

*Japanese*  
*Comintell*

	<b>NOTEBOOK</b>
	43 Sheets • 4 IN. x 6 IN.
	No. 45-1904 15¢

DATAMATE & DUAL TRADEMARKS REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.  
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There are Comm. Units, Tynes KO 甲, VTSUZ, HEI (丙, 丁, 和, 乙) and Bo 乙

通信代行 了 TSUSHIN DAIKO suru  
take over communications (duty)

通信謀報 TSUSHIN CHOHÔ Radio Intelligence

通信調査部 TSUSHIN CHOSABU Communications Monitoring Dept. <sup>Intercept Unit</sup>

通信班	保安部	TSUSHIN HAN	HUAN SU	Communications Security Dept. <sup>(Intercept Unit)</sup>
"	幹部	"	KAMBU	Communications Party
"	整理	"	SEIRY	Traffic Control
"	手	"	SHU	"operator"
"	操式	"	SÔSHKI	dispatch form
"	統制	"	TÔSEI	Comm. traffic control

雷令作 (DEN)REISAKU <sup>(radio dispatch order)</sup>  
radio dispatch order

NE: NE area

- (大4) Daiichi - Rangokantai (4)
- CP2 Central Pacific (1) and (2)

Communications Intelligence / Intelligence Estimates  
Intelligence Methods / Intelligence Procedure  
Communications Deception Operations  
Communications and ComIntell Organization

(CP2) 214 On Oct 31 1942 the 1942 Fiscal Year Fleet Organization modified in part: 第一通信隊  
1<sup>st</sup> TSUSHIN TAI was newly established and assigned to the 8<sup>th</sup> Fleet and stationed at BUIN, along with SC Det-32 and the 8<sup>th</sup> Guard Force + 6 Saitoh SLF.

(CP2) 448 GF Force <sup>see page after next</sup> 15 Nov 1943  
TSUSHINTAI (CGB) } <sup>Commander</sup> <sup>1st</sup> Combined Force } <sup>1<sup>st</sup> Rangokutan tai (41-)</sup>  
<sup>Communications Force</sup> <sup>Combined Communications Force</sup>  
Duties (1) Interception of (enemy) communications and control (of same) (2) Intelligence reports  
(3) Exploitation of above for intelligence purposes (3) carry out operational communications (4) Command of Communications Force will cooperate with the Command of High Seas Escort Force with regard to required communications for escort and Anti-Submarine Warfare (including the directed against enemy communications. NOTE (2) The 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force administers all Communications Forces and the Combined Communications Force attached to the Combined Fleet with regard enemy communications.

(CP1) 531 <sup>Change in</sup> <sup>as of</sup> <sup>begin</sup> Combined Fleet Wartime Organization - April 10 1942: 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase Opns  
"DAICHI RENGO TSUSHIN TAI" - ~~attached~~ part of the Combined Fleet  
Composition: TOKYO 1<sup>st</sup> Comm Unit; TAKAO 1<sup>st</sup> Comm Unit; OH KANIMA 1<sup>st</sup> Comm Unit; OKINAWA 1<sup>st</sup> Comm Unit; ~~3<sup>rd</sup> Comm Unit~~; ~~4<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit~~  
5<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit ((Saipan)); 6<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit ((Kwajalein))

(大4) p48 第三部 五言 (対米情報) Intelligence Reports on the U.S. were prepared by the 5<sup>th</sup> Division (under the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section) of the Navy General Staff.

(大4) -166 SANARI DIARY The Combined Estimate (of the 1<sup>st</sup> Section, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section and the Special Duty (Communications Intelligence) ~~group~~ ("Tokyo Main" group) of the morning of 12 May, 1943 (NOTE - The 1<sup>st</sup> Section changed with operations on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section, and the Special Duty group was in charge of Communications Intelligence) Interpretation by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section (by the head of Sub-Branch #5):  
In view of recent American propaganda and other statements, items that should be given consideration are:

- (1) Their announcement of their occupation of FRENCH FRIGATE indicates their plans for offensive against the Marshalls, Gilberts.
- (2) Despite great volumes of propaganda about recovery of WAKE at the time of our occupation of that island, there has been not one word about that recently.



(3) ALEUTIANS - US Navy's official announcement (Note concerning an invasion), while propaganda may have all undercurrent of truth - That an invasion may be carried out this month or next month; we must pay careful attention to determine the timing; there is a good probability that they will <sup>arrive</sup> ~~arrive~~ <sup>land</sup> ~~land~~ <sup>land</sup> at Attu first (while this was being written, they landed on Attu on the p.m. of 12 May) "..."  
Special Duty Group (Comint)

(a) Central Pacific Area (a) Since mid March plain language messages from aircraft carriers in the Central Pacific have been intercepted. From late March through early April, many patrol planes have appeared, temporarily in traffic -- believed that they are conducting continued training; many movements of patrol planes suggest training from (Douglas) bases in Midway. In mid-May the largest number of planes were operating from Midway. Last year (1942) on 9 April at the time of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, 22 etc. were active; accordingly, we estimate that the activity by up to 15 patrol planes does not indicate a sortie by their aircraft carriers. Weather conditions have changed, communication activity at that base but weather reports have not been observed to be used for training exercises.

(b) Submarines. An unusual example is American submarines deployed along a North-South line to the South of Wake. The Central submarine of base is the Task Unit Commander but Ground Submarine remains, as before, at Pearl Harbor ("in HAWAII")

MID APRIL DISTINCTIVE FEATURES

- ① 3 Submarines were operating in the SOLONONS near RUSSEL Islands and GAKICAI (<sup>Amalial</sup> ~~Amalial~~ <sup>Island</sup> ~~Island~~ <sup>Island</sup>)
- ② There seems to be a cooperation to move BRISBANE Command vessels from the Gulf of Carpentaria forward to the GUADALCANAL Area.
- ③ On 13 April 2 Submarine Squadron (6 Subs per Squadron) are moving forward toward Dutch Harbor area and a new force will probably move out to the Kuriles

(B) NORTHERN AREA

- (a) The Northern Fleet appears normal by its communication but it is not possible to estimate its strength
- (b) of importance is the movement of aircraft from Anchitka to KULUK (Bay).

④ COMMERCIAL SHIPPING

(a) MOVEMENTS TO THE SOUTH

- (a) in late April a rather large one passed through FIJI and by 2 May had arrived in the Solonons area.
- (b) about 3 May a large convoy passed to the south of FIJI.
- (c) During April, shipping was active between AUCTION <sup>Island</sup> and NORTHERA
- (d) Since late April a force of Cruisers and larger vessels have been active in an unknown area
- (e) Search and patrol activity north of ESPIRITO SANTO has been intense.

⑤ AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS

- (a) In the beginning of May was marked by the large number of aircraft that moved to HAWAIIAN islands from the West Coast
  - (b) <sup>aircraft</sup> 6 Squadrons left the Hawaiian Islands in early May for Midway. Judged by past experience this would indicate some kind of attack (in the future?).
- Directives to US Radio Direction Finding Stations (to take hearings on our transmissions <sup>on the 9th and 11th</sup>) were more numerous than ever before. <sup>Many were sent to the North on the 11th</sup>  
 (Note: on 12 May the Americans were ready to land on Attu. Americans were then concerned about the movements of our forces, especially our Northern Force. Our Communications Intelligence Group ("Tokyo Mac Han") seems to have broken the enemy directives to its RDF Stations.)

(2) page 44-E G.F. Policy (U.S.G.) 3rd phase of 15 August '43.

Policy: (a) Increase the effectiveness of the Central Communications Links in each zone of interception and

[ETL: Maricao - 116 F. 2<sup>nd</sup> Opus <sup>Intercpt Zone</sup> = Kuriles (Method 1); 2<sup>nd</sup> Intercept Zone = Seas E of Hushu (Method 2) <sup>see below</sup> and Marau (Method 2) & Boxin (5 Method 3); 3<sup>rd</sup> Intercept Zone: Wake (Method 1), Maruex (Method 4), Eastern Carolines (Method 5) and Western Carolines (Method 6). Method A - Strike ops by 1st Strike Force; Method B = air strike ops with CVI & part of their screening with greater part of Surface Force operating separately. Method C - etc. - - -]

In addition effect smooth operational communications in the area to concealment of our planned moves and plan for prompt delivery of operational communications. (b) Expand the Communications Intelligence Organization, ascertain and acquire more and more intelligence of the enemy and also carry out interference with the enemy's communications.



(C) have specially designed ships, when required, conduct false communications to deceive the enemy and ~~disrupt~~ <sup>disrupt</sup> the security screen for our plans and conceal our movements.

15 Aug 43 CP 450. Table of Organization - lists free organization and lists Communications Zone C of B - 1st Central Comm. Zone & 1st Combined Comm. Zone as MISSIONS:  
(A) Carry out and control Communications Intelligence Reports (通信諜報) (B) Distribute Intelligence Reports (C) Carry out operational Communications. Footnote to the organization Table (b): The connection with the exploitation of enemy communications by the Commander 1st Combined Comm. Zone will make allocations to the Combined Comm. Zone and to all Communication Zones.

(C.P. 2) p 152 Re: Kawarawa Batai attempt Sept 1942 to <sup>capture</sup> WABO <sup>at</sup> WABO <sup>at</sup> WABO. The Kawarawa Detachment was supposed to launch an all-out attack against G of I on the 17th (17 Sept 1942) in the Central Combined Fleet, on the 11th, ordered the 1st Combined Comm. Zone to advance to TRUK to improve its effectiveness against enemy communications; after the move to TRUK, all Communication Zones (Units 3-4-5-6) would receive directives from that Zone with regard to their assignments against enemy communications. (Read KASIRO to Xonikid)

(CP 2) 170 th, 1st Communication Zone, <sup>Commander</sup> left Yokokawa with his force on the 12th and completed the move to TRUK on the 14th (19 September 1942). That movement pleased the Commander (and his unit!!) "at the front" of our fleet's operations where he could better direct Communications and exploit enemy communications but this move, <sup>in view of</sup> <sup>(make use of)</sup> past operations, was a bit late.

