

# VARIOUS TRANSLATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX TO CINC COMBINED FLEETS' REPORT #1

"LANCASTER SQUADRON" - YOSHIO KAWAMURA 1965

1-10 - GF COMM PLAN / JAPANESE RADIO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

11-49 - NAVY STAFF SECTION IMP. GEN. HQ - G.F. (2) (80) \*2

50-75 - NAVAL OPNS. HOME WATERS (80)

76 → JAPANESE COMINT ORGANIZATION - OPERATIONS - HISTORY -  
"CLIMB MT. NIITAKA" - Kanya MIYAUCHI

91-97 SRN - SRH

R.I. ①

REVERSE

DUPLICATION OF TRANSLATIONS  
OF (29) NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE  
NORTH EAST AREA - EARLY OPNS  
OF NORTHERN FORCE

HYTONE



THEME BOOK

SHEETS BOUND SECURELY  
YET ZIP OUT EASILY.  
COVER FOLDS BACK  
AND SHEETS LIE FLAT.

11 IN. x 8½ IN. 70 SHEETS

No. 11-6518  
COLLEGE RULED

SO WA 4  
 MI SI 6  
 RE SE 2  
 HA WA 4  
 NA RI 7  
 C WA 6

CF

YOWI 6  
 UI 1 2  
 TU HI 8  
 MU RO 6  
 SE TU 7

NERO 8  
 RI SI 5  
 SEY GF  
 RO SE 2 ✓  
 HA O 2

TOWNS MIN  
 CRUIS  
 MO SOMI  
 NAM VMIN + v/chnas  
 RI TU RU

CNCS = KAHHA TU  
 NCS  
 1st sect MAYO RU  
 Secy FLA TU  
 3rd sect WA HA TO

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Nam + Minister  
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Come In

Tokyo, J...  
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Tokyo  
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all Sects  
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 Secy Sect  
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Sect  
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all Sect  
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 E TV TI RI

NU NU 1  
 O RE 1 ✓  
 RA RE 4  
 NUTAS

MORU 2  
 R. 30 0  
 HE HA 5  
 HE MI 2

4F

KENA 9  
 KINA 8

all Sect  
 Secy Sect  
 MU SE KU

NAKO  
 MU RO KE

JF XAMES

all Sect  
 Comand Sect  
 SU KU 3

Curve  
 Xuan Hand  
 ME NI FU

6F

ME SO 8  
 HA MU 5 (adv Exp Sect)

all Sect  
 Secy Sect  
 NE SE RA  
 NA RI TE

HOIN  
 GUARD  
 MO MI YU

Yokonke

YU WI 5  
 RA D 6  
 TA HE 9

RI TA 3  
 YU WI 5  
 SA SU 9

Tokyo  
 Comand  
 Sect  
 I KA E

Chuchi

YAKU  
 YU WI 4

Stinking Force  
 KE SA 6

Carden 2  
 YU HA 5  
 OTO 5  
 ANDY 4  
 FU KA 9  
 U MA 7  
 RYU 2  
 TE HI 3

11 AF

O RI 8  
 SI HA 1  
 SU YO 4

Sanpan

Embassors  
 Kasaga Mann HAN 8  
 TOKAZE HI FU 1

Tokyo  
 HA FU 6

Truck  
 TO ME 3

Thay  
 ME NI FU

Annab  
 N 9

12" air force  
 WI KA 6

SE Ex EIT  
 WI KO 3  
 KU MI 8  
 RO TE 3

Pala

Tag

RU TO 8

Nanto YAHES

Shine  
 KIMA 8  
 RE SI 15  
 TU KI 5

?  
 RO SI 2

THU 3  
 NANA  
 RI YU 9

YUKA  
 TA WA 5

Lesder 34  
 NA NI 7

I'D RATHER BE QUILTING COOKBOOK

Churn Dash menu copy

Cut unpeeled tomatoes in 1/2-inch thick slices, dredge in flour. Melt margarine in skillet and fry tomato slices over low heat until brown. Sprinkle with sugar, salt and pepper. With a pancake turner, lift onto warm serving dish. Blend cream into skillet drippings, stirring until smooth. Pour over tomatoes and serve at once. Serves 6.

DILLY BEANS (Make one or more days ahead)

1/2 cup vinegar

1/2 cup water

1/4 cup sugar

1 1/2 teaspoons dried dill weed

1/4 teaspoon salt

297

6 6 5 OTHERS DD  
YA KA 2 23 dg YA KA 2

1 W1 M1 5Mura kufu

SO Wp I-10 (h)

I-M 8 I-10

W1 VA 50 South Seas RNO

W1 ME FU HQ Mission to PIC

KO RE MA Tokyo RPS

HI KI FU Kane Library (RPS)

RO TI 1 Saeiki Am Oba

Combined Fleet, Secret Operation Order #1  
 Yamamoto, Isoroku, Commander in Chief  
 #145 of 700 copies - Combined Fleet Order - Combined Fleet Operations in the war against the United States  
 Great Britain and the Netherlands will be in accordance with the Separate Annex

Flagship - NAGATO  
 Saeki Bay, 5 November 1941

The term "Combined Fleet", commonly used in the War Histories Series, does not denote the Fleet, collectively (as indicated), but instead has the specific connotation of "Combined Fleet Headquarters" / "C.F. Staff" -  
 e.g. "The Combined Fleet <sup>(estimated)</sup> <sup>(judged)</sup> <sup>(concluded)</sup> <sup>(believed)</sup> etc that - - - - -  
 Staff plus P.O. men? (vs) Staff = Staff of operations plus Admin.

At the time  
 "Besshin Force"  
 No singular nor plural; no indication of gender  
 In Japan family name first precedes personal name, but here is reversed for Western readers

Combined Fleet Order #1, Separate Annex  
 I. Operation of Combined Fleet in case war with the United States, G. B. and the Netherlands begins during the Chinese Operation  
 A - Outline of Operations, B - Preparations for war and outbreak of war, C - 1<sup>st</sup> Phase of Operations, D - 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase of Operations  
 E - Protection of Command and Construction of enemy SLOC, and Mine Warfare. **(F) Communications** G - Replenishment of Operations of the Combined Fleet. I. Joint Army-Navy Agreement (Separate Volume)

Warning  
 These communications are highly secret and in some cases classified

**(F) COMMUNICATIONS**

(1) Policy - Combined Fleet communications during war operations will be in accordance with Combined Fleet's Wireless Communications Regulations and based on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement concerning Communications in the Southern Operations. In addition, they will conform to the following provisions:

(2) Communications Arrangements (a) Arrangements at the outbreak of war: ship, submarine, and aircraft communications - <sup>Appendix Table 1</sup> The Communications by Communication Units <sup>(bases)</sup> <sup>(bases)</sup> <sup>(bases)</sup> - <sup>Appendix Table 2</sup> <sup>(bases)</sup> <sup>(bases)</sup> <sup>(bases)</sup> These arrangements will be changed in the future to meet battle conditions. The respective force commanders will change the arrangements for submarine and aircraft communications as need thereof arises. (b) Times for taking up assignments at the outbreak of war, as follows:

CLASSIFICATION	TIME	REMARKS
COMMUNICATIONS BY COMMUNICATION UNITS	2400 X-8 <sup>0000</sup> X-7	AFTER 2400 X-2, (and until specifically arranged for designated) the 2 <sup>nd</sup> CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FLEET and the HAINAN Guard District will be included in the ships' communication system.
SHIPS' COMMUNICATIONS	2400 X-6 <sup>0000</sup> X-5	
Submarine Communications	2400 X-6 <sup>0000</sup> X-5	
Aircraft Communications	2400 X-3 <sup>0000</sup> X-2	
Communications for Specially Designated Units	Special order	

NOTES: 1. For those forces which must take up their assignments before the times set forth in this table, their respective Force Commanders will determine those times and report it to the proper authorities.  
 2. In some cases one element of a force will take up its assignment at a time differing from that of the remainder of the force <sup>Communications time of part of the force will be changed by special orders</sup>

(3) COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES (a) Broadcast method will be the principal means of communications within an operations force. Acknowledgements will be required when there is uncertainty regarding the receipt of a message, or when a confirmation is necessary because the message is particularly important (b) Each force, under the direction of its Commander, will come under the short range communications system of its nearest Communication Unit and its broadcast communication system. (In case of special necessity, it may come under the long range communication system) Also, communications dealing with transportation, supply, personnel administration etc, not urgent from the stand point of operations, will come under this communication system. The Carrier Striking Force, the Commerce Destruction Force and other forces on special missions, at great distances, will come under specially designated communications systems centered in the Tokyo Communication Unit (TOSU) when they set out from their rendezvous positions. (c) All communications units will relay to the proper authorities, the communications of the operations force within their respective areas. Relay will be by broadcast, and acknowledgements will be required when the confirmation of receipt is especially needed. Relay of messages <sup>higher priority</sup> <sup>Emergency</sup> as urgent or higher precedence will be broadcast immediately, other important messages at times indicated in paragraph "d", below:

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	COMMUNICATIONS TO BE RELAYED
TOKYO COMM. UNIT	COMMUNICATIONS OF THE CARRIER STRIKING FORCE, COMMERCE DESTRUCTION FORCE AND OTHER FORCES UNDER SPECIALLY DESIGNATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
TAKAO COMM. UNIT	COMMUNICATIONS OF SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT UNDER THE SOUTHERN FORCE
3 <sup>RD</sup> COMMUNICATIONS FORCE (PALAU)	COMMUNICATIONS OF SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT OF THE SOUTHERN FORCE BASED ON PALAU
8 <sup>TH</sup> COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SAIGON)	COMMUNICATIONS OF AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
5 <sup>TH</sup> COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SIAM)	COMMUNICATIONS OF SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT UNDER THE SOUTH SEA (MELANESIA) FORCE

6<sup>TH</sup> COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (KAWAJALEIN)  
 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE VANUATU (SENKENBUTU) FLEET, THE SUBMARINE FORCE  
 NOTE: Frequencies to be used will be as set forth in "d" below when there is no danger of interference with operational communications of forces, the frequencies for ships may be utilized.

1Gc8 → IN (minus X) - ? Basis? BUIN  
 → 2N (AF) with 4F, 6S, 27 big, 0bore, 1x2, 1p8

(d) Each force will broadcast radio msg. of operational importance in accordance with the following table. All communications units will broadcast important dispatches dealing with operations in accordance with the following table. Force commanders will use the broadcast facilities of the communication unit for communicating within their respective areas. Each force will receive messages as prescribed by that force commander.

Table with 4 columns: COMMUNICATION UNIT, TIMES OF BROADCAST, BROADCAST FREQUENCIES, MESSAGE TYPES. Rows include TOKYO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, TAKAO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, 3rd COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (KAWASU), 8th COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SAIGON), 5th COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SAMPA), and 6th COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (KUALALUMPUR).

NOTE: (1) All communications units will relay by Broadcast method Tokyo Comm. Unit's Short-wave broadcast communications. Each Com. Unit will relay the broadcast of Tokyo Comm. Unit. (2) After X-2 days, broadcast communications will be given permanent numbers. (3) Acknowledgments will be sent in cases of special necessity. (4) Tokyo Comm. Unit (TETSU) and TAKAO Comm. Unit (TAKA TSU) will transmit on prescribed frequencies. (5) Times of broadcast may be changed as the situation may demand. (6) Suitable changes in broadcast frequencies may be made by the Communications Units in accordance with its needs.

(e) When the Main Body is in the home land area, transmission from the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet will control the transmission facilities of the TOKYO and KURE Communications Units (TOKYO, KURE TSU), or the TOKYO Communications Unit (TOKYO) may be assigned to this task.

(f) Communications outside the fleet's area of special emergency, except in cases of special emergency, all communications will be made by means of the communication system through the nearest communications unit.

(4) Safe-guarding Messages. (1) Code tables and call signs to be used are: Combined Fleet Top Secret Order # 171, "Use of Codes"; Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order # 52 - "Table of Combined Fleet Special Wartime Call Signs"; Combined Top Secret Order # 169 "Table of Special Emergency Signals"; Classification of Special Fleet Communications, GF Top Secret Order # 179, GF Special Communication System (Planned); (2) Methods of safe-guarding and distinguishing deceptive dispatches: Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order # 49 - "Methods of Safe-guarding and Distinguishing Deceptive Dispatches." ("GF Category Deceptive message security system")

(3) Method of Indicating Dates: Combined Fleet Standing Order # 51 - "Table of Military Date Indication Code Chart" Combined Fleet's Abbreviations for Dates

(4) Method of Indicating Place Names:

Table with 4 columns: METHOD, ABBREVIATION, REFERENCES, USE. Lists methods for indicating places from Method #1 to #11, including abbreviations like CH HE 1 through CH HE 11 and their corresponding references and uses.

NOTE: IN USING NAVAL AVIATION PLACE-NAME CODE TABLES ISSUED BY NAVAL STAFF SECTION IMP. HQ. MOST SECRET SERIAL 167, THE FOLLOWING IS APPLICABLE: CLASSIFICATION PERIODS TO BE USED. A: From the 1st to the 15th of odd numbered months. B: From the 16th to the end of odd numbered months. C: From the 1st to the 15th of even numbered months. D: From the 16th to the end of even numbered months. E: RESERVE (BY SPECIAL ORDER)

RADIO INTELLIGENCE (5) EXPLOITATION AND INTERFERENCE WITH ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Exploitation of ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. 1. The radio intelligence units assigned to the fleet will utilize enemy communications in accordance with the direction of the Chief of the fleet. 2. The radio interception units assigned to the land-based command, which will utilize enemy communications as directed by the Commanders in Chief of the respective fleets. 3. Unless otherwise ordered, interference with enemy communications will be conducted in accordance with the direction of the unit commander. 4. When known to be effective, the unit commander (the Island Command or the Commander) will direct the nearby communication unit (subordinate communication unit) to carry out interference of enemy communications.

exploit enemy communications in accordance with the following table: 4. When known to be effective, the unit commander (the Island Command or the Commander) will direct the nearby communication unit (subordinate communication unit) to carry out interference of enemy communications.

(d) All communications units will broadcast important dispatches dealing with operations in accordance with the following table. Force commanders will use the broadcast facilities of the communications unit for communicating within their respective areas. Each force will receive messages as prescribed by that force commander.

Table with columns: COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, TIMES OF BROADCAST, BROADCAST FREQUENCIES, MESSAGE TYPES. Rows include TOKYO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, TAKAO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, 3rd COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (KAWASU), 8th COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SAIGON), 5th COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SAMBA), 6th COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (KAWASU).

NOTE: (1) All communications units will relay by broadcast method Tokyo Comm. Unit. Serial number will be given. (2) After X-2 days, broadcast communications will be given permanent numbers. (3) Acknowledgments will be sent in cases of special necessity. (4) Tokyo Comm. Unit (TETSU) and TAKAO Comm. Unit (TAKATSU) will transmit on prescribed frequencies. (5) Times of broadcast may be changed as the situation may demand. (6) Suitable changes in broadcast frequencies may be made by the communications units in accordance with its needs.

(e) When the Main Body is in the home land area, transmission from the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet will control the transmission facilities of the TOKYO and KURE Communications Units (TETSU, KURETSU), or the TOKYO Communications Unit (TETSU) may be assigned to this task.

(f) Communications outside the fleet's area will be conducted through the nearest land-based communication system through the nearest communications unit. (4) Safeguarding Messages: (1) Code tables and call signs to be used are: Combined Fleet Top Secret Order #171, 'Use of Codes', Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order #52, 'Table of Combined Fleet Standing Order #169, 'Table of Special Communications', 'GF T.S. Order #179, 'GF Special Communications'. (2) Methods of safeguarding and distinguishing deceptive dispatches: Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order #49, 'Method of Safeguarding and Distinguishing Deceptive Dispatches'.

(3) Method of Indicating dates: Combined Fleet Standing Order #51 - 'Table of Military Date Indication Code Chart' Combined Fleet's Abbreviations for Dates

(4) Method of Indicating Place Names:

Table with columns: METHOD, ABBREVIATION, REFERENCES, USE. Rows include Method #1 for indicating places, Method #2 for places, Method #3 for places, Method #4 for places, Method #5 for places, Method #6 for places, Method #7 for places, Method #8 for places, Method #9 for places, Method #10 for indicating places, Method #11 for indicating places.

NOTE: IN USING NAVAL AVIATION PLACE-NAME CODE TABLES ISSUED BY NAVAL STAFF SECTION IMP. HQ. MOST SECRET SERIAL 167, THE FOLLOWING IS APPLICABLE: CLASSIFICATION PERIODS TO BE USED. A: From the 1st to the 15th of odd numbered months. B: From the 16th to the end of odd numbered months. C: From the 1st to the 15th of even numbered months. D: From the 16th to the end of even numbered months. E: RESERVE (BY SPECIAL ORDER).

RADIO INTELLIGENCE (5) EXPLOITATION AND INTERFERENCE WITH ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Exploitation of ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. In the early 1920s, the Japanese Army intelligence wanted information on breaking enemy Army codes/ciphers. The Japanese Army Staff, Lt. Col. Jan Kowalski, Polish spy, an expert in code/ciphers and code breaking arrived in Japan in 1924. His instructions and lectures were attended by 70 Japanese officers - Army and 3 Navy plus an Army major interested in the lessons included in Russian code books and lessons were assembled in 1925, published as military top secret under the title 'Code Breaking'.

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	OUTLINE
TOKYO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	Obtain intelligence, chiefly on movements of the main American Fleet and aircraft; also, on the movements of naval forces of the USSR.
TAKAO COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	1. Obtain intelligence, chiefly on movements of American, British and Netherlands fleets and aircraft in the Far East. Details to be prescribed by Commander 1st Combined Communications Force. 2. Depending on the situation, one element will come under the command of the CincC, 11th Air Fleet. 3. As the Southern Operations move forward, that unit will proceed to the occupied areas whenever suitable.
OTHER COMMUNICATIONS UNITS	Under the direction of Comdr. 1st Combined Communications Force, units will gather operational intelligence.

b. Except in case of special orders, (all) interference with enemy communications will be directed by the Comdr. 1st Combined Communications Force. When conditions are deemed favorable and when requested by a force commander, the Commander 1st Combined Communications Force will direct the appropriate Communications Unit in the area (subordinate Communications Unit's) to interfere/obstruct enemy communications, as appropriate.

APPENDED TABLE 1

SHIPS, AIRCRAFT and SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS

TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS	COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, ARRANGEMENTS, ETC. - REMARKS
SHIPS' COMMUNICATIONS	1. The Flagship Communications system comprises those frequencies used mainly by the Flagship of the Commander in Chief of each Fleet and the Flagship of an specifically established Squadron. 2. Ordinary short wave is used by the flagship of the Comdr (C.O.) of a Squadron and when specifically required by an ordinary vessel. 3. Frequencies used in ship communications will be mainly used by the Southern Force, and those forces closely connected with it. Other forces may use them for urgent communications. However, when the Combined Fleet is taking up "VULCAN" Interception Dispositions, their main use will no longer be restricted to the Southern Force. 4. Southern Force communications is Classification 3. ((3 KUN?))
AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS	Frequency System 4 (4 TEN)
SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS	Frequency System 3 (3 TEN) Communications of the "VANGUARD (SUBMARINE) FORCE" (SEIKEN BUTAI) submarines will be determined by Comdr. VANGUARD FORCE.

*the radio intelligence group will plot mainly the movements of the U.S. fleet & aircraft; secondary, the presence of the Soviet navy*

*the radio intelligence group will plot mainly the movements of the U.S. fleet & aircraft; secondary, the presence of the Soviet navy*

*Operational data will be obtained in accordance with the direction of this*

*See also page 10*

APPENDED TABLE 2 COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS / FREQUENCIES / BASES / UNITS

COMMUNICATIONS ZONE OF NETWORK	STATIONS OF NETWORK	FREQUENCIES - DISPOSITION #1		FREQUENCIES - DISPOSITION #2		REMARKS
		ORDINARY	SUPPLEMENTARY	ORDINARY	SUPPLEMENTARY	
#1	TAKAO COMM. UNIT (PHEROPE C.U.) TOKYO C.U. 5th C.U.	6,505 (Na 56) 13,010 (Na 57)	5,550 (Re 51) 11,100 (Re 52) 7,590 (Re 75) 15,180 (Re 76)	6,505 (Na 56) 13,010 (Na 57) 5,550 (Re 51) 11,100 (Re 52)	7,590 (Re 75) 15,180 (Re 76)	
#2	3rd C.U. TAKAO C.U. 8th C.U. (SMGSP)	6,760 (Ta 25) 13,520 (Ta 26)	7,155 (Ta 27) 14,510 (Ta 28) 7,750 (Re 77) 15,500 (Re 78)	6,760 (Ta 25) 13,520 (Ta 26) 7,155 (Ta 27) 14,510 (Ta 28)	7,750 (Re 77) 15,500 (Re 78)	
#3	3rd C.U. TOKYO C.U. 8th C.U. (SMGSP)	4,745 (To 17) 8,980 (To 19)	7,055 (Na 33) 15,710 (Na 34) 7,315 (Re 73) 14,630 (Re 74)	4,745 (To 17) 15,710 (Na 34) 8,610 (Re 81) 17,220 (Re 82)	7,315 (Re 73) 14,630 (Re 74)	On special orders, 6th C.U. will join this network
#4	3rd C.U. 4th C.U. 5th C.U. 6th C.U.	5,780 (Na 14) 10,360 (Na 15)	7,290 (Na 37) 14,580 (Na 37) 7,635 (Na 18) 15,310 (Na 19)	5,780 (Na 14) 10,360 (Na 15) 7,290 (Na 37) 14,580 (Na 37)	7,635 (Na 18) 15,310 (Na 19)	
#5	HAINAN C.U. TAKAO C.U. 8th C.U. (SMGSP)	7,010 (Re 71) 14,020 (Re 72)	6,260 (Re 61) 12,520 (Re 62)	7,010 (Re 71) 14,020 (Re 72)	6,260 (Re 61) 12,520 (Re 62)	
#6	CHIJIMA C.U. 5th C.U. MARCUS IS	5,725 (Re 14) 11,450 (Re 14)	4,925 (Re 41) 9,850 (Re 42)	5,725 (Re 14) 11,450 (Re 15)	4,925 (Re 41) 9,850 (Re 42)	
#7	OMIATO C.U. TOKYO C.U. YOKOSUKA C.U. CHIJIMA C.U.	5,925 (Yo-17) 11,850 (Yo-18)	6,300 (Tan 23) 12,600 (Tan 24)	5,925 (Yo-17) 11,850 (Yo-18)	6,300 (Tan 23) 12,600 (Tan 24)	
#8	OMIATO C.U. TOKYO C.U. MAIZURU C.U. CHINKAI C.U.	4,320 (Ma 11) 8,640 (Ma 12)	6,695 (O-25) 13,390 (O-26)			
#9	WAKKANAI C.U. OMIATO C.U. TOKYO C.U. RASHIN C.U. MAIZURU C.U.	4,015 (O-11) 8,030 (O-12) 16,060 (O-13)	4,717.5 (Tan-21) 9,435 (Tan-22)			This network will be established by special order


NOTES:  
1. The times of Communications will be the customary ones, unless specified otherwise.  
2. When sending and receiving conditions between ships and stations (units) in the same Communication Zone or network are poor, an intermediate Communications Unit will be responsible for relay.  
3. Unless otherwise ordered, Disposition 1 will be used. Subsequent changes in Dispositions or frequencies will be prescribed by Comdr. 1st Combined Communications Force.  
4. Communications Units (Base) communications in occupied territories, except where specifically designated, will be as prescribed by the Commander of the Force concerned.  
5. Reserve Frequencies:  
5,085 (Ta 14)    4,205 (Ho-71)    6,820 (To-57)  
10,170 (Ta 15)    8,410 (Ho 72)    sic 13,040 (To-48) ((13,640?))  
5,325 (To 23)    16,820 (Ho 73)    4,665 (Sa 14)  
10,650 (To 24)    4,030 (Re-11)    9,330 (Sa 15)  
5,225 (Sa 25)    8,060 (Re-12)    18,660 (Sa 16)  
10,450 (Sa 26)    16,120 (Re-13)    sic 12,360 (To 44) ((12,300!!))

See Appended Chart (Page 6 -> over) "Combined Fleet's Communications Units (Bases) and Communications Networks ->

Source? Monograph?	15 Mobile HF Transmitters	To serve as a Mobile Communication Unit during the French Indo China and Malay operations
→ 1st Communications Unit	15 receivers	
2nd Communications Unit	20 mobile HF Transmitters (20 receivers?)	To serve as a Mobile Communication Unit during the Philippines and NEI operations

CLASSIFICATION  
A - Applicable to Central Communications Unit of the Combined Fleet  
B - " " " " " " " " of a Fleet  
C - " " " " " " " " of a Unit (such as a Base Force, etc.)

6 Appended Chart showing COMBINED FLEET'S COMMUNICATIONS UNITS AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS (Networks in colors and marked ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦)



(NE) 49 Wartime organization of the Combined Fleet as of 5 November 1941:  
 1st Combined Communications Force: TOKYO COMM. UNIT, OKINAWA COMM. UNIT, SAIPAN COMM. UNIT, TRUK COMM. UNIT, KWAJALEIN COMM. UNIT, PALAU COMM. UNIT, SAIGON COMM. UNIT, HAINAN COMM. UNIT, HONGKONG COMM. UNIT.

(NE) 57 Combined Fleet Reorganization (from 1st Preparations for opening hostilities until main Army lands to assault the Philippines) - OKINAWA COMMUNICATIONS UNIT was removed from the 1st Combined Communications Force organization and assigned to 5th Fleet.

(NE) 53 Combined Fleet Organization as of April 10 1942 (end of 1st phase operations) lists the (1st phase II) 1st Combined Communications Force as: TOKYO NAVAL COMM. UNIT, TAKAO NAVAL COMM. UNIT, OKINAWA COMM. UNIT, SAIPAN COMM. UNIT, TRUK COMM. UNIT, KWAJALEIN COMM. UNIT, PALAU COMM. UNIT, SAIGON COMM. UNIT, HAINAN COMM. UNIT, HONGKONG COMM. UNIT.

(NE) 212 On 31 October 1942 - 1942 FISCAL FLEET ORGANIZATION modified on part - a 1st Tsushin Tai 通信隊 is newly established and assigned to the 8th Fleet, and will be stationed at BUN, along with S.C. Div #32, the 84th Guard Force and the 6th SASSEBO Naval Special Landing Force.

(NE) 450 448 GF Organization 15 August 1943 - Table of Organization COMMUNICATIONS FORCE (CGB) - Cmdr; Cndr  
 1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS FORCE; Forces Assigned: 1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS FORCE.  
 MAIN TASKS: (1) CONTROL EXPLOITATION OF (ENEMY) COMMUNICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL.  
 (2) ISSUE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. (3) CONDUCT OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS.  
 Note (2) The 1st Combined Communications Force's main mission is to issue intelligence reports to the Communications Units attached to the Combined Fleet and all Communication Units for coverage of enemy communications.

(SE) 96 On the night of the 12th (September '42) the 8th Communication Unit (at RABOUL) which was monitoring enemy communications in the (Guadalcanal) area, intercepted some communications believed to reflect enemy conditions.

Aug 15 '43 GF THIRD PHASE OPERATIONS (7-8 PLAN) 444-1

Chapter 7 of GF 3rd Phase Order - 15 August 1943. "COMMUNICATIONS POLICY" - (1) Increase the effectiveness of the central communications links in each Zone of Interception and also effect smooth operational communications to that area to facilitate concealment of our planned movements; plan for prompt delivery of operational communications. (2) Strengthen the Communications Intelligence Organization; make every effort to acquire accurate enemy intelligence and also carry out interference with enemy communications. (3) Have specially designated ships and stations, when required, carry out false communications to deceive the enemy and act as a security screen for our plans and conceal our movements.

The Commander (Rear Admiral Gunichi KAKIMOTO) Combined Communications Force left Yokosuka on the 12th (Sept '42) and completed the move to TRUK on the 19th (Sept '42). This move placed that Unit at the front of our fleet's operations where it could better direct communications and apply our enemy communications, but this move in view of the course of past operations, was a bit late.

With this move of the 1st Combined Communications Force to TRUK, the Navy General Staff gave the Commander, OKAWA Communications Unit, the control of the Central Radio Section under command from 0900 the 17th (September).

It was probably due to the above move to TRUK that a CI Report that there were several indicators that a strong allied force was operating in the New Caledonia area, reached Commander SE Area Area, who on the 23rd ordered a strict alert against Allied Force's operations and also ordered the strengthening of the defenses of the Shortlands Area to be extended.

According to the SANAEI Organ - a "Combined Estimate" was that of the 1st Section, the 3rd Section and the Tokumutan (Special Duty Group) - (Note 12 Section (Operations), 3rd Section (Intelligence) and the Special Duty Group (Communications Intelligence)...

第三部 五課 (対米情報) Intelligence reports on US were by 5th Subsector of the 3rd Section NGS - such as the table of U.S. CVs and CVLs with estimates of Commissioning dates etc.



NE/68 OMINATO Guard District - In accordance with 大海指第三号 OMINATO Guard District order #6 of Dec 41 "Operations Policy" - (1) Augment (or) improve... insure safety of Tsushima Strait, Central SOTA Strait. (2) Guard strictly area of Sea areas of N Honshu, Hokkaido and the RYUKYUS - maintain security & safety of the Sea of OKINAWA (3) Security of SLOCs E part of Japan Sea (Coordinate with MATSURO & cooperate with Yokosuka etc) (4) RADIO COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

RDF interception of enemy signals, intercept & learn of enemy movements in the areas of KANAGAWA and KAWASAKI - depending on situation send ships and aircraft and intercept the line of movements in that area, the analysis of the coast and river from blood and aircraft movements using non-naval vessels. This assignment of missions and tasks to the force organization:

Communication Force - Commander, CGB, the Guard District - Forces (OMINATO COMM. UNIT, WAKKANAI COMM. UNIT, Radio Center)

Principal Tasks (1) 無線通信 (2) 方位測定 (3) 通信管制 (4) 通信謀報 (5) 艦隊作戦に協力

NE/42 "Early Sightings" of enemy in BUNNIN (before the GUADALCANAL arrival there!!) 10th and 18th submarine reports. December 17 - According to Radio Intelligence there were 10 ships between 15230 and 16020 bearing between 50° and 68° from OKINAWA; one vessel bearing 18° from TRUK and 3 vessels bearing 087°-107° and 128° from SHIMIZUKI (off WAKKANAI near KODE).

NE/51 Modification of Wartime Organ effective Dec 10 1941. 1st Combined Communications Force: TOKYO C, TAKAO C, OKINAWA C, SAIPAN C, TRUK C, KWAJALEIN C, PALAU C, SAIGON C, HAINAN C, HONGKONG C.

NI-Bangal Annex 1 - 1st period 1st phase (from 1st Preparations for opening of Hostilities until the Army's main force has completed its assault landings in the Philippines - with a 20 day gap)

1st Combined Communications Force MISSION: Operational Communications and Radio Intelligence Report but its "culture of operations" is omitted by the author.

Annex 2 - 2nd period 1st phase - the entry Communications Force is omitted by the author.

Annex 3 - 3rd period 1st phase - 1st Combined Comm Force (less OKINAWA Comm Unit) were continued period ops

GF Secret order #2 November 7 1941 GF Wartime Organ lists some Commands as:

Order 5, Sea Force Organ of 5 January 1942 was for invasion of PALAU (no 通信 番号 given) but 1st phase Organ ordered for Feb invasion of SURUJI (Guam) TSUSHIN BUTAI 6th Special Joint Stations (BIKINI, EBON, MEJIT) water towers (RABOUL, ENIWE, KUSAI, MILI, UTRIK). Detachments on ENIWE (JAWIT) ENIWE-JI (EWEYE), Main Force, KARADIA, Detachment - Imieji (EMISS) (JAWIT)

Order to 6th Comm. Unit entry - By Fleet Organ of 10 April 1941 - (6th, 5th, 4th & 3rd Comm Units assigned to 1st Combined Communications Force. By Fleet Organ of 5 January 1942 6th Comm. Unit (was 5th & 4th & 3rd) was assigned to its parent Defense Force. TSUSHIN BUTAI = 6th Comm. Unit - 6th Comm. Unit - interference, interception, Radio Intelligence

Order 339 Marshall Area Force Organ of 5 Jan. '42 - (BIMARKS ASSAULT) communication interference, interception, Radio Intelligence


Order 339 Hantai ENIWEJI (EWEYE) Detachment ENIWEJI, Detachment JAWIT.





# Appended Chart showing COMBINED FLEET'S COMMUNICATIONS UNITS AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS (Networks in colors and marked 1 2 3 4 5 6 7)

## DIAGRAM KEY



- NE 49 "Wartime" 1151 C
- NE 51 "Combine the 1st C" 1st C
- NE 53 "Comb 1st C" 1st C
- NE 54 "NSVA" NSVA
- NE 212
- NE 450 448 "same as with date is 15 NOV 43"
- SE 2 96 F

Aug 15 '43 GF  
THIRD PHASE OPORD  
(FZ PLAN)  
LA 444  
F

Chapter 7 of GF 3rd Phase Opord - 15 August 1943. "COMMUNICATIONS" POLICY - (1) Increase the effectiveness of the central communications links in each zone of interception and also effect smooth operational communications to that area to facilitate concealment of our planned movements; plan for prompt delivery of operational communications; (2) Strengthen the Communications Intelligence Organization; make every effort to acquire accurate enemy intelligence and also carry out interference with enemy communications; (3) Have specially designated ships and stations, when required, carry out false communications to deceive the enemy and act as a security screen for our plans and critical movements.


The Commander (Rear Admiral Gunichi KAKIMOTO), Combined Communications Force left Yokosuka on the 12th (Sept '42) and completed the move to Truk on the 19th (Sept '42). That move placed that unit at the front of our fleet's operations where it could better direct communications and exploit enemy communications, but this move, in view of the course of past operations, was a bit late. With this move of the 1st Combined Communications Force to Truk, the Navy General Staff gave the Commander, SWADA Communications Unit, the control of the Central Radio Section under Ceylan from 0900 the 17th (September).

It was probably due to the above move to Truk that a PCI Report that there were several indications that a strong allied force was operating in the New Caledonia area, reached Commander SE Area Force, who on the 23rd ordered a strict alert against Allied force's operations and also ordered the strengthening of the defenses of the Shortlands area to be exhibited according to the SOWAN Origin - a "Combined Estimate" was that of the 1st Section, the 3rd Section and the Tokumitsu (Special Duty Group) - (Note 1st Section (Operations), 3rd Section (Intelligence) and the Special Duty Group (Communications Intelligence)...

第三部 五言課 (対米情報) Intelligence reports on US were by 5th Subsection of the 3rd Section NGS - such as the table of U.S. CVs and CVLs with estimates of Commissioning dates etc. 5th Section of 2nd Division (Intelligence) of NGS - 5th Section responsible for intelligence on the U.S.


## 1942 Revision of Communications Network

on opposite page (NITAKAYAMA SCORE by HISAMITSU KANGA 8/15/46 page 97)



- Centrally controlled Distant Communication Network
- Locally controlled Distant Communication Network
- Distant Control of Communication Network belonging to Fleet Flagship(s)
- Fleet Flagship mooring buoy (with cable communication to Central or Local Comm Units)
- Radio route
- cable/land wire connections

## Chart in Japanese manuscript #118 (Operational History Naval Communications)



- CHINA (CHINA)
- SHANGHAI (SHANGHAI)
- YOSUKA (YOSUKA)
- MIYAZUKI (MIYAZUKI)
- CHINAE (CHINAE)
- PORT ARTHUR (PORT ARTHUR)
- SHANGHAI (SHANGHAI)
- BAO (BAO)
- HAINAN (HAINAN)
- OSAKA (OSAKA)

Under radio silence but due to an unforeseen incident in the vicinity of AGINCOURT IS (35°N 9°E) on 7th Nov. Radio messages were transmitted. The Royal Navy at HK intercepted their messages and learned of their movements. Messages received by intercepting force carried - 2 - correct 118 to detail.


8) JAPANESE NAVY'S RADIO DIRECTION FINDING ESTABLISHMENT as of December 1 1944

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	DETACHMENT	COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	DETACHMENT	COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	DETACHMENT	BASE FORCE	DETACHMENT
YOKOSUKA	HATSUSE Mura, Kagaya	SASEBO	MANJO 海士郎	No 10 (SINGAPORE)	#2 (SINGAPORE)	OKINAWA	KO REICU 小利久
	SHIRAKATA Chomei - Chino		HAKATA	No 12 (RANGOON)	#3 (SABANG)	RYOJUN	DOJO KO 土城子
	HACHIDO Izu Is.		EI (FAGOSVIRA)	No 21 (SOERABAYA)	#2 (RANGOON)	BAKO	TESSEIJI 鉄家茂
OWADA			TANEGASHIMA Osumi Guntō	No 24 (ANBON)	#2 (SOERABAYA)	HAINAN	藤格
UCHIHI-JIMA	OGIGAWA Chijima - Dorins	RASHIN (KOREA)	KAISUN 会文	No 25 (ANBON)	#2 (AMBON)	No 10 (SINGAPORE)	MIRI BASE
	ISJIMA KAZAN RETTO		EIKO 永房	No 31 MANILA	#2 (KUPANG)	No 10 FRENCHINDO CHINA	#2 (SAIGON) 西貢
OMINATO	SEKINE	CHINKAI	USHISHIMA Tsu Shima (NAGASAKI)	No 32 DAVAO	#2 (DAVAO)	No 22 (BALIKPAPAN)	
	NEMURO		RAKUTO 日東	No 33 COMMUNICATIONS UNITS		No 23 (MAKASSAR)	
	HENASHI (SAKI) Nishi Tsugaya		HEIKAI 平海	Detachments 46		GUARD FORCE (SAIGON)	
SHIMUJHU	NBSAMI (MISAKI) Joya Shuchin to HOKKAI DO	TAKAO	SHINJO	Total 79		MARCUS	
	MUTASHI (off PARAMSURAO To)	No 2 (WELIAK)	(Main force)			WAKE	
OSAKA	MATSWA (To Kuriles)	No 4 (TRUK)	#2 (日曜島)				
	SHONANISAKI Wakayama	No 3 (PALAO)	Captured by US Marines 1944				
MAIZURU	SHIBITA NIIGATA	No 5 SAIPAN	" "				
	NAKAHOKUJO TOTTORI	No 6 (KWAJALEN)	#1 (JALUIT)				
KURE	MIYAZAKI Miyazaki	No 8 (CARAUL)	#2 (GASHATA)				

From "CLIMB MT. MITAKA" by MIYAMUCHI, Kenya - p 495

368 3. COMMUNICATIONS UNIT 通信隊 p 368-70

(a) COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT (通信部)



大本營海軍部聯合艦隊 (2)

(Vol 80) of Senshisōsho SECOND VOLUME OF "NAVY STAFF SECTION, IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS - COMBINED FLEET"

Chapter III - First Phase Operations (1) (Until the middle of the latter part of January 1942) Part I.

1. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION and the plan to accelerate operations. The Navy Staff Section of Imperial General Headquarters (hereafter "Navy Staff Section") on December 12th studied the situation based on the smoother than anticipated progress of operations in all areas, especially on destruction of the battleships of the American Pacific Fleet, etc., and reached the following conclusions: (1) Estimate of naval strengths

CONDITION TYPE	REMAINING STRENGTH IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA (AT ANCHOR PEARL HARBOR December 8th)	STRENGTH TO REMAIN IN THE ATLANTIC (RESERVE FORCE)	STRENGTH THAT CAN BE CONCENTRATED IN THE PACIFIC (INCLUDING THOSE DAMAGED)	NOTE: STRENGTH OF THE COMBINED FLEET AT BEGINNING OF THE WAR
Battleships	2 (9)	3 (8)	8 (6)	10
Aircraft Carriers	1-2 (0)	2	4	10
Cruisers	14 (7 Light Cruisers)	13	20 (4)	37 (Includes 19 Light Cruisers)
Destroyers	50 (19)	73	100	93
Submarines			40	57
Patrol Aircraft (Flying boats)			80	
"Heavy Bombers"			80	

(2) Future moves by America and Britain. The American fleet will probably not advance to attack with its main forces (conduct forward invasion operations) for some time to come; it will probably undertake some guerilla type raids to make face for their countrymen; it will probably carry out invasion operations against the "G" area (Guam area? - G invasion force?) (the MANDATES?) within two months; invasion type raids are probable.

The American Fleet will keep the smallest possible force in the ATLANTIC, sending principally battleships and carriers to the Pacific.

Britain will probably send some two battleships and an aircraft carrier to the Far East

Submarine warfare will be directed against the Southern Sea areas by forces based in AUSTRALIA, NETHERLANDS INDIES AND INDIA.

FROM JANET'S FATHERS PAPERS: (OP 20 COPY) From Com 16 15 2250 15 December 1941 To OPNAV info CINCPAC (Deferred) (Deferred) [Written on message copy] "To Com 14 + ComPAC Pass for info" COPEK

COPEK. TWO INTERCEPTS IN AFIRM NEGAT PLAIN CODE SIXTH AND THIRTEENTH FOLLOWED WITHIN A FEW HOURS BY ENCIPHERED VERSIONS CONFIRMED INDICATOR SUBTRACTOR ALREADY RECOVERED BY MATHEMATICAL ELIMINATION PM CODE REMAINS UNCHANGED X WILL SEND SUBTRACTOR AND ADDITIVE RECOVERIES THIS SYSTEM IF YOU DESIRE BEGIN WORK ON CURRENT PERIOD

FROM OPNAV 16 Dec 1941 To Com 14 info CINCPAC 17 Dec 1941 - COPEK Com 16's 1502250 MOST ENCOURAGING. COM 14 COMMENCE SOLUTION CURRENT AFIRM NEGAT CIPHER AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE X OPNAV WILL ARRANGE FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF SIX OFFICERS AND FURTHER MEN EXPERIENCED IN AFIRM NEGAT SOLUTION TO PEARL HARBOR. COM 16 SEND SUBTRACTOR AND ADDITIVE RECOVERIES TO COM 14 AND PREPARE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN THREE C I UNITS ATTEMPTING THIS SYSTEM X DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE SOLUTION OF BASIC CODE AND WILL MOP UP SUPERSEDED CIPHER (Released by Capt. King)

246250  
2000  
250000  
LHA 2nd AG

126 F

## ③ our counter plans

The Counter plan that we should adopt for the time being is to <sup>speed</sup> ~~move~~ up our scheduled operations and at the same time intensify <sup>our</sup> commerce destruction operations in Indian Ocean and in the Eastern Pacific.

