3) arrived Kure on June 1 with AGANO (CL) and six DD's. Also on June 1 KUMANO and SUZUYA (CA's of Crudiv 7) arrived Saeki Bay (E. coast of Kyushu). All units which sortied from Yokosuka on May 30 and 31 (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 3, par. II,1) are now accounted for except HITAKA and HAYATAKA, which are estimated to be enroute the Marshalls to carry out the transfer of their planes to Wotje and Ruotto scheduled for sometime in June.

2. UNYO and CHUYO (ACV's) escorted by 3 DD's are scheduled to arrive Yokosuka at 1600I, June 9 from Truk. UNYO is carrying 650 passengers, 12 aircraft; CHUYO, 650 passengers, 10 aircraft.

3. OTAKA (ACV), now believed at Sasebo having radar installed, is apparently scheduled to depart soon for Yokosuka.

III. Southwest Pacific:

(A) Ponape - Nauru.

2DD's of Desdiv 24 are scheduled to transport stores from Truk to Ponape and Nauru, arriving Ponape, June 6, Nauru June 8.

(B) Solomons.

Further information confirms the sinking by our Task Force of 2 Japanese DD's (believed to be MURASAME and HARUSAME) on the night of March 5 in Kula Gulf and indicates that approximately 10 Japanese officers and 162 men were lost in the action.

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(C) N.E.I.

1. A Japanese Army Transport Convoy (#8) was scheduled to depart Soerabaya, June 4, moving reinforcements to Waingapu (Soemba Is.), and several other points in the N.E.I. - New Guinea area; thence returning to Soerabaya, due June 23 (I-time).
2. A series of dispatches suggested troop movements from Palau to Hollandia.
3. 5 VB (land attack planes) will be flown from Takao to Madisen, Java in the near future.
4. Four radar sets are to be sent by plane from SUZUKA (Empire) to Kendari.

R.A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 6, 1943

SRNS 0419

I. General

1. During the past 24 hours volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was somewhat below normal, the only change of significance in any individual system being a sharp drop in auxiliary ship traffic. Operational traffic remained at a rather low level while Army activities continued to be the source of a very substantial volume.

2. There is some evidence that air bases in Taiwan are being reinforced. This area is also assuming greater importance as a stepping stone for aircraft flown from the Empire to the N.E.I.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. Commander Batdiv 3 (KONGO and HARUNA) will command an unknown force which has been assigned to the Advance Force (2nd Fleet, based at Truk) in a movement to Truk, scheduled immediately upon completion of exercises now being carried out near Kure. While there is as yet insufficient information on which to base definite conclusions, it appears that the recently depleted Japanese naval strength at Truk may soon be restored to more normal (based on previous practice) proportions.

2. Machine guns and related equipment are being removed from the AOBA (CA damaged at Kavieng April 3, now at Truk), indicating that she will continue out of action for some time.

III. Japanese Shipping

1. An escorted convoy of several vessels (indicated by association of addressees to be enroute Truk) departed Yokosuka June 1 for Saipan. Noon positions are available.

2. A Convoy "B" departed Takao at 1000L, June 5 for Singapore, apparently having under tow the 7,072 ton tanker KOZUI Maru. Noon positions are available.

IV. Southwest Pacific

(A) Bismarcks

1. The anti-submarine protection provided for the AIKOKU Maru (YCL),

0884

by Director, NSA/Chief, OSS
 7/16/43
 01/02/80

en route Truk to Rabaul (835 nautical miles distance), is of interest. She will have a DD escort to a point 150 miles south of Truk, then aerial patrol by fighters from Kavieng during the entire ensuing day.

2. Transportation by submarine between Rabaul and Lae continues to be carried out regularly. There is some slight evidence that aerial patrol is utilized further to safeguard these operations.

V. Diplomatic

A message from Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to the Japanese Ambassador at Kuibyshev reveals that Japan will soon commence negotiations with the Kremlin designed to place Russo-Jap relations on a long-term friendly basis. The exact nature of the proposed negotiations is unknown, but that Japan is playing a lone hand is indicated by Shigemitsu's statement that " -- it might be a very delicate matter if Germany and Italy find out about it -- -- but we can fix it up with them later".

W.D. Boone
for R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 7, 1943

SRNS 0420

I. General

~~SECRET~~

1. On the whole, intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours was colorless. Overall volume was below normal, the decrease being principally accounted for by a drop in administrative traffic. There were slight increases, of no apparent importance, in operational, weather, D/F, and contact codes. In the High North, radio traffic indicated a primary Japanese concern with routine supply and reinforcement. The Solomons were unusually quiet, as was the Marshalls-Gilberts area, except for indications of long-range reconnaissance to the north and east of Wake.

2. NISSHO Maru (10,526-ton tanker), in requesting a thorough overhaul, complained of various broken down machinery, etc. It was pointed out that his job called for a 6 weeks cruise. 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff gave permission for the overhaul upon completion of present duties. No information is available concerning the significance of the "6 weeks cruise".

3. Consideration of several items set forth below suggest feverish activity on the part of the Japanese to prepare defensively for real or imagined offensive operations on our part. This trend has already been noticeable over a period of several months and it is therefore possible that the lessons of Guadalcanal and Attu are now further being taken to heart by the Japanese. There is also clear evidence that heavy air reinforcements have been sent or are en route to the High North, the Marshalls, and the Solomons-Bismarck-New Guinea-N.E.I. areas. The last-named area, taken as a whole (but not including Sumatra) now contains approximately 25% of the entire Japanese air forces (Army and Navy) and 30% of their total land-based strengths. This concentration of air strength suggests a prospective Japanese counter-air offensive, or alternatively, may be intended to absorb the shock of expected Allied air operations on a large scale by our South and Southwest Pacific Forces.

4. An order of May 8 from Comdr. Striking Force assigned the "Standby Force" and "Upkeep Force" to the Main Body of Striking Force. The Standby and Upkeep Forces were composed of units which had recently been repaired, overhauled, or reorganized and were chiefly engaged in upkeep and training exercises.

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714 Date: 01/07/80

5. A plane with two German Naval Captains embarked departed Taihoku (Formosa) for Tokyo, via Fukaoka (Kyushu), on June 6.

II. Southwest Pacific

As of May 31, the control of Japanese radio intelligence in the event of attack in the New Guinea (?) - New Britain area was given to Rabaul (8th Communication Unit), and in the event of attack in the Marshalls - Gilberts - Nauru area, to Jaluit (6th Communication Unit).

(A) Marshalls

Further evidence of the strengthening of Marshalls bases is furnished by a 4th Fleet order of June 6 to 4th Civil Engineers whereby the latter were directed to prepare materials on an urgent basis, including barracks, for the following:

- For 400 men at Wake
- " 900 " " Mili Landplane Base
- " 500 " " Taroa
- " 400 " " Kwajalein
- " 500 " " Wotje
- " 400 " " Jaluit
- " 1400 " " Nauru

(B) Solomons

A fragmentary Japanese dispatch of June 5 mentions mines laid in the vicinity of Faisi Island, indicating Japanese knowledge of our recent mine-laying in this area.

(C) Rabaul

8 Weather Unit at Rabaul ordered a number of weather vessels to make hourly weather reports between 0300I and 0900I daily, commencing June 7.

III. Northwest Pacific

On June 6 Paramushiru Air Base sent a message concerning the use of laborers of the Japan-Russia Fisheries Co. for rush jobs in establishing air bases in that area. It was also stated that they are to be used for the urgent work of engineering and transport on Paramushiru Island land air base.

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F01	<u>✓</u>	F30	<u>✓</u>
F02	<u>✓</u>	F31	<u>✓</u>

~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 8, 1943

SRNS 0421

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continues below normal. The volume of operational traffic has remained practically unchanged and is still relatively low, but D/F traffic rose substantially and is at the highest level for about 10 days. Northern Area traffic was relatively high, with about half administrative in character. Except for a flurry in the High North, Jap submarines were quiet.

2. Communication Staff at Ominato on June 7 (I-time) requested Truk Communication Unit to advise whether any firm basis existed for the latter's conclusions regarding the composition and mission of the U.S. Task Force heading north in the (New Caledonia?) area.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. Comdr. Striking Force (C-in-C 3rd Fleet) on June 7 directed Crudiv 7 (CA's KUMANO and SUZUYA), HARUNA (BB of Batdiv 3), Desdiv 16, and 2 DD's to depart Western Inland Sea area and to arrive Yokosuka June 13. KONGO (BB, Flag of Batdiv 3) and 1 unidentified ship were directed to load personnel and gear of Yokosuka # 2 Special Landing Force and # 28 Anti-Aircraft Unit at Yokosuka and to be ready to sortie on June 25. It will be recalled that Combatdiv 3 previously had been ordered to command a force of unknown composition and to proceed to Truk (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 6, paragraph II, 1).

2. A message at 0848I, June 8 stated that Cardiv 2 (CV's HITAKA and HAYATAKA) would depart Yokosuka on an unrecovered June date (probably very shortly).

3. GOSHU Maru (APV of 8,592 gross tons) departed Truk for Yokosuka at 0600I, June 7, arriving 2000I, June 13. Noon positions are available.

4. On June 7, Chief of Staff 4th Fleet advised C-in-C 11th Air Fleet that despite the most energetic efforts, 4th Fleet does not have sufficient ships to supply Airflot # 22 (Marshalls) with gasoline. Assistance in this regard was requested.

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RETURN TO F II

5. A convoy of 3 ships, including FUJIKAWA Maru (XCVS) and 2 escort vessels departed Yokosuka for Truk at 1400I, June 7. Noon positions from June 8 to 14 are available.

III. Northwest Pacific

1. An administrative dispatch at 1829I, June 6 from 12th Air Fleet, action to Kiska Base Force, suggests plans for plane flights to Kiska. On June 6 (I-time) 6 seaplane fighters took off for Ominato.

2. On June 7, 4 definite (8 possible) Jap submarines were D/F'd in the general Aleutians area.

IV. Solomons Area

An increase in volume of radio traffic from Comdr. New Georgia Area Force to a wide list of addressees suggests preparations for increased Japanese activity in the Solomons area in the near future.

V. Diplomatic

A message from Hsinking to Tokyo dated May 28 points out that if United States forces should set foot anywhere on Kamchatka, the Kwantung Army would attack Vladivostok and other points immediately. An unknown personage was quoted as stating that the Japanese General Staff would be in accord with such a move, thus inferentially admitting the semi-independent character of the Kwantung Army, even to the extent of starting a war with Russia.

VI. Economic

1. During June, a total of 9 Japanese ships, aggregating 72,300 gross tons, have been assigned to carry 63,000 tons of French Indo-China rice to Japan and Korea. In addition, 1 other MARU is to carry 10,000 tons of Saigon corn. Thai rice, during June, is to be carried by 4 ships aggregating 26,700 gross tons.