With the move to TRUK of the 1st Combined Comm. Zone, the Nils. gave the Comdr WABO Comm. Unit the control of the Central RDF organization on the 14th and ~~on the 17th~~ reversed a part of the Central RDF organization from 0900 the 17th. It was probably due to the above move to TRUK that a Communications Intelligence report of <sup>source</sup> indications that a strong allied force was operating in the New Caledonia area ~~the 23rd~~, reached the Commander of the S.E. Area Force; who on the 23rd ordered a strict alert against

allied <sup>strengthening of the</sup> operations and also ordered <sup>the</sup> <sup>defence</sup> of the Shortlands area to be expedited.

(CP 2) 448. CP Organ for 3rd Phase Opns (Modification as of Nov 1, 1943) <sup>announced 8/20/43</sup>  
Communications Zone (C of B) - Comdr: Comdr 1st Combined Comm. Zone  
Zones assigned: 1st Combined Comm. Zone; Main Tasks: (1) Control and carry out exploitation of (enemy) Communications Intelligence material (2) Dissemination of Intelligence Reports; (3) carry out operational Communications Reorganization of Inner South Sea Zone and newly organized 30th Special Base Force. In connection with the Reversion of the Imperial Navy's War time organization of 1 January 1944, the 30th Special Base Force was reformed <sup>on 10 January</sup> and the 30th Comm. Unit was removed from the force & assigned to the 31st Special Base Force.

(CP 2) 581 F. As of (30 January 1943), 6th Communication Unit (Kogakai) had an allowance (of 400 persons)

(SE 2) P 62. Deception Messages (after the 2nd Battle of the Solomons August 24, 1942) - RVU-20 sunk, and KdB + Ad Force had returned to TRUK to refuel, 2 destroyers, the ASASAWO & WATSU WAGO were sent by G-Orders (of 1 Sept) to 2FP to a point 10 miles N of Stewart Islands to carry out radio deception. They left 2 September and returned to TRUK on the 8th 1942.

(SE 2) 96 F. (in connection with the KAWARAWA attack on G of I ENEMY signals (12 September 1942)) On the night of the 12th, the 8th Communication Unit (at RABOUL) which was monitoring the enemy communications situation in the G. area, intercepted communications believed to reflect enemy conditions - at 1800 some 13-15 enemy YC were in the air and at 2030 an enemy YC took off from the airfield transmitting in plain language; at 2200 two of the YC requested radio bearings and sent SOS signals. According to them, it was believed that the KAWARAWA Detachment had penetrated into the airfield according to schedule. However, at 0500 enemy communications in Guadalcanal returned to normal, showing the impression that the attack had failed. (1942?)

(SE 2) 174 L. YC attacked Shortland; one was shot down by the ASASAWO. ASASAWO ASASAWO 2 prisoners were taken and not only did we learn of the enemy's situation at RABOUL and Port Moresby, but we also obtained the enemy's code book and we able to read a part of the enemy's code (messages).

(CP 2) 219 L. On November 20, 1942, the 1st Combined Comm. Zone that was moving forward to TRUK was directed by CULFIT to move to HQ of the 1st Combined Comm. Zone to RABOUL area and on 21 November that HQ completed its move up to RABOUL.



DECEPTION COMINT

(CP) 332 F (US Assaults Advn - May 43 - and GF to TOKYO Bay)

"In addition the CUG GF Radio order # 57 of 16<sup>th</sup> (Tokyo Bay, May 1943) directed that the forces remaining in the Outer South Seas and the South East areas, under direction of the Comdr Advn Force, carry out deception communication to mislead the enemy to believe that the greater part of the Combined Fleet were at anchor at TRUK from May 18 through the 24<sup>th</sup> and that for 2 weeks from the 25<sup>th</sup>, they are concentrated in the Marshalls, possibly to advance and attack Midway or CAROLINE.

Also that Comdr's order # 507 of the 17<sup>th</sup>, the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force which had been at Rabaul would shift to OMASATO, and Comdr SE Area Fleet of Comdr 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet would cooperate together to effect their transportation; the Comdr 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet was also directed to carry on Communications intelligence duties in place of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force.

(SE) 332 F. DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATIONS suggestive of operation to attack Midway etc. (1943)

Comander Advn Force, who remained at TRUK, on the 17<sup>th</sup>, informed the Advn Force, Comdr 14, on Oct 22, the 4<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and Tokyo Communications units that Type B (Ziotsu) deception messages (contents unknown) would be sent in Multi-type code on B-2 frequencies from 18 May until 7 June to give the impression that the Advn Force and a majority of the Combined Fleet were concentrated in the Marshalls on the 21<sup>st</sup> and indicating plans to attack the Midway and CAROLINE areas, and that from 25 May until 7 June, these forces were assembled and were conducting purposeful search and patrol operations. Also Comdr Advn Force ordered deceptive Communications be conducted from 30 May to 2 June including stopped up ASW measures and from 31 May until 2 June deceptive messages be transmitted from the outer limits of the air patrol/search sectors reporting sighting of surfaced submarines. This surface and air force carried out deceptive communications, the former until 7 June, the latter until 2 June.

中 央 212 On October 31<sup>st</sup> 1942 the 1942 Fiscal Year Fleet Organ. was modified in part: The 1<sup>st</sup> TSUSHINTAI 通信隊 was newly organized and assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Force of the 8<sup>th</sup> Fleet and established at BUIN, along with SE Dev 32 and the 84<sup>th</sup> Guard Force.

中 央 218 " 15<sup>th</sup> November (1942) the CUG Combined Fleet directed the advance of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Unit (which was moving forward to TRUK) to Rabaul area; that HQ completed its move to Rabaul on the 21<sup>st</sup>.

中 央 448 Force organization changes as of 15 NOV 1943. TSUSHAN BUTAI (C&B) - Comdr #1 Combined Communications Force consisting of 1<sup>st</sup> (No. 1) RENKOTSUBUN TAI - Duties: (1) Interception of (enemy) communications and exploitation of source for intelligence purposes (2) make intelligence reports (3) Carry out (our) operational communications.

Note (2) The Comdr. 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force administers all Communications Forces and (including) and the Combined Comm. Force(s) attached to the Combined Fleet with regard to enemy communications.

(4) Comdr of Communications Forces will cooperate with the Comanders of the High Seas Escort Forces with regard to communications for escort and ASW (including those directed against enemy communications).

中 央 542 On 10 January the 30<sup>th</sup> Special Base Force was established at PALAU a part of the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Communications Force was removed from the 4<sup>th</sup> Base Force and included in the 30<sup>th</sup> Special Base Force.

中 央 (1) 531 第一聯合通信隊 for Phase II (Fleet Reorg. of May 1942) TOKYO Naval Comm. Unit, TAKAO Naval Comm Unit, CHICHIJIMA Naval Comm. Unit, OKINAWA Naval Comm Unit, #3 COMM UNIT, #4 COMM UNIT, #5 COMM UNIT, #6 COMM UNIT. April 1943

(\*) 142 - (Investigation into Yamamoto shot down) Note: The 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force was made up of the TOKYO & Comm. Force and the OKINAWA Comm. Force and was under the direct command of the Combined Fleet in the wartime organization and had jurisdiction over all Communications forces and Special Established Comm. Forces in regard to matters directed by the Chief of Naval General Staff.



★ 4-166 SARAWAI DIARY (1943) The combined estimate of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and the TOKUMAWAN (Special Intelligence Group) on the morning of 12 May: (Note 1<sup>st</sup> Div charged with Operations, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division charged with Intelligence and the Special Intel. Group charged with Communications Intelligence)

3<sup>rd</sup> Division interpretation (By Head of 5<sup>th</sup> Section)

In view of the recent American propagandist and other statements, items which consideration should be given are:

- (1) Their announcement of their occupation of FENAFUTI -- plans for offensives against the MATSUNOS & OUBETSU
- (2) Despite much propaganda about a recovery of WAKA, at the time of our capturing it, not one word regarding this recovery!
- (3) Alertness - The official US Navy announcement (concerning an invasion) although propaganda, probably has an undercurrent of truth -- that an invasion will be made this month or next - and we must pay attention to determine the timing. There is a good possibility that they will come to seize the first (Note - while this was being written, the enemy landed on the 12<sup>th</sup> of 12 May) ...

(Page 168) Special Intelligence Group 'Tokumawan' Central Pacific Ocean Area 1943

(A) Since mid March plane language messages from aircraft carriers in the Central Pacific have been intercepted through early April and many patrol planes have appeared temporarily -- believe they are conducting combined training; many movements by patrol planes suggest training from Hawaii mid April. In mid May, the largest number of apc were operating from Midway. last group on 7 April (at the time of the Sollette raid on Tokyo) 22 apc were active, accordingly we estimate that activity by up to 15 patrol planes. did not indicate a strike of their apc carriers but that

if 15 or more apc were active, there is probably a sortie of apc aircraft carrier(s). Weather conditions have changed the communication activity of that base, but weather reports have not been observed to be used for training exercises.

(b) Submarines. An unusual example is the deployment of American submarines on a north-south line to the South of WAKA. The central submarine is the Task Unit Commander, although Commander Submarine remains, as before, at Pearl Harbor.

Mid April Distinctive Features

(1) Three submarines are operating in the Solomons near RUSSEL Island (and GAKKAP) G. Base (Guadalcanal)

(2) There seems to be a cooperative move to shift BRISBANE Command vessels from the Gulf of Carpenter forward to the GUADALCANAL area.

(3) On 15 April, two submarines Squadrons (6 subs to a Squadron) are moving forward to the Dutch Harbor area and a new force will probably move up to the KURILES.