In short, the Navy Staff Section, ~~ImpHQ~~, saw a reversal in the U.S.-Japan ratio in battleships which they considered the main strength; <sup>they</sup> and believed that the American Navy would, likely, make several moves, such as raiding operations but was unlikely to use its fleet's main strength for an invasion for some time to come. Consequently, for the time being we gave no thought to <sup>our</sup> invasion by America's main force <sup>and</sup> but made our estimates on the situation <sup>that</sup> developed from the advances <sup>of</sup> our own independent, and <sup>offensive</sup> ~~positive~~ operations.

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Captain Sadatoshi TOMIOKA, the head of the 1st sub-section of the Naval General Staff brought this estimate of the situation when he came to the Combined Fleet's Headquarters\* on 16 December 1941 to exchange views and confer. The Diary of the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, Rear Admiral MATOME UGAKI records that their opinions on this <sup>matter had already</sup> ~~had~~ been covered in letters <sup>to our Senior Staff officer (Captain Kameto KUROSHIMA)</sup>; <sup>that</sup> and the views of the Combined Fleet staff and that of the Central Authorities were almost identical. With regard to the Southern Operations; the Army and Navy Staff Sections of ImpHQ and that of the Combined Fleet all judged that the greatest difficulties had already been overcome; that by the smoother than anticipated progress, the situation there had reached one of pursuit, and that its conclusion was now a matter of time.

PLAN TO ACCELERATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS

In order to carry out the Southern Operations, the Army had withdrawn forces from the North and from China which had caused considerable anxiety, especially over our military readiness for emergency response against the USSR. The Army Staff Section felt keenly the need to plan to strengthen our war readiness in the north by completing our

\* (Aboard the flagship, NAGATO, at anchor in the Fleet Anchorage off HASHIRAJIMA in the Western Inland Sea - near KURE)

Southern Operations as rapidly as possible, and before the time ~~that~~ the snow <sup>had</sup> melted in the north (and operations <sup>there</sup> became feasible). For these reasons, the Army Staff Section had earnestly hoped to speed up the Southern Operations from before the beginning of the war. Note: The Central Agreement prior to the war had expected to end the JAVA operations on the 120<sup>th</sup> day after the start of the war. However in the Tokyo Agreement between the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet, the Southern Army had proposed a plan to shorten it by about one month. The Navy could not completely agree to this because of the point of view of the Air Annihilation Battles and carrying out the guarding of convoys; the Army Staff Section also did not agree, chiefly in regards to transports. Eventually, it was decided that the landing on JAVA would be on the 80<sup>th</sup> day after the beginning of the war (February 26<sup>th</sup>).

On the one hand there was a strong demand from the Material Mobilization side to invade <sup>quickly</sup> and occupy the raw materials area of the South <sup>without any</sup> delay, to prevent damage to facilities there and make repairs so as to promptly obtain the necessary raw materials. Consequently, since the operations were progressing even more smoothly than had been anticipated, the trend toward speeding up the Southern Operations <sup>naturally</sup> became stronger in both the Army and Navy Staff Sections in ImpHQ. The Navy Staff section, not having to consider an attack by the main force of the American fleet for some time to come <sup>now felt</sup> that a speed up of the Southern Operations was feasible. The Army Staff Section, well aware of the need to accelerate their emergency war-readiness against Soviet, was naturally even more favorably inclined than the Navy toward speeding up the Southern Operations. At a Section Chief's conference on 12 December, the Army Staff Section made a study into speeding up and <sup>generally</sup> advancing the operations; in the Duty Diary of General TANAKA Chief of the 1st Section, Army General Staff there appears the following entries:

(1) In view of the successes at the beginning of hostilities, including the attack on PEARL HARBOR and in order to make <sup>(full)</sup> practical use of these results, <sup>as future</sup> operational guidance henceforth, we should (a) advance (the schedule of) the invasion of the PHILIPPINES, (speed up the landing of the main force of the 14<sup>th</sup> Army); (b) speed up the landing of

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the main strength of the 25th Army; (c) advance (the schedule of) the BURMA operation (d) speed up the operations of the KAWANONJI Detachment (Note - Malacca Borneo).

2. carry out the previously decided policy of Diplomacy toward the USSR.

However, it is necessary to study, prudently, the significance of the recent statement of the German Army of suspension of operations against the Soviets.

Also, one necessary item in the transition of diplomacy toward the Soviets is that of unflinching liaison hereafter between the KWANTUNG Army and the Northern Army.

4. the matter of the HONG KONG operations.

5. maneuvers against CHENGKING (regime) (details omitted as not pertinent). A unique opportunity to cause a fall of the CHUNGKING Political authority, particularly by the above policies, will be <sup>not only</sup> at the conclusion of the Southern Operations but by future increases in the intensity of our maneuvers against CHENGKING as set forth above.

128  
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The Combined Fleet, also, realized the need to plan for acceleration of the Southern Operations by taking advantage of the war's situation. The Chief of Staff, R/Adm USAMI, in his diary, quotes (in Chinese) the celebrated Chinese tactician and strategist of the VI Century, SUN TZE, to underscore the wisdom of acting positively when Opportunity Knocks, and especially so when Our Army is so uneasy about the North, and makes such an urgent request.

128  
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THE FIRST PHASE, Part II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTIVES FOR THE PACIFIC OCEAN FRONT

Commerce Destruction Operations along the U.S. West Coast

The Pacific Ocean Front, our navy's main operations area, was where we would oppose our principal enemy, the American Navy; Our principal target was the main strength of the American Pacific Fleet. Now in our attack (in PEARL HARBOR) at the outbreak of the war, we crushed their battleships, thus reversing the <sup>US pre-war</sup> prior battleship strength ratios between us; and as a result, estimated that they would be unable to mount any real, <sup>offensive</sup> positive operation (against the Far East) for some

time to come. However, since his aircraft carriers had escaped our Pearl Harbor attack, we would have to expect guerilla-type (hit-and-run raids) operations by his carriers and submarines on our Pacific Ocean Front, which would continue to be our navy's main battle area.

The primary objective of our submarines which had been deployed to the HAWAIIAN area was the destruction of the American battleships, but their tasks also included attacks on <sup>operating in the Hawaiian area or</sup> Aircraft Carriers and Cruisers ~~entering or departing~~ PEARL HARBOR ~~(or operating in the HAWAIIAN area)~~, and blocking the Pearl Harbor channel. \* (None of which were accomplished)

129  
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On 10 December, one of our submarines (I-6) in the Hawaiian area reported sighting a LEXINGTON class carrier <sup>\*\*</sup> which was believed enroute to the American West Coast. ~~(When could the author come to this conclusion?)~~ Commander Submarine Force ordered Subron 1, having 9 of our newest submarines, to pursue and attack but as they had <sup>not</sup> made any contact by the 13th. The Combined Fleet, after conferring with the Navy Staff Section at Imp. Hq., changed its pre-war plan and ordered the pursuit continued, <sup>so that</sup> ~~after~~ which Subron 1 <sup>could</sup> would commence commerce destruction operations against sea lines of communications along the U.S. West Coast from SEATTLE to SAN DIEGO. Originally the war plan said: <sup>depending on the situation,</sup> "Send one submarine division (3 submarines) to the U.S. West Coast to make attacks there, to continue the shock-effect of the Pearl Harbor attack on enemy morale. In addition, on the 14th the Combined Fleet ordered Subron 1 to carry out gunfire bombardment of strategic places on the American west coast.

This force began its attacks on shipping on its arrival. ~~This force~~ <sup>They</sup> ~~first~~ <sup>first</sup> ~~attacked~~ <sup>attacked</sup> on the West Coast on 20 December, ~~and commenced~~ <sup>reporting</sup> 11 ships sunk or damaged. In the meantime an intelligence report <sup>had been received from the</sup> Navy Staff Section at Imp. Hq. stating "that 2-3 AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS PASSED THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL ON ABOUT THE 18th AND SEEM TO BE HEADING NORTH IN THE PACIFIC". The Submarine force temporarily <sup>deployed to</sup> intercept the above but made no sightings and on the 14th ordered Subron 1 to attack the West Coast by gunfire on the night of the 25th. The scheduled

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\*\* That footnote says it was the ENTERPRISE returning from the Aleutians attempt to rescue Reinforce VORACE

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\* (probably by midget submarines; a chart from the captured midget-sub <sup>in the channel to Pearl Harbor and endeavor to block it; if the enemy sorties, pursue and attack.</sup> indicated places along the Pearl Harbor Channel for each of the 5 midget subs. \*\* (29) It was not a LEXINGTON carrier; it was the ENTERPRISE engaged in ASHI operations north of CANAL; it returned to PEARL HARBOR in the 15th.

date for their leaving the U.S. West Coast. However Cinc YAMAMOTO on learning of this, directed that they avoid making their gunfire bombardment on CHRISTMAS eve; to change their schedule to do it on the 27<sup>th</sup> or later. However, it was necessary for all of those submarines to leave their stations and begin their return voyages prior to the 27<sup>th</sup> due to their fuel situation. It may be said that it was most unfortunate for our submarines to cross the Pacific Ocean to America's west coast and return without having bombarded America's home land, especially at a time when the American public was agitated and trembling! Their operation, commerce destruction on a large scale against the American West Coast was unique during our war that followed ((not so! The Japanese submarine offensive against Allied shipping off MADAGASCAR, the West Coast of AFRICA and approaches to the RED SEA was of far greater scale and yielded far greater results in ship sinkings! Maybe the Author used unique in terms of so little sunk for such fuel and submarine days-at-sea expended!)) According to ((Navy General Staff member)) SANAGI's diary, The Navy Staff Section, ~~Imperial~~ HQ inferred from <sup>(an)</sup> overseas radio(s) of 8 January (1942) etc., that this operation had a great psychological effect on America, and its sea lines of communication.

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COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST AMERICAN CARRIERS and CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF OUR SUBMARINE FORCE

Cinc Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO was <sup>concerned over the fact</sup> that the American aircraft carriers had escaped our attack on PEARL HARBOR ((they were at sea)) he immediately ordered his staff to make a study of countermeasures <sup>to counter</sup> American aircraft carriers. It is said that his anxiety over aircraft carriers was greater than anyone's. In a letter of 7 January 1941 to the then Navy Minister, Admiral OIKAWA, he stated that if the Japanese home-land received an air attack, that despite any material damage, such an attack would be a tremendous psychological shock to the Japanese people. ((He reminded the Navy Minister <sup>of an incident</sup> in the Russo-Japanese war, when a Russian force <sup>having</sup> escaped the navy's blockade,

had sunk Japanese transports in KOREA STRAITS and even appeared off Japan; that angry Japanese mobs had demonstrated against the navy's failure to protect their home land, <sup>and</sup> set fire to the Navy Minister's <sup>(official residence)</sup> Admiral YAMAMOTO wrote another letter to the subsequent Navy Minister, Admiral SHIMADA, dated 24 October 1941 in which he stated that even if Japan <sup>was successful</sup> in seizing the raw materials zone off the South ((the Netherlands Indies, British Borneo, Malaya and the Philippines)), he feared that the home-land would receive air attacks and become a scorched earth. After the outbreak of the war, the Navy Staff Section, Imp Gen HQ, estimated that: "The American navy will probably use small forces for the time being for guerilla warfare." Cinc YAMAMOTO believed it quite likely that such guerilla warfare would <sup>involve</sup> air attacks on Japan by aircraft carriers. **Approach, Attack & Evade**

The Staff of the Combined Fleet and Naval Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters studied and deliberated on the matter of: <sup>measures to be taken against</sup> ~~defensively there wasn't any sure means to make contact, attack and destroy them~~ aircraft carriers but could not discover any sure method because <sup>They estimated</sup> that it would take some time for the American navy to recover from the chaos and confusion of the beginning of the war but by late December they saw signs of that navy's gradual recovery and judged that it would probably begin a counter attack.

Just as the Combined Fleet had estimated, reports <sup>of</sup> American carrier movements began to arrive from 1 January 1942 onward; with each such report the Staff agonized over its estimate of the enemy's plans, strict alerts were placed in effect from home waters to the MARSHALL Islands and our submarines were redeployed.

At this time the Combined Fleet was planning to have the main strength of our Carrier Striking Force use TRUK as its advance base after the invasion of RABAU to guard JAPAN'S Eastern Front from there. There were several ways to establish contact with an operating American carrier <sup>force,</sup> such as: one of our submarines sighting it leaving PEARL HARBOR, or operating in the vicinity of the HAWAIIAN Islands; from inference based on the nature <sup>and type</sup> of the enemy's signals ((i.e. radio intelligence)); or through a sighting by the air or surface patrols from our bases, etc. However, our air-bred surface <sup>since these</sup> ~~fact of~~

The original agreement to use the Kells in the SW line operations was believed by the HQ GF to mean that the entire strength of the SW line was to be used for operations in the SW line but due to the enemy's situation, the 1st Det US 7th Submarine Squadron was incorporated in the SCREENING/WARDED FORCE in the Pacific waters to be ready to close & attack/destroy an enemy SubB which came to the Pacific waters.

130  
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insufficient strength, <sup>lacked</sup> and were quite weak; Our radio intelligence reports <sup>from accuracy viewpoint</sup> lacked credibility. <sup>missions</sup> Close surveillance by our submarines <sup>in the Hawaiian area had</sup> became distant observation <sup>due to the enemy's strong anti-submarine pressures</sup> <sup>requiring</sup> many submarines;

While the possibility for contacts with enemy carriers was high, it was far from <sup>ideal</sup> perfect. Consequently we could only use all of these <sup>methods</sup> jointly, and hope for the best. However, our submarine surveillance area of the Hawaiian Islands, which had the greatest potential, was being reduced preparatory to increasing our attacks against the enemy's sea lines of communications, and finally, on 25 February, it was entirely withdrawn.

At the commencement of hostilities - 25 submarines were on patrol in the Hawaiian

Area but on 12 December <sup>they were reduced to</sup> 15 submarines, and were further reduced on 18 December to 7 boats.

By 13 January <sup>only</sup> 3 "remained on patrol others

On 22 " <sup>remained</sup> 3 (but <sup>one was</sup> ~~one~~ lost during patrol)

and on 8 February <sup>only</sup> 2 "remained"

Up until now, the principal <sup>operational objective</sup> target of our main strength of submarines in a war with one country, America, had been the main power of the American fleet but this Great East Asia War had become one against several countries and it was expected to be a long war.

Moreover, since the <sup>National</sup> Policy for Direction of the War specified that, as a first step, we should cause the submission of the maritime power, Britain, Commerce warfare against sea lines of communications was emphasized.

Note: At a meeting of the Supreme War Council on 4 November 1941, Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO stated that Britain was the weak point in the Anglo-American Alliance and if her sea lines of communications were cut, Britain would have to submit; the War Minister (and Premier) General Tojo, also, advocated sealing Britain's fate through commerce warfare against sea lines of communications as a feasible step leading to a short war.

However, in the early period of the war, we had to forego commerce warfare against enemy sea lines of communications due to insufficient numbers of our submarines and after the outbreak of the war, as new submarines became available, the policy was to replenish our strength.

131  
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As mentioned before, it was estimated that the main force of the American fleet would be unable to advance across the Pacific for some time to come (as a result of our surprise attack on their battleships at Pearl Harbor at the start of the war).

Also, the efficacy of our surveillance having been greatly diminished by the enemy's anti-submarine warfare pressures, the Navy Staff Section Imp GTR and the Combined Fleet, after conferring together, decided <sup>gradually</sup> to cease the surveillance in the Hawaiian Islands and to shift our submarines to destruction of the enemy's sea lines of communications.

In the meantime float planes carried by our submarines had reported three times on their night reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR, providing important data on ships at anchor, night-time recovery work activity and other things. However, the third reconnaissance could not be effected due to searchlights being turned on the aircraft. In addition contact had been established with important units on four occasions.

On 1 January a force including one American carrier was headed west but it <sup>escaped</sup> ~~was~~ not in time and turned back enroute ((a silly note! WAKE fell on December 23<sup>rd</sup>; no carriers were thereafter sent to "aid" WAKE!))

The second was on 8 January when the drifting old type American aircraft carrier LANGLEY was attacked and sunk, later on this was assessed as a misidentification of ship type. ((the LANGLEY, a seaplane tender, was sunk off JAVA in late February 1942))

The third was the attack and sinking of the LEXINGTON class aircraft carrier on 12 January 1942, which will be covered later. ((the SARATOGA was torpedoed but made port under its own power, was repaired and rejoined the Fleet just after the Midway battle))

The Fourth was the torpedoing and sinking of a large west-bound tanker on 22 January. Note: This was the <sup>NECHES</sup> ~~task~~ force for the ENTERPRISE force, then moving up to attack WAKE; due to this sinking, the operation was cancelled.

In the meantime the Combined Fleet had our submarines make gunfire attacks and <sup>and collect</sup> invasion data on JOHNSTON, PALMYRA and MIDWAY, Reconnoiter French Frigate Shoals and SAMOA (the latter to determine

((★ The Author is mistaken - it was the LEXINGTON's force, not ENTERPRISE, then off SAMOA (Page 19))

132  
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whether American battleships had passed through the Panama Canal on December 18<sup>th</sup> 1941); they also made a reconnaissance of San Francisco, of the ALEUTIANS area and attacked shipping off the West Coast of the United States. In addition, the Combined Fleet wanted submarines, in accordance with the situation to reconnoiter PANAMA, the East coast of AUSTRALIA, FIJI and other places.

During the last part of January, <sup>Commander Submarine Force</sup> decided on a policy of commerce warfare against enemy sealines of communications, allocating Subron 2 to the INDIAN OCEAN area, Subron 3 to the South Pacific area and Subron 4 to the INDIAN and South Pacific oceans. Thus, the decision was made to suspend, for the time being, the surveillance in the HAWAIIAN area.

THE REPORT OF SINKING A LEXINGTON CLASS CARRIER AND ITS EFFECT

On 10 January 1942, one of our submarines reported sighting an enemy force centered in a LEXINGTON Class aircraft carrier about 550 miles west of the island of HAWAII; our Submarine Force ordered its ships to concentrate. On the morning of the 12<sup>th</sup> our submarine I-6 reported that it had made torpedo hits on the above carrier and sunk it; that three hours later had surfaced and searched that area. The Submarine Force, although it had a little doubt, reported that the sinking was probably true. The Navy Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters, after being briefed on the circumstances, publically announced the sinking.

On the other hand, the Combined Fleet had some doubt as to the sinking and felt that the communique by the Navy Staff Section of Imp. Gen. H. Q. was a little too early. Still, the Combined Fleet judged that the success of this attack would boost the fighting spirit of the officers and men of the submarine force which, since the beginning of the war and contrary to expectations, had not been able to achieve the success that had been hoped for before the war, and that they could be expected to play a more active part thereafter.

Then on 20 January, whether it was the success of the attack

132  
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and probable sinking, <sup>of the Lexington</sup> (due to <sup>there was a hiatus in</sup> subsequently intelligence reports with regard to American aircraft carriers, the Combined Fleet in a radio to the Submarine Force directed that hereafter surveillance in the HAWAIIAN Islands <sup>should be</sup> loosened even more and its forces dispersed to MIDWAY and other areas; <sup>that</sup> in view of the sinking of the LEXINGTON and other American developments of late, there seems to be a reduced possibility of an air attack on the TOKYO BAY area for some time to come"

Now on 24<sup>th</sup> of January, <sup>the complete report of the</sup> sinking from the I-6, sent after its arrival at KWASALEIN (MARSHALL ISLANDS), arrived and the Combined Fleet now, finally assessed the sinking of the LEXINGTON as confirmed. Moreover, since there was a continuing absence of intelligence reports regarding American aircraft carriers, the Combined Fleet made a firm estimate, <sup>(crossed in)</sup> that the American navy, <sup>hurt by the loss of</sup> the LEXINGTON, had probably suspended its carrier operations.

It was due to this estimate of an alleviation in the situation on our Eastern Front that the Combined Fleet decided to shift <sup>to the South West Area</sup> the employment of the main force of our Carrier Striking Force, <sup>up until now their plans were</sup> for it to stand by <sup>ready to counter attack</sup> on our Eastern Front. Almost immediately after <sup>decision</sup> that the MARSHALLS Area received a surprise attack by an American carrier task force. In short, the report of the sinking of the LEXINGTON and the later unexpected hiatus of intelligence on activities of the American carriers brought about the faulty estimate of a reduced threat on our Eastern Front.

133  
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The LEXINGTON class aircraft carrier which we believed had been sunk was actually the SARATOGA, which although it had been damaged was able to proceed under its own power.

Translation of the remainder of Chapter III omitted here -> CHAPTER IV "1ST PHASE" OPERATIONS ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN FRONT (see MIDWAY, etc.) and ERRONEOUS ESTIMATE OF MODERATION IN THE SITUATION AND THE MARSHALLS RECEIVE AN AIR ATTACK

169  
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Meanwhile <sup>Intelligence</sup> reports were saying that the enemy in the South Pacific was showing increased activity. Also, <sup>since</sup> it had been decided to <sup>carry out additional</sup> assault operations following the capture of RABOUL, the concern of the Navy Staff Section of Imp. G. H. Q. shifted from

our Eastern Front of the Pacific Ocean to the South East area.

The Navy Staff Section and the Combined Fleet had a plan to have the main strength of our Carrier Striking Force (after participation in the invasion of RABAU) proceed to the seas east of AUSTRALIA in the early part of February and <sup>after carrying</sup> out attacks on that area, return to the TRUK area to be prepared for American carrier attacks to the east. The objectives of that plan were to isolate AUSTRALIA, <sup>give</sup> indirect support to operations in the South Western Area ((MALAYA - the PHILIPPINES - N.E.I. - BURMA)) and guard the Eastern Front.

However, Cardiv 2, which had been sent (after returning from assisting in the capture of WAKE Island) to the South Western Area to participate in the capture of AMBONIA; as a result of its experience there, <sup>it</sup> recommended that rather than use a carrier force to strike invasion-targets, it would be better to concentrate our carrier force for attacks on such rear bases as the PORT DARWIN, <sup>concentration point for</sup> a concentration point of the enemy's forces; it also recommended that in view of the current situation, and as there was a probability of complete success in such an attack, that Cardiv 2 be ordered to carry out that attack.

In the meantime the Southern Force had recommended a plan for Cardiv 2 to attack PORT DARWIN and move into Southern Seas, at the time of the invasion of JAVA <sup>and</sup> operate to cut off the enemy's retreat. Toward the end of January the Combined Fleet had made the estimate that the situation to the east had eased and expecting that a powerful enemy surface force would be concentrated South of Java, saw this as a good opportunity to put things to right with one blow; as it was estimated that the current strength of the Southern Force was insufficient, a plan was formulated to cancel, for the time being, the movement of the main force of the Carrier Striking Force to the east coast of Australia and transfer it instead to the Southern Force. This plan was decided upon in TOKYO on January 30<sup>th</sup> and on January 31<sup>st</sup> the Combined

170  
F170  
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ordered the main strength of the Carrier Striking Force (as of 3 February 1942) and a part of the Submarine Force assigned to the Southern Force. Thus it was decided that for some time the main power of the aircraft carriers would disappear from the Pacific area.

However, on January 31<sup>st</sup> a Naval Communications Unit stationed at KWASALEIN\* (#6) having noted an increase of <sup>about a dozen</sup> new call signs used by American <sup>naval ships and ships and</sup> radio stations during the latter part of January, concluded that the enemy <sup>was on the verge of some kind of offensive action</sup> had some kind of positive plans in hand, and called this to the attention of all departments. On receiving this the Navy Staff Section at Imperial Headquarters felt that <sup>if lacked the basis on which (vague) to initiate any positive measures, (while at) the South Seas ((MANDATES)) Force put an alert measures in effect in the RABAU area; this report was delayed and did not reach the Combined fleet until February 1<sup>st</sup>. ((so they say! or was it also too vague until the next AM?))</sup> <sup>this, alone, was insufficient for taking any</sup> <sup>actual</sup>

During the latter part of January, our forces in the Marshall Islands area noticed that enemy submarine reports which had previously been incessant had now entirely disappeared. I concluded that the war situation had somewhat alleviated and had slackened its guard a little; they paid little, if any, attention to the above Comint report.

In the meantime the Submarine force, as directed by the Combined Fleet had severely reduced its surveillance in the Hawaiian Islands area since the latter part of January. In the Marshalls the air patrols carried out on the 30<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> had not sighted the enemy. At that time the air strength in the MARSHALLS was deployed as follows: AT TARUA (MADJELAP) 9-land based bombers ((NELLS)) and 15 fighters ((CLOUDES)); AT IMIEN (JALUIT) 4 Patrol planes ((MAVIS)) and 8-2place float recce. planes; AT EBIDIE (KWASALEIN) 8-3 place float

\* Naval Communication units operated naval radio and radio direction-finder stations and formed naval radio intercept stations as a integral part of providing radio services to the fleet and providing radio intelligence ("comint") reports in support of operating forces. <sup>At this time</sup> The Combined Fleet was directly supported by the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force of the: TOKYO, TAKAO ((FORMOSA)), OKINAWA, 3<sup>rd</sup>, ((PALAU)), 4<sup>th</sup> ((TRUK)), 5<sup>th</sup> ((SAIPAN)) and 6<sup>th</sup> ((KWASALEIN)) Communications Forces plus mobile intercept unit aboard <sup>all</sup> most Fleet flagships for "Comint" services.

171  
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\* Note air strength in Palau (Rabaul) <sup>which included</sup> <sup>of forces</sup>

rece, planes; at WAKE 4-2 place float, rece aircraft  
 ((The author omitted the 18 Type 96 (CLAUDE) <sup>304</sup> fighter aircraft at  
 RUOTTO ((ROI-KWADALEIN)) The main force of the South Seas Force's  
 Base Air Force's strength was at TRUK, as was the main strength of  
 our Carrier Striking Force, <sup>then</sup> preparing to depart for the South West area.

Early in the morning of the 1<sup>st</sup> of February, strategic islands  
 of the MARSHALL Islands - KWADALEIN, RUOTTO ((ROI)), TAROA, WOTJE,  
 JALUIT and MAKIN ((GILBERT ISLANDS!)) were unexpectedly attacked by <sup>American</sup>  
 aircraft and WOTJE and TAROA received gunfire bombardments from  
 surface forces; ships and aircraft present received considerable  
 damage. Fortunately, <sup>since the</sup> skills of the enemy pilots was inferior,  
<sup>low</sup> this damage was relatively low. Our forces present  
 counter attacked to the best of their ability, units of the Base Air Force  
 then at TRUK were ordered to concentrate in the MARSHALLS and our  
 Carrier Striking Force also headed for the MARSHALLS area.

The Combined Fleet learned of the attack around 0700. As that  
 Command had for some time been apprehensive about an air attack in Japan  
 proper, <sup>in the event</sup> the attack by the enemy carrier task force on the  
 MARSHALLS <sup>could</sup> be a feint, <sup>orders</sup> were issued for a strict alert  
 in the sea approaches to the east coast of the main islands.

next, at 1100 orders went to the Carrier Striking Force at TRUK <sup>which was rushing to</sup>  
 the MARSHALLS area, and that its assignment to the Southern Force (then  
 scheduled for 3 February) would be covered by a subsequent order. Also,  
 at 1300 the Combined Fleet ordered <sup>METHOD #3</sup> OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN  
 FLEET <sup>WITH</sup> CURRENT FORCE ORGANIZATION. Note: By the above order (as set  
 forth in Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order #1) (1) The Submarine Force, the Carrier  
 Striking Force, The South Seas ((Maudslayi)) Force and the Northern Force (charged  
 with the patrol and guarding of the eastern approaches to Japan) would operate  
 against the American Carrier Task Force; (2) The Main Body would support  
 them as required; (3) Depending on the situation, a part of the 11<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet (the Shore  
 Base Air Force) would shift to the East, temporarily.

During February 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>, <sup>reinforcements of</sup> heavy bombers and Patrol planes were rushed

171  
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to the Marshalls area from TRUK and all-out search for the enemy was  
 carried out but the enemy was not sighted. <sup>On learning that contact with the enemy had been lost,</sup>  
 (After receiving this report the

2<sup>nd</sup> called off our Carrier Striking Force's move to  
 to prepare to move to the South. That force  
 PALAU, as previously scheduled.

were not in time. The previous plans had called  
 concentrate in case of an enemy attack but this  
 Hective  
 a-attack against Guerilla warfare.


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 lack on Tokyo. Quoting from his diary, "The

admission for one's shortcomings". Now almost  
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 ly their special characteristic!

hat they were trying to catch the public eye  
 in the war situation in the South and in the West  
 diverted attention away from their actual results.  
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 he ultimate would be an air attack on our  
 already converted 10 auxiliary carriers and

are <sup>now</sup> procuring the necessary air material and personnel to operate  
 them; thus they are growing stronger and stronger. We must  
 lie in wait in the vicinity of our nation's Capital while we  
 nurse our injuries in the south-east. Moreover, We'd best <sup>now</sup>  
 to profit by this lesson!

According to Commander MIWA (Operations Staff Officer, Combined  
 Fleet: - Even though this attack was a probable one, he ((the enemy)) had  
 the stage all to himself. Since we were unable to mount an  
 \* U.S. destroyer attack off GAIKAPPAN 24 January. \*\* this Marshalls attack



172  
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(The author omitted the 18 Type 96 (CLAUDE) <sup>389</sup> fighter aircraft at  
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171  
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172  
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carried out but the enemy was not sighted. <sup>On learning that contact with the enemy had been lost,</sup>  
<sup>the report that contact with the enemy had been lost,</sup> After receiving this report the  
Combined Fleet at 2320 on the 2nd called off our Carrier Striking Force's move to  
the Marshalls and ordered it to prepare to move to the South. That force  
reversed course and headed for PALAU, as previously scheduled.

Finally, the reinforcements were not in time. The previous plans had called  
for forces in the vicinity to concentrate in case of an enemy attack but this  
plan did not <sup>make possible an effective</sup> counter-attack against Guerilla warfare.

The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Rear Admiral Matome UGAKI, considered  
the attack on the Marshalls as the opportunity for the enemy carrier  
force to have attacked the home islands and his apprehensions <sup>increased,</sup>  
<sup>in particular,</sup> over an air attack on Tokyo. Quoting from his diary, "The  
Record of the War":

This was indeed "an admonition for one's shortcomings". Now almost  
two months from the beginning of the war, <sup>the enemy shows an aggressive</sup>  
<sup>A bold and resolute attack plan, yes, but this execution was stupid!</sup> the enemy shows a positive policy;  
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adventure is certainly their special characteristic!

<sup>In my opinion</sup> I would say that they were trying to catch the public eye  
by dropping sparks on the war situation in the south <sup>and</sup> in the west  
and that they have diverted attention away from their actual results.  
Hereafter they will use the best and most effective method (to attract  
public attention) -- the ultimate would be an air attack on our  
capital. They have already converted 10 auxiliary carriers and  
are <sup>now</sup> procuring the necessary air material and personnel to operate  
them; thus they are growing stronger and stronger. We must  
lie in wait in the vicinity of our nation's capital while we  
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\* U.S. destroyer attack off CAUCAPAN 24 January. \*\* this Marshalls attack

172  
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effective counter-attack and the Combined Fleet Staff could only jump up and down in mortification. Fortunately for us, his skills were inferior, which saved us from greater casualties and damage. Such minor damage was, in a sense, a victory for us. The fact that he selected our most advanced

strategic bases as his target and withdrew after only one attack shows that his objective was to boost public morale and <sup>achieve</sup> internal political results! On the other hand, as he has learned that <sup>the defenses of</sup> our important strategic points are weak, there is the apprehension that he will <sup>accelerate</sup> speed up these kinds of attack in the future. Whatever happens, we absolutely must not permit an air attack on TOKYO!

We knew that, defensively, we could not be certain to catch, attack and destroy enemy carriers when they came to attack but, in this instance, our expectations were not met due to such petty air patrol/searches and because our failure to concentrate our counter-attack forces <sup>in time</sup>. Defensive operations against enemy carriers is bad strategy and worse tactics; this <sup>fact</sup> should be fully realized!

Also, the South Seas Force requested such huge <sup>air</sup> reinforcements as 54 land based bombers and 18 Patrol planes for both RABAU and the MARSHALLS areas after the air attack on RABAU (will be covered later), based on battle lessons from its operations. However even these numbers of aircraft were said to be insufficient for the extent of air patrols for such a tremendous frontage.

The American Carrier Forces' raids on the Marshalls area made us recognize that our optimistic estimates regarding the enemy to the East were incorrect. Now to provide protection for our home islands area the Combined Fleet on 3 February decided to remove Carrier 5 from the Carrier Strike Force and have it stand by its home waters and to shift the Carrier Strike Force (nucleus - Carrier 1) to the south west area, as previously planned.

In addition, on 5 February, 21 land based bombers of TAKAO Air (intended to be the nucleus of a newly organized "4<sup>th</sup> Air") were ordered

detached from the Southern Force and assigned to the South Seas Force, to be deployed to the RABAU area. The Main Force of the Carrier Strike Force, whose deployment to the Southern Force had been temporarily held up, was assigned to that Force on 8 February.

On 7 February the ŌWADA<sup>⊕</sup> Communications Unit intercepted radio telephone traffic from enemy surface ships bearing 53° from ŌWADA. On the 8<sup>th</sup> the Combined Fleet issued orders for: "METHOD 3 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET";<sup>⊕\*</sup> the SHIOKAWA, then at YOKOSUKA, to put to sea; organizing a part of the Main Body and Carrier 5 into a "Screening" (or "Covering") Force, to close, attack and destroy the enemy carrier force. Afterward, there being no change in the enemy's movements, the Combined Fleet on 15 February cancelled its "METHOD 3 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET."

Before the war during the Combined Fleet Map Manuevers of September 1941, the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet, which would be charged with operations in the area concerned, wanted to advance to the strategic places of LAE and SALAMUA after the occupation of RABAU in order to make the latter place secure. The Combined Fleet reproved this suggestion pointing out that the Fourth Fleet had the important task of patrolling the areas of our Inner South Seas ((Maudslayi Islands)) which faced our main enemy, the American Fleet, and advances into the South East area at that time would have to be postponed. Again at the time of the War Games (Map Manuevers) aboard the flagship NIMITZ in October, the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet stated that an occupation of RABAU only would be useless and emphasized that additional forward strategic points would have to be assaulted and occupied to make RABAU secure. The Combined Fleet also recognized that desirability but being pressed for operational studies of other priority fronts and since that area lacked the military resources, made no operational studies of this subject. The reply to the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet was that a decision would be made later regarding advances after the occupation of RABAU.

<sup>⊕</sup> The Ōwada Communications Unit, located miles of Tokyo, served as the Naval Radio Intelligence Center, receiving intercepts and traffic analysis reports from all outlying Communications Units; it served as the [decryption and] radio intelligence dissemination organ of the Japanese Naval High Command and also the radio-direction <sup>central control and</sup> finder <sup>central plotting</sup> station.  
\*\* See Page 24 f

174  
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After the outbreak of the war, the war situation in all areas, <sup>as</sup> improved, it <sup>had</sup> was decided to go ahead with the assault and occupation of Rabaul. Both the Navy Section Imperial General Headquarters and the Combined Fleet <sup>knew</sup> decided that they had to decide how that area's strategic arrangements could be solidified. Since the beginning of the war the strategic value of that area had increased tremendously as a line for counter-attack operations for the enemy. However the enemy's defenses, readiness etc were judged to be extremely weak. For those reasons, the Naval Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters, and others, planned to advance as far as Eastern New Guinea and the southern edge of the Solomon Islands in order to solidify a defensive posture fronting on the Coral Sea to control Torres Strait and Eastern Australia.

Just after the occupation of Rabaul, the Army's South Seas Detachment <sup>still</sup> had some time left in the Pacific before being shifted to the S.W. area, so the Army Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters agreed to the above plan. From immediately after the beginning of the war, the Army and Navy Staff Sections at Imperial General Headquarters had exchanged views on the Navy Staff Section's plan to assault and occupy Australia and a plan to block off the sea lines of communications between the U.S. and Australia. Toward the end of January the principal Army and Navy planners had agreed to operations to cut the lines of communications between America and Australia and believed that a decision to advance to the southern line of the Solomons and Eastern New Guinea should include preparations for such operations. However the order for the assault/occupation was set forth in the document as having <sup>as</sup> its main objective the "establishment of defensive arrangements".

On 29 January 1942, the Chief of Naval General Staff <sup>issued the following directive to</sup> the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet:

NAVY STAFF SECTION, IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, DIRECTIVE #47

CINC COMBINED FLEET WILL CARRY OUT OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITISH NEW GUINEA AND THE SOLOMON ISLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CENTRAL AGREEMENT AS SET FORTH IN THE ANNEX APPENDED.

#### ANNEX

1. OBJECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL AGREEMENT OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

WITH RESPECT TO THE OCCUPATION OF STRATEGIC POINTS IN EASTERN BRITISH NEW GUINEA AND THE SOLOMON ISLANDS.

IN ADDITION TO CUTTING LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THESE POINTS AND THE AUSTRALIAN MAINLAND, YOU WILL CONTROL THE SEA AREAS TO THE NORTH OF EASTERN AUSTRALIA.

#### 2. OPERATIONS POLICY

BY ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION, AND AS SOON AS FEASIBLE, YOU WILL ASSAULT AND OCCUPY STRATEGIC POINTS IN THE VICINITY OF LAE AND SALAMUA. ALSO, WHEN OPPORTUNITY PERMITS THE NAVY ALONE (OR IF THE SITUATION ALLOWS - IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY) WILL ASSAULT AND OCCUPY TULAGI AND ESTABLISH AN AIR BASE THERE. IF FEASIBLE AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF LAE AND SALAMUA, ASSAULT AND OCCUPY PORT MORESBY BY COOPERATION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY.

#### 3. FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED.

ARMY - THE SOUTH SEAS DETACHMENT.

NAVY - FORCES HAVING THE 4TH FLEET AS A NUCLEUS.

#### 4. OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS

AS DECIDED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE ARMY AND NAVY COMMANDERS.

#### 5. PROTECTION ASHORE

LAE, SALAMUA AND TULAGI WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NAVY.

PORT MORESBY WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ARMY.

The next day, the 30<sup>th</sup> <sup>(JAN '42)</sup>, the Combined Fleet ordered the South Seas Force to carry out the operation in accordance with the directive. Since the Navy Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters had passed to the South Seas Force and others the fact that they were planning to assault and occupy Australia and to sever the lines of communications between America and Australia, the South Seas Force understood this new operation to be a part the general set up. That Force now scheduled the occupation of LAE and SALAMUA for MARCH and the occupation of TULAGI and PORT MORESBY for April.

175  
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175  
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## AMERICAN FORCES TO THE PACIFIC

## ATTACK ON THE MARSHALLS

Admiral King demanded that the Pacific Fleet strike a strong blow on islands held by Japanese forces at the earliest possible opportunity but the occupation of the Gilberts by Japanese forces and the bombardment of TUTUILA (SAMOA) by the I-20 on 11 January led the Pacific Fleet to estimate that an invasion of the SAMOAN Islands was imminent, and, as it was accelerating the strengthening of the defences of CANTON and SAMOA, there were no forces for such an attack.

The American Pacific Fleet estimated that any invasion of SAMOA by Japanese forces would probably be mounted from the MARSHALLS or TRUK and that the Japanese plans envisioned a continuation of their advances, an occupation of MIDWAY or HAWAII\* extending from WAKE, and/or an occupation of SAMOA extending from the GILBERTS. The American Pacific Fleet also overestimated the Japanese forces deployed to the Central Pacific and judged that the <sup>(Japanese)</sup> Carrier Strike Force was also operating in that area. It was for this reason that they cancelled an air attack on 20 December against MAKIN and JALUIT by a force formed around the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON.

Through the air reconnaissance <sup>(of TRUK)</sup> by a British aircraft on 6 January 1942 they learned that Japanese naval vessels were at TRUK; this caused the American Navy to estimate that an invasion of FIJI was imminent and concluded that a sudden attack on TRUK or the MARSHALLS was necessary.

On the other hand, the British requested that America provide the military forces to reinforce FIJI but as the Americans were then reinforcing CANTON and SAMOA they had no forces available for such reinforcement. CANTON was a very important point on the U.S.-AUSTRALIA line of communications, but it was only 960 miles from MAKIN and its defence very difficult, it was a source of concern to the American Authorities. It had one runway for B-17s, 5000 feet in length but not one plane was stationed there and its garrison was extremely small. Moreover, there was only one airfield in the FIDJIs, on NANDI Island, with only 22 aircraft assigned there and a garrison force for the FIDJIs of

8,000 British and others.

A reinforcement force of American Marines left SAN DIEGO on 6 January for the American naval base at PAGO PAGO, TUTUILA, SAMOAN ISLANDS and arrived there 23 January 1942. They were escorted by a naval force centered in the aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, augmented enroute by the aircraft carrier YORKTOWN which had passed through the PANAMA CANAL to the PACIFIC. Thus, the defence of the eastern half of the U.S.-AUSTRALIA line of communications was established.

176  
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As previously mentioned, the ACADIA Conference had been held from late December to mid January 1942. At that time a plan to reinforce the Western Pacific was discussed which brought about the matter of protection for the South Pacific, the security of U.S., Great Britain, New Zealand and AUSTRALIA. It was then decided that the U.S. would assume the protection of NEW CALEDONIA and FIJI.

Based on this, the U.S. War Department ordered the transportation of 2000 men to CHRISTMAS Island; 1500 men to CANTON I<sup>s</sup> and 4000 to SAMOAN BORA BORA (The Japanese author is confused, geographically -- BORA BORA IS IN FRENCH OCEANIA, near TAHITI!) during the month of January. In addition, the American Army planned to send to the South Pacific 14,000 men by the end of January and 11,000 men during February.

In the latter part of January, Japanese forces advanced to RABAUL. AUSTRALIA warned that the ((American)) forces then being transported to NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA by the Pacific Fleet would probably fail to arrive in time. However, the American Navy had secretly learned and believed that as soon as the Japanese forces had solidified their foothold on RABAUL, a force of 2 aircraft carriers, several cruisers and some battleships would be prepared to advance and invade the NEW HEBRIDES Group and NEW CALEDONIA.