2. BOGOTA (a German ship of 1,230 gross tons) is to depart Kobe on (June date) for Batavia to await orders, thence to proceed to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to submarines engaged in transportation operations to Germany.

3. Auxiliary sailing vessels are now being employed by the Japanese as carriers in the Bismarck-Solomons area.

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7/14/80 Date: 8/10/80

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~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 9, 1943

SRNS 0422

I. General

A noticeable decrease (22%) occurred in overall volume of Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours. Volume of priority traffic on the Truk broadcast to Guadalcanal Operations Force was above normal, as was Army traffic on the Palao to Rabaul channel. Tokyo-Paramushiru channel was also above normal but was primarily concerned with administrative traffic.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. Comcardiv 2 in HITAKA (CV) with 2 DD's as escort is scheduled to depart Yokosuka for Truk on June 10 (I-time), arriving North Channel at 0900I, June 15. Anti-submarine patrols are to be provided at Yokosuka and Truk. Courses, points en route with times, and speeds are available. (See also, ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 8, paragraph II, 2).

2. A northward-bound Jap submarine is proceeding west of Hokkaido on June 10 and at about 1200I, June 11 will transit Soya Strait (between Hokkaido and Sakhalin) for the Paramushiru area.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Mandates

(a) C-in-C 2nd Fleet on June 2 requested that 2 MARU's be assigned for carrying provisions to the Marshalls and Palao areas, giving as his reasons the prospective increase in personnel at Truk during mid-June and the fact that the problem of establishing large stores of provisions in these areas must be solved.

(b) An unidentified Jap vessel is departing Yokosuka for Truk, carrying 700 workmen for the 4th Civil Engineers and 600 military personnel.

(c) ISUZU (CL) is scheduled to carry personnel for Nauru from Kure.

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(B) Bismarck Archipelago

Comdesdiv 22 (less 2 DD's) reported his arrival and departure from Garowe (?) Island (N. of New Britain), bringing back to Rabaul 235 Army personnel (including 209 patients).

(C) Solomons

At 0910I, June 8 a Jap plane reported sighting 2 (U.S.) cruisers (?) and 2 (U.S.) DD's (?). Position, course, and speed were given but remain unrecovered. This message was broadcast to Subforce.

IV. Japanese Intelligence

A Japanese diplomatic message dated June 2 from Canton to Hanoi reported that the Foreign Office of the Chungking Government recently received information concerning the Washington conference, summarized as follows:

1. The U.S. will take charge of all naval operations in the Pacific while the British fleet will take charge in the Indian Ocean.
2. The Aleutians are to be completely reoccupied and utilized as air and submarine bases.
3. In the Midway area, Guam is to be reoccupied.
4. U.S. air and submarine operations will be stepped up in the Solomons and New Guinea areas.
5. Air defenses of Australia will be taken care of by American planes.
6. Transport of supplies to China by air will be increased. U.S. will transport to India, Great Britain and China from India to China.
7. Including the American air force and transports, Chungking has 500 planes available.

V. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. An unidentified Japanese vessel (___SHO MARU) was torpedoed and sunk in Lat. 17° 30 N., Long. 110° 55 E., at 1200I, May 29 (?).
2. Two rather lengthy Japanese messages dated June 5 and 7 are available and in process of translation. They deal with the results of questioning a radioman first class from U.S.S. GRENADIER, but neither message apparently mentions the fate of the submarine. The results of research on these messages will be reported herein shortly.

VI. Japanese Convoys and Shipping

1. (a) NISSHO Maru's (10,526-ton tanker) "6 weeks cruise",

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mentioned in the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 7 (paragraph I,2), involves a routine trip to Singapore and Balikpapan to load fuel oil, gasoline, etc., thence to Truk.

(b) TOA MARU (10,052-ton tanker) is scheduled to arrive Palembang Harbor to load oil on June 12 (I-time) and will top off at Singapore.

2. A Japanese convoy of 10 MARU's was scheduled to arrive Takao on June 9 (I-time) from the Keelung area.

3. Convoy # 3501, composed of 6 MARU's, departed Manila at 1500I, June 8 and is scheduled to arrive off Cape St. Jacques (French Indo-China) at 0700I, June 13. Noon positions are available.

4. A convoy bound for Rabaul is to be met by an escort vessel in Lat. 1° 30' S., Long. 148° 08' E. at about 0500I, June 9. Other convoy activity in this general area has also been noted.

5. A 6-ship convoy departed Japan at 0820I, June 7 for Takao via Bako, arriving Takao 2100I, June 10. Approximate noon positions are available.

6. In a report of the shipping situation at Palao, it was indicated that 11 ships are to depart for Rabaul on June 13. Escort arrangements were requested.

VII. Economic

1. Junks, as well as auxiliary sailing vessels, are under construction at Saigon under the auspices of the Japanese Army. A message dated February 27 indicates that 500 ship carpenters are to be collected as a military labor gang from the Canton area and are to be sent to Saigon for this purpose.

2. ALSTERUFER (2,729 gross tons), a German blockade runner, reported her safe arrival (at Singapore?) on May 24. She is believed to have left Bordeaux for the Far East on March 29.

R. A. Boone
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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 10, 1943

SRNS 0423

I. General

Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours presented a colorless picture, with overall volume remaining at the low level of yesterday. Operational and administrative volumes reached the lowest levels since early May. Volume of traffic on High North channels declined to below normal. The only activity of note was in Army traffic, an exceptionally high volume of which was originated by Palao, probably in connection with continued troop movements to the East N.E.I.-New Guinea-Melanesia area.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. A dispatch originated by CinC 5th Fleet (probably in CA-NACHI) at 2100I, June 9 indicated that he was at sea in the general Paramushiru area.

There is no information on which to base an estimate of the strength or mission of this force but it will be recalled that 4 CA's (NACHI, MAYA, MYOKO, HAGURO), 3 CL's (KISO, TAMA, ABUKUMA), and at least 6 DD's were given anchorage assignments in Paramushiru Strait on May 17. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 31, par. II,1). In addition to the above, 3 XCL's and 1 XCVS are believed to be operating in this area.

2. Further strengthening of bases in the Paramushiru area is indicated by the scheduled arrival from Yokosuka in Paramushiru Strait on June 12 of 259 men of # 30 Pioneer Unit.

3. Desdiv 10 (AKIGUMO, KAZEGUMO, YUGUMO) departed Yokosuka Communication Zone and entered Ominato Communication Zone at 1500I, June 9. The previous operating sphere of Desdiv 10 (attached to Desron 10, 3rd (Carrier) Fleet) has been the Southern area.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

It is indicated that Airflot 21(?), which moved from the Bismarcks to the Tenian area about May 17, is scheduled to return to the Southern area, probably the Solomons. Mogamigawa Maru (APV) is expected to assist in this

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 01/01/43

movement. Apparently either Airflot 21 was moved to Tenian for refitting and reorganization, or Japanese plans with respect to this Airflot have undergone a change.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

AKEBONO Maru (AO of 10,200 gross tons) was hit by a torpedo just prior to 0012I, June 9 in position Lat. 02° 17 N., Long. 145° 38 E., but was able to proceed at 14 knots. She had been scheduled on June 5 to proceed at discretion from Rabaul to Tarakan, but after this attack was routed to Truk.

V. Economic

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN, 7,747 ton German tanker, arrived Singapore June 2, and was scheduled to depart June 4 for Surabaya, speed 11 knots.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 11, 1943

SRNS 0424

I. General

~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

Although the overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was only slightly above normal for the past 24 hours, the complexion of traffic was greatly changed. Contact traffic reached a new peak, with the majority indicated as high precedence on the Rabaul and Truk broadcasts to Guadalcanal Operations Force and on the Tokyo to All Major Commands circuit. Most of this traffic was intercepted between 1700 I and 2100I, June 10 (see below). D/F traffic on the Tokyo/Ominato channel increased considerably.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. In a lengthy message dated June 6 from New Georgia Defense Force, it was concluded that increased U.S. bombings and concentration of transports and aircraft at Guadalcanal were indicative of an attack on Kolombangara. The probable date of the attack was given but is unrecovered, and the belief was expressed that landings will be attempted at a number of points in the New Georgia and Solomons area. The message continued with a number of orders concerning immediate reinforcements, dispositions, and strengthening of forces in the threatened areas.

2. Between 1000I and 2120I, June 10, many plane contact reports dealing with the sighting of a U.S. Force of BB's (or carriers), cruisers, and DD's were noted. At least 13 plane sections or groups were involved, with an estimated minimum of 60 planes. The volume of this aircraft traffic was the highest in many weeks.

(B) Marshalls

The appearance of "Eastern Force Air Force" and "Flagship Eastern Force" in Japanese radio traffic tends to confirm the organization of a new force to operate in or from the Marshalls. The Air Force concerned is probably to be composed of Airflot # 22 and squadrons from HITAKA and HAYATAKA, at Wotje

BY DIRECTOR, NSA/CSS, 500

7/14/43 Date: 01/27/43

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~~RETURN TO F-11~~

and Ruotto respectively. Surface ships are probably assigned to this force, with the possibility suggested by routing that Comdr. Eastern Force is still in Japan.

(C) Rabaul

1. Chief of Staff, 8th Fleet is to depart Rabaul by plane on June 15 for the purpose of making an inspection of the Wewak area.
2. KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS of 6,863 gross tons) is scheduled to arrive Rabaul at 0900I, June 13 from Truk.

III. Northwest Pacific

Navy weather stations in the Kuriles were directed to make hourly weather reports concerning fog, etc. in cooperation with an Army observatory on Hokkaido. Observations are to be made hourly from June 8 to July 7. A large volume of weather traffic from Kuriles stations indicates that fog may be delaying operational plans.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. A Japanese message reported that HITAKA (CV) was torpedoed at 1832I, June 10 in position bearing 70° distant 17 miles from Iro Saki (?) (Lat. 34° 36' N., Long. 138° 51' E) and is unable to make way. An unidentified ship was ordered out from Yokosuka (?) to assist, and another vessel was directed to cease its convoy escort and to proceed to the scene for anti-submarine duties. A message at 0700I, June 11 reported "Commenced towing, speed about 2 knots", probably referring to HITAKA. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 9, paragraph II, 1. for HITAKA's schedule).
2. Although the messages concerned are somewhat confusing, it appears likely that IRO (14,050-ton tanker), under tow to Japan, was again torpedoed but not sunk, with a list of 13° reported at 0601I, June 10. At 1200I, June 10 speed was indicated as 4.5 knots in the vicinity of Bungo Suido, with towing conditions worse than before the attack.

V. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. # 3 TONAN Maru (19,200-ton tanker) departed Truk for Palao at 1500I, June 10 and is scheduled to enter Palao at 1100I, June 15 to unload 5,000 tons of fuel oil and 300 (tons?) of gasoline. Approximate noon positions are available.
2. A 5-ship convoy departed Kobe at 0900I, June 9 for Palao, arriving 1500I, June 17. A number of points en route are available.
3. An important convoy of 4 ships, apparently heavily loaded with munitions, departed Bako at 1400I, June 10, arriving off Cape St. Jacques at 1400I, June 16. Noon positions are available.

by Director, NSA, Cillof, CSS
Date: 6/16/46

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4. The routing of a number of Japanese ships to Balikpapan indicates a growing importance of that port as a probable refueling point.

VI. Diplomatic

A message dated June 4 from Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to his Ambassador at Kuibyshev gives the impression that Shigemitsu is having difficulties with the Japanese Navy over the release of the Russian ships recently seized. Previously, he had expressed great annoyance over a statement by a "so-called Japanese spokesman" (who, according to Shigemitsu, had the backing of the Army General Staff) to the effect that the Kwantung Army would immediately attack if Russia grants bases to the U.S. Apparently to placate the military, Shigemitsu once again instructed his Ambassador to obtain written assurances regarding the bases.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MA Date: *08/20/80*

R.A. Boone

R.A. Boone.

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[Handwritten notes and signatures]

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 12, 1943

SRNS 0425

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic rose considerably above normal during the past 24 hours and was practically at an all-time record. Administrative traffic returned to its recent high level, and the auxiliary ship traffic recorded a new high, generally distributed over all areas. A total of 72 messages in tactical code were noted on Truk and Rabaul broadcasts to Guadalcanal Operations Force and on the Tokyo to All Major Commands channel. Weather and D/F traffic continued high.

2. A Japanese CV, possibly ZUIHO, is scheduled to carry out training exercises on June 14 (I-time), with June 15 indicated as a reserve date, in the Southern Kyushu area. On June 23 (with June 24 as a reserve date), HOSHO (old CV) is to conduct torpedo firing training exercises, with 18 torpedoes to be fired.

3. A Japanese destroyer was ordered to Yokosuka on June 9 for the installation of additional equipment, including 25 mm. and 13 mm. guns and radar.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Comdr. Air Group # 452 reported having embarked in a submarine and departed from Kiska on June 9. He expects to arrive Shimushu, where his Air Group is located, on June 14.

2. Desdiv 10 (3 DD's) is scheduled to arrive in Paramushiru Strait during the evening of June 13 with 259 men of the 30th Pioneer Unit embarked.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls

No further information is available concerning the mission or composition of "Eastern Force" mentioned in paragraph II, (B) of yesterday's ~~Secret~~

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
md Date: *01/02/80*

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Supplement. One slight indication, however, suggests that C-in-C 2nd Fleet may be the commander of this apparently newly organized Force.

(B) Solomons

Between 0930I and 1040I, June 11 a Jap plane reported sighting a U.S. force of 1 cruiser and 1 DD. He also gave weather reports in the vicinity.

IV. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. Crudiv 7 (CA's KUMANO and SUZUYA), HARUNA (BB), RYUHO (ACV) and 5 DD's were scheduled to sortie from the western Inland Sea area, probably through Bungo Suido, at 0600I, June 12 and to proceed to Yokosuka. Airflot # 50 was ordered to provide air coverage as far as Long. 134° 30'. Upon arrival at Yokosuka, RYUHO is to be temporarily assigned to Cardiv 2 and will be sent to Truk. This decision may have been made as a result of HITAKA's damage, in which case RYUHO would probably carry HITAKA's planes southward.

2. AIKOKU Maru (XCL of 10,500 gross tons) having apparently delivered an important cargo for 11th Air Fleet, is scheduled depart Rabaul for Kure at 1600I, June 12.

3. HITAKA (CV) and 2 DD's arrived Yokosuka according to a message of 1053I, June 12 (see yesterday's ~~Supplement~~ Supplement, paragraph IV, 1 regarding the torpedoing of HITAKA).

V. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. GENOA Maru (6,785 gross tons), was reported sunk at about 1800(?)I, June 11 in Lat. 7° 35' N., Long. 134° 28' E.

2. At about 0240I, June 8, _____ To Maru was torpedoed and sunk in Lat. 8° 14' N., Long. 134° 18' E.

3. (Possible) KAIUN Maru (unlisted), in a message from Takasago Maru (XAM) at 0640I, June 11, was reported to have a 10° list with her bow under water and in some danger of sinking. The master and crew were transferred to another ship. It was reported that judging from the oil and debris which came to the surface, it is considered certain that the submarine was sunk. KAIUN Maru departed Rabaul on June 8 for Truk.

4. AKEBONO Maru (10,200-ton tanker), previously reported damaged by a torpedo attack (~~Supplement~~ Supplement of June 10, paragraph IV), arrived Truk at about 1330I, June 10.

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by Director, NSA/CSS, CSS

MS Date: 8/12/88

5. Traffic indicates that FUJIKAWA Maru (XCVS of 6,938 gross tons) was attacked by a submarine in the Marianas area at about 1140I, June 10 but apparently was not sunk. It is believed that the attack took place in Lat. 24° 45' N., Long. 145° 52' E.

7. An unidentified Japanese vessel, apparently in the Marcus-Chichijima area, reported having been hit by a torpedo at 1705I, June 11.

8. A Japanese submarine warning broadcast places the location of HITAKA (CV) torpedoing in Lat. 34° 13' N., Long. 139° 51' E.

VI. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. A convoy of 8 Maru's under escort was scheduled to depart Takao (?) at 1000I, June 11 for Japan, arriving at 1030I, June 17, speed of 7 knots. Noon positions from June 11 to 15 inclusive are available.

2. A 10-vessel convoy is en route to Hongkong and Sams (Hainan). Part of the convoy is scheduled to arrive Hongkong at 2000I, June 13. Noon positions from June 9 to 13 inclusive are available.

VII. Miscellaneous

1. On June 10 Comdr. 12th Special Base Force (at Rangoon) requested 300 mines and as many of the mines stored at Singapore as possible.

2. A message dated June 4 in Japanese diplomatic code from Vienna to Tokyo reported that the Germans are making secret tests with a ray designed to affect the magneto of a plane, thus stopping the motor and causing the plane to crash.

W. D. Boone
for R. A. Boone.

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W.D. Boone Date: 01/02/80

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~~Secret~~ Supplement

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 13, 1943

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SRNS 0426

I. General

1. Overall volume of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours declined to approximately normal. Administrative traffic dropped somewhat following yesterday's sharp rise while auxiliary ship traffic declined 50%. Number of tactical messages was about unchanged with the Tokyo Broadcast to all Major Commands being the most productive source of this type of traffic.

2. At 1937 I, June 10, an unidentified Japanese vessel, which had just finished depth charging the U.S. submarine which attacked the HITAKA, (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 11, par. IV, 1), was itself taken under fire by HITAKA anti aircraft and machine gun batteries at a distance of about 3 kilometers, resulting in slight damage to the hull of the Japanese vessel, the killing of two of her crew and the wounding of five.

3. On June 12 CinC Third Fleet hoisted his flag ashore at an unidentified air station, probably in the Kure area, indicating that he would return it to ZUIKAKU (CV) on an unrecovered date, possibly June 23 when ZUIKAKU is scheduled to complete overhaul.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. Operational traffic in the high north increased with a heavy volume being directed to Northern Submarine Force. Association of addressees suggested possible reinforcements for Kiska by air and/or by submarine.

2. Staff officer Emoto who was recently prominent on Attu has appeared in traffic from Paramushiru, indicating that he made good his escape.

3. There appear to be a considerable number of merchant vessels proceeding from the Empire northward to the Paramushiru area. An Army transport convoy of 3 vessels was scheduled to depart Otaru (Hokkaido) at 1600 I, June 14, for an unidentified destination believed to be near Kataoka Bay (N. Paramushiru).

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III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls

Eastern Force (first noted in ~~fact~~ Supplement of June 11, paragraph II (B)) was again prominent in traffic. Nothing further as to the actual composition of this force was revealed but there were indications that CinC Second Fleet may be Commander Eastern Force and that air units will play an important, if not predominant part in its operations.

(B) Bismarcks

1. On the night of June 9-10 Comdesdiv 22 evacuated from Garowe Island (N. of New Britain) an undisclosed total number of army troops including 152 wounded, and a few naval personnel. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 9, paragraph III (B).

3. 65 industrial fishing vessels (?) are being sent from Palau to Rabaul, departing Palau in two groups, the first of which is scheduled to depart June 14 and arrive Rabaul June 24.

(C) New Guinea

500 drums 91 octane gasoline and 60 drums aviation oil were urgently requested by Sorong, an emergency Seaplane Base on the Western tip of Dutch New Guinea.

(D) Solomons

A dispatch dated June 9 indicated that the Japanese are salvaging the HITACHI MARU (6545 tons) and NICHIMARU, two merchantmen bombed in the North Solomons area.

IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping

A convoy of two vessels, one carrying ammunition and the other gasoline, were scheduled to depart Singapore June 12 to arrive Batavia June 15.

V. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. 14 warrant officers and above and 73 petty officers and men of the crew of the KAMIKAWA MARU are reported to be passengers on the AIKOKU MARU (XCL) departing Rabaul June 12 for Kure. This leaves little doubt that the KAMIKAWA MARU was in fact sunk by a U.S. submarine on May 28. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 30, paragraph IV, 1).

2. Further details with reference to the sinking of the GENOA MARU reported in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement reveal that she received one torpedo hit but was able to proceed to a position two miles north of Palau

By Unsub...
Date: 7/11/44

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where she sank at 1851 I, June 11. There were no casualties, the entire crew being rescued by a patrol boat.

3. An attack by a U.S. submarine in the Singapore area during the night of June 10-11 on a convoy believed to include the NICHIRAN MARU, LONDON MARU, and YASUKUNI MARU, possibly resulted in the damaging or sinking of one of the vessels in the convoy.

4. A flurry of traffic from 1830 to 2253 I, June 12 reporting U.S. submarines in the South China area indicated that an attack had been made on a Japanese convoy, apparently with some success.

5. An item dated June 3 indicated that Japanese planes discovered a U.S. submarine on the surface at 1000 I, June 2, position Lat. 28°-15' N., Long. 125°-00' E. Depth bombs were dropped but results reported as uncertain.

VI. Economic

Japanese efforts to repair the oil refineries at Balikpapan were indicated by the fact that a cargo of 1500 tons of miscellaneous " - - machinery parts" were consigned to Balikpapan on a vessel departing Takao June 14.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 14, 1943

SRNS0427

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic remained normal during the past 24 hours; the only significant features being continued abnormal volume in the Marshalls-Gilberts (treated separately below), and a sharp gain in Army traffic. 84 messages were intercepted in the Army system, the bulk of which were on the Tokyo to Palau and Palau to Tokyo circuits. Guadalcanal Operations Force was prominent in tactical traffic, the total volume of which was about unchanged from the previous day.