(4) Northern Area

(a) Communications wise, the (US) Northern Force appears normal but it is impossible to estimate its strength

(b) of importance is the movement of aircraft from ANCHUTEA to KULOK (Bay)

(c) Movement of convoys and shipping to the South

(a) In late April a rather large convoy passed through FIJI and by 2 May had arrived in the Solomons area

(b) about 3 May a large convoy passed to the South of FIJI

(c) During April shipping was active between AUKLAND and NOUMEA

(d) A force of cruisers, and large ships, have been active in an unknown area.

(e) Search patrol activity north of ESPERITO - STN TO has been vitense.

(4) AIRCRAFT movements

The early part of May was noticeable for the large



Number of of aircraft group in the West Coast of Hawaiian Islands  
 (b) ~~By~~ early May 6 Squadron of 1st left at Hawaiian Islands  
 in Midway. Judging from past experience, this  
 indicates some kind of attack in the future. Orders to  
 U.S. Direction Funder Status to take bearings  
 (on our transmissions) were more numerous than ever  
 before; on the 9<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup>, many were sent to 2nd  
 (Note on 12 May, the Americans were ready to land  
 on Attu? American forces were then concerned over  
 movements of our forces, especially those North Force.  
 Our Communications Intelligence Group seems to have  
 broken the enemy directives to its RDF network?

✓ (4) page 444 (or 447?) Communications - GF Policy  
 for 3<sup>rd</sup> Phase 15 August 1943

(a) Policy (a) increase the effectiveness of the  
 central communications links in each zone of  
 interception, and in addition to effecting smooth  
 operational communications in those areas, facilitate  
 the concealment of our planned movements,  
 and also effect prompt delivery of operational  
 communications. (b) expand the Communications  
 Intelligence Organization, ascertain and acquire  
 more and more intelligence on the enemy, and  
 also conduct interference with the enemy's communications.  
 (c) Have specially designated ships, when required,  
 carry out false communications to deceive the enemy  
 while screening the security of our plans and  
 concealing our own movements

(4) page 450 - Table of Organization - shows  
 "Communications Area C-8B" → 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Zone  
 → Mission: (a) Carry out and (control) Communications  
 Intelligence Reports 通信業務報 (b) distribute Intelligence  
 Reports (c) Conduct operational communications  
 Footnote to Organ. Table (b) The Comdr 1<sup>st</sup> Comm Zone in connection  
 with exploiting enemy communications will make (allocations) to the  
 Combined Comm. Areas attached to the GF and to all Communications  
 Forces.

(4) p 48 第三部 五課 (対米情報)

The 5<sup>th</sup> Section of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division (7<sup>th</sup> Div NIS) produced  
 intelligence reports on the US such as Imp 42 as the table of  
 CV and CVL (page 49) with estimates of date of Commissioning

CP② 152 QUADRONAL Opus - in support of KAWAGUCHI  
attack of September 1942  
 The Kawaguchi Det. was supposed to launch an attack  
 against the G. Airfield on the 11<sup>th</sup> (Sept 42) in. The Comdr GF  
 on the 11<sup>th</sup> ordered the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Comm. Zone to move forward  
 to TRUK in order to improve their effectiveness against  
 enemy communications and, after their move to TRUK,  
 all Communications forces of the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet would become  
 directives from their work regard to their assignments  
 against enemy communications (over for make in Kawaguchi  
 attack subject)

CP② 170 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Advances to TRUK  
 Rjaden Kakimoto (Class 1913) - the Comdr 1<sup>st</sup> Comm. Zone  
 had been ordered to advance to TRUK on 11 September,  
 left Yokohama with his force on the 12<sup>th</sup> and completed  
 their move up to TRUK on the 19<sup>th</sup>. This move placed  
 that command at the Fleet's operational front, where he  
 directed communications and exploited enemy communications  
 as viewed best for our operations but this move seems  
 to be a bit too late for past operations

With this move of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Comm. Zone, the  
 Naval General Staff on the 14<sup>th</sup> placed the ONASA Comm.  
 Unit in charge of the control of the Central GF network  
 and as of 0700/17 November made revisions in one  
 section of the Central GF network.

While it was probably not due to this movement forward,  
 a Communications Intelligence report that many signs indicated  
 that a strong allied force was operating in the New Caledonia  
 area. Reached Comdr SE Area Forces, who, on the 23<sup>rd</sup>  
 ordered strict alerts against allied forces activities  
 and directed that the strengthening of defenses in the  
 Shortland area be expedited

CP② p 385 - US Radar on Canton detected by (Comdr?)  
 6<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit on 21 August (43) reported that our planes  
 were detected by Canton Radar on 18 August at 60 miles  
 according to plain language messages to their planes.



(CP2) p.62 Deception Messages  
(After the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battle of the Solomons 24 Aug '42 -  
Ruyfo - sunk - and KdB - Adv Force had retired to  
refuel, 2 DDS ASAWMO and MATSUOKA were  
sent by GFF orders (9/1 Sept) to 2FF - to port  
40 miles N of Stewart Islands to carry out radio-  
deception. They left 2 Sept, returning to Truk on the 8<sup>th</sup>

(CP2) (581F) As of 30 January 1943 - the 6<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit  
(Kawaguchi) had an allotment of 400K (73)

(SE2) (96) (In connection with Kawaguchi attack on G airfield  
12 September)  
On the night of the 12<sup>th</sup>, the 8<sup>th</sup> Comm. Unit (at Rabaul)  
which was monitoring the enemy's communications  
situation in the "G" area, their enemy signals  
group 敵信班 intercepted signals which were thought  
to reflect chaotic conditions in enemy voice circuits.  
At 1800 since 13/15 enemy a/c were in the air  
at 2030 an enemy a/c took off from the airfield  
and at 2200 transmitted in plain language  
requesting radio bearings and sent SOS signal  
It was believed that this indicated that the  
Kawaguchi Detachment had penetrated into  
the airfield according to schedule. However  
by 0500 the 13<sup>th</sup> the enemy's communications  
on Guadalcanal had returned to normal and led  
them to believe that the attack had failed.

(SE2) Captured Code Book

(174) That day (Oct 3<sup>rd</sup>) three twin-engine  
Bristol Beaufort a/c attacked Shortland;  
one was shot down by gunfire of the BOB and  
two prisoners taken. Not only did we learn of the  
enemy situation at RAB and Port Moresby, but also  
we obtained the enemy code book and were able  
to read a part of the enemy's code.

\* Skitip New Guinea tail

(CP2) (219) The 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force that was  
moving up to TRUK was ordered by ComC of  
to move the HQ of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Comm Force to the Rabaul  
area and on 21 November (1942?) that the 1<sup>st</sup> moved up to Rabaul

Deception measures to cover movement of KdB  
to Tokyo area to US assault on Attu to Tokyo area  
US aircraft on Attu. GFF → KdB → Tokyo Bay

In addition, by his radio # 75 of the 16<sup>th</sup> (May 1943) the  
ComC of directed that the forces remaining in the Inner  
South Seas and South East Area, carry out deceptive  
communications under the direction of Com Advance Force  
to mislead the enemy to believe that the greater  
part of the Combined Fleet are at anchor at TRUK  
from May 18 through the 24<sup>th</sup> and that for  
a period of two weeks from the 25<sup>th</sup>, they are  
concentrated on the Marshalls, possibly to advance  
and attack Midway or Canton.

May 1943

Also, by ComC of's order # 507 of the 17<sup>th</sup>, the  
1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force that had been at Rabaul  
would shift to OKINAWA, and the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet Communications  
Unit would carry out communications intelligence duties  
in place of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Comm Force in its absence.  
Com Advance Force and Com 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet to cooperate  
to effect the transportation for the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Comm Force.

(CP2) (332) DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATIONS → → MIDWAY

Com Advance Force, who remained at Truk  
on the 17<sup>th</sup>, informed the Advance Force, Cruiser 14,  
and Subella 22 and the 4<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> at Tokyo Comm. Units  
that type (Z) "B" Deceptive Communications using meaningless  
deceptive messages (contents unknown) in multiple-type  
Code on B 1 frequencies would be carried out from 18 May  
until June 1. Following this, he ordered that the  
deceptive messages would be sent to give the  
impression the Advance Force and a great part  
of the Combined Fleet were concentrated in the







In the above radiotext the East Indies Force Air Force was the 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Flotilla, the East Indies Ground Force was the 24<sup>th</sup> Sp. Battalion's "several forces" (the "several forces" are those forces organized temporarily for strategic or tactical purposes. 部隊区分)

On the 14<sup>th</sup> the outline <sup>in carrying out</sup> of radio deception messages for the Communication Unit of the SW Force was signalled to it.

From COMOR SW Force, To: all <sup>Unit</sup> Commanding Officers of the SW Force, all Commanders of Communications Units, Singapore Ctry NAS.

SW Force Secret. #14/103017.

SW Force Secret. Ref. Order #63. In accordance with SW Force Radio Order #62, Radio Deception will be carried out as follows

219 F (1) Objective of Radio Deception To imitate (and give the impression) of a movement of a powerful force from the TAWAN Straits Area south to the Java Area. To entice the enemy to the South West area.

(2) Dates - from 20 January through 31 January

(3) Ship or station doing it - (sequence - date - relay Comm. Unit - in order, the ship, and deception ship & radio station)

(a) 1<sup>st</sup> - Jan 20<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup>; 31<sup>st</sup> Comm. Unit (as determined by Cdr's Comm.) - 21<sup>st</sup> Comm. Unit.

(b) 2<sup>nd</sup> - Jan 23<sup>rd</sup> - Jan 25<sup>th</sup>; 11<sup>th</sup> Comm. Unit <sup>Philippines</sup>

Force at anchor in the Philippines (as determined by that Comdr) - Sevaio Telegraph Station

(c) 3<sup>rd</sup> - Jan 26<sup>th</sup> - 28<sup>th</sup>; 10<sup>th</sup> Comm. Unit, ASHIGARA; 11<sup>th</sup> Comm. Unit (BASKOPAN) Telegraph Station.