177  
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Now the Cinc Pacific Fleet placed a force centered in the aircraft carrier "LEXINGTON", all the Patrol planes that could be diverted, and all available Army bombers to the operational control of Comdr. ANZAC area, Vice Admiral Leahy, for movement into the FIJI-NEW CALEDONIA area. In the meantime the

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Pacific Fleet had decided to carry out diversionary air attacks against the MARSHALLS Area in order to alleviate the pressure by Japanese forces on the South Eastern area. This decision resulted in the air raid on the MARSHALLS on 1 February 1942.

The carrier 'LEXINGTON' left PEARL HARBOR to make an <sup>air</sup> attack on WAKE in concert with the 1 February attack on the MARSHALLS but its tanker was sunk by a Japanese submarine on 23 January, 135 miles west of GATHU, so its attack on WAKE was cancelled. Afterward it was assigned to the ANZAC command which decided to use it for an air attack on RABAU.

177  
ACTIVITY BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS - THE BATTLE OFF RABAU


An American radio broadcast of 12 February stating that a part of the American fleet that had attacked the MARSHALLS on 1 February had reached NEW ZEALAND and that an American Army force had arrived in AUSTRALIA. This was circulated to all forces by the Navy Staff Section with the evaluation that while this was probably propaganda, some U.S. Army and Navy forces were <sup>believed</sup> estimated to have been shifted to that area.

As stated before, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of February the Combined Fleet had cancelled its order "METHOD NO 3 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET". The next day, the 16<sup>th</sup>, it received a Radio Intelligence report that an American carrier force had apparently sortied from PEARL HARBOR which <sup>report</sup> was circulated to all forces <sup>on the 17<sup>th</sup></sup> with its estimate of a high probability of an attack on WAKE or the Inner South Seas (MANDATES) area concerned the following day, the 17<sup>th</sup>. That day, the Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, made a report to the Throne on tactical matters and, according to the record, stated that the Navy Staff Section's estimate was that were the enemy carrier task force to proceed to the west, it could appear off the MARSHALLS around the 20<sup>th</sup>, or off TOKYO about the 23<sup>rd</sup>. On receipt of the Combined Fleet's report and estimate, the South Seas Force sensed that an American carrier task force was then between the HAWAIIAN Islands and AUSTRALIA, I judged that an attack was likely on the MARSHALLS, EASTERN CAROLINES, or the RABAU area, and ordered precautionary measures placed in effect in those areas.

Just by chance, a remote Lookout Station on SATAWAN Island, 160 miles SE of TRUK, reported sighting the tops of masts of what it took

178  
to be "2 destroyers of unknown nationality" on the 19<sup>th</sup>. "STRICT ALERT" was then ordered by the South Seas Force but after an air search had failed to sight anything, <sup>and</sup> it was realized that the SATAWAN report had been erroneous, the ALERT was cancelled on the 20<sup>th</sup>.

However, a 4-engine KAWANISHI <sup>SAKI</sup> Patrol plane, which had <sup>early that morning</sup> taken off from RABAU harbor to patrol to the east, reported sighting a large enemy force but was not heard from again. This report led the South Seas force to estimate an air attack on TRUK (his own location!) as likely; all forces present were ordered to sortie and the scheduled date for the assault and landings at LAE and SALAMUA was postponed. Ordered to conduct a search and attack against the enemy force, 4<sup>th</sup> Air which had been newly organized on 10 February sent off 17 land based bombers ("BETTS") from RABAU on the 20<sup>th</sup>; they reported that their attack had been successful, one aircraft



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However, a 7-engine KAWANISHI <sup>SAKI</sup> Patrol plane, which had <sup>early that morning</sup> taken off from RABAU harbor to patrol to the east, reported sighting a large enemy force but was not heard from again. This report led the South Seas force to estimate an air attack on TRUK (his own location) as likely; all forces present were ordered to sortie and the scheduled date for the assault and landings at LAE and SALAMUA was postponed. Ordered to conduct a search and attack against the enemy force, 4<sup>th</sup> Air which had been newly organized on 10 February sent off 17 land based bombers ("BETTS") from RABAU on the 20<sup>th</sup>; they reported that their attack had been successful, one aircraft carrier left burning fiercely and about to sink but their <sup>own</sup> force had been almost completely annihilated. The next day, the 21<sup>st</sup>, Patrol planes from RABAU took off for search and attack and searches were flown over a wide area from TRUK and the MARSHALLS but nothing was sighted.

The LEXINGTON force had planned to make a surprise air attack on RABAU from the east of that place on the 21<sup>st</sup> but having been sighted and attacked the day previous the opportunity for surprise had been lost, so they reversed course and cleared the area. Contrary to the report by the Japanese force, no vessel of the LEXINGTON force was damaged in that action.

The Commander of that force, in his report to the Cinc Pacific Fleet, recommended that thereafter, in any attack on an air base such as that of RABAU, 2 aircraft carriers - at least - should be used. Thereupon, the Pacific Fleet directed that the force centered in the YORKTOWN, which had departed PEARL HARBOR on 17 February, join the LEXINGTON force and give indirect protection to the Army force being transported from AUSTRALIA to NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA. Later, that 2 carrier force would conduct a surprise air attack on LAE and SALAMUA on 10/11 March (only 10 March!)

#### ATTACK ON WAKE

Must immediately after the air battle off RABAU an American carrier force made

a surprise air and gunfire attack on WAKE and since more we were unable to mount any effective counter attack against them. The Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, RAdm UGAKI, wrote in his diary for that date the following:

A little past five this morning a WAKE patrol plane sighted 2 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Light Cruisers, one Aircraft Carrier and 4 Destroyers about 10 miles from WAKE. There was the usual difficulties in identification of ship types - calling them battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers. The enemy attacked with 50 carrier planes, 7 shipboard float scouts and cruiser gunfire. Our shore batteries replied shooting down two aircraft; ~~but~~ after one cruiser was set afire, the enemy withdrew at high speed on courses between 40 and 60°. One of our patrol planes maintained contact and about a dozen of our land based bombers from ROI (KAWASAKI) attacked, obtaining one hit with a 250 kilo (550#) bomb on the stern of an enemy cruiser, causing it to fall behind. It is disappointing that our counter attacks did not attain better results. The enemy shows very good tactical concepts in having one carrier force in the north and another one to the south, acting in concert but their operations are not praiseworthy.

Now we must take drastic measures at <sup>those</sup> points where they insolently approach our islands, launch their aircraft and open up <sup>bombard us with gunfire.</sup> gunfire bombardment.

According to the MIWA Diary and <sup>post-war</sup> recollections of surviving members of the Staff, the Headquarters Combined Fleet <sup>do not wish in any sense</sup> began to realize, more and more, the dimensions of the problem of the defense <sup>in the defense</sup> being able to come to grips with <sup>our</sup> an enemy carrier force and attack and destroy it. Also, now that the enemy had learned <sup>the weak condition of Japan's</sup> ~~how~~ our outer perimeter defences, <sup>there was a likelihood of more frequent</sup> ~~we~~ he would be likely to make carrier air attacks in the future. However, <sup>for the time being,</sup> we had to persevere in the war situation and later on <sup>will undertake</sup> positive, offensive operations to

179  
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destroy the American carriers in one blow. The concept of the Staff of the Combined Fleet at that time, was an operation to assault and occupy the Hawaiian Islands <sup>but it was</sup> ~~and~~ not the operations concept that later on became the Battle of MIDWAY.

The South Seas Force, on receiving the report from WAKE of the attack on the 24<sup>th</sup>, made preparations for a counter attack but cancelled them on the 25<sup>th</sup> and established March 8<sup>th</sup> as the date for the assault and occupation of LAE and SALAMUA. The WAKE attack force had been formed around the carrier ENTERPRISE, which had returned to PEARL HARBOR on 6 February following its attack on the MARSHALLS, and had left again on the 14<sup>th</sup>. On the 21<sup>st</sup> it was ordered to add a gunfire bombardment to the planned surprise air attack on WAKE. During its withdrawal on the 25<sup>th</sup> after its successful attack, it was again ordered to make a surprise attack on MARCUS Island, so set a westerly course.

ATTACK ON MARCUS. After the attack on WAKE, intelligence reports on American carrier forces temporarily ceased but activity by American submarines in waters near our main islands now intensified. At that time we had deduced that the American navy tended to deploy some of its submarines in advance of an attack in the vicinity of its objective.

On 2 March a Radio Intelligence report was circulated containing the estimate that a part of an American carrier force was between MIDWAY and the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS but early in the morning of the 4<sup>th</sup> an American carrier force attacked MARCUS Island. The garrison there put up a spirited resistance but was unable to mount an effective counter-attack.

The Combined Fleet ordered counter-attacks and placed all forces on the alert; the (CV) SHOKAKU, then in MIKAWA BAY ((NAGOYA - ISE BAY area)), was ordered to sortie. At that time Cardiv 5 had already been directed to return to the Carrier Strike Force (effective 5 March) to participate in the CEYLON attack operations (to be covered later on).

On the morning of the 5<sup>th</sup>, a report came that there was a flight of aircraft of unknown nationality had been sighted bearing 110° distant 360 miles from YOKOSUKA, headed west. The Combined Fleet estimated

180  
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that an enemy aircraft carrier was in that vicinity and issued orders for the "SITOKAKU" to sortie once more, for the Screening/Covering/Protective Force to make preparations to sortie and reassign Cardiv 5 to the above force. However, the above flight of aircraft turned out to be our own aircraft so Combined Fleet cancelled all of the above measures and Cardiv 5 left home waters for the South on 7/8<sup>th</sup> March.

MARCUS Island was near our home islands but there was no airfield that could be used by <sup>our</sup> land based bombers between it and our main islands. It was here that the American Carrier Force had attacked but <sup>as</sup> there was another report (later found to be in error) that that an additional American carrier was to the northwest, great concern was felt over an attack on our main islands. <sup>(at first)</sup> The Combined Fleet did not believe that this American Carrier force would <sup>(Enterprise, SLC + Northampton + BPR)</sup> attack our main islands as it <sup>did not have sufficient power available.</sup> <sup>Not, since American carrier forces had been making a series of attacks on strategic points of our outer perimeter, and had now attacked Marcus, close to our main islands, the Combined Fleet now</sup> estimated that the probability of an attack on our home islands had become greater. After its attack on MARCUS Island the American carrier force immediately withdrew.

#### OCCUPATION OF LAE AND SALAMAUVA and the ATTACK BY THE AMERICAN CARRIER FORCE

After the occupation of RABUL, the South Seas Force occupied the air base at "SURUMU" located midway along the South shore of NEW BRITAIN Island (on which was RABUL), and moved up a part of its fighter aircraft to that airfield. Moreover, the Base Air Force was attacking the enemy air fields which dotted eastern NEW GUINEA, seeking to control the air. The South Seas Force learned of the enemy carrier force attack on MARCUS Island but went ahead with the operation to occupy LAE and SALAMAUVA, as scheduled. The Occupation Force captured both places on the 8<sup>th</sup>. The LAE airfield <sup>was reported</sup> to be useable by fighter aircraft in two days and fighters were

scheduled to move up on the 10<sup>th</sup>. However, on the morning of the 10<sup>th</sup> LAE and SALAMAUVA received <sup>an</sup> enemy air attack by carrier aircraft mixed in with land based bombers and of the 18 vessels present, 4 were sunk and 13 were damaged. This was a huge loss!

On receipt of the report of the air attack, patrol planes were sent out to search for the enemy and at 1520 sighted a force centered in a "SARATOGA" class carrier, bearing 250°, distant 90 miles from PORT MORESBY. Since an attack would be in the dark of night, the attack force could not take off as night take offs and landings were impossible from RABUL's WEST airfield (the Eastern airfield was for small aircraft) at that time.

The next day, the 11<sup>th</sup>, the Base Air Force took off for search and attack but were unable to sight the enemy. It was concluded that the enemy had retired to the AUSTRALIAN area.

After receiving the report of the air attack on LAE and SALAMAUVA, the Navy Staff Section at Top G. H. Q. circulated to all Divisions at that Headquarters its estimate of the enemy's plans as follows:

By combining the following items, it is estimated that the enemy has plans to launch a positive offensive against the RABUL or TRUK areas in the near future and <sup>concurrently</sup> at the same time make surprise attacks on TOKYO or the BONIN Islands areas.

1. Recently many important despatches have been noted passing through Station NPL (TUTUILA, Samoa) originated by and addressed to the CINC Pacific Fleet and the Commanders of the AUSTRALIAN and NEW ZEALAND Fleets, leading to the suspicion that rather powerful force is operating in that area.
2. There has been an increase in communications at TUTUILA, CANTON and JOHNSTON Islands bases since 3 March.
3. On 3 March the number of Patrol planes appearing in the HAWAIIAN area were unusually large (details omitted by the Author) and it is suspected that a group of ships departed PEARL HARBOR that date.
4. On the 5<sup>th</sup> at 2100, a U.S. submarine appeared 150 miles

181  
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east of CHICHIMA (Bonins) and exchanged despatches with the flagship of its submarine group.

5, In the past when the enemy planned a surprise attack, submarines were sent out to reconnoiter in advance.

Next, the Navy Staff Section then transmitted the following despatch in the name of the Head of the 1<sup>st</sup> Department of the Naval General Staff regarding its estimate of the recent activities of the American Fleet in the Pacific Ocean area:

In view of the broadcasts

by authorities of the U.S. and Australian Governments regarding <sup>plans for offensive</sup> ~~positive~~ operations ~~plans~~ against Japan and intelligence reports of the departure <sup>(in early February)</sup> of powerful reinforcement forces from AMERICA ~~in early February~~ headed for AUSTRALIA, it is estimated that the Americans and AUSTRALIANS have some plan <sup>for</sup> operations against the RABAUL or TRUK areas.

The American Carrier Task Force that had attacked LAE and SALAMUA was made up of the force centered in the "LEXINGTON" and the force centered in the "YORKTOWN". The latter had left PEARL HARBOR on February 17<sup>th</sup> escorting a convoy to NOUMEA and joined the "LEXINGTON" force 6 March in the seas west of the NEW HEBRIDES islands. After launching their air attacks on LAE and SALAMUA on 10 March from waters off PORT MORESBY, they proceeded an area south of the NEW HEBRIDES on the 16<sup>th</sup> where they separated, the YORKTOWN force remaining in the Coral Sea, the LEXINGTON force returning to PEARL HARBOR.

182  
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#### SUBSEQUENT INTELLIGENCE AND ACTIONS

The night of the American carrier attack on LAE and SALAMUA, 10 March, a radio intelligence report stated that a <sup>radio</sup> frequency like that of an enemy aircraft carrier had been detected north of WAKE and that at midnight direction finders had placed it 600 miles north of that island. From this, the Combined Fleet believed American carrier <sup>forces</sup> were operating in consort, one north and one south, and

that the one to the north was aimed at Tokyo. It issued a series of directives: for Cardiv 5, then southbound, to head for CHICHIMA; <sup>ordered</sup> "METHOD 3 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FORCE"; temporarily/reassigned Cardiv 5 to the SCREENING/COVERING FORCE, ordered that force to sortie; for a part of Subron 8 to depart KURE and take up patrol station 300 miles east of Tokyo Bay (INUBOE ZAKI); and for the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla, then returning to KISARATSU Air Base, to conduct searches for the enemy. The Northern Force reinforced its Picket Patrol line, which was 700 miles east of HONSHU, in order to extend its patrol line further to the north.

On the 11<sup>th</sup>, eleven air search sectors were flown from KISARATSU to 700 miles east of HONSHU but no enemy was sighted. Meanwhile, according to Radio Intelligence's Direction Finders, the enemy was moving to the east. On the afternoon of the 11<sup>th</sup>, Navy Staff Section <sup>Trp 9 HQ</sup> placed the fighter aircraft groups of OMURA Air and KURE Air under the command of the Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval District to strengthen the air defenses of the Tokyo Plain. Thereafter, <sup>daily</sup> air searches from KISARATSU were flown and on the 14<sup>th</sup> searches from MARCUS were added but no enemy sightings were made. That evening the Combined Fleet cancelled all alert measures and the Navy Staff Section returned the fighter aircraft reinforcement groups to their original assignments.

182  
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At that time, two of the four American aircraft carriers in the U.S. Pacific Fleet were in the South Pacific, the "SARATOGA" was under repair on the U.S. West Coast and the "ENTERPRISE", which had attacked MARCUS Island, had returned to PEARL HARBOR on March 10<sup>th</sup>. From the above it can be seen that our Radio Intelligence, the basis of the above series of alerts, was in error. On the night of March 28<sup>th</sup>, the Combined Fleet estimated that there were indications that an American carrier force would attack the MARSHALLS the next morning, again based on a radio intelligence report. Again, nothing happened! Afterwards there was an interruption in intelligence on the activities of American carrier forces; then on 18 April 1942 came the Doolittle Air Attack!

There were five radio intelligence reports concerning American carrier forces from late January - those of 31 January, 7 February, 17 February, 10 March and 28 March and only two of these turned out to be true: those of 31 January - "ENEMY PLANS SOME OFFENSIVE POSITIVE ACTION(S)" and 17 February - "CARRIERS SORTIED FROM THE HAWAIIAN AREA"

182

355

CHAPTER VIII BEGINNING THE SECOND PHASE OPERATIONS  
I. SHIFT TO SECOND PHASE OPERATIONS  
THE COMBINED FLEET SHIFTS ITS FORCE ORGANIZATION

Now that the Southern Operations had ended, the main objectives of the Combined Fleet for the 1st Period of the Second Phase operations were to shift its main operations to the Eastern front, to make preparations for subsequent operations in the Pacific Ocean area while carrying out the delayed operations to assault and occupy PORT MORESBY with a part of its forces.

with the end of First Phase operations imminent, <sup>on 5 April,</sup> the Combined Fleet promulgated its Force Organization for the 1st Period, 2nd Phase operations in order to facilitate the movements of all forces concerned. On 10 April it corrected one part of it and ordered the shift to the new force organization be placed in effect. The correction covered the original intent to send the carrier KAGA, which had completed repairs and was remaining in home waters) to take part in the PORT MORESBY operations, but since the Commander on the spot had requested an increase in carrier strength, Cardiv 5 (SITOKAKI and ZUIKAKU) had been allocated instead of the KAGA.

The new Force Organization (for the 1st Period, 2nd Phase) was:

FORCE	COMMANDER	FORCES	MAIN TASKS	DEPLOYMENT
MAIN FORCE	CinC Combined Fleet		Support all operations	On guard at anchor
Main Body		nucleus BARDIV 1		
Screening Force	CinC 1st Fleet	Main Body of 1st Fleet "KAGA"	Be prepared for an enemy carrier task force	Western Part of the INLAND SEA
ADVANCE FORCE	CinC 2nd Fleet	nucleus 2nd Fleet	support all operations	
CARRIER STRIKE FORCE	CinC 1st Air Fleet	nucleus 1st Air Fleet	Support all operations	(aircraft squadrons in S. KYUSHU)
VANGUARD FORCE	CinC 6th Fleet	nucleus Subron 5	attack enemy fleets surveillance strategic places Destruction enemy SLOCs & part-cooperate with the Port Moresby operations	

356

Force	Commander	Forces	Main Tasks	Deployment
BASE AIR FORCE	CinC 11th Air Fleet	main strength of 11th Air Fleet	Air operations in South East Area, Inner South Seas Area, Home bases; cooperate with South Seas and Northern Forces; surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR.	
South Seas Force	CinC 4th Fleet	4th Fleet, plus Crudiv 6, Crudiv 5, Cardiv 5, (S) SHOTO, (CVS) MIZUTSU, and 2 Destroyers	early May, assault and occupy Port Moresby guard own area of responsibility protection SLOCs	
Northern Force	CinC 5th Fleet	nucleus in 5th Fleet	guard own area of responsibility	
Southern Force	CinC S.W. Area Fleet	S.W. Area Fleet main force AirFlot 22 nucleus AirFlot 23	guard own area of responsibility. Destruction of enemy SLOCs. Cooperation with Army operations protection of own SLOCs.	
Communications Force and Attached Forces		omitted		

By special order on about 20 April, Combined Fleet temporarily assigned a part of its "decisive-battle force" to the South Seas force for the invasion of PORT MORESBY but in order to use them in the 2nd Period Operations ((MIDWAY-ALUETIANS)) limited their temporary assignment to no later than approximately 10 May. These temporary reinforcements were heavy cruisers, carriers and destroyers that had recently completed repairs and drydocking, or had recently been modernized or would not require overhaul prior to the 2nd Period Operations. Of the carrier divisions, Cardiv 5 was the one most recently organized, and had the least training, and therefore it needed more actual battle experience.

357

At the time of the shift to 1st Period 2nd Phase operations <sup>(10 April 1942)</sup> the situation in all areas was generally as follows:

In the S.W. Area the surprise attack operations against CEYLON and the attacks on sea lines of Communications ((hereafter, S.L.O.C.)) in the BAY of BENZAL had been completed and the operations forces had begun their withdrawal. Submarines in that area, after cooperating in the above operations and attacks on enemy S.L.O.C. were expecting to be recalled to home waters for repairs.

In the MALAY Area the navy cooperated in the transportation of Army forces to RANGOON by sea; after the fall of RANGOON Army force were being moved northward to BURMA.

In the area North of AUSTRALIA, scheduled operations were being  
(\*\* see also page 357 358 next page - spread up date for MO Ops)

conducted and air operations against AUSTRALIA were being carried out.

PHILIPPINES AREA: operations against COTABATO were still continuing; therefore, MANILA BAY had not yet been opened. The Combined Fleet assigned a part of the destroyers of its "decisive battle force" to the PHILIPPINES to replace those destroyers that required repairs and overhaul. Those replacement destroyers were now cooperating in PHILIPPINES operations.

Headquarters of the Base Air Force was at BANGKOK; most of Air Flotilla No. 22 were patrolling to the westward while most of Air Flotilla No. 23 were carrying out gradually augmented air operations against AUSTRALIA; a part were making attacks on the entrance to MANILA Bay and some were preparing to move to new assignments. Air Flotilla No. 21 had recently returned to home land bases for rebuilding and maintenance; while training they were conducting patrols to the east, anticipating to exchange places with Air Flot 22.

Air Flotilla #22 returned to home land bases to facilitate its exchange with Air Flot 21 and began rebuilding, maintenance and training.

In the South Seas area reports on American carrier forces were circulated as before and on each occasion strict alert measures were put in force. There had been no attacks by American carriers since the attacks by carrier planes on MARCUS on 4 March and their attack on Eastern New Guinea on March 10<sup>th</sup>. However, there was trend toward intensified counter-attacks by enemy air forces from PORT MORESBY; there was, also, a succession of reports that a stream of supplies were being sent from America to Australia.

As a result of the need for repairs and rectification of damage to ships received <sup>on 10 March</sup> in the LAE-SAMARUA operations the South Seas Force expected to carry out the assault and occupation of PORT MORESBY in the latter part of MAY. Preparations were hastened <sup>as</sup> but the new force organization ordered that operation to be carried out in early May, the schedule was advanced accordingly.

The Base Air Force's new deployments were: The Base Air Force to

357  
F358  
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TINIAN; 22<sup>nd</sup> Air Flot. (after relieving the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flot) to North HONSHU-HOKKAIDO areas; 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flot the TOKYO Plain - MARCUS Island area and 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Air Flots - the MARSHALLS - S.E. Area, as before.

The Submarine Force's Subrons 1, 3 and 8 were under maintenance in home waters; it was intended that Subron 3 participate in the MIDWAY operation after patrols in the MARSHALLS area, Subron 1 take part in the ALEUTIAN operations, and for Subron 8 <sup>to</sup> make attacks on enemy ships to the east of AUSTRALIA (including use of midfloat submarines) and on SLOCs and <sup>also use part of its force</sup> to cooperate in the PORT MORESBY invasion operations. Subrons 2 and 5 which were <sup>then</sup> returning from the INDIAN OCEAN to home waters for maintenance were scheduled to return again to the INDIAN OCEAN area.

All forces had begun their required movements to their new deployments based on the new 1<sup>st</sup> Period 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase force organization; the flagship of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet reached YOKOSUKA on April 17<sup>th</sup>, the Headquarters Base Air Force moved to TINIAN that same day. The Carrier Strike Force was scheduled to arrive in home waters on the 23<sup>rd</sup>. In the meantime the flagship Submarine Force was heading for KUNSOLEIN via TIKO, Subron 8 was enroute to the seas east of AUSTRALIA and the South West area and about 15 April Subron 3 left home waters for the MARSHALLS area. Thus the CinC Combined Fleet, having terminated the Southern Operations, was shifting his main force to the Eastern Front for Second Phase operations.

2. THE DOOLITTLE AIR ATTACK (See War History Series - "NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH-PACIFIC AREA" and "THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY")  
Before the war, the Japanese navy had some concern over an air attack on the home islands by an American carrier task force. Such an attack by land based aircraft from the east was not conceivable in view of the characteristics of the aircraft and the strategic situation at that time. That concern was <sup>chiefly</sup> because Japan's eastern front opened on a vast expanse of sea, <sup>from</sup> which an enemy carrier force could attack our capital.

In January 1941, CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO wrote the then Navy Minister, Admiral OIKAWA, to give his "views on war preparations", in which he stated that in the event of an air attack on the main islands, he was deeply concerned less <sup>over</sup> the material damage received than with the <sup>rumor arising from the</sup> deep psychological shock to national character of the people. This was

358  
F359  
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359  
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the reason that CINC YAMAMOTO aimed at destroying the American carriers in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor at the outbreak of war.

While the Navy Staff Section, Imp. Gen. H.Q. also were concerned over an American carrier attack on the main islands, <sup>their</sup> apprehension was less acute than Admiral YAMAMOTO's due to the differing <sup>their</sup> estimates of its probability; <sup>even</sup> some considered YAMAMOTO's concern as eccentric.

At any rate, <sup>prior to the war</sup> there was concern over patrols to the east of the main islands. Navy Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters had the air patrols extended to 700 miles and established a surface patrol by picket boats also at 700 miles east of the Capital. This figure of 700 miles was established under the hypothesis that carrier aircraft had an extreme attack capability of 250 miles, so that an enemy carrier would be sighted in the morning of the day before its planned attack <sup>and</sup> that would give us time and opportunity for counter attacks. Also, our land based bombers had an attack capability at that range. However, the actual problem was that there were very few aircraft to allocate to air patrols and the fact that from the beginning of the war, the numbers of picket boats, and their readiness, were inadequate. As a result, picket boats were deployed only to those sections of our wide sea frontier which were the most likely to be attacked.

As related previously, the first carrier air attack was received in the MARSHALS on February 1<sup>st</sup>. This was immediately after the Combined Fleet <sup>had</sup> decided to send the Carrier Strike Force to the South West Area although initially YAMAMOTO intended to hold that force in the Pacific Ocean area as a precautionary measure. Now, Combined Fleet detached Cardin's from that force and sent it back to home waters to join with a part of the Main Body in home waters to form a new Screening/Covering Force to cope with <sup>any enemy attempt to</sup> attack the main islands by enemy aircraft carriers. That force was

Subsequently reinforced and remained in effect.

Subsequently, strike operations by American carrier task forces continued and on March 4<sup>th</sup>, MARCUS Island was attacked. There was anxiety that the next attack would be on our home islands.

360  
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A plan to assault and occupy the Island of CEYLON having been scrapped, <sup>around mid March</sup> the Staff Combined Fleet conceived the idea of the MIDWAY operation having as its main objective making contact with, attacking and destroying the American aircraft carriers. After adoption by the Navy Staff Section at Imp. Gen. H.Q., it was decided to put it in motion in early June. If successful, an attack by an American carrier force on our main islands would have been impossible for some time to come. During the period that preparations were being made for that operation, our home islands <sup>never</sup> received their first air attack.

#### RESUME' OF AIR ATTACK AND INTERCEPTION

The American carriers appeared in the CAROL SEA on March 10<sup>th</sup> and the next day, the 11<sup>th</sup>, radio intelligence reported <sup>that</sup> an enemy carrier force was to the north of WAKE. The situation became tense but that report proved to be a mistake. In April, there were radio intelligence reports on the 9<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup>, which were subsequently proven true - containing hints that an enemy carrier task force was approaching us, but our navy had failed to see the clues.

Unexpectedly, at 0630 on April 18<sup>th</sup>, a picket boat some 730 miles east of TOKYO reported sighting three enemy aircraft carriers. Our situation <sup>now</sup> became extremely tense; estimating that there would be an attack the next day, actions were taken to maintain contact <sup>and</sup> to counter attack and for air defence. CINC Combined Fleet issued a series of <sup>orders</sup> "METHOD NO. 3 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET"; naval air forces in the KYUSHU area to concentrate on the Tokyo Plain; the Screening/Covering Force and the recently returned Advance Force to sortie; the Carrier Strike Force then south of the PESCADORES headed north to head for the enemy after refueling; and for submarines enroute to operational areas also to steer for the enemy. At the same time the Navy Staff Section, Imp. H.Q.,

360  
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360  
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directed air defense fighter aircraft of the Coastal Forces to concentrate in the Tokyo Plain area. Naval Air forces of the Tokyo Plain, on receipt of the enemy sighting report immediately sent off Search Planes and also sped up preparations for maintaining contact and attacking the enemy carrier force.

However, at a little past noon that same day, a scattering of twin engined American aircraft attacked the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA area, NAGOYA, KOBE, and NIIGATA, dropping medium type and incendiary bombs. Most retired to the West. Having been expecting the attack to take place the next day, we were completely surprised. We weren't even able to distinguish the type of attacking aircraft, nor were we able to estimate their point of take off. At that time we had not even considered a land based medium bomber type being launched from an aircraft carrier.

That day, the planes conducting the air search expected that they would certainly sight the enemy carrier force but they failed to sight anything. Our side worried over estimates of the enemy's likely courses of action: had the enemy carrier force now retired to the east? - had he temporarily withdrawn and about to turn back to make another attack? - was he headed to the north, or to the south, to attack other places?

Even after the attack there was a continuing flow of false reports but none of these sightings were true. As there were no further attacks by enemy aircraft, it was concluded that the enemy carrier force had withdrawn, so on the night of the 20<sup>th</sup> the Combined Fleet called off the alert and the Navy Staff Section returned the fighter aircraft squadrons to their original deployment.

A study of the attacking aircraft showed them to be B-25 medium type land based bombers and it was concluded that they had been launched from an aircraft carrier. There was a strong suspicion that SOVIET merchant ships had possibly acted to aid the enemy in connection with the attack and five Soviet ships in waters near Honshu were boarded and examined but as nothing suspicious was found, they were released.

After the attack the Navy Staff Section <sup>General</sup> Imperial Headquarters made an estimate of the situation and radioed it to all forces at noon the 19<sup>th</sup> (191200). THE NUCLEUS OF THE ENEMY FORCE WAS THREE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. THEY LAUNCHED B-25 TYPE BOMBERS YESTERDAY THE 18<sup>th</sup> AT ABOUT 0900 WHEN ABOUT 600 MILES EAST OF TOKYO BAY. AFTER THROWING OUR PATROL LINES IN CONFUSION <sup>THE</sup> ENEMY FORCE WITHDREW. A NUMBER (NOT MORE THAN 10) ENEMY BOMBERS ATTACKED TOKYO, YOKOHAMA, CHIBA, NIIGATA, NAGOYA, KOBE AT LOW ALTITUDES, STRAFING WITH MACHINE GUNS AND DROPPING 45 KILOGRAM BOMBS AND 1 KILOGRAM INCENDIARIES, THE STRAFED TOWNS AND VILLAGES WHILE PASSING OVER MIE PREFECTURE, CENTRAL WEST SHIKOKU AND KYUSHU WHILE MOST WERE HEADED FOR BASES ON THE CHINA COAST. A FEW (12 AIRCRAFT CERTAIN) HEADED FOR SIBERIA OR FOR RESCUE BY SOVIET SUBMARINES, OR <sup>MADE</sup> CRASH LANDINGS ENROUTE. THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY WERE SHOT DOWN. SINCE THOSE ENEMY AIRCRAFT THAT REACHED CHINESE BASES (OR SIBERIA) HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR GUERRILLA ATTACKS ON WESTERN TAIWAN, FRENCH INDO CHINA OR OUR MAIN ISLANDS, VIGILANCE IS NECESSARY.

361  
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Afterward, the Navy Staff Section JupGHQ received reports from the 1<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary Fleet and from Army forces in Central China on Prisoners of War which were assembled, evaluated and disseminated by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Department (Intelligence) on the 26<sup>th</sup> - ((OMITTED)).

362  
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THE EFFECTS OF THE AIR ATTACK - The Psychological Effects

The material damage received during this first air attack on our main islands was minor but the psychological shock to the Military and Civilians and its accompanying trauma was extremely large. Since the outbreak of war, reports of victory after victory had been circulated; we had been lead to believe that fighting would be conducted far from our home islands. We had been jubilant over the confusion of America's Military as a result of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR but when the surprise



attack was on us, our disorganization differed only in degree. The concerns of the Combined Fleet and of the Navy Staff Section at Trip. G. HQ over the capability of an American carrier force to attack our home islands covered previously, varied only in degree.

362

369

V FAILURE OF THE PORT MORESBY ASSAULT/OCCUPATION OPERATIONS (See SSSS VOLUME "NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST AREA (I)")

OUTLINE OF THE ASSAULT/OCCUPATION OPERATIONS - PREPARATIONS

As stated previously, the assault/occupation of LAE, SALAMAUVA, TULAGI and PORT MORESBY was directed by Navy Staff Section, Imp. G. HQ, directive #47 of 29 JANUARY 1942; its directive #59 of 27 February ordered the assault/occupation of NAURU and OCEAN Islands.

Pursuant to the former, the South Seas Force planned for the assault/occupation of LAE and SALAMAUVA in early March, TULAGI and PORT MORESBY for mid April, to be followed by NAURU and OCEAN. The assault and occupation was carried out on 8 March (1942) but that force

369

received a large scale counter attack on 10 March, which included planes from an American carrier task force, resulting in widespread damage to its ships. In order to effect repairs and make ready the damaged ships, the South Seas Force postponed the next operations for about one month, scheduling them for the latter part of May. However, on 10 April, the Combined Fleet in its force organization

assigned temporary reinforcements to the South Seas Force for the TULAGI-PORT MORESBY operation, and ordered that those operations be completed by about 10 May in order to shift those reinforcements to the MIDWAY-ALBATROSS operations. Accordingly, the South Seas Force advanced its operations to the early part of May. This reinforcement consisted of CruDiv 5, Cardiv 5 and 2 Destroyer divisions.

The South Seas Force had to advance his slow speed invasion ships into the distant Coral Sea but an American carrier task force had appeared off Rabaul on 20 February and in the Coral Sea on March 10<sup>th</sup>. Moreover, they were troubled by the counter attacks that would be made from Port Moresby and other enemy air bases in North Eastern Australia, and

especially troublesome were measures to cope with the enemy carrier force. The South Seas Force had previously planned to gain control of the Coral Sea and enemy air power in NE Australia by his own aircraft carriers. For this reason they asked the Combined Fleet to change the assignment of the carrier ICGA (as set forth in Combined Fleet's Force Organization for the 1<sup>st</sup> period of the Second Phase Operation dated April 5) to a carrier division, which was granted. However the Combined Fleet directed that no prior action be undertaken by his carrier force

against enemy air power in North East Australia or in the Coral Sea. First of all Tulagi they planned to occupy Tulagi and build a seaplane base there; next, to move forward seaplane bases to the westward and have the invasion force strips advance under their umbrella along the northern rim of the Coral Sea while their carrier force patrolled for the enemy carriers in the Coral Sea. In the meantime the Combined Fleet had ordered the shore based air force in the Rabaul area, Air Flotilla #25 to join forces and cooperate with the South Seas Force. 28<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla was assigned the tasks of air-annihilation battle in the Port Moresby area and patrols in the Coral Sea area. Also, the Combined Fleet half of Subron 8 of the Vanguard Force operating in the seas east of Australia, to patrol the Coral Sea and cooperate in the Port Moresby operations.

370

The South Seas Force was assembled in Truk by April 27<sup>th</sup> when it held an operations conference and completed preparations. Tulagi was occupied on schedule on May 3<sup>rd</sup> and on the next morning, the 4<sup>th</sup>, an enemy carrier aircraft made a surprise attack on that place, the invasion force receiving severe damage. The Japanese Carrier Strike Force, with Cardiv 5 as its nucleus, headed for the enemy carrier force and made contact on the 7<sup>th</sup> but due to an error were unable to attack. That day the small carrier Shoto, which was providing protection for the Japanese invasion convoy was attacked by the enemy carrier force and was sunk.

On the morning of the 8<sup>th</sup> two fast-line aircraft carriers on each side mutually exchanged attacks. The Shoto was damaged and unable to launch a recon plane but had no hindrance to her movements. As this was reported as "NO HINDERANCE TO FIGHTING OR NAVIGATION", it was misinterpreted to "ABLE TO CARRY OUT AIR WARFARE". The battle reports were reported as 2 American carriers sunk etc, but later on an aircraft carrier was sighted afloat so later one carrier was listed as damaged. It was estimated that it withdrew to Australia for repairs.

As there was a sharp decrease in aircraft capable of use in Cardiv 5, particularly divebombers and torpedo planes, the Commander of the South Seas Force called off the pursuit. In addition, he was concerned about fuel for ships and enemy attacks from Midway, Oahu, and having lost the air power protecting and supporting the (Moresby) invasion force, he ordered the invasion operations suspended. At that time the Japanese Carrier Strike Force reported it had only 9 aircraft which could be used for an immediate attack.

The Combined Fleet, in home waters, was displeased with Commander South Seas Force's actions. Chief of Staff Ugaki in his diary "Record of the War" said: (omitted) ... the Combined Fleet ordered (the South Seas Force) to take advantage of this favorable opportunity to endeavor to destroy the remaining enemy. On receipt of this the Comd. S. Seas Force ordered a pursuit and attack and reported to the Combined Fleet the true situation and recommended a postponement of the operations. The Combined Fleet recognized that the operations had to be suspended.

The Combined Fleet conferred by telephone with the Navy Staff, Imp. G. HQ, and after they had conferred with the Army Section, the operations were temporarily suspended. They would be carried out at the same time as the F.S. Operations which were scheduled for July, and that the 17<sup>th</sup> Army would forward the Army troops. This was the basis for the Combined Fleet on the 10<sup>th</sup> ordering the operations suspended.

371

COMMENCES EXTRACTS FROM Vols. 85 of the War History Publications

"SENSHISOSHU" "HONDO HOMEN KAIGUN SARUJEN" «85»

"NAVAL OPERATIONS IN HOME WATERS"

Chapter II - Section 5 - PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN CARRIER FORCES

SITUATION JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1942

Since the outbreak of war our Southern Ocean Operations had progressed smoothly, our Army, advancing south along the Malay Peninsula entered SINGAPORE on February 1<sup>st</sup> - the British Army surrendering unconditionally on the 15<sup>th</sup>. In the PHILIPPINES area, U.S. - Philippines forces retreated into the BATAAN Peninsula, MANILA was occupied on 2 January and other strategically important places were occupied during February.

Also in January and February, the islands of SUMATRA, CELEBES, BORNEO, AMBON, etc., were captured and JAVA was put under siege. In the meantime, the South Seas Force had captured RABAU and KAVIENG, thus acquiring advance bases in the South East Area.

On the Eastern Front signs of activity by the enemy's carrier forces gradually appeared but the Naval General Staff in late December estimated that air attacks on our main islands would not occur until the first part of February.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1942, the I-3 reported sightings of an American fleet containing (an) aircraft carrier(s) south of the Hawaiian Islands, proceeding to the west. It was judged that if this American force planned to make an air attack on Tokyo it would arrive in Japanese waters around January 10<sup>th</sup>. The Combined Fleet, the YOKOSUKA Naval District all OMINATO units assumed Alert status as follows: NORTHERN FORCE: (1) Formed the Patrol and Picket Force of Auxiliary Cruiser Division 22 (AWATA MARU and ASAKA MARU) and the ((auxiliary seaplane carrier)) KIMIKAWA MARU and deployed the Eastern High Seas patrol line.

(2) Dispatched the Auxiliary Gunboat SHOEI MARU and 14 picket boats 700 miles to the east to conduct observation patrols from the 9<sup>th</sup> onward. (3) Patrolled the Bonin Islands area with Converted Gunboat Division #14 and the CHICHIRIMA Air Squadron.

YOKOSUKA FORCE (1) Deployed special picket boats 350 miles to the east of the Tokyo Bay Area to patrol along that line. (2) Stationed the HATSUSHIMA and 2 special picket boats some 50 miles off KASHIMA NADA to patrol the zone of the Sea Area Defense Force. (3) Placed the fighter air defence aircraft on stand-by from 0600 the 9<sup>th</sup>. (4) Put into effect air <sup>patrols</sup> searches to 500 miles (6 planes each from YOKOSUKA air and KISARAZU Air) and placed an Air Attack Force on stand-by

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on the 10<sup>th</sup>. (5) Anti-submarine patrols by 2-seat float planes from TATEYAMA Air and YOKOSUKA air and searches to the South East of the BOZU Peninsula to 200 miles by SUZUKA Air. (6) In addition, all forces' patrols <sup>were</sup> awaiting the enemy's appearance.

OMINATO FORCES Searches by Des Div 1 to the east of HOKKAIDO and the KURILES.

On January 12<sup>th</sup> the I-6 reported it had torpedoed and sank the carrier LEXINGTON (actually it was only damaged) 500 miles SE of the Hawaiian Islands. Moreover, as no reports were received as a result our patrol and search operations, <sup>the</sup> normal condition of readiness was resumed.

AMERICAN CARRIER FORCE ATTACKS THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Early in the morning of 1 February, an American Carrier Force, in two groups, attacked the MARSHALL and GILBERT Island areas. The Combined Fleet ordered "METHOD #3 <sup>OPERATIONS</sup> AGAINST AMERICAN FLEET" (Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order #1 of 5 November 1941, outlined operations by the Submarine, Carrier Strike, South Seas and Northern Forces in the event of an attack by an American Carrier Force). Our Carrier Strike force (nucleus in the AKAGI and KAGA) left TRUK at 1100 February 1<sup>st</sup> and sped eastward but did not encounter any enemy forces; it suspended its operation and arrived at PALAO on the 8<sup>th</sup>. The Northern Force deployed the KISO, TAMA, SAGI, AWATA MARU, AKAGI MARU and ASAKA MARU to the east to form a patrol line and ordered the Picket Boats being readied at YOKOSUKA to make preparations to depart. The 7<sup>th</sup> Base Force ((CHICHIRIMA)) was directed to <sup>(deploy)</sup> Minesweep Division 17 (4 converted drag-fishers) and Subchaser Division 66 (3 converted whale-catchers) along longitude 150° East as a patrol line. The YOKOSUKA Naval District had the NOSHIRO MARU, the CHOUN MARU and 5 Special picket boats conduct a patrol along longitude 146° East but they made no sightings. Normal conditions were resumed on the 5<sup>th</sup>.