2. Indications noted some time ago that Japanese employ radar in aircraft were borne out by a recent installation at Yokohama in a Type 2 Flying Boat.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

At 1400I, June 16 the following force is scheduled to depart Yokosuka for Truk:

<u>Strength</u>	<u>Attached to</u>	<u>Name</u>
2 BB	Batdiv 3	KONGO, HARUNA
1 CV (or ACV)	Cardiv 2	RYUHO
2 ACV	3rd Fleet	UNYO, CHUYO
2 CA	Crudiv 7	KUMANO, SUZUYA
1 CL	4th Fleet	ISUZU
12 DD (approximate)		

Daily positions are given and arrival at North Channel, Truk is scheduled for about 1200I, June 21.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls-Gilberts

1. In view of the importance which the newly organized Eastern

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Mad RA Date: 01/02/80

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Force is assuming the following correlation of information thus far available concerning it is presented:

(a) Commander Eastern Force is tentatively indicated to be C-in-C 2nd Fleet.

(b) Eastern Force includes Eastern Air Force which is commanded by Commander Air Flot 22 composed of 2nd Air Attack Force and the Squadrons of Cardiv 2 (HAYATAKA and RYUHO) scheduled to be based in the Marshalls.

(c) Surface components of Eastern Force are not yet known but "Squadron 14", which apparently includes ISUZU (CL), has been closely associated with Eastern Force. Desron 2, composed of JINTSU (CL) and 9 DD's, was associated with Eastern Force in one dispatch dated June 13.

(d) The majority of intercepted messages concerning Eastern Force appear to constitute "dummy traffic", the reason for which is not yet clear.

(e) While further strengthening of the Marshalls-Gilberts areas a logical defensive move for the Japanese, the distinct possibility that the mission of Eastern Force may be to undertake offensive operations against U.S. bases lying to the southeast of the Gilberts should not be overlooked.

N.B. - k

2. JINTSU (CL), flagship of Desron 2, which has been unlocated for some time appears to be at Rnotta (Marshalls), accompanied by 1 DD. 2 additional DD's of Desron 2 are scheduled to depart Truk June 14th to arrive Rnotta at 1100I, June 16.

3. A 3-ship convoy escorted by 1 DD departed Truk June 12; 2 of the vessels bound for Ponape and 1 for Kwajalein (Marshalls).

(B) New Britain

A Japanese Army Hospital ship carrying 450 patients departed Rabaul June 13 for Palau.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. 35 crew members of the # 2 NISSHIN Maru (17,579 gross ton tanker) are being transported to Kobe from Keelung, strongly suggesting that this ship, which was attacked in the general vicinity (Lat. 23° 40 N., Long. 124° 50 E.) of Keelung on April 17-18 and has not been heard from since, was sunk.

2. On June 13 Chief of Staff 4th Fleet reported a recent increase in damage to ships in the Inner South Sea Area (Mandates), referred to U.S. submarines as being on a rampage, and ordered the enforcement of strict anti-submarine measures.

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7/13/80 Date: 01/02/80

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V. Diplomatic

In a wire to Knibyshev Foreign Minister Shigemitsu stated that there were reliable reports that beginning early this winter the route of American supplies to Russia is to be changed from that via Murmansk to via Vladivostok and Basra, and that Ribbentrop had already given orders to the German diplomatic officials at Tokyo to protest to the Japanese Government.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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~~SECRET~~
SECRET SUPPLEMENT

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 15, 1943

SRNS 04/28

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic has remained substantially unchanged, with only weather traffic reaching a new high. D/F traffic continued in fairly heavy volume, with Jaluit as the principal center of activity. Tactical traffic was lower than on the previous day and is now at a 10-day normal level.

2.

On June 14, C-in-C 11th Air Fleet directed a number of air forces under his command to carry out the training of fighters (including twin-engined planes) in order to complete preparations for attacks against enemy offensive forces and transports.

3.

Confirming previous suggestions, HITAKA (CV) squadrons, plane crews, and designated upkeep personnel have now been transferred from HITAKA to RYUHO (ACV). Comcardiv 2 shifted his flag to RYUHO on June 15 (I-time) and, as mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement, is scheduled to depart from Yokosuka on June 16, arriving Truk on June 21. At Truk his flag will be shifted to HAYATAKA (CV). It is interesting to note that RYUHO is taking only 21 shipboard fighters and 9 shipboard attack planes, suggesting the probable capacity of that ship. 18 shipboard bombers from HITAKA were turned over to Yokosuka Air Arsenal for transfer to Tenian, to arrive June 22.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls

1.

JINTSU (CL) and 1 DD are scheduled to arrive at Ruotto at 1530I, June 16. These vessels are carrying material of some kind for 25 and 4 large landing boats respectively. Although details are unknown, the indicated presence at Ruotto of at least 29 large landing craft suggests the formation there of an amphibious force.

2.

HAYATAKA squadrons are scheduled to depart Truk for Ruotto on June 16 (I-time).

0907

~~RETURN TO F-11~~

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Date: 01/02/80

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(B) N.E.I.

A message dated May 17 from 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet requested that nets or cables (the recovery of the message is somewhat fragmentary in this regard) be stretched to stop the passage of Allied submarines through the lesser Sunda Chain as follows:

- Alas Strait (between Lombok and Soembawa Is.) 1
- Sapeh Strait (between Soembawa and Komodo Is.) 2
- Ombai Strait (between Alor and Timor Is.) 2
- Alor Strait (between Alor and Pantar Is.) 1

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

An unidentified ship reported 1 torpedo hit in the Tsugaru Strait area (between Honshu and Hokkaido) at 1838I, June 14. Further details are unknown.

IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. From about June 10 to June 30 an additional 11 MARU's have been assigned to carry cargo from French Indo-China and Thailand to Japan. Approximately 66,000 tons of cargo will be carried by these ships.

2. A Japanese convoy of 13 vessels departed Bako at 1400I, June 14 and are scheduled to arrive at San Jacques (French Indo-China) at 0730 I, June 21. Noon positions are available.

3. An important convoy of 4 vessels departed Bako at 1300I, June 13, speed 14 knots. It is scheduled to arrive at San Jacques at 1430I, June 17. Noon positions are available. SHINKOKU Maru (10,020-ton tanker), bound for Palembang, is included in this convoy.

4. A 5-ship convoy departed Palao for Rabaul at 0900I, June 14, speed 8.5 knots, scheduled to arrive at 0600I, June 22. Noon positions are available.

V. Diplomatic

(a) On June 4, the Japanese Ambassador (Sato) at Moscow was handed a blistering note from the Soviet Government concerning the failure of Japan to release the ships KAMENETS-PODOLSK and INGUL. The note pointed out the obvious Japanese desire to use the release of these ships as a bargaining point for other pending questions, and accuses Japan of violating the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. In short, Molotov insisted upon an immediate and unconditional release.

(b) In his instructions to Ambassador Sato on June 8, Shigemitsu was obviously extremely angry and annoyed at the Soviet note. The Ambassador was directed to insist upon Japan's legal position and to discover how the two governments are at variance. If the Soviet refuse to listen further, however, Sato was ordered to return to Moscow from Knibyshev.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 6/16/40

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 16, 1943

SRNS 0429

I. General

1. At 0000I, June 15 the cipher of the Japanese system from which most important intelligence items are obtained was changed.

2. A slight increase in overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was caused by a sizeable gain in administrative traffic. Practically all major systems were approximately normal, except D/F traffic which continues at a high level, with Rabaul emanating the majority of messages of this type.

3. A message concerning the damage to HITAKA (CV), recently torpedoed by one of our submarines, indicates that this ship expects to dock about June 23 (?). It was estimated that 1 week will be required to install a caisson and to pump water out of the ship. In view of the fact that the damaged sections are under water, no estimate of date of completion could be made.

4. A message dated June 11 indicated that all 59 shipboard attack planes assigned to Cardiv 1 are now equipped to carry 4 type VI (depth) bombs. Presumably this modification resulted from the recent torpedoing of HITAKA (CV)

5. Grudiv 5 (CA's NACHI, MOYKO, HAGURO) are scheduled to arrive Sasebo on June 16. A message dated June 11 from Comcrudiv 5 listed work to be done on these ships while at Sasebo, requiring about 1 month for completion.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

At 1300L, June 16 a number of Japanese contact reports indicated the presence of 1 or more U.S. transports of various sizes at Lunga Point, Russell Islands area, Tulagi, Gavutu, and Purvis Harbor (Florida Is.)

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Date: 01/02/88

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~~RETURN TO F-11~~

~~SECRET~~

(B) Marcus Island

An inspection party is flying from Japan to Marcus on June 17 and will be over the Chichijima area at about 1515I, June 17.

(C) Nauru Island

A message from C-in-C 2nd Fleet indicated that Batdiv 3 is bringing military supplies to Truk for strengthening Nauru. It was requested that these supplies be loaded on a ship to be made available and that the same ship also carry military materials, ammunition, and fuel for various bases in the Jalnit-Kwajalein area.

(D) Tenian

Tenian Air Base is to be expanded and an air arsenal constructed.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. A message dated May 30 indicates that SHINTO Maru (1215 gross tons) was unsuccessfully attacked in Lat. 32° N., Long. 131° 51 E. at 2115I, May 29. It was reported that the submarine was engaged, resulting in much oil and debris coming to the surface.

2. OTORI (torpedo boat), escorting a 3-MARU convoy into Truk on June 14 (I-time), reported having attacked a submarine by gunfire in Lat. 8° N., Long. 152° 63 E. The submarine, however, escaped.

3. Further confirmation of the sinking of KAMIKAWA Maru (XCVS) on May 28 is furnished by a message from C-in-C 8th Fleet in which he states that the shortage of observation and reconnaissance planes in the Rabaul area was further accentuated by the KAMIKAWA Maru disaster. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 30, paragraph IV,1).

IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping

1. In view of U.S. submarine activity in the Palao area, Japanese convoy schedules between Bungo Suido (Japan) and Palao were revised. It was indicated that convoys from Bungo Suido to Palao would depart from the former area on June 20, 24, July 2 (?), 8, _____, and 29. Convoy departures from Palao are scheduled for June 19, 24, 30, July 6, 13, 20, and 24.

2. A 2-MARU convoy, escorted by 1 DD, departed Truk for Rabaul at 1000I, June 14 and is scheduled to arrive at 1600I, June 18. Approximate noon positions and courses are available.

3. A 2-MARU convoy, escorted by 1 DD, is scheduled to arrive Saipan at 1100I, June 17 (?), departs at 1600I on the same day, and arrives Yokosuka at 1200I, June 26. Noon positions are available.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 01/02/80

4. HONKA Maru (unlisted) struck a mine and sank while entering port at Rangoon at 1108I, June 14. The sinking took place on bearing 304°, distant 2.3 miles from Klephant Point (near Rangoon).

