

MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS

1 AIR RECONNAISSANCE OF PETROPAVLOVSK

IIAE.
A-WORK

3-29

THE AIR ATTACK ON TOKYO
APRIL 18 1942 - THE DOLITTLE ATTACK

X - "NAVAL OPNS IN HOME WATERS" (85)

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MISCELLANEOUS
OPERATIONS

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Files in Bathroom

- Adm Top
- SRH Comm. W.P. Maps 1 Jan '42 - 1 May '42
- SRNS 0001-0078 With. Map Room Reports April 14 - Jan 20 1942
- SRND 239 Signal Center's Roster of Jap. Operations (in R.I.)
- SRH 231 Guerrilla Rosters, Monitoring of Philippines
- SRH 125 Friedman's views MAFIC & Philippines
- SRH 043 Gen Marshal - Dewey - Magle
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- * ARMY MONOGRAPH #118 (Book Cart)
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- MAPS JAPAN/CHINA/TAIWAN/KOREA
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KIMIKAWA MARU AIRCRAFT RECONNOITER USSR (PETROPOLVSK)

To carry out the duties ordered by Northern Force radio order #3, the (XAV) KIMIKAWA Maru left AKKESHI on 19 January (1942) and moved up to PARAMUSHIRO arriving the 21st. In addition to duties of an air ^{patrol} reconnaissance of that area, air reconnaissance of "ABA CHI YA" (ANACHA BAY - PETROPOLVSK) was flown on the 24th. The KIMIKAWA Maru departed PARAMUSHIRO the 27th and returned to AKKESHI the 29th.

A part of its report of reconnaissance of ANACHA BAY stated:

Reconnaissance altitude - 5000 meters. NO NAVAL VESSELS AT ANCHOR AT PETROPOLVSK. 6 MEDIUM SIZE MERCHANT SHIPS INSIDE THE HARBOR AND 4 LARGE SIZED ONES OUTSIDE THE HARBOR.

#105

Activity of the 11th Air Fleet (the Shore Based Naval Air Command)

"G" TRAINING

Organizationally, the 11th Air Fleet was formed 15 January 1941 and soon began its training under the direct command of its Commander, ^{It} deployed to bases in the "islands of the South Sea" (as the Japanese navy called their Mandated Islands, where military bases were forbidden under the terms of their mandate to Japan by the League of Nations following World War I). This training was called "G" training ((G = GUAM?)) in Japanese naval war plans "G Operations" meant "assault and capture of GUAM". Each of its forces except those parts left behind to complete its training, moved out to the various land and sea bases at MARCUS, TINIAN, PELELIU, TRUK, WOTJE, RUDTO (R.O.I. Kwajalein) and TARA where they conducted torpedo, bombing and other training in conjunction with surface forces (the CV RYUJO, and other vessels). Thus training from forward bases they rapidly augmented their state of training and readiness. This was also important in promoting the construction of air bases in the Mandates area and the so called "A-work", aerial photographic missions over ^{certain} important strategic positions in the Western Pacific.

"A WORK"

Pursuant to a request from the Naval General Staff, the 11th Air Fleet directed 3rd Air to carry out "A-work" in conjunction with "G Training". Photographic reconnaissance missions were flown using a photographic


version of the Type 96 land based Bomber ((NELL) as follows:

Date	Base	Objective	(comment)
18 April	TAKAO ((SW TAIWAN))	LEGASPI (airfield SE tip of LUZON, Philippines))	
23 May	PELELIU ((S. TP PALAU))	JOLO (airfield) - SULO Islands, Ph.ippines))	
		BAGO (airfield) - MCCURRE GULF, N.W. New Guinea))	
		MANDKWAR (airfield, at the head of the "bird, N.W. New Guinea))	
		SOROEI (airfield, JAPEN IS in Goolvink Bay N.W. New Guinea))	

11 June TINIAN ((Mariana Is)) GUAM

3rd Air moved to the air base on TINIAN around the 1st of June 1944 and over three days, 11th, 12th and 19th of June, photographed the entire island of GUAM from 8,800 - 9000 meters altitude ((approx 29,500 feet))

On the 19th, America protested to our Foreign Office about overflights of GUAM by aircraft of unknown nationality.



SELECTED PARTS FROM "SENSHI SO SHO (WAR HISTORY SERIES)

「VOL 85」 本土方面海軍作戦 HONDO HOMEN KAIGUN SAKUSEN NAVAL OPERATIONS IN HOME WATERS - dealing with the Early American Carrier Task Force Attacks on Japanese strategic positions, including the Air Attack on Tokyo (the "Doolittle Attack") on 18 APRIL 1942... pages 73-

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V. ALERTS AGAINST AMERICAN CARRIER FORCES

situation January - February 1942.

General Situation. Since the outbreak of the war, our Southern invasion operations had progressed smoothly; our Army, moving south on the MALAY peninsula had entered SINGAPORE on February 15th, the British Army surrendering unconditionally on the 15th. In the PHILIPPINES area, U.S. and Philippines forces had retreated into the BATAAN peninsula; MANILA was occupied on 2 January and other strategically important places were occupied during February. Also in January and February the islands of SUMATRA, CEBES, BORNEO, AMBONNA etc., were captured and JAVA put under siege. In the meantime the South Seas Forces had captured RABAUL and KAVIENG, thus acquiring advanced bases in the South Seas Area.

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On the Eastern front, signs of activity by the enemy's carrier task forces gradually appeared and the Naval General Staff estimated in late December 1941 that air attack on our main islands would not occur until early February.

On 1 January 1942 the submarine I-3, on patrol in the HAWAIIAN Sea area, reported sighting an American fleet which included aircraft carriers to the south of HAWAII, proceeding to the west. It was estimated that if this American fleet planned to make an air attack on Tokyo it would arrive in JAPANESE waters around January 10th and the Combined Fleet, and all forces of the YOKOSUKA and OMIYAZO Naval Districts assumed alert status, as follows:

- (a) NORTHERN FORCE ((operational title for the 5th or Northern Fleet)) - formed a patrol force of Auxiliary Cruiser Division 22 (ANATA MARU, ASAKA MARU) and the ((auxiliary seaplane tender)) KIMIKAWA MARU, and deployed them on an eastern high seas patrol line.
- (b) Sent the Converted Gunboat SHOEI MARU ((3580 tons)) and 14 Picket Boats ((converted fishing trawlers))

the Japanese author says "HAWAII", meaning HAWAIIAN ISLANDS - Hereafter, HAWAII = "HAWAIIAN ISLANDS"

* SOUTH SEAS FORCE, the operational name for 4th Fleet ("Mandate") forces whose area of operational responsibility was the area of the "Mandated Islands", the MARIANAS, THE CAROLINES and the MARSHALLS plus certain Japanese Islands to the south of TOKYO.

to form a picket line some 700 miles to the east; these began their patrol of the picket line on the 9th. (c) patrolled the area to the east of the BONIN Islands by CHICHIJIMA Air and the 10th Gunboat Division ((MAGANE MARU (3120t), YOSHIDA MARU (2926 tons)-))

YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT (a) Placed picket boats 350 miles to the eastward and stationed its Guard Force some 300 miles out to be on guard. (b) stationed the HATSUSHIMA ((AM-1500t)) and 2 Special Picket Boats 50 miles off KASHIMA NADA ((Eastern sea-coast of the Tokyo plain)) to patrol that area. (c) placed the fighter air defence aircraft on stand-by from 0600 the 9th. (d) carried out air searches to 500 miles with YOKOSUKA Air and KISARAZU Air (6 planes each); had an attack force on stand-by during the 10th. (e) Anti submarine patrols of TOKYO Bay approaches by YOKOSUKA Air and TATEYAMA Air: 2-seat float planes and patrols of the east by SUZUKA Air to 200 miles. (f) all other forces on stand-by.

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OMINATO NAVAL DISTRICT - (a) patrols by Desdiv 1 of the KURILE Islands and to the east of HOKKAIDO.

On 12 January the I-6 reported it had torpedoed and sunk (actually only damaged) the carrier LEXINGTON, 500 miles SE of HAWAII. In addition, since no reports had been received as a result of the patrols and search operations of all forces, normal conditions were resumed.

AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCES ATTACK THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Early in the morning of 1 February, American Carrier Task Forces in two groups attacked the MARSHALL - GILBERTS area. The Combined Fleet ordered "OPERATION METHOD #3 AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET" (The Combined Fleet's Secret Operation Order #1 of November 5th 1941 outlined the operations to be carried out by our Submarine, Carrier, South Seas and Northern Forces in the event of an attack by an American carrier task force). Our

Carrier Striking Force (mainstay in the AKAGI and KAGA) ((Actually, Cardiv 1 and ZUIKOKU of Cardiv 5, 2 fast BBS, Crudiv 8, ASUKUMA and 5 DD)) left TRUK at 1100 February 1st and sped to the east but were unable to contact the enemy; suspending the operation, they returned to PALAU, entering the harbor on 8 February.

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The Northern Force deployed the light cruisers KISO and TAMA, the auxiliary cruisers A MARU and ASAKA MARU, and the torpedo boat SAGI to the east to form

a patrol line and ordered the Picket Boats being equipped in YOKOSUKA to make preparations for departure. The 7th Base Force ((CHICHIJIMA)) was ordered to have Minesweep Division 17 (4 converted mine sweepers) and Subchaser Division 66 (3 auxiliary sub-chasers) deploy along longitude 150° East as a patrol. The Yokosuka Naval District had the ^{auxiliary gunboats} NOSHIRO MARU ((2333 tons)) and CHOUKI MARU ((2131 tons)) and 5 Special Picket Boats patrol along Longitude 146° East but none made any sightings and on the 5th normal conditions were restored.

"GUARD" FORCE ((can also be rendered as "Screening Force", or "Warning Force")) FORMED

In view of the surprise attacks by the American carrier task forces on the Inner South Seas ((the Mandated Islands area)), the Combined Fleet, having in mind an attack of this nature against the Tokyo area, was deeply concerned over the necessity of strengthening the protection of the seas to the east of our main islands. Combined Fleet's Order #64 of 8 February made Carrier Division 5 of the 1st Air Fleet the nucleus of a newly established Air force attached directly to the Combined Fleet and stationed in home waters, prepared for an attack by an American carrier task force.

On 7 February the Combined Fleet, based on Communications Intelligence ((hereafter abbreviated to "Comint")) reports from the OWADA Communications Unit ((Tokyo)), estimated that there was a probability that an American carrier task force was nearing the home islands area. To prepare for this, a "Guard Force" was ordered established from the Fleet's Main Body on the night of the 8th.

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<p>GUARD FORCE - Commander Vice Admiral SHIRO TAKAGI, CINC 1st FLEET.</p> <p>Batdiv 2 (ISEI, HIRUGA, FUSO, YAMASHIRO)</p> <p>Crudiv 9 (KITAKAMI, OI) ((rebuild-1946 as torpedo (40x24") cruisers))</p> <p>Cardiv 3 (HOSHIO, ZUIHO plus DDS MIKAZUCHI and YUKAZE)</p> <p>Attached Air Force (SHOICAKU, ZUIKAKU plus DDS AKIGUMO, KASUMI and AKEBONO)</p> <p>Desdiv 27, 1st Section ((ARIAKE, YUGURE)) plus DD YAKAZE.</p>
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Air searches by the YOKOSUKA Naval District forces were carried out from the 10th onward but when nothing was sighted either on the 10th or 11th, these air searches were suspended. The Northern Force reestablished its patrol line to the east of TOKYO on the 8th but on the 10th it was clarified that the previous Comint had been based on routine communications by American domestic civil air lines, and as nothing untoward had occurred, the CINC Combined Fleet cancelled his order "OPERATION METHOD #3 etc".

SITUATION AFTER MID-FEBRUARY

According to a 'Comint' Report that an American carrier task force had departed PEARL HARBOR around 1400 on 16 February, the Combined Fleet on 17 February estimated that there was a considerable possibility of an American carrier task force attack on WAKE, or the Mandated Islands area.

(76) All forces increased their vigilance: YOKOSUKA Naval District had his Guard Forces move out to patrol the seas to the east and had his air forces search out to 500 miles from the 22nd onward. Afterward, a report (Comint) on the 19th stated that the American carrier task force was to the north of JALUIT and on the 20th, it appeared to the east of RABAU and battled with our South Seas Force. On the 24th, WAKE Island was bombed and bombarded by gunfire by an American carrier task force but apprehension over an attack on the home islands area now diminished. However, YOKOSUKA had one of its patrol units remain on station.

THE SITUATION OF MARCH and APRIL 1942

On 4 March MARCUS Island (about 1000 miles SE of TOKYO) received an air attack ((by an American Carrier Task Force)) and the forces of the Combined Fleet, the YOKOSUKA and OMINATO Naval District went on the alert. The YOKOSUKA Naval District sent a warning of the MARCUS attack to a convoy of 15 merchant ships then passing near MARCUS Island. YOKOSUKA's Air Attack Force was ordered on 30 minutes stand-by from early morning of the 5th and all flights, except operational missions and scheduled training flights, were grounded. It was under these conditions that a report, "13 AIRCRAFT, NATIONALITY UNKNOWN, 240 MILES EAST OF CAPE SHIOYA^{*}", was received; at 0752 the 5th the YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT issued an air raid warning to his area of jurisdiction. The Combined Fleet immediately ordered the 'GUARD FORCE', then at anchor at ((the Fleet Anchorage)) HASHIRAJIMA ((INLAND SEA, western part, near KURE)), to attack the American carrier task force to the east of TOKYO. However, later on it became known that the "13 aircraft of unknown nationality" were indeed friendly aircraft, so at 0908 the Air Raid Warning was cancelled and at 1300 the sortie of the Guard Force was called off. Being unable to obtain any intelligence on the

* East coast of central northern Honshu.

enemy, it was concluded that the American carrier task force had retired after attacking Marcus Island. As a result, the situation at the YOKOSUKA Naval District gradually returned to normal.

However, in the dead of night of the 10th, a 'Comint' report from the YOKOSUKA Naval Communications Unit stated that the U.S. carrier task force had appeared to the north of WAKE which posed a danger of an air attack on the main islands. On the 11th, Combined Fleet and Home Islands forces took measures to intercept the enemy force and to defend the capital. The Guard Force sortied, KURE forces providing anti-submarine patrols in the BUNGO CHANNEL area. The Northern force added the 1st Patrol Force (10 picket boats) to the north of the 2nd Patrol Force (10 picket boats). Navy Section, Imperial General Headquarters temporarily reinforced the fighter force of the TOKYO plain area with fighter squadrons from IWAKUNI and SASAGO, placing them under the ^{temporary} operational control of Commander YOKOSUKA Naval District. As there were no subsequent reports on the enemy, the GUARD FORCE withdrew its patrol line east of the BONIN Islands on the 15th, most of that force retiring to anchor in ISE BAY. CARDIV was detached from the GUARD FORCE and returned to the Carrier Striking Force; it headed for YOKOSUKA to prepare for its next operations. At 1200 the 17th, the Northern Force reverted to normal conditions, the 1st Patrol Force being withdrawn to KUSHIRO, the 2nd Patrol Force remaining on station. Conditions in the YOKOSUKA Naval District reverted to normal at 1130 the 17th; the IWAKUNI and SASAGO fighter squadrons returned to their home bases on the 18th of March.

On 18 April the main island, Honshu, received its first air attack (more below). Since mid April many enemy submarines had been sighted in the vicinity of the southern shores of the Tokyo plain. ^{these operations were} later recognized as connected with their carrier task force's attack. Later on, 'Comint' reports plus an appearance of enemy submarines ^{in an area} came to be viewed as important essentials for estimates of attacks by American carrier task forces. Also, a Soviet merchant ship was then passing near TOSA ((Southern SHIKOKU Island)) and as there was a suspicion that it might possibly be connected with the air attack on TOKYO, the KURE Naval District had SAKI Air reconnoiter it by air on the 19th and had the BANYA Maru ((Auxiliary Gunboat 2797 tons... later renamed "Hong Kong Maru")) board and inspect it. The DSAKA Guard force sent the #2 MATSUE Maru to assist, if necessary. Thus, only four months

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after the outbreak of the war we received an air attack on our home islands and although the material damage was small, it demanded an immediate strengthening of air surveillance and vigilance in the Pacific Ocean approaches. To make up for the deficiencies in numbers of picket boats, fishing boats, manned by civilians, would act as air-defense lookouts; the Prefectural authorities would deploy "civilian air-defense picket boats" as was done in the OSAKA Defense Area.