GUARD FORCE FORMED

In view of the attack by American Carrier forces on the Mandated Islands ("the Inner South Seas"), the Headquarters Combined Fleet, foreseeing the possibility of that kind of attack on the TOKYO area, was deeply concerned over the need to strengthen our guard over the sea to the east of our main islands. Combined Fleet Order #64 of 8 February

75  
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created a new force, "Combined Fleet's Attached Air Force", of which Carrier Division 5<sup>th</sup> (from the Carrier Strike Force) would be its core, and stationed it in home waters so as to be prepared for such an attack by an American carrier force.

On 7 February, based on a Radio Intelligence report by the OWADA<sup>\*</sup> Communications Unit, the Combined Fleet estimated that it was probable that an American Carrier Force was nearing the home islands, and to prepare for this, ordered a "Screening Force" formed. Its Commander to be the ComC 1<sup>st</sup> Fleet (Vice Admiral TAKASU) and to consist of Batdiv 2 (ISE, HYUGA), FUSO and YAMASHIRO), Crudiv 9<sup>th</sup> (KITAKAMI and OI), Cardiv 3 (HOSHIO, ZUIHO) with DDS MIKAZUCHI and YUKAZE, CialC Combined (Shorebased) Attached Air Force, Cardiv 5 (SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU) with DDS AKIGUMO, ARARE, KAGERO, and 1<sup>st</sup> Section Desdiv 27 (ARIAKE, YUGURE) plus YAKAZE.

75  
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Air searches for the enemy was carried out by the Yokosuka Naval District from the 10<sup>th</sup> onward and when nothing was sighted on either the 10<sup>th</sup> or the 11<sup>th</sup>, these were suspended. (after the OWADA Radio Intelligence report had proven to be random U.S. civil airline transmissions)

The Northern Force had deployed its patrol lines on the 8<sup>th</sup> but on the 10<sup>th</sup> it became clear that the previous radio intelligence had been based on routine administrative radio messages by American commercial airline stations. As nothing untoward had occurred, the Combined Fleet cancelled its order "USE METHOD #3 AGAINST AMERICAN FLEET"

SITUATION AFTER MID-FEBRUARY

Based on a Radio Intelligence report that an American carrier force had departed from PEARL HARBOR about 1400 the 16<sup>th</sup> of February, the HQ Combined Fleet on 17 February estimated that there was a good probability that an American carrier force would attack WAKE or the Mandated Islands area. All forces increased their vigilance, the

\* OWADA (Radio Intelligence) Communications Unit (Tokyo's main radio intercept station located 12 miles NW of Tokyo) was the RDF Central and center for Communications Intelligence activities of the Japanese Navy, (was under the direct command of and fed into the chief of staff of the "Special Duty Group" of the Naval General Staff (the "Navy Staff Section", Imperial General Headquarters).

\*\* KITAKAMI and OI (5100 ton light cruisers 1920) were rebuilt in 1941 as Torpedo Cruisers armed with 40-24" torpedoes (10 quadruple mounts) plus 4 x 5.1" and 8 x 25mm AA guns.

Yokosuka Naval District had 9 vessels of its defence forces proceed to patrol its eastern seas and made air searches to 500 miles beginning the 22<sup>nd</sup>. Subsequently, Radio Intelligence (on the 19<sup>th</sup>) reported the American carrier force to be north of JAWIT but on the 20<sup>th</sup> it appeared to the east of RABAU and fought with the South Seas Force. On the 24<sup>th</sup>, WAKE Island was bombed from the air and bombarded from the sea by an American carrier force, and it was concluded that the danger of air attack on our home islands had vanished. Deployments returned to normal except Yokosuka had one unit of its patrol force remain on station.

76  
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SITUATION IN MARCH AND APRIL 1942

On 4 March, MARCUS Island (about 1000 miles SE of Tokyo) received an air attack; the Combined Fleet, the Yokosuka Naval District and the OMIYATO guard Force took precautionary measures. At the time of the air attack on MARCUS Island, a convoy of 15 merchant vessels were in that vicinity and alert messages were sent by the Yokosuka Naval District to put them on their guard. The Yokosuka Air Attack Force was placed on a 30 minute stand-by from pre-dawn the 5<sup>th</sup> and all flights were grounded except operational missions and flights in the immediate vicinity of air bases.

It was under these circumstances that a report, "13 AIRCRAFT, NATIONALITY UNKNOWN, 240 MILES EAST OF SHIOYA MISAKI \* HEADED WEST" WAS SENT BY some unit, and at 0752 on the 5<sup>th</sup>, Yokosuka issued an Air Raid Warning to its area. The Combined Fleet immediately ordered the SCREENING COVERING FORCE (at anchor at HASHIRAJIMA (the Fleet Anchorage in the INLAND SEA near KURE)) to sortie and attack the American Carrier Force east of Tokyo Bay.

76  
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Later on, it became clear that aircraft of unknown nationality were indeed our own, so at 0908 the Air Raid Warning was cancelled and at 1300 the sortie of the SCREENING COVERING FORCE was recalled. Later, there having been no intelligence on the enemy, it was concluded that the American carrier force had retired after attacking MARCUS Island, and the situation gradually returned to normal. However, in the dead of \* SHIOYA Cape - East coast of North Central Honshu, approximately 160 miles NE of Tokyo

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 night of the 10<sup>th</sup>, a Radio Intelligence report from the YOKOSUKA Naval Communications Unit stated that an American carrier force which had appeared <sup>to the</sup> north of WAKE Island posed the danger of an air attack on our main islands. On the 11<sup>th</sup> the Combined Fleet and the all of the Homeland Forces took appropriate measures to intercept and for the air defence of the capital. The Covering Force sortied on the 12<sup>th</sup>, the Kure Defence Forces conducting anti-submarine patrols in the Bungo Channel for them. The Northern Force <sup>extended</sup> its picket line by adding the 2<sup>nd</sup> Picket Boat Force (10 boats) to the north of its 1<sup>st</sup> Picket Boat Force (11 boats).

To reinforce the fighter aircraft strength in the area of the Tokyo Plain, the Navy Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters ordered the fighter aircraft forces from IWAKUNI and SASEBO to operate, temporarily, under the operational direction of the Commandant Yokosuka Naval District subsequently, as nothing abnormal developed concerning the enemy by the 15<sup>th</sup>, the <sup>(MARCH)</sup> <sup>screening</sup> Covering Force left its patrol station to the east of the Bosen Islands, <sup>and</sup> most of it <sup>returned to</sup> anchoring in ISE BAY. Carrier Division 5 was detached from the <sup>screening</sup> Covering Force and reassigned to the Carrier Strike Force; it headed for YOKOSUKA to prepare for its next operations (in the INDIAN <sup>Ocean</sup> (MARCH)).

The Northern Force resumed normal condition at 1200 the 17<sup>th</sup>, the 1<sup>st</sup> Picket Boat Force withdrawing to KUSHIRO, leaving the 2<sup>nd</sup> Picket Boat Force on station on the picket line. At 1130 the 17<sup>th</sup> the YOKOSUKA Naval District also reverted to normal conditions and on the 18<sup>th</sup> both IWAKUNI Air and SASEBO Air returned to their regular stations.

On April 18<sup>th</sup> our main island received its first air attack (more on this later on). Since mid April many enemy submarines had been sighted in the approaches to the Tokyo Plain and it had been estimated that their operations were connected with air attacks by their carrier forces. Later on, Radio Intelligence reports and the appearance of enemy submarines came to be viewed with deep concern as indicators of attacks by American carrier forces. Also, since a Soviet merchant ship was passing near TOSA (Southern SHIKOKU Island) during the American air attack on HONSHU, it was suspected of having some connection with that attack.

On the 19<sup>th</sup>, the KURE Naval District ordered SAEKI Air to reconnoiter it and sent the auxiliary gunboat BANYA Maru to board and inspect it. The #2 MATSUEI Maru from the OSAKA Guard Force also cooperated.

Here, only four months after the beginning of the war we received an air attack. The damage received was insignificant but the fact demanded a prompt reinforcement of Air Defence pickets and lookouts along the shores of the Pacific Ocean; to make up for the inadequacy in picket boats, fishing boats manned by civilian fishermen could act also as Air Defence Warning Lookouts and it was suggested that the Prefectural Authorities provide civilian manned boats as look-outs.

## (6) THE DOOLITTLE AIR ATTACK

American Forces' Situation prior to the Attack.

In January 1942, the Com U.S. Fleet, Admiral KING, and his Operations Officer studied the concept of an air attack on Tokyo by an American carrier force in retaliation for the Japanese navy's attack on PEARL HARBOR. Later on, this concept was brought into reality through the cooperation of their Army and Navy. A carrier task force was organized, plans were drawn, an aircraft unit was prepared and the training of its pilots undertaken; the biggest problem was whether land-based aircraft could be launched from an aircraft carrier, as hoped. The plan was officially adopted in the latter part of March and 16 B-25 bombers (Commander - Lt Col. Doolittle) were selected for the attack. After the completion of <sup>(a month's)</sup> special training in Florida, these aircraft flew to ALAMEDA, a San Francisco Bay airfield and there loaded aboard the aircraft carrier "HORNET" on 1 April 1942. The HORNET left San Francisco on 2 April and joined Admiral HALSEY's Task Force north of MIDWAY on 13 April. The organization of that Task Force was: Task Force 16 - Commander - Vice Admiral William F. HALSEY. Aircraft Carriers "ENTERPRISE" (VF-27, VSB-36, VTB 18), and "HORNET" (16-B25s). CRUISER Force (3 CA, 1 CL), DESTROYER Force: (2 Des Divs + 8 Destroyers) Replenishment Force (2 AO).

The essential points of their plan -- in order to attack TOKYO

on the night of the 18<sup>th</sup>, to launch the air attack force (each aircraft carrying 4-500 pound bombs) the afternoon of the same day from a position 500 miles from HONSHU. Lt Colonel DOGLITTLE, <sup>would</sup> alone, take off in advance and attack TOKYO with many incendiary bombs to start fires to show the way to his fliers who would come after him, 13 of these to bomb TOKYO, the other three to attack NAGOYA, OSAKA, and KOBE.

78  
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The Commander of the Air Attack Force had hoped to approach to within 390 miles to make sure of carrying out the plan and felt that about 565 miles was the greatest distance for any expectation of success. In the meantime, preparations at 5 temporary air fields for the B-25s to land in CHINA had progressed.

As mentioned before, the American Carrier Forces that had attacked the MARSHALL Islands on February 1<sup>st</sup> 1942, next appeared east of RABAU on the 20<sup>th</sup>, were off WAKE on the 24<sup>th</sup> and on 4 March attacked MARCUS Island, a situation requiring our being on guard against an air attack on our home islands. On March 10<sup>th</sup> a Radio Intelligence report that a radio frequency like that of an American carrier force had been intercepted and placed to the north of WAKE Island. The Combined Fleet had the <sup>Screening</sup> Covering Force sortie and took other measures in response but no intelligence of the enemy was obtained. The Combined Fleet thereafter remained vigilant, especially against attacks against the home islands.

A Radio Intelligence Report on 27 March placed an American carrier force some 700 miles east of the MARSHALLS but nothing unusual developed. (Some of the) Radio Intelligence reports regarding the enemy's carrier activities in April were:

(1) "MANY PATROL AIRCRAFT APPEARED IN THE PEARL HARBOR AREA ON THE NINTH. MOREOVER GUARD SHIPS ARE PATROLLING THE SAME AREA." ("ENTERPRISE" departed PEARL HARBOR on 9 April... but this was not deduced by Japanese Radio Intelligence)

(2) Intelligence Report via radio 150730 from Chief of Staff Northern Force: "27 Patrol <sup>Planes</sup> HAVE APPEARED IN THE ALEUTIAN'S AREA. SINCE 0100

79  
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THE 14TH, 17 PATROL AIRCRAFT HAVE APPEARED CENTERED ON DUTCH HARBOR, ONE PLANE WAS 120 MILES WEST OF DUTCH HARBOR. FROM THE ABOVE, IT APPEARS THAT A STRONG SURFACE FORCE <sup>IS</sup> WAS OPERATING IN THE ABOVE AREA. ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT THIS <sup>IS</sup> WAS THE LARGEST NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT YET OBSERVED IN THE DUTCH HARBOR AREA" (On 14 April, the HORNET group joined the ENTERPRISE TASK FORCE in the area between MIDWAY and the Western ALEUTIANS -- but this, also, was not inferred by Japanese Radio Intelligence)

(3) "ENEMY SUBMARINES ARE GRADUALLY BECOMING VERY ACTIVE IN OUR HOME <sup>"WATERS"</sup>

Both the Combined Fleet and the H.Q. 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet (Northern Force) had these reports, but neither Headquarters anticipated an attack by an American carrier task force.

#### The Japanese Navy's Situation

Transition to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase Operations. The Southern Operations had proceeded smoothly, the important raw materials areas had been secured and the Navy, having completed its 1<sup>st</sup> Phase operations was shifting to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase Operations. On April 10<sup>th</sup> the ((Fleet)) War Time <sup>(Administrative)</sup> Organization was changed, the main points being:

(a) YAMATO placed in Batdiv 1; (b) Instead of individual destroyers or destroyer divisions being assigned to each carrier, a new Desron 10 (1 CL Flaw 3 Desdivs) was organized to screen and patrol for all ships assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Fleet;

(c) The South West Area Fleet, reorganized into a 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Expeditionary Fleets;

(d) BASE AIR FORCE to be reorganized into 6 Air Flotillas by addition of newly established 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotillas, all assigned to the 11<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet; (e) New Surface Escort Fleets established: 1<sup>st</sup> Escort Fleet to cover seas between home waters and the Southern occupied region; 2<sup>nd</sup> Escort Fleet to cover seas between home waters and the South Seas area.

79  
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That same day, the Combined Fleet issued its force <sup>(tactical)</sup> organization for the 1<sup>st</sup> Period of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase operations (from 10 April, until the latter part of May). Its essence was as follows:

FORCE	COMMANDER	COMPOSITION	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS
1. MAIN FORCE (a) Main Body	CinC Combined Fleet	Batdiv 1 Desron 3 (less 1 Desdiv) Cardiv 4 (less SHO HO)	Support all operations	at anchor, Western INDIAN OCEAN patrols training upkeep

(FORCE)	(COMMANDER)	(COMPOSITION)	(PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS)	(OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS)
(b) COVERING FORCE	CinC 1st Fleet	1st Fleet - (less Batdiv 3, Crudiv 6, Desdiv 27, Desron 3 (less 1 Desdiv)) 2nd Section (Crudiv 4 part of 1st Air Fleet)	On guard, at anchor Western Inland Sea or in ISE Bay prepared for the American Carrier Task Force	
2. ADVANCE FORCE	CinC 2nd Fleet	2nd Fleet - less: (2nd Section Crudiv 7 Crudiv 8 1 Desdiv of Desron 4) Batdiv 3 (less 2nd Section) 11th Seaplane Carrier Division (less Mizuno)	Support all operations	On guard, at anchor Western Inland Sea Training upkeep
3. CARRIER STRIKE FORCE	CinC 1st Air Fleet	1st Air Fleet (less a part) 2nd Section, Batdiv 3 Crudiv 8 1 Desdiv of Desron 4	Support all operations	On guard at anchor, Western INLAND SEA upkeep
4. VANGUARD FORCE	CinC 6th Fleet	6th Fleet Subron 5 CHIYODA NISSHIN	attack enemy fleet and surveillance of strategic places	
5. BASE AIR FORCE	CinC 11th Air Fleet	11th Air Fleet (less 22nd Air Flotilla (less a part) - 23rd Air Flotilla (less Tsiko Air)	Air warfare in all assigned areas, Cooperation with the operations of the South Seas Force and the Northern Force	
6. South Seas Force	CinC 4th Fleet	(omitted by the author)		
7. Northern Force	CinC 5th Fleet	5th Fleet NACHI	continue 1st Phase - 4th Period operations	
8. Southern Force	CinC S.W. Area Fleet	(omitted by the author)		
9. Communications Force and Attached Forces		(omitted by the author)		
10. Notes: (a) The 7th Base Force (Borneo Islands) is under the Comdr South Seas Force with regard to High Seas Escort and Protection matters. (b), (c) and (d) omitted by the author.				

80  
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On April 16th, Naval Staff Section, Imperial General Headquarters Directive # 85 said - The Annexes to Navy Staff Directives # 1 and # 2, "The National Policy for the War Against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands" are <sup>hereby</sup> modified for the 2nd Phase Operations part as set forth in the appended Annexes. There is no material on hand on this and the details are not known but they are believed to include <sup>(a policy to)</sup> stabilize the defenses of the occupied areas while cooperating with the Army's Burma operations in the South West area, to assault and occupation of Port Moresby, Midway, FIJI, SAMOA etc., in the South East Area and on the Eastern Front; that in these operations, contact with the ~~contact~~ "American Fleet" can be expected to give the opportunity to attack and destroy it, thus establishing a posture of invincibility.

### The Combined Fleet's Situation

As mentioned above, the force organization for the Combined Fleet for the 1st Period of the 2nd Phase operations was ordered into effect on 10 April. However, main forces of that fleet, which had been participating in the Southern Operations, were either returning to home waters or had just reached home ports to prepare for their next operations. <sup>At that time</sup> the MAIN FORCE's 1st Fleet was at anchor at HASHIRASIMA but Desron 3 and Crudiv 4 (RYUO) were returning from operations in the INDIAN OCEAN. The <sup>Screening</sup> Covering Force's Batdiv 2, the carriers HOSHIO and ZUYHO and most of the others were at anchor in the Western INLAND SEA or carrying out exercises or repairs in home waters. The 1st Section of Crudiv 4 of the Advance Force was at YOKOSUKA getting ready while the ATAGO had only reached YOKOSUKA on April 17th; Crudiv 7, the 1st Section of Batdiv 3 (HAI AND KIRISHIMA), Desdiv 18 and the HAGIKAZE and MAIKAZE of Desdiv 4 were still enroute back from operations in the INDIAN OCEAN. Most of the remainder were still operating in the Southern Area. STRIKING FORCE's AKAGI, Crudiv 2, Crudiv 5, 2nd Section Batdiv 3 (HARUNA and KANGO) and Crudiv 8 were south of TAIWAN Straits heading for home waters after completion of their INDIAN Ocean operations. South Seas Force was operating in the South Seas Area. Of the VANGUARD FORCE, the KATORI, CHIYODA, Subdivs 3 and 15 (6 submarines) had left home waters in mid April for TRUK; The "A" (甲子) Vanguard Detachment (AIKOKUMARU, HOKOKUMARU, 4 submarines and the NISSHIN) were enroute to PENANG from the Western INLAND SEA; 7 submarines of Subron 3, in accordance with Subforce orders, was proceeding eastward, <sup>for a position</sup> some 200 miles east of Tokyo Bay (they were about 500 miles from Tokyo at the time of the Doolittle air attack); Subrons 1 and 5 were under repair and Subron 2 was operating in the Southern area. The Base Air Force's 26th Air Flotilla was flying daily air patrols to the east of our main islands, ready for an attack by an American carrier force; The Headquarters of Air Flotilla 21 had moved to KANDA on base to prepare to move with KANOKAS land based bombers to the MACAO area; both Air Flotillas 24 and 25 were deployed to the Solomons and New Guinea areas, respectively, of the Inner South Seas Area. The Headquarters of the 11th Air Fleet moved up to TINIAN on 18 April. In the Northern Force, the NACHI was at anchor at MURORON, Crudiv 21 was anchored at AKKESHI (HOKKAI DO), the KIMI KAWA Maru was under repair at MAIZURU. The Patrol/Picket Force's ASAKA Maru and

81  
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the 3<sup>rd</sup> Picket Boat Squadron (#1 UNYO Maru and 16 picket boats - <sup>2 more were still enroute</sup>) had departed YOKOSUKA and KUSHIRO (HOKKAIDO) and reached the picket line at 1200 the 17<sup>th</sup> <sup>(2 more picket boats were still enroute)</sup> and took up station, after relieving the AWATA Maru and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Picket Boat Squadron (ANSHU Maru, KOWA Maru and 20 picket boats) which headed back to their base at KUSHIRO. Thus, early in the morning of the 18<sup>th</sup> of April the picket boat Squadrons formed, in effect, two separate picket-lines. AIR FORCES On 10 February, the newly organized MISAWA Air Group (27 land based bombers) had been incorporated into the Northern Force and assigned the duties of air patrols to the east of our main islands in mid-March, being then fully capable. On 5 March, the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla (Comdr R/Admiral Masao TADA) and 36 land based bombers of KANOYA Air, <sup>which</sup> had been assigned to the Northern Force for air patrols but by the April 1 reorganization of the Base Air Force, the 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla (Comdr R/Adm Masanori YAMAGATA - KISAKAZU Air, MISAWA Air, and 6<sup>th</sup> Air) were incorporated in the Northern Force and on 10 April, the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla and the 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla were removed from the Northern Force by the Combined Fleet force organization of that date.

YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT FORCES' SITUATION


Forces <sup>above</sup> under the direct command of the Commandant Yokosuka Naval District on 10 April were the Yokosuka Communications Force and the 4<sup>th</sup> Picket Boat Squadron; <sup>under 52 Subordinate Commanders were</sup> the Sea Area Defence Forces (DDs. OBORO, OKIKAZE, SAWAKAZE and Sub-chaun Divisions Tamaharu 22, 23, and 24.), The Land Defence Forces (The Naval Base Guard Force, the A.A. gun batteries, the AA machine gun batteries, the Naval Barracks force) and the Air Forces (Yokosuka Air, TATEYAMA AIR, 10<sup>th</sup> Combined Air Force [Kasumigaura, Chikuba, Hyakuri Aira, Yatabe, and Kashima Air Squadrons] and the 13<sup>th</sup> Combined Air Force [Suzuya, and OI Air Squadrons]). <sup>At that time,</sup> The Yokosuka Naval District Forces did not make <sup>special</sup> air patrols/searches but did conduct anti-submarine patrols in its area of responsibility.

(82)  
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OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENTS

Picket-Boat sights the American Carrier Force. As related above the Northern Force had 3 picket boat Squadrons (of 20 picket boats each) formed into 3 watches which conducted observation patrols some 700 miles east of Honshu between Latitudes 33° and 39° North Latitude. At 1200 the 17<sup>th</sup> of April (1942) #3 Squadron relieved #2 Squadron on station, the latter starting back to return to its base at KUSHIRO.

Continuation from VOLUME 85 of the 戦史叢書 "Denshi Soshu" WAR HISTORY Publications, "NAVAL OPERATIONS IN HOME WATERS" (本土方面海軍作戦) OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS - Picket Boat sights an American Carrier Force. As related previously (pages 127-130 VOL. I - RADIO INTERVIEW) the Northern Force had 3 Picket Boat Squadrons (of 20 Picket Boats each) formed into 3 watches conducting observation patrols about 700 miles east of Honshu between Latitudes 33° and 39° North. At 1200/17 April, #3 Squadron relieved #2 Squadron on station, the latter immediately started its return to its base at KUSHIRO. At 0630 the 18<sup>th</sup>, Picket Boat #23 NITTO Maru of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron reported sighting an American Aircraft Carrier and followed



this with a report of 3 aircraft carriers; it was not heard from again, having engaged the enemy for about 30 minutes. Sunrise that day in the vicinity of the Picket line was 0404, and sunset was at 1716; weather was partly clear, wind N.W. at 15 meters/second, and visibility was 9000 meters. The previous day the enemy force had refueled when about 1000 miles east of Honshu and on completion had left the tankers and destroyers behind and pressed on at high speed. At morning twilight of the 18<sup>th</sup>, their radar picked up two "blimps" when they were more than 700 miles from Japan. Not expecting to encounter a patrol line that far out, the Task Force Commander immediately reversed course and ordered the ENTERPRISE to launch search plans. Now that hope of undetected approach was lost, there was doubt that the B-25s had sufficient range to reach the Chinese airfields if launched 150 miles further out than planned. The Flight Commander made the decision to change the night attack plan to a daylight attack, and to take off as soon as preparations were completed.

ITTO Maru of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron, in sighting an American aircraft carrier <sup>east of 3 aircraft carriers</sup>; it was not heard from again, having engaged the enemy for about 30 minutes. That in the vicinity of the patrol line; N.W. at 15 meters/second and visibility

east of Honshu the enemy force had the destroyers and tankers and during twilight on the 18<sup>th</sup> they were radar picked up two "blimps". The enter a patrol line that far out, the ENTERPRISE to launch search picket boat patrol line. The enemy saw before launching the attack there was doubt that the B-25s had <sup>150 miles further out</sup> the decision to change the plan for a take off as soon as preparations were <sup>visibility of 15 meters/second and at 125</sup> 16 of the attack group having been surprised aircraft then attacked the picket sinking picket boats of both #2 and #3 [picket boat attacked]. Missing (sunk) by Damaged (and sunk by our forces)

83  
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the 3<sup>rd</sup> Picket Boat Squadron (#1 UNYO Maru and 16 picket boats - <sup>2 more were still enroute</sup>) had departed YOKOSUKA and KUSHIRO (HOKKAIDO) and reached the picket line at 1200 the 17<sup>th</sup> and took up station, after relieving the AWATA Maru and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Picket Boat Squadron (ANSHU Maru, KOWA Maru and 20 picket boats) which headed back to their base at KUSHIRO.

Thus, early in the morning of 17<sup>th</sup> April, the Northern Force formed, in effect, ten squadrons. On 10 February, the newly formed Northern Force had been incorporated into the Northern Force of air patrols to the Masao TADA) and 36 to the Northern Force the Base Air Force, the KISARAZU Air, MISAU Force and on 10 April, removed from the Northern Force of that date.

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YOKOSUKA NAVAL FORCES under the 1<sup>st</sup> District on 10 April were under the 5<sup>th</sup> Sub-Picket Boat Squadron; SAWAKAZE and Sub-Defense Forces (The Naval Machine Gun Batteries, (YOKOSUKA Air, TATEYAMA Hyakuri Bara, Yatase Air Group) [Suzuya, and Forces did not make submarine patrols in

At 0725 the HORNET turned into the N.W. wind and launched the Number One B-25 and by 0820 all 16 aircraft of the attack group had been launched. ENTERPRISE aircraft then attacked Picket Boats for about 3 hours, damaging and sinking of both #2 and #3 Squadron (details omitted).  
NORTHERN FORCE Upon receipt of the report of the sighting of an American carrier, the Commander Patrol Force (Comdr. Ayr. Cruiser Division 22, RADM Shigenori HORIUCHI) immediately ordered the (XCL) AWATA Maru (#2 Patrol Squadron's support ship) and the (XCL) ASAKA Maru (support ship for #3 Patrol Squadron) to establish contact with the enemy and report its movements; he also ordered #1 Patrol Squadron, then in KUSHIRO for overhaul and crew rest, to take up a patrol along longitude 155° East as soon as preparations for sea could be completed and directed #2 Patrol Squadron (then returning to port) to expedite preparations to depart as soon as they reached NEMURO (HOKKAIDO). The (XCL) AKOBI Maru of Cruiser 22 left NEMURO at 0900 18<sup>th</sup> and the SHOBI Maru with Patrol Squadron Number 1 (17 Picket Boats) departed KUSHIRO at 1400 that day for their operation area.  
Based on the reports by the Patrol Force's Picket Boats, Commander Northern Force estimated the enemy force as 3 aircraft carriers and many DDs. At 1045 he directed that the north-south intervals between Picket Boats be increased to 10 miles and that the patrol line proceed westerly from the position of the contact report of the #23 NITTO Maru. However, as many of the Picket Boats had been damaged and scattered by the attack by ENTERPRISE aircraft, their search was fruitless. The NAOKI (Flagship of Comdr. Northern Force/Cinc 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet) had been at I at Misaki (many of the crew were on shore leave and had to be recalled); it departed there at 1115 and joined Cruiser 26 (TAMA & KISS) at 1830 enroute to the scene of action.

OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENTS

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Picket Boat sights the American Carrier Force. As related above the Northern Force had 3 picket boat Squadrons (of 20 picket boats each) formed into 3 watches which conducted observation patrols some 700 miles east of Honshu between latitudes 38° and 39° North latitude. At 1200 the 17<sup>th</sup> of April (1942) #3 Squadron relieved #2 Squadron on station, the latter starting back to return to its base at KUSHIRO.

At 0630 the 18<sup>th</sup>, picket boat #23 NITTO Maru of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron, in position 36° North - 152° - 10' East reported sighting an American aircraft carrier and followed this with a report of a force of 3 aircraft carriers; it was not heard from again - having been engaged with the enemy for about 30 minutes. That day sunrise was at 0404 and sunset at 1716 in the vicinity of the patrol line; weather at the time was partly clear, wind N.W. at 15 meters/second and visibility of 9,000 meters

The previous day when some 1,000 miles east of Honshu the enemy force had refueled and on completion had left behind the destroyers and tankers and proceeded on westward at high speed. At morning twilight on the 18<sup>th</sup> they were more than 700 miles from Japan when their radar picked up two "blimps". The Task Force commander, not expecting to encounter a patrol line that far out, immediately reversed course and ordered the ENTERPRISE to launch search planes. They confirmed the presence of a picket boat patrol line. The enemy had hoped to be able to get closer to Japan before launching the attack planes. Now, that hope was lost and there was doubt that the B-25s had enough cruising range to reach the Chinese airfields if launched 150 miles further out than planned. The Flight Commander made the decision to change the plan for a night attack to a daylight attack and to take off as soon as preparations were completed.

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At 0725 The HORNET turned into the N.W. wind of 15 meters/second and at 0725 launched the #1 B-25; and at 0820, all 16 of the attack group having been launched, changed course to east. ENTERPRISE aircraft then attacked the picket boats for about 3 hours, damaging and sinking picket boats of both #2 and #3 Squadron. [(omitting details of each picket boat attacked)]. Missing: (sunk) #23 NITTO MARU, CHODO Maru; Heavy Damaged (and sunk by own forces)

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CHOKYU Maru, #21 NANSHIN Maru and #1 IWATE Maru; Medium <sup>Damage:</sup>  
AWATA Maru, KOWA Maru, #3 CHIYO Maru, EIKICHI Maru, #2 ASAMI Maru,  
#26 NANSHIN Maru and KAI SHIN Maru.

84  
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Northern Force On receipt of the report of sighting an American aircraft carrier, the Commander Patrol Force (Comdr. Auxiliary Cruiser division 22 - R/Adm. Shigenori HORIUCHI) immediately ordered the ((XCL)) AWATA Maru (#2 Patrol Squadron's support ship) and the ((XCL)) ASAKA Maru (#3 Patrol Squadron's support ship) to establish contact with the enemy and report its movements. He also ordered #1 Patrol Squadron, then at KUSHIRO for overhaul and crew rest to take up a patrol along longitude 155° East as soon as preparations for sea had been completed and directed #2 Patrol Squadron (then enroute back to port) to expedite preparations to depart as soon as they reached NEMURO (HOKKAIDO).

85  
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The ((XCL)) AKASHI Maru of the <sup>the SHOEI Maru and</sup> #1 Patrol Squadron <sup>They departed on longitude 149° E (about 20 miles west of the U.S. Kailashing) and</sup> departed KUSHIRO that day at 1430 headed for their operations area; N41 (17 picket boats) <sup>based on the Patrol Force's reports,</sup> departed <sup>at 1430</sup> headed for their operations area; N41

Commander Northern Force estimated the enemy force to consist of 3 aircraft carriers and many destroyers. At 1045 he directed that the north-south intervals <sup>between</sup> picket boats on the patrol lines be increased to 10 miles, and the patrol line proceed westerly from the position of the contact reported by the #23 NITTS Maru. However since many of the picket boats had been damaged and scattered by the attack by ENTERPRISE planes, their search did meet expectations ((e.g. - was futile)).

The NACHI ((Flagship of the Northern Force)) was at anchor at MURORAN ((many of the crew were on shore leave and had to be recalled)); it departed at 1115 and joined Crudiv 26 (TAMA and KISO) at 1830 enroute to the scene of the action.

85  
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#### COMBINED FLEET'S OPERATIONS DIRECTIVES

((The <sup>and Headquarters</sup> Flagship of the Cmf Combined Fleet, the new super battleship YAMATO, was moored in the fleet anchorage at HASHIRAJIMA, near KURE in the western part of the INLAND Sea. The Cmf's buoy had permanent landline connections to the shore so that the Cmf and his Staff were in direct communication with all Naval ships and stations via the Naval communications (and Radio Intelligence) network. The Cmf's staff radio operators could take over direct control of the Naval radio stations at TOKYO, KURE and SASEBO, if desired, for direction of operations.))

On receipt of a telephone report from the Navy Staff Section, Imperial General Headquarters, at 0750 the 18<sup>th</sup> that 3 American aircraft carriers had been sighted at about 0600, 730 miles to the east of Honshu, the Combined Fleet immediately issued the order "USE METHOD #3 AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET", the same order that it had issued at the time of the American carrier attack on the MARSHALLS on 1 February. Now, in the middle of changes in the force assignments for the new 1<sup>st</sup> Period operations of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase, the Combined Fleet's organization was in disarray and things were a bit confused. The new force organization attached special importance to getting ready and training for a decisive battle in connection with the MIDWAY operation contemplated for early June but the immediate and urgent requirement was the organization of a special task force to carry out a search for, and to attack and destroy the enemy carrier force.

The ((CA)) ATAGO, flagship of Vice Admiral Nobutake KENDO, <sup>and</sup> the Commander the ADVANCE FORCE by the new force organization, had arrived at YOKOSUKA the 17<sup>th</sup> ((he and his staff were just now enroute to Tokyo to report to the chief of

the Naval General Staff)) Combined Fleet Secret Radio order #801 was issued ordering all ships anchored in home waters incorporated into the Advance Force immediately, <sup>the force to</sup> <sup>expedite its</sup> <sup>establish</sup> contact with the American carrier force, to attack and destroy it. The force organization of the 15<sup>th</sup> assigned the ADVANCE FORCE

86  
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2 Highspeed Battleships, 6 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Seaplane carriers and 2 Destroyer Squadrons but the 2 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers were still enroute back to home waters from the Southern Operations and one seaplane carrier and most of the destroyers were still operating in the South. The units, <sup>immediately</sup> available for use by Comdr ADVANCE FORCE were: Heavy Cruisers TAKAO and ATAGO, Seaplane Carrier MIZUHO, Desdiv 4's ARASHI and NŌWAKE (all at anchor in YOKOSUKA) and the Light Cruiser JINTSU at anchor at KURE. Headquarters Combined Fleet now ordered heavy cruisers HAGURO and MIYOKO (at HASHIRAJIMA), MAYA (MIKAWA Bay),

CHOKAI (returning from CAMRANH Bay on 16 April), aircraft carrier HOSHŌ and 3 Desdivs, 7, 8 and 10 (Yokosuka) to the ADVANCE FORCE. At the same time the Combined Fleet ordered the Covering Force to support the Advance Force. At that time the Covering Force was on guard, anchored in the Western Inland Sea, carrying out training and upkeep. As it was lacking its Destroyer Squadron, which

was still taking part in operations in the INDIAN Ocean, Desdiv 15- which had departed KURE for the PHILIPPINES on the 17<sup>th</sup>- was ordered to reverse course and temporarily attached to the Covering Force. Also, the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla was ordered to move to the Tokyo Bay area and the KAGA's Carrier Air Group was placed under the Command of Comdr. 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla.

The Carrier Strike Force, having completed its INDIAN Ocean operations, was then south of TAIWAN enroute back to home waters; it was ordered to advance quickly to the seas east of Honshu to establish contact with, attack and destroy the American Carrier force.

VANGUARD (Submarine) Force The Commander of the Vanguard Force, (Vice Admiral Teruhisa KOMATSU) in his flagship KATORI (Training cruiser), the Seaplane Carrier CHIYODA, and the Eastern Vanguard Detachment (6 submarines) departed from the INLAND Sea on 16 April and were enroute TRUK when the report of sighting American carriers was received. At 0940, the 18<sup>th</sup>, the Eastern Vanguard Detachment was ordered to pass north of the BONIN Islands and search for the enemy <sup>along a line</sup> bearing 50° and the CHIYODA was directed to join the Covering Force. Also, Subron 3 which was at that time about 500 miles to the east of Honshu was ordered to take part in the interception operations.

BASE AIR FORCE In accordance with directives from the Combined Fleet, the Commander of the Base Air Force, at TINIAN (Vice Adm. Nishizo TSUKAHARA, CMC 11<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet) at TINIAN at 0930 the 18<sup>th</sup> ordered the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla <sup>(to take command)</sup> of the land bombers force of KANOYA Air and shift to the Tokyo Bay area and come under the command of Comdr. 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla. At 0940 Commander 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla was ordered to take command of the air forces in the Tokyo Bay area, and others, to attack and destroy the enemy carrier force. Thus, the 21<sup>st</sup> Air Flotilla, 4<sup>th</sup> Air (the land based bomber force at KISARAZU) and the KAGA carrier Air Group, all came under the command of Comdr. 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla. That Commander (R/Adm. Masanori YAMAGATA), on learning of the attack by the American carriers at 0800 the 18<sup>th</sup> by a telephone call from the Navy General Staff, immediately ordered the four Type 1 ("Betty") land bombers conducting the regular daily

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air patrol from KISARAZU to establish contact with, and track the enemy force. These aircraft had departed KISARAZU that morning at 0635 to patrol the sector 055-090° and at 0930 the #4 aircraft made the following sighting report:  
"ONE <sup>(TWIN ENGINE)</sup> AIRCRAFT, NATIONALITY UNKNOWN, 600 MILES BEARING 085° FROM KISARAZU HEADED WEST. LOOKS LIKE A FLYING BOAT. COULD NOT OVERTAKE IT USING 230 KNOTS"

YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT. The YOKOSUKA Naval District received the first report of the sighting of an aircraft carrier by the #23 NITTO Maru at 0805 and at 0820 ordered its air squadrons. "ATTACK ENEMY SHIPS BY METHOD #2 (at YOKOSUKA Naval District system - should the location of the enemy be unknown, the air attack force will, after cooperating in the search by the search force, move to attack.) The Air Attack Force was made up of 6 Squadrons, the 1<sup>st</sup> Attack Squadron (12 land based bombers), the 2<sup>nd</sup> Attack Squadron had long endurance/long range flying boats, the 3<sup>rd</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> Attack Forces had dive-bombers, carrier torpedo/bombers and float reconnaissance aircraft. At the same time, all other units were ordered on strict alert. At 0830 the YOKOSUKA Naval District was ordered on the Alert.

#### AIR ATTACK ON HONSHU AND THE VICINITY

With the receipt of the report - ENEMY CARRIER(S) SIGHTED, YOKOSUKA Air ordered its aircraft then airborne to land; 9 Zero fighters were promptly placed on stand-by and when the KISARAZU search plane's report of a 'plane resembling an enemy flying boat heading west' was received at 1120, 3 of those fighters took off for combat air patrol. Next, 3 more Zeros took off at 1240 at about the same time that enemy planes penetrated the Tokyo-Yokohama area at low altitudes. YOKOSUKA Naval District ordered an Air Raid Alert at 1252 when 5 more Zeros took off, increasing the air patrol aloft to 11 fighters.

The Army, which had the Air Defense responsibility for the Tokyo-Yokohama area ordered Air Raid Alert at 0830 on receipt of the navy's reports of sighting American aircraft. It had been estimated that the American air attack on Honshu would occur the next day, the 19<sup>th</sup>, and hoping for the best, the Army XVII Air Group had fighters take off at 1000 and patrol between 4 and 5000 meters, and at about 1200 they started to land to refuel.

At a little past 1200 the SUGAYA Air Defense Observation Station north of MITO (40 miles NE of TOKYO) reported sighting one large type aircraft and about 1215 the Tokyo district received an air attack. From that time onward reports of confirmed aircraft sightings were <sup>continuously</sup> received from all areas of the TOKYO Plain.

The main force of the Army VIII Air Group that was standing by on the ground took off immediately for intercept attacks and some 40 fighters and Type 100 Headquarters-reconnaissance aircraft searched for the enemy but being at high altitudes were unable to sight the enemy planes. The American B-25s had penetrated from <sup>the</sup> north east through east at low altitude, dropping incendiary and 500 pound bombs in many places. By 1235 they had left Tokyo's skies.

Around 1330 one enemy B-25 attacked <sup>the</sup> YOKOSUKA Naval Base, scoring (a) hit(s) on the (TANIGAI (13000 ton Submarine tender being converted to aircraft carrier RYUHO)) in drydock, damaging its hull below the water-line. Our 11 fighters were at 3,000 meters, too high to be able to see the attacking plane.

Also at 1356 several enemy aircraft appeared over KAWASAKI (an industrial city between TOKYO and YOKOHAMA and bombed the industrial area; fires spread to the gas tanks which in turn expanded the fires which were put out at around 1510.

At 1420 a B-25 dropped bombs and incendiaries on factories and a military arsenal in NAGOYA at low altitude; another strafed the Navy #2 Fuel Depot at YOKKAICHI with machine gun fire and a third attacked the city areas of KOBE with incendiaries, causing damage.

The KURE Naval District sounded the Air Raid alarm at 0930 for the sea area Defences, the air forces and the BUNGO CHANNEL Defence Forces. The BUNGO CHANNEL, the Fleet's main route to and from sea was used that day for the sortie of the Covering Force from their anchorage in the Western Inland Sea.

At 1130, 9 Type 96 ("CLAUDE") fighters and 2 Zeros of IWAKUNI Air were placed under the operational command of the Commandant

YOKOSUKA Naval District and moved to YOKOSUKA that afternoon. Upon the receipt of reports of air attacks on the TOKYO, NAGOYA and KOBE areas, IWAKUNI Air (Type 96 ("CLAUDE")) fighters and KURE Air (Type 95 ("DOME")) float planes were placed on 15 minute stand-by at 1433 and 1445, respectively, to prepare against air attack; the KURE Guard Force were ordered to form a patrol line off SHIKOKU Island from position 32°N 134°E, interval 11 miles, course 055°. At about 1500, two fishing boats off SHIKOKU were strafed by machine gun fire from an American aircraft; at 1546 a SAEKI Air dive bomber sighted an American plane flying at low altitude 36 miles bearing 210° from ASHIZURI MISAKI (the S.W. tip of SHIKOKU) and pursued it, but due to its high speed, had to give up the pursuit.