V. Diplomatic

Correction:

The last sentence of yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement should read ".....Sato was ordered to return to Kuibyshev from Moscow".

T.R. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 17, 1943

SRNS 0430

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was slightly above normal during the past 24 hours. The majority of the major systems showed little change in trend, and volume of priority traffic was very low. Gains were noted in merchant ship traffic and in the aircraft code, the latter reaching one of the highest peaks on record.

2. A partial translation of the message concerning work to be done on Crudiv 5, mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement, indicates that AA batteries and machine guns will be increased and that radar control (?) will be installed for MYOKO's main battery directors.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. An old item dated August 9, 1942 reported a radar installation on Kiska which began operating July 25. Results were considered satisfactory even in the experimental stage, with range for stationary objects given as 135 kilometers and for moving objects, 71 kilometers. The radar was reported to distinguish fairly reliably between Japanese and U.S. aircraft.

2. Reinforcement of the Paramushiru area is being vigorously pursued. AWATA MARU (7,398 gross ton XCL) is scheduled to arrive Paramushiru June 21 from Yokosuka, transporting 4 large landing barges, stores, machine guns, equipment, and 83 men. ASAKA MARU (XCL) is due Paramushiru June 29, also transporting supplies from Yokosuka.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls

1. The transfer of HAYATAKA squadrons from Truk to Buotto took place on June 16 as scheduled. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 4, par. III(A),b).

2. It is indicated that Airflot 22, recently incorporated in Eastern Force Air Force, has severed connections with the 11th Air Fleet

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: 01/02/80

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IV. Indian Ocean

Reinforcement of Port Blair, in the strategically located Andaman Islands, is indicated by a trip there from Singapore of the GOKOKU Maru (10,300 gross ton XCL).

V. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. In the past, gasoline was delivered directly to individual Japanese bases in the Marshalls-Gilberts area by single ships. Interference by U.S. submarines, however, has resulted in the adoption of a system whereby convoys carry gasoline to principal bases only. Further distribution is effected by the use of auxiliary motor-sailing vessels.

2. An item dated May 7 reveals that the TOSEI MARU (5,484? gross tons) received a torpedo hit in its port quarter and sank within 2 minutes, probably in the general vicinity of Tsingtao. SHINSEI Maru came alongside to rescue passengers and possibly also was sunk.

VI. Economic

1. The German ship ROSSBACH was scheduled to depart Manila June 1 and was routed south across the China Sea. Having visited Japan proper, she is possibly on her way back to the Atlantic.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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~~SECRET SECURITY~~ ~~SECRET SUPPLEMENT~~

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 18, 1943

FRNS 0431

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic during the past 24 hours was approximately normal. The major systems recorded little or no change with the one exception of Direction Finder traffic which increased substantially, due in part to flurries originating in the Jaluit and Rabaul areas. Some increase in operational traffic occurred in the Marshalls and New Guinea-Solomons areas but priority traffic remained below normal.

2. An item dated February 24 reveals that the HARUNA (29,300-ton BB, completed in 1915) had developed cracks varying in length from 1/2 inch to 20 inches in 6 of its 8 main battery (14") guns, and that at least 3 of these guns would require replacement.

II. Northwest Pacific

A dispatch originated by Chief of Staff, 12th Air Fleet indicates that an airbase is being constructed on Shimushu Island (between Paramushiro and the southern tip of Kamchatka). Large landing barges are being resorted to for transportation owing to the acute shortage of larger vessels.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. At 0920I, June 17 an unidentified unit reported sighting a U.S. force of ___ cruisers, ___ destroyers, and ___ transports, apparently in the southern Solomons area, as the dispatch was relayed to Guadalcanal Operations Force and passed for information to Southeast Subforce.

2. Several messages were noted which appeared to be urgent requests for additional aircraft for the Rabaul-Solomons area, probably due to the Japs recent unprecedented loss of planes in the Vicinity of Guadalcanal.

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Date: 01/02/80

~~RETURN TO F II~~

3. The First Fleet (includes 8 of Japan's BB's) is scheduled to conduct night battle practice in southern Japan waters during the latter part of June. FUSO (BB) or YAMASHIRO (BB) and Desron 11 are specifically ordered to participate and it is indicated that the practice will include the firing of torpedoes.

4. A fishing fleet, apparently en route south from the Empire, arrived Chichijima on June 8. It will be recalled that 65 fishing vessels were scheduled to arrive Rabaul from Palau during the latter part of June, (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 13, par. III, (B),3), and that on May 19 some 31 fishing boats departed Manila for Cebu, possibly on the first leg of a trip to the Melanesian area. (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of May 20, par. III, (c)).

5. A fair volume of administrative traffic associating various air units and defense units in the Solomons suggests Japanese efforts to improve coordination of air patrols and generally to tighten defensive measures in this area.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. A Japanese convoy in position Lat. 26° 06' N., Long. 121° 17' E. was attacked by a U.S. submarine but escaped undamaged. The exact date (probably June 12-13) was not recovered.

2. Further confirmation of the sinking of # 2 NISSHIN Maru (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 14, par. IV,1) is contained in a dispatch which reports the sinking at about 1815L, (___ date in April) of this 17,579-ton tanker. (There had been some question as to whether the vessel reported sunk was the # 2 NISSHIN Maru or a patrol boat, but that it was the former is considered almost positive).

V. Diplomatic

1. A dispatch from Tokyo refers to "intercepted enemy (U.S.) communications" as the source of information that Japanese troops on Attu fought valiantly and inflicted heavy losses to the very end. The action described was apparently during the period subsequent to the loss of Japanese communication with Attu, and probably refers to certain plain language dispatches used by our forces at the time.

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R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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~~SECRET~~ SUPPLEMENT

Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 19, 1943

SRNS 0432

~~SECRET~~

I. General

1. During the past 24 hours overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic expanded approximately 20% to reach the highest level yet recorded for any one day. All areas contributed. Tactical traffic doubled the previous day's low figure, with Truk to Guadalcanal and Jaluit to Gilberts the principal channels. Virtually all of the operational traffic on the latter channel was urgent or most urgent. (Treated separately below). Administrative and weather traffic showed slight gains while Army and Direction Finder traffic increased substantially, the latter to a new high peak.

2. Airflot 21, whose location and activities have been rather obscure for some time, is definitely located in the Saipan-Tenian area, apparently undergoing refitting and training.

3. A message dated May 17 gives a revised schedule of Combined Fleet radio deception traffic which was to be originated by Advance Force and other units in the Truk area and suitably relayed. Meaningless groups in the form of specified cryptographic systems and a false call list were to be used. The objective of this deception appears to have been the disguise of important Japanese Fleet movements which began at that time. However, our Radio Intelligence organization not only detected these movements but also uncovered the fact that radio deception was being attempted.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Marshalls-Gilberts

1. Apparently in response to an extensive air raid by U.S. Forces, flurries of urgent operational traffic which associated most of the area's important commands were originated in the Marshalls-Gilberts. The first message noted was originated at 1830I, June 18 by the 3rd Base Force at Tarawa (Gilberts). This was followed by dispatches every few minutes from various points in the area, including Jaluit and Kwajalein. Addressees included 2nd, 4th,

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Date: 01/02/88
MA CB

6th, 11th, Southeast Area, and Combined Fleets as well as the Naval Staff. The last message noted was an urgent directive from Commander Eastern Force Air Force at 2350I, June 18.

2. Three Pioneer Units last seen in the Melanesian area were associated with Airflot 22, suggesting a move to further strengthen bases in the Marshalls-Gilberts.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

On June 13 AIKOKU Maru (XCL) was instructed to avoid the Hayasui Seto (South coast of Kyushu) area in the daytime owing to presence of U.S. submarines.

IV. Diplomatic

In an exchange of messages between Ambassador to Russia Sato and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu (See ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 15, par. V. for prior reference) Sato warned Shigemitsu that Japan must release the 2 seized Russian ships or be prepared to fight, and that the situation was "pregnant with the possibility of sealing Japan's doom". Shigemitsu forthwith agreed to the unconditional surrender of the vessels in question, whereupon Sato conveyed this intelligence to Molotov and subsequently reported that for the first time he had "got some fortunate results".

R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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~~Secret~~ Supplement
Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 20, 1943

SRNS 0433

I. General

~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

1. In general, no significant trends were apparent from Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours. Overall volume declined somewhat from yesterday's high, but continues slightly above normal. Most of the major systems are now approximately at a normal level, except Army traffic which was considerable between Palao and New Guinea - Rabaul addresses.

2.

Japanese combatant ships are employed to carry men and munitions to the various theaters of operation and to advanced bases. As an example, of the ships in the Task Force due to arrive Truk on June 21, 6 tons of stores for the 4th Munitions Section are carried in YUKIKAZE and 2 other DD's, Desdiv 27 is carrying 69 men for 3rd Special Base Force (Tarawa), Cardiv 7 is carrying freight, and Batdiv 3 has some 10 tons of ordnance material and 66 technicians.

3. During the night of June 18-19, Japanese planes in the Empire were engaged in night torpedo practice. A special illuminating group apparently makes up a part of the attacking group.

4. Inability at the present time to read the principal Japanese operational code once again makes it necessary to place greater reliance upon traffic associations, analysis, and routing. For a comment concerning the short-comings of radio intelligence when based solely upon these factors, see the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of April 30, paragraph I, 2.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Aircraft Movements

1. Associations between Comcardiv 2 and Iwo-jima Base suggest that additional aircraft of Cardiv 2 are being flown to Truk from Japan.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
md cts Date: 6/28/80

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~~RETURN TO FA~~

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2. A message at 1700 I, June 19 suggests a reinforcement flight of fighter planes from Yokohama to Rabaul, via Chichijima, Saipan, and Truk.

(B) Marshall-Gilberts

1. A number of messages were originated on June 19 by Base Force # 3 at Tarawa, undoubtedly concerned with detailed reports of damage and possibly requests for replacements, repairs, etc. as a result of our air strikes during the previous day.

2. Further Japanese efforts to increase the defensive capabilities in this area are indicated by Airflot # 22's request on May 19 that the following installations be completed at once:

At Hille:

- "C" Runway (80 x 1000 meters)
- Accommodations for 15 fighters (additional to the present 12 fighters)
- Accommodations for 27 land-based attack planes
- Torpedo storages.

At Tarawa:

- Accommodations for 6 fighters
- Accommodations for 18 land-based attack planes.
- Torpedo storages.

(C) New Guinea

A Japanese message of June 14 tabulated the number of aircraft on 8 Allied airfields (probably in the Port Moresby area), aggregating 110 large, 60 medium, and 81 small-type planes.