(d) 4<sup>th</sup> - Jan 29<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup>; 2<sup>nd</sup> Comm. Unit, East Indies Ground Force (as determined by that Comdr.) Malay Force at anchor with MALAY Area.

(4) Outline of the operation.

(a) Radio frequency (a) use 6435Kc (TAW 8) for deception communications (b) frequencies for use by relay stations for broadcast.

218 F (a) text: first use "THIS IS RADIO DECEPTION" from the code book, <sup>with</sup> current use, repeated twice, after which use blank code groups (if there are no blank <sup>code</sup> groups use meaningless text)

(b) Call sign - Relay, Communication Unit will use its current call sign, others will use common call sign (collective call)

(c) Communications Units (Radio Stations) which imitate the deception communications of prescribed ships or by ships, will transmit deception messages

on the prescribed frequencies between 1900 and 0700 and the addressed relay communication unit will transmit such deception messages within about 2 hours, as a standard.

(d) Each Relay Communication Unit (except those having no broadcast network) will transmit these deception messages to its own communication network in such a manner as to increase its traffic volume by 50% or more. (at discretion, relay the deception messages of paragraph d, above)

(5) In addition, (a) do not transmit bona fide traffic on frequencies used for deception traffic and (b) Deception Communication Units and ships (radio stations) will pay attention to the transmitter to be used, transmission procedures and transmission power and strive to be consistent with the movement of the false force and its desired direction and also not mislead Communication Units (Radio Stations) ashore.

Also, the following outline of Diversion Operations was sent to the Surprise Attack Force:



From: Comdr SW Force To: Cdr Comdr SW Force,  
Comdr Surface Attack Force; Info: CNAF,  
CNAF AF, Comdr Southern Army, 16<sup>th</sup> Army,  
Comdr 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Army (\*). SW Force Secret 15156542  
SW Force Radio Order #65.

218  
F

THE SURPRISE ATTACK FORCE, IN ADDITION  
TO TASKS SET FORTH IN SW FORCE ORDER NUMBER #62,  
WILL OPERATE AS FOLLOWS: (1) Subdiv 30 (less 1-166  
and 1-162) WILL CARRY OUT A SURPRISE COMBATTING  
OF THE SHORE FACILITIES AT PERMOTON (West Coast of Australia)

(2) F-162 will reconnoiter COLOS Island, conduct a  
general bombardment of shore facilities there and destroy  
enemy SLOC in that area.

(3) <sup>The provisions of</sup> Paragraphs 1 and 2, above,  
should be carried out simultaneously if possible and  
the details as determined by that commander.

169  
F

Comintell Report of 9 March 1943

From: Comdr Communications Unit (6<sup>th</sup> Div)

To: Comdr. 22<sup>nd</sup> Air Flotilla, Comdr 6<sup>th</sup> Base  
Force (Kororua), Comdr 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Base Area (Truk)

Secret Radio 091613, Suva (date) there has  
been great increases in communitio activity between  
the Pearl Harbor Air Base and PEARMYRA and Johnston.  
Also, CATTON has appeared on the above airbase  
network and it appears likely that the enemy  
is expanding the base at CATTON, indicating  
plans against the GILBERTS.

Combining the above with the many appearances  
of combatant ships in the seas to the north east  
of the Hawaiian Islands, plus the active communitio  
situation in that area strongly suggests a  
westward movement of strong air-related

forces from the West Coast of the US. to Pearl  
Harbor.

The above report may not have been the  
reason, but on that date the Combined Fleet ordered  
the SASAGO 7<sup>th</sup> Special Naval Landing Force, then  
enroute to the South East Area to change to the  
GILBERTS area. ((They were the main strength of the  
defenders at TARAWA that November))

March 20<sup>th</sup> - From: 1<sup>st</sup> Section, Navy Staff Imperial Gen. HQ  
To: CMCs Combined Fleet, all Naval Districts and  
Comdr's Guard Districts. Secret Radio 20171104  
FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF. A SYNTHESIS OF THE  
FOLLOWING INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE A  
MOVEMENT TO THE CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA BY  
(AND) ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE(S); FOR THE NEXT  
FEW DAYS IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR TRUK,  
WAKE, MARCUS AND THE EASTERN AREA OF  
HONSHU TO BE ON AN ALERT. (1) Enemy  
carriers have not made an appearance in the  
SOLOMONS AREA since February. (2) Attacks  
by enemy submarines have been made on the  
20<sup>th</sup> (position 32°-50'N; 152°-50'E - east of  
HONSHU) (3) Comint Reports: (a) on the 12<sup>th</sup>  
and also the 13<sup>th</sup> there was an increase in the  
number of patrol planes active between the  
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and MIDWAY; on the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>,  
also, there were many patrol planes active off  
MIDWAY. (b) on the 13<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> there were  
many signals from enemy submarines in the  
seas near Honshu. (c) according to enemy plain-  
language messages on the 16<sup>th</sup>, it seems that  
aircraft carriers are in the HAWAIIAN area.

Naval General Staff Alert Message on April 2<sup>nd</sup>  
From: Navy Staff Section Imperial Gen. HQ.



To: All Naval Districts, Coast Districts, Cinc all Fleets and Combined Fleet (less Comd SW Area Fleet)  
 Secret Rader 03140652. In view of the following Comint reports and the enemy submarine sightings situation, it is judged necessary for a special alert for the main islands, the Coastal Zones, and the TAIWAN area for a few days beginning the 4<sup>th</sup> (of April)

(1) There has been a sudden increase in the number of patrol planes active in the Hawaiian Islands on March 31<sup>st</sup> and at MIDWAY on April 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> indicating ships having sortied from the Hawaiian Islands on the 31<sup>st</sup> and moving to the westward via the vicinity of the MIDWAY area. (2) As before, enemy submarines are active, operating in the area of our Eastern Patrol (Picket) lines. (3) For the past few days, meteorological reports from the Fukien area of China have appeared, indicating future movement and activity by American Air Forces (in China)

At the time that the above alert message was transmitted the Combined Fleet had ordered all of the 3<sup>rd</sup> ((Carrier)) Fleet's air groups to the shore bases surrounding RABOUL, precisely as if to initiate ((another)) "I" type ("A") operations. (The massed air attacks on Guadalcanal, SAMARAI, RABOUL and PORT MORESBY in April 1943, when Admiral YAMAMOTO visited RABOUL to direct these "I" operations "in person", -- just before his death)). Therefore, the Combined Fleet ordered the 3<sup>rd</sup> Fleet, which was, as before, at TRUK,

to carry out deception communications to simulate that they were undergoing training exercises at TRUK in order to inhibit strikes by American carrier task forces by appearing as if they were planning "I" type operations.

「北東」 (P. 49) Combined Fleet War Time Organization (46)  
 第一聯合通信隊 (1 GCG)

東京 TOKYO	Tsushintai	高雄 TSUSHINTAI	
父島 CHICHIJIMA	"	沖繩	Total 8 通信隊
第三 3 <sup>rd</sup>	"	第四 4 <sup>th</sup>	① Operational Communication
第五 5 <sup>th</sup>	"	第六 6 <sup>th</sup>	② Comint Reports

During 1<sup>st</sup> Phase operations - changed 1 "Rantai" (Group) Chichijima  
 of Tsushintai -  
 CHICHIJIMA Comm. Group assigned to NORTHERN FORCE - 1 GCG 1<sup>st</sup> phase  
 NE 22: Organy of GF at that time (Apr 10 1942) for 1<sup>st</sup> Period (MI)

1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force (1 CCG)  
 TOKYO KAMON TSUSHINTAI 3<sup>rd</sup> KAMON TSUSHINTAI  
 TARKO " " " " 4<sup>th</sup> " " " " 5<sup>th</sup> " " " " 6<sup>th</sup> " " " " 7<sup>th</sup> " " " " 8<sup>th</sup> " " " " 8<sup>th</sup>  
 Total 8 Communication Units Chichijima detached from organy of NE  
 NE 22: Change in Organy for 2<sup>nd</sup> Period (MI) Same as 1<sup>st</sup> period

NE 72 " Operations in the NE area right after start of war"  
 F ... (movement of various ships of SF)

73  
 F 10<sup>th</sup> Dec 1941 1435 an aircraft from CHICHIJIMA Air reported sighting a surfaced submarine 40 mi S. of HIRASIMA etc. (first & sub sighting) appeared enemy of IYONADA etc.

15 Dec GF Submarine Intelligence report - 2 Lt off entrance to Tokyo Bay; 2 Lt within 100 miles of HIRASIMA on 10<sup>th</sup>. 13<sup>th</sup> - 1 Lt off entrance to Bungo Channel. (1010)

17<sup>th</sup> GF Submarine Intelligence report. According to Comint 10 ships on 15<sup>th</sup> 2300 - 16<sup>th</sup> 200, 50-60 pm CHICHIJIMA 1 ship bearing 18° from TRUK. 1 ship bearing 123° and one ship bearing 107° from SMO TAKI - Total 14 ships.



13  
19<sup>th</sup> GF Submarine Intell. Report (1630) 1-4  
Ships in vicinity of Tokyo Bay, Bungo Straits, Kii Channel (believed) & 3-4 ships in the Bonin Islands line of islands  
A little info covers a battle plane sighted on evening out in YOKUDA.