In just a brief period of time the American planes had zipped through the skies of our homeland and had very cleverly completed their attacks on strategic places without the loss of a single aircraft. One landed at VLADIVOSTOK due to a fuel supply failure, the other fifteen reached China but it was then night, 4 planes made forced landings with great damage, the occupants of the other eleven aircraft parachuted into the blackness of the night. Of these one was killed and four were drowned, about half the others being injured. One plane crash landed in the water off NINGPO and its crew along with the crew of another that parachuted to earth near NANCHANG were captured by Japanese forces.

#### SEARCH FOR THE AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE --

THE AIR SEARCH. Prior to the sighting of the American aircraft carriers, 4 land based bombers (of 26th Air Flotilla) had taken off from KISARAZU Air Station for the daily air patrol. At 0815 they were sent to search for the enemy carriers, their search area being a sector between 55° and 90° from INUBO SAKI (Cape, about 40 miles east of TOKYO), at 0940, #4 search plane (they were numbered from #1 north clockwise) reported sighting a twin engine flying boat, and it was believed that the retirement course of the American carriers was approximately that of the search route of #4 search plane's; that while at some time they may have been in

close proximity to each other, the carriers had not been sighted. At that time the visibility was about 10,000 meters. The 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla (6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Force) sent 3 more aircraft to search the area centered on the position where the enemy had been sighted and in order to carry out an attack promptly when contact had been made, ordered the attack force to be ready to take off as follows: 6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Force secret radio order # 58 (181100)

THIS FORCE'S (PLUS KAGA, KANOKA AND 4<sup>th</sup> AIR GROUPS) SEARCH AND ATTACK PLAN. (1) 18<sup>TH</sup> APRIL. (A) SEARCH AND TRACKING. AT PRESENT FOUR SEARCH AIRCRAFT ARE IN CONTACT (NOTE - THEY WERE NOT IN CONTACT!) AND AT 1130 AN ADDITIONAL 3 AIRCRAFT WILL TAKE OFF, SEARCH COURSES 78°, 85° AND 92° TO 700 MILES, TURN RIGHT FOR 40 MILES AND RETURN TO BASE. (B) ATTACK: TAKE OFF FROM KISARAZU AT 1215; ABOUT 1600, 30 LAND BOMBERS OF ATTACK FORCE MAKE TORPEDO ATTACKS (KISARAZU AIR 16, MISAWA AIR 9, 4<sup>TH</sup> AIR 5). #1 CONTROL OF THE AIR FORCE: 12 ZERO FIGHTERS FROM 6<sup>TH</sup> AIR AND 12 ZERO FIGHTERS FROM THE "KAGA" (2) ON THE 19<sup>TH</sup> MAKE AN ALL-OUT-ATTACK AT DAWN.

The 3 aircraft from MISAWA Air flew out about 700 miles (to the longitude of 155° East) searching for the enemy and it is believed that at about 1500 when they had reached their maximum advance, the enemy carrier task force was still some 80 miles farther to the east, retiring at full speed.

The 6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Force took off from KISARAZU at 1230 without any intelligence of the enemy - thus, 22 Type 1 ("BETTY") land bombers (17 from KISARAZU Air and 5 from 4<sup>th</sup> Air) and 12 Zero fighters (from 6<sup>th</sup> Air) were joined by 12 Zero fighters from the KAGA's Air Group over KATSUURA (near KISARAZU) and proceeded on their search and attack mission. The Type 1 ("BETTY") bombers of MISAWA Air were slightly delayed in take off from KISARAZU, 5 of which caught up and joined with the above Attack Force, the other 3 bombers proceeded to search on course 085°. After

To modify Chapter 9 - The first period, 2nd Phase Operations

The Supplement to the

U.S. related primarily; on 16 April the C.N.S. directed the C.I. G.F., Yamamoto and the C.I. Chinese area fleet, Koga, to assemble in the Pacific along 2nd phase operations plan.

Staff Section, July 6th # 55

The Imperial Navy's operations policy in the war against the U.S. (G.R. + N.R.I.) as follows:

Staff Section # 85

Staff Section # 1 and # 2

Modify as follows: Modify the supplement [The Imperial Navy's policy in a war with the U.S. (G.R. + N.R.I.)]

It is important that the above Supplement is available and that they are not know their contents and it is difficult to try to deduce its contents, not. However from the operations that the Combined Fleet planned for that period - the the invasion of the Midway and the Western Aleutians, followed by the F.S. (Fiji/Samoa) operations and probably the invasion and invasion of the Hawaiian Islands was also included, as will be covered later, these were studied in the 2nd Phase Operations map maneuvers that the G.F. conducted beginning in early May (1942).

C.I. G.F.'s Instructions

Since at that time the G.F. had already issued orders for the 2nd Phase, it is thought that the 1st period operations were no hurry about subsequent operations. The C.I. G.F. perhaps, because an order from Staff Section # 85 was believed necessary for the invasion of Midway etc, orders with regard to these were not issued. The following instruction was issued by the C.I. G.F. on April 16th

Combined Fleet Secret Instruction # 2

2nd Phase Instructions

Under the August outline of our Empire, all forces have been great and it was with great pleasure that this occasion that all objectives of that period were attained by the military virtues of all forces etc.

However, the enemy's accomplishments are not do not yet accomplish the military aspect of the war. The enemy arrogantly neglected his defenses and suffered from our lightning attacks, he has made many mistakes; the scale of his increased preparations is also large, and he plans a long duration war with no thought of past defeats, or, planning a large counter attack endeavor to reverse the situation. We must establish a strategy of our offensive and defense, grasping the command of the sea.

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advancing about 460 miles, the fighter group had to leave the formation and return; most of the Attack Force continued until they had advanced some 650 miles along course 085° when the visibility became bad and they advanced by individual sections but failing to sight anything, they finally returned to base.

At that time it had not been established that the American aircraft which had attacked our homeland had been launched from aircraft carriers nor was the type of aircraft confirmed, it was believed probable that a carrier task force, or other vessels, were present in those waters to pick up the air crews. The Air Attack Force arrived back at KISARAZU or KASUMIAGURA by 2255.

3 land based bombers from the MARCUS Island Detachment of MISAWA Air had taken off on their daily patrol at 0537 to patrol a sector between 15° to 55° but due to rain in the northern part returned after 5-600 miles. The 9 land bombers of KANOKA Air (21st Air Flot.) which were under orders to move to the South were ordered to shift to KISARAZU and took off at 1430.

The YOKOSUKA Naval District conducted air searches of waters adjacent to Tokyo Bay and its island chains to the South but failed to sight any enemy forces. (details omitted as adding nothing except extraneous detail)

SEARCHES BY SURFACE SHIPS

In accordance with Combined Fleet's Secret Order # 801, V/Adm. KONDO immediately ordered the ADVANCE FORCE, presently at anchor at YOKOSUKA, to make preparations to sortie and issued other necessary orders, one after the other, as follows: (1) The (CA) MAYA and (CX) SHOHYO to be included in the forces at YOKOSUKA and be part of the Main Force of the Advance Force, (2) The Main Force (less the MAYA and SHOHYO) to sortie at 1700 the 18th, pass through Point "A" (24 miles bearing 167° from NOJIMA ZAKI (the Southern tip of the CHIBA Peninsula - about 50 miles South of Tokyo)) at 2100 and reach Point "B" (34°N - 143°45'E) at 0500 the 19th. (3) the MAYA to join near Point "A". (4) The (CL) JINTSU to move South east of the NOJIMA area. (5) The SHOHYO to join the Main Force as soon as preparations have been completed. (6) The (AO) NARUTO to load fuel and proceed to the

90  
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area around AOGASHIMA (Island approximately 150 miles south of <sup>Yokosuka</sup>)

The Main Force of the Advance Force (less the MAYA and SHOHU) departed YOKOSUKA at 1700 and was joined by the MAYA, as scheduled, and passed through Point "B", searching to the eastward. The SHOHU which was training at sea, immediately returned to YOKOSUKA, expedited its preparations and left there at 0415 the 19<sup>th</sup>, proceeding to join the Main Force. The ((CAS)) MYOKO and HAURO left HAKODADAI at 0945 the 18<sup>th</sup>, the JINTSU left KURE at 1015 the 19<sup>th</sup> and proceeded to the HAKHISIMA ((Bonins)) area to search. Thus the Advance Force moved out to the east of the home islands and searched for the enemy until the evening of the 20<sup>th</sup>, without finding any trace.

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
The COVERING FORCE, in company with the <sup>((CAS))</sup> HOSHU and ZUIHO and 2 destroyers, sortied from the Western Inland Sea at 1500 the 18<sup>th</sup> and were joined off the BONGO Channel by Desdiv 15, which had been enroute to the PHILIPPINES; it was also joined, later on, by Desdiv 16 which had sortied from YOKOSUKA. The Covering Force then headed for the HAKHISIMA area to take up the search for the enemy.

The Carrier Strike Force proceeded with all dispatch toward the homeland, under orders to intercept and destroy the American Carrier Task Force, <sup>((SHOKAKU and ZUIKAI))</sup> Cardiv 5, which had been detached and was operating independantly, rejoined after quickly refuelling at BAKO, the whole force headed for the American Carrier Task Force. However the Combined Fleet called off the pursuit of the American force on the evening of the 20<sup>th</sup> by its order "CANCEL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET, METHOD # 3", when the Carrier Strike Force was still far from the assumed Battle location.

Commander VANGUARD ((Submarine)) Force had Subron 3, then nearest the position of the American Carrier Task Force, deploy on a scouting line and advance to the east. At 0700 the 19<sup>th</sup>, they had <sup>but</sup> reached Longitude 154° East, they were ordered to advance to Longitude 160° East <sup>(about 1000 miles east of NUSUBO SAKI)</sup> at 0950 the 19<sup>th</sup>. This was based on a dispatch from the Northern Force (182015) which estimated that there was a

(92)  
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strong probability that the enemy was withdrawing to the east and that there was a good chance for the Air Attack Force to attack east of 155° East under the protection of our Carrier Strike Force.



SEARCHES AFTER THE AIR ATTACK. The air and surface searches, although very intense, were quite fruitless -- not one clue was found regarding the American Carrier Task Force. Moreover, as the air attack was made at very low altitudes, the type of aircraft could not be confirmed although it was certain these were twin-engine planes. If twin-engine bombers could take off from an American aircraft carrier, there was a pressing need to study the type and number of aircraft carried, and the capability of being landed back on board, and to revise basically our counter-plans to this new development. Thus, there was unease over the many unknown elements of this problem; there were many things that had to be done but at present, the most pressing task was to attack the American Carrier Task Force that had escaped and to establish defences against a recurrence of such an air attack.

92  
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The Combined Fleet and Naval District forces continued their search for the enemy at first light the 19<sup>th</sup>. 9 Type 96 ("NELL") land bombers of KANOYA Air took off from KISARAZU at 0410/19<sup>th</sup> pursuant to 6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Force Order # 2 to conduct a careful search for the enemy but at 0700 the weather turned bad but except for one plane that returned to base, the others searched for 700 miles without results. Similarly 8 Type-1 ("BETTY") land bombers of KANOYA Air took off from KISARAZU at 0400 (1 plane took off at 0600) to conduct a search for the enemy, but they also failed to sight any enemy, sighting only our own vessels. That day the weather north of 060° from KISARAZU was rainy but otherwise it was fair with visibility of 15 miles or more. Seven Type 1 land bombers of MISAWA Air took off from MARCUS at 0320, searched their designated area and returned at 1215 without having sighted any enemy. Pursuant to YOKOSUKA Naval District's secret radio # 392, 2- Type 97 (MAVIS) flying boats took off at 0245 to patrol the seas east of the Tokyo Plain but encountered nothing unusual. As there were no further signs of attack or of enemy aircraft, the Air Raid Alert was lifted at 0315 but the YOKOSUKA Naval District sent fighter planes aloft and kept the Air Attack Force on stand-by.

93  
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The same day at 1215 a telephone call was received from the Central Military District Headquarters that "OSAKA and SARAE (Suburb south of OSAKA) had sighted enemy aircraft overhead". Immediately, the KURE Naval District ordered IWAKUNI Air and KURE Air to patrol the KURE area and there were many subsequent reports received of attacks by American aircraft. At 1300 YOKOSUKA sent up 21 Zero fighters, 5 Type 96 "CLAUDE" fighters and 7 Zero float-plane fighters for upper air patrols; also MATSUSHIMA Air (OSAKA Defence Area) sent out float scout planes which patrolled the Kii Channel but no American aircraft having sighted, the Alert was terminated at 1730 and the situation returned to normal.

93  
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The many reports of attacks by American aircraft against the Tokyo Plains area and the Kobe-Osaka area on the 19<sup>th</sup>

were mistaken reports made of friendly aircraft.

#### SEARCHES ON THE 20<sup>th</sup> AND SUBSEQUENTLY

All forces carried out careful searches over a wide area from early on the 19<sup>th</sup> but could not find any trace of the force that had attacked our home islands on the 18<sup>th</sup>. It was believed that the American Carrier Task Force, upset by being discovered by our patrol/picket line, retired immediately thereafter to the eastward and departed <sup>from</sup> waters near Japan <sup>at 1930 the 19<sup>th</sup></sup>.

In consideration for forthcoming operations, the Combined Fleet ordered the following forces to revert to their 1<sup>st</sup> Period, 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase force organization by Combined Fleet Radio Op. order # 124 (191930): CARDIV 5, DESDIV 27, SUBRON 8, and CHYODA.

However, at 0920 the 19<sup>th</sup> there had been a report that a picket boat of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Patrol Force (Northern Force) which had been returning to KUSHIRO had received gunfire. Therefore, at 1930 the Combined Fleet ordered an Alert for all forces concerned for the possibility of an American carrier attack on the HOKKAIDO area. The OMINATO Naval Defence Area at 0130 the 20<sup>th</sup> ordered its air forces, then under strict alert, to carry out air searches for the enemy in the sea areas of Southern HOKKAIDO. The sea-area searches by the 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla were continued again on the 20<sup>th</sup>.

94  
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(6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Force Radio Op. order # 3-191600) - ORGANIZATION FOR SEARCH AND ATTACK FOR TOMORROW 20<sup>th</sup>: (1) SEARCH: (a) BASE: KISARAZU - 18 TYPE 1 ("BETTY") LAND BOMBERS (MISAWA AIR 12 - CHITOSE AIR 6) TAKE OFF 0500; SEARCH SECTORS SAME AS 19<sup>th</sup>; MISAWA TAKE 12 NORTHERN SECTORS, CHITOSE TAKE THE 6 SOUTHERN SECTORS. BASE: MARCUS ISLAND: 5 MISAWA AIRCRAFT TAKE OFF AT 0400, SEARCH SECTORS A THROUGH E (15° - 50°) TO 7000 MILES. (2) ATTACK: ONE HOUR STAND BY FROM 0500 ONWARD. (a) #1 ATTACK FORCE (TORPEDO ATTACK) TYPE-1 ("BETTY") LAND BASED BOMBERS, 18 FROM KISARAZU AIR, 9 FROM KANOYA AIR UNDER THE COMMANDER KISARAZU AIR. (b) #2 ATTACK FORCE (TORPEDO ATTACK) 18 TYPE 96 ("NELL") LAND BOMBERS FROM KANOYA AIR. (c) #3 ATTACK FORCE (BOMBING ATTACK) DIVE BOMBERS AND TORPEDO-BOMBERS FROM THE KAGA. (d) #1 AIR SUPERIORITY FORCE - 12 ZERO FIGHTERS

94  
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FROM 6<sup>th</sup> AIR. (e) #2 AIR SUPERIORITY FORCE - 12 ZERO FIGHTERS  
FROM THE KAGA.

The air operations on the 20<sup>th</sup> were somewhat reduced in scope from those of the 19<sup>th</sup> (( Details of air search and patrol operations omitted here -- all were negative. )) The Combined Fleet had not yet modified any of the sea area air searches originating in the shore-based air force and, feeling that the American Carrier Task Force might be in the Southern KURILES area, ordered an air search be made some 350 miles to the south of ETROFU Island. ....

#### END OF THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN CARRIER FORCE

Thus, no intelligence reports of the enemy having been obtained, by its Radio Opord # 125 (201930) the Combined Fleet cancelled its "OPERATE AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET BY METHOD # 3", directing a return to the force organization for the 1<sup>st</sup> Period, 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase operations for all forces except 21<sup>st</sup> Airflot, (less TOKO Air) to be under the command of Com 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla, and for the Northern Force, the Base Air Force and Subron 3 to continue to be on strict alert (( Details of the searches, covering Hokkaido and KURILES waters, and the seas to the east of HONSHU are omitted here -- all searches were negative ))

#### MovEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE

Afterward, the Navy Staff Section of Imperial General Headquarters concluded from a Radio Intelligence report of the 25<sup>th</sup> that the American Carrier Task Force had returned to PEARL HARBOR:

(NAVY STAFF) SECTION IMP. GEN. HQ SECRET RADIO # 285 (251010) - "AT DAWN THE 25<sup>th</sup> THERE WERE UNUSUALLY INTENSE AIR (SEARCHES AND) PATROLS IN THE HAWAIIAN (ISLANDS) AREA, (THIS IS) BELIEVED TO BE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RETURN TO PEARL HARBOR OF THE AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE.

In addition to this being the first experience of an air attack on our main islands, this attack came earlier, time wise, than had been imagined. There were many deficiencies in estimates of the situation by all concerned and conspicuous was the lack of substance in Radio Intelligence reports. ....

#### INFLUENCE OF THIS AIR ATTACK

The emotional shock of the Doolittle Air Attack on the Government and the people of Japan was extremely severe, as was its effect on the subsequent direction of operations by Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

##### 1. Effect on the MIDWAY-ALEUTIANS operations

In early April, the Navy had decided on a policy of carrying out both these operations as one in early June. The Army, while not disapproving, were opposed in particular to participation by any Army troops. It now used the Doolittle Air Raid as an opportunity to approve of the operations and also agreed to the dispatch of Army troops in each of them. The reasons were that by occupying the strategic locations of MIDWAY and the western ALEUTIANS, air searches from those places could then sight an American Carrier Task Force early in the game.

##### 2. ANXIETY OVER AMERICAN CARRIER FORCES

This air attack had a profound effect within the Naval Staff Section at Imperial General Headquarters; the Combined Fleet, and all its forces, which had originally had been concerned over an American Carrier Task Force's attack on our home islands, now became even more apprehensive and thereafter took prudent measures in all kinds of situations

##### 3. Initiation of the CHEKIANG operations.

The Army Staff Section of Imperial General Headquarters issued an Imperial Command to its China Army to commence operations in CHEKIANG to capture or destroy the bases in China that the Americans had intended to use, to forestall any such future attacks like the Doolittle raid. These operations would start with attacks from the HANGCHOW area in mid-April and from the NANCHANG area in early July, both forces advancing in concert, to join together, thus occupying all the selected bases.



chapter 8 (Page 479) The NGS Special Duty Group and the OWADA Comm. Unit  
Even if the defeat in the Battle of Midway and the death of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMAMOTO had not been a result of breaking our codes (as set forth in the previous chapter), the heights of the American navy's/America's techniques, skills, (reliability) organization, and zeal was one to which the Japanese Navy's/Japan's could not be compared and the vast number of actual examples are more like a novel.

"I recall, said former Captain Muihara YAMADA, ex-C.O. of the 4th Weather Station at Guam on 24 March 1962, that during questioning by a Lieut. Huggins (fluent in Japanese) in the Interrogation room in Pearl Harbor, he said 'The American Navy has solved the Japanese navy's codes and I'll take this opportunity to show you the U.S. Navy's 'Black Chamber' right here in the Hawaiian Islands. I recall that while walking toward Nimitz's Headquarters he pointed his finger at a building about the size of the Marn Building (the Marumouchi Building, opposite Tokyo station, in the 1930s/1940s) saying there it is, where more than a thousand persons are engaged in code breaking."

According to the New York Times the number of people in the Code Breaking Department(s) at the time of Pearl Harbor was between 2 and 300 and that number had grown to more than 10,000 by the end of the war.

... refers to Yardley's American Black Chamber as being established in the early 1912-1915 period. On the other hand, after the war were written such as "The Navy's Secret Chamber" and others which mentioned the Navy's OWADA Communications Unit, whose predecessor was the "Special Chamber" of the 2nd Group of the 4th Section Naval General Staff, which was established in

1929 (exact date not known), this was the beginning of the Navy's Communications Intelligence organization. Interception was initially assigned to the Naval Technical Bureau at HIROTSUKA, north of HIYOSHIDA (Kanagawa Prefecture) using the radio receiving station there (also called the KANIGAMI receiving station). The personnel working in the

"Special Chamber" were Commander NAKASUGI, Lt. Comdr. FUKAMACHI, Lt. YAMAZAKI, Lt. MORIKAWA and 3 typists. A Working Group was established within the Naval Special Landing Area at SHANGHAI -- its target COMINT (abbreviated to "C"). This was the origin of the SHANGHAI FACILITY (called the "X Facility")

The major effort of the 4th Section's "Special Chamber" was directed at the military (naval) communications of the U.S.A. (abbreviated to "A") and of Great Britain (abbreviated to "B"). Since in "A" work, state department codes appeared on U.S. naval communications networks, they were handled and studied together. Although the U.S. Navy's 2 letter substitution code was followed by the appearance of a single-letter substitution code (AN-2), and changed from time to time, they were usually completely deciphered and read. Due to considerations of personnel and work resources, work was not explicitly

Vertical text on the left margin: 333. Next to the left margin, there is a vertical column of text, possibly a list or index, mentioning names and dates.

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That same year (1929?) a Special Group (called the 18th Group) of the Army General Staff was established in the 2nd Section. It was directed to concentrate on the Soviet Union (abbreviated as "S") and on China (abbreviated as "C"). Afterward an intercept facility was established under it at TANASHI (Tokyo Prefecture). The Navy General Staff sent its research specialist on China, Lt. YAMADA, to the Army to study "C" codes, and attached him to the "X Facility" pending his conclusions. (The above is taken from "VICISSITUDES OF OUR NAVY'S COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE" by Lt. Comdr. WACHI ('19) (published in 1955) who had been C.O. OWADA Communications Unit.

He states that Comint activity began when the 4th Section of the NGS Staff established the "Special Duty Group" in 1925 (it would be correct to say when it established the "Special Chamber" of the 2nd Group of the 4th Section NGS in 1929, not 1925!). The 11th Section NGS was raised in status and made independent as the "Special Duty Group", ~~2nd Division~~, Naval General Staff in 1940. When initially established it had 7 people (7 is correct), including typists, on the 3rd floor of the Navy Ministry building (Tokyo). Among these early Comint personnel was the grandson of Admiral Katoji KATO (1890), Lt. MORIKAWA, Shigem ('22) - afterward as a Captain the C.O. of OWADA Comm. Unit. Senior to Lt. Morikawa was Lt. NAKASUGI, Hisayiro ('08) - (one of the navy's "three" who attended Lt. YAN's lectures (the Polish Army's code expert who gave code-breaking lessons for the Japanese Army in 1925) - Lt. YAN KOWALEWSKI - Polish Expert, 1925 - Lt. YAN KOWALEWSKI - "These initial code crackers" attacked the U.S. State Department's

NADED and Grey Code (note - they were one and the same) using classical methods, had considerable difficulty, but were successful in obtaining the "quite" from the Katoji's code breakers on constructing the Grey Code (NVCVC etc). In 1932 the 4th Section (Communications) was newly organized into the Naval General Staff; the previous 2nd Group of the 4th Section was elevated in status and made the 10th Subsection of the 4th Section, and its work gradually advanced and intensified. That Autumn the Naval Tender ERIMO was sent specifically to collect material (intercept work) during the American Fleet's Fleet Problem/Maneuvers in the Pacific. That material was consolidated in the 10th Section and the code used (HEBURN -- "HEBAN" + "Machine Code") was successfully deciphered and read. At that time as a result of the "C" work (Chinese code decryption) by the SHANGHAI Facility, we secretly learned

YAN's lectures etc (in Russian) were from lectures not by Yan but by Yan's students (Lt. YAN's student NAKASUGI, Lt. Comdr. FUKAMACHI, Lt. YAMAZAKI, Lt. MORIKAWA and 3 typists). A Working Group was established within the Naval Special Landing Area at SHANGHAI -- its target COMINT (abbreviated to "C"). This was the origin of the SHANGHAI FACILITY (called the "X Facility")

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that the Nanking Government had concentrated its aircraft groups at the CHANGSHA Airfield, on stand-by, planning to attack our aircraft carrier(s). This enabled our naval air force to make a preventative attack on these <sup>air</sup> fields. (For the above intelligence, Capt. <sup>(+)</sup> WACHI and Lt. <sup>(+)</sup> YAMADA, in charge of the X Facility, <sup>were awarded</sup> the "Order of the Golden Kite".

1934 In 1934, the NGS 10<sup>th</sup> Section <sup>(Govt)</sup> stole and photographed the American Grey Code - AF 2 and the British <sup>(Government)</sup> Interdepartmental Code - DF-5, from the American and British Consulates, respectively, in Japan and were thereby able to completely decipher messages in these codes.

American Consulate  
General Kato  
British Consulate  
Suzuki  
Osaka

In 1935 the "X" Facility knowing that the offices of the 3 principal cable companies (The Commercial Pacific connecting GUAM, Midway, the Hawaiian Islands etc with the US -- The Great Eastern connecting the Far East, Faohow and Hongkong with Europe and the Great Northern passing through Siberia to Europe) were located in Shanghai. Their study showed that 2 of these offices handled lots of coded messages. After photographing these messages, they were successfully read.

In 1936 a Specialized Central Intercept Facility (in OWADA <sup>village</sup> in KITAADACHI District of SAITAMA Prefecture) was completed, the OWADA <sup>(Radio)</sup> Receiving Station and, at first, only 9 Reserve Radomen were assigned as Intercept personnel. The A Group ("working group against America <sup>(+)</sup> Communists"), a B Group (against <sup>(+)</sup> Great Britain) and a C Group (against China) were established, followed by a "S" Group (against the <sup>(+)</sup> Soviet). In the summer of 1936 many important codes, documents and other publications were secretly photographed (by the Military Police - at the request of the 11<sup>th</sup> Section NGS) from the British Consulate in OSAKA.

In 1937 the 10<sup>th</sup> <sup>課</sup> Section NGS (actually in the Navy Ministry) became the 11<sup>th</sup> sub-section <sup>課</sup> (Chief - Captain NAICASUGI and 5 Commanders as group chiefs with 60 intercept operators and technicians. The OWADA Intercept Station (Lt. Cmdr WACHI in charge) in July received an increase of 15 outstanding active duty officers, <sup>finally</sup> completing the Communists Intelligence Organization of the Japanese Navy. With the outbreak of the "China Incident" by the Marco Polo Bridge fighting on 7 July, (1937) the OWADA Communists Unit

483 intercepted an urgent radio message from the Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in PEKING (WIFE) to the CNO <sup>(OPNAV)</sup>. As it was Saturday afternoon and the 11<sup>th</sup> Sub Section personnel had already left their offices, the Officer in Charge, Lt. Cmdr WACHI 1 decrypted the message - which said that the ANTI-Japanese <sup>young</sup> officers of the 29<sup>th</sup> Army under the Command of General Sun, dissatisfied with the local agreement (s), had decided to attack the Japanese Army. Lt. Cmdr WACHI sped the above report to the Navy Ministry and as a result the intelligence was passed by those authorities to the Japanese Army. The Army did not have any faith in the above, saying "This is probably some demonstration -- it is something apart from our local agreement (s)". The value of intelligence from code breaking was not yet <sup>fully understood</sup>, indeed it was <sup>not</sup> trusted. The collision between Chinese and Japanese Armies starting the Sino-Japanese war took place 9 hours after the above radio message had been deciphered.

484 1938 After the successful surreptitious photographing of the American State Department's two-part BROWN CODE at the American Consulate General in Kobe (1938) (according to "The Japanese Navy's Secret Chamber") nearly all coded messages between the U.S. State Department and the American Embassy (on diverse subjects) were deciphered and read. It is said that there were <sup>about</sup> 2 or 3 that they could not decrypt per month. When they photographed the Brown Code, they found in the safe a metal rod carrying some 36 metal washers having random Roman letters incised on their rims. After study, these were determined to be the famous strip-cipher -- the M138 cipher device.

1939 That autumn the U.S. Navy <sup>scanned out large</sup> conducted a huge naval maneuvers in the area of the Hawaiian Islands which was an excellent opportunity to learn of the activity and movements of the American fleets. It was also a splendid opportunity to test the effectiveness of the Japanese Navy's Communists Intelligence Organization which had finally been put into shape. First of all, OWADA would analyze <sup>along with</sup> its Radio Direction Finders facilities, the American Navy's Communists network; <sup>searching out</sup> every possible radio transmission from all ships and stations by Japan's network of Radio Direction Finders at OWADA, YOKOSUKA, SASEBO, TAKAO, CHICHIJIMA, OMINATO, NEMURO, SAIPAN, JALUIT, TRUK etc and fixings

with cross bearings the positions of the transmitting ships/stations. Intercept personnel were sent to SALVIT ((Marshall Islands)) to receive medium <sup>frequency</sup> wave messages that could not be heard in Japan. Also it was planned to send the naval tanker KAMOI to purchase fuel oil in Los Angeles and to pass through the area of the fleet's maneuvers in order to intercept medium wave and other transmissions of the (American) fleet. These plans produced somewhat successful results ((by the Japanese Secret Chamber)). As it was decided that at the end of those maneuvers the American fleet would remain as it was in the Hawaiian Islands, the Naval General Staff 11<sup>th</sup> Sub-section's A Group's <sup>main task</sup> (in this group there was a code breaking <sup>Section</sup> group and a <sup>Radio</sup> Communications Intelligence <sup>Section</sup> group, the latter charged with Traffic Analysis) was to secretly learn the state of affairs (movements etc) in the American fleet in the Hawaiian area. From this period onward, our Naval Radio Intelligence work against the U.S. assumed a <sup>ready</sup> prepare-for-war status.

1940

Since the organization and its system for Communications Intelligence required a tremendous expansion to meet the vast requirements for the work of radio intelligence, the opinions of all concerned were sought in view of the restrictions placed on the required personnel. Intercept personnel, <sup>were</sup> classed as "Special" (or "Specialist") in the radioman category, <sup>they</sup> were given special instruction and training, their qualifications ascertained and future assignments determined. A "G" Group (for work against German communications) and a "F" Group (for work against French signals) were newly established. In November a Mexican facility, the "L" Facility, was set up, <sup>in deep secrecy</sup> in the Japanese Legation in Mexico City (under Lt Cdr. W. ACH) and 4 intercept operators, to cover U.S. naval communications in the Atlantic and secretly learn of movements of the U.S. Fleet.

In December the 11<sup>th</sup> Sub-Section <sup>of the</sup> Naval General Staff was <sup>detached</sup> removed from the 4<sup>th</sup> Section NGS, becoming the "Special Duty Group, Naval General Staff," <sup>attached</sup> as facility directly to the Chief, NGS. Its Commander was Rear Admiral Kenichiro KAKIMOTO (13)

As a result of the work of the A Group (originated by its Head Lt Cdr. W. ACH,

prior to his going to the L Facility at Mexico City) of photography <sup>of radio waves</sup> using an oscilloscope at OWADA Intercept Station, (of the radio waves) emitted by the principal ships of the U.S. Fleet, the special and unique character of each of these radio waves could be readily seen and each of these special characteristics kept on file like a fingerprint. Because of these special identification marks, like fingerprints, the identification of a transmitter could be made <sup>promptly</sup> in spite of changes in radio call-signs. In this manner, <sup>radioed</sup> orders for fuel, food or other things transmitted by ships of the U.S. fleet training in the LANTANA Roads were deciphered and it was known whether they were in Pearl Harbor or not; thus the <sup>habit</sup> custom of returning to Pearl Harbor for week-ends was established, as well as <sup>other</sup> the movements of the fleet in that area. (It is believed that the date for the attack on Pearl Harbor was determined by the week-end in Pearl Harbor Custom - 7 December 1941 was a Sunday)

1941

On May 15, the OWADA Naval Radio Receiving Station was detached from the Tokyo Communications Unit and became the "OWADA Communications Unit" <sup>Force</sup> (part of the 1st Combined Communication Force). Both of these "Comm. Units", TOKYO and OWADA, plus TAKAO and all Communications Units in the Inner South Sea (the Japanese <sup>of Tokyo</sup> Mandated Islands plus Japanese <sup>of - CHANTJIMA, SARDON, PALAU, TAIPEI & KARASUBUKI</sup> Islands to the Society) were (5/15/41) organized as the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communication Force. Also, the Communication Units of Naval Districts and Auxiliary Naval Districts were included in that organization. The Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communication Force, R/Admiral KAKIMOTO had additional duty as Chief Special Duty Group, Naval General Staff, with the principle duty of conducting <sup>carrying out</sup> Communications Intelligence. In September, <sup>a majority of</sup> prospective graduates (March 1942) of Specialist Colleges and Universities, <sup>with foreign language skills,</sup> were given part-time work as employees in radio intelligence and in January 1942 became the first class of Student Reserve officers. A "D" Group (to work on Dutch communications) was established in the autumn of 1941. In the field of results obtained: In February the Support Force of the US Fleet was formed and the "L" Facility <sup>(Mexico City)</sup> detected <sup>and</sup> penetrated their activities in the Atlantic ("the Camouflaged Navy") in escorting convoys for the British. <sup>Effective</sup> 1 April (and thereafter) the U.S. Navy changed radio call signs and <sup>abolished</sup> the use of plain language and simple substitution ciphers. The "L" Facility detected <sup>beginning of activity</sup> the Support Force and associated matters and on 8 December intercepted and reported "AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR - THIS AS NO DREN L", which was also done by OWADA, TAKAO and X (Shanghai)...

1942 In September the 2<sup>nd</sup> Period Reserve Officers were selected to full billets and were distributed to all important Fleet Headquarters and other strategic facilities. The Headquarters of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force moved forward (to the war zone) to TRUK and RABAU. In each battle such as the capture of WAKE and CORCEADOR we seized American military code/cipher materials, <sup>cylinder ciphers and other communications publications,</sup> to advance the work of radio intelligence. The cylinder-cipher was used later on for ~~secret~~ <sup>secret</sup> communications with guerrillas in the Philippines but ~~the~~ <sup>in charge</sup> Reserve Officers <sup>(responsible)</sup> studied them and decrypted them.

1943 The S Group (against Spanish) and a P Group (against Portugal) were established as the Special Duty Group of the NCS. Although a Special Research Room (having R/Admiral Hijiri NAKASUGI ('08) and R/Admiral Sairichi ITO ('08) and 26 others in it) was established to work on the American Strip Cipher, <sup>success was not attained.</sup> ~~Results were not obtained!~~

The HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force moved (back) to SAIPAN. The 3<sup>rd</sup> period Reserve Officers were selected. With the purpose of recovering code/cipher materials from sunken enemy ships, the cooperation of the Divers Association was obtained and a Special Deep Water Submerged Group was formed attached to the NCS. <sup>As the facilities for</sup> The Special Duty Group of the NCS were greatly expanded, <sup>total of</sup> some 130-150 persons added, it moved out of the Navy Ministry building into 3 barracks buildings in front of the Ministry of Finance.

1944 The 4<sup>th</sup> class of Reserve Student Officers were selected. <sup>The classification of</sup> "Special Voice Intercepter personnel" was established, personnel, both Officers and petty officers, who were superior in understanding <sup>spoken</sup> English being selected. <sup>(Such</sup> Special Speech personnel were called "VOICE Unit" or V Group. The Japanese Navy's interception capability against the America's air <sup>(American)</sup> voice circuits was inadequate since they <sup>had</sup> used rapid speech, many hidden-word codes and slang, <sup>so a</sup> knowledge of English as a mother-tongue was needed for <sup>accurate</sup> such voice radio interception. For this reason, <sup>sons of</sup> Japanese ancestry ("Nisei") attending Japanese Universities and Colleges were used as Reserve Officers and employed in voice intercept work. Such VOICE Units were required also at OWADA Com Unit and as its voice intercept capability was inadequate, <sup>"Nisei"</sup> young women students at college level were used. Some 20 or more young women, <sup>as property-officers, formed a detached unit</sup> ~~students~~ <sup>staff</sup> ~~manning~~ the receivers, listening in of the voice channels of the American Navy at their station in the farm village

of OHIRA in Chita Prefecture. <sup>all personnel of</sup> On July 7<sup>th</sup>, the HQ of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force perished on Saipan along with that islands <sup>Cannon and</sup> Defense Forces. <sup>Along with</sup> the tension in the war situation in July, the Operational C.I. Group (the Combat Intelligence Group) was detached from the Special Duty Group (NAS) and transferred to the OWADA Communication Unit to adapt the intelligence estimate of the enemy (situation) based on the Communication Intelligence situation. Most of the strength of the Special Duty Group moved from their 5 buildings outside of the Navy Ministry to the Naval War College buildings at MEGURO. The American Navy had now begun to use teletype in radio communications and this was intercepted and read by the HASE Test Section of the Yokosuka Navy yard.

1945 The 5<sup>th</sup> class of Reserve Officers were selected. Very large scale instruction and training was <sup>started to</sup> given <sup>Communications Intelligence</sup> personnel at the OWADA Communication Unit. We were able to predict from enemy communications the number of B-29s <sup>that</sup> they were planning to take off from their bases to attack Japan and their planned time of arrival over Japan. Although changes in the Communications situation were noted, we were unable to predict the entry of the USSR in the war (August 9<sup>th</sup>).

By the end of the war our C.I. organization was divided into 2 categories: "special radio-man" and "special voice", totalling some 4000 persons. Outstanding names among them were WACHI, <sup>知智</sup> KAKIMOTO, <sup>柿本</sup> FUKUDA, <sup>深田</sup> NOMURA, <sup>野村</sup> YAMADA, <sup>山田</sup> YAMAZAKI, <sup>山崎</sup> MORIKAWA, <sup>森川</sup> OZAWA etc (

b489

491

通信解析 TSUSHIN KAISEKI "TRAFFIC ANALYSIS" (GIST)

In short, Traffic analysis is used to <sup>detect</sup> <sup>spy out</sup> <sup>shoot out</sup> intelligence of the enemy (when you can't break the enemy's codes) by intercepting his communications and analyzing them from various angles. Student Reserve Officers graduated from Specialist/Foreign Language Colleges were screened and selected for work in the Special Duty Group of the Naval General Staff as Intelligent officers and put to work on traffic analysis. NAKAMUDA, one of the 1<sup>st</sup> class of Student Reserve Officers, after receiving training was then assigned to the Special Duty Group of the NCS, then to the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force, then to the HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet, and back to the Special Duty Group and then to the OWADA Comm. Unit, thus working both on the theoretical and practical sides of C.I. He wrote "Recollection of an Intelligence Officer" <sup>(See RI-2)</sup>

492

In general terms, Radio Intelligence reports <sup>can be</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>from</sup> the result of ferreting-out trends of enemy operations from material obtained through interception of his communications and locating the position of his transmitters, etc.

There are many methods of traffic analysis; the first step, for example, can be to average statistically his volume of traffic. The Special Duty group's method, the so-called "analysis of <sup>Radio-nets</sup> <sup>Networks</sup> <sup>Radio channels</sup>" was a unique one. The basis for skill in analyzing networks was the proficiency in the American Navy's Communications rules and regulations, especially those for "Relaying" (forwarding) "Relay (duplicate)", (handing) requests for retransmissions, "temporary call signs", "Designation of additional addresses (for a message)", and other irregular procedures which <sup>usually</sup> accompany operational movements. Consequently, if the <sup>reason for</sup> <sup>is</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>kind</sup> of irregular procedure by the heart/central core of important ships/stations can be analyzed, one is close to the enemy's strategic <sup>intention</sup> <sup>front</sup> <sup>center</sup>. By consolidation of such analyses of many plans, which is the <sup>nerve center</sup> of an analysis of such networks, one derived a system which <sup>would</sup> <sup>correctly</sup> <sup>spy</sup> <sup>out</sup> the American forces' strategic intentions.

See RI-2, project 5

493


DIRECTION FINDER STATIONS and Naval Communications Units

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT 通信隊	DETACHMENTS DETACHED UNITS 分遣隊		
YOKOSUKA 横須賀	HATUSE (Mura) 初声 (MURA)	SHIRAKAZU (Mura) 白湯 (CHIDA)	HACHIJUJIMA (IZU 7 12) 八丈島
OWADA 大和田	OGI (Mura) 扇 小島	IOJIMA (Kagami) 石硫黄島	
CHICHIJIMA 文島			
OMINATO 大湊	IKERINE 関根	NEMURO (Hokkaido) 根室	HENASHI (SAK) (AGMORI) 根作 (山崎)
SHIMUSHU 占守島	MUSASHI (Wan - Paramushiro) 武蔵 (島) (KURILES)	MATSUDA (Kurusu) 松本 (島)	NOZAMI (MISAKI) 野鷲 (Kamoh)
OSAKA 大阪	SHIONOMISAKI 朝山 (WAKAYAMA)		
MAZURU 舞鶴	SHIBITA (Machi) 志比田 (NIGATA)	NAKAHOJO (Mura) (TOYAMA) 中北條	
KURE 尾道	MIVAZAKI 宮山 (Kure) 瀬田		
SASEBO 佐世保		HAKATA (Kyūto) 博多	EI (Mura) (Kagoshima) 栄 種子島
RASHIN 幕津	KAIBUN 全文	EIYO 永興	
CHINKAI 鎮海	USHIJIMA 牛島	RAKUTO 洛東	HEIKAI 平海
TAKAO 高雄	SHINJO 新庄 (main force)		
2 <sup>nd</sup> (No 2) WAKE	2 <sup>nd</sup> NICHYŌ TO		
4 <sup>th</sup> (No 4) TRUK			
6 <sup>th</sup> (No 6) KWANLEIN	1 <sup>st</sup> JALUIT		
8 <sup>th</sup> (No 8) RABOUL	2 <sup>nd</sup> GASMATA		
10 <sup>th</sup> (No 10) SINGAPORE	2 <sup>nd</sup> SINGAPORE	3 <sup>rd</sup> SAGANG (JAVA)	
12 <sup>th</sup> (No 12) RANGOON	2 <sup>nd</sup> RANGOON	3 <sup>rd</sup> ANDAMON (I)	
21 <sup>st</sup> (SURABAYA)	2 <sup>nd</sup> SURABAYA	4 <sup>th</sup> BUTANIA	
24 <sup>th</sup> (AMBON)	2 <sup>nd</sup> AMBON	3 <sup>rd</sup> KUPAN (TIMOR)	
25 <sup>th</sup> (ENDE) (main force)			
30 <sup>th</sup> (MANILA)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Manila		
32 <sup>nd</sup> (Davao)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Davao		

495

Communications Units  
Tachin-tai (通信隊) 33  
Detachment (分遣隊) 46  
Total 79

All Direction Finder Stations were equipped with long beam, medium beam and short wave D/F sets "TM" Type Beam Units of Transmitting and Receiving Equipment



-- When a surface force operates at sea it is under radio silence. However, it is necessary for the Headquarters to send out intelligence reports and orders to that force. In case such communications are sent in one direction, by broadcast method, they can give a hint of that surface force's operational movements.  
 ((message from CNO → SFO broadcast → PIH → broadcast on Pearl Circuit, broadcast by NOUMEA net))

LT TAKAKI, who wrote <sup>日本海軍の機密室</sup> The Japanese Navy Secret Chamber, wrote the author on June 27 1974 with regard to Traffic Analysis as follows:

(494)

(1) 14 July 1944 the Special Duty Group of the NAVS (except for the Code Breaking Group) moved to the 3rd and 4th floors of the NAVS WAR College (during school vacation) in Meguro. As there were no intercept facilities at that school, only American traffic (incl. American air forces in China) was intercepted and <sup>analyzed</sup> worked out in the OUBDA Communication Unit having approximately 200 intercept positions. The Reserve Officers of the Traffic Analysis group worked on traffic analysis.