III. U. S. Submarine Operations

1. According to a Japanese report, at 0000 I, June 19, in the vicinity of Lat. 50° 26' N., Long. 155° 14' E., a number of Jap fishing vessels were attacked by gunfire from a U.S. submarine. Two fishing vessels were reported sunk.

2. Urgent messages from HIYODORI (torpedo boat) strongly suggest that a convoy escorted by that vessel was attacked by a U.S. submarine in the Saipan area between 0730 I, and 0758 I, June 20. Prior messages indicate that this convoy was composed of 5 vessels, en route from Yokosuka to Truk.

R. A. Boone
R. A. Boone

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 21, 1943

SRNS 0434

I. General

1. It is indicated that the present Japanese Navy call list will be replaced on July 1. The call list currently in use was adopted on February 1.

2. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic for the past 24 hours was slightly below normal and, in general, all major systems were approximately normal in volume. Except as indicated below, no significant trends or changes are apparent from radio intelligence at the present time.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

A series of urgent Japanese operational dispatches from the New Georgia area, beginning at 0727I, June 21 and addressed to Combined and 2nd Fleets suggests a possible U.S. landing in that Area. Later dispatches from the same Area were passed to S.E. Area and 8th Fleets, Airflots 22,25, and 26, 4th and 6th Fleets, and other addressees. A dispatch at 0745I from a probable Jap Lookout Station at Segi (Lat. 8° 36 S., Long. 157° 52 E.) reported sighting 2 (U.S.) DD's distant about 6 miles, headed E.

(B) Marshalls-Gilberts

On May 18 it was anticipated that Jap planes would be based on Mille and Tarawa as follows:

At Mille: 27 land-based attack planes
27 fighters

At Tarawa: 18 land-based attack planes
18 fighters

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(C) N.E.I.

1. A south-bound Army motor-sailing convoy of 4 (small) Maru's, 26 motor sailers, and 1 fishing vessel was scheduled to depart Manila on June 21, to arrive Cebu on June 25, and to depart for Menado about July 1. (See also, ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 18, paragraph III, (A),4).

2. Associations indicate that Air Group # 202 at Kendari (estimated to be composed of 3 squadrons of fighters) is preparing to fly to Yokosuka via Menado, Manila, Takao, and Kanoya.

III. Northwestern Pacific

1. At 1432I, June 21 a Japanese picket boat reported sighting a large enemy plane on course 270°. At 1441I it reported having lost sight of the plane.

2. On June 19 (I-time), 5 picket boats were proceeding northward, with indications that additional boats will follow.

3. The directive which organized the 12th Air Fleet on May 15 provides that the following air units be assigned to that Fleet:

Airflot # 24
Air Groups Nos. 253, 281, and 452.

R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 22, 1943

SENS 0435

I. General

Virtually all major systems in intercepted Japanese radio traffic for the past 24 hours showed a decline in volume, resulting in an appreciable decline in overall volume. Tactical traffic, however, was the exception and approached its recent peak, with much of this traffic concerned with the Northern area. The overall picture developed by radio intelligence in general remains unchanged from previous estimates and no new trends are discernible at the present time.

II. Japanese Fleet Movements

1. The Japanese Task Force which left Japan on June 16 arrived at Truk on June 21. It will be recalled that this force is composed of KONGO (BB), ACV's UNYO, CHUYO, and RYUHO (in place of damaged HITAKA), CA's KUMANO and SUZUYA, ISUZU (CL), and about 12 DD's. At 1600I, June 21 there were indications that Comcardiv 2 had shifted his flag from RYUHO to HAYATAKA (CV).

2. Traffic places AOBA (CA), heavily damaged in a bombing attack at Kavieng, in Japan. SENDAI (CL), which was engaged in towing AOBA, is now slated to carry the 19th and, if possible, the 20th AA units to the Solomons area (by traffic association), departing Yokosuka the latter part of June.

3. The possibility that an important part of 3rd (Carrier) Fleet will be ready to put to sea during the last part of June is suggested by a request for plane replacements to be delivered after June 25 (?) as follows:

(CV) ZUIKAKU: 5 VF's, 2 VB's, 8 VTB's, 1 VOS
(CV) SHOKAKU: 5 VF's, 2 VB's, 7 VTB's, 1 VOS
(CV) ZUIHO: 5 VF's, 4 VTB's
(CA) CHIKUMA: 2 VOS

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III. Solomons

1. The widespread list of addressees in Japanese traffic originated in the New Georgia area on June 21 included fleets, forces, units, and other activities
2. Dispatches of an urgent nature were originated by important Jap air activities in the New Georgia area during the morning of June 22.
3. Gatakai Island Lookout (Southernmost Island of the New Georgia Group) reported sighting 1 DD(?) and 1 other vessel at 0909I, June 22. Wickham Lookout also originated urgent traffic during the forenoon of June 22.

IV. Northwest Pacific

1. An anti-submarine patrol has been established in the vicinity of Kakumabetsu-wan (W. coast of Paramushiru) and Kataoka (S.W. coast of Shimushu) in the northern Kuriles.
2. A flurry of priority operational traffic beginning at 1655 I, June 21 was noted between Kiska and the Flagship of Northern Subforce.

V. Economic

1. Japanese shipping tentatively assigned to carry rice from Thailand to Japan and China is as follows:

July,	82,000 tons
August,	85,000 tons
September,	85,000 tons

2. A lengthy analysis dated June 9 from Saigon to Tokyo concerning the possibility of increasing rice shipments clearly reveals the importance of lighterage in expediting the turn-around of Japanese shipping. It was pointed out that the utilization of 45,000 tons of available lighterage makes it possible to ship 180,000 tons of rice per month, taking into consideration the fact that June to September is the wet season. The message ended with the hope that the planned shipments can be made during the months of June, July, August, and September.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 23, 1943

SRNS 0436

I. General

1. Overall volume of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours returned to normal, owing almost entirely to an expansion in administrative and weather traffic. Tactical traffic fell off considerably after yesterday's spurt and Direction Finder traffic also declined. Activity on the whole appeared colorless and without significant trends.

2. As of May 18, # 2 Base Air Force was created by Combined Fleet order and placed under command CinC 12th Air Fleet. The primary mission of # 2 Base Air Force was stated to be patrol, defense, and attack in the northeastern Sea area. The line of demarcation for operational responsibility between it and # 1 Base Air Force (formerly Base Air Force, tactical title of 11th Air Fleet) runs due West and due North East from position Lat. 24°N., Long. 160°E. (near Marcus). Accordingly, the Bonin Islands, Northern Formosa and the entire Northern area fall within the sphere of # 2 Base Air Force (12th Air Fleet), and Marcus, the Marianas, Southern Formosa, and the area to the South and East, including Wake and Midway, fall within the sphere of # 1 Base Air Force (11th Air Fleet). Substantially all Japanese Naval air operations outside of Japan proper, excepting carrier operations, are affected by the above order.

II. Northwest Pacific

1. CinC 5th Fleet, last noted at Paramushiru on June 18, is indicated by traffic routing to be at sea, probably in NACHI (CA)

2. At 2210I, June 22 Northern Subforce Flagship originated a most urgent dispatch addressed to Kiska, 5th Fleet, and Combined Fleet. This was followed by a similar dispatch 50 minutes later

3. The anti-submarine patrols being established in the northern Kuriles apparently are rather extensive. A partially translated dispatch indicates

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that a total of approximately 14 subchasers and miscellaneous patrol craft have been assigned to the Paramishiru, Kataoka Bay, Matsuwa, and one other unrecovered area.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. A "Motor Sailing Vessel Convoy" is transporting supplies to Buin, arriving June --, presumably from Rabaul. Apparently the policy of employing this type of transportation has now been extended to the Melanesia area.

2. Military provisions and naval stores and personnel (about 20) are to be transported from Rabaul to Gatukai (Southeastern end of New Georgia group). The date of landing is unrecovered but is possibly June 22. The Officer in command of "All naval and military boats" participating, apparently including one or more destroyers, is ordered to return to Rabaul in a vessel scheduled to arrive June 26.

(B) New Guinea

1. Associations of Lae Base Force, Southeast Area Sub Force, and Supply and Repair Units in an unusually large volume of traffic on June 21 indicates that the Rabaul-Lae and Salamua daily submarine express is to expand its service.

2. A dispatch dated June 2 refers to the arrival at Nabire on June 15 of a vessel carrying supplies and equipment for construction of an airfield at Sorong (Northwest tip of New Guinea).

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. An unidentified Army Transport which departed Manila June 3 was several days overdue at Ambon on June 13 and may have been the vessel reported sunk by Tautog on June 6 in this area.

2. At 1100L, May 14 a convoy 7 miles south of Marinduque Island (Central Philippines) was attacked by a U.S. submarine and 2 unidentified vessels sunk. The escort vessel claimed sinking the submarine, based on a large quantity of oil and debris which came to the surface after depth charging.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 24, 1943

SRNS 0437

I. General

1. Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours was almost at a normal level and in general its complexion appeared routine.

2. Traffic routing on June 23 indicates that the various Japanese fleet commanders are located as follows:

- Japan: C-in-C's Combined and 3rd Fleets
- Truk: C-in-C's 2nd, 4th, and 6th Fleets, Comcardiv 2
- Rabaul: C-in-C's 8th and 11th Air Fleets
- Ominato Area: C-in-C 5th Fleet

3. Further details of the use of Japanese combatant ships to carry personnel, munitions, and cargo are now available (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 20, paragraph 1,2). It is indicated that the Japanese Task Force which arrived Truk on June 21 (Batdiv 3, Crudiv 7, DD's, ACV's, etc.) carried Yokosuka # 2 Special Landing Force (1127 men), 8 large landing craft, 26 automobiles, guns, munitions, and other cargo (about 850 tons), apparently consigned to Nauru. In addition, AA Units # 5 and # 28 for the Rabaul Area were carried.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

In the New Georgia Area, an urgent dispatch was originated by Gatakai Island Lookout at 1700I, June 23 and Visu Visu Lookout (N. tip of New Georgia Island) originated one at 0615I, June 24. From 0100I to 0650I, June 24 reconnaissance reports were sent by 4 Jap planes to 11th Air Fleet and Ballale

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Air Base. Some of these reports were readdressed to Air Attack Force # 5 and # 6, Kolombangara Air Base, and New Georgia Defense Force

(B) Truk

It was decided on June 13 to locate radar installations for complete coverage of Truk as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Hill</u>	<u>Radar Sets</u>
Fuyushima	289 meter	2
Harushima	271 meter	2
Akishima	313 meter	1
Getsuyoshima	-	2

(C) Marshalls

During the past 2 days, a number of indications have been noted that various air bases in the Marshalls are being reinforced with aircraft units. Cardiv 2 planes have flown to Wotje and Ruoetto, and planes ferried to Truk by CHUYO are flying to Taroa.