THE DOLITTLE AIR ATTACK

AMERICAN FORCE'S SITUATION PRIOR TO THE ATTACK

In January 1942, the Cinc U.S. Fleet, Admiral KING, and his operations officer studied the concept of an air attack on TOKYO by an American carrier task force in retaliation for the Japanese navy's attack on PEARL HARBOR. Subsequently, this concept was made into an operational reality through the cooperation of the American Army. A carrier task force was organized, plans drawn up and an air craft unit was selected and special training of its pilots proceeded; the biggest problem was whether launching land-based aircraft from a carrier could be done as hoped for. The plan was officially adopted in the latter part of March and 16 B-25 Army bombers (Commander - Lt. Col. Doolittle USAF) were chosen for the attack; after completion of special training for one month in Florida, these were flown to ^{the} San Francisco Bay airfield at ALAMEDA where they were loaded aboard the carrier HORNET on 2 April, which sailed and joined Admiral HALSEY'S TASK FORCE 16 north of MIDWAY on 13 April.

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ORGANIZATION - TASK FORCE 16 - Vice Admiral William F. Halsey U.S.N.	
Aircraft Carrier Force	"ENTERPRISE" (27 fighters, 18 torpedo bombers, 36 dive-bombers) "HORNET" (loaded with 16 B-25s) (plus own planes on hangardeck)
Cruiser Force	(3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser)
Destroyer Force	(2 Desdivs - 8 Destroyers)
Replenishment Force	(2 oil tankers)

The essential points of the American plan were: the B-25s to take off the evening of 18 April from a position about 500 miles east of Tokyo, each plane carrying four 500 pound bombs. Lt Col Doolittle to take off before the other 15 B-25s, to attack Tokyo with incendiary bombs to start fires to guide the bombers to

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follow; 12 of these would bomb TOKYO, 3 would bomb NAGOYA, OSAKA and KOBE. The Attack Force Commander hoped to approach Japan to within 390 miles of TOKYO to insure carrying out the plan and believed that the approach had to be to 565 miles to have any expectation of success. In the meantime, preparations at 5 temporary landing fields in CHINA had progressed.

'COMINT' Reports

As related above, American carrier task forces attacked the MARSHALL Islands on 1 February, appeared off RABOUL on the 20th, off WAKE on the 24th, and on 4 March attacked MARCUS Island, situations that required patrols and alerts against an attack on our main islands.

On March 10th a 'Comint' report that the radio-frequency similar to that used by American carrier task forces had been intercepted and placed by direction finders to the north of WAKE Island. The Combined Fleet had the Guard Force sortie and other measures to oppose an attack but was unable to obtain any intelligence of the enemy; the Combined Fleet thereafter remained vigilant, especially against attack against our main islands. Again on 27 March 'Comint' reports put an American carrier task force some 700 miles to the east of the MARSHALLS but nothing untoward occurred. From the beginning of April the following 'Comint' reports were received.

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(1) MANY PATROL PLANES APPEAR IN THE PEARL HARBOR AREA ON 9 APRIL AND PATROL/GUARD SHIPS ARE OPERATING IN THE SAME AREA. (AUTHOR'S NOTE - THE ENTERPRISE departed PEARL HARBOR).

(2) According to an intelligence report of 0730 ^[April] the 15th from the Chief of Staff, Northern Force; 27 PATROL PLANES HAVE APPEARED IN THE ALEUTIANS AREA AND FROM 0100 THE 14th ONWARD, 17 PATROL PLANES WERE ACTIVE WITH DUTCH HARBOR AS A FOCUS AND ONE PLANE HAD BEEN PLACED AS 120 MILES WEST OF DUTCH HARBOR. FROM THE ABOVE IT APPEARS THAT A STRONG SURFACE FORCE IS OPERATING IN THE ABOVE AREA. ATTENTION INVITED TO FACT THIS IS THE LARGEST NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT YET OBSERVED IN THE DUTCH HARBOR AREA. (AUTHOR'S NOTE: ON 14 APRIL THE CARRIER "HORNET" JOINED THE "ENTERPRISE" IN AN AREA BETWEEN MIDWAY Island and the ^{western} ALEUTIANS)

(3) ACTIVITY OF ENEMY SUBMARINES OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN IS GRADUALLY

INCREASING,

Neither the Combined Fleet nor the 5th Fleet, both of which had these reports expected an attack by an American carrier task force based on these intelligence reports.

THE JAPANESE NAVY'S SITUATION - THE SHIFT TO 2nd PHASE OPERATIONS

The Southern Operations ((the PHILIPPINES, MALAYA, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, CARRIER RAID ON CEYLON AND THE BAY OF BENGAL)) had proceeded smoothly, the important raw-materials zones had been secured and the Navy, having completed its 1st Phase Operations was shifting to 2nd Phase operations, changed its wartime organization on April 10th. Main points in this reorganization were:

- (1) YAMATO (new super battleship) assigned to Batdiv 1.
- (2) In the 1st Air Fleet ((Carrier Striking Force)), instead of individual destroyers or Desdivs being assigned to each carrier division, a new Squadron 10 ("Desron 10") of a light cruiser (flagship) and 3 Desdivs was established to screen and protect the aircraft carrier force.
- (3) A South West Area Fleet organized with 1st, 2nd and 3rd Expeditionary Fleets.
- (4) Reorganization of the Shore Based Air Fleet ((the "BASE AIR FORCE")) - new Air Flotillas 25 and 26 established, totaling 6 Air Flotillas, all under Comdr. 11th Air Fleet.
- (5) organization of SURFACE ESCORT Fleets: a 1st Escort Fleet to provide protection of sea lines of communication between home waters and the Southern Occupied Territories; 2nd Escort Fleet - same, between the Mandated Islands area and home waters.

Also on the 10th, the Combined Fleet issued its organization of forces for the 1st period of the 2nd Phase operations (10 April until late May)

COMBINED FLEET FORCE ORGANIZATION ((Tactical Titles + Missions Assigned))			
FORCE	COMMANDER	COMPOSITION	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS AND OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS
(1) MAIN BODY FORCE (a) MAIN FORCE	CINC COMBINED FLEET	Batdiv 1 ((YAMATO, NAGATO, MUTSU)) Desron 3 (less Desdiv)	Support All operations. On Guard, training and upkeep, at anchor Western Inland Sea.
(b) GUARD FORCE	CINC 1st Fleet	1st Fleet (less Batdiv 3, Crudiv 6, Desdiv 27, Desron 3 (less 1 Desdiv)) 2nd Section, Crudiv 4, part of 1st Air Fleet.	On Guard at Western Inland Sea or ISE Bay, prepared against American Carrier Task Force ((Attack))
(2) ADVANCE FORCE	CINC 2nd Fleet	2nd Fleet (less 2nd Section C, Crudiv 5, Crudiv 8, 1 Desdiv of Desron 4) Batdiv 3 (less 2nd Section) 11th Air Flotilla (less ZUHO)	Support all operations on Guard, upkeep, training, at anchor Western Inland Sea.
(3) CARRIER STRIKING FORCE	CINC 1st AIR FLEET	1st Air Fleet (less a part) Batdiv 3 - 2nd Section Crudiv 8 1 Desdiv of Desron 4	Support all operations. On Guard, upkeep, at anchor Western Inland Sea.

Continued from previous table page 10

(4) VANGUARD FORCE ((Submarine Force))	CINC 6th Fleet ((Submarines))	6th Fleet, Subron 5, CHYODA, NISSHAN	Attack enemy fleet - surveillance of strategic places
(5) BASE AIR FORCE	CINC 11th Air Fleet	11th Air Fleet (22nd Air Flotilla (less a part), 23rd Air Flotilla (less TKS Air))	Air warfare in all areas; cooperate in the operations of the South Seas Force ((Mandated Force)) and the Northern Force
(6) South Seas Force ((Mandated Force))	CINC 4th Fleet	- Remainder omitted by the Author	
(7) Northern Force	CINC 5th Fleet	5th Fleet, NAEM ((CAP))	Continue 1st Phase 4th Period operations
(8) Southern Force	CINC S.W. AREA Fleet	- Remainder omitted by the Author	
(9) Communication Force and attached forces		Remainder omitted by the Author	
(10) NOTES	(a) The 7th Base Force ((CHICHIMA)) will be under the command of Comdr. South Seas Force with regard to surface escort matters (b), (c), (d) Omitted by the Author		

The Navy Section Imperial General Headquarters ((hereafter "I. Sect. IGHQ")) issued its Directive # 85 on 16 April: MODIFY, PER SEPARATE ANNEX, THAT PART CONCERNING 2nd PHASE OPERATIONS IN THE SEPARATE ANNEXES TO I. Sect. Imp. G. H. Q. Directives # 1 and # 2 - "OPERATIONS POLICY IN THE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS". Those Separate annexes are not now available and their details are not known. However their contents are presumed to include the matters of stiffening the defenses of the occupied areas while cooperating with the Army in the BURMA operations, the assault and occupation of PORT MORESBY, MIDWAY, FIJI, SAMOA etc in the South East and Eastern areas and should the opportunity arise for the expected decisive fleet battle to close with and attack and destroy the American fleet - a policy of establishment of invincibility

THE COMBINED FLEET'S SITUATION

As stated before, the Combined Fleet's force organization for the first period of the 2nd Phase operations were put in effect on 10 April but the principal forces of the Combined Fleet were returning to home waters, or had just reached there after taking part in the Southern operations. These forces were to prepare for their next operations, as follows: the Main Force's 1st Fleet was at anchor at HASHIRAJIMA ((the Fleet anchorage in the western part of the Inland Sea, near KURE)); Desron 3 and Cardiv 4 (RYUJO) were returning from their operations in the INDIAN OCEAN; the GUARD FORCE's Batdiv 2 was at anchor at HASHIRAJIMA, the HOSSHO and ZUHO were at anchor in the Western Inland Sea and most of the others were at anchor carrying out upkeep, maintenance and repairs; the ADVANCE FORCE's Crudiv 4 (1st Section) was at YOKOSUKA getting ready for next operations, the ATAGO had just returned to YOKOSUKA on April 17th, Crudiv 7,

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Batdiv 3's 1st section (HAGI and KIRISHIMA), Desdiv 18 plus the HAGIKAZE and MAIKAZE of Desdiv 4 were enroute from operations in the INDIAN OCEAN. Most of the rest were still operating in the Southern Area; the CARRIER STRIKING FORCE's AKAGI, Cardiv 2 and Cardiv 5, 2nd Section of Batdiv 3 (HARUNA and KONAGO), Cardiv 8 (and destroyer screen) were then south of TAIWAN heading for home waters after their Indian Ocean operations; the South Seas Force, the 4th Fleet, was in the midst of operations in the South Seas area ((Mandated Islands area)); the ((Submarine Force)) VANGUARD FORCE's KATORI ((CLP)), CHIYODA, Subdivs 3 and 15 (total 6 submarines) had departed the Western Inland Sea in mid-April headed for TRUK, the A Vanguard Detachment ((XCL)) AIKOKU Maru, ((XCL)) HOKOKU Maru plus 4 submarines and NISSHIN ((floatplane/midfat sub carrier)) had left the Western Inland Sea for PENANG, Subron 3 (7 submarines), on orders by the Vanguard Force were moving to the vicinity of 700 miles east of TOKYO Bay and at the time of the American carrier force's attack on Tokyo were some 500 miles east of TOKYO BAY, other submarines, Subron 1 and Subron 5 were under repairs and Subron 2 was participating in the Southern operations; the BASE AIR FORCE's Air Flotilla 26 was carrying out enemy searches from the homeland, preparing for an attack by an American carrier task force, the 21st Air Flotilla's ^{HQ} and land bombers of KANOYA Air had moved to KANOYA in preparation for moving to the MALAY area, Air Flotilla 24 and Air Flotilla 25 were in the process of expanding ^{respective} their operations in the inner South Sea area ((the Mandated Islands area)) and the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA areas, Headquarters of the 11th Air Fleet had moved to TRUK on 18 April ((from the South-RANGOON)); the principal ships and patrol forces of the

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NORTHERN FORCE were as follows: ((flagship)) NACHI at anchor at MURORAN, Cardiv 21 at anchor at AKKESHI, KIMIKAWA Maru (XAV) under repair at MATSURI, Patrol Force-((XCL)) ASAKA Maru and 3rd Patrol + Picket Force (#7 UNYO Maru ((converted gunboat)) and 16 Picket boats had left KUSHIRO and YOKOSUKA and arrived at their patrol line at 1200 the 17th and took station (2 other picket boats were then enroute to the patrol line); the watch that they had just relieved, ((XCL)) AWATA Maru and the 2nd Patrol + Picket Force ((converted gunboats)) ANSHU Maru and KOWA Maru plus 20 picket boats) had started to return to KUSHIRO - thus, on the 18th there were exactly two patrol lines deployed, for all practical purposes. AIR FORCES: on 10th February the newly formed MISAWA Air Squadron (27 land bombers) had been incorporated in the Northern Force and given the responsibility for ^{air} patrols of the seas east of Honshu, reaching full operational

capability in mid March. On 5 March Air Flotilla 21 (Comdr. - R/Adm Takao TADA with 36 land bombers of KANOYA Air) had been included in the Northern Force and based on KISARATSU began air patrols.

Along with the reorganization of the Base Air Force on 1 April, the 26th Air Flotilla (Rear Adm MASAO YAMAGATA - KISARATSU, MISAWA and 6th Air Squadron) were assigned to the Northern Force. Pursuant to Combined Fleet's organization of forces for the 2nd Phase operations of 10 April, the 21st and 26th Air Flotillas were removed from the Northern force.

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SITUATION OF THE YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT FORCES

The force organization of the YOKOSUKA Naval District on 10 April, under the direct command of the Commandant, consisted of the YOKOSUKA Communication Force ((MISSION ^{control of} Radio Direction Finder operations and radio communications ^{propagate in} Radio Intelligence and fleet operations)), most of #4 Patrol + Picket Force, the Sea Area Defense Force, Yokosuka Defense Force, DDS OBORO, SANAKAZE and OKIKAZE, Subchasers # 22, 23 and 24, YOKOSUKA Land Defence - YOKOSUKA Naval Base Guard Force, A.A. Batteries, Machine Gun Batteries, etc - AIR FORCE - YOKOSUKA Air, TATEYAMA Air, and 10th Combined Air (KASUMIGAWA Air, TSUKUBA Air, HIYAKURI GAHARA Air, YATABE Air, KASHIMA Air), and 13th Combined Air (SUZUKA, and 01-010) forces. The YOKOSUKA Naval District was not carrying out enemy air searches at that time but was conducting aerial anti submarine patrols.

COURSE OF THE OPERATIONS - PATROL/PICKET FORCE SIGHTS AMERICAN CARRIER(S)

As stated previously the Northern Force's Patrol/Picket Force was composed of small picket boats ((converted fishing trawlers)) in 3 Patrol/Picket Squadrons (each of some 20 picket boats) organized in 3 watches and stationed some 700 miles to the east, patrolling between Latitudes 33°N. and 39°N. lat.

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At 1200 17 April, #2 Patrol/Picket Squadron was relieved on station by #3 Squadron and started to return to its base at KUSHIRO, when at 0630 the 18th, Picket Boat # 23 NITTO Maru of #2 Patrol/Picket Boat Squadron ^{first} reported sighting an American aircraft in position 36° North 152°-10' East, following this reporting sighting ^{It was not heard from again} 3 aircraft carriers of an American carrier task force. After being engaged with the enemy for about 30 minutes. That day, sunrise along the Picket-line was 0404 ^(-9 time) and sunset was 1716, the weather partly clear, wind N.W. at 15 meters/second with visibility of 9,000 meters.

Prior to this, the American carrier task force, on the 17th when some 1000 miles east

of Japan had refueled, and after leaving their destroyers with their oil-tankers, had proceeded west at high speed.


Before day break of the 18th the American force was more than 700 miles from Japan when their radar picked up two "blimps"; the Task Force commander had not expected to encounter a patrol line that far out and immediately changed course, ordering the ENTERPRISE to launch search planes, these planes confirmed the fact that these were Japanese picket boats on patrol at a much greater distance from Japan than anticipated. The Task Force had expected to be able to be closer in before discovery, but that hope was now lost. ^{the decision to} launch the 16 attack planes some 150 miles further out than planned involved some doubt that the B-25s could reach the China bases. The Commander changed his plans for a night ^{air} attack to a daylight air attack, and as soon as preparations to launch were completed, the attack group was launched, the HORNET turning into the 15 knot wind at 0725, all B-25s being airborne by 0824.