According to SCAP Publication 'Ships/Organization/etc'  
1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force

TOKYO COMA. UNIT	Dec 1941	ASG '45
TAKAO "	"	
CHICHUJIMA "	"	July 1942
OKINAWA "	"	1 July 42 (CHICHUJIMA AREA SP. BASE FORCE)
3 <sup>rd</sup> "	"	MAY 42 (INACTIVATED)
4 <sup>th</sup> "	"	14 JULY 42
5 <sup>th</sup> "	"	14 July 42 (To 4 <sup>th</sup> Base Force 4 <sup>th</sup> Fleet)
6 <sup>th</sup> "	"	14 July 42 (to 5 <sup>th</sup> Sp. Base Force / 4 <sup>th</sup> Fleet)
OWADA "	"	14 July 42 (to 6 <sup>th</sup> Base Force / 4 <sup>th</sup> Fleet)
1 <sup>st</sup> Communication Unit	31 OCT 1942	
2 <sup>nd</sup> COMMUN. UNIT	31 OCT 1942	
SUBMARINE COMM UNIT	31 OCT 1942	
8 <sup>th</sup> FLEET 1 <sup>st</sup> Base Force	31 OCT 1942	
	1 April 44	5 NOV 44 (to 12 <sup>th</sup> Area Fleet)

SEI (P44) The South Seas Force units organized by the flagship, KASUYAMA, Comdr-18 (2 old CL), MINORU 19 (4 Minelayers + other), 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Flotilla, Subm 7 (9 Robots), the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sp. Base Force (PALAO), 4<sup>th</sup> Sp. Base Force (TRUK), 5<sup>th</sup> Sp. Base Force (SAIPAN), 6<sup>th</sup> Sp. Base Force (KUSABLEN) plus Comdr 6 (4 CAT) and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force under the command of ComC 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet, U/Adm Staff INOUE

NE (P63) By the reorganization the Chichijima Comm Unit was placed under the command of ComC 4<sup>th</sup> Base Force.

第一聯合通信隊 第二聯隊 各12編成

ARMY POLICY OF LONG TERM INVINCIBILITY

(大2) 301 The Army had a policy that after the strategic goals of the South were occupied and the raw material region had fallen into our hands, to establish a long term invincible strategic posture; then to accelerate an end to the war to put pressure on India along with a naval blockade so that India would drop from the British Commonwealth, the Navy in control the India Ocean to extend our sea lines of communication and establish liaison with the German forces already in the Middle East, and meanwhile preparations and plans against India.

(中) 383 TSUSHINBUJIN (MARSHALS) 6 CG 本部 本部 (KUSABLEN) Detachment  
ENIBUSI (Sumitai) ENIBOR (Sumitai) (分遣隊)

CPI/P 293 Report of Acquisition of Comint Reports (1942) On 10 December MARIN and TARAHA (Gilberts) were captured by the Comdr "HA" via assault support force and from the statements of prisoners and the captured codes & documents we learned of the lookout-communications network in that area, the frequencies used and the number of frequency bands etc. This network was centered in FIJI, which had a defense force of 3000 Army troops stationed there, and was exchanged every six months.

CPI-339 Organization of the Marshalls Area Forces as of 5 Jan 1942  
Communications Force, Comdr: Com #6 Communications Force (Comint)  
Force; 6<sup>th</sup> Communications Force

Main Force; "ENIBUSI" Detached Force, ENIBOR Det, "EBBYE" (Jaluit) Force.  
Main Duties: "Communications liaison" - detect enemy electronic jamming, interception. "Keep in touch" - detect enemy electronic jamming, interception. (intelligence)

CPI 380 South Seas Force Deployment  
+ vicinity PALAO - 3<sup>rd</sup> Base Force - 3<sup>rd</sup> Communication Unit  
" TRUK - 4<sup>th</sup> " " - 4<sup>th</sup> " "  
" SAIPAN - 5<sup>th</sup> " " - 5<sup>th</sup> " "  
" KUSABLEN 6<sup>th</sup> " " - 6<sup>th</sup> " "

CPI 383 - Deployment of Marshalls Area Defense Force  
Communications Force - 6<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit, Specially Established Lookout Stations (BIKINI, ETON, MESIT), Lookout Stations (RONABEK, ENIVETOK, KUSAH, MILLE UTOROK), ENIBUSI Detachment, ENIBOR Detachment. Main Force KUSABLEN

CPI 395 - Marshalls Area Def. Force Commanders under -  
③ Comdr 6<sup>th</sup> Communications Force & Comdr Communications Force  
Captan USHIO, Fujii 1924 5 Jan 1942 - 1 Sept 1942  
6<sup>th</sup> Communications, by Fleet Organization of 10 April 1941 included in 1<sup>st</sup> Combined Communications Force and by Fleet Organization of Jan 5 1942 was attached to its basic (6<sup>th</sup>) Defense Force.



#551 The Combined Fleet's 6th Round of Communications Drills

In view of the R.I. report that there had been a sudden increase in the patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area between April 25<sup>th</sup> and April 27<sup>th</sup>, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet was deeply suspicious that the enemy carrier task force had sorted and judged that there was some indication of an attack on ~~Hawaii~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~main~~ <sup>an</sup> islands. In order to <sup>cause</sup> ~~make~~ the enemy to infer that we were on a strict alert, ~~Combined Fleet~~ <sup>Combined Fleet</sup> Radio Order #19 (28 2200) <sup>GF, 6th Round of</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~issued~~ <sup>issued</sup> into effect ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> ~~late~~ <sup>late</sup> ~~April~~ <sup>April</sup> ~~until~~ <sup>until</sup> ~~12~~ <sup>May</sup> to exchange false messages and communications three times from late April until <sup>12 May</sup>

#293 Procurement of Intelligence Reports The Comdr of the 44<sup>th</sup> Air Occupation Support Force on 10 December captured MAKIWA and TARAWA. According to what the prisoners said and according to the documents, codes that were captured we learned the frequencies used on the circuits of that area's breakout communications <sup>network</sup> ~~network~~ <sup>they</sup> ~~these~~ <sup>these</sup> ~~defense~~ <sup>defense</sup> ~~press~~ <sup>press</sup> ~~code~~ <sup>code</sup> ~~book~~ <sup>book</sup> ~~3~~ <sup>3</sup>, sent out by FSI were ~~defense~~ <sup>defense</sup> ~~code~~ <sup>code</sup> ~~books~~ <sup>books</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> were released ~~every~~ <sup>every</sup> 3 months and that the FSI ~~garrison~~ <sup>garrison</sup> force consisted of some 3000 Army troops

NE P288 大海 Secret Radio #776, from Head of 1st Division NIS Imphambur, to 95th AF, 95th SF (Midway retreat) <sup>definitely</sup> ~~definitely~~ <sup>they</sup> ~~they~~ <sup>noticed</sup> ~~noticed~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>movement</sup> ~~movement~~ of an <sup>new</sup> ~~new~~ <sup>force</sup> ~~force~~. Be sure to pay ~~particular~~ <sup>particular</sup> attention to radio security in view of the source of strong radio transmissions by all our forces. @ According to the 6th Communications Unit's (Kurejalen) Secret Radio #908 a powerful enemy force was located ~~North~~ <sup>North</sup> at 2020 the 9<sup>th</sup> from position ~~31°15'N 176°E~~ <sup>31°15'N 176°E</sup>. Also in connection with the report that 3 enemy carriers had been sent to the ~~ALBATROSS~~ <sup>ALBATROSS</sup>, it is necessary that a reconnaissance be conducted by Patrol planes and submarines and flank patrols by surface vessels

#465 Emergency Communications Control (Control of own Communications) Cancellation of Control over own Communications and orders to go ahead with the SR operation. The South Sea Forces' Restriction on Communications of the 24<sup>th</sup> of February were canceled off at 0600 the 25<sup>th</sup> (the day after the attack on WAKE - 24 Feb = ~~Wakay~~ <sup>Wakay</sup>, attack WAKE) at 0950 the invasion of LAE and SALAMUA was set for 8 March.

#578 LAE - SALAMUA detected by LOCKHEEDS The S.R. occupation landed on the 8<sup>th</sup> of March and everything seemed to progress smoothly but 2 days later, the 10<sup>th</sup> of March, the Comdr 5 Sea Force received the 1st report that an enemy KOB carrier planes had attacked the LAE SALAMUA area. Then in the middle of the night, the same day, he received a Radio Intelligence report that an enemy KOB had been D/Fed N of WAKE (see SE March details) <sup>planes</sup> ~~planes~~ 100750 P → P P 65d → 4F 245f Attacked by many American carrier <sup>planes</sup> ~~planes~~ 100755 " " " carrier ac and LOCKHEEDS (Hudsons)

#458 24 FEB WAKE attacked by Helms's Enterprise Grp. 240420 <sup>46</sup> Immediately after take off enemy landing force attacked WAKE island - ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~engaging~~ <sup>engaging</sup>. 240545 P <sup>46</sup> NYS "To South Sea Force, South Sea Force Emergency Communications Restriction (no effect)"

#361 Just Before invasion of Rabaul, the Comdr 5 Sea Force <sup>ordered</sup> ~~ordered~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~to <sup>endeavor</sup> ~~endeavor~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~to <sup>furnish</sup> ~~furnish~~ <sup>their</sup> ~~their <sup>Special</sup> ~~Special <sup>Communications</sup> ~~Communications <sup>intelligence</sup> ~~intelligence reports (Radio order #55 of 21 January 1942). As a result the following R.I. Reports were obtained 1/22 Com. Force Order #7. It is expected that practically at the same time that the R Area operations commence, enemy ships and ac will pay attention that secretly learn of the above movements. 1/25 0530 4<sup>th</sup> Com. Unit's Radio #334 (British) (R.I. Report) (summary) British ac were in communication with Port Moresby from last night until this morning 25/1620 4<sup>th</sup> C.V. Rad. #243, R.I. Report (British) (summary) There were frequent radio contacts between Port Moresby and ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~ac~~ <sup>ac</sup> from 1205-1600 262040 4<sup>th</sup> C.V. #351, R.I. Report (Br.) (summary) at 2020 4 enemy ac were airborne + in frequent comm. with Port Moresby 270730 4<sup>th</sup> C.V. 353, R.I. Report (Br.) (summary) 2 British ac airborne at 0700 comm. with Port Moresby <sup>over</sup>~~~~~~~~~~~~



280700 4<sup>th</sup> EN # 360. RI Report (FR) (Summary) at  
0650 1 hr <sup>airborne</sup> in ~~area~~ <sup>area</sup> ~~west~~ Port Moresby.