III. Northwest Pacific

1. A short urgent operational dispatch was originated by a Jap submarine at 0733I, June 24. Associations indicate that a sighting of a U.S. unit took place in the Northern area.

3. A number of Japanese merchant vessels are indicated in the general Ominato area or further northward, suggesting continued transport operations undoubtedly concerned with strengthening the Northern Kuriles. A 2-Maru northbound convoy departed Kushiro (Lat. 42° 59 N., Long. 144° 22 E.) at 1600I, June 23.

4. On May 25 Comairflot # 24 requested the immediate installation of 2 radar sets at Paramshiru Air Base.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. HINODE Maru (unlisted) was sunk as a result of a torpedo hit late on June 10 in Lat. 2° 43' N., Long. 152° E. At the time of the sinking she was escorted by 1 DD.

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2. A Japanese message dated May 2 confirms the sinking of KAMAKURA Maru (17,526 gross tons) at about 0210I, April 28 as a result of 2 torpedo hits made 5 minutes earlier.

3. During the afternoon of June 23 (I-time), a DD and 2 patrol vessels were ordered to sortie from Truk to carry out sweeps for a submarine reported off the South Channel, Truk.

V. Japanese Merchant Shipping

In conformity with the recently noted trend to send large numbers of auxiliary vessels, such as fishing boats, motor-sailers, steam-sailers, etc. to the Southern Area, 4 Japanese Navy steam-sailers departed Manila en route to Bali on June 24. They are scheduled to sail via Jolo and to arrive at Tarakan early on July 1. It is quite apparent that heavy reliance is now placed by the Japanese upon small auxiliary vessels of all types to carry on necessary trade and carriage between their many bases in the Southern Area. The use of these small vessels, while less efficient, obviously releases larger ships, reduces escort vessels, and greatly spreads the risk of submarine attacks.

VI. Economic

A message from Saigon to Tokyo dated June 17 reported that vessels which had recently sailed from French Indo-China carried a total of about 47,000 tons of rice consigned to various Japan and China ports.

R.A. Boone

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 25, 1943

SRNS 0438

I. General

During the past 24 hours overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic was somewhat below normal, with the majority of the major systems participating in the decline. As in the past several days, traffic revealed no significant trends. In general, Japanese preoccupation appears to be concerned with the strengthening of bases in the Kuriles and Marshalls-Gilberts areas. It is conceded that for the present at least, the Japanese moves are apparently defensive in nature, but by the same token, their system of mutually supporting bases are available for local offensive operations if desired.

II. Northwest Pacific

On May 13 the 27 fighter planes of the SHOKAKU (CV) were sent to an unidentified base, indicated by association of addressees to be in the Northern area. In the ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 1 indications were noted that a unit of carrier planes were based at Paramushiru, suggesting that in all probability these were SHOKAKU planes.

III. Southwest Pacific

(A) Gilberts

Shortage of transportation is holding up the construction of concrete fortifications at Tarawa.

(B) Palau

A partially translated message from Palau Branch 4th Military Stores gives an inventory as of May 15, and is listed in part as follows:

Anti-aircraft gun covers	-----	1,000
Type-95 depth charges	-----	188
Type-94 mines (model 1)	-----	3,534
Aviation gas (92 octane)	-----	1,000 tons
Aviation gas (91 octane)	-----	470 tons
Aviation gas (87 octane)	-----	900 tons

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Reference was made to the fact that there were 3,000 men to feed, with provisions for 150 days.

(C) N.E.I.

Radars for use of Ambon Base Force were sent from Japan in May. Frequent recent references to radar installations on warships, aircraft, and land installations indicate rapid Japanese progress in this field.

(D) Solomons

At about 1425I, June 25 a Japanese plane reported 8 U.S. transports (AP's) bearing 270°, distance 16 miles from Savo Island, speed 16 knots. The report was relayed to the Southeast Area Subforce.

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. Further details of recent sinkings reveal that of 438 passengers and crew on the KAMIKAWA Maru, 361 were rescued, whereas there were but 141 survivors of the KAMAKURA MARU disaster. According to the Japanese version, it was stated that after the latter attack the submarine surfaced and by shelling and machine gun fire prevented the rescue of survivors who were floating about. (It will be recalled that our submarine referred to the KAMAKURA Maru, 17,526 gross tons, as "troop-laden").

V. Economic

A report dated May 28 indicates that no oil is being exported at the present time from Makassar, Menado or Ambon, but that subject to arrival of equipment a maximum of 500 tons per month after November, 1943 can be exported from Makassar, and a maximum of 800 tons per month after December, 1943 from Menado and Ambon combined.

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 26, 1943

SRNS 0439

I. General

In general, intercepted Japanese radio traffic of the past 24 hours was colorless and devoid of any specific trends. Overall volume was below normal, and most systems indicated a downward tendency. D/F traffic, however, was very active, with Jaluit as the principal originating center.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

The sighting of 8 AP's off Savo Island, mentioned in yesterday's ~~Secret~~ Supplement, gave rise to at least 2 most urgent operational dispatches from 11th Air Fleet to the 5th and 6th Air Attack Forces

A steady stream of Jap aircraft reconnaissance reports followed, with at least 9 different planes of 7 groups involved.

(B) Marshalls-Gilberts

Some evidence of Japanese radio deception has been noted in traffic involving the Marshalls-Gilberts area.

(C) N.E.I.

A message dated May 24 from 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet stated that it had been decided to conduct air operations against Australia, using both Army and Navy planes. In order to solve the logistic problem of the many Army planes involved, it was requested that stores of fuel, ammunition, etc. be placed at Dilli, Koepang, Waingapu (Soemba), Kendari, Ambon, Surabaya, and Makassar.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

Recent dispatches furnish clear evidence of a Japanese determination to combat our submarine operations with speed and persistence. For

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this purpose anti-submarine operations are carried out, whenever possible, by aircraft, patrol boats, and destroyers. A typical example of this persistence is furnished by a report from KIYONAMI (DD) that she had attacked a submarine with depth charges and gunfire at 0037I, June 25 in about Lat. 66° 04' N., Long. 152° 34' E. Immediately thereafter, 2 patrol boats were dispatched from Truk, and considerable urgent radio traffic arose, culminating in a lengthy most urgent message at 1100I, June 25. The search was still going on at 0617I, June 26, with indications that it would be continued during the night of June 26-27.

IV. Economic

1. A message from Berlin to Tokyo dated June 17 strongly suggests that Axis surface-ship blockade runners between Europe and the Far East will resume operations this fall.

2. Large Italian submarines were to be used as blockade runners for transport between Germany and Japan, beginning with May. Although the relevant message (dated April 15) is not quite clear, it appears that a number of submarines will engage in this traffic on a two-way basis. The first submarine to be used has a carrying capacity of 160 tons, with an additional 70 tons to be carried in the keel space (double bottom?), subject to submergence in water.

W. D. Boone
for R.A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 27, 1943

SRNS 0440

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I. General:

1. Overall volume of Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours was approximately normal. Both operational and administrative traffic were at normal levels and little change was noted in the majority of major systems.

2. Two Special Subchasers were scheduled to complete radar installations at Kure by June 15.

II. Northwest Pacific:

1. Emergency work to enlarge the landing strip on Matsuwashima (central Kuriles) commenced June 1, pending the arrival of a Pioneer Unit regularly assigned to this work.

2. On June 12 Radio Intelligence, Tokyo, ordered the urgent transfer of 2 reserve ensigns and 10 enlisted ratings qualified for Radio Intelligence (at least 6 to have first class qualifications) to the Flagship, 12th Air Fleet (in High North).

III. Southwest Pacific:

(A) Bismarcks.

4 motor-sailing vessels and 5 fishing boats were scheduled to depart Truk, June 26 on a southerly course toward the Bismarcks. It will be recalled (~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 18, par. III, (A),4) that a fishing fleet arrived Chichijima, June 8, enroute south from the Empire, and that 65 fishing vessels were scheduled to arrive Rabaul in latter June from Palau.

by Director, NSAV, CMB, 0303
Date: 01/02/40

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(B) Gilberts.

At 1555I, May 26 the Tarawa Base Force informed Makin that judging by U.S. aerial patrols the defenses of Makin should be given the greatest attention.

IV. U. S. Submarine Operations:

Correction: In the 4th line on page 2 of yesterday's Supplement change the latitude to read "Lat. 6°-04' N."

1. At 1017I, June 26, the Greenwich Island Lookout Station reported sighting 2 surfaced U.S. Submarines. At 1040I the Station further reported that the enemy had reconnoitered the entrance to the channel and departed to the southeast.

2. At 2235I, June 21, an unsuccessful U.S. submarine attack was reported in position Lat. 09°-01' N., 131°-22' E. Three torpedo tracks were sighted, 1 passing close ahead, one about 10 meters astern, and one torpedo exploding about 50 meters abeam.

3. At 1346I, June 11, an unidentified vessel at anchor in Kakumabetsu Bay (west coast of Paramushiru) was torpedoed, and sank at 1442I. Apparently the ship was of fair size as the message mentions the rescue of approximately 420 crew members and reports 3 casualties.

V. Diplomatic:

A message from Tokyo to Kuibyshev dated June 23 states that the Japanese have a "secret report" that Russia is informing the U.S. of Japan's part in detaining the Soviet ships. The information referred to was received in the following dispatches:

<u>From</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>NCR No.</u>
State Department	May 20	9904
Roullard (Vladivostok)	May 21	1472
ALUSNA, Moscow	May 22	1363

It appears, therefore, that the Japanese are reading at least one of the above code systems.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 28, 1943

SRNS 0441

I. General

1. Overall volume of intercepted Japanese radio traffic continued approximately normal, priority traffic on the major channels was normal, and only weather and D/F traffic were very active. The latter system centered upon Tokyo and Rabaul. On the whole, information gained from radio intelligence during the past 24 hours appeared to be of a routine nature.

2. A message from S.W. Area Fleet dated May 25 indicated that a Special Communication Unit (Radio Intelligence) would be established for that area, with accessory equipment located at Singapore and Surabaya.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

Ganongga Unit on June 26 advised great caution in the New Georgia area by reason of frequent Allied air reconnaissance of Wilson Strait and Vella Lavella Island. On the same day, Comdr. Wickham Force was ordered to send about 1 platoon with a Navy radio set and radio personnel to various points for closer observation of Allied ships and aircraft. The observation points selected are to be suitable for communication by sea and land with the southern part of Wickham.

(B) New Guinea

1. Associations indicate that at least 3 Jap submarines are currently engaged in transporting supplies into the Lae area.

2. Slight indications by association have been noted that Cardiv 2 may be used to ferry aircraft reinforcements into the New Guinea-Solomons area.