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Afterward, ENTERPRISE aircraft attacked the Picket Boats in that area for some 3 hours, casualties to the 2nd and 3rd Patrol/Picket Squadrons were: ((omitting details for each Picket Boat damaged or sunk))

Picket Boats #23 NITTO Maru and CHODO Maru, sunk; CHOKYU Maru, #2 NANSHAN Maru and #1 IWATE Maru, heavy damage, disposed of (sunk) by own forces; Medium damage suffered by AWATA Maru, KOWA Maru, #3 CHIYO Maru, EIKICHI Maru, #2 ASAHI Maru, FUKYU Maru, and KAISHIN Maru; 33 killed and 23 wounded.

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NORTHERN FORCE - The Commander Patrol/Picket Force (Comdr Auxiliary Cruiser Division 22, R/Adm. Shigenori HIRIUCHI) on receipt of the report of the sighting of the American carrier task force, immediately ordered the ((XCL)) AWATA Maru (the #2 PATROL/PICKET Squadron's support ship) and the ((Xci)) ASAKA Maru (the support ship of #3 PATROL/PICKET force) to make contact with the enemy, and for the #1 Patrol/Picket Squadron, then at KUSHIRO for upkeep and crew rest, to take up patrol along Longitude 155° East as soon as preparations for sea were completed; he also ordered the #2 Patrol/Picket Force, then enroute to port after relief on station on the 17th, to expedite preparations to depart as soon as they reached NEMURO. The ((XCL)) AKAGI Maru of Auxiliary Cruiser Division 22 departed NEMURO at 0900 the 18th, the SHOJI Maru ((Conv. gunboat 1986 tons)) and 17 Picket Boats left KUSHIRO at 1430 the same day for the patrol area, and patrolled along East Longitude 149° (about 200 miles west of the sighting of the American carrier force)

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The Commander Northern Force, putting together the reports from the Patrol/Picket Force, judged the American carrier force to consist of 3 aircraft carriers and several destroyers. Then at 1045, he ordered the 2nd Patrol/Picket Force's picket boats to open their interval to 10 miles north and south of the position that the enemy had been sighted, on their way back to port, proceeding on westerly courses. However since many of that force's picket boats had been damaged and their positions were scattered, the effectiveness of their search was below expectations.

The ((CA)) NAH (flagship, 5th Fleet) had remained at anchor at MURORAN since being assigned to the Northern Force on 16th March; she left port at 1115 the 18th ((not the most prompt reaction??)); Comdiv 21 ((CLs) TAMA, Kiso) had departed AKKESHI at 0920; after these 2 forces rendezvoused at sea at 1830, they returned to their original positions.

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OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVES OF THE COMBINED FLEET.

At 0750 the 18th the Headquarters Combined Fleet received a telephone call from the Naval General Staff, learning that a report had been received that 3 American aircraft carriers had been sighted 730 miles east of Honshu at around 0600; that Headquarters immediately ordered "OPERATIONS METHOD #5 AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET" This order outlining the operations against the American carrier force had also been sent out on the attack against the MARSHALLS on 1 February and on 10 March when there was a high probability of a carrier task force attack. ((on the main

islands)). Now at this time the Combined Fleet was in the middle of shifting its force organization (and forces) to their new 1st Period 2nd Phase operations dispositions which had been ordered on the 10th, so its organization was in disarray and unsettled just then.

The day before, the 17th, the ATAGO (CA) which had been assigned to the ADVANCE FORCE by the reorganization of forces as flagships of the 2nd Fleet, had just arrived at YOKOSUKA from assignment in the Southern Forces. It was immediately ordered (Combined Fleet Order #501) included with the Advance Force ships and ordered to speedily sortie, contact, attack and destroy the American carrier task force. The ADVANCE FORCE's assigned strength included 2 (fast) battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 float-plane carriers and 2 Destroyer Squadrons but of these, the 2 battleships and 4 of the heavy cruisers were then enroute back from the South and as, one of the float-plane carriers and most of the destroyers were still operating there, the following ships at anchor in home waters could be used against the American carrier task force: ATAGO and TAKAO (CA), float-plane carrier MIZUHO, and the destroyers ARASHI and NOWAKE of Desdiv 4 at anchor at YOKOSUKA Naval Base and the light cruiser JINTSU at the KURE Naval Base.

Thereupon the HQ Combined Fleet transferred the heavy cruisers MYOKO and HAGURO (at HASHIRAJIMA), the MAYA (at MIRAWA BAY) and the CHURAI (then returning from CAMRANH BAY), the light-aircraft carrier SHOHO plus Desdivs 7, 8 and 9 (at YOKOSUKA) to the Advance Force. At the same time the Combined Fleet ordered the GUARD FORCE in support of the ADVANCE FORCE.

At that time the main force of the Guard Force was on alert, at anchor in the Western Inland Sea, carrying out upkeep and training but its attached Destroyer Squadron was lacking, having participated in the Indian Ocean operations, so Desdiv 15, which had departed KURE on the 17th for the PHILIPPINES, was ordered transferred temporarily along with Air Flot 21 to the Tokyo Bay area; the KAGA (CV) Air Group was placed under the operational command of Comdr 26th Air Flotilla.

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Our carrier striking force had completed its operations in the INDIAN OCEAN and was south of TAIWAN, returning to home waters; it was ordered to speed to the east of Honshu and contact, attack and destroy the American carrier task force.

The VANGUARD (SUBMARINE) Force

The Comdr of the Vanguard (Submarine Force) (Vice Admiral Teruhisa KOMATSU) in the flagship KATORI (training ship) with the float plane carrier CHIYODA and the Eastern Vanguard Detachment (6 submarines) had departed the Western Inland Sea on 16 April and were enroute TRUK. On receipt of the report that an American carrier task force had been sighted, the Eastern Vanguard Detachment was dissolved and ordered to make a sweep search for the enemy north of, and along bearing 50° from the BONIN ISLANDS, and the CHIYODA to operate in cooperation with the GUARD FORCE. Also, at the same time Subron 3, which was then in the vicinity of 500 miles east of Honshu was ordered to intercept and attack the enemy.

BASE AIR FORCE

The TINIAN Based, Base Air Force (shore based naval air force) (11th Air Fleet - Comdr. V. Adm. Nishizō TSUKAHARA), pursuant to CINC Combined Fleet orders of 0930 for Comdr. Air Flotilla 21 ^{to take command of the land bombers of} KANOKA Air and move to the TOKYO BAY area, at 0940 ordered Comdr. Air Flotilla 26 to take command of all the (naval) air forces in the Tokyo Bay area and attack and destroy the enemy carrier striking force. Thus, Air Flot 21, 4th Air (the land based bomber Squadron at KISARATSU Air Base and the KAGA's air group came under the command of Comdr. 26th Air Flotilla.

The Comdr 26th Air Flotilla (Rear Admiral Seigo YAMAGATA) who had learned of the attack by American carrier task force ^(hereafter "American carrier T.F.") by a telephone call from the Naval General Staff at 0800 the 18th, immediately ordered the 4 Type 1 ("Betty") land bombers of KISARATSU Air that were carrying out air patrols at that time, to search for, and maintain contact with the enemy. These aircraft had departed KISARATSU that morning at 0635 to patrol the sector between 55° - 90°. At about 0930, one of the four planes reported sighting an enemy aircraft:

ONE TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT, NATIONALITY UNKNOWN, RESEMBLES A FLYING-BOAT (SLIGHTED) UNABLE TO OVERTAKE AT SPEED 230 KNOTS

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600 MILES 85° FROM KISARATSU HEADED WEST.

YOKOSUKA NAVAL DISTRICT FORCES

The first report of sighting the American carrier T.F. by the ¹23 NITTO Maru was received in the YOKOSUKA Naval District at 0805 the 18th; at 0820 that Commandant ordered his air forces "ATTACK ENEMY SHIPS, METHOD 2" - this outlined the method of air attack by District forces in accordance with the YOKOSUKA Naval District's plan, e.g.: In case the location of the American fleet is not clear, the attack force; after searching for the enemy in cooperation with the air search force (the forces of the 11th Air Fleet stationed in the TOKYO BAY area) will then shift and attack the enemy. The attack force was made up of 6 Squadrons, the first attack force consisted of 12 land bombers, the second patrol planes (flying boats), both forces having large cruising range; the 3rd through the 6th attack forces were made up of shipboard dive bombers, torpedo bombers and float reconnaissance planes. At the same time all other forces were to go on a strict alert and at 0830 the entire YOKOSUKA Naval District was ordered on the alert.

AIR ATTACK ON HONSHU AND THE RESPONSE

With receipt of the report "ENEMY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SIGHTED", YOKOSUKA AIR ordered all planes attached to that command to land; 9 Zero fighters were immediately put on stand-by and when the KISARATSU search/patrol plane report "PLANE RESEMBLING ENEMY FLYING BOAT HEADED WEST" was received at 1120, 3 of those were sent off as close cover. Next, at 1240 ^{when} the other 3 planes were dispatched, enemy aircraft had penetrated the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA area at low altitude; YOKOSUKA AIR sent 5 more Zero fighters aloft at 1310 as reinforcements, increasing the upper air patrol to 11 aircraft.

The Army, which had the responsibility for the air defense of the Tokyo-YOKOHAMA area, at 0830 ordered AIR RAID ALERT for its area of authority, based on the Navy's report of the sighting of the American force. It had been estimated that an air attack on Honshu would occur the next day, the 19th and hoping for the best, fighters of the Army XVII Air Group took off at 1000 to patrol at altitudes between 4 and 5,000 meters

and began landing to refuel at 1200.

At a little past 1200, an Air Defense observation Post north of MITO (some 40 miles N.E. of TOKYO) reported sighting a large type enemy aircraft and at about 1215 the TOKYO area received an air attack. By the time warning reports of confirmed enemy planes were sent out, sighting reports of enemy aircraft had already been received from all over the Tokyo plain area, one after the other.

The main force of the XVII Army Air Group, which had been on stand-by, immediately took off to intercept, some 40 fighters and Type 100 HQ Reconnaissance planes searching, but as they had climbed to high altitudes, they failed to sight any American aircraft. The American planes had penetrated from the East to North East, at low altitude, dropping incendiary and 500 pound bombs, setting fires in many places and by 1235 had left TOKYO's airspace.

Continuing the attack on the Tokyo area, one aircraft attacked the YOKOSUKA Naval Base at about 1330 making (a) bomb hit (s) on the ((AS)) "TARGE" ^(**) then in drydock ((being converted to a light aircraft carrier)), causing damage to its hull plates below the water line. Eleven fighters had previously been airborne but were at an altitude of 3000 meters too high to sight the attacking plane. Also, at 1356 a few planes appeared over KAWASAKI ((just north of YOKOHAMA)) and bombed the industrial area, setting fire to gas tanks which spread until about 1510, when the fires were extinguished.

Three aircraft attacked the western part of Honshu ^{at low altitude;} one plane dropped incendiary bombs on NAGOYA factories and munitions depots at 1420; another strafed the Naval #2 Fuel Depot at YOKOHAMA and a third dropped incendiary bombs on the streets of KOBE causing damage.

At 0930 the KURE Naval District ordered an AIR RAID ALERT for its sea-area Defense Forces, Air forces, the BUNGO CHANNEL and other maritime zones. The BUNGO Channel, the Fleet's main route to and from sea was used that day for the sortie of the GUARD FORCE from its anchorages in the Western Inland Sea ((HONSHU)). 9 Type 96 ((CLAUDE)) fighters and 2 Zero fighters of IWAKUNI Air were placed under the tactical command of Comdr. YOKOSUKA Naval District at 1130 and shifted to YOKOSUKA AIR that

* - the Japanese language has no article and no distinction is made between singular and plural - thus "bomb hit" could be a bomb hit or the bomb hits.

** The completion of the conversion of the TARGE to the CVL RYUHO was delayed until 31 March 1943.

afternoon

On receipt of the intelligence report of the air attack on the Tokyo area, NAGOYA, and KOBE, IWAKUNI AIR (Type 96 ("CLAUDE")) fighters) and KURE AIR (Type 95 2-place ("DAVIS")) floatplanes) were placed on 15 minutes stand-by at 1433 and 1445 respectively, prepared for a sudden enemy attack.

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In addition picket boats were stationed off SHIKOKU along a line bearing 55° with intervals of 11 miles. At about 1500 2 fishing boats off SHIKOKU were straffed by machine gun fire of an American plane and at 1546 a dive bomber of SAERI Air sighted an American plane 36 miles bearing 210 from the southernmost tip of SHIKOKU but was unable to close on it due to its high speed.

In a very short period of time, American planes had ripped through our main islands' skies and had carried out their attacks on strategic places without the loss of a single aircraft. One, due to a malfunction in its fuel supply, landed at VLADIVOSTOK; the other 15 reached CHINA during darkness, 4 of which made crash landings with great damage while the occupants of the other 11 parachuted into the blackness of night, one being killed and four drowned; one plane crash landed in the water off NINGPO and the crew of another which parachuted near NANZHAN were captured by Japanese forces.

SEARCH FOR THE AMERICAN CARRIER FORCE - The SEARCH by AIRCRAFT

Prior to the sighting of the American Carrier Task Force, 4 land based bombers of KISARATSU Air (of 26th Air Flot.) had taken off from KISARATSU Air Base for the daily air patrol, and at 0815 had headed along their search sectors, 55°-90° to a distance of 700 miles, and numbered from north. At 0945 #4 aircraft reported sighting a twin-engined flying-boat and it was presumed that the carriers' retirement course would be near to the search planes' course but they were not sighted even though at some time they were in close proximity to each other. At that time the visibility was about 10,000 meters.

26th Air Flotilla (6th Air Attack Force) sent 3 additional aircraft to search

an area around the position where the enemy had been sighted and an attack force promptly to attack, as follows:

6th AIR ATTACK FORCE Secret Radio #58 (15th at 1100)

THIS FORCE'S (PLUS KAGA, KANOKA and 4th AIR) SEARCH AND ATTACK PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS: (1) 18th (A) SEARCH AND SHADOW FORCE: AT PRESENT 7 KISARATSU AIRCRAFT ARE SEARCHING AND IN CONTACT (Author's NOTE: NOT IN CONTACT). 3 MISAWA AIRCRAFT WILL TAKE OFF AT 1130, SEARCH ON COURSES 75°, 85° AND 92° TO 700 MILES WITH TURNS TO THE RIGHT THEN FOR 40 MILES AND RETURN. (B) ATTACK FORCE: KISARATSU AIR TAKE OFF AT 1215; AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 THE 30 LAND BOMBERS OF THE ATTACK FORCE WILL MAKE TORPEDO ATTACKS (KISARATSU AIR 16, MISAWA AIR 9, 4th AIR 5), CONTROL OF THE AIR FORCE #1-12 ZERO FIGHTERS FROM 6th AIR, AND 12 ZERO FIGHTERS FROM KAGA AIR GROUP. (2) 19th. MAKE MORNING TWILIGHT ATTACK WITH ENTIRE FORCE.

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The 3 additional MISAWA search planes flew their assigned missions for about 700 miles searching for the enemy but when they had reached their furthest advance at about 1500, it is believed that the American carrier T.F. was some 80 miles still farther to the east, retiring at high speed. At 1245 6th Air Attack Force's Air Strike Force took off from KISARATSU without any up-dated intelligence on the enemy, 22 Type-1 ("Betty") land bombers (17 from KISARATSU Air and 5 from 4th Air) and 12 Zero fighters (from 6th Air) being joined by 12 Zero fighters from the KAGA Air Group over KATSUURA (20 miles SE of KISARATSU). MISAWA Air's Type 1 ("Betty") bombers were somewhat delayed in take off from KISARATSU, 5 of these caught up with and joined the attack force but another 3 "Betty's" searched for the enemy on course 85°. After an advance of about 400 miles, the fighters were forced to leave the attack force and return, guided by "Betty's"; the majority of the land bombers continued until around 1630 when they had advanced some 650 miles along course 85° and where the visibility became bad and they advanced by individual sections to continue the search but failing to see any trace of the enemy, they too returned to base.

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At that time it was not known that the American aircraft that had attacked HONSHU had taken off from aircraft carriers nor had the

type of aircraft been confirmed; therefore, from the sighting report of aircraft carriers by the Picket Boat, it was believed probable that a carrier task force or other ships were present in those waters to pick up the air crews. The Attack Force had returned to KISARATSU or to KASUMIGAWA by 2255.

At 0537 3 land-bombers of MISAWA Air's MARCUS Island Detachment took off for their daily patrol of sector 15°-55° but as the northern part was rainy, they returned to base after covering 5-600 miles.

KANOYA Air (21st Air Flotilla), which had been preparing to move to the southern area was ordered to move to KISARATSU sent 9 land bombers from KANOYA at 1430

The YOKOSUKA Naval District carried out searches for the enemy in the area of the NAMPOSHOTO ((the Islands directly south of Tokyo Bay)) and seas adjacent to the Tokyo Plain as follows, but without sighting the enemy.