281640 duto <sup>36<sup>th</sup></sup> FR # 1609 4 EN <sup>FR</sup> ~~airborne~~ in  
Southwest P. Moresby.

281850 duto ~~36~~ # 363, duto <sup>Frequent occurrence of</sup> many enemy a/c  
are relayed by Port Moresby and <sup>up</sup> until now 5 a/c have  
appeared but from their east origin all appeared to be Command  
a/c, many (a/c) seem to be airborne.

291600 duto 4F <sup>45<sup>th</sup></sup> # 336, RI Report. Port Moresby  
15 transmits routine & priority at 1502 to Y45, ~~at~~ 1523  
to Y48, Y45, Y46, & Y47. In view of last night's enemy  
comm. situation, it seems an attacking a/c again  
 tonight is likely.

SEI 88 F Tsu Shuntai  
OWADA Communication Unit (Communication exclusive duty  
of collecting Radio Submarine reports) located at  
OWADA, SAITAMA (Kan) 30 miles NW of Navy Dept Tokyo

(How Japs obtained BAMS code + additive)  
from RAIDER 16

(P 136) ((capture of AUTO MEDON)) Mohr went  
to work in the strong room and there  
found 15 bags of secret government mail  
which included decoding tables, fleet  
orders and naval intelligence reports.  
in a long narrow green envelope (containing)  
an evaluation by the Planning Division of  
the British War Cabinet of the military  
strength of the British Empire in the Far East,  
including notes on the preparations of  
Singapore, written sending back to Berlin  
to be carried personally.

(P 91) When the CITY OF BAGDAD was captured  
by Ady. Mohr walked out of the Captain's Cabin  
with the contents of the wastebasket & desk  
drawers (in a seabag, he carried for  
this purpose) Mohr had taken a copy of  
the Merchant Navy Code. Using this code  
WENZEL & WESSEMAN tried to decipher the  
current signals circulating in the air in  
the Indian Ocean. WESSEMAN was well  
equipped for the task, having spent 3 years  
as a cryptanalyst. soon Capt. Rogge  
was reading much of the confidential traffic  
between ships and shore stations.



(RAIDER 16 - continued)

(S.S. BENARTY) (p 113) The Benarty (had much to tell Capt. Rogge and his men in those days of Sept 1940 -) was carrying ADMIRALTY mail. Adj. Mohr went aboard, rummaged through the wastepaper baskets in the picked up sackfuls of official documents which were taken back to the raider... there were some more cipher tables and messages which made it possible for Radio Officer WENZEL to decipher the deciphered codes. Some of the material was sent by Radio to the cryptologists in Berlin and they completed the job, so for the next few days, until the British deciphered the codes again, the merchant ships could be kept track of by their messages.

(p 139) So the TEDDY was sunk... then ship 16 took her Diesel oil, leaving her enough to reach a Japanese port, in to trade the oil gas to the Japanese for stores for the raiders in the area and to get Navigator KAMENZ to Japan, where he could make his way to Germany to deliver those very important documents.

On Nov 6 (1940). OLE JACOBSS sailed for KOFU, around 6 December, the trade was made for 11,000 tons of Diesel fuel, but at the disposal of the German Naval attaché at Tokyo and a new airplane, NAVIGATOR <sup>KAMENZ</sup> was dispatched to Vladivostok <sup>via</sup> the Trans Siberian RR to Moscow and Berlin. He dropped off copies of the British war plans in Tokyo but could not be sure what use the Japanese would make of them; because they were so <sup>very</sup> important, the Japanese authorities decided to believe they were forgeries planted just to confuse them.

(156) In capturing the "AUTOMEDON", Rogge discovered the wartime shipping routes laid out carefully on secret charts of the area.

1st Comm Unit	15 Mobile HF transmitters 15 receivers	To serve as mobile Comm Unit during the PAC East Malay Operations
2nd Comm Unit	20 mobile HF transmitters (20 receivers?)	To serve as mobile Comm. Unit during the Philippines and NEI operations

Classifiers

- A - applicable to Central Comm. Unit of the GF
- B - " " " " " " of the Fleet
- C - " " " " " " a unit (such as a Base Force etc)

(English?) (volume?) (source?) "In war victory is everything - pertinent, timely intelligence is of primary importance."



Hondo Honren Kaigun Sakusen 《85》

内戦部隊

P 25-26 Wartime Organization Chart of Interim Forces

YOKOSUKA NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS UNIT

OMINATO	"	"	"
KURE	"	"	"
OSAKA	"	"	"
MAIZURU	"	"	"
SASEBO	"	"	"
MAIZURU	"	"	"
BAKO	"	"	"
RYOJUN	"	"	"

Hontai + Det. at 六合, 永年, 尾, 大島, 月島, 白鷺

Page 32 - YOKOSUKA Comm. Unit → communications

Page 34 KURE K.C.U. Hontai + Det. at 山崎, 中黒瀬, 高知, 宮崎

Page 36 SASEBO K.C.U. Hontai + Detachments at 針尾, 滿場, 博多

Page 42 MAIZURU K.C.U. Hontai + Detachments at 志津, 上杉, 中北条, 新築田

Page 43 OMINATO K.C.U. Hontai + Det. at 近川, 關根, 根室, 幌延

Page 43 WAKKANAI K.C.U. Hontai + Det. at 赤松, 聖子, 大島, 宇津

Page 44 CHINKAI K.C.U. Hontai + Det. at 徳山, 上南, 牛島

Page 44 RASHIN Comm. Unit Hontai + Det. at 明湖, 洞, 會文, 永興

Page 45 BAKO K.C.U. Hontai + Det. at 萊菌, 鉄線尾, 鷺臺, 真

Page 48 OSAKA Comm. Unit Hontai + Det. at 守口 and 湖山

Subs. Radio and Land line Communications and utilization of enemy communications (take advantage)



- (English - source - identity?) @ "Indicators"  
 of (some) enemy command and control radio traffic
- (B) The deployment of ~~an~~ enemy strike or reconnaissance aircraft to forward or alternate <sup>airfields</sup>
  - (C) the appearance of code words of significance in <sup>dispatches</sup>

A Salient indicator, if identified, will tend to classify a pattern clearly into the class of "can attack" or "cannot attack"

Searching for and identifying salient indicators are important actions

Indicators which <sup>have</sup> ~~have~~ not sufficient salience (salient - projecting or jutting beyond a line) (striking, conspicuous))

The decision maker draws the line or sets the threshold between <sup>can</sup> ~~cannot~~ attack -- he must take in all elements of the military picture to judge properly -- most Comdrs would seek simultaneously to minimize both hits and false alarms

(However) simply by lowering the threshold ~~between~~ the can attack cases become more frequent and of course set off a multitude of false alarms and will be criticized for his constant "call of wolf"

Minimize simultaneously both misses and false alarms



"The translation of HOMER should, above all, be penetrated by a sense of 4 great qualities of his author: that he is eminently rapid; that he is eminently plain and direct - both in the evolution of his thought and in the expression of it; that is, both his syntax and in his words; that he is eminently plain and direct in the substance of his thought --- that is, in his manner and ideas;

and finally, that he is eminently noble"

(7126) Matthew Arnold's "On Translating HOMER"

(909A) A Translation is no translation, he said, unless it will give you the music of a poem along with the words in it"

John Wellington Synge - "The Aran Islands" (1907)

Montaigne - "Nothing is so firmly believed as what we least know" "Essays" bk I ch 31

Men are most apt to believe what they least understand "Essays" bk III ch 11

Nathan Bedford Forrest (1824-1872) "Get there first with the most men"

通信情勢

CP, p 368. Decree the P.M. of 31 January (1902) the 6<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit (Kwajalein) brought to the attention of all sections that during the last ten days of January there had been an increase of new call signs of <sup>hundreds or no</sup> radio stations which led to an assumption that the enemy was planning some kind of positive action

CP, p 367 Com Unit May # 7. With the beginning of the Repros. all units should endeavor to detect and report on the activities and movements of the enemy ships and aircraft expected to concentrate in the BISHOP and SOLOMON Islands areas.

ditto Jan 25<sup>th</sup> 1620. 4<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit Secret # 324. British Comint (gist) From last night until this morning communications were active between British a/c and Port Moresby

ditto Jan 25<sup>th</sup> 1620. 4<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit Secret # 343. British Comint (gist) Communications were active from 1200-1600 between Port Moresby and British a/c

CP, p 367 Jan 26<sup>th</sup> 2040. 4<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit Secret Radio # 351. British Comint (gist) At 2020, 4 enemy a/c were active in the air and communications were being flight Moresby

ditto Jan 27. 0730. 4<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit Secret # 353. British Comint (gist) at 0700 2 British a/c were airborne communicating with Port Moresby

ditto Jan 28. 0700. 4<sup>th</sup> Comm Unit's # 36a. Br. Comint (gist) at 0650 one Br. a/c airborne in comm. with Port Moresby

ditto - 1640 same # 362. Br. Comint (gist) Since 1609 4 British a/c have been airborne & in touch with Port Moresby

ditto 1850 same # 363. Br. Comint (gist) <sup>from</sup> The frequency of communications of enemy a/c using Port Moresby as a relay, and of which appear to be from their call signs to be a/c commanders, leads to the inference that many aircraft are airborne

ditto 29 January 1600 Fleet Secret # 336. Comm Report Port Moresby at 1502 sent routine <sup>and priority</sup> messages to Y-45 and at 1523 to Y44 and Y45 Y46 and Y47. In view of <sup>the</sup> last night's enemy communications situation, it may be that 4 enemy a/c will attack tonight also.



(245 Report of (February) Operations (1 Jan - 31 Jan '42)  
"Communications Section"

300430 (Jan '42) From Chief, Naval Communications Section  
To 245.