(2) When an enemy uses his radio, be it surface, air or a submarine, the ROF Section of the Communications Unit ("Control") orders all ROF facilities simultaneously "Take Bearings".

(3) Let us say the transmission is from call sign NERK on 4235 KCS calling Howland (or other stations) saying <sup>that</sup> it has an OP (Operational Priority) message to transmit, gets a "go ahead" ("o.k.") and proceeds to send its message. At that time the <sup>order</sup> "TAKE BEARINGS" is given by OUBDA Communication Unit.

(4) With this, <sup>order</sup> those of the almost 80 Radio Direction Finder Stations (see table - opposite page) that "catch" this enemy transmission take RDF bearings and send back their results -- such as "31° (main) Comm. Unit - 90°"; "8th Comm Unit (RABASU) - 8°"; "KURE Comm Unit 110°"

(496)

(5) The Traffic Analysis Group now plots these bearings on a large scale Polar-projection chart <sup>where their intersections</sup> ~~and~~ locate the transmitting ships, aircraft or submarine. <sup>Since</sup> all RDF bearings are great-circles, they cannot be accurately plotted on regular (Mercator) charts or plotting sheets. By this means we determine (for example) "An enemy submarine is here in the vicinity of CHICHIMA in the Bonin Islands."

(6) Finally, when an enemy <sup>if</sup> transmits a coded message <sup>and</sup> uses <sup>the</sup> code indicators <sup>(the indicators for D's codes)</sup> BIMEK or FEMYH codes, we know positively this transmission is from an enemy submarine. <sup>As</sup> there are many possibilities <sup>of</sup> that a submarine may be sunk and its codes recovered and used to decipher future messages.

the enemy issues only 2 kinds of codes to its submarines. However, Code EN-103 ((English Navy - #103?)) is for use in aircraft and the BAMS Code is used by Allied Merchant Ships.

\* On 10 July 1940 the AMS ATLANTIS captured the British City of BAGHDDAD along with her secret papers, together with allied code tables for merchant shipping, British Admiralty codes and several tables of keys. A specialist cryptographer aboard, restricted talk of keys when they were captured. The ATLANTIS captured the BENARCTY, and took more papers and work help. B - Breast in Berlin with which they were in radio contact, established that they had the exceptionally important BAMS (Broadcasting for Allied Merchant Ships) code. Note (DWP 494 sig): BAMS (2 part code) <sup>the best code</sup> recovered by the Japanese from the Germans) was read over though additives tables had the key.

- ⑦ In addition (a) Depending on the <sup>frequency used</sup> ~~code length employed~~, the sender can be identified as a surface ship, an aircraft or a submarine; (b) Its position can be <sup>obtained</sup> ascertained by RDF bearings; (c) the heading of the message (the addresses) gives clues to the sender (d) the signal strength is material of importance for RDF analysis (e) The <sup>form and</sup> shape of the <sup>propagated radio</sup> wave photographed by the oscillograph will indicate whether it is from a large or small vessel - <sup>(but sometimes as as a fingerprint for identification)</sup>



(f) aircraft action reports from a pattern. These for aircraft carriers (Task Force Commanders) are forwarded to the Hawaiian Islands (CenC Pacific Fleet), San Francisco or Washington (in CNO). These are indicating they carry results of long battles and other such important matters.

⑧ In the case of the above ship <sup>transmission</sup> network frequencies (among them - daily, scheduled transmission of weather reports, submarine intelligence reports, arrivals and departures of aircraft etc.) if <sup>such regularly</sup> scheduled reports "pre-transmitted in best code" (according to <sup>NAVSTA</sup> 13M machines can used against numerical <sup>codes</sup> solutions) they can be soon be readable, <sup>within 24 hours</sup> the general <sup>regular, scheduled networks that</sup> networks broadcasted by Honolulu, Noumea, Perth and Sydney, <sup>intercept operators</sup> are interested by <sup>randomly</sup> random forms the material for analysis

⑨ <sup>A degree of</sup> The <sup>on</sup> reliance in the RDF positions obtained for an enemy (ship or aircraft) position permits future estimation of its location.

⑩ After the war the Americans <sup>most</sup> were astonished at the capabilities of the Japanese navy in Traffic Analysis and <sup>they have largely overlooked</sup> after the 2nd world war was ended at the time of the American-Soviet Cold war, they showed deep interest in the Japanese Navy's Traffic Analysis of Soviet Connections

With the outbreak of war the Navy Department put into effect its plans to select certain students with good linguistic capabilities from foreign language and Commercial Colleges and Universities <sup>as Reserve Officers</sup> (for training and assignment to intelligence billets) before the Army drafted them, just as it had selected <sup>extern</sup> students for training and assignment as Fiscal and Technical Officers. The Special Duty Group of NGS pushed this and in the summer of that year (1941) selected 50 students who excelled in the English language from the Tokyo Foreign Language and four other schools and assigned them to Communication Intelligence work. In December 1941 some 60 (humanities) students were selected from Tokyo University and others of that same level and officially <sup>chosen as</sup> "1st period Student Reserve Officers",

whose graduations had been advanced to December, and assigned to the "A" and other groups of the Special Duty Group of the Naval General Staff to carry out the duties of code decryption and traffic analysis. Their period of training was to be one year with graduation scheduled for January 1943 but as there was a shortage of required <sup>Communications Intelligence</sup> personnel in the fleets, and other front line Headquarters and all Communications Units, about half were distributed to the front line without waiting for graduation.

One of these juniors, a graduate of Yokohama Commercial College, was Lt (at war end) Hisashi NOMURA 野村長. In October 1943 (then an Ensign) assigned to the Special RI unit at the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet (flagship MUSASHI) then at anchor at TRUK, he reported that from the 12th there had been a marked increase in the number of enemy patrol planes active in the Hawaiian Islands area and that "HARU" (Commander of the Hawaiian Defense Force) <sup>(form)</sup> ((COM HAW SEA FRONT)) had transmitted a <sup>standardized</sup> message that had four times previously been associated with the sortie of enemy carrier task forces, and moreover that from the 14th <sup>on</sup> the special call sign Z Z T had made its appearance on the "Honolulu" broadcast. From the above data it was estimated that there was a "GOOD PROBABILITY THAT A STEERSHIP ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE HAS SORTIED FROM AH (Hawaiian Islands). This estimate was concurred in by the Special Duty Group ((Radio Intelligence)) of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. Due to this estimate, the Combined Fleet

sortied from TRUK Atoll for the seas to the north of the Marshall Islands <sup>to apprehend, attack & annihilate</sup> to <sup>in one blow</sup> contact and annihilate the enemy carrier task force. <sup>However</sup> None the less, it was nothing but a waste of precious fuel oil and this sortie for a <sup>thereafter become known as</sup> decisive battle ended being called "The Combined Fleet's <sup>(prelude in the Pacific)</sup> Pacific Ocean Stroll". The enemy carrier task force moved <sup>to the south</sup> to the South and did not touch the Marshall Islands.

However, in March of the following year (1944), The Combined Fleet had moved from its base at TRUK to PALAU. <sup>Navian Lieut (jg)</sup> NOMURA had the assignment as Chief of Radio Intelligence, Headquarters Combined Fleet (flagship MUSASHI) estimated that an enemy carrier task force would attack PALAU and the Intelligence Staff Officer <sup>Chika</sup> Comdr NAKASIMA (1926) made an identical estimate as a result, the MUSASHI was ordered to return to KURE and the ship of the

502

Combined Fleet at Palau were ordered to <sup>return to the</sup> retire to the LINTAUN area in the Philippines while the HQ of the Combined Fleet moved ashore in PEARL. As expected, large groups of carrier aircraft from enemy Task Force 58 attacked the Palau area from the 29<sup>th</sup> through the 31<sup>st</sup> <sup>of March,</sup> destroying shore based air (a) <sup>convoy(s)</sup> inside the reef, other units and facilities. That the ships of the Combined Fleet escaped this destruction changed Lt(18) Nomura's ~~TRAIL~~ <sup>TRAIL</sup> back star to a white star. ALSO, Lt(18) NOMURA by Traffic Analysis estimated that the "ENEMY DOES NOT PLAN LANDING OPERATIONS" and that the "ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE WILL PROBABLY WITHDRAW ON THE 31<sup>ST</sup>". G.F. Staff Intelligence Officer NAKASIMA made an identical estimate to the Headquarters. However, the CINC GF, Mineichi KOGA and his Staff did not have faith in the Radio Intelligence reports developed by his <sup>own</sup> Radio Intelligence Group and intent <sup>on</sup> the futility of the American carrier force's attack, concluded that a landing operation would certainly be carried out. PALAU's communication facilities having been destroyed, the CINC could exercise direction of the Combined Fleet, so that <sup>majority of the</sup> night <sup>headquarters</sup> was embarked in 2- Type 2 large flying boats ("EMILY") and took off at mid-night from PALAU for DAVAO on MINDANAO. Due to bad weather #1 plane carrying the CINC and half the Staff collided with a mountain on Mindanao (or crashed at sea) <sup>(killing</sup> <sup>and everyone</sup> <sup>aboard died)</sup>; <sup>Chief of Staff,</sup> <sup>and other staff members</sup> <sup>riding in the #2 aircraft (also</sup> <sup>crash landed at sea off CEBU, and was saved with most of the others</sup> <sup>aboard. The only ones who arrived safely at DAVAO were Lt(18) NOMURA</sup> <sup>for whom no seas were available in the "EMILYS")</sup> <sup>and others</sup> including the Radio Intelligence Group that had produced the correct intelligence that an enemy landing on PALAU was improbable. 4 months later Imperial General Headquarters announced that in March the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Mineichi KOGA, had lost his life in an aircraft while directing operations in the front lines. Lt. Nomura was representative of the 1<sup>st</sup> group of <sup>(Student Reserve Officers)</sup> Yobigakusei in the Special Duty Group; he said that the high percentage of deaths - in action of his class (40 out of some 130) was due to two reasons: the

502

503

Rapid expansion of the fighting and the lack of required numbers; that many of his <sup>1<sup>st</sup></sup> class of Student Reserve Officers were assigned to actual units when only half-trained and "fought" for almost a full four years; that in the tactical field, the decryption of (enemy) codes was practically worthless but as the saying goes "A cornered mouse will go after a cat"; the 1<sup>st</sup> class of Student Reserve Officers developed <sup>ideas</sup> during their duties in the Special Duty Group, <sup>and</sup> made estimates of the enemy situation <sup>means of</sup> by Traffic Analysis. ~~It~~ <sup>around</sup> May of 1942 By breaking the enemy's call signs they succeeded in constructing the Communications Net Diagrams, these being the nucleus <sup>of a</sup> method <sup>for</sup> deducing the overall enemy situation.....

506

(In reference to 2<sup>nd</sup> Class of Yobigakusei -- after initial military training at the Toka (flying boat) Air Base in Southern Taiwan and return to Yokosuka -- of the 553, 115 entered <sup>Yokosuka</sup> the Naval Communications School (at KURE (ga) HAMA) on 10 April 1943. Of these, 64 entered the Special group <sup>Toku Shuntan</sup> 特選班 ("Special Signals group" also called the <sup>gai shun ban</sup> "Foreign Signals group" where they had practical instruction in code breaking and Traffic Analysis) and 51 entered the Code Group <sup>nei shin ban</sup> 暗号班 (called the <sup>nei shin ban</sup> "Internal Signals group" or <sup>onhan</sup> "Code Group" where they received practical instruction in encoding and decoding our own codes) After joint basic training they were divided into Special Groups (特選班) "A" (USA), "B" (Great Britain), "C" (China), "D" (German), "F" (Spain), "L" (France-Italy), and "S" (USSR). Each of these were further subdivided into a Code Breaking Group <sup>KAI SEKI BAN</sup> 解読班 and a Communications Intelligence Group <sup>KAI SEKI BAN</sup> 通信諜報 (Traffic) Analysis 解析) and after receiving 3 months technical practical instruction they were transferred <sup>newly established shinagawa</sup> to the <sup>Branch</sup> School of the Navy Supply Corps School (after Sept. 1944 that became the main school - the branch school being then at Tsukiji) where they joined the Code Group and after actual training in the Special Duty (R) group, Naval General Staff, at Kasamigasaki, were commissioned Ensigns on 31 August 1943 and assigned to operational forces.

507

By the 3<sup>rd</sup> class of Yobigakusei. 216 entered <sup>code</sup> 内信, 221 entered Radar <sup>pen saku ban</sup> (暗探班) and 78 entered 特選班 Special group (外信) - total 515 - they graduated in June 1944, were commissioned Ensign and 20 were immediately ordered to the Headquarters China Area Fleet, the HQ 5<sup>th</sup> AF Fleet, to all Communications units and other front line organizations. About half of the Special Duty group remained at the Yokosuka Communications School and after 1 July took up work in the



Special Duty (SI) Group of the Naval General Staff at the Naval War College building at MEADCO. To circumvent spies, they were ordered to wear civilian clothes at home and to and from work -- to wear uniforms only at work.

At that time, messages intercepted at OWADA Communications Unit were sent to the 3rd floor or 4th floor of the Naval War College where the Special Duty (SI) Group of the NAS had moved and where the analysis work was now carried out. As it was necessary to expedite that work, intercepting Communications intelligence moved to the interpretive section at OWADA.

The "V Group" (abbreviation for VOICE -- petty officers who intercept voice radio transmissions) of the OWADA Communications Force on 3 August 1945 intercepted the POTSDAM Declaration to Japan and on the 10th picked up from Manila, MacArthur's plain language notification to his forces that the "WAR IS ENDED"

IN JAPANESE NAVAL CALL SIGN USAGE (eg: MORU 2 = 4th Fleet (South Sea Frm) MORU 22 = 4th Fleet MORU 258 = 4th Fleet MORU 217 = Secretary, 4th Fleet MORU 249 = Communications Officer, 4th Fleet MORU 203 = All Commands, 4th Fleet eg: RYUJO TENCHI 356 = Communications Office, RYUJO

TACTICAL CALLS "J TU U" = Command 4: 7 TU U 7 = Commander 4 9 YANI 17 = 3rd Fleet Secretary 10 I NE 17 = 2nd Fleet Secretary

Read group 457 - Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division.

SRN (Individual Translations, Japanese Navy Messages)

SRN 129,616 thru 123,367 Translation of Japanese Navy Messages, Japanese Name Free (NSA sez "captured message file -- TRUE") 5 Dec 41 - 25 March 42 (3752 pages) Note SRN 133,368 - 161038 Transl. of Japanese Naval Messages with II (19 Dec 42 - 31 Dec 43) (CINCPAC) These are plaintext (good clean copy) of CINCPAC's routing messages 31,670 pages including some included in 25 Dec 41 (Hudson) Incoming mgs.

SRN 131588 - 131785 Bot 164

From Comdr 1st Combined Communications Force To Commanders in 1st Combined Communications Force July 103600 SMS #300. You shall pay particular attention to the maintenance of security with regards to operations.

- 1. Except for intercepts necessary for direct application to their duties, Communications Intercepts, which are sent and received by the Commanders of operations force, are not to be read (by others) 2. ... etc

1/30/42 1900 C/S GF -> Comdr Combined Communications Force Info 6th Comm Unit. It is requested that Communications Intelligence be limited to such essential matters as may form the basis for estimating the <sup>enemy situation</sup> condition of the enemy. The volume of dispatches dealing merely with routine enemy communications must be curtailed forthwith.

2/1/42 0650 4FF -> All Comdr S. Seas Force Info Comdr 1st Combined Comm. Force SMS 378 NO 3, NO 4, NO 5 Communications units will attempt to take Direction Finder Bearings on the enemy in the Marshall Islands area.

2/1/42 0900 Cdr Guard Div 53 -> 4FF, Comdr 6th Base Force SMS 153. ACTION SUMMARY: 1. 3 CRUISERS IN FLIGHT BEATEN 9 70°. 2. DAMARE; BURDEAUX MARU, KASHIMA MARU SUNK; one hangar airplane, TOYOTSU MARU aground

1 FEB 42 0400 Cdr. S.C. DIV 65 -> 6 Base Force Info 19th Air Gp., FMIDJI Detachment At 0400, enemy a/c attacked; KANTO MARU (東力) hit on stern and burst into flame

SRN 131788 1 Feb 42. Cdr Adv Exp For (th) -> Comdr 1st Sub For Info Staff 6th Base For, Cdr 19th Air Gp., Cdr Guard Divs 51, 52, 53 etc 0530 sent #1 Subforce carry out operations sweep from the area east of KURADALENS to WOTJE. 110 deciphered

SRN 131817 1 Feb 42 1800 sent 2200 deciphered Chief Special Group, NAS -> C/S GF, 6F, 1AF, Commanders of Airflot 24, 6th Base For, Subrons, 6th Communications Unit and 19th Air Gp. THE GIST OF A DISPATCH FROM X 69 TO DG 3 AT 1718 OF 1 FEB: "HURRY THE ATTACKS MEET AT POSITION 30-37'N 167-22'E. CAUTION THIS DISPATCH IS BELIEVED TO BE A DUMMY MESSAGE SINCE IT WAS SENT IN PLAIN TEXT 1800 (DECEPTION?)

1 FEB 42 1730 Comdr Communications Force -> Chiefs of Staff 4F, 5F, 6F, 1AF, Comdr 6th Base For, 245 and 6th Base For Info C/S GF, Comdr Communications Units Nos 4, 5, 6, 6 MINATO.

POSITION OF ENEMY STRIKING FORCE ACCORDING TO D/F: AT 1640 CALL 01D9 POSITION 8°N 170-30'E, AT 1620 CALL Z7B3 BORE 123° FROM OWADA POSITION 12°N 170°E frequency 4205

2 Feb 42 2000 0920 (Mar Day) deciphered. From Ch. Sp. Duty Section Imp HQ -> C/S GF Info Comdr 6th Communications Unit, C/S GF. THE MESSAGE OF YOUR SMS 906 WAS SENT BY COMDR HAWAIIAN AREA SCOUTING FORCE. IT IS A ...

1/31/42 0620 6th BASE FORCE -> MARSHALLS DEFENCE FORCE THE ENEMY APPEARS TO BE CARRYING OUT STRICT RADIO SILENCE AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO INTERCEPT ENEMY ACTIVITY BUT THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY IN NEARBY WATERS IS EXTREMELY PROBABLE. IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUS ORDERS, ALL FORCES WILL CARRY OUT PATROLS AS FOLLOWS (details in page 94)

BOX 164 (WOTJE)

(MAKIN) KANTO MARU

See page (read) 25 245 record note difference in parts!

SRN 131991

SRN 131627

1/30/42 1030

Cdr 5th Communication Unit -> C/S 4F, Comdr 1st Combined Comms Force, Info Com 600BF, Comdr 6th Comm. Unit, Chief Sp. Sectn IMP HQ, Comdr 5th Base Force, SMS 134.

Z 261 appeared on Honolulu's 4165 Kc channel at 1645 29 January with a 17 group urgent message, at 1715 with a 32 group, and at 1800 with a 52 group message - all addressed to Johnston. Sent to Honolulu and acknowledged, D/K FIXES AT 1715-66° - 41758 - 69° at 0045 30 January 1V91, W2 BL 3T (planes and ships in communication) used the same frequency of 4105 Kc as a relay (also transmitted in Morse code on 415 Kc) signal strength strong. Ref fix at 0100 - 78°. At 1705 G4HA appeared on same frequency and sent a 39 group urgent message to Honolulu - D/K at 1710 - 90°

SRN 13106

2/1/42 1100

12I Sub Force -> Subm 1 Imp Com 6th Base Force. 12I Sub Force Despatch 22. DISPERSE QUICKLY -> COURSE 60°, make offensive search speed 18 knots in order from the north I-23, I-9, I-15, I-17, I-19, I-26, I-25

2/1/42 1450. From Com Subm 2 -> Comdr 12I Sub Force SMS 102. I-15 starboard engine is defective again

2/1/42 1800 Comdr 12I Sub Force -> 12I Sub Force Imp Comdr 6th Base Force, C/S GF. 12I Sub Force Despatch 22. I-23, I-9 and I-17 will pass to the north of WOTSE. I-19, I-26 and I-25 will pass to the south of WOTSE. Proceed to scouting line (probably Grid pattern) before 0000 2 February.

8 December 1941

080300 From Chief Communications Section NGS -> all Comm Units Info C/S all Fleets NGS Secret Message #7. FROM 0400 8 DEC ALL COMMUNICATIONS UNITS RESTRICT URGENT MESSAGES EXCEPT FOR WEATHER REPORTS AND MESSAGES SENT BY AIRCRAFT AND SIMPS/FORCES OF GF AND 2ND CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

12/8/41 2330. COMDR 6th COMM. UNIT -> "Intercepted an immediate msg to forces under my command from FSL: 'TRANSFER THE SCOUTING PLANE TO THE OTHER PLACE AND MAKE THE CHANNEL SAFE FOR NAVIGATION 0130'"

12/9/41 - 0140 - 6th Comm Unit -> C/S GF, 4F, 6F except 1st GCG Secret msg #2. 1. Intercepted NPH broadcast starting "ALL WARSHIPS SHOULD PREPARE FOR ENEMY AIRCRAFT" 2. from 0047 - "OUR PLANES WERE SENT OUT TO AIRFIELDS AT FORD ISLAND, PEARL HARBOR, HICKAM, KANE OHE"

12/9/41 0310 same originator and addresses Secret Message #4. BROADCAST FROM FSL "DISPATCH ORDER # 0102. JAPANESE PLANES WHICH PENETRATED INTO OAHU ISLAND DESTROYED 6 PLANES ATTACHED TO RODGERS AIRFIELD."

12/9/41 0617 - originator? -> GREET. FROM FSL addressed to forces under my command intercepted at 2250 following plain text message "INVESTIGATE TWO SMALL BOATS WHICH ARE REPORTED IN THE CHANNEL OFF BISHOP POINT BUT DON'T TURN ON SEARCHLIGHT UNLESS NECESSARY"

12/9/41 0540 6th Comm Unit -> C/S GF, 4F, 6F, Secret msg #6. 1. Broadcast from FSL sent at 0434 19th by C/S GF to the ship your planes bombed was the THUNDER (US submarine) 2. 0205 9th - originated by Commandant CUBAN. "OFFSHORE OF CUBAN ARE 2 DESTROYERS AND ONE LARGE VESSEL WHICH IS THOUGHT TO BE A TRANSPORT, THE ENEMY IS ANCHORING AND LANDING AT MANY POINTS. 3. AT 0950 COMMANDANT 14th NAVAL DISTRICT ORDERED "CARRY OUT WARTIME COMMUNICATIONS CENSORSHIP OF RADIO AND CABLE TRANSMISSIONS"

12/9/41 Cdr 6th Comm. Unit -> C/S GF, 4F, 6F, 1st Combined Comms Force "ON THE 9th at 0710 CUBAN STATION broadcast "CUBAN WMS ATTACKED AGAIN BY ENEMY PLANES"

12/9/41 - 1230 - 6th Comm Unit -> KdB, Adv Exp Force Info 24 sfi. Secret msg #13. 1. AT 1200 19th aircraft 121 A (of Patrol Squadron 24) sent urgent msg "Bombed Japanese Cruisers (and Destroyers) on posit 17° 02'N, 168° 04'W. 2. at 1210 same plane sent urgent message "ATTACKED BY ENEMY PLANES"

12/9/41/1500 C/S 4F -> Chief 1st Sect, Navy Section Imp. HQ. Info C/S GF, Comdr 1st GCG frag 8350 Secret msg 458. According to a wireless intercept there appears to be an American aircraft carrier in the neighborhood of JOHNSTON Island at 1200 on the 9th. Further, as we judge that the American Security Force is not located Pearl Harbor Hawaii and because the action plan of seeking the above areas has an important relationship with the WAKE operation, it is especially desirable to report any decisive information up to 0600 the 10th.

12/9/41/1600 C/S 4F -> Comdr 4th, 5th, 6th Base Forces Info Codes Comm. Units # 4, 5 and 6 9770 IT IS DESIRED THAT THE VARIOUS COMMUNICATIONS UNITS BE UTILIZED TO

CAREFULLY OBSERVE THE COMMUNICATIONS OF AMERICAN FORCES AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WHICH IS DETERMINED TO BE IN THE VICINITY OF JOHNSTON ISLAND. REPORT 93 RESULTS TO ME

12/10/41 C/S I-16 -> Comdr Adv Exp Force, Com Subm 3 Frag 6610 AT 1811 on the 8th received a communication from a midget submarine using TO RA AND ALTHOUGH WE HAD CONTACT UNTIL 1914 SAME DAY, CONTACT CEASED AFTER THAT. (Japan Central Time - 9!)

12/10/41 Chief Naval Communications -> Adv Exp Force frag 16700. SMS 480 THE SARATOGA at 0400 and 1017 (Central Area Time) took aboard its aircraft in the vicinity of San Pedro (west coast US)

12/11/41 2140. Special Duty (Scout) of the Navy Section Imp. HQ -> C/S GF, 4F, 6F, 1st Info 24 sfi and 1st GCG. According to D/K at 1830 there was a ship which seemed to be an aircraft carrier (call W42) was in a position near 150 miles bearing 120° from WAKE Island. It was using 4265 Kc.

12/12/41 0600. Comdr 6th Comm. Unit -> Comdr Subm 7, Comdr 24 sfi Info 9th Adv Exp Fleet, and Comdr Combined Division 1. SMS #56. ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF D/K BY 4th COMM UNIT (TRK) and this unit (KUDS+JALUT), WE FIXED A UNIT IN THE VICINITY OF 90 MILES ENE OF WAKE AT 0556 on the 12th at KASG (call sign?) (APPARENTLY AN AMERICAN TENDER FOR FLYING BOATS)

12/12/41 1130. Originator: Special Duty Sergeant (NGS) -> C/S KdB, 4th Southern Force, Info 9th GF, Comdr 1st Frag, 16700 SMS 137 CALL SIGN (KASG) (BELIEVED A WARSHIP) PLACED BY DIRECTION FINDER(S) IN THE VICINITY OF WAKE ISLAND AT 0520 (CENTRAL TIME) THE 12th USING FREQUENCY 4265

12/12/41 1430. Originator: Staff 6th Fleet -> Chief, Special Group, Navy Section (NGS). Info: Comdr 6th Comm. Unit, Staff 4th Fleet, Staff 6F. SMS 883. 1. THE FOLLOWING APPEARED ON FREQUENCY 4155 (submarine use) on the 30th: the inter communication of 4 ships using 5 FFE, signal strength poor, and of 2 ships using IXDQ as a relay, signal strength good. 2. Appearance of Waves - 30th. Hawaiian Area - 14 waves freq. 4105 Kc. 8 planes all these in the vicinity seem to be carrying out operations energetically.

12/12/41 151794. Orig. Comdr Adv. Exp. Force -> C/S Central Fleet: Info Comdr 6th Base Force, Comdr 24th Airplot, Chief NGS. SMS 893 Adv Exp Force Action Summary #9. 1. WE RECEIVED BOMBING AND TORPEDO ATTACKS FROM ENEMY SIMPOSED PLANES AT HAWAIIAN ISLANDS FROM 0300 TO 0610. WE WERE MAINTAINING A CONTINUOUS POSTURE AGAINST ATTACKING PLANES. 2. AT 0500 WE HAD THE SUBMARINE FORCE ANCHORED AT THE BARGE (6 submarines) make a sortie and proceed to the WOTSE area. 3. Damage: YASUKUNI Maru - 1 man - 2 bomb hits; ARATAMA Maru - 3 bomb hits; KATORI Maru - 1 man - 1 bomb hit; HEIAN Maru - 1 man - 1 bomb hit; SUBMARINE I-23 all received near miss. Repairs are possible at the base. Summary of casualties: 6 killed, 20 seriously wounded; 43 slightly injured.

12/12/41 151816. Orig. Chief, Sp. Group, Naval General HQ -> C/S GF, C/S all Naval and Coast Divisions, Info: Comdr 6th Comm. Unit attached to 1st Combined Comm. Unit, Comdr 5th Comm. Unit. SMS #619. According to Communications Intelligence, enemy positions at 1500 on 2 February are as follows: A. Hawaiian Area. (a) Position of the enemy force coming to attack JALUT: 1. at 7455 Kc from 0911 to 1301, 15° to 23° 2. at 6450 Kc at 0926 - 7° 3. at 3150 Kc at 1007 - 10°

12/12/41 151834. Orig. C/S 4th Fleet -> C/S GF, Chief NGS, Info: all Comdr in Chief 1, 2, 5 and 6 Fleets, 14, 15th Air Fleets, all Comdr 1st Southern Force. SMS 385, South Sea Action Report 0232-1 Feb. 1. A compilation of the morning reports show that the Marshall area has been attacked; (a) In the Northern Marshall Islands, a striking force composed of 1 transport, 3 or 4 cruisers and a proportionate number of destroyers bombed KUSAKEN and ROTO and shelled MARSBACK and WOTSE at 0400. (b) From the condition of the attack on KUSAKEN and MARSBACK from 0400 on, it is believed that there is a detached wing in the South Marshall area, with an aircraft carrier as its nucleus. 2. The Marshall Islands Force and Air Force are joining battle in full strength. 3. The 6th Bureau (Comdr 6), when supporting ROTO, has been ordered to proceed immediately to the Marshall, and is preparing to strike the enemy. Also, 18 planes, the full complement of the bombing unit of the 24th, left TRK at 0800. We are moving a unit of large flying boats to the Marshall, we shall pursue + annihilate the enemy.

From SRN 12966 - 13327 (Central time)

SRN 131941

SRN 131794

SRN 131816

SRN 131834

SRN 131834

SRN 131834

31 January 1942

1 February 1942

1 February 1942

1 February 1942

87



SRN  
96 115561

U MO 2 (all fleets) DE HAFU 6 (Tokyo Radio) - SU U W 40 - FROM KAITATO (Chy 3rd Sect N 45)  
Action: Chiyota Staff 3F, 2F, 4F, 4F, 5F, 11 Air Fleet and WI YA 50 (S. Seas RNC) 1800/27 Nov 1941  
(To: 11/270827 S XT 1600(A) H)  
Serial 707. ACCORDING TO A REPORT FROM THE CONSUL GENERAL IN AIC (Honolulu),  
6 American freighters escorted by 4 destroyers left AIC (Honolulu) THE evening of 16 November,  
according to report, they are headed for ES (Singapore). Trans 12/13/45

SRN  
116741

From Nav. Minster, Acton, All 1st Dist, all Guard Divisions, all Fleets, RNO Manchuria,  
1st Div, RNO South Seas, Chy NWC,  
1820/02 Dec 1941 (To: 12/02 2008 S NP 6520A) H  
Starting 4 December 1941, additive system #8 of Naval Code D will be used and additive  
system #7 will be discontinued. From Office of Naval Communications - as there are some  
communications units in Japan which have not yet received additive list #8, in  
conjunction with their additive list #7 will be used. Trans 3/11/46

SRN  
13722

*[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten notes on the bottom half of page 97, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side.]*

tb

# REVERSE

pages 5-21 Intelligence and Alert operations, 1 Jan - 15 Apr 1942  
as contained in (29) Naval Ops in the N.E. Area.  
北東方面海軍作戰

(Note) This not a thorough a translation <sup>Text pages 74-137</sup>  
parts of REVERSE TRANSLATIONS (I) and (II) (Red) and (Yellow) <sup>as that contained in the REVERSE</sup>

"REVERSE" COMINT (MAGIC) NOTES 33-39 inc  
"REVERSE" INTELLIGENCE NOTES 40 -

Pages 22-24 Naval General Staff and "Tokumuhan" organization  
and duties  
Pages 25-29 Intelligence and R.I data from 245.  
Pages 30-32 Pre-War Intelligence Collection by Oranbe  
Pages 33-49 "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,  
INC. "Nemura's order being read by U.S."

INTELLIGENCE

INGSI

MAGIC

245





NE

OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHERN FORCE IN JANUARY 1942

74 F

General Situation The operations of Japanese forces progressed smoothly after the beginning of the war. Our carrier striking force, which made a surprise attack on Hawaii\* at the outbreak of the war, destroyed the <sup>(anchored)</sup> American Fleet's Battleship force and returned safely to the Western Inland Sea. In the South West area, assault landings were successful on the northern part of the MALAY peninsula on 8 December and our forces attacked as they advanced toward SINGAPORE. Our Base Air Force sank 2 British battleships in the "Sea Battle off MALAYA" on 10 December. They were successful in destroying enemy air power in the PHILIPPINES on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December and the main force of the Army troops landed at LINGAYAN BAY on December 22<sup>nd</sup> and occupied the capital, MANILA, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January 1942.

However, in the HAWAII\*\* operation the American aircraft carriers were absent so we were unable to attack and smash them. From January onward we worked hard on counter-plans against strike operations by their carrier task forces without success.

86 F

The escape of the American aircraft carriers (being absent from Pearl Harbor) and their future movements became a kind of headache for the Japanese navy. After January 1942, the main task of the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet ("Northern Force")\*\* was to operate patrols to the east of our main islands, these patrols being carried out by converted fishing boats acting as Picket boats and having a crew of 14 (half naval personnel, half fishermen as civilian employees of the military).....

87 F

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST AN AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE

Against an American Carrier Task Force coming to attack our main islands, close mutual liaison between our Patrol Force (mainly Picket Boats) and our Base Air Force ((the Naval Shore Based Air Force of Heavy bombers, long range patrol planes and fighter aircraft)) giving vigilant <sup>patrol</sup> searches for the enemy, <sup>close</sup> observation and surveillance, would be of

\* The Authors of these Histories all use the word "HAWAII" for Hawaiian Islands. So in these translations the expression [HAWAII] means "Hawaiian Area/Hawaiian Islands".  
 \*\* Each major Japanese force had two names - (1) its administrative name and its operational (or tactical) title: e.g. (above 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet - "Northern Force"; 6<sup>th</sup> (Submarine) Fleet - "Vanguard (Submarine) Force"; 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet - "South Seas (Mandates) Force"; 1<sup>st</sup> Fleet - "Main Body"; 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet - "Advance Force"; 1<sup>st</sup> Air Fleet - "Carrier Striking Force etc.

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able to sight an American carrier task force at an early time. To do this, the Patrol Force's picket boats would be deployed some 700 miles east of INUBO BAKI (Cape about 60 miles east of Tokyo) while heavy land bombers of the Base Air Force, based on KISARATSU (across Tokyo Bay from Tokyo), would carry out regular air patrols to 700 miles and also have a detachment of land bombers carry out patrols from MARCUS Island (a little over a thousand miles South East of Tokyo). If an American carrier task force is sighted the 26<sup>th</sup> Air Flotilla of the Base Air Force and the Yokosuka Air Group of the Yokosuka Naval District would make air attacks on it and the entire force of the Combined Fleet in home waters would apprehend, attack and annihilate it.

88  
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By these 700 mile air patrols and searches, the enemy would be contacted the morning before the day he planned to attack and he would be intercepted at dusk at around 600 miles and attacked first with torpedoes; contact would be maintained by shadowing, and attacked again at dawn, first with more torpedoes, followed up with bombing attacks.

107  
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OPERATIONS IN FEBRUARY 1942

The invasion operations in the South progressed smoothly; the Army forces which had been proceeding south on the Malay Peninsula entered SINGAPORE on 1 February and on the 15<sup>th</sup>, the British Force surrendered unconditionally. In the Philippines area, the American and Philippine forces had retreated to the BATAN peninsula area; MANILA had been occupied on 2 January and other important positions had also been occupied during February. In addition, SUMATRA, the CEBES, BORNEO, AMBON and other islands had been captured during January and February and the island of JAVA was completely surrounded. In the meantime the South Seas (MANDATES) Force had occupied RABOUL and LAUENIS, securing advanced bases for the South East Area.

NOTE: NE PP 109/101 (dated 5) The Plan of the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet: 1. Operation of the Patrol Force were set forth in Northern Force Staff Order #14 (not available). - There were three types of deployments, 1, 2 and 3, to be taken up, depending on the intelligence on the enemy. Unless otherwise ordered, regular deployments would be in lines RV and WO, some 700 miles from main islands. If radio intelligence or report by our planes indicated a force, deployment #1 would be accomplished by advancing the picket force to a distance of about 1000 miles from the main islands and the patrol group of all force would be expanded. Deployment #2 was to be taken up when an enemy force was sighted by our patrol force. Deployment #3 was to be taken up when an enemy force was sighted by our patrol force. Deployment #3 was to be taken up when an enemy force was sighted by our patrol force.

108  
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However, indications of activity by American carrier forces gradually appeared on <sup>Japan's</sup> Eastern Front, the most important items of enemy intelligence during February were:

- 1) February 1<sup>st</sup> - enemy carrier task forces attacked the Marshall's area.
- 2) 7 February - OWADA (Tokyo Naval Communications Unit specializing in Radio Intelligence) heard radio telephone messages of a surface force of 4-5 ships bearing approximately 53°.
- 3) 13 February - approximately 6 enemy submarines bearing between 55°-65° seem to be drawing near to the HONSHU area.
- 4) According to a radio intelligence report, an enemy carrier task force sortied from HAWAII around 1400 February 16<sup>th</sup>; at about 2140 the 18<sup>th</sup> such a force was in <sup>(approximate)</sup> position 29°-40' North 175°-50' East (about 450 miles WNW of MIDWAY); such a force was in the general area of <sup>(approximately)</sup> 800 miles bearing <sup>(about)</sup> 58° from JALVIT. at 1700 the 19<sup>th</sup>.
- 5) An American carrier task force appeared bearing 75° distant 460 miles from RABOUL.
- 6) 24 February an American carrier Task Force attacked WAKE.

(As shown above) The American carrier force, which had concealed all indications of its movements since January, attacked the Marshall Islands; subsequently there were <sup>radio intelligence</sup> reports which brought about a hustle and bustle of operations to counter American carrier task force threats to our Eastern Front.

The American carrier force attacked the Marshall Islands early in the morning of 1 February (at 0800) the CinC Combined Fleet ordered a strict alert by the Northern Force (charged with protecting Japan's main islands from attacks through the Pacific Ocean areas) and also issued Combined Fleet Radio Order #59 (011300) "USE METHOD #3 FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET, <sup>CURRENT</sup> FORCE ORGANIZATION".

108  
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On the 4<sup>th</sup> (February) the Chief, Radio Intelligence Group of Imperial General Headquarters issued the following intelligence report "DIRECTION FINDER POSITION OF ENEMY'S NORTHERN CARRIER TASK FORCE AT 1630 THE 3<sup>rd</sup> WAS 24° 30' NORTH, 174°-30' W. (approximately 300 miles SE of Midway)".

On receiving a radio intelligence report of the 7<sup>th</sup> (Feb) "ENEMY SURFACE SHIPS HAVE APPEARED IN THE NORTH", the CinC Combined Fleet issued the following:

110  
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COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER #68 (081540) to Cinc 5<sup>th</sup> (Northern) and 6<sup>th</sup> (Submarine) Fleets: "BETWEEN 1923 AND 1952 ON THE 7<sup>th</sup>, RADIO TELEPHONE MESSAGES OF FOUR TO FIVE SURFACE SHIPS WERE HEARD BEARING APPROXIMATELY 53° FROM OWADA ((OUTSKIRTS OF TOKYO)) x BE ON THE ALERT;" and simultaneously organized a "SCREENING FORCE" from surface ships of the Combined Fleet in home waters to be prepared to intercept an attack by an American carrier task force.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> it became clear that the previous radio telephone signals were business <sup>radio</sup> conversations between

110  
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American civil aviation stations, prompting the following: Combined Fleet (Chief of Staff) 110830. (1) <sup>OUT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT</sup> THE INTERCEPTED RADIO TELEPHONE MESSAGES OF ENEMY SURFACE SHIPS IN COMBINED FLEET'S RADIO ORDER #86 ((should it be #68? or should the former one be #86?)) WERE BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL AVIATION RADIO STATIONS ON THE AMERICAN MAINLAND. (2) EXPECT THE SCREENING FORCE ORGANIZATION TO CONTINUE FOR THE TIME BEING.

Also, on the 15<sup>th</sup> the Cinc Combined Fleet cancelled his February 1<sup>st</sup> message - "USE METHOD #3 FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST..." etc.

111  
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On the 17<sup>th</sup>, Combined Fleet (Chief of Staff) 171300 sent: "THROUGH SYNTHESIS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE IS A GOOD PROBABILITY THAT WAKE ISLAND AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA WILL BE ATTACKED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY ~~(AN)~~ AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE ~~((S))~~."

On the 18<sup>th</sup>, the NORTHERN FORCE (CHIEF OF STAFF)'S 181300 stated: "NORTHERN FORCE INTELLIGENCE REPORT #3. ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORT (S:) IT SEEMS THAT AN ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE SORTIED FROM HAWAII AT ABOUT 1400 ON 16 FEBRUARY. VIGILANCE IS NECESSARY."