(1) one "Betty" searches the NAMPOSHOTO area; (2) 2 flying boats from YOKOSUKA Air searched a sector 85°-92° from YOKOSUKA to 400 miles between 1449 and 2100. (3) made off shore searches to 150 miles around the eastern shore and southern tip of the CHIBA Peninsula ((across Tokyo Bay to east)) and off the entrance to ISE Bay (NAGOYA area). SURFACE SEARCHES

Acting pursuant to Combined Fleet's Radio Order # 801, Admiral Kondō, Commander Advance Force, immediately ordered the Advance Force at anchor in YOKOSUKA to prepare to sortie and also issued, one after another other necessary orders:

- (1) ((CA)) MAYA and ((CVL)) SHŌHO to be included in the Main Force of the Advance Force;
- (2) Main Force (less the MAYA and SHŌHO) to sortie at 1700 the 18th, pass through Point "A" (24 miles, bearing 167° from NOJIMA ZAKI ((the southern tip of the CHIBA Peninsula)) -) at 2100 and reach Point "B" (34° North-143°-46' East) at 0500 the 19th;
- (3) the MAYA to join near Point "A";
- (4) ((CL)) JINTSŪ to proceed to the South East of the entrance to TOKYO Bay;
- (5) ((CVL)) SHŌHO to sortie as soon as ready and join the Main Force.
- (6) After loading fuel, the ((AO)) NARUTO to proceed to the vicinity of AOGASHIMA ((island some 150 miles south of YOKOSUKA)).

The Main Force of the Advance Force (less the MAYA and SHŌHO) sortied from YOKOSUKA on schedule at 1700 the 18th and after being joined by the MAYA, passed through Point B to search to the eastward. The SHŌHO, which had been at sea for training, immediately returned to YOKOSUKA, expedited its preparations for operations and departed at 0415 the 19th to join the Main Force. The ((CA)) MYŌKŌ and ((CA)) HARURO departed HASHIRAJIMA at 0945 the 18th, the JINTSŪ left KURE at 1015 the 19th and carried out searches in the HACHIJŌJIMA ((about 150 miles south of Tokyo Bay)). Thus the Advance Force moved out to the east of our main islands and searched for the enemy until the evening of the 20th without finding anything.

The GUARD FORCE, in company with the light carriers HOSHŌ and ZUICHO and 2 destroyers, sortied from the Western Inland Sea at 1500 the 18th and were joined off the BUNGO Channel by Desdiv 15 which had been enroute to the PHILIPPINES and later on by Desdiv 16 which had left YOKOSUKA; that force then took up a search for the enemy in the area off HACHIJŌJIMA.

The Carrier Striking Force, ordered to contact, attack and destroy the American carrier T.F., proceeded, with all dispatch toward the home islands; Cardiv 5 (SHŌKAKU and ZUIKAKU and 3 destroyers), which had been detached and was operating independently, was ordered to expedite refuelling at BAKO ((PESCADORES IS.)) and rejoin, heading for the enemy carrier T.F. However the Combined Fleet called off the pursuit of the American task force on the evening of the 20th, "CEASE OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICAN FLEET, Method #3", when the Carrier Striking force was still far from the location of the assumed battle.

Commander VANGUARD ((Submarine)) force had Submarine Squadron 3, which was expected to reach Longitude 154° at 0700 the 18th and which he believed to be nearest to the American carrier T.F., form a scouting line and proceed to the east. However, at 2015 the 18th a dispatch from the Northern Force stated that it was highly probable that the enemy had withdrawn toward the east and that there was a good possibility for an attack by our air attack force under the protection of our Carrier Striking force in the sea area to the eastward of 155° East.

Based on this estimate, at 0950 the 19th Subron 3 and the Eastern Vanguard Detachment were ordered to advance eastward to Longitude 160° East (some 1000 miles east of Tokyo Bay)

SEARCHES AFTER THE AIR ATTACK

Air and Sea searches, though intense were quite fruitless, not one clue concerning the American carrier T.F. being found. Also, as the air attack aircraft flew at low altitudes, it was not easy to identify the type of aircraft but it seemed that they were twin-engined; If twin engined bombers could take off from American aircraft carriers, there was a pressing need to study the type of plane, the number of aircraft that could be carried, and whether they could land on board and to revise basically our plans and policies to counter this matter. Thus while there was uneasiness over the many unknown elements, the things that had to be done at present were to attack the American carrier force that had escaped, and to establish defences against a repetition of such an air attack in the future.

The forces of the Combined Fleet and the YOKOSUKA Naval District continued their search for the enemy at first light the 19th, 9 Type 96 land bombers ("NELL") of KANOYA AIR took off from KISARATSU at 0410 the 19th, per 6th Air Attack Force order # 2. At 0700 the weather turned bad but all planes searched to 700 miles (except one, which had to return) without sighting the enemy. Likewise 8 KANOYA Type 1 ("Betty") land bombers took off at 0500 (one plane later at 0600) from KISARATSU to search for the enemy without results, sighting only friendly ships. They noted that the rain was north of bearing 60° from KISARATSU but that it was clear with 15 mile visibility to the south. 7 MISAWA Type-1 bombers took off from MARCUS Island at 0320, searched the sea area without sighting the enemy.

KANOYA Air ordered a search by 3 Type-1 land bombers to cover the sector 110°-160° from TOI SAKI (the SE tip of KYUSHU) which was carried out, without results, from between 0930 and 1645.

4 Type Scout float planes from YOKOSUKA carried out relatively short range searches just before nightfall

On the 19th ^{air} searches were made in the Northern area from OMINATO from 90° to 130° to 350 miles but no enemy was sighted.

CONFUSION IN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AFTER THE AIR ATTACK

At 0202 the 19th the Army reported that "OBSERVATION POSTS AT SAWARA ((40 miles N.E. of TOKYO)), KAGOSHIMA ((S.E. KYUSHU)) and TEGANE ((25 miles NE of KISARATSU)) HEARD RATHER LARGE BOMB EXPLOSIONS" and that an AIR RAID ALERT had been ordered in the Eastern Military District. On orders by YOKOSUKA Naval District ((hereafter "N.D.)) 2 Type-97 ("MAVS") flying boats took off at 0245 to patrol the seas to the east of the Tokyo Plain but encountered nothing unusual. As no further signs of an attack, nor enemy aircraft, were seen, the AIR RAID warning was lifted at 0315, but as a precaution the YOKOSUKA N.D. sent fighters aloft and had its air attack force stand-by. That same day at 1215, a telephone call from the CENTRAL MILITARY DISTRICT that "ENEMY PLANES SIGHTED OVER OSAKA AND SAKAE ((an OSAKA suburb)). The KURE N.D. ordered AIR RAID ALERT for IWAKUNI Air and KURE Air and for the KURE area. Afterward there were many reports of attacks by American aircraft.

At 1300 YOKOSUKA Air sent up 21 Type Zero fighters, 5 Type 96 ("Claude") fighters and 7 Type Zero float scouts, KOMATSUSHIMA Air (OSAKA GUARD FORCE) had its float scouts patrol the Kii Channel ((eastern entrance to the Inland Sea South of KOBÉ/OSAKA)) until 1530 but no American planes appeared and at 1730 the Alert was cancelled and normal conditions were resumed. Many of these mistaken reports of American planes in the Tokyo Plain and in the OSAKA/KOBÉ were of our own aircraft.

SEARCHES ON THE 20th AND THEREAFTER

All forces carried out careful searches over an extensive area from early the 19th without finding any trace of the force that had attacked HONSHU on the 18th. It was believed that the American carrier TF, upset by encountering our patrol line, retired immediately to the east and that there was little possibility of any enemy surface vessels remaining on the seas near Japan.

In consideration for preparations for forthcoming operations ((TULAGI; SOLOMONS, PORT MORESBY - New Guinea and OCEAN & NAUREU Islands, Central Pacific))

the Combined Fleet, on 19 April at 1930, ordered the following forces to revert to their former situation:

COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER # 124 (191930):

CARDIV 5, Desdiv 27, Subdiv 8, CHITOSE WILL RETURN TO THEIR ORGANIZATION FOR THE 1st PERIOD OF THE 2nd PHASE.

However, since a picket boat of #2 Patrol/Picket Squadron, then returning to KUSHIRO reported it was receiving gunfire in position Latitude 39-40N, Longitude 150-50 East at 0930 the 19th, the Combined Fleet reported this to all commands concerned at 1930 as a possibility that the American carrier TF would attack HOKKAIDO. The OMINATO Naval District at 0130 the 20th ordered a strict alert by all forces under its command and directed its air force to carry out searches for the enemy in HOKKAIDO'S sea area. Air Flot 26 again carried out enemy search on the 20th, its order issued on the 19th for its search organization was:

(191600) 6th Air Attack Force - Signal of ord # 3. FOLLOWING ENEMY SEARCH AND ATTACK ORGANIZATION FOR TOMORROW THE 20th. (1) ENEMY SEARCH - (A) REFERENCE POINT KISARATSU - 18 TYPE 1 LAND BOMBERS (MISAWA AIR 12, CHITOSE AIR 6) - TAKE OFF 0500 - SEARCH LINES SAME AS 19th - MISAWA AIR NORTHERN 12 LINES; CHITOSE AIR SOUTHERN 6 LINES. (B) REFERENCE POINT MARCUS ISLAND. MISAWA AIR 5 AIRCRAFT TAKE OFF 0400 SECTORS A THROUGH E (15° - 50° TO 700 MILES). (2) ATTACK - 1 HOUR STANDBY FROM 0500 ONWARD. (A) 1st ATTACK FORCE (TORPEDOES) 18 Type 1 LAND BOMBERS OF KISARATSU AIR, 9 KANUYA AIRCRAFT - COMMANDER KISARATSU AIR SQUADRON (B) 2nd ATTACK FORCE (TORPEDOES) - KANUYA'S 18 Type 96 ((NEU)) LAND BOMBERS (C) 3rd ATTACK FORCE (BOMBS - TORPEDOES) KAGA'S DIVE BOMBERS AND TORPEDO BOMBERS (D) 1st AIR CONTROL FORCE 12 ZERO FIGHTERS FROM 6th AIR. (E) 2nd AIR CONTROL FORCE - 12 ZERO FIGHTERS FROM THE KAGA.

The scope of enemy search was slightly smaller than that carried out on the 19th; CHITOSE Air took part, instead of KANUYA Air. Five MISAWA Air search planes took off at 0500 the 20th of April (the 12 planes being changed to 5) and at 1325 all planes

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returned. At 0430 six CHITOSE aircraft took off from MARCUS Island, one bomber had to turn back due to a malfunction, and the other five completed their search missions at 1410, as scheduled.

The Combined Fleet had not modified any of the Base Air Force's sea area searches but thinking that the American carrier TF might be in the area to the east of the Southern KURILES, ordered a search to be made some 350 miles to the south east of ETORAF Island. A Type 1 ("Betty") land bomber took off from KISARATSU at 0735 and flew course 60° for 600 miles without sighting the enemy; a YOKOSUKA N.D. Type 2 ("Emily") flying-boat also made a search of the same sea area.

END OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN CARRIER T.F.

Thus, no intelligence of the enemy having been obtained, the Combined Fleet cancelled its order "METHOD #3 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN FLEET" and ordered a reversion to the force organization for the 1st Period of the 2nd Phase operations

201930 COMBINED FLEET RADIO ORDER # 125. (1) CANCEL METHOD NUMBER 3 AGAINST AMERICAN FLEET (2) ALL FORCES (SHIPS) REVERT TO 1st PERIOD FORCE ORGANIZATION & HOWEVER 21 AIR FLOTILLA WILL COME UNDER THE COMMAND OF AIR FLOTILLA # 26. (3) NORTHERN FORCE, BASE AIR FORCE AND SUBREN 3 WILL CONTINUE ON STRICT ALERT.

The next day, the 21st, it was planned for "Betty's" of MISAWA Air to search out 700 miles from MISAWA between 65° and 105° to cover both HOKKAIDO sea approaches and the Southern KURILES but the weather was bad and those searches were not carried out. Searches by KISARATSU Air from 045-125 from KISARATSU, also to 700 miles (sectors 1 through 12) were ordered for the 22nd; At 0645, four "Betty's" flew sectors 5, 6, 7, and 8 to 4-600 miles until forced to turn back by bad weather; four others flew sectors 9-10-11-12 to about 600 miles before being forced to return. Sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4 were searched according to plan, however no enemy sightings were made.

11 Type 1 land bombers of MISAWA Air completed their transfer to MISAWA on the 22nd; at 0550 the 23rd 9 of these "Betty's" took off to search the sector 70-130 to 700 miles. On the 24th and 26th, four and six sectors, respectively, were searched for American ships while KISARATSU and MARCUS Island searches returned to normal conditions.

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MOVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN CARRIER T.F.

Afterwards, according to a Comint report of the 25th, the Navy Section, Imperial Gen. H.Q., decided that the American Carrier Task Force had returned to PEARL HARBOR.

NAVY SECTION IMP. GEN. HQ. SECRET RADIO # 285 (251010). AT DAWN THE 25TH AIR PATROLS IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AREA WERE UNUSUALLY ACTIVE AND IT IS ESTIMATED THESE WERE PATROLLING FOR THE RETURN OF THE AMERICAN CARRIER TASK FORCE TO PEARL HARBOR.

Thus, the American Carrier Task Force, which had been sighted by our Picket Boat on 18 April and whose subsequent actions were not apparent, avoided our intensive searches and retired to the east, arriving back at PEARL HARBOR on the 25th.

(Under Opinions, as given in Battle Reports of the various units, two are considered worthy of recording.)

a. Installation of "dempa taushingi" (radar) 電波探信儀

b. Summing up the experiences of the first fighting over Japan proper, it was noted that the surprise attack occurred much earlier than had been expected and that the estimate of the situation by all forces lacked exactitude and precision, and even Comint reports were conspicuous for inadequacy in their substance.

EFFECTS OF THIS AIR ATTACK

The emotional shock of the Doolittle Air Attack on the Government and the people of Japan was extremely large, as was its effect on the subsequent direction of operations by Imperial General Headquarters and by Headquarters Combined Fleet in the following three main operations:

(1) Effect on the MIDWAY-ALEUTIAN Operations

In early April the Navy had decided on a policy of conducting both operations at the same time in early June and the Army, while not approving it, had opposed participation by Army forces. However, the Doolittle Air attack gave them the opportunity quickly to approve it, and to decide to have Army forces participate. Their reason was that by the occupation of MIDWAY and the western ALEUTIANS, aerial patrols would be able to make

early sightings of American carrier task forces.

2. ANXIETY OVER American Carrier Task Forces

The air attack on Tokyo had a profound effect within the Navy Section at Imperial General Headquarters and also in the Combined Fleet, which from the beginning had been concerned over preventing an air attack on our home islands. The concern of all forces over the American carrier task forces now became much greater and thereafter took prudent measures in all kinds of situations.

3. The start of the CHEKIANG Operations.

The Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, in order to forestall attacks like that of the American carrier task force, issued an Imperial Command to the CHINA Army to begin CHEKIANG operations to capture, or destroy, the air bases in CHINA that the Americans intended to use. These operations were to start with attacks in mid April from the HANGCHOW area and from the NANCHANG area in late April, so that in early July the forces advancing in concert from both these areas would join up, occupying the required air bases.

KOB sketch 33

sketch 35

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II ORDERS TO REINFORCE THE WAKE INVASION OPERATIONS

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WAKE INVASION OPERATIONS and the RETURN TO JAPAN

(Too soon -- see page)

After sunset the 16th (December 1941), Condror 8, Carrier 2 (less its desdiv) plus DD TANIKAZE and URAKAZE, under the command of ABE, Com Carrier 8, parted company with the Carrier Strike Force. After refueling from the 1st Refueling Force the next day, the 17th, they headed south with the expectation that the Commander of the Wake Attack Force would initiate its first attack a dawn 22 December. Later, (HQ) Combined Fleet placed their unit under the command of Commander South Seas Force ((MANDATES FORCE)) for the duration of the operations.

The South Seas ((Mandates)) Force's WAKE invasion (under command of Condror 6) failed due to high seas and the counter attack by several enemy fighter aircraft that remained, in which two destroyers were lost. The attack was temporarily postponed on 11 December ((1941)) to regroup for another attempt, the forces withdrawing to KAWASALEIN. Due to the distance involved, the fighter aircraft of Airplot 24 were unable to operate over WAKE and no aircraft carriers were deployed to that area to gain control of the air in that area.

The Commander of the Invasion Force requested Comdr South Seas Force for measures to destroy the remaining enemy fighter aircraft. The latter had made a request to the (HQ) Combined Fleet for the reinforcement of an aircraft carrier force and this Commander replied that he had decided to send a part of the Carrier Strike Force to the area concerned after the Carrier Strike Force had completed its assigned attack on MIDWAY.