Navy Staff Section, Imp. Gen. HQ Secret Radios # 123,  
Enemy Submarine Activities Fleet Intelligence Report # 8; enemy  
submarine activity up to 28 January was:

- a. Marshall Islands Area (As of 28 January, 2 enemy  
submarines have appeared on the 2, one to the north  
of Kwajalein (Roi Island) and the other to the south of  
Eniwetok. Although the former was attacked and  
believed sunk, enemy submarines have been very active  
in the Marshall's area. estimate 2-3 remain in that area.
- b. E. Carolines, W. Carolines - Marianas area. no intelligence;  
these are few indications of presence of enemy submarines
- c. Bismark to MacDate area. no enemy sightings

d. Bonins - Tokyo Bay - Kii Channel - Bungo Channel area  
no additional intelligence since Intell. Repal # 7

(2) ships navigating in the Marshall Island area must  
maintain especially strict security, with alert lookouts and  
continuing close liaison with 6<sup>th</sup> Communications Unit (Kampfer)

061920 (Jan 42) From Chief 3<sup>rd</sup> Section (Intelligence) Naval Staff  
Section, Imperial Gen. HQ. To 245, 4/5 all Fleets, 4/5 all  
Naval Districts. Navy Staff Section 16HQ Secret Radios # 413

According to intelligence from the German, Drangin Office,  
an American force of 2 Battleships, 1 aircraft carrier,  
several cruisers and other naval vessels passed thru  
the Panama Canal toward the Pacific, among BATTLESHIP  
on 14 December.

081200 From Chief, Naval Communications (Chief 3<sup>rd</sup> Section  
(Intelligence) Naval Staff Section, Imp. Gen. HQ) to 245,  
4/5 G.F. and others --- Navy Staff Section 16HQ Secret Radios # 424.

I. Intelligence report received from the Liaison

Officer with the Japanese naval attaché, Germany:

1. U.S. Army is preparing an Army Divisional Expeditionary  
Force of 4 Army divisions in the New Orleans area  
for dispatch to Australia and troops are now embarking  
on some 16-18 transports. 2 Army Divisions are to sail  
by mid-January, the other 2 Divisions to sail by mid-  
February. Another 11 vessels have been obtained for  
the above movement of the latter 2 Divisions from the  
Blue Funnel Steamship Line and the New Zealand Steam  
Shipping Company.

2. From all intelligence reports it is ascertained that  
a powerful <sup>U.S.</sup> naval force is now proceeding toward the  
New Zealand area. It has been confirmed that a  
substantial number of small naval craft are also  
enroute to that area, among these are submarines  
and some tankers, minelayers and probably two  
cruisers of the ASTORIA class.

II Our Estimate regarding the above:

Item 1, above, could be enemy propaganda to  
divert us; it is logical that the enemy contemplates  
sending some Army units there.

Regarding item 2; it is estimated that the enemy  
is capable of sending some Cruisers (aircraft carriers  
could be scheduled), destroyers and other types to the  
Australian area as a feint the dispositions of the  
Imperial Navy and also provide defense of the  
Commonwealth areas and protect <sup>his</sup> sea lines of  
communications (and thereby protect the movement of  
Army expeditionary forces, aircraft and military supplies).

III according to an AP dispatch, the Australian  
Prime Minister has stated that the U.S. Pacific Fleet  
will utilize Australia as the base on which to  
hinge the allied war strategy against the  
Axis Powers (in the Pacific).



COMINT derived Jap Radio Intel

14-022012 May 12 KIMIHI Serial 343 "on the 28<sup>th</sup> a Task Force ("Temporarily Established Force") worked NPM (Jap) on 4338 KCS four times, GMT 06, 12, 18 and 2400. Judging from the submarine and a/c activity, it appears that the fleet departed Pearl Harbor for sea cruise on the 28<sup>th</sup>

B 110446 May KIMIHI Serial 444 of 10<sup>th</sup>. D/F POSITION OF UNKNOWN ORIGINATOR USING CALL ZPCI WAS IN POSIT. 15°N 173°E at 1750 THE 10<sup>TH</sup>

11542/1 MAY COMSWPAC FOR → CTR 16, 17, AIG 147 (Special 1472) INF NAV CINC PAC, CINCPAC, NZNS, TANGIER JAMMING EXPERIENCED ON 5875 KCS RECONNAISSANCE FREQUENCY IN PORT MORESBY AREA. IF EFFECTIVE JAM AGAIN ENCOUNTERED SHIFT TO FIRST ALTERNATE 8420 KCS. AUTHENTICATED PLAIN LANGUAGE REPORTS IMPERATIVE

Matb Unit 150702 April YEHA 3 Serial 411 REPORTS HEARING U.S. V/c calls in Ait (Hawaii) area as follows: 7 V/c using  $\phi\phi$  1, 5 V/c using  $\phi\phi$  2. Two flying boats using T2  $\phi$  3 etc ...

14-170305 Apr Typical Japul. TCI Station Message "Report 240. American Naval V/c  $\phi$  V  $\phi$  [Signal strength 5] worked NIX, NPS and NIQ. NIX sent one message through NPS. Bearings from Jaluit 83°-93° [from 1145 to 1244], from Kwajalein 80° 91°-96°

COMV 220011 April T1 Summary. "Mandate: Radar Intelligence Units (JALUIT, TRK, PALCO) incl include <sup>Comdr's. At Det Detached Units (collective)</sup> New Britain AG

COM 14 250826 → COMS ... JALUIT RADIO says he is covering seven American frequencies. From volume of his traffic he runs a large unit. However there is nothing to indicate he is getting more than call sign identification and D/F bearings

COM 14 261268 KIMIHI Serial 265 "IT APPEARS THAT SOME 20 CARRIER BASED NAVAL PLANES HAVE RETURNED TO THE HAWAIIAN AREA AND WE JUDGE THAT THE FLEET HAS RETURNED TO THE PEARL HARBOR AREA

OPNAV 260645 TEYU 9 Serial 459 of 21 April to SACLES info 5 address "US communications intercept between NIX and flying boat  $\phi$  V 33. Flying Boat  $\phi$  Y 35, signal strength 3 - Following lead "NO GOOD - SEND MORE EEE'S. ALONGSIDE OF ROUGH HILL OFF SHORE TO THE LEFT OF THE FLAT SHORE."



COM 14 261916 according to one of JALUIT'S Radio Intelligence reports dated 25<sup>th</sup> - only partially filled in... "THE AMERICANS ARE OPERATING 6 PLANES IN THE ALETIANS (OR NEARBY) AREA AND 24 PLANES IN THE KANU AREA FOR SCOUTING OPERATIONS."

COM 14 272338. NASA 4 (JALUIT) Serial 495 IS TYPICAL R.I. Report: in one extract: "PROBABLE SUBMARINE CALL LL4E IN VICINITY OF JOHNSTON ISLAND, SIGNAL STRENGTH 4-5, BEARS OBS FROM KUBA BLEND AT 1905. COMMENT - OUR VESSEL using above call sign sent message FDG 262315 FROM NEAR JOHNSTON ISLAND. JAP BEARING was accurate within three degrees. Jaluit time date group 0210 - time of bearing 0005."

COM 14 290202 - On 27<sup>th</sup> OMINATO Radio Intelligence reported US Aircraft activity as follows: 23 April KL Area 2 1/2, AOE Area 2 1/2; 29 April KEN Area: 2 1/2, AH (HAWAIIAN) Area 4 1/2. KL + KEN mostly Canada; AOE = ALASKA/PACIFIC (actually Dutch Harbor) This was sent urgent Active Cinc 4<sup>th</sup> Detached Force (is Det R.I. units?) and Tokyo R.I. info 1/2 GF, 1/2 HOF, Under Cdr, 1/2 Surface + Comdr Marshall's Bu Force

COM 14 291002 Tokyo R.I. Section Serial 290 gives call sign identifications for 26<sup>th</sup> TORY, PLUG, M9U, 069 were all correctly identified.

COM 14 291922 - IN NASA 4 (Jaluit) Serials 500 + 501 of 29<sup>th</sup> reports number of planes in AOE and KCV Area. KC Area new file

OPNAV 302359 Opns. Dir Navy Dept Tokyo → 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet Info GF - 1/2 Force 6<sup>th</sup> Attack Force, Tokyo Intel, 11 Air Fleet - "R Intel Report 0900 - 24<sup>th</sup> From [ ] data until recently many enemy a/c were in communication with U.S. bases. Many of these interceptors by this Division. [ ] as a precenter [ ] numbers designate new [ ] and numbers in parentheses designate the number of times contact was made from [ ] AH - 21(16); AF - 2(1); AH [ ]; AE and AC - 7(1) AH - HAWAIIAN AREA

COM 14 302216 - MIYO RE (NAS) Serial 349. "AS A RESULT OF DEDUCTIONS FROM US WEATHER BROADCASTS TO COMMERCIAL VESSELS, WE FIND THAT THERE IS ONE COMMERCIAL VESSEL AND NAVAL VESSELS IN THE VICINITY OF 31 54N [ ] 142E EAST THEY WERE IN THE SAME POSITION ON [ ] APRIL

COM 14 010149 MAY Jaluit Radio reports "US NAVY RADIO INTELLIGENCE REPORT (0100-1 MAY) 14 NAVAL a/c heard, apparently an air patrol from Alaska. All such messages are Priority but above was Urgent Comment greatly increased interest in operations in Hawaiian, Alaska, and SAMOAN areas being shown by Japanese recently.

Also on 25 April Tokyo reported that Fleet Units had returned to Pearl Harbor (Pearl Harbor Raid) as ordered by transmission from our 20 carrier based a/c, indicating their return to base harbor

COM 14 011145/1158/1108 TI Summary (May) MAY 1942 In view of the great interest shown by Tokyo in Palmyra, Samoa, Canton Area recently, of the primary & urgent Radio Intelligence attention to above and Hawaiian areas and the recent reconnaissance of BAKER-HOWLAND ISLANDS, various Radio Intelligence Stations have recently shown interest in the ALETIANS.