Based on the above, plus <sup>subsequent</sup> intelligence reports, the

\* The Japanese language has, properly speaking, no article; no plural and no genders.

Northern Force issued the following order: "NORTHERN FORCE RADIO ORDER #24 191700

ACCORDING TO RADIO INTELLIGENCE THE ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE THAT SORTIED FROM HAWAII ON THE 16<sup>th</sup> WAS INDICATED TO BE IN THE VICINITY OF 29° 46' NORTH, 175° 50' EAST AT 2146 THE 18<sup>th</sup>."

110  
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On 20 February, an American carrier T.F. attacked the RABAU area; the Commander Northern Force, on the 21<sup>st</sup> issued:

NORTHERN FORCE RADIO ORDER #25 (211100) 1. (a) AT 0900 THE 20<sup>th</sup> AN AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE (INCLUDING A BATTLESHIP AND AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER) APPEARED 460 MILES - 75° DEGREES FROM RABAU. AND OUR SOUTH SEAS FORCE IS ENGAGING IT IN BATTLE. (b) FROM RADIO INTELLIGENCE IT SEEMS THAT AN ADDITIONAL CARRIER TASK FORCE WAS 800 MILES BEARING 58° FROM JALUIT AT 1700 THE 19<sup>th</sup>. 2. ... ((omitted - orders to subordinate units))

112  
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An American Carrier Task Force attacked WAKE Island on the 24<sup>th</sup> but Comdr Northern Force estimated that there would not be an attack on the home-islands and ordered no special patrols nor search operations

115  
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ORGANIZATION OF THE SCREENING FORCE

During the latter part of January our Carrier Striking Force (nucleus of Cardiv 1 and 5) in supporting the BISMARCK Archipelago invasion operations moved down to that area. Cardiv 1 returned to TRUK on Jan. 27<sup>th</sup> and Cardiv 5 reached there the 29<sup>th</sup> (Cardiv 2 had arrived in PALAU on January 28<sup>th</sup> to support the invasion of AMBOINA). It was intended that Cardiv 1 and 5 would <sup>next</sup> engage in all-out strike operations to the south. The SHOKAKU loaded aboard the aircraft of both <sup>that were</sup> Cardiv 1 and 5 to be returned to air depots and escorted by the destroyers KAGERO and HAMAKAZE, proceeded to YOKOSUKA (arrived the 3<sup>rd</sup> of February) where it loaded aboard the replacement aircraft, intending to return to TRUK about the 11<sup>th</sup>.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SCREENING FORCE

However, as a result of the American carrier force's attack on the MARSHALLS on February 1<sup>st</sup>, our Carrier Striking Force sortied from TRUK to speed to the east to intercept but as the

dep TRUK 28<sup>th</sup> (29<sup>th</sup>?)

American carrier force had retired, our Carrier Striking Force was recalled on the 3<sup>rd</sup>, anchoring at PALAU on the 8<sup>th</sup>.

Now, the Cinc Combined issued the following order to prepare for air attacks on our main islands.

117  
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"COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER #64. (FEBRUARY 080000) (1) THE CARRIER STRIKING FORCE (LESS CARDIV 5, ARARE AND KAGERO, MINORS OBORO) AND SUBRON 2 ARE HEREBY ASSIGNED TO SOUTHERN FORCE. (2) CARDIV 5 (LESS OBORO) WITH ARARE AND KAGERO WILL BECOME AN ATTACHED AIR FORCE WITH TACTICAL TITLE "ATTACHED AIR FORCE" (COMMANDER - COM CARDIV 5). (3) AS SOON AS ITS AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN MADE READY, THE ATTACHED AIR FORCE WILL PROCEED TO MIKAWA BAY AND BE PREPARED FOR AN AIR ATTACK ON THE TOKYO AREA BY AN ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE WHILE CONDUCTING TRAINING."

Immediately after the above order was issued, when the radio intelligence report (as previously related) of a possible enemy surface force was received, the Cinc Combined Fleet organized the SCREENING FORCE. Concerning this, the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet wrote in his diary as follows:

"Last night (Author's note: evening of February 7<sup>th</sup>) (according to a radio from the Head of Radio Intelligence, <sup>stated that</sup> they had heard radio telephone messages of 4-5 vessels bearing about 50° from OWADA. <sup>consequently, the possibility of</sup> a raid on the home islands <sup>could not</sup> be discounted. In addition to ordering alerts in important areas, a Screening Force was organized of Batdiv 2, Crudiv 9, Cardiv 3 under Command of Cinc 1<sup>st</sup> Fleet; Cardiv 5 plus 2 destroyers <sup>will</sup> to be included in the Screening Force, ~~to be~~ ready for any eventuality. As we had not heard anything positive by midnight, orders to sortie were not issued." The order referred to was as follows:

117  
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COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER #69 (081800) A SCREENING FORCE IS HEREBY ORGANIZED WITHIN THE MAIN BODY. FORCE COMPOSITION: BATDIV 2, CRUDIV 9, CARDIV 3, ATTACHED AIR FORCE, DESDIV 27 FIRST SECTION, YAKAZE. COMMANDER: CINC 1ST FLEET, TASK

ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH, ATTACK AND DESTROY ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCES

WHICH COME TO ATTACK IN SEAS NEAR HONSHU. TIME OF SORTIE WILL BE GIVEN BY SPECIAL ORDER. <sup>(UNTIL THE TIME OF SORTIE THE)</sup> ATTACHED AIR FORCE MOVEMENTS WILL BE AS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED. <sup>(Command)</sup> with the exception of the "ATTACHED AIR FORCE", the other ships/units were at anchor in the Western Inland Sea ((the term given the Fleet Anchorage at HASHIRAJIMA... near KURE)). The SUOKAKU, after taking aboard its air squadrons off TATEYAMA, prepared for sortie and accompanied by the (DD) KAGERO left YOKOSUKA on the 11<sup>th</sup> and after <sup>setting up</sup> a base for its torpedo bombers and dive bombers, proceeded to ISE Bay, <sup>set up</sup> preparing a base at the SUZUYA Air Base, moved to MIKAWA BAY on the 14<sup>th</sup>. The ZUIKAKU accompanied by the (DDs) AKIGUMO and ARARE departed PALAU on the 9<sup>th</sup> and after air ferrying its dive bomber and torpedo bomber squadrons to the TATEYAMA Air Base, entered port at YOKOSUKA.

118  
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OPERATIONS IN MARCH 1942

The Southern Operations continued to advance smoothly. The Japanese Army forces which landed on JAVA on 1 March, occupied BATAVIA on the 5<sup>th</sup> and on the 9<sup>th</sup> the NETHERLANDS INDIES surrendered unconditionally. In the PHILIPPINES area, preparatory attacks against the PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN forces in the BATAAN Peninsula area continued and most of the important places in those Islands were captured, completing the 1<sup>st</sup> phase operations.

However on our Eastern Front, we <sup>continued to be</sup> concerned about and worry over the rampages of the American carrier task forces; moreover, American submarines had finally become very active in waters adjacent to our main islands. Important intelligence regarding the above was as follows:

At 0425 the 4<sup>th</sup> MARCUS Island <sup>was</sup> attacked by an enemy carrier task force.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> an enemy carrier task force attacked the SALAMAWA - LAE areas from 0710 to 0930.

At 1830 the 10<sup>th</sup> radio call signal(s) like those of an enemy carrier task force appeared at approximately 28° N - 164° E.

According to Combined Fleet (Chief of Staff) radio 282230 - synthesis of radio intelligence reports indicate that an enemy carrier task force sortied from PEARL HARBOR on 20 MARCH, passed through the vicinity of PALMYRA Island and on the 27<sup>th</sup> at 2300 was in the vicinity of 700 miles east of the MARSHALL Islands.

119  
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Since the attack on WAKE on 29 February, intelligence reports on the American carrier task force were:

022230 (March)

A PART OF THE NORTHERN CARRIER FORCE IS BETWEEN OAHU AND MIDWAY AND THE ACTIVITY OF PATROL PLANES IN THE MIDWAY AREA

DURING THE FORENOON OF THE 2<sup>nd</sup> IS BELIEVED IN CONNECTION WITH THAT FORCE

On the other hand, an American carrier task force attacked MARCUS Island early on the morning of 4 March. At that time there was a detachment of the

7<sup>th</sup> Defense Force ((BONIN ISLANDS)), airfield, <sup>construction</sup> personnel and <sup>other</sup> construction personnel under the command of Lt (jg) Yoshiaki MACHIDA on MARCUS Island

From <sup>Command</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> Defense Force Detachment ((time date group not given)) ENEMY

CARRIER FORCE SIGHTED 0425 ABOUT 40 ENEMY AIRCRAFT ATTACKED ENGAGED TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OTHER SHIPS FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR FOUR DIRECT HITS ON RADIO TRANSMISSION STATION, COMPLETELY

BURNED OUT. (omitted by the Author). BATTLE RESULTS: SHOT DOWN 4 AIRCRAFT

(3 NOT CONFIRMED) - TWO PRISONERS OF WAR. CASUALTIES: 5 DEAD (OF THESE 3 AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL), 6 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED (4 OF THESE AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL) 6 LIGHT WOUNDS (2 AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL). AUTHORS NOTE: (1) According to the



((post-war)) recollections of Lt MACHIDA, since all of the attacking aircraft were dive bombers he reported his estimate of two aircraft carriers. MORISON in his "History of Naval Operations in World War II" states "No enemy planes were seen or encountered, but anti-aircraft fire was fairly heavy and one scout-bomber was shot down."

120  
F The Commander Northern Force, in addition to directing a reinforcement of his picket lines and air patrols, by his radio order #35 (041920) stated: BONIN'S FORCE MUST BE VIGILANT FOR REPEATED <sup>ENEMY</sup> AIR ATTACKS TOMORROW MORNING. A HEARTY WELL DONE TO THE MARCUS DETACHMENT FOR THEIR BRAVE BATTLE. The Cinc Combined Fleet's radio order #81 (041930) directed the SHOKAKU to sortie

121  
F Now CARDIV 5, which had arrived YOKOSUKA on 13 February in the ZUIKAKU (escorted by the ARARE) <sup>had</sup> moved to MIKAWA BAY <sup>joining</sup> where, with the SHOKAKU and KAGERO, <sup>they were</sup> it prepared for the appearance of an American carrier task force. At the end of the month <sup>(February)</sup> the SHOKAKU

13

and KAGERO moved to YOKOSUKA for repairs; on the 28<sup>th</sup> the ZUIKAKU and ARARE left ISE Bay for KURE arriving the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March for maintenance.

By Combined Fleet radio order #80 (031440), CARDIV 5 less OBORO plus ARARE and KAGERO <sup>as of 5 March</sup> would be withdrawn from the SCREENING FORCE, and reassigned to the Carrier Striking Force. As 0920 the 5<sup>th</sup> the SHOKAKU (escorted by the KAGERO and AKIYUMO) had taken aboard her aircraft and had completed

preparations for sortie. This morning (at 0730) the (DD) SHIGURE had radioed that 13 aircraft of unknown nationality on westerly course had been sighted bearing 110° distant 360 miles from YOKOSUKA. Cinc Combined Fleet <sup>judged</sup> that

an enemy aircraft carrier was in the vicinity, issued radio order #82 (050950) directing the SHOKAKU to sortie, search for and attack it, ordering the SCREENING FORCE to prepare to sortie, <sup>it also</sup> and reassigning CARDIV 5 to the SCREENING FORCE.

However, the 13 aircraft (above) turned out to be our own and at 1300 both the sortie of the SHOKAKU and the assignment of CARDIV 5 to the

SCREENING FORCE were cancelled. Radio intelligence was the basis for the estimate that the American carrier task force had retired after its attack on MARCUS Island. (no time-date group given hereafter "I.D.G.")

121  
F INTERROGATION OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR REVEALS THAT THE ENEMY WHICH ATTACKED MARCUS ISLAND CONSISTED OF THE ENTERPRISE, THE SALT LAKE CITY AND NORTHAMPTON. 2. BY RADIO INTELLIGENCE THE ENEMY POSITION AT 1630 THE 4<sup>th</sup> WAS APPROXIMATELY 29°N - 176°E; IT SEEMS TO BE RETIRING TOWARD MIDWAY...

On the 7<sup>th</sup> at 1130 Combined Fleet Radio Order #84 ((no I.D.G.)) recalled the stand-by status of CARDIV 5; on the 8<sup>th</sup> the ZUIKAKU and ARARE left the Western Inland Sea and the SHOKAKU with destroyers AKIYUMO and KAGERO left Tokyo Bay; they joined up on the 9<sup>th</sup> and headed for STARBUCK BAY for employment in the Southern operations.

However, a report from Radio Intelligence on the 11<sup>th</sup> stated "SEEMING ENEMY CARRIER FORCE'S POSITION AT 1830 THE 10<sup>th</sup> WAS 28°N 164°E". Imperial General Headquarters, Cinc Combined Fleet, <sup>Commander</sup> Yokosuka Naval District and others <sup>all</sup> believing that this enemy carrier force was coming to attack, took appropriate measures as follows:


1. Cinc Combined Fleet ordered (111340) "USE METHOD #3 FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET", 2. That Cinc also recalled CARDIV 5 then heading for STARBUCK BAY, assigned it again to the Screening Force, and directed it to proceed to the CHICHIJIMA ((BONIN)) area; the Screening Force was also ordered to sortie at an appropriate time. (3) Imperial General Headquarters placed Subron 6 (the Submarine Training Command ~~for now submarine training~~) under the operational command of the Cinc Combined Fleet

121  
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and ordered the SASEBO and IWAKUNI fighter groups to come under the operational command of the Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval District. As part of the above appropriate measures, the Northern Force's KANOYA and MISAWA Air Flotillas (shore based bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) were concentrated at KISARATSU Air Base and began enemy search and attack missions, the Screening Force, the Submarine Force and coastal forces of the YOKOSUKA Naval District began relatively large scale operations, but there was no further intelligence of the enemy.



see page 13

(To review the development of the above situation we will go back to Cinc Combined Fleet's decision to cancel the assignment of CARDIV 5 to the SCREENING FORCE and that force's departure for STARBUCK Bay to join its regular command for the carrier raids on CEYLON, along with the text of the dispatches concerned.)

OPERATIONS AGAINST AN AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE BASED ON RADIO INTELLIGENCE

On March 10<sup>th</sup> from 0710-0935, 40 American carrier aircraft attacked the LAE-SALAMUA area. The following intelligence reports were sent by Naval Staff Imperial General Headquarters:

- 101430 From: Head of Radio Intelligence, Navy Staff Section, Imperial Gen. HQ.
1. BY SYNTHESIS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE, THE ENEMY, IN ADDITION TO BEGINNING AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE RAGANU-TRUK AREA, INDICATES PLANS TO MAKE RAIDS ON THE TOKYO OR THE BONIN ISLANDS AREAS.
  2. SINCE 3 MARCH THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE RADIO TRAFFIC IN THE TUTUILA, PALMYRA, AND JOHNSTON ISLAND AREAS.
  3. ON 3 MARCH ENEMY WARSHIPS SORTIED FROM PEARL HARBOR.

Just before midnight of the 10<sup>th</sup> the following intelligence reports were received:

March " 102330 FROM COMMANDER RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT (which one? probably Tokyo?) POSITION SUSPECTED ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE ((CALLSIGN)) XMVS (ON 4165 KILOCYCLES) AT 1830 WAS 28°N 164°E (SLIGHT ERROR POSSIBLE). Based on this intelligence report, the Navy Staff Section at Imp. Gen. HQ was: In connection with carrier task force detected yesterday afternoon to the northward of WAKE,

1. Around 3 March the patrol planes in the HAWAII area were quite active which indicated that some force had sortied
2. In view of the appearance of enemy submarines in seas near our home-islands, CHICHIJIMA ((BONINS)) and off the eastern coast of HONSHU and taking into consideration the enemy's method of employment of forces, it is estimated that an enemy carrier task force is planning strike operations against the coast of our home-islands.

This estimate was the basis of Cinc Combined Fleet's orders, as follows:

March

" 111310, COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER # 90.

1. RADIO DIRECTION FINDER POSITION OF SUSPECTED ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE AT 1830 THE 10<sup>th</sup>, BEARING 350° DISTANT 600 MILES.
  2. CARDIV 5 LESS OSBORO PLUS KAGERO AND ARARE SPEEDILY HEAD TOWARD CHICHIJIMA.
- 111340 COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER # 91.

1. USE METHOD NUMBER 3 FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST FLEET. TARGET OF ATTACK THE ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE WHICH APPEARED TO THE NORTHWARD OF WAKE ON THE TENTH.
2. CARDIV 5 LESS OSBORO PLUS KAGERO AND ARARE ASSIGNED TO SCREENING FORCE FOR THE TIME BEING. SCREENING FORCE SHOULD SORTIE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

In the meantime Imperial General Headquarters through Navy Staff Section Directive # 65 of the 11<sup>th</sup> placed all the fighter aircraft of the IWAKUNI and SASEBO air groups under the operational command of the Commandant, YOKOSUKA Naval District. In addition Navy Staff Section Imperial HQ directive # 66 placed Subdiv 6 ((Ro-57, Ro-58 and Ro-59)) plus the ((Destroyers)) YUGUMO and SAWAKAZE under the operational control of CinC Combined Fleet.

The Northern Force, the Screening Force, the Vanguard ((Submarine)) Force immediately began operations in accordance with the Combined Fleets orders, above, and the forces of the YOKOSUKA Naval District all took station for their assigned duties. The entries in the <sup>diary of the</sup> Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Rear Admiral MATONE UGAKI regarding the situation from March 12<sup>th</sup> onward were:

Mar. 12<sup>th</sup> (abbreviated by the author - "Although there was a report of sighting the enemy, it was a mistake in communications. Otherwise everything all right.")

Mar. 13<sup>th</sup> No sightings of the enemy attack force by the enemy searches today. Radio Intelligence Unit says everything is the same as before. When we wait, the enemy doesn't come but when we were not prepared, he does! A Universal Rule!

Mar. 14<sup>th</sup> Even though its rainy here, the weather to the east of Tokyo Bay is generally good. Although aircraft patrols against the enemy have continued, nothing has been sighted except our own ships on patrol.

Mar. 15<sup>th</sup> <sup>Radio intelligence has concluded that</sup> The activity by enemy patrol planes in the HAWAII<sup>①</sup> - MIDWAY <sup>the recent</sup> areas has been caused by ~~an~~ night attack on Pearl Harbor by our flying boats ((patrol planes)) and also by our <sup>air</sup> reconnaissance of Midway. Consequently, the Screening force was ordered back to its stand-by area and Cardiv 5 was ordered to return to the Carrier Striking Force. (Author's note - In the air attack by our flying boats on HAWAII<sup>①</sup>, they were refueled by Subron 1 at French Frigate Shoals and then carried out their attack; this was called the "K" operation.)

124  
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The CinC Combined Fleet now judged that in view of the above situation there was no attack on our main islands by the enemy carrier force and at 0900 the 15<sup>th</sup> issued Combined Fleet radio order # 98, by which Cardiv 5 was returned to the Carrier Striking Force and the Screening Force was ordered to return to its stand-by area. Next, on the 18<sup>th</sup> at 1800 the order "CANCEL ORDERS FOR OPERATIONS BY METHOD # 3 AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET. ORGANIZATION OF PATROLS TO CONTINUE" was sent out. .... ((125, 126 orders etc. by Northern Force omitted))

126  
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2. SCREENING FORCE

The reinforcements to Screening Force from March 11<sup>th</sup> were as follows: Cardiv 5 less OBORO plus ((DDs)) ARARE and KAGERO, by GF radio order # 91 of 111340. ((DDs)) YUGUMO and SAWAKAZE <sup>from the Yokosuka Naval District</sup> by Navy Staff Section's # 66 and GF radio order 92 ((CA)) MAYA and TAKAO ((plus DDs)) ARIAKE and YUGURE <sup>from the Southern Force</sup> Desdiv 21 ((HATSUHARU, NENOH, HATSUSHIMO and WAKABA)) by GF radio order 93 of the 15<sup>th</sup> The KAGA ((CV)) by GF Radio order # 94 of the 15<sup>th</sup>

127  
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With these reinforcements assigned, the Commander Screening Force issued signal/radio order # 15 (112230) assigning the TAKAO, the Second Section of Desdiv 27 (ARIAKE and YUGURE) and the YUGUMO and SAWAKAZE to his Main Body and Cardiv 5 to his Air Force. On the 12<sup>th</sup> at 0740 his Radio order # 1 to his Air Force was as follows:

1. Force Organization.
  - a. 1<sup>st</sup> Air Force - Cardiv 3
  - b. 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Force - Cardiv 5 (less OBORO) plus KAGERO and ARARE
2. Tasks: 1<sup>st</sup> Air Force - direct air cover of the Main Body and Anti Submarine patrols (enemy search and attack by special orders)
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Force - <sup>enemy</sup> search and attack

Again on the 14<sup>th</sup> by Signal/Radio order # 11, Desdiv 21 was assigned to the Main Body and the ((CV)) KAGA assigned to the Air Force.

At that time, each ship's situation was as follows:

(127)  
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Batdiv 2, Cardiv 9, 1st Section Desdiv 27, ((DD)) YAKAZE and Cardiv 3 were at anchor in the "Western Inland Sea"; the ((DDs)) YUGUMO and SAWAKAZE were at anchor at YOKOSUKA and TATEYAMA; Desdiv 21 would return from the Southern Operations, arriving at the HASHIRAJIMA Anchorage and SASEBO on March 25th; Cardiv 5 was enroute to STARBUCK BAY - ((Celebes - near KENDARI)) its position at 1200 the 10th had been 19° 30' N, 131° 38.5' East; The MAYA, TAKAO, ARIAKE and YUGURE were at anchor in STARBUCK Bay. The KAGA had returned to STARBUCK BAY on March 11th after taking part in the air attack on PORT DARWIN.

In accordance with Combined Fleet's radio order # 91 to sortie at an appropriate time, Commander Screening Force issued signal/radio operational order # 13 (111630) and also signal/radio operational order # 14 (112230):

- (1) MAINBODY (BATDIV 2 LESS 2nd SECTION) <sup>((ISE and IJUNGA))</sup> DEPART HASHIRAJIMA AT 0500 THE 12th, PASS THROUGH BUNGO CHANNEL AT 1300, AND AFTER PASSING BETWEEN SUFU GAN ((29-49N, 140-21E)) AND MUKOJIMA ((27-41, 142-08)), REACH POSITION 50, 300 MILES FROM HAHAJIMA ((BUNINS)) AT 1600 THE 14th. THEREAFTER OPERATE AS THE SITUATION REQUIRES (2) SECOND SECTION BATDIV 2 (FUSO AND YAMASHIRO) STAND BY AT HASHIRAJIMA. (3) CARDIV 5 LESS OGORO PLUS KAGERO AND ARARE. AFTER FUELLING, IF NECESSARY, JOIN MAIN BODY AT 1600 THE 14th (4) CARDIV 3 AND DESDIV 27 (LESS 2nd SECTION) PLUS YAKAZE OPERATE AS PRESCRIBED IN SCREENING FORCE OPERATIONS PLAN (5) ((AO)) NARUTO, AFTER LOADING WITH FUEL AT SASEBO, STAND BY AT CHICHIJIMA ((BUNINS)). (6) SAWAKAZE JOIN MAIN BODY AT 1200 THE 13th IN POSITION 29 N, 137-37 E. (7) YUGUMO JOIN MAIN BODY THE MORNING OF THE 16th, ((CA)) MAYA AND TAKAO JOIN SAME MORNING OF THE 17th (TIMES WILL BE ORDERED LATER) NORTH EAST OF CHICHIJIMA (RENDEZVOUS POINT BY

SUBSEQUENT ORDER). (8) 2nd Section Desdiv 27 PROCEED TO CHICHIJIMA AND REFUEL THEN AWAIT ORDERS.

By radio order # 4 <sup>of 112730,</sup> CARDIV 5's rendezvous was changed to 1200 the 14th in position 29° 40' N - 145° 00' E. It had reversed course at 1447 THE 11th, position 12° 25' N, 130° 30' E. Subsequently there was no intelligence of the enemy. CinC Combined Fleets Radio Order # 98 of the 15th restored Cardiv 5 to the Carrier Striking Force, the Screening Force being ordered to return to its stand-by location. The Main Body (except those forces that had not yet joined) and the 1st Air Force entered ISE Bay on the 16th; Cardiv 5 quickly refuelled at YOKOSUKA, then headed for STARBUCK BAY. This operation ended up as "an exercise in futility."

### 3 VANGUARD ((SUBMARINE)) FORCE OPERATIONS

(128)  
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The submarines that could participate in this operation around 10 March were: the I-9, I-15, I-19, and I-26, on conclusion of the "K" operation searched for the American carrier task force that had attacked MARCUS during their return to YOKOSUKA. Subron 8 was organized in the 6th ((submarine)) Fleet on 10 March and were at KURE, getting ready, the I-10, I-21, I-29 and I-30 were able to make urgent departures. Subdiv 6 of the KURE Naval District Forces (the Ro-57, Ro-58 and Ro-59) which had been placed under the operational control of the CinC Combined Fleet by Navy Staff Section's #66 were placed under the command of Commander Vanguard Force by Combined Fleets radio order # 92 of (112300).

By the order "USE METHOD #3 AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET", Commander Vanguard Force by his radio order # 42 (111830) directed the above 4 submarines of Subron 4 (under the command of Comsubdiv 14) to proceed, as soon as ready, to cover an area from 300 miles to 700 miles east of INUBOSAKI ((35-42N, 140-52E... about 50 miles east of TOKYO)). This was followed by his radio order # 47 of March 13th directing the above 4 submarines

to take up the "L" Deployment Line, for the 4 submarines of Subron 1 stations on the "M" Deployment Line and for the Ro-class submarines in Subdiv 6 to take station on the "N" Deployment Line, the submarines deployed above to be under the command of Com Subron 1 with the tactical title of Submarine Patrol Force. (The geographic positions of the above Deployment Lines are not known). Subron 1 submarines reached their deployment positions by 1200 the 16<sup>th</sup>; the I-10, I-21 and I-29 departed KURE on the 12<sup>th</sup>, the I-30 leaving on the 13<sup>th</sup> but the time/date of arrival at their deployment positions are not known. In the meantime the old Ro-boats of Subdiv 6 had left KURE on the 12<sup>th</sup> and took up stations on the N-line at 0200 the 17<sup>th</sup>.

By his radio order #48 of the 16<sup>th</sup>, Commander Vanguard Force ordered the 4 submarines of Subron 1 to break off their patrol at 0600 the 17<sup>th</sup> and return to port; the others were to cease patrols at 0800 the 18<sup>th</sup> and return. All submarines reached KURE or YOKOSUKA on the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup>.

4. Operations of the YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT FORCES (omitted...)

133  
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OPERATIONS DURING APRIL 1942 - outline/summary

The Southern Operations are advancing smoothly and we have secured the necessary raw-materials sections. The navy, having almost completed the 1<sup>st</sup> phase operations, and about to shift to 2<sup>nd</sup> phase operations, revised the war organization on 10 April - the main point in it being:

1. ((BB)) YAMATO assigned to Batdiv 1. (1 light cruiser and 3 destroyers)
2. In the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Fleet, a newly organized "Desron 10" will have the task of screening and escort of the aircraft carriers instead of a desdiv or destroyers being attached to each carrier division. Also, a part of the Squadron can be interchanged with another part.

3. As the conquest operations in the South West area are for the most part completed, a South West Area Fleet is newly established. Since the principal duty in that area will be patrols and the suppression of disorder, a 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Southern Expeditionary Fleets will be established as a part of the newly established South West Area Fleet.

Subdiv #6  
134

135  
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4. Revision of the Base Air Force. As of 1 April the 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> Air Fleets were newly organized making a total of 6 Air Fleets. All are assigned to the 11<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet (Administrative title; Tactical title; "Base Air Force")

5. Establishment of a "HIGH SEAS ESCORT FORCE". A new 1<sup>st</sup> High Seas Escort Force is established, charged with the escort and protection of shipping between the occupied areas of the South and the main land and a 2<sup>nd</sup> High Seas Escort Force is formed for escort and protection of shipping between the "South Sea ((Mandated and other islands to the Southward)) islands and the home land.

136  
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..... Early in the morning of 18 April, the pocket boat #23 NITTO MARU, returning from patrol (had been relieved the previous day) reported sighting an American carrier T.F. in position 36°N-152-10E. Cinc Combined Fleet ordered "USE METHOD NO 3 FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET," hoping to concentrate the forces in home waters with our Carrier Striking Force then returning ((from the Indian Ocean operations against CEYLON)) and come to grips with, attack and destroy the enemy force but <sup>since</sup> the American carrier task force had retired after launching <sup>(Commanded by Lt Col. Duplittie US Army Air Corps)</sup> land based aircraft from its aircraft-carrier, we were unable to catch up with it. As we judged that we would <sup>probably</sup> receive an air attack the next day, with the result that we received a surprise attack that day! Apart from the damage the influence and effect that attack had on all levels was exceedingly large; especially so to the Staff Headquarters of the Combined Fleet which had vowed that an air attack on our homeland would be absolutely prevented!

137  
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本 Honda Homen Kaiguasaku Sou. P. 95 The Navy Staff Section, Imperial General Headquarters concluded that the American Carrier Task Force ((Doolittle Raid)) had returned to Pearl Harbor on the 25<sup>th</sup> based on an Radio intelligence report of that date - Navy Staff Section Imp. Gen HQ radio #285-257010 (April 1942) "FROM DAWN TUE 25TH, PATROL AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS SHOWED UNUSUAL ACTIVITY WHICH IS BELIEVED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RETURN TO PEARL HARBOR OF THE AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE"



85 HONDO HOMEN KAIGUN SARUSEN

本土方面海軍作戦


NAVAL OPERATIONS IN HOME WATERS

CHAPTER I - NAVAL OPERATIONS IN HOME WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

3. OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF

The Organization of the Naval General Staff prior to the beginning of the war was:



TEMP. EUROPEAN WAR STUDY

Studies of Battle Lessons China Incident History

Plans and carrying out Radio Intelligence

Studies of Research of History 1st 2nd European Wars

Partial changes in the Organization of the Naval General Staff

changes in the organization of the Naval General Staff were directly connected with changes in the Navy Staff Section of Imperial General Headquarters

On 17 November 1941, a Defense Group was established under the 2nd Section of the 1st Division, N.G.S. The 2nd Section was abolished 10 October 1942 and in order to strengthen anti submarine operations a 12th Section was established. This 12th Section was charged with matters concerning Home waters operations, defenses, patrols, anti submarine operations and commerce protection

On 30 January 1943, the SPECIAL DUTY DIVISION ((Radio Intelligence)) which was equal and parallel to the 4th Division, N.G.S. (charged with Communications), was combined into the 4th Division

The Naval General Staff organization was again changed as of 15 July 1943 ((the 3rd Division - Intelligence - and the Radio (Communications) Intelligence allocation of duties and tasks remained unchanged. The 4th Division (Communications and Communications (Radio) Intelligence) was divided into 3 - sections: Communications Plans; Codes/Ciphers; and Radio (Communications) Intelligence. Each of these was subdivided into groups ((HON IFF)).

The Radio Intelligence section was divided into four groups: An Administrative group, 1st group, 2nd group, and 3rd group, under the overall command of a Rear Admiral (RAdm Tomokichi NOMURA), while each group ((HON IFF)) was headed by a Captain of Arm. Group: Captain Moritaka AMANO; 1st Group - Captain Hirotada MORIKAWA; 2nd Group - Captain Shigeru ENDO, also assigned as Head of the 3rd group)

In 1943 Head of 4th Section (Department) was RAdm. Genichiro KAKIMOTO

See also book 'The Code Breakers' pp 579

RADIO (COMMUNICATIONS) INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

The Administrative Group had 2 sub-groups "A and B."

- "A" sub-group; Comdr. Hideo KOBAYASHI; charged with matters concerning:
1. control of the work of the <sup>organs</sup> facilities for Radio Intelligence <sup>vehicles</sup>
  2. plans for carrying out Radio Intelligence
  3. personnel/material/facilities necessary for Radio Intelligence
  4. education/training necessary for Radio Intelligence work
  5. receipt/possession of materiel.
  6. liaison outside the Radio Intelligence group.

- "B" sub-section; Lt Cdr. Yasuji TANIGUCHI; charged with -
1. a part of the plans for conducting Radio Intelligence
  2. part of the education/training necessary for Radio Intelligence
  3. matters concerning with important Radio Intelligence business
  4. matters not assigned to other groups.

The 1st Group, under Comdr. TSUTOMU FUKUSHIMA, was charged with -

1. Scrutiny and Consolidation of Reports concerning operations which are based on Radio Intelligence
2. a part of the plans for conducting Radio Intelligence
3. a part of American and British Radio Intelligence
4. assembly & analysis of the materiel. \*

Sub-Group B, under Lt Cdr. Tane HAYAMA, was charged with -

1. part of the plans for carrying out radio intelligence
2. a part of SOVIET Radio Intelligence
3. assembly & analysis of the materiel \*

The 2nd Group was divided into (3) sub-units, A, B & C. The "A" Sub-

- group was headed by the Chief of the 2nd Group Captain Endo;
1. German, French, Italian, <sup>(French India China)</sup> Saigon and Thai Radio Intelligence
  2. part of American and British Radio Intelligence \*
  3. part of plans for conducting Radio Intelligence
  4. assembly and analysis of the materiel \*

The "B" Sub-Section - Lt Cdr. Hisajiro NAKAYAMA - charged with

1. part of the plans for carrying out Radio Intelligence

- 2. Chinese Radio Intelligence
- 3. Assembly and analysis of the material

Sub-Section "C" - LtCol. Hideo KAWAI - charged with

- 1. part of the plans for carrying out Radio Intelligence
- 2. Soviet Radio Intelligence
- 3. Assembly and analysis of the material

The 3rd Group had two sub-sections, A and B. The "A" sub-section was headed by LtCol. Tazemon SATAKE, charged with:


- 1. part of the plans for carrying out Radio Intelligence
- 2. part of American Radio Intelligence
- 3. assembly and analysis of the material

The B sub-section had as its chief LtCol. Shigeru Endo, charged with:

- 1. part of the plans for conducting Radio Intelligence
- 2. part of British Radio Intelligence
- 3. assembly and analysis of the material

From Page 13 The organization of the Naval General Staff before the war was:

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF



On 1/30/43, the Special Duty Section (Radio Intelligence)

occupied a separate but equal status to the


4th Division (Communications and Codes) in the Naval General Staff was merged into the 4th (Comm.) Section

From 30 Jan 1943 - After 15 July 1943



Rear Admiral Tomokichi Nomura			
3rd Group Capt. Shigeru Endo	2nd Group Capt. Shigeru Endo	1st Group Capt. Hidetada Morikawa	Administrative Gp. Capt. Moritaka Arano
LtCol. Shigeru Endo LtCol. Tazemon SATAKE LtCol. Hideo KAWAI LtCol. Shigeru Endo	LtCol. Shigeru Endo LtCol. Tazemon SATAKE LtCol. Hideo KAWAI LtCol. Shigeru Endo	LtCol. Hidetada Morikawa LtCol. Tazemon SATAKE LtCol. Hideo KAWAI LtCol. Shigeru Endo	LtCol. Moritaka Arano LtCol. Tazemon SATAKE LtCol. Hideo KAWAI LtCol. Shigeru Endo
RI plans CHINESE assembly analysis V.S. P.I. G.I.B. RI Plans analysis	German French Italian FIC T.I.H. V.S. P.I. G.I.B. RI Plans analysis	Plans USSR/RI assembly analysis Plans USSR/RI assembly analysis Plans USSR/RI assembly analysis	Plans USSR/RI assembly analysis Plans USSR/RI assembly analysis Plans USSR/RI assembly analysis

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF  
Prior to the beginning of the war, the organization of the Naval General Staff was:



1. The Naval General Staff the 1st Section (1st Division) had the primary responsibility for peace time operations of Interior Forces (Home waters forces) and matters concerning Defense. The 2nd Section had primary responsibility for the protection of Commerce. On 17 November 1941 a DEFENCE GROUP was established in the 3rd Section to combine matters of defense and operations of Interior Forces, which had previously been that of the 1st Section. Protection of Shipping and War-time patrols/guard measures were also assigned to this new group. Moreover, since the duties of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Sections were related to the necessary decisions on preparations for war, force levels and organization, the objectives were now met for the first time through the close coordination and liaison by all Sections. Assigned duties of appropriate Sections follow:

1st DIVISION, 1st SECTION

- 1. Plans for National Defense
- 2. General plans for employment of forces
- 3. War-time Organization
- 4. matters related to forces necessary to National Defense
- 5. matters concerned with the duties, movements and operations of detachments of ships/forces
- 6. matters concerning joint Army-Navy operations
- 7. matters concerning Tactics
- 8. items related to operational materials and military location (quid?) charts.
- 9. matters concerning Battle tactics

- Continuation from left hand column:
- 5. Items concerned with guarding against danger and the protection of military secrets.
  - 6. matters dealing with the continuity of orders on naval warfare
  - 7. Items concerning Education and training that are related to Defense and Protection of Commerce.

B - GENERAL

- 1. Items concerning ships' duties and movements.
- 2. matters concerning defence/guard/watch (Keibi)
- 3. Items concerning organization (except war-time organization), composition, complements, systems and regulations.
- 4. Items concerning education, training, military discipline and morale.
- 5. Items related to military instruction
- 6. matters concerned with exercises/maneuvers and orders for same.
- 7. matters dealing with Chiefs of Staff conferences.
- 8. Items concerning battle service orders and fleet movements
- 9. matters dealing with fleet inspections
- 10. Items related to teaching methods and procedures.

1st DIVISION 2nd SECTION

(A DEFENCE GROUP)

- 1. Part of Operational Plans (Operations of Interior Forces, Defense Plans and Plans for the Protection of Shipping.)
- 2. That part of plans involving Defense in the War-time organization.
- 3. That part concerning forces necessary for national defense (related to defense)
- 4. That part of items relating to the movements and operations of detachments of ships/forces (relating to National Forces and Defense)

2nd DIVISION, 3rd SECTION

- 1. Plans to fulfill War Readiness
- 2. matters relating to the selection, outfitting/furnishing weapons, aircraft, and ships
- 3. matters concerning the tests and studies/research of item (2) above

4. matters concerning installations on land and at sea
5. matters pertaining to examination and inspection of ships and weapons
6. items concerned with tactics of fighting forces and battle endurance.

2<sup>nd</sup> DIVISION, 4<sup>th</sup> Section

1. items concerned with a despatch of forces (expeditions)
2. plans related to general mobilization
3. plans for transportation and replenishment (Logistics)
4. matters concerning harbors, hydrography, and meteorology
5. matters involving inspections (except fleet inspections)

page 17 L Hondo to men Kaigun sakusen

"without the Chinese Incident to furnish the "temporary additional military funds" there would have been serious short-comings and lack of readiness at the beginning of the war with the US."

Intelligence data (various sources)

February 1942 (245)

1 Feb 42 Visual Signals  
Radio Log of Comdr 24<sup>th</sup> Combined Comm Division

011730 From Navy Staff Section/Imperial General Headquarters Secret Radio #123  
Feb 42 chiefs of staff of  
To: AF, CF, IAF, SF plus Comdr 24S 01 (February) 1730, (received 24S 1900)

(see page 7)  
4 February  
Chief ComINT Group IMPERIAL  
IF POSITION ON ENEMY'S POSITION  
CARRIER TASK FORCE WAS  
29 50N - 174 30 W AT  
1630 THE (312)

ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE (Q1DQ) ESTIMATED POSITION BY

DIRECTION FINDER 8°N - 170-30 E, at 1640, ENEMY FORCE Z7B5

BORE 7° FROM GWADA AND PASSED THROUGH 12°N - 170 E AT 1620,

AT THE END OF THE MESSAGE SENT AN ADDITIONAL MESSAGE

ON 4205 KCS

1 Feb 42 source same as above 010800 (received at 1005)  
From 1/5 COMBINED FLEET → Comdr 24S, Chief 1<sup>st</sup> Section Navy Staff Section,  
Imp. Gen. H.C. COMBINED FLEET SECRET RADIO #181, AT DAWN THIS MORNING

AN ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE HAVING A MAIN STRENGTH OF BATTLESHIPS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ATTACKED THE MARSHALLS ISLANDS AREA

4 Feb 42 source same as above 041000 (transmitted by TRUK 1115) (AT TRUK - after arrival report of arrival 040730 transmitted by TRUK 1133)  
From Comdr. Commerce Destruction Force; To CHIEF, SPECIAL SECTION, NAVY STAFF SECTION, IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, COMDR. 1<sup>st</sup> COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS FORCE, COMDRS, 3<sup>rd</sup> (PALAU) AND 4<sup>th</sup> (TRUK) COMMUNICATIONS UNITS.

COMMERCE DESTRUCTION FORCE SECRET RADIO #8. DURING THIS FORCE'S OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA (FROM 26 NOVEMBER THROUGH 5 FEBRUARY) THE FOLLOWING ITEMS BECAME KNOWN THROUGH RADIO INTELLIGENCE. (A) SINCE 14 DECEMBER THE ENEMY HAS ORDERED STRICT RADIO SILENCE BY ALL ITS MERCHANT SHIPS AT SEA. THEIR PRINCIPAL COASTAL RADIO STATIONS SUCH AS WSL, KOK, ETC., BROADCAST MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO THEIR MERCHANT SHIPS ON FIXED WAVE LENGTHS FROM TEN MINUTES BEFORE EACH ODD HOUR GMT. THESE MESSAGES ARE NEVER ANSWERED BY THE MERCHANT SHIPS. THERE ARE NO DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THESE MERCHANTMEN AND THE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATIONS NOR WITH NAVAL FORCES ON THE HIGH SEAS, OFF SHORE PATROLS NOR WITH THEIR SEA FRONTIER DEFENCE FORCES. (B) THE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK OF VHC, NPL, ZGN, ZLP, ETC., HAS NPM AS ITS CENTER, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN NPM AND VHC (BELIEVED TO BE DARWIN) USES FREQUENCY 16400 (7995) WITH A SUNRISE-SUNSET FREQUENCY OF 12795 KCS. (C) FROM AN ANALYSIS OF ORIGINATORS AND ADDRESSEES ON THE ABOVE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, WE CONFIRMED THAT THERE ARE US NAVAL LIAISON FACILITIES AT DARWIN, SUVA, CANBERRA, →

26  
February 1942 SYDNEY, WELLINGTON, MELBOURNE, ETC., AND THAT A CONSIDER-  
ABLE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC PASSED BETWEEN DARWIN AND THE U.S. CHIEF  
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. (D) DURING THE FIRST TEN DAYS OF JANUARY,  
WHILE OPERATING IN THE AREA TO THE NORTH OF THE TUAMOTO  
ARCHIPELAGO, STATION NCD 9 APPEARED ON A NIGHTTIME FREQUENCY  
OF 2854 KCS ACTING AS THE CENTER OF A COMMUNICATIONS NET  
CONTROLLING NCD 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 AND 8 GØS, ALSO UV 3, 8 LS, ZDL,  
IZ 2 APPEARED ON 2600 KCS. IN THE VICINITY OF THE MARQUESAS,  
NCD 9, IZ 2 AND OTHERS HAD VERY HIGH SIGNAL STRENGTHS, EVEN WITH  
THE VOLUME CONTROL SET ON ZERO (AND HAD A SIGNAL STRENGTH OF FIVE  
EVEN WHEN WE WERE IN THE LONGITUDE OF JALUIT.) FROM THE PLAIN  
LANGUAGE TEXT OF THE ABOVE COMMUNICATIONS OF NCD 9 AND OTHERS  
AND FROM THE APPEARANCE OF UV 3 ON NPM'S AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS  
NETWORK, FROM MESSAGES EXCHANGED WITH ZDRD AND THE MANY  
MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO AND FROM HAWAIIAN AREA AIR SQUADRONS,  
IT APPEARS THAT THE ENEMY HAS ESTABLISHED NEW AIR BASES IN  
THE SOUTH PACIFIC.