The (HQ) Combined Fleet had not received any word from the Carrier Strike Force since 8 December because of ^{its} strict radio silence. On the night of the 14th a radio from Commander Carrier Strike Force reported the cancellation of the attack on MIDWAY. Thereupon (HQ) Combined Fleet sent the following to the Comdr Carrier Strike Force; time/date group 150200:

(1) 24 AIRFLUTILLA HAS MADE SUCCESSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON WAKE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR BUT DESPITE CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO ITS AIR POWER AND FACILITIES, INVASION FORCE LOST TWO DESTROYERS TO ENEMY'S REMAINING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FORCE AND SUSPENDED TEMPORARILY THAT INVASION AND ARE AT RWDTTO ((RDI-KWASALEIN)) PLANNING ANOTHER ATTEMPT.

(2) CARRIER STRIKE FORCE AT APPROPRIATE TIME WILL ASSIGN A SUITABLE FORCE

TO REINFORCE THE SOUTH SEAS FORCE WAKE INVASION FORCE

TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES ON WAKE

In the matter of reinforcement of the WAKE Invasion Force the Carrier Strike Force was forced to continue breaking radio silence by sending more and more messages which was dangerous in view of the increasing enemy submarine activity. Later messages from Comdr South Seas Force revealed plans to invade WAKE between January 26th and the 28th and the desire for the Carrier Strike Force to attack WAKE with full force on the 26th. Refueling and other considerations made this request impossible for Comdr Carrier Strike Force, who planned to assign CARDIV 2 to cooperate with the South Seas Force's invasion of WAKE; his radio 161600 read as follows:


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CRUDIV 8, CARDIV 2 and 2 SCREENING DESTROYERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMCRUDIV 8 WILL COOPERATE IN WAKE INVASION OPERATIONS USING ITS AIR POWER ON ABOUT THE 26TH. AFTER THESE OPERATIONS THAT FORCE SHOULD RETURN TO HOME WATERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

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As danger from enemy shore based reconnaissance had now disappeared the principal emphasis became anti-submarine patrols using all dive bombers of the force while "streaming westward" in a Screening Formation #12 (below). On the 15th fighters for the combat air patrol were placed in the hangar on stand-by and Cardiv 5 given the duty


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of flying ASW patrols and Van reconnaissance flights from sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset.

On the 15th the weather turned bad with fairly high waves and rain but fortunately Cardiv 2 and its screen were able to refuel. Afterward, visibility deteriorated and the force took Reduced Visibility Formation #13



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text
Condensation

This History records a long series of enemy submarine reports issued by the (HQ) Combined Fleet, the Navy Section-Imperial General Headquarters, the YOKOSUKA Communications Unit, the YOKOSUKA Naval District, MARCUS Island. These reported sub "sightings" in the approaches to Empire waters, off the main islands and in the vicinity of the Bonin Islands. Some of these reports included "radio intelligence based information" (from Navy Section, Imp Gen Hq - "According to Radio Intelligence" on the 14th) - "one vessel each, bearing 79°, 64°, 65° and 66° from CHICHIJIMA (all within estimated 400 miles radius)"; YOKOSUKA Communications Unit on 17th reported ("According to Direction Finder observations enemy submarines are concentrating to the north and north east of CHICHIJIMA"); The same unit reported on the 17th that (at 1936 hrs, a good quality RDF fix of a suspected enemy submarine was 33° 05' N, 139° 45' East"); Navy Section Imperial General Headquarters on the 18th said - ("According to Radio Intelligence 9 enemy submarines have appeared in the CHICHIJIMA area")

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VI OPERATIONS OF THE WAKE INVASION FORCE

At sunset the 16th, Comdiv 8, Comdiv 2 (less its desdiv) plus the (DDs) TANIKAZE and URAKAZE, under the command of (RADM) ABE, Commander Cruiser Division 8, parted company with the Carrier Strike Force and proceeded southwesterly. After refueling the 17th from the 1st Replenishment Force, the "ABE Force" continued on course with the expectation that the WAKE Invasion Force would reopen its attack on WAKE on December 22nd, and that the "ABE Force" would make its first strike on WAKE at sunrise the same day. However, ^{now} (HQ) Combined Fleet placed the "ABE Force" under the command of Commander South Seas (Mandate) Force for the duration of the WAKE Invasion operations.

Upon the Carrier Strike Force ^{being} directed to support the WAKE invasion, those forces directly concerned with the operation, Comdiv 6 and Com. Inft 24, ^{thereafter} addressed the Carrier Strike Force and Com. Div 8 with so many ^{the} messages ^{and} suggested agreements ^{and} recommended operational arrangements that the entire matter became entirely confused.

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
Finally at 1330 the 17th Comdr South Seas Force issued the order saying WAKE would be attacked on the 22nd and 23rd, and the ABE Unit would cooperate in the operation from the 20th through the 23rd and that the details of this would be coordinated with Com. Div 8 by Com. Div 6 and Com. Inft 24. However, ^{many} the ^{radio} messages ^{involving} ^{this} coordination ^{showed} more complications and confusion. Com. Div 8 grew concerned over the increasing submarine threat to his force, through such radio chatter, and hoping to terminate ^{such} radio exchanges, by issued his outline of operations at 0730 the 18th. The diary of a Com. Div 8 staff officer records the situation at that time:

December 17th. Busily engaged in various negotiations with Comdr South Seas Force regarding the WAKE Invasion arrangements. In lieu of an Operations conference that HQ is sending a stream of messages ^{and} conducting a conference by radio, in regard to our operations. With messages going back and forth, the entire matter ^{became} complicated and confused. Additionally, the more we use our radio, the more dangerous it becomes for us because of enemy submarines. (They're ^{safe} at anchor inside Kure's cove!)

December 18th Since last night three irritating radio conference type messages have continued. We have decided on a solution to this. We will announce clearly our decision saying that any reply will be useless. As the WAKE Invasion Force Reinforcement Force, under the temporary command of Comdr South Seas Force, we will attack that island to destroy enemy aircraft, gun batteries, machine gun nests and enemy positions up to the time of ^{approach} the landing of our forces and will give direct cooperation at the time of our forces' landing. Moreover, if the powerful enemy surface force should appear, we will issue directives to our forces present in the area. ASW patrol aircraft of our force sighted a suspected submarine 40 miles ahead the evening and while things were tense for a while, nothing happened.

On the 20th the ABE Force received a report that American patrol planes (from VP 23) had moved up from MIDWAY to WAKE the previous evening. That evening a message from Comdr. South Seas Force stated that if possible the ABE Force's attack should be advanced by one day to destroy the enemy patrol planes first and the attack on WAKE commenced on the 21st.

As its attack had been moved forward one day, the ABE Force immediately increased speed to 30 knots and headed for WAKE.



At 0345 the 21st the "ABE Force" launched its reconnaissance (followed by its attack force) aircraft, when 350 miles from WAKE to begin its attack. However, no enemy patrol planes were sighted so they attacked the shore installations and withdrew. According to U.S. sources ((postwar)) a patrol plane had flown with mail from Pearl Harbor to WAKE with mail and had taken off for its return flight at 0750, just before the "ABE Force's" attack at 0450.

As there had been no counter attack by any enemy fighters against our attack, we were about to suspend our attack for the 22nd when a report was received that enemy fighters had opposed an attack by land based bombers of Airflot 24. Thereupon, plans were changed and at 0900 we launched an attack which, when about to attack was engaged by enemy fighter aircraft and two of our torpedo-bombers were shot down. Comdr "ABE Force" decided to make another attack to wipe out enemy fighter strength there but learned that the remaining enemy fighter aircraft had been shot down by our previous attack, so cancelled the new attack.

The WAKE Invasion Force commenced their landings on the 23rd and our aircraft were sent to support and patrol that vicinity. Those operations went smoothly and the invasion was successful. The ABE Force's duty now being completed, it recovered its aircraft and headed west at 1350 upon being detached by ComC Combined Fleet to return under the command of Com 1st Air Fleet (Comdr Carrier Strike Force).

During Cardiv 2's operations in conjunction with the Invasion of WAKE, air attacks were mounted as follows:


Dec. 21st 18 Fighters, 27 Dive Bombers with 2 Torpedo Bombers as lead aircraft.

Dec 22nd 6 Fighters, 33 Torpedo-Bombers; 2 enemy fighters shot down; 2 of our Torpedo Bombers shot down; 1 of our Torpedo Bombers hit by enemy fire and forced to ditch, personnel OK.

Dec 23rd 1st sortie: 6 Fighters and 6 Dive Bombers; 2nd sortie: same as 1st;
3rd sortie: 2 Fighters and 9 Torpedo Bombers; 4th sortie: 3 Fighters and 9 Torpedo Bombers.
5th sortie same as 4th sortie.

From 0515 until 1050 - fire suppression and stand-attack missions,

The afternoon of the 24th both destroyers refueled from the SORYU; that day a Tone aircraft which had been on van air patrol, capsized on being recovered and suffered severe damage. Another Tone aircraft had been lost during operations in the Hawaiian Islands and on CHIKUMA, aircraft was lost off WAKE, for a total of 3 planes, but without any personnel casualties. Comdr Carrier Strike Force on the 25th sent orders for the WAKE Attack Force to proceed to KURE. On the 27th that force was joined by Desdiv 23, sent by Comdr South Seas Force to augment ^{the ABE Force's} BSW Screen ^(at 20 knots) for the passage through the Marianas Islands area, where enemy submarines were reported concentrating. Desdiv 23 was detached at 0600 the 27th. That day at 1400 the van air patrol reported a suspected submerged submarine; 9 dive bombers were dispatched for an attack but their target had disappeared. After Cardiv 2 had conducted van air patrols on the 28th all its aircraft were sent on to USIA Air Base. That 0230 that day Desdivs 21 and 27 joined the ABE Force from the Main Body to augment its screen for the passage through the approaches to the BUKADO Channel, the last hazardous sea area.



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War History Series: "HAWAIIAN OPERATIONS (ハवाई作戦)
Chapter 8 page 292: HAWAII SAKUSEN
Collection of Intelligence & Maintenance of Security

The 3rd Department (第3部) of the Naval General Staff was the center of our Navy's collection and evaluation of Intelligence. The Special Duty Group of the Naval General Staff had the responsibility for radio intelligence and the technical aspects of intelligence were allocated to the appropriate sections of the Naval Affairs Department, the Naval Aviation Department and the Technical Research Office of the Navy Department. Directly available also was the information from foreign newspapers, magazines, other publications and radio broadcasts reported from abroad by our Naval Attaches, Naval Inspectors and other personnel stationed overseas. Material from our newspapers, magazines, other publications and radio broadcasts were made available by our Press Section.

Matters relating to our number one hypothetical enemy, the USA, were given priority for collection by naval intelligence; this was the principal responsibility of the 5th Section under the 3rd Division of the Naval General Staff. For this reason, the largest number of our naval Attaches and other personnel stationed overseas were on duty in the United States. For example as of June 4th, 30 officials were assigned to the Office of the Naval Attaché at our Embassy in Washington, D.C. - one Naval Attaché, 2 Assistant Attaches, 3 Attaches, 4 Language Students, 8 Naval Inspectors and 12 Assist. Naval Inspectors, for a total of 30. Of the 3 Attaches, one was assigned to the Office of the Naval Attaché, the other two were assigned to Los Angeles and Seattle. These latter two Attaches Resident on the West Coast of the USA returned to Japan in July 1941. There was a Naval Inspector's Office in New York City, to which the 8 Naval Inspectors and the 12 Assistant Inspectors were assigned but eight of the latter were attached to the Office of the Naval Attaché in Washington DC. With the worsening of US-Japanese relations and freezing of funds in August 1941, the Naval Inspectors and Assistant Inspectors were withdrawn to Japan.

* Of these, one, Uldu TACHIBANA returned to Japan when the U.S. State Department declared him a 'persona non grata' due to his involvement in seeking to obtain classified naval information to the detriment of the United States.

War History Series Vol 24
From (Vol 24) "Naval Invasion Operations in the Philippines and Malay Areas
P. 381

The Malay Invasion Force left SAMS Bay, Hainan Island on 4 December 1941 and formed cruising disposition with the Transport Convoy as per sketch #24. At 0240 the 5th the DD WAKABE (screening to the east of the formation) sighted a Norwegian merchant vessel, the SALDOR (1500 tons) in position 40° distant 135 miles from CAMRANH Bay. It was boarded, inspected and released after being ordered to take an easterly course (away from the Convoy). At 0945 a Japanese patrol plane reported sighting a submarine, 130° distant 196 miles from SAKUR, proceeding on a westerly course at 10 knots.

(6th) SHADOWED BY A BRITISH AIRCRAFT - ORDERED SHOT-DOWN

The weather on the 6th was cloudy with moderate easterly winds, at 1345 all of the escort vessels sighted the silhouette of an airplane above the horizon to the south west where clouds were plentiful. Because of the distance and due to being partially hidden by the clouds, it could not be identified as friendly or enemy. Before long this aircraft moved to the southwest to shadow the Convoy, circling the main Convoy at a distance and also circling and circling the KASHIMA's Convoy. When each force had recognized the aircraft as British, warning reports were issued.

From Descom 2 - "ONE BRITISH AIRCRAFT COURSE SOUTH 1420

From Comdr Escort Force - "ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHADOWING US 1500

The British plane continued its observations, moving outside gunfire range of the Escort Force. Learning of this, V. Adm OZAWA (Comdr MALAY INVASION FORCE) at 1500 sent the 1st and 2nd Air Forces (under his command): SHOOT DOWN THE LARGE BRITISH AIRCRAFT SHADOWING US. POSITION GRID TE 5 MA HO

Previously, on 1 December, the Navy Section, Imp ComHQ had directed (Ref: 1st AMERICAN, BRITISH OR DUTCH AIRCRAFT REPEATEDLY RECONCITERS OUR IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BASES OR TRANSPORT CONVOYS, IT MAY BE SHOT DOWN (See Sketch #25, Page 387))

Admiral Ozawa's order was received by the 'C' Attack Force at their base at SOKTRANG, French Indo China, at 1620; 2 Zero fighters and one land reconnaissance plane took off at 1640 but were unable to make contact with the British aircraft and returned to their base that evening.

7th BRITISH AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

At 0300/7th, Admiral Ozawa, anticipating an attack by British forces on the Convoy, ordered a night search of Area A (See Appendix Map 6) by 3 float-planes of the 2nd Air Force. Initially based at REAM Bay (F.I.C.) several float-planes searched Area A without making any sighting, but on returning to base Reserve Ensign OGATA, Eiichi, pilot of a KAMIKAWA Mam Zero float-scout, sighted a British PBX type flying boat about 20 miles bearing 300° from the islet PUULO PANJANG (N.W. of Point CAMAU - smtn-FIC). He fired a warning burst from his machine gun ahead of and below the British aircraft as a signal warning it to move away from the vicinity of the convoy. The British aircraft did not return the fire and turned away, departing from the area of the convoy. This action was observed by some ten of our army fighter planes which shot it down at 1015. This was reported to Admiral Ozawa at 1100.

Vertical text on the left margin: "I saw 4... Ensign... CHEN... The pilot spotted the wreckage... of Convoy..."

Since the night of Dec 1 imp/HTO has been deeply worried about the possibility of a reaction from the planes... SUAISAKA etc

NAVAL INVASION OPERATIONS IN MALAYA AND PHILIPPINES AREAS

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The Navy Section Imperial General Headquarters sent out information on the 6th (EL Date/5 Dec 1941 W.L.D.) that that morning an aircraft requisitioned by the Army, carrying secret documents concerning the forthcoming operations had made a forced landing on the China Coast and that due to various circumstances it was suspected that those documents had fallen into the hands of the Chinese. Consequently the shooting down of the British aircraft caused great concern over the possibility of Great Britain and Japan becoming prematurely engaged in hostilities which would have a bad effect not only on the Malaya operations but also have an extremely adverse influence on all operations.

Para 6 (The Broken Seal p. 307 sep 5 SUAISAKA etc)

Note: "SUGAKI diary - SEN SO BOKU 戦深録 stated 5 Dec 1941 an aircraft left TAIHOKI for CANTON on the 1st carrying important army operations orders and crash landed on the China Coast. It was subsequently discovered by a Chinese soldier and it was feared that important secrets had fallen in the hands of the enemy. It is said they were the directions for the entire operation in accordance with the order of the Chief of Army General Staff, like those of the Chief of Navy General Staff orders to begin the war during the first 10 days of December. We must keep being warned over this development. Said to be among these orders was the fact that Philippine fighter groups had been ordered to be on 25 minute stand-by. There must be no carelessness about this. Warnings have been radioed to all concerned."