COM 14 0222 (May) KIMI HI (Tokyo RI) "on 28<sup>th</sup> a Task Force (Temporary Establishment Force) worked NPM (Near Radio Hawaiian Is) on 4338 kcs from time - at 0600 - 1200 - 1800 and 2400. Judging from submarine & a/c activity, it appears that the fleet departed Pearl Harbor for a while on the 28<sup>th</sup>

030300 - TOWNVILLE RECEIVED REQUEST FOR WEATHER CONSPACK FOR FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED A/C WHICH WAS NOT GIVEN DUE TO FAMILIAR JAP ROSE

COM 14 030722 Cinc GF Serial ITS "From Cinc Southern Army Radio Intel report No 3. Bomber [ ] at Port Darwin IP CHARLES TOWERS ABOUT 10.0 KILOMETERS SOUTH WEST OF TOWNVILLE IS USED AS A BASE FOR US ARMY B-25 PLANES

COM 14 032238 TI Summary Tokyo R.I. sends URGENTS to GFP IFF probably in connection with sinking of the MIZUHO... Radio Intelligence centers are increasing volume of traffic indicating degree of success analyzing Blue naval traffic

COM 14 042302 TI Summary... Jaluit R.I. includes Urgents and Urgent-Priorities to usual addressees with Chasut for consistently included.

COM 14 050146... HO KO B Serial 100 of 4<sup>th</sup> Nav Radio Network Opnd 103. "ENEMY CARRIER TASK FORCE DEPARTED HAWAIIAN AREA ON 1 MAY & ADDRESSEES WILL USE VIGILANT EFFORTS TO DETERMINE ITS LOCATION AND MOVEMENTS" Com 14 comment: Tokyo R.I. deductions correct. Previous indications this information obtained by analysis of aircraft communications. (Addresses were Communication Activities)

BELLS - 050202 ENO 3 Serial 539 "IN CHECKING UP ON VARIOUS U.S. COMMUNICATIONS (CONDITIONS) WE THINK IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT SINCE MARCH 27<sup>th</sup> A PORTION OF THE U.S. FLEET HAS MOVED TO, AND CONCENTRATED IN THE AC OR DO (PORTION TO AG) AREA, HAVING COME BY WAY OF AH AND AG ROUTE."



TANAS (GFF) serial 964 of 3<sup>rd</sup>

COM 14 050700 GFF → All Major Commands on 3<sup>rd</sup> Flagg  
"GFF Opord #20. AS/DEFENCE AGAINST ANOTHER ENEMY KOB  
attack on the TOKYO area. THE (Air Unit of 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet)

UNIT x 6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Corps, and Naval Radio Net will  
until [ ] date carry out following: Carry out radio  
deception measures in sectors where our important  
units are present. Address to Eastern [ ] deception  
messages indicating that we have a large number of  
planes patrolling & certain ships (some equipped for  
this work) are being assigned to Counter [ ] &  
Command in 140 [ ] apparently some areas in Japan  
have been weakened to provide strength in forthcoming  
theater of operations.

COM 14 050926 (May) NASA 4 Serial 541 1<sup>st</sup> part of 2 says  
THAT AS OF (0600 3<sup>rd</sup>) There were 5 planes heard in the  
OAHU area, 2 in the MIDWAY, 2 in PALMYRA, 2 in the  
area and 2 in the AOE area. Can you identify  
last 2 places? 1<sup>st</sup> in SITKA or Canada, last probably  
Dutch or Kodiak NISE 1 Serial 547 1<sup>st</sup> part  
of 3 on 4<sup>th</sup> Likewise gives planes heard operating as  
follows: OAHU-7; KL-2; KCL-2; APE-2.  
AOE

COM 14 052202 (May) KIMIHI (Tokyo R) Serial 3349 4<sup>th</sup>  
AT 2240 says that enemy when call was D75QP was  
fixed by D/F in position 13 North 160 East at 2000  
(VICINITY ENIWETOK)

COM 14 061948 (May) YAH 1 (24<sup>th</sup> Air?) Serial 602 to  
Desron 6. "It is requested that your unit furnish this HQ  
and 25<sup>th</sup> Air, any intelligence having a bearing on the present  
Campaign...."

NETA 8 Serial 012 From G's 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet to 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet  
Info G's GFF. The 5 Battleships, 3 carriers and 7 Cruisers which  
departed A.S. were headed west when sighted by [ ]  
(group in carrier was a double gable - may be incorrect; group  
to west is not confirmed) Suggest San Francisco for A.S.

Com 14 062308 TI Summary. Air, Submarines and  
Radio Intelligence continue to monitorize traffic, latter  
probably indication of some degree of success in  
tracking BLUE units.

Com 14 060132 in TI Summary (5<sup>th</sup>) --- Apparent that  
of radio deception are being inaugurated throughout the  
fleet, outstanding is the use of [ ] of calls other  
than their own when originating dispatches. Today our  
Command has split his dispatches into three numbered series  
This may have been due to being away from his flagship.  
C.C. is apparently interested in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Attack Corps.

COM 14 072308 TI Summary. INTENSE ACTIVITY. Many plane language  
contact reports in all connected sighting US forces operating  
(local sea) area. 5<sup>th</sup> Air Attack and Radio Intelligence  
Systems focused contact report with heavy & rapid dispatches  
over entire Orange System blocking normal traffic as  
HOROKUSHIRO (CALL NE U G) regularly sends what appears  
to be the message or Radio Intelligence information to COMNAV  
and TOKYO Radio Intelligence Central.

Belconnen (?) 090720 (TI Report) in A Man (a Meteorological vessel)  
193 (NA To 2) continues to report weather from the  
Northern area and indications are that the gathering of weather  
information is probably for a future projected operation

Com 14 090054 (TI Report) - Traffic from Coral Sea very  
heavy. Plane report that Surotoya sent appears to be  
not believed by Tokyo R. I. --- 5<sup>th</sup> Air Attack sent a  
steady stream of messages, mostly radio intelligence to  
above 3 units (RYUKAI, Cmdr 5/Carrier 5, Cmdr 6)

Belconnen 121021. ((Radio Intel Network)) To 518 Serial 609  
of the 10<sup>th</sup> - "Bearings on ship whose call sign was 'NERK' calling  
station (NEA?), signal strength 2-3 was 74° from Kwajalein  
at 1850. P. Call ZPGI DASH MY DISPATCH (DATE) IN THE  
A.G. VICINITY.

OPNAV 140130 - NASA 4 Serial 6239 12<sup>th</sup> "U.S. RADIO INTEL  
REPORT OF THE 11<sup>th</sup> to usual addresses. "HEARD 10 FLYING BOATS IN  
A (HAWAIIAN) AREA and 2 in the area assumed to be either KJ or KD.  
BY D/F, position of 6690 was 53-30N, 170-00W at 1920. There  
were many contacts with NPR (Radio Research)"

COM 14 151144. HoKO 8 Serial 272 of the 12<sup>th</sup> - "WHAT SEEMS  
TO BE A BOAT (sic!) (CALL) 6690 4265KCS at 1915 was in the  
vicinity of AOI (ADAK) communicating with NPR [AOE]  
(Dutch Harbor) (Note HoKO 8 Serial 100 on 4<sup>th</sup>, was 15<sup>th</sup> sent 6<sup>th</sup> 272

COM 14 151115 NASA 4 Serial 638 of 14<sup>th</sup>. The following Radio  
intelligence is deduced from recent U.S. radio traffic: LANDING  
FORCES OF (MARINES?) ARE BEING TRANSFERRED TO AG, AE,  
AC and RYM. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A LANDING FORCE OF AN ENEMY  
UNIT WILL MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK ON [ ] This is only a  
partial translation. RYM suggests British Samoa area

COM 14 170316 in. KI MI HI. Serial 462 of 12<sup>th</sup> says, in part,  
that according to R.I. analysis, former Asiatic Fleet units are  
now using DG and DOB as their operating bases

COM 14 151115 NASA 4 Serial 638 of 14<sup>th</sup>. The following Radio  
intelligence is deduced from recent U.S. radio traffic: LANDING  
FORCES OF (MARINES?) ARE BEING TRANSFERRED TO AG, AE,  
AC and RYM. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A LANDING FORCE OF AN ENEMY  
UNIT WILL MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK ON [ ] This is only a  
partial translation. RYM suggests British Samoa area

COM 14 170316 in. KI MI HI. Serial 462 of 12<sup>th</sup> says, in part,  
that according to R.I. analysis, former Asiatic Fleet units are  
now using DG and DOB as their operating bases



COM 14 172314 (May) in To FU 8 Serial 82 of 16E  
Lists frequencies used by our units as determined from a  
radio captured at (KOE PANG?). KI MI HI Serial 475,  
4 parts of 16E gives details of "ALLIED CALL SIGNS".  
There is a section in the publication for SEA HARBOR  
LOCAL GENERAL MANEUVERING AND GROUP DELIVERY  
SIGNALS x

BELCONVEN 181402 in REPORT OF AMERICAN COMMUNICAT-  
IONS x TONE BEARINGS AS FOLLOWS x PARA IX CRST  
(SIGNALS STRENGTH BEARING 37 FROM PQ  
(KWADALEIN) AT 17 AND 20 FROM PY (JALUIT) AT 1620 x  
PARA "Ro" x NERK (17) communicated with A 735 (Strength  
5) Bearing from PQ and PY 134° at 1750 communicated with  
NPR (Strength 4-6) Bearing from PQ 15° (49265 x 36723 x  
735 2722597 x BLANK) BEARING FROM PY 131 (about) x  
Notes - Expression in brackets given in code groups probably  
calls attention possibility one of these bearings may be false  
bearing x Along places PQ and PY in line, indicating  
PQ is WOTJE ((NO! PQ IS KWADALEIN!))

COM 14 192126 (TI Summary) in KOE PANG