January 1942 245 Intelligence messages recorded in Report  
061920 (rec'd 062105) FROM: CHIEF 3<sup>rd</sup> Section (Intelligence) Navy Staff (Section),  
Imperial GenHQ. To: COMOR 245, 4/5 all fleets, 4/5 all Naval Districts,  
Navy Staff Section ImperialHQ Secret Radio # 413. ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE  
FROM THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE AN AMERICAN FORCE OF 2 BATTLESHIPS,  
1 AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND OTHER NAVAL VESSELS PASSED THROUGH THE  
PANAMA CANAL TOWARD THE PACIFIC AND REACHED BALBOA ON 14<sup>TH</sup>  
DECEMBER

JANUARY 1942 081200 FROM: COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH OF 3<sup>rd</sup> SECTION, NAVY STAFF AT IMP. GEN.  
HQ. To: COMDR 245, 4/5 COMBINED FLEET (and others). NAVY STAFF IMP. GENHQ  
SECRET RADIO # 424. (A) INTELLIGENCE REPORT RECEIVED FROM THE LIAISON  
OFFICER WITH THE JAPANESE ATTACHE, GERMANY, (1) THE U.S. ARMY IS PREPAR-  
ING AN ARMY DIVISIONAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OF FOUR DIVISIONS IN THE  
NEW ORLEANS AREA FOR MOVEMENT TO AUSTRALIA AND ARE EMBARKING

27  
TROOPS ABOARD SOME 16-18 TRANSPORTS. TWO ARMY DIVISIONS TO SAIL  
BY MID-JANUARY, THE OTHER TWO DIVISIONS TO SAIL BY MID-FEBRUARY.  
ANOTHER 11 VESSELS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FOR THE LATTER MOVEMENT  
FROM THE BLUE FUNNEL STEAMSHIP LINE AND NEW ZEALAND STEAM SHIPPING  
COMPANY. (2) FROM ALL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS IT IS BELIEVED THAT A  
POWERFUL U.S. NAVAL FORCE IS NOW PROCEEDING TOWARD THE NEW ZEALAND  
AREA; IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SMALL  
NAVAL VESSELS ARE ALSO ENROUTE TO THAT AREA; AMONG THE ABOVE ARE  
SUBMARINES PLUS SOME TANKERS AND MINE LAYERS, AND PROBABLY 2 CRUISERS OF  
THE ASTORIA CLASS. (B) OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE ABOVE REPORT: ITEM  
(1) COULD BE ENEMY PROPAGANDA TO DIVERT US BUT IT IS LOGICAL THAT THE  
ENEMY CONTEMPLATES SENDING SOME ARMY UNITS. REGARDING ITEM (2) ABOVE,  
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF DISPATCHING SOME CRUISERS  
(AIRCRAFT CARRIERS COULD BE INCLUDED), DESTROYERS AND OTHER TYPES TO THE  
AUSTRALIAN AREA AS A FEINT OR TO DIVERT OUR NAVY'S DISPOSITIONS AND  
AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE DEFENCE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AREAS AND  
PROTECT SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (AND THEREBY PROTECT THE MOVE-  
MENT OF U.S. ARMY EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, AIRCRAFT, AND MILITARY SUPPLIES  
(C) ACCORDING TO AN A.P. DISPATCH, THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER HAS  
STATED THAT THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET WILL UTILIZE AUSTRALIA AS THE BASE  
ON WHICH TO HINGE THE ALLIED WAR STRATEGY AGAINST THE AXIS POWERS  
IN THE PACIFIC.

JANUARY 1942 091315 (VISUAL SIGNAL) FROM COMDR 245 → 245. EXPLOIT ENEMY  
COMMUNICATIONS USING <sup>CONDITION</sup> SITUATION # 2 - FREQUENCY 2850 KCS

JANUARY '42 210517 (VISUAL SIGNAL) FROM COM 245 → 245. ALTHOUGH OUR AIRCRAFT  
DID NOT SIGHT THE ENEMY, WILL MAINTAIN FORMATION AND SPEED AS SIGNAL STRENGTH  
OF INTERCEPTED ENEMY MESSAGES ON INTERMEDIATE WAVE LENGTH SUGGESTS CONTACT  
WITH ENEMY IS POSSIBLE

220050 (VISUAL) FROM COM 245 → 245. HEREAFTER, AND UNTIL ARRIVAL IN  
THE MANDATED ISLANDS, PLACE IN EFFECT THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS FOR  
MONITORING AND INTERCEPTION OF THE ENEMY'S RADIO COMMUNICATIONS:

I. CONDITION OF READINESS - #2

II ASSIGNMENTS AND OBJECTIVES

1. FLAGSHIP (HEIKOKU MARU)

- (a) enemy surface ships' intermediate frequency 2500-3000 Kcs, as usual.
- (b) NPM Aircraft network 12,795 Kcs from 0400 on during daylight hours.
- (c) NPM Bases' network 12,900, 16400 (7995) Kcs as necessary.

2. SHIP # 2 (AIKOKU MARU)

- (a) NPM Aircraft circuits in the 4150 KC <sup>band</sup> area from 0400 on during daylight hours.
- (b) Intermediate frequencies - 2500-3000 KC from 1800 until 2400
- 3. #2 Ship submit daily intelligence report at 1700.
- 4. Above times subject to change in response to changes in the local conditions in order to fulfill objectives.

Extract from Comdr. Commerce Destruction Force's report on "Battle Lessons and Experience Gained in Commerce Destruction Operations, February 1942, under Armament and facilities"

"The installation of medium wave and short wave radio direction finders are absolutely essential. <sup>high frequency</sup> enemy merchant vessels presently use principally short wave, and most naval vessels use <sup>intermediate frequencies</sup> medium wave length for transmissions. Even if there be large inherent errors, on interception of a enemy message with an RDF, it can be determined whether the transmission was from ahead or astern, or from port or starboard of one's ship. During our recent operations, even though we repeatedly intercepted <sup>high frequency</sup> short wave transmissions of high signal strength from cruising merchant ships, we were unable to capitalize on such intercepted transmissions, not knowing from what direction they originated. Similarly, although we also intercepted strong <sup>intermediate frequency</sup> medium-wave signals from enemy surface vessels, not knowing their general location, we were perplexed as to what course to take to avoid contact..."

Under Personnel

"... In the beginning, in order to compensate for a shortage of 3 naval communications personnel in the staff, 2 radiomen from the ship's radio personnel allotment were assigned to the staff complement as "civilian specialists" to be able to meet the command's communication responsibilities. While it is clearly

recognized as being somewhat irregular, there were several good reasons for such action other and above making up for a personnel shortage, e.g.: their experience in foreign communications procedures was wider and their knowledge of foreign languages was more extensive than that of regular naval communications personnel; moreover, since they were highly skilled in handling of international Morse code communications, using these individuals to exploit intercepted enemy communications yielded rewarding results. It would seem to be fruitful to assign such former merchant marine radio personnel for requisitioned or converted men of war to fill the communications intelligence functions in the fleet and shore commands and assign regular naval radio personnel to fill the communications allowances of merchant vessels taken over or requisitioned for naval service."

MISC FROM PEARL HARBOR INQUIRY RECORDS re WE-WE coded addresses

Page 2633 C.I. Summary for 29 Nov '41... 103<sup>rd</sup> Air Group originated one dispatch today whose addressees were composed entirely of enciphered calls. It appears he has no Navy call list. One addressee was "JUTI KOKKUU TAI - 11<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet."


P.2641: C.I. Summary - "3<sup>rd</sup> Fleet in one WE Address; a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to the Comdr 14<sup>th</sup> Army aboard RYUJO MARU - "HITO YANJUN SATEI (IROI RYU ZEU MARU)"

P.2603 A WE ADDRESS today broke down as "ITI KOU KOU KAITAI - 1<sup>st</sup> AIR FLEET"

P.2623 - Idents: MI RA 9 - Comdr 3; TA E 1 - Comdr 7; KAME 5 - Arrang; YAWU 1 - Comdr 5; KENU 3 - Comdr 7; RESE 4 - Desm 3; A KI 0 - Desm 4; TI YA 7 - Comdr 1<sup>st</sup> Base Force; SASE 2 - Comdr 2<sup>nd</sup> Base Force; YO MO 9 - Desm 5; RE A 2 - SHOGAWA Air Corps; KUNO 9 - ERIMO (AO) MI MO 3 - Air Unit? and UNIDENTS TU E 7, A KU 8, KU SU 7, SA TU 88, KU N 88, O YU 9, KONO 0, NOTU 6, NETES, N SI 3, SU TEI, YA YU 1, NARE 5 and ENO 7 (aircraft unit?)

P.2624 SITI 4, a sub-squadron arrived JALUIT yesterday ((Subunits?))

P.2631. 27 NOV. '41 4<sup>th</sup> FLEET: SAIPAN AIR CORPS → JALUIT → Civil Eng. units at IMIESI and ENIWETOK heard from after being silent several weeks.



SAIPAN TRUK TENJAN PARAO JALUIT

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#105  
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NOTES ON  
PREWAR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION BY ORANGE

In response to a request from the Navy General Staff, HQ 11th Air Fleet (Reorganized 15 January 1944) ordered 3rd Air to carry out "A work" (A作業) in connection with "G" Training ((24Sf, under small direction of 11AF carried out training flights at bases being developed in the Mandated Islands)) ("the photo-reconnaissance of GUAM was called "A Work") 3rd Air had (some photographic reconnaissance aircraft) ((Land Base Reconnaissance 9/1)) which then made reconnaissance flights over LEGASPI ((SE tip of LUZON)) from TAKAO Air Base ((Southern Formosa)) on April 18, 1941. Part of that unit shifted base to PELELIU ((PALAU)) and on 23 May flew photo recon missions over "HORU" ((Jolo - Sulu Archipelago, mid way between MINDANAO and British Borneo)), "BABO" ((in the mouth of the New Guinea "bird" - inner McCLURE Gulf)), "MANOKUWARI" ((MANOKWARI - on the back of the head of the New Guinea "bird", on the NW corner of GEELVINK Bay)), "SERUI" ((SERDEI/SERUI - principal town on largest of JAPAN Islands - central GEELVINK Bay)) etc. 3rd Air then shifted its base to TENIAN and flew photo recon flights over GUAM on 11, 14 and 19 June from altitude of 8800-9000 meters. On 19 June America lodged a protest with the Foreign Office over "flights of aircraft of unknown nationality over Guam".

#136

In the early part of November 1941, the HQ 4th Fleet estimated that bases for both land-planes and sea-planes had been completed on WAKE, but they knew practically nothing else concerning the situation on that island.

According to intelligence acquired during the late November stop over at WAKE by Special Envoy KURUSU, enroute to his new assignment in the United States, it was ascertained that there were some 300 regular troops and 1200 laborers there.

#104

The 36 land based bombers ((Nees of 24Sf)) moved out to the Marshalls in mid October via SAIPAN and TRUK, leaving one plane enroute. Next, a Type 1 ("Betty") bomber was assigned to CHITOSE Air and moved out in late November. On 4 December it was used to reconnoiter WAKE Island (plane commander, Lt Nobuo ANDO - '37 Etajima).

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Northern Force Radio Opnd #3 611100 (January 1942) ① Cmdr 22 will promptly fuel in the OMINATO - MURORAN area and return to AKKESHI after fuelling and stand by while conducting training work. ② KIMIKAWA Maru ((KAVs)) will depart MURORAN on January 8th and proceed to the PARAMUSHIRO area. Carry out air patrols and also at an opportune time carry out a secret reconnaissance of ABACHIYA ((AVACHA)) (VICINITY PETROPOLZOVSK).

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In accordance with Northern Force Radio Opnd #3, the KIMIKAWA Maru departed AKKESHI 19 January and took up (air) patrol duties on the 24th, making an aerial reconnaissance of ABACHIYA Bay area and on the 27th departed PARAMUSHIRO and returned to AKKESHI the 29th. Summary of part of its report: RECONNAISSANCE OF ABACHIYA BAY - ALTITUDE 5,000 METERS - NO NAVAL VESSELS AT ANCHOR PETROPOLZOVSK, 6 MEDIUM SIZE MERCHANT SHIPS INSIDE THE HARBOR AND FOUR LARGE SHIPS OUTSIDE THE HARBOR.

Excerpt from "JAPANESE MONOGRAPH # 161 - Part 1 - GILBERT ISLANDS OPERATIONS"

31  
" On 16 November 1941, a Japanese land-based attack plane made a secret reconnaissance of the GILBERT Islands and confirmed the above estimate of the situation [radio stations on both MAKIN and TARAWA; few CASUARINA trees on those islands; airfields for land-based attack planes could be constructed on both TARAWA and APAMAMA as their geographic and geological features were similar to the Marshalls, indicating that construction would be rather simple; Seaplane bases could easily be constructed on both MAKIN and APAMAMA. Naval and ocean areas indicated no military forces and no military installations. An airfield could be constructed for land-based attack planes on MAKIN and the terrain was suitable for construction of defense installations]

"COMINT" (EXERPTS FROM THE "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR" SERIES)

④ #55 FROM: TOKYO (NERNS) (Vice Chief Gen. Staff) May 17 1941 #796  
TO: BANGKOK (RIKUGUN) (ARMY ATTACHE)

(STRICTLY SECRET) WE ARE SENDING MAJOR AOYAMA KAZUICHI TO SIAM TO WORK UNDER YOUR ORDERS IN INTERCEPTING AND DECRYPTING OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMY CODES USED IN THE SOUTH SEAS AREA. HE IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE EARLY IN JUNE. MAJOR AOYAMA WILL HAVE WITH HIM INTERPRETER KAZAMA RYU, OPERATORS SATO JINJURO AND BABA TERUKUNI AND EMPLOYEE NAOMIYA NAUYOSHI. AOYAMA WILL BE ATTACHED TO YOUR OFFICE, AND THE OTHERS WILL HAVE THE STATUS OF ATTACHE'S OFFICE PERSONNEL. (Trans 6-16-45)

⑤ #57 - FROM: TOKYO; (NERNS) (Vice Chief Gen. Staff) 26 July 1941. #016  
TO: BANGKOK (RIKUGUN) (ARMY ATTACHE)

1st. WE RECEIVED SIAM SPECIAL MESSAGE #54 (CK. 54!) AND THANK YOU FOR THE TIMELY AND VALID INFORMATION.

2nd. PLEASE REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE FOLLOWING MATTERS RELATING TO THE PHNOMPEN BANGKOK RAILROAD:

1. THE DEGREE OF COMPLETION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR COMPLETION OF THE ARAZANYA SISOPHON RAILROAD.
2. SITUATION ON EQUIPMENT FOR SISOPHON MONGKO BUREU RAILROAD.
3. IS THERE SERVICE BETWEEN PHNOMPEN AND BANGKOK POSSIBLE FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT?

⑥ (no number - an additional message found in 1977) June 4 1941 #739  
FROM BANGKOK (SIAM) (SIAM RI DETACHMENT?)  
TO: TOKYO (AUTUMN) (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept)

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT RECENTLY BOTH ENGLAND AND AMERICA HAVE BEEN WORKING ON THE SOLUTION OF JAPANESE CODES. THEIR HAND SEEM TO HAVE EVEN REACHED INTO THE TELEGRAPHIC OFFICES IN THIS COUNTRY. THEREFOR I FEEL IT IS VITAL THAT THE ARMY NAVY AND [? FOREIGN OFFICE ?] CHANGE THEIR CODES IN GENERAL, AND ALSO THAT THEY CONSTRUCT SPECIAL DIFFICULT CODES FOR ULTRA SECRET USE AND DISTRIBUTE TO IMPORTANT PLACES. (Trans 6/20/45)

④ #735 (page A339) FROM BUCHAREST, (WAR DEPARTMENT) SENIOR ADJUTANT (FORKIN) TO TOKYO SYO, RIKUGUN #196  
18 OCT 1941

① I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO SEND TO JAPAN ON THE ASAMA MARU SOME OF THE POLES WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING HERE FOR SOME TIME (1 OFFICER EXPERT ON ANTI-RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE; 1 (group - perhaps "man connected with N.E. INTELLIGENCE"); 1 ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY EXPERT AND CRYPTANALYST). I HAVE COMMUNICATED WITH THE ATTACHE IN GERMANY ON THIS MATTER. IT HAS BEEN THE HOPE OF MYSELF AND THE KWANTUNG [? REPRESENTATIVE] FOR SOME TIME THAT WE DO THIS SO PLEASE CONTACT THE KWANTUNG AUTHORITIES AND LOOK INTO THIS MATTER. ② I HAVEN'T ASKED THE POLISH CONSUL STAFF OR EVEN THE MEN IN QUESTION WHAT THEIR THOUGHTS ON THIS MATTER ARE BUT THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME SO PLEASE LET ME KNOW PROMPTLY WHAT YOU WISH TO DO. ③ THESE MEN ALREADY HAVE MANCHURIAN PASSPORTS. (Transcribed 4-21-45)

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ACTUAL COMINT EXAMPLES from "THE MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR"

V #47 FROM HELSINKI (HELGS) (Helsinki Army Attaché) May 26 1941 To: CIRCULAR: TOKYO (SUMMER) (Vice Chief Army General Staff) #319

"B" (OTSU) INTELLIGENCE. ACCORDING TO INTERCEPTED WIRELESS MESSAGES, RECENTLY 30 (CK-30V) SUBMARINES OF THE BALTIC FLEET HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO THE BLACK SEA AREA (ULTRA SECRET) (Trans. 1/15/45)

V #40 FROM HELSINKI (HELGS) August 24 1941 To: CIRCULAR (SUMMER) (Vice Chief General Staff) #469

Red Air Force Intelligence. "B (OTSU) INTELLIGENCE, PRISONERS' STATEMENTS. (1) THE P-2 DIVE BOMBER IS TWIN-ENGINE AND RESEMBLES THE ME-110. THE TAIL HOWEVER COMES TO A SHARP POINT. VERY FEW OF THESE PLANES HAVE APPEARED ON THE EASTERN FRONT. (2) THE PURSUIT PLANE I-17 IS CALLED MIK-1 (MIKOYAN), THE I-18 IS CALLED THE MIK-2.

(3) A TB-7 TYPE BOMBER REGIMENT IS MADE UP OF 3 COMPANIES. (Trans 3/1/45)

IV #700 TOKYO TO PEKING (DIR) NOV 22 1941 SINCE THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF BRITISH CODE MATERIAL #644 COMING IN NOW, WHICH WE CANNOT READ, PLEASE INVESTIGATE. (Trans March 1945)

III b #486 SHANGHAI TO TOKYO (DIR) OCT 16 1941 I HAD A SECRET AGENT OBTAIN FROM THE US NAVY RADIO STATION ORIGINAL TEXTS IN PLAIN TEXT MESSAGES FROM SESTATE HULL TO CONSUL GENERAL SHANGHAI. (Trans 5/3/45)

IV A 318. PEKING TO TOKYO #699 NOV 21 1941 CLUES HAVE BEEN OBTAINED HERE REGARDING TELEGRAPHIC CODES USED AT PRESENT BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY. IN USE BETWEEN SHANGHAI, CHUNGKING, HONG KONG AND LONDON. POSSIBLE THAT THESE HAVE ALREADY BEEN DECODED BY THE NORTHERN ARMY. 1. DIPLOMATIC CODE 2. PLAIN LANGUAGE ABBREVIATIONS. 3. NUMBERS CODE

V (no number - additional message found in 1977) June 17 1941 FROM BERLIN (GMBRIC) To TOKYO (AUTUMN) (Head Gen Affairs Dept) #410 TODAY THE 17th LT. HAYASHI INTERVIEWED THE CODE CAREER OF THE ABWEAR AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM QUESTIONS OF FUTURE OPERATIONS. THE GERMANS ARE ANXIOUS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH JAPAN IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND BOTH MEN AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE SOLVING OF RUSSIAN CODES. (See III A 859 (next - top page 35)) WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHEN INTERPRETERS SEKIMOTO AND TAKAHASHI WILL BE ABLE TO LEAVE (Trans 6-25-45)

III A #859 <sup>page 4430</sup> FROM BERLIN (GMBRIC) To: TOKYO (WINTER) (Head Gen Affairs Dept) Sept 22 1941 #875 FROM COLONEL HAYASHI. (1) SINCE I PLAN TO LEAVE THE 26th, I

WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE BEFORE THAT DATE AN OUTLINE OF HOW YOU ARE GOING TO SEND THE BRITISH INTER (MESSAGES) AND THE EARLIEST AVAILABLE WIRE OF THIS TYPE. I HAVE ASKED MAJOR NISHI TO DELIVER MATERIAL TO THE GERMANS DURING MY ABSENCE BUT UNLESS WE GET A CLEAR IDEA FROM YOU ON HOW YOU ARE GOING TO SEND THE WIRES, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HANDLE THIS MATTER. (2) TODAY I RECEIVED (SOME) DECRYPTED INTER (MESSAGES) FROM THE GERMANS BUT I AM NOT GOING TO WIRE THEM TO YOU. ALSO I SUGGEST THAT YOU STOP SENDING ME MESSAGES YOU HAVE DECRYPTED. THE GERMANS ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE MATERIAL RECEIVED RECENTLY AND CONGRATULATE LT COL KAWAMURA AND HIS GROUP AND TO SUEYOSHI ON THE SUCCESS OF THEIR (CRYPTANALYTIC WORK) (Translated March 1945)

III A #356 HONOLULU (KITA) -> WASHINGTON Sept 22 1941 (Trans. 10/6/41) Circular #38. Message to Tokyo #173 Remy message #166 (D.A.) A - destroyer left port on the 16th bound for New Caledonia. Naval Captain G.T. GARDENLIED, in command of the Pacific transport under the jurisdiction of the De Gaulle Regime and Commander G. CABANIER, Commander of Defense, took passage on the destroyer to take up new posts.

\* III A #356 From Tokyo (TOYODA) To Honolulu. Sept 24 1941 (Trans. 10/9/41) #83. STRICTLY SECRET. Newspaper WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU MAKE REPORTS CONCERNING VESSELS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES INsofar as possible: (1) THE WATERS (OF PEARL HARBOR) ARE TO BE DIVIDED ROUGHLY INTO FIVE SUB-AREAS (WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO YOUR ABBREVIATING AS MUCH AS YOU LIKE) AREA A. WATERS BETWEEN FORD ISLAND AND THE ARSENAL. AREA B. WATERS ADJACENT TO THE ISLAND SOUTH AND WEST OF FORD ISLAND. (THIS AREA IS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE FROM AREA A). AREA C. WEST LOCH. AREA D. MIDDLE LOCH. AREA E. WEST LOCH AND COMMUNICATING WATER ROUTES. (2) WITH REGARD TO [WARSHIPS] AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU REPORT ON THOSE AT ANCHOR (THESE ARE NOT SO IMPORTANT) TIED UP AT WHARVES, BUOYS OR IN DOCKS. (DESIGNATE TYPES AND CLASSES BRIEFLY. IF POSSIBLE WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO MAKE MENTION OF THE FACT WHEN THERE ARE TWO OR MORE VESSELS ALONGSIDE THE SAME WHARF). ((\*\* IS [WARSHIPS] A MISTRANSLATION OF BATTLESHIPS?))

III A #357 (KITA) FROM HONOLULU -> WASHINGTON Sept. 29 1941 Circular #041 (Translated 10/10/41) HONOLULU TO TOKYO #178 Re YOUR TOKYO'S #83 (above - #356) (STRICTLY SECRET) THE FOLLOWING CODES WILL BE USED HEREAFTER TO DESIGNATE LOCATIONS OF VESSELS: (1) REPAIR DOCK IN NAVY YARD (THE REPAIR BASIN REFERRED TO IN MY MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON #48); KS. (2) NAVY DOCK IN THE NAVY YARD (THE TENTEN PIER); KT. (3) MOORINGS IN THE VICINITY OF FORD ISLAND: FV. (4) ALONGSIDE OF FORD ISLAND: FG (EAST AND WEST SIDES WILL BE DIFFERENTIATED BY A AND B RESPECTIVELY) Related to Washington, San Francisco. (5) - not available

III A #358 From Honolulu (KITA) -> Tokyo October 2 1941 #184 (Translated 10/5/41). On the 1st, an American steamship entered port from Australia. (2). Although its name was not announced, it may be the MATSON Steamship Company boat "MONTREY". In addition to ordinary passengers, it had on board approximately 600 Australian and New Zealand troops under the command of Wing Commander AXEL RICHARDS. The troops were allowed to land in Hukon and go on an excursion. The English language newspaper on the 1st stated that this was the first instance of an American ship being used for the transport of English troops.

III A #654 From Tokyo (TOYODA) To: RIO. September 4 1941 #203 (Trans 10/4/41) STRICTLY SECRET MY MESSAGE #202 (D.A.) REPEATED AS FOLLOWS: WE HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY THE GERMAN AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES TO TRANSMIT 15 PARCELS OF DOCUMENTS TO THEIR MINISTERS IN RIO (#14 AND 6 BY THE ITALIANS, #17 THROUGH #15 BY THE GERMANS) THESE ARE BEING SENT BY SECRETARY INOUE, WHO IS ON BOARD THE TOA MARU. WHEN RECEIVED PLEASE TURN OVER TO THEM SECRETLY.



III A #1288 From BANGKOK TO TOKYO (SIAM) Sept 19 '41 #154 (Trans 2/12/45) IN ORDER TO KEEP OUR PLANS SECRET, PLEASE TRY TO HAVE OFFICERS WHO ARE SENT HERE COME INCORNI TO.

36 III A 1305 From Tokyo to HANOI Sept 27 '41 #293 (Trans 10/2/41) Major (coltd) FUJIWARA and Lieutenant (coltd) YAMAGUCHI of the General Staff Office, under the assumed names of Koichi YAMASAKI and Hajime YAMADA respectively are scheduled to leave here the 28th by aeroplane to join the THAILAND Embassy Staff as non-career clerks and will arrive there on the 29th to stay overnight. Because of the urgency of the situation there was not enough time to secure French Indo-China visas so please have some one from your staff meet them at the airport and take care of them so no problems arise. Also please make hotel reservations for them. This has been relayed to THAILAND.

III A 1306 Tokyo to BANGKOK September 29 1941 #615 (Trans 10/2/41) Strictly Confidential. Re my #614 (see below #1307) In order to collect military intelligence in your intelligence department at this time Major (coltd) FUJIWARA and Lt (coltd) YAMAGUCHI of the General Staff Office, are being sent there as honorary non-career clerks under the assumed names of Koichi YAMASAKI and Hajime YAMADA. They will have the status of non-career clerks. Please have your Ambassador and Director of Intelligence department recognize this.

III A 1307 Tokyo to Bangkok Sept. 29 1941 #614 (Trans 10/2/41) The non-career clerks in your intelligence department, Koichi YAMASAKI and Hajime YAMADA are scheduled to arrive by aeroplane on the 30th. Please direct their activities.

III A 1308 Bangkok to Tokyo October 2 1941 #683 (Trans 10/9/41) Re your 613 ((1/4)) The hospital inspection was originally planned with a view of having the Navy support it; however, now that the naval authorities have completed their part of the work toward its establishment, they have requested us to take over the entire responsibility connected with it. We are now experiencing considerable difficulty in getting a license issued in accordance with Thai medical laws in effect at present. Permits connected with the RESEARCH LABORATORY FOR TROPICAL DISEASES attached to the Government General's Office in Formosa are now quietly endeavoring to have an understanding whereby a license will be issued. The profits for the establishment of the hospital would, therefore, depend on what success may be achieved by them. At any rate, we would like to have a semi-official, attached to this office attached to the staff of this hospital and, therefore, I would appreciate your arranging this matter.

III A 1309 From SINGAPORE (MINORAS) to BANGKOK Oct 2 1941 #74 (Trans 10/17/41) From HANOI to OKA attached to the staff of —. A surgeon with the rank of Major in the Army is scheduled to arrive in BANGKOK on the 7th of October. He plans to stay in the country for approximately 10 days. In connection with the organization setting up the demarcation of the border, he will conduct an investigation of sanitary facilities in and around BANGKOK. Inasmuch as he would like to contact sanitary officials in the Ministry of the Interior, National Defense Ministry, and the Red Cross organization, as well as military authorities, please arrange for the extension of full facilities to him. On his return trip he will make an inspection tour of sanitary facilities between SIEM REAP and BATTAMBANG.

III A #296 Bangkok to Tokyo Sept 26 '41 #665 (Trans 9/29/41) To Section Chief YOSHIOKA from YATAGAI. In order to get the best results, I think we should establish a Chinese Commercial concern, I mean ostensibly Chinese, in ROYAKUKAN (KARAI). I believe we should make it appear that this concern is dealing in medicines. Business Official TAKASIE agrees with me on this point. We should equip the shop as though it were doing a drug business. The equipment would cost approximately 7,000 Baht and the rent about 200 baht. Taxes would be low. In view of the situation here, we should disguise the drugs and make it appear that they came from China.

V (no number) page 50 From TOKYO (TIENS - Head, Gen Affairs Dept (Gen Staff)) To STOCKHOLM (REPAR) 2 parts complete Nov. 21 1941 (Transl. 8/21/45) 1) After the Japanese Government's [19] Poland, one of the Polish officers remained while others broke their contracts, on orders from their home government, and withdrew to Egypt. 2) The officer remaining is a 1st Lieutenant on active service (MICHSLAV NICOLAEVICH SZKOLA (SHKOLA) - (he is in Peking with 4 children) and at present is engaged in vital work in the Kwangtung Army. 3) Because of this man's braves and also for results of espionage the Kwangtung Army had this 1st Lt. remain. However he is anxious about his position because he received no formal approval from the Polish War Ministry to his withdrawal from the military lists. Therefore we would like you to work through Polish officers in contact with you in order to arrange for official recognition by the Polish War Ministry authorities of the separation from the service of the above 1st Lieutenant. Then see that a proper response is transmitted to this man through the Polish Consul in HARBIN or SHANGHAI.

V Page 29 (bottom) from BERLIN (GMBK) to TOKYO (SUMMER - V/Chief Gen Staff) May 8 1941 #204 (Translated 3/8/45) The German War Ministry has requested us to collect the following intelligence for them as regards Britain. Please report at once any data suitable for use in exchange of intelligence (actual figures as much as possible) 1) Amount of various types of foodstuffs in storage and degree of restriction. 2) Degree of decline in production capacity suffered by the various industries because of German bombings.

Vol II A Page A 152 June 10 1941 THE OKADA Incident Washington (NSMURN) to Tokyo #389 Lt. Col. Okada was arrested for speeding by the police - complaint of mistreatment 1) not only is Japanese navy displeased over the successive occurrences of incidents related to it, such as the OKADA incident, the TACHIBANA incident and the TOEI Maru incident... OIT Honolulu 6/12/41

Vol II A page 153 (Boris #289) from Hollywood to Washington #36 June 10 1941 Trans June 25 1941 Secret to the Naval Attaché from TERAH.

1. Our lawyers is of the opinion that KONO (Tachibana's chauffeur) should be kept in the country for 30 days) In view of the danger that he might give evidence unsatisfactory to TACHIBANA (Japanese naval language official who has been held on charges of espionage). It would be wise to subsidize him. Furthermore as Kono has no funds, the lawyer has suggested that the navy be responsible for paying this man a subsidy of \$25,000 and all court costs. In order that the navy be kept out of the picture, some of Kono's friends should be selected to appear to be supporting him. We are in the process of making these arrangements. Should you have any objection to this manner of procedure, please advise us.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that [ ] is a good friend of the intelligence chief and in cahoots with the investigating authorities, it is wise for the navy to little to do with this matter.

Though our lawyer would not predict the outcome of this incident, as the hearings will be complicated, at the very earliest it will be tomorrow, the 11th, before counter schemes can be developed.

It is going to be necessary for TACHIBANA to have frequent communication with the lawyer; therefore we believe that it would be ill-advised for TACHIBANA to go to Washington at the present time.

II A #259 Page A 154. Tokyo (Foreign Minister) to Washington (Koshi). #307 of 21 Dec 41 (6-25-41) Re my 294 (re prohibition of loading lumber on AZUMA Maru at Phila and prospects future supplies of benzene) in which it is true that the United States did make a friendly gesture in connection with the TACHIBANA affair, we are watching the restriction on gasoline exports to Japan...

II A p 154 T. #292 SFO (MUTS) to Washington #026 21 June 1941 (July 1, 1941) Commander Tachibana sailed from here without mishap on the 21st by the NITTA Maru

*[Faint, mostly illegible handwriting on page 38. Some words like "Vol II" and "1927" are visible.]*

*[Faint, mostly illegible handwriting on page 39. Some words like "The" and "and" are visible.]*

PURPLE INTELLIGENCE NOTES

ORANGE

III B #313 TOKYO -> SEATTLE Oct 16 1941 #2187 CIRCULAR Henceforth report movements of warships:

- 1. If no great changes, report them every 10 days if Priority Intelligence - report each occasion. a. arrival/departure US Flagships of Fleet or Scouting Force. b. if more than 10 vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time. c. arrival/departure of warships other than US (give detailed report on class/ships) 2. If patrolling be inaugurated by naval air, report at once.

III B #315 Panama to Tokyo August 18 1941 #128 Report of Observations: (1) Ships moving thru Panama Canal toward the ATLANTIC

- August 15 - 4 U.S. submarines (# ---) August 16 - 2 U.S. freighters, August 17 - 1 " " (2) Ships moving toward the PACIFIC August 15 - 1 US freighter - 1 De Gaulle DD (TRIUMPHANT), now at anchor at BALBOA August 17 - 1 U.S. Destroyer, now at anchor at BALBOA 1 - cruiser (?) moored

Recently 5 large destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, rations, supplies)

\* III B #356 TOKYO -> HONOLULU STRICTLY SECRET 24 September 41 #83 HENCEFORTH MAKE REPORTS VESSELS AND ALONG FOLLOWING LINES IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE.

From 'The American Mages' by Ronald Lewis p 59. 'What were the recipients of MAGIC to think of the two intercepts of MAY 9 and 11, one sent to Tokyo from Los Angeles and the other from Seattle, in which the Japanese representatives reported fully on the recruitment of spies, the surveillance of aircraft plants and their output, the maintenance of connections with second generation Japanese-Americans in the Army, the study of shipping, the penetration of the labor movement and so on?'

III B #402 HOLLYWOOD (MAGAOUCHI) -> WASHINGTON August 26 1941 #66 (message to Tokyo #163) Reference your #489 to the U.S. (inquiring methods U.S. handler cases of control of business by foreigners in Japan)

5. In connection with the TACHIBANA incident, naval officers were trailed and kept under surveillance as a matter of course. (Trans 10/4/41)

III B #410 Washington (NOMURA) -> TOKYO SEP. 8 1941 #789 WANTS TERASAKI To Go TO CHICAGO TO SECRETLY CONTACT MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN First Committee meeting there. (TERASAKI, official in charge of espionage network in U.S., Central America and South America), to establish an espionage net in MEXICO, focal point MEXICO City. He has been active in the U.S. and in South America, especially in the ARGENTINE, BRAZIL and CHILE. (Trans 9/8/41)

III B #500 From Buenos Aires -> Panama Sept 23 1941, Circular #146 (Trans 10/20/41) Bernardino to Tokyo #416. (STRICTLY SECRET) C.O.R. When Minister Yamagata (Min. to CHIEF) was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal zone for him. Since then we have had USVI go to CHILE to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given copies of the maps. Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attaché YAMADA to our Navy's counter TATSUMA who is returning home on the BUENOS AIRES MARU. The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through our embassy in Rome. Minister YAMAGATA has already advised Chief of Bureau TERASAKI regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report. \* Hidenari TERASAKI, 2nd Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Washington, is the head of espionage in the U.S. and in Latin America.

III B #643 - From SANTIAGO To Buenos Aires August 22 1941 #62 (Trans. 9/16/41). Part 1 of 3 (Message to Tokyo #230). From TERASAKI. The results of my conference with the Ministers to Brazil, ARGENTINA, CHILE and --- are as follows: (1) We propose an (intelligence) setup in Latin America in order that we may secure intelligence on the public opinion of the United States, not situation, intelligently and diplomatically. The method by which this is to be accomplished is roughly as follows: (a) We propose the establishment of spies within the United States. From these we shall obtain intelligence. (b) This set up should perform the duties of collecting and evaluating information obtained from offices of personnel of American Ministers in Latin America. (c) We shall study the effectiveness of propaganda contained in American and Latin American printed matter and radio broadcasts. (d) It shall collect and evaluate intelligence secured from persons with whom they are in close contact, as well as the offices of third powers in Latin America. (e) It shall collect and evaluate intelligence secured from individuals and government offices in Latin American countries. (f) Though we plan for the organized of an intelligence net and the distribution of agents necessary for the operation of this proposed setup, in the light of current affairs when anything of great importance arises, we, of course, will put every detail into operation with the technicians with which it is carried out in spy stories. (Circular in 3 parts - complete)

III B #652 From SANTIAGO -> WASHINGTON September 17 1941 - #65 (Trans. 9/22/41) Santiago to Tokyo #261. (Separate wire) Regarding paragraphs 1 to 3 a of my message #231 (1/2) all of our offices in North America should give their immediate attention to the selection of spies. They should choose only those who are best qualified for the job and have them go to work on collection of information and, if possible, liaison. The offices in Latin America shall accept their reports from them in which they complete credence. If it is possible to obtain the services of an informant who has been a seaman, it might be a good idea to try and get him a job in a Steamship company. (There is one who falls in this category in New York. It would be very much to our interest if a job could be found for him in some steamship company which has a North American service.) P. It must be borne in mind, of course, that it is exceedingly difficult to select individuals who can be reliably utilized. Moreover it is very difficult to check any information from a foreign country. Therefore, it is of primary importance that we make up our minds to spend vast sums of money. P. It is a known fact that the FBI (FBI?) is making a practice of trying to get the men into the

III B. #808 BERLIN (OSWIMM) -> TOKYO August 14 1941  
HITLER SAID -- "IF A CLASH OCCURS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S., GERMANY WILL AT ONCE OPEN WAR AGAINST THE U.S."

IV B page A 198 #397 NOV 16 1941 (transcribed 11/19/01) Washington (Norman) -> Tokyo ["B class REPORT"]  
I understand that the United States strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese-American war is to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids (I understand that the aircraft carriers are being either remodeled or camouflaged) and also to isolate the Japanese forces in China, by severing Japanese supply routes in the CHINA SEA by means of submarines

IV page A 193 #344. SAN FRANCISCO (MUTU) -> WASHINGTON Oct 20 1941  
... members of Parliament KASAI scheduled to deliver a lecture on the 29th at the KONNYU KYUVERSU Club on the subject "WILL JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES FIGHT" ... earnestly wish you have him cancel his lecture.

IV B page A 312 #683 CANTON -> NET Nov 13 1941 Circular # 237  
On the 12th the British Consul General called on me and after handing me a written document dated the 11th, he went on to say that on the 5th a Japanese naval reconnaissance seaplane made a flight over the southern part of Hong Kong harbor as far as the STANLEY fortifications and then headed north. However as a result of a protest lodged concerning a similar incident which occurred September 28th (29th) (see my circular #946 (not available) of November 1st) Japan promised to issue strict instructions so that a repetition of that did not occur. This recurrence was indeed most unexpected -- etc

Continued from bottom of page 41 --- ... Confidence of those in the office of Axis nations. Please note this point carefully and exercise the utmost caution in making these selections (remainder refers to reference number (N/A)) ... the matter contained in B of above reference would be next to impossible to effect. However, if there is one with whom very close relations have been maintained in the past, it may be that he can be utilized. Registry (C) - each office should be equipped with good radio sets of the middle wave band. They should be used to listen to domestic broadcasts in the United States. The central listening post shall be located, let us say, in Brazil, where one who is proficient in shorthand English shall be on duty at all times. The leading US newspapers and magazines shall be subscribed to now in the name of some foreigner, then should be thoroughly perused (even the society columns) and carefully analyzed. The intelligence officer in para (C) of reference shall be stationed in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia (the last mentioned is looked upon as a very important port by our Army and Navy, with a view to obtaining information about Panama, as you are already aware) and MEXICO. To fulfill all these duties, the telegraphic section of all these offices concerned will have to be extensively enlarged. This is at present the most important actual step to be taken. As sources of supplies for the above mentioned intelligence personnel, the present sources of DOMESTIC news agencies and others of our special correspondents shall be utilized, we shall also make indirect use of Spanish and Portuguese language correspondents. Since it will be of interest to keep abreast of economic conditions in the United States, we shall maintain close contact with our merchants who in turn will keep themselves advised through local native merchants who have access to information in the United States. Should the German and Italian diplomatic officers be ordered out of a country before the Japanese, we shall make arrangements to take on their informants. The informants referred to above shall not be limited to Latin Americans but shall also include those who reside in Spain and Portugal (should, for example, MEXICO get into the war, our informants in Mexico shall relay their information to those in Spain and Portugal who in turn shall pass it on to Japan) relayed to Washington. Mailed to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.