Para 6 (p. 295)

* 2nd Air Force - 3 XAV with rebanked aircraft: KAMIKAWA Mam 6853 tons, 17 knots, SANYO Mam 8360 tons, 18 knots, each with 8 Zero type observation and 4 Zero type Scout planes plus SAZARA Mam, 7185 tons, 17 knots with 6 Zero observation and 2 type 95 (DAVE) Scout float-planes.

"BOISE OPS"

(from "Naval Operations in the North Eastern Area")

NE Date 294

THE U.S. Single engine float plane adrift off Japan

((Note U.S. Marines landed on TORAJI/GUADALCANAL on 8 August 1942))

A search plane from GIZAN air reported at 1130 12 August 1942: "THERE IS ONE ENEMY FLOAT PLANE BEARING 107°, 48.4 MILES FROM BASE" Another message ((probably a follow up message from the same plane)) stated: "IT IS A SINGLE ENGINE, SINGLE FLOAT, 2 SEAT BIPLANE MARKED WITH A STAR" (Note - position given is 112° - 49.0 miles from SHIRIYA (SAKI) (AMUCO 41-20N 141-25E). Next, at 1215, MISAWA AIR transmitted: "SIGHTED CAPSIZED AMERICAN FLOAT SCOUT PLANE BEARING 118° DISTANT 44.6 MILES" and at 1225, another sent: FROM 10,000 METERS LOOKS LIKE AN ENEMY SEAPLANE BEARING 119° DISTANT 43.0 MILES HEADED 120°.

From the first sighting report the Headquarters Combined Fleet estimated that there was a good possibility of an air attack by an American carrier task force and subsequent sightings confirmed the presence of such an enemy force. At 1630 Combined Fleet Radio order # 213 stated: ((121630(3))

- 1. AT 1130 TODAY AN ENEMY FLOAT SCOUT AIRPLANE WAS SIGHTED ADRIFT IN GRID POSITION HI EN 55. THERE IS A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK BY AN ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE ON OUR MAIN ISLANDS.
2. COMDR CARRIER STRIKE FORCE WILL EXPEDITE MOVEMENT OF MOST OF CARRIER AIRGROUPS TO THE TOKYO AREA WHERE THEY WILL COME UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMDR AIRFLOT 22.
3. COMDR SUBMARINE FORCE WILL HAVE AS MANY SUBMARINES AS POSSIBLE PROCEED TO THE AREA TO THE EAST
4. FOR THE TIME BEING, COMDR 2nd FLEET WILL MOVE THROUGH THE AREA TO THE EAST OF CICHIJIMA ((BONIN ISLANDS))
5. ALL FORCES IN HOME WATERS WILL EXERT MAXIMUM VIGILANCE."

Operations of the various forces were:


NORTHERN FORCE - At that time the 1st Patrol Force was on patrol line TA 1 and RE 1 off the 3rd Patrol Force was on patrol lines TA 2 and RE 2 (as scheduled for 1800/12th -- per sketch -> next page). At 1800 Comdr Northern Force ordered the "packet boat(s)" of the 1st Patrol Force in the vicinity of the enemy float plane to attack it. On the 13th the Comdr Patrol Force ordered

the 3rd Patrol Force to search for a drifting capsized enemy float scout-plane, extending their time on station to 1800 the 13th.

Base Air Force - Comdr 22nd Air Flot ordered its land bombers to make preparations for attack and for land bombers of GENZAN Air to concentrate at KISAPATSU early the morning of the 13th, 12 GENZAN bombers moved to KISAPATSU at 0915/13th. Complying with Comdr. Base Air Force directive, Comdr 26th Air Flot ordered land bombers of KISAPATSU to move to MARCUS (MINAMI TORI SIMA) on the 13th. Twenty bombers began their air patrols on the 13th.

Advance Force (2nd Flot) The main force passed through water to the east of 'CHICHI SIMA' as ordered - see sketch below but Desron 2 which had left YOKOSUKA on the 11th for TRUK, continued on at high speed (Note that the Advance Force was already some 300 miles S. of SHIRASU at 1200/12).

SKETCH showing movements of all forces at the time of the sighting of American scout plane, downed & drift off HONSHU August 12 1942



The Carrier Strike Force sent 34VF, 30VB and 29VT to TATEYAMA. Comdr Submarine Force ordered Subron 1 and Subron 3 to make preparations for sortie to the area about 500 miles east of INUBO EZAKI. The I-21 departed YOKOSUKA on the 13th to patrol off Tokyo Bay (it returned to YOKOSUKA the 17th). Subron 1 left YOKOSUKA ^{and KURE} on the 15th; afterward, the I-25 proceeded to the American west coast while the others headed for the SOLOMONS.

In the meantime the Commandant Yokosuka Naval District had ordered his bombers to prepare for attack missions; he had a YOKOSUKA Type 2 (EMIST) flying boat search a line 80° from INUBO EZAKI for 800 miles, stationed the Ro-31 out 100°, 250 miles from the same reference point and ordered the destroyers NAGANAMI and ASASHO of his sea-area defense force to their air-raid deployment positions.

Searches and patrols by Air Flot 22, YOKOSUKA Air and the Northern Force's Patrol Forces on the 13th and searches from MARCUS commenced on the 14th but no sightings nor any intelligence on the enemy were obtained. (American sources, moreover, have no record of this incident, so the above sighting of a capsized float plane must be written off as a mistake or misunderstanding.)

CinC Combnad Fleet 151780 - his radiogram #216 addressed to all forces concerned cancelled the previous alert disposition and terminated the operations. (This incident is covered quite differently in "NAVAL OPERATIONS IN HOME WATERS")

104 E

At the beginning of August, American submarines, which until now had been relatively inactive in the North East Coastal area, now became extremely active there. On the 1st the cargo ship OSHIMAMARU, torpedoed off SHIRAYA SAKI; in succession the MEIWA MARU (sunk), the KOAN MARU (medium damage) were torpedoed. Next on the afternoon of the 4th the FUKUZAN MARU (medium damage), on the 8th the BI FUKU MARU (sunk) and the KISEI MARU were torpedoed. This concentration of American submarine attacks led Adm HIRATA, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District to estimate that an American Carrier Task Force was approaching our main islands from the east, so he ordered YOKOSUKA KINRAL DISTRICT FORCE TO "ATTACK ENEMY SHIPS BY METHOD #1" at 1520 the 12th. (Note this is 1 hour and 10 minutes before CinC Combnad Fleet's 121630) ... On the 12th, Air Flot 22 was ordered on standby for attacks on American Carrier Task Force. No intelligence being available by the 14th, the alert against an American carrier attack was cancelled on the 15th.

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ROUTE OF THE BEARS



An order to cope with the new war situation after the loss of Guadalcanal and with the overall general situation as a background, the Navy Section 1644 issued orders (March) covering the operations pending for the 3rd Phase (of the war) and accordingly, established (April) the wartime organization. The High Command achieving a temporary lull in the Solomon area after the withdrawal from Guadalcanal, changed the direction for primary operations to New Guinea, slaughtered WAB¹² ^{and then} made positive ^{plans} to recapture Port Moresby and carried out Army troop reinforcements. However, the defeat of the LOR Conroy during the above reinforcement operations poured cold water on those offensive plans. However attention should be given to the fact that a section of the Army staff at Long's HQ used that ^{of} ~~fact~~ as the opportunity to start studies to shorten the general front line in the Pacific in connection with building up fighting power.

However, with the safety of Truk as a prerequisite, the Navy hoped to bring about a decisive battle. They finally believed that this was the only way to bring about the enemy's submission. ^{in a decisive battle} ~~the Navy naturally acted to carry out the offensive policy of New Guinea.~~ ^{the only way to bring the enemy's submission was through a decisive battle!}

However, with the safety of Truk as a prerequisite, the Navy hoped to bring about a decisive battle. They finally believed that this was the only way to bring about the enemy's submission. ^{in a decisive battle} ~~the Navy naturally acted to carry out the offensive policy of New Guinea.~~ ^{the only way to bring the enemy's submission was through a decisive battle!}

About the time ^{that} the air and sea attacks by Allied forces against our strategic points in the SE area ^{became} more intense each day, Admiral Yamamoto's line of ^{the} ~~the~~ decision to personally take command of the elite carrier aircraft ^{of the 1st Fleet} ~~of the 1st Fleet~~ ^{was} ~~was~~ ^{formed} ~~formed~~ by the local available air strength to attack Guadalcanal Island and Southern New Guinea (the I Opn was on 1 April) Vice Yamamoto perished in an aircraft crash after the collision of the above fleet.

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
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To be moved up the day, we immediately increase speed to 30 knots and headed toward WAKE (See Sketch 41 page) that force at 0345 the speed

21st Under 8 headed its reconnaissance aircraft followed by the attack force ^{a distance} when ^{at 350 miles from WAKE} to begin the attack. However no enemy patrol planes were sighted so ^{they} attacked the shore installations and ^{King's} ^{at Wake} ^{at 0450} ^{in its return flight} ^{just before} withdrawal. According to US sources (between) the patrol plane ^{was} ^{at Wake} ^{wrote} ^{mail} and had taken off ^{just before} ^{the attack} at 0450 in its return flight just before

~~On~~ As there had been no ~~attack~~ counter attack by every of, on the next day the ~~22nd~~ ^{was} suspended the attack for the 22nd. ^{we received a report that (Crew)} ^{Afterward,} ^{when} ^{bombers} ^{of} ^{24th} ^{AV} ^{Florida} ^{attacked,} ^{they} ^{were} ^{opposed} ^{by} ^{enemy} ^{fighters} ^{etc.}. Therefore we changed our schedule and launched an attack at 0900 the ~~22nd~~; enemy fighters appeared and shot down 7 attacking a/c. The force commander decided to make another attack & sweep up the enemy fighters ^{but} ^{in the previous} ^{attack} ^{the} ^{enemy} ^{had} ^{been} ^{shot} ^{down} ^{so} ^{the} ^{attack} ^{was} ^{cancelled.}

RATHER BE QUILLING COOKBOOK
Crown Art, Quilling note



had been shot down so the attack was cancelled. The Wake Force ~~did not~~ began landy on the 23rd so our aircraft were sent ^{to} support and to patrol the nearby. The strike went smoothly and the invasion was successful. Our duty here was performed on a/c and headed westward at 1350 were relieved by a/c C. ~~Could~~ ^{to} ^{return} ^{to} ^{the} ^{Kodi.}

- 21st 18 ^{VF} ~~VTB~~, 27 bombers and 2 VTB as lead a/c
- 22nd 6 VF, 33 VTB ~~35~~ ^{12 VTB} ^{but} ² ^{enemy} ^{VF} ^{shot} ^{down}, ² ^{of} ^{an} ^{VTB} ^{shot} ^{down}, ¹ ^{VTB} ^{hit} ^{and} ^{incapable} ^{to} ^{ditch} ^{and} ^{perished} ^{OK.}
- 23rd ^{1st} ^{strike} ^{attack} - 6 VF, 6 dive bombers
- 2nd ^{strike} Same as above
- 3rd 2 VF 9 VTB
- 4th 3 VF 9 VTB
- 5th Same

From 0515 to 1030 - fire suppression ashore & attack

414-

P
414

Order to reinforce the Wake Invasion operation

South Sea Force

The Wake Invasion operation (Operation Under Command 6) failed because of high waves and that ~~the~~ ^{temporary} counter attack by several ^{remaining} VF in which 2 DD were lost. It was called off ^{on 11 December to prevent another attempt} and the forces withdrawn to Kwajalein: The enemy VF ^{temporarily} ^{to gain control over} (which) remaining on Wake (there were no ~~it~~ ^{it} deployed in that area to) ^{due to the distance involved, the VF of} and the 24th Air Flot ^{had not} ^{to Wake,} ^{was unable to fly}

The Commander of the Invasion Force on return to Kwajalein requested of Commander South Sea Force to take measures to destroy ^{the} ^{enemy} fighter planes. The latter ^{on the 12th} had requested ~~the~~ ^{the} KCB Fleet for the reinforcement of an aircraft carrier force ^{was not aware} of the ^{the} ^{fact} that it had decided to send a part of the ^{the} ^{Strike} Force to that area after the KCB had completed its assigned attacks on Midway.

Since the GF had not received ^{any} ^{report} ^{message} ^{they} ^{sent} ^{the} ^{KCB} since the 8th due to strict radio silence but the night of the 14th it received a message from ^{the} ^{Carrier} ^{KCB} reporting they had ^{cancelled} ^{off} the attack on Midway. On receipt of that message, HQ GF sent the following to Commander KCB at 150200

- ① 24 AIR FLOT HAS MADE SUCCESSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON WAKE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF WAR AND ^{DESPITE} ^{THE} ^{FACT} ^{THAT} ^{IT} ^{HAS} ^{LOST} ^{CONSIDERABLE} ^{DAMAGE} ^{TO} ^{ITS} ^{FACILITIES} AND AIR POWER. OUR INVASION FORCE LOST TWO DD TO THE ENEMY'S REMAINING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FORCE AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE INVASION AND ARE AT PRESENT PLANNING ANOTHER ATTEMPT
- ② THE CARRIER STRIKE FORCE ^{AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME} WILL ASSIGN A SUITABLE FORCE TO REINFORCE THE SOUTH SEAS FORCE'S WAKE INVASION FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ON WAKE

(415) "1. Due to ^{the} ^{reinforcement} of the Wake Invasion Force, the KCB was forced to send more and more messages which was dangerous in view of enemy submarine activity. Later a ^{message} ^{from} ^{Commander} ^{South} ^{Sea} ^{Force} showed their plan to invade WAKE between January 20th and 23rd and wanted the KCB to attack WAKE with full force on the 20th. ^{Because} ^{of} ^{repeating} ^{and} ^{other} ^{messages} this was not satisfactory to the KCB, who planned to assign Carrier 2 to cooperate with the S. Sea Force, so KCB P sent the following

message at 1600 the 16th (161600)

AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ^{FOR} ^{COMMAND} ^{OF} ^{COM} ^{GROUPS} ^{HAS} ^{COOPERATED} ^{IN} ^{THE} ^{WAKE} ^{INVASION} ^{OPERATIONS} ^{WITH} ^{ITS} ^{AIR} ^{POWER} ^{ON} ^{ABOUT} ^{THE} ^{20TH}, IT SHOULD RETURN TO HOME WATERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PREPARE FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS

After sunset the 16th ~~they~~ ~~the~~ ~~ABE~~ Force under the command of ~~the~~ ~~ABE~~ the Com Order 8, started company fort the KdB ~~and~~ ^{After} ^{with} a ^{unit} ^{repelled} for the 1st Republic Force, ^{operated} on 17th they headed South intending to carry out their first attack ~~at dawn~~ ~~to be~~ with the expectation that the Lind Wake Attack Force would carry out its first attack at dawn on December 22nd. Subsequently, the Command Head (HQ) had placed that unit under the command of Order South Seas Force for the duration of the operation.