III. Northwest Pacific

On June 3 Fifth Fleet directed that all mail addressed to Paramshiru activities be forwarded to Musashi-wan

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 01/02/60

IV. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. On May 26 an unidentified Jap commander commended air units for sinking a U.S. submarine which was sighted at 1510I, May 24 in position bearing 52°, distant 4 miles from Shirakami-saki (?) Light. (Lat. 41° 24' N., Long. 140° 12' E.)
2. At 1740I, June 26 the 2 patrol boats searching for a U.S. submarine in the Truk area (see ~~Secret~~ Supplement of June 26, paragraph III) were ordered to return to base the following morning if no contact was made by that time.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

7/11/80
Date: *01/02/80*

T. A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 29, 1943

SRNS 0442

I. General

Japanese radio traffic intercepted during the past 24 hours was again devoid of any noticeable trends, despite an appreciable rise in overall volume. Administrative, D/F, Army, and weather traffic were all above normal, with practically (90%) all Army traffic noted on the Tokyo to Palao channel. Flurries of traffic, occasioned by U.S. submarine activities, were noted in the Truk area (see below). In the High North, traffic was largely confined to administration between air bases and coastal patrol operations in the Kuriles area, although associations of addressees in one message indicate that an important convoy movement is taking place, direction unknown.

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Nauru

Nauru reported at 0340I, June 29 that 4 B-24's attacked and are being engaged. This was followed by fairly heavy traffic between 0350I and 1132I, June 29 which suggested a raid against islands of the Gilberts, possibly Tarawa.

(B) Greenwich Island

At about 0911I, June 28 it was reported by Greenwich Island that a B-24 flew over from the S.E. and carried out a reconnaissance of the Air Base from a very great altitude.

(C) Solomons

Associations of addressees in a message at 0546I, June 27 give a slight indication that a trip may shortly be made to the New Georgia area by a Reinforcement Force.

III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. Base Force # 5 (Saipan) reported that SHOTOKU Maru (1146 or

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1967 gross tons) was torpedoed and sunk 2000 meters off the W. side of Rota Island (Marianas). Arising out of this sinking, several patrol boats and seaplanes were ordered to engage in a hunt for the submarine. 2 MARIUS's were dispatched to the scene to rescue passengers.

2. A number of submarine warnings were sent out by Base Force # 4 (Truk) on June 28 and 29. At 1500I, June 28, a patrol vessel was ordered to search out and destroy an enemy submarine bearing 53°, distant 60(?) miles from Truk. At 1640I, a convoy was diverted to the South Channel.

IV. China

1. A message to IZUMO (Flagship of China Fleet) on June 6 reported that 5 P-40's which made forced landings were captured by the Japs on June 5. They were loaded on 5 army pontoons and sent down the Yangtze River, travelling only at night.

2. Prior to the above message, on May 31, the Central China Fleet noted an increase in the number of communications from the American air force in China, including requests for special weather reports twice daily, and therefore advised strict precautions in all directions.

V. Diplomatic

Tokyo advised Knibyshev on June 25 that the 2 seized ships would be released on June 28. (Note: presumably the ships in question are INGUL and KAMENETS-PODOLSK).

R.A. Boone
R. A. Boone.

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Summary of Japanese Naval Activities as of June 30, 1943

SRNS 0443

I. General

1. On June 29 (I-time), intercepted Japanese radio traffic was somewhat above normal in overall volume, but nothing of an unusual nature was apparent until the steady stream of high precedence traffic began in the Central Solomons area (see below). D/F traffic approached a new record high.

2. (a) According to a message dated May 14, C-in-C Combined Fleet at that time fully intended to salvage the Attu situation by using Northern Force (5th Fleet) and a Striking Force to attack U.S. surface forces in the Attu area. The operation order provided for an increase in submarines in the Aleutians area, planes and surface forces were to patrol and attack our forces, preparations were ordered to transport reinforcements to Attu, and Striking Force was to assemble in the Yokosuka area on about May 22, thence to proceed E. of the Kuriles to support Northern Force in meeting our surface forces. Striking Force actually arrived Yokosuka on May 22 and part of this force put to sea on May 25, only to arrive Kure on June 1.

(b) The reason for the abrupt change of plans is unknown. Subsequent information suggests the surmise that the bases in the Kuriles were perhaps not yet sufficiently developed to warrant the risk of a major sea engagement in the North, and that the strategic defensive would be maintained pending further strengthening and development of Japan's ring of bases in all areas.

3. According to an availability schedule for overhaul, the ships of Cardiv 1 completed overhaul at Kure on the following dates:

ZUIKAKU,	June 23
SHOKAKU,	June 13
ZUIHO,	June 18

II. Southwest Pacific

(A) Solomons

1. (a) During the late evening of June 29 (local time), high precedence traffic from the Central Solomons reflected Allied operations in that

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area. A series of operational dispatches were then originated by New Georgia Defense Force, beginning at 0450I, June 30. The intercepted dispatches are too numerous to tabulate, but addressees included the following:

- 11th Air Fleet (generally for action)
- Combined, S.E. Area, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Fleets
- Airflots # 25 and # 26

Air units and forces were heavily involved in this traffic, with a large number of air reconnaissance reports noted. Messages suggest a landing not too distant from Viru Harbor.

(b) Among intercepted sighting reports on June 30 were the following:

- Enemy transport unit (0505I)
- Many (?) enemy transports (0538I)
- 11 U.S. Cruisers (0648I)
- 5 DD's proceeding E. under a 12-plane cover (1045I)

(c) At 0826I, June 30, New Georgia Defense Force reported an Allied landing on Rendova Island. A Jap Lieut. Comdr. was ordered to proceed to Munda with the "ship force" and the Viru Army and Navy forces

2. A Japanese force of Army and 20 Navy personnel were apparently landed on Gatakai Island (southeasternmost of the New Georgia Group) by BOKO (DM or CM) at 2200I, June 29. This force is probably small, in view of its having been landed from only one relatively small vessel.

(B) New Guinea

Among a series of messages originated by Base Force # 7 (at Lae) during the early hours of June 30 is a dispatch reporting the landing of Allied Army troops on the north side of Nassau Bay (about 30 miles S. of Salamoa). All Jap forces were alerted.

(C) N.E.I.

A message of May 31 indicated that the Japs were engaged in sweeping an Allied minefield, most probably in the N.E.I. area. The sweep was made for both magnetic and contact mines and 27 mines had been disposed of at the time of the message.

(D) Nauru

A message of May 25 furnishes further evidence of increased construction activities at Nauru and corroborates previous indications that Nauru is assuming greater importance as an air base. It is planned to complete # 2 runway by the end of August.

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

710 Date: 01/02/80



III. U.S. Submarine Operations

1. TAKAMISAN Maru (1,992 gross tons) was torpedoed and sunk at 1730I, May 29, apparently in the Sasebo-Shanghai area.
2. PENANG Maru (5,214 gross tons) was hit by 1 torpedo of 5 fired at 0907I, April 11 in Lat. 5° 32'S., Long. 123° 10'E. The ship sank at 1335I.
3. According to a message from 2nd Fleet, on May 8 an unidentified Jap tanker was damaged as a result of striking a contact mine.

IV. Economic

Japan appears to be making strenuous efforts to obtain increased rice shipments from French Indo-China and Thailand, and the planned dates of shipment have been advanced wherever possible. These two producing areas are to furnish a total of about 1,000,000 tons, of which about one-third represents an additional demand. F.I.C. advance-date shipments amount to 146,000 tons, and from Thailand, 22,000 tons were to be shipped 5 to 6 months earlier (during June) than originally planned.

R.A. Boone
R.A. Boone.

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Further slight indications of the scope of "I. Operation" are furnished in an unreadable message at 1203I, April 6 in which "I. Operations Force" is associated with 11th Air Fleet, Striking Force, and Airflot # 26. Cardiv 2 and 3rd Fleet (Striking Force) were linked with 11th Air Fleet, Combined Fleet, and a list of Solomons activities in a message at 1910I, April 6.

(B) Solomons

1. During the morning of April 7 (LZT) Japanese aircraft patrols were prominent in the New Guinea-Solomons area, with at least 7 different groups noted. A single plane originated a series of sighting reports between 1025L and 1125L, April 7. These included the sightings of

- (a) 4 CA's, 7 DD's, and 2 large AP's at Tulagi Harbor and
- (b) 1 large AP and 1 medium-AP at Koli Point.
- (c) 1 large AP and 2 small AP's in the Lunga Area.
- (d) 1 medium AP, 1 small AP, and 4 DD's in Sealark Channel.
- (e) 2 DD's and (?) CA's at Savo Island.

2. A seaplane carrier (CHITOSE or KAMIKAWA Maru) was scheduled to depart Rabaul at 0900I, April 7, arriving in the Buin area at 0700I, April 8.

(C) Marshalls-Gilberts

Extensive air patrols in the Marshalls-Gilberts area are suggested by the radio traffic of air bases and air units located there.

II. Japanese Convoy Movements

1. A convoy of 6 MARUS, escorted by 4 probable DD's, departed Palao at 1630I, April 6 and is scheduled to arrive in the Wewak (?) vicinity at 0600I, April 12. It is this convoy which was directed to conform to the "X day" landing schedule (see ~~S~~ Supplement of April 3, paragraph II (A), (a)).

2. A convoy of 4 MARU's departed Surabaya April 5 for Ambon (?), arriving 1800I, April 11.

3. A transportation unit, composition unknown, was ordered by C-in-C 11th Air Fleet to depart from Oema Island in the Shortlands at 1610I, April 7 and, to arrive at Bairako Harbor (?) on the N.W. coast of New Georgia (Lat. 8° 11' S., Long. 157° 16' E.) at 0240I, April 8 where cargo is apparently to be landed.

III. Japanese Ship Casualties

1. An unidentified MARU, apparently in the Shortlands area, was hit by bombs during a daylight raid on April 2 and sank at 0445I, April 3. The master was killed but 46 survivors were rescued.

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2. A Japanese Battle Report of February 2 states that MAKIGUMO (DD of 1500 tons displacement) struck a contact mine while evading torpedoes (probably fired by PT-boats). Although MAKIGUMO was later towed, it was considered impossible to save the ship and she was finally sunk by 1 torpedo fired by YUGUMO at 0127I, February 2 in position bearing 224°, distant 67 miles from Savo Island. 16 officers and 248 men were rescued.

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IV. Japanese Merchant Shipping

For the purpose of ameliorating the shipping shortage, it appears that all Japanese freighters which now follow fixed schedules between Japan and Manchuria were to be placed on a "tramp ship" basis as of April 1.

V. Diplomatic

In reply to a protest made by Russia concerning the torpedoing of the Russian vessel ILMEN, Japan expressed astonishment that such an unreasonable accusation should be made. It was pointed out that from February 15 to 21 ten American submarines were seen in the South Seas and that two Japanese ships were attacked near the spot where the ILMEN was sunk. The note concluded that if the ILMEN was really sunk by a submarine, it certainly must have been an American submarine.

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