As stated previously, ^{the KdB had been} after being placed to support the Wake ^{invasion} ~~operation~~ ^{the HQ of} ^{Desm 6 and} ^{staff} ^{of} ^{the} ^{forces} ^{on} ^{the} ^{spot} ^{directly} ^{concerned} addressed the KdB and ^{PR} 85

^{so many} inquiries with regard to ^{command} ^{agreed} ^{to} ^{the} ^{matter} ^{became} ^{extremely} ^{confused} ^{at} ¹³³⁰ ^{the} ^{17th} ^{the} ^{4th} ^{Fleet} ^{ordered} ^{that} ^{Wake} ^{would} ^{be} ^{attacked} ^{on} ^{the} ^{22nd} ^{and} ^{23rd} ^{and} ^{that} ^{the} ^{unit} ^{sent} ^{from} ^{the} ^{KdB}

⁴²⁶ ^I would cooperate in the operation ^{roughly} ^{from} ^{the} ^{20th} ^{through} ^{the} ^{23rd} ^{the} ^{4th} ^{Desm 6} ^{and} ^{Annex} ²⁴ would arrange the details of ^{cooperation} ^{for} ^{the} ^{operation}

with HQ Order 8. Accordingly messages regarding ^{cooperation} ^{for} ^{the} ^{operation} became complicated and ^{Command} ^{Order} ⁸ ^{was} ^{concerned} ^{over} ^{ASW} ^{patrols}, ^{hoping} ^{to} ^{terminate} ^{the} ^{inquiry} ^{issued} ^{his} ^{order} ^{of} ^{operation}. ^{regarding} ^{Command} ^{Order} ⁸ ^{Staff} ^{Officer}, ^{Kingita's}, ^{diary} ^{recorded} ⁱⁿ ^{his} ^{diary} ^{log} the circumstances as follows

Dec 17th

^{various} ^{all} ^{branches} ^{of} ^{the} ^{force} ^{occupied} ^{with} ^{negotiations} ^{with} ^{the} ^{4th} ^F ^{with} ^{regard} ^{to} ^{the} ^{WAKE} ^{invasion}. ^{Lacking} ^{an} ^{action} ^{plan} ^{the} ^{4th} ^{Fleet} ^{is} ^{sending} ^{many} ^{radios} ^{to} ^{conduct} ^a ^{campaign} ^{by} ^{radio} ^{regarding} ^{our} ^{reinforcement}. ^{With} ^{radios} ^{going} ^{back} ^{and} ^{forth}, ^{orders} ^{become} ^{confused} ^{and} ^{confused}. ^{Consequently} ^{the} ^{more} ^{we} ^{use} ^{the} ^{radios} ^{the} ^{more} ^{dangerous} ^{became} ^{of} ^{every} ^{submarine}. ^{to} ^{the}

Dec 18th

Since last night ^{radio} ^{message} irritating conference had continued, we have decided on a solution to this: ^{announced} ^{our} ^{decisions}, ^{saying} ^{that} ^a ^{reply} ^{is} ⁱⁿ ^{order}. ^{Along} ^{with} ^{the} ^{temporary} ^{command} ^{of} ^{the} ^{Order} ^{South} ^{Seas} ^{Force} ^{that} ^{command} ^{called} ^{was} ^{the} ^{WAKE} ^{Invasion} ^{Force} ^{Reinforcement} ^{Force} ^{and} ^{we} ^{will} ^{attack} ^{that} ^{island} ^{up} ^{to} ^{the} ^{invasion}

WAKE

^{to} ^{destroy} ^{every} ^{aircraft}, ^{gun} ^{batteries}, ^{machine} ^{gun} ^{emplacements} ^{and} ^{at} ^{the} ^{time} ^{of} ^{the} ^{landing}. ^{Moreover} ^{if} ^{any} ^{surface} ^{force} ^{should} ^{appear}, ^{we} ^{will} ^{take} ^{direct} ^{the} ^{forces} ^{present} - ^{ASW} ^{patrol} ^{by} ^{means} ^{of} ^{the} ^{WAKE} ^{INVASION} ^{Reinforcement} ^{Force}, ^{on} ^{the} ^{evening} ^{of} ^{the} ^{18th} sighted what appeared to be ⁴⁰ ^{miles} ^{ahead}; ^{both} ^{things} ^{were} ^{there} ⁱⁿ ^a ^{line}, ^{nothing} ^{developed}

On the 20th the WAKE Invasion Reinforcement Force received a ^{reconnaissance} ^{report} that an American Patrol Squadron (VP 23) had advanced ^{from} ^{the} ^{midway} ^{to} ^{WAKE} the previous evening. ^{That} ^{evening} ^{the} ^{Order} ^{South} ^{Seas} ^{Force} ^{the} ^{order} ^{that} ^{if} ^{at} ^{all} ^{possible} ^{the} ^{opening} ^{of} ^{the} ^{attack} ^{on} ^{WAKE} ^{would} ^{be} ^{advanced} ^{one} ^{day}, ^{that} ^{the} ^{actual} ^{invasion} ^{would} ^{be} ^{commenced} ^{on} ^{the} ^{21st} ^{and} ^{first} ^{goal} ^{is} ^{to} ^{destroy} ^{every} ^{patrol} ^{plane}. ^{Thus} ^{the} ^{attack} ^{was}

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quilt patterns, though, in being composed of triangles and squares. Roast leg of lamb wouldn't be the same without the traditional suggestion of mint.

(418) As the danger from enemy shore based reconnaissance had diminished the principal emphasis was on ASW, using some bombers and cruising westward in Cruising Formation #12 (See page 418 - Sketch #34). On the 15th the combat air patrol ops were stretched below the danger zone standard by, and Card 5 given the duty of ASW and Vesp patrols from sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset.

On the 15th the wx was bad, not fairly high waves and rain but fortunately Card 2 and the Screen repaired. Afterward visibility worsened so Reduced Visibility Formation (Form #13) was taken (Sketch 35 page 420).

At 2150 on the 15th a message for GF was received. Study of Enemy Situation as of AM the 15th: about 2 in the vicinity of Tokyo Bay the 11th. Approx 2 within a radius of 100 miles of HAWASIMA on the 10th, 1-3 near the entrance of Bungo Channel since the 13th.

At 0200 on the 16th received a message for Navy Sect by Card 2 saying "Aircraft reported one (A) NE of Marcus by R/I 14th" one 79° for CHICHU, 64°, 65°, 66° (at which 40 miles when have appeared off Tokyo Bay or Bungo Channel.

16th 1745 (rec'd) Navy Sect 1st her info

on 15th 2350 one 87° + one 123° for SHIONOMISAKI

" 16th 0130 one 58° and one 65° for HAWASIMA

16th for MARCUS 12 (in manufacturing)

~~1208~~ 1 A at 1208 45° - 560 miles

weather finally cleared after 17th - 1st day since 9th when air ops could be carried out

17th one bulk sighted sub at 0950 (later identified as a whale)

17th reports: rec'd 0700 Yokosuka Comm Unit reported 2 Kals E of Hachigo jima

rec'd 1075 for GF RI 15th 2330 - 0620 45°/68° for Chudigima (80 miles)

1 - 18° for TRUK; SHIONOMISAKI 87° - 107, 123° total 16

1 sighted in W Inland Sea - search underway with known

Rec'd 1122 for Yokosuka Comm Unit

at 1930/16th suspected A 33-05 N 139-45 E

Retreat - rather good

NE.
273 Japanese Navy attempts to "recover secret documents from a
"sunk U.S. Submarine" in the ALEUTIANS

On July 5th at 0345 (J) the (DD) NENOH along with the FUSISAN MAMA was about to take on fuel when it sighted an American submarine about 1000 meters astern; it immediately cast off and made depth charge attacks, reporting it had sunk the enemy submarine in a position 180°-1000 meters from GIBSON Island in Chichiyagoff Bay. On the 25th the Chief of Staff ST. Fleet asked that the NENOH be sent to examine the depth and plant a buoy on the spot of the sinking of the enemy submarine so that secret documents from the submarine could be recovered. The NENOH carried out the assignment but could not discover (find) the sunken submarine. When a ^{seablane} float plane force made ASW searches and patrols, it was attacked by U.S. military planes and retired to the seas to the west of AGAT Island.

"In our traditional way (we will) close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks."
(in order)

Air Reconnaissance from Japanese Submarine → 30 Nov 1941 - Nov 1942

Date	Submarine	Place	Remarks
30 Nov '41	I-10	SUVA BAY	night
17 Dec '41	I-7	P.H. © ✓	Dawn
5 Jan '42	I-19	P.H. © ✓	night
7 Feb '42	I-25	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 Feb '42	I-9	P.H. © ✓	night
26 Feb '42	I-25	Melbourne	Dawn
1 Mar '42	I-25	HOBART	Day
"	I-25	Wellington	pre-dawn
13 March '42	I-25	Auckland	" "
19 March '42	I-25	SUVA	Dawn
"	I-10	DA-BAN	-
7 May '42	I-30	ADEN	Dawn
8 " "	I-30	JIBOUTI	"
19 " "	I-30	Zanzibar	"
19 " "	I-30	DAR-ES-SALAAM	"
19 " "	I-21	SUVA BAY	Dawn
23 " "	I-29	SYDNEY	"
24 " "	I-21	AUCKLAND	Dawn
25 May 1942	I-9	KISKA, ANCHITRA	-
26 May 1942	I-9	KISKA	-
27 May 1942	I-19	while preparing for a night flight on the north side of BOGOSLOV IS, an enemy destroyer was sighted. One submerged - badly damaging our plane.	
27 May 1942	I-25	KODIAK	Day
29 May 1942	I-21	SYDNEY	Dawn
30 May "	I-10	DIEGO SUAREZ	night
31 May "	I-10	"	"
1 June 1942	I-10	Search of coast of Diego Suarez	night
9 August 1942	I-25	Oregon state	night
29 August 1942	I-25		
29 August 1942	I-25	SEYCHELLES IS	Day
30 August '42	I-19	SUDEKO To	-
13 Oct '42	I-7	Espirito Santo	Dawn
19 Oct '42	I-19	Noumea	-
30 Oct '42	I-9	Noumea	Dawn
2 Nov '42	I-8	Efate	moonlight 0000-0030
4 Nov '42	I-31	SUVA	0100
4 Nov '42	I-9	Noumea	Dawn
8 Nov '42	I-7	VANIKORO IS	Dawn
11 Nov '42	I-21	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov '42	I-9	ESPIRITO SANTO	Dawn

M1
137
F

Miscellaneous Notes Miscellany

At the beginning of the war Cardiv 3 (HOSHIO & ZUIHO and 2 DD) was disestablished and the ZUIHO and HOSHIO were "attached" to the 1st Air Fleet. On 3 May (or 4) the JUNYO (ex KASHIWARA Maru) was included in Cardiv 4 (until then the RYUJO and SHOHU) making it a 3 ship Division but the SHOHU was sunk on May 7 (1942). The sister ship of the JUNYO, the HIYO, completed her conversion in July and joined the JUNYO, the three ships forming a division. At that time there was no intention to form a 3 ship Division.

大
260
F
261
F

Reference Note In this "Renraku Kaigi" (連絡会議) the following was listed as to the Navy's vesants and losses from the beginning of the war up to 7 March (1942).
① NAVY VESSELS - Battleships: Sunk: 5 U.S.; 2 British; Heavy/medium damaged: 4 U.S. Aircraft Carriers: Sunk: 2 U.S. Cruisers: Sunk: 4 U.S.; 3 British; 4 Dutch, ^{Heavy/medium} damaged: 8 U.S.; 1 British, 1 Dutch Destroyers: Sunk: 8 U.S., 10 British, 4 Dutch; Heavy/medium damaged: 6 U.S.; 5 British. Submarines Sunk: 44; Heavy/medium damage 15.
② Merchant Ships Sunk - 105 vessels 600,000 tons; Heavy/medium damaged 91 ships 320,000 tons Captured - under investigation. 2657 LOSSES 27 ships sunk.
③ Aircraft - shot down 461; damaged, set aside 76. "Self destroyed" and "failed to return" 122. Also the Army listed ^{losses} damages as follows: Personnel losses KIA 7,000 men ^{wounded} 14,000. Ship losses about 100,000 tons sunk, 200,000 tons damaged (of these 60,000 tons can be restored) Aircraft losses (up to February) 440.

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The full text of speech given by the chief of staff of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines

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OCT 23 1942

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Section 9. *General Affairs*

WARNING

(June 25, 1942.)

*CONCERNING THE SURRENDER OF REMNANTS' GUERRILLA
RESISTANCE*

Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, Commander-in-Chief of the USAFFE in the Philippines, in order to avoid further futile sacrifice, ordered on the 7th of May the surrender of the entire USAFFE in the Philippines.

Moreover, recognizing the fruitlessness of guerilla warfare to the general situation, he also ordered on the 18th of May last to stop all guerilla activities of little bands.

Now, the Japanese Forces have disarmed almost all of the Fil-American Forces and constabulary corps, and in accordance with International Laws concentrating them under complete protection, and at the same time occupying all the Philippine Islands completely, and detailing and stationing forces at various places to guard and protect the life and property of law-abiding people.

The general public, having confidence in the Japanese Forces, are endeavoring to do their best in their respective work; and peace and order is almost perfectly restored.

But it is very regrettable and sad for the Philippines that some persons, by whom the order was not thoroughly understood, or beguiled by some absurd rumors, are continuing their futile resistance against the Japanese Forces. But even these persons, if they surrender themselves by the end of June, 1942, will especially be guaranteed the safety of their lives by the Imperial Japanese Forces, and will be treated as Prisoners of War in accordance with International Laws. But those who will not surrender, will be severely punished according to the Military Law.

Don't repent too late by continuing your futile resistance and letting this best chance for you to surrender slip by.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE
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GREATER EAST ASIA WAR BULLETIN

December 8th:

The Imperial Japanese Navy sank two battleships, seriously damaged four battleships, four first class cruisers, and destroyed many planes of the United States in Hawaii.

American gun-boat *Penguin* was sunk off Guam Island.

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces successfully landed at Kota Bharu, Malay Peninsula.

December 9th:

The Japanese submarines sank a U. S. navy transport in Manila Bay.

December 10th:

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces effected successful landing at a point in Northern Luzon.

The combined forces of the Japanese Army and Navy effected landing at Guam Island.

The Japanese Naval Air Forces completely destroyed the main forces of the British Asiatic Fleet off the east coast of Malay Peninsula.

December 13th:

The Imperial Japanese Forces attacking Hongkong completely occupied Kowloon.

December 16th:

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the combined forces of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy effected successful landing at British North Borneo.

December 18th:

The Imperial Japanese Forces effected successful landing at Hongkong.

The Imperial Japanese Forces occupied Penang, an important point located at the west coast of Malay Peninsula.

December 20th:

Defying enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces effected successful landing at dawn at a point in Mindanao.

December 22nd:

Large Imperial Japanese Forces effected landing at a point in Luzon.

December 23rd:

The Imperial Navy's Landing Corps completely occupied Wake Island.

December 24th:

The Imperial Japanese Forces landed at Lamon Bay in Eastern Luzon.

December 25th:

Governor-General Young of Hongkong surrendered and the High Command of the Imperial Japanese Forces ordered to stop firing at 7 p.m.

Kuching, capital of Borneo, was completely occupied.

December 28th:

A Victor's Parade was held at Hongkong.

Ipoh in Malay Peninsula was occupied.

December 29th:

Corregidor fortress was heavily bombed.

December 30th:

The Imperial Navy's Aviation Corps heavily bombed Singapore fortress at dawn.

December 31st:

Kelantan in the Malay Peninsula was occupied.

The Imperial Japanese Units which landed at British North Borneo successfully occupied Brunei.

January 1st:

Labuan Island in British North Borneo was completely occupied.

January 2nd:

Manila was completely occupied.

January 4th:

Rabaul, the capital of New Britain Islands, was heavily bombed.

January 6th:

Kampar, an important point in the west coast of Malay Peninsula, was occupied.

January 8th:

USS *Langley* was sunk at a point southeast of Johnston Islands.

January 9th:

The Japanese Navy's Landing Corps effected landing at Masbate, an island located south of Luzon.

January 11th:

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces landed successfully at Tarakan, Borneo and Menado, Celebes, at dawn.

January 12th:

The occupation of Menado was completed.

January 13th:

The Imperial Japanese Naval Units sank the 1,291 ton Dutch warship *Prins Van Oranje*.

January 14th:

Serembau and Seban in Negri Sumiran province in Malay Peninsula were occupied.

January 19th:

Lieutenant-General Rensuke Isogai was appointed Governor-General of Hongkong.

The Imperial Navy's Special Landing Corps occupied Rikpa, Celebes. Tavoy, Burma, was completely occupied.

January 22nd:

Kavcuret, Burma, was completely occupied.

January 23rd:

Landing was effected near Rabaul, New Britain and at Kabieng, New Ireland.

January 24th:

The combined forces of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy successfully landed at Balik Papan, Borneo, at dawn.

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces effected successful landing at Kendari, Celebes, at dawn.

Kabieng, New Ireland, and Tawao of British Borneo fell completely in Japanese hands.

January 25th:

Balik Papan, Borneo, was completely occupied.

January 26th:

Klang, an important point in Malay Peninsula, was occupied.

January 27th:

Landing was effected at Pamangkat, located at the northern end of Borneo.

January 29th:

The Imperial Japanese destroyers engaged in a fierce naval battle with the British destroyers off Endau sank British destroyer *Sanet*.

Pontianak, an important point in Borneo, was occupied.

January 31st:

Complete occupation of Johore-Bharu was effected. Moulmein in Burma was also occupied.

February 3rd:

The Imperial Japanese Navy's Aviation Corps effected the first air attack on Java Island, shooting down or destroying on the ground eighty five enemy planes.

February 4th:

The Imperial Japanese Navy's Aviation Corps attacked the enemy's main forces accompanied by several destroyers at a point south of Kangean Islands, Java Sea, and sank three enemy cruisers, thus destroying the main forces of the Netherland East Indies Navy.

February 5th:

Thirty-four enemy planes were either shot down or destroyed on the ground at Tjimbaling and Surabaya.

The Imperial Naval Air Forces made a surprise attack on the enemy convoy at a point near Singapore, setting fire upon a ten thousand ton vessel.

A first-class enemy destroyer was sunk in Java Sea.

February 6th:

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces carried out fierce attacks upon the airfields in Rangoon, Palembang, and Muntok, Mingaradong in Banka Island, shooting down twenty-eight enemy planes each at Palembang and Muntok, and twelve enemy planes at Mingaradong.

February 7th:

Defying heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire, the Imperial Japanese Air Forces attacked Palembang airfield, shooting down or destroying on the ground fifty enemy planes.

A heavy bombing was carried out upon Mingaradong airfield.

A communique was issued by the Imperial Headquarters that, in the course of extensive naval operations since the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War up to January 31st, the Imperial Japanese Naval Forces sank or destroyed twenty-nine enemy submarines and fifty-two enemy merchantmen, totalling thirty-one thousand tons.

February 8th:

A fierce aerial attack was carried out upon Palembang aerodrome, shooting down or destroying on the ground seventeen enemy planes.

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces succeeded in crossing the Salwin River in Burma.

A communique was issued by the Imperial Headquarters that, in the course of extensive operations in Hongkong and South Seas since the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, the Imperial Japanese Army and Air Forces sank ninety-two enemy warships and merchantmen and shot down or destroyed on the ground one thousand thirty-eight enemy planes.

February 9th:

The Imperial Japanese Forces attacking Singapore Island made a new epoch in history by the successful crossing of the Johore Strait at 12:20 a.m., the bridge thus falling into the hands of the Imperial Japanese Forces.

At seven o'clock p.m. Tengeh airdrome was completely occupied.

Maccasar, Celebes and Gasmata, New Britain, were completely occupied.

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces subjected Batavia to a large scale air raid.

February 10th:

Martaban, an important point located at the right bank of Salwin River, was completely occupied.

Banjermassin, Borneo, was completely occupied.

February 11th:

The Imperial Japanese Forces occupied Bukitima Hill, Singapore Island, and entered Singapore city at eight o'clock a. m. on the auspicious occasion of the Empire Day.

The Imperial Japanese Naval Parachutists made a successful operation at Menado, Celebes.

The Imperial Headquarters issued a communique that, in the course of extensive operations in Malaya front, the Imperial Japanese Naval Forces sank two enemy battleships, two destroyers, one army transport, twenty-two merchantmen and either shot down or destroyed on the ground one hundred twenty-four planes.

February 12th:

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces carried out a surprise attack upon a group of enemy merchantmen preparing to flee from Singapore Harbor, and sank one ten thousand ton class, one three thousand ton class, two seven thousand ton class and nine one thousand ton class enemy merchantmen.

February 13th:

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces attacked Palembang airfield, shooting down or destroying on the ground nine enemy planes.

February 14th:

The Imperial Japanese Army Parachutists succeeded in a surprise landing at Palembang, Sumatra.

February 15th:

At seven-fifty p.m., Lt.-General Percival, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces, surrendered unconditionally.

There were around seventy three thousand war prisoners (twenty-eight generals) including Lt.-General Percival.

The communique was issued by the Imperial Headquarters that in the course of extensive naval operations in Malaya the Imperial Japanese Naval Forces sank one light cruiser of *Alexa* type, one auxiliary cruiser, one submarine, two gunboats, one minelayer, one transport, one merchantman of thirty-thousand ton class, one merchantman of eight thousand ton class, four merchantmen of five thousand ton class and two merchantmen of three thousand ton class; caused serious damages on one Netherland East Indies cruiser, one destroyer, two army transports, ten merchantmen and one torpedo boat; and caused the agrounding of one minelayer and one merchantman.

Defying heavy enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces effected landing at a point near Muntok and occupied Pangkal Pinang, an important point of Banca Island.

February 16th:

The Imperial Japanese Naval Forces completed the occupation of Singapore Harbor.

Beginning with this day, Singapore has been renamed "Shonan".

City of Birin in Burma was occupied.

Two enemy cruisers were either sunk or agrounded and two large size enemy merchantmen were sunk at a point south of Gaspar Strait.

February 17th:

The Imperial Japanese Naval vessels reached Palembang, Sumatra.

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces that staged air raid upon Keepang, Dutch Timor, sank one enemy merchantman of three thousand ton class.

Five enemy warships and merchantmen were either sunk or captured off the coast of Sumatra.

February 18th:

Defying enemy resistance, the Imperial Japanese Forces succeeded in crossing Birin River, Burma.

The Imperial Japanese Naval Air Forces staged a heavy air raid upon Soerabaya, shooting down thirteen American warplanes and inflicting many direct hits upon five enemy destroyers hiding within the said harbor.

Without bloodshed, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied Islands situated at a point south of Shonan.

February 19th:

The combined forces of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy completed occupation of Denpasar, Bali.

The Imperial Japanese Naval Air Forces carried out a series of air raids upon Port Darwin, Australia, shooting down or destroying on the ground twenty-six enemy planes, sinking or inflicting serious damages on fourteen enemy warships and merchantmen, thereby causing great shock upon Britain and Australia.

Five enemy flying fortresses were destroyed on the ground at a point in Bali Island.

Heavy air raid was staged by the Imperial Japanese Air Forces at Bawean Island, situated at a point north of Soerabaya.

The Imperial Japanese Army Air Forces attacked, in defiance of heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire, Buitenzorg air base, situated at a point south of Batavia, shooting down or destroying on the ground a total of twenty-seven American and Netherland East Indies planes.

Nineteen enemy planes were destroyed in a raid over Bandoing airfield.

February 20th:

The Imperial Japanese Government issued a statement concerning the new operations in Portuguese Timor.

The Imperial Japanese Naval Squadron consisting mainly of destroyers encountered the enemy naval squadron composed of American and Dutch cruis-

ers and destroyers, at Lombok Strait, and after a severe naval engagement, sank four enemy destroyers and inflicted serious damages upon the Dutch cruisers of *Java* type and *Tromp* type, and one destroyer.

The Imperial Japanese Forces occupied Tenjong Karali, situated at the southeastern part of Sumatra.

The Imperial Japanese Parachutists carried out a surprise attack again at a point near Koepang, Dutch Timor.

The combined forces of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy effected landing at Koepang and Delhi.

The Imperial Japanese Army Units operating in Pintong Island occupied two points of the said island without bloodshed.

An airbase in Delhi was also completely occupied.

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces carried out a heavy air raid over Karijiana airbase in western Java, shooting down or destroying on the ground twenty-seven American and Dutch planes.

February 21st:

The third raid over Port Darwin, Australia, was carried out.

A unit of the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Forces, in a suicidal attack upon a strong enemy naval unit which included an aircraft carrier, inflicted serious damages upon the aircraft carrier (which was believed to have been sunk) and another warship.

Feb. 22nd:

The Squadrons of the Imperial Japanese Air Forces carried out heavy air raids upon various enemy airfields in Java and Burma, shooting down or destroying on the ground a total of thirty-nine American, British and Dutch planes.

February 23rd:

Lahat, located about eighty kilometers southeast of Palembang, Sumatra, was occupied, at which point an Imperial Japanese sea plane, after a dogfight, shot down an enemy three-motored flying boat.

February 24th:

The Imperial Japanese submarines bombarded a point eight kilometers north of Santa Barbara, California, thus terrifying the American people.

The Imperial Japanese Naval Units stationed at "Otori" Island (formerly Wake Island) successfully counter-attacked the enemy fleet, consisting of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and six destroyers, setting fire on a cruiser, scoring direct hits upon a first class cruiser and a destroyer and shooting down five enemy planes.

The Imperial Japanese Forces bombed Port Moresby, New Guinea.

The Imperial Japanese Air Forces raided, by surprise, various airfields in Java, shooting down or destroying on the ground a total of sixty-eight enemy planes.

The units of the Imperial Japanese Air Forces which carried out air raids on Batavia scored direct hits on a light cruiser and two merchantmen of three thousand tons.

Another unit of the Imperial Japanese Air Forces bombed and sank two Dutch merchantmen at a point south of Ampan Island.

The Imperial Japanese Forces captured a Dutch merchantman and a tanker at a point near Timor.

February 25th:

In a raid on Kalijatjic air base of western Java, the Imperial Japanese Air Forces either shot down or destroyed on the ground a total of thirty-seven enemy planes.

In a raid on Mandalay and Mingaradong aerodromes in Burma, the Imperial Japanese Air Forces either shot down or destroyed on the ground a total of thirty-four enemy planes.

February 26th:

Heavy raids were conducted along all enemy bases in Java.

February 27th:

The Imperial Naval Squadrons operating in Java Sea successfully sank one enemy cruiser and three destroyers in a major naval engagement with the main forces of Allied in Southwestern Pacific Fleet, in Java Sea at six p.m., and continued mopping up operations.

The Imperial Headquarters issued a communique that, in the course of extensive aerial operations carried out over Dutch East Indies and New Guinea since February 10th up to the 18th of the same month, the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Forces shot down or destroyed on the ground a total of ninety-nine American, British and Dutch planes.


February 28th:

Intercepting the thirteen enemy planes coming from Australia, the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Forces shot all of them down at a point south of Java Sea.

第十三警戒航行序列

(第五航空戰隊戰時日誌)

挿圖第三十五



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SRH-125 Friedman's view of Magar vs Hirohito
of PBOWA

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223 } 1930, '33, '34, '35
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SRH 211 Picopa Bull 5-45 "Jap. Comrad's"

FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

* MONOGRAPH #118 Jap. Naval Comrad's

Jap. messages SRN 131xxx - 13xxx Series

SRH-012 Role of Radio Intelligence in
the B* War August 41 - July 42
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JR Coral Hunting
JR August (Litho)
Phapang in PIRATE
Maps: Japan/China/Taiwan/Korea

CINCOPAC/Halsey crosses MARSHALLS RING


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ROUTE OF THE BEARS



An order to cope with the new war situation after the
loss of Guadalcanal and with the overall general situation
as a background, the Navy ^{Staff} Section 16, HQ, issued orders (March)
covering the operations policy for the 3rd Phase (of the war) and
accordingly, established (April) the wartime organization. The High
Command, achieving a temporary lull in the Solomons area after
the withdrawal from Guadalcanal, changed the direction for
primary operations to New Guinea, slaughtered WALS in ^{and then} made positive
plans to reconstitute Port Moresby and carried out Army troop
replacements. However, the defeat of the LBE convoy during
the above reinforcement operations poured cold water
on these offensive plans. However attention should be given
to the fact that a section of the Army staff at Imp 6 HQ used this ^{as}
as the opportunity to start studies to shorten the general front line
in the Pacific in connection with building up fighting power.

However, with the ^{reality} the TRK exchange as a prerequisite,
the Navy ^{has} the policy of ^{keeping} the ^{idea} of ^{being} the ^{Army's}
submarine was through a ^{series} ^{of} ^{battles}


However, with the safety of trucks as a prerequisite, the Navy
hoped to bring about a decisive battle. They finally, although they
think over the subject to bring about the enemy's ^{in the end}
they naturally acted to carry out the offensive policy of New Guinea.
Believing that a withdrawal was not actually a defeat.

About the time ^{that} the air and sea attacks by Allied
forces against our strategic points in the SE area ^{became}
more intense each day, Admiral Yamamoto, and ⁱⁿ ^{the} ^{face} of ^{the}
decision action of ^{his} ^{submarine} ^{command} of ^{the}
elite carrier aircraft of ^{the} ^{fleet} ^{group}, found by the local
available air strength to attack Guadalcanal Island and
Southern New Guinea (the I-Opinaka on early April) Civil
Yamamoto perished. in an aircraft crash after the ^{completion}
of the above quest

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日の攻撃を控えていたところ、その後第二十四航空戦隊の陸攻が攻撃した際、敵戦闘機の抵抗があったとの報を入手した。そこで予定を変更して二十二日〇九〇〇発進で攻撃を行なったところ、敵戦闘機が出現し、わが艦攻二機が撃墜されるに至った。増援部隊指揮官はこの敵戦闘機掃蕩のため再度攻撃を決意したが、すでに前回の攻

撃の際、この敵戦闘機を撃墜していたことが判明し攻撃を取り止めた。

翌二十三日には攻略部隊の敵前上陸があり、それを支援するため飛行機を派遣するとともに周囲の警戒を行なった。作戦は順調に経過し攻略に成功したのでウェーキ攻略増援部隊は飛行機を収容し、任務を終わって西方に向かい、一三五〇第四艦隊司令長官の指揮下を離れ機動部隊に復帰した。


この、第二航空戦隊のウェーキ攻略作戦における攻撃隊の使用状況は次のとおりである。

- 二十一日 艦戦一八機、艦爆二七機、誘導艦攻二機
 - 二十二日 艦戦六機、艦攻三三機、敵戦闘機二機撃墜、艦攻二機被撃墜、艦攻一機被弾不時着人員無事
 - 二十三日
 - 第一次 艦戦六機、艦爆六機
 - 第二次 同右
 - 第三次 艦戦二機、艦攻九機
 - 第四次 艦戦三機、艦攻九機
 - 第五次 同右
- 〇五一五から一〇五〇まで、上空制圧、攻撃
- 二十三日一三三五〇の聯合艦隊電令により、南洋部隊指

挿図第四十一

第十三警戒航行序列
(第五航空戦隊戦時日誌)

挿図第三十五



日没三〇分後までこれを実施させ、別に第一、第二航空戦隊については対潜攻撃のため各艦艦爆三機ずつを甲板待機とさせ、そのほか第八戦隊にも前路警戒および追尾潜水艦警戒を命じた。⁽³⁾

この十五日は雨で天候不良、波浪も相当高く、辛うじて第二航空戦隊と警戒隊に燃料補給を行なったが、その後視界が不良となってきたので、日没後から狭視界に備え第十三警戒航行序列(挿図第三十五参照)とした。

機動部隊は十四日夜ミッドウェー攻撃取り止めの電報を発信してから、ウエーキ攻略作戦支援に関連し連続電波を出さざるを得なくなり、対潜慮慮上大いに不安を感じていた。この電報の往復は十六日夕刻まで頻繁に続き、ウエーキ攻撃隊分離後も同攻撃隊は南洋部隊からの連続する打ち合わせ電に悩まされていた。

十六日夕刻機動部隊本隊はウエーキ攻撃隊を分離し、予定航路を小笠原諸島北方に向かって航進を続けたが、案の定敵潜水艦に関する情報が次のとおり連続した。⁽³⁾


十五日二一五〇受信 聯合艦隊から(要旨)

十五日午前までの敵潜発見状況


東京湾付近十一日約二隻、母島十日一〇〇浬圏内約二隻、

挿図第三十四

第十二警戒航行序列
(第五航空戦隊戦時日誌)



夜間又ハ対潜直衛機ナキ場合ノ駆逐艦配備




TRACK of the WAKE ATTACK FORCE

ウエーキ攻撃隊行動図

藤田日記等

as drawn in the FUJITA Diary



揮官の指揮を解かれ機動部隊に復帰したウエーキ攻撃隊は、前路および対潜警戒を厳にしながら西進し、二十四日午後には「蒼龍」から駆逐艦に燃料を補給した。


この日前路警戒の「利根」飛行機一機は揚収の際転覆大破し、第八戦隊はハワイ沖で「利根」、ウエーキ沖で「筑摩」が各一機を失っていたので、これで合計三機の損耗となったが、いずれも人員に異状はなかった。

翌二十五日、ウエーキ攻撃隊は機動部隊指揮官から呉に入港するよう電令を受けた。

二十六日には警戒のため南洋部隊から派遣された第二十三駆逐隊と合同して、敵潜存在の疑いのあるマリアナ諸島線海面を二〇節で突破した後、二十七日〇六〇〇同駆逐隊を分離した。(挿図第四十二参照)

ところが同日一四〇〇、前路哨戒機が潜没潜水艦らしきものを発見し、これの攻撃に艦爆九機を発進させたが目標を発見できなかった。

翌二十八日、第二航空戦隊は前路警戒を行なった後、飛行機隊を宇佐航空隊に先行させた。またこの日二三〇〇主力部隊から派遣された第二十一および第二十七駆逐隊と会合し、いよいよ警戒を厳にして最後の危険海面で



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"Wm. U. Pratt" (Wheeler)

INTENTIONS VS CAPABILITIES

P. 39 Re. General Brent's opponents to Pratt's support of Hoover's policy for, tasked with the heavy responsibility for nation's defense, they tended to base their calculations on the WORST CASE ANALYSIS - that is, they calculated principally on the basis of a potential energy CAPABILITIES rather than his intentions. The latter, they agreed, could change with the national mood or shift with Cabinets. For this reason the Gen Board continued to side with the possibility of a war with G. Britain - by contrast Pratt relied more heavily on national intentions and came to the not illogical conclusion that a war between US + GB was virtually impossible.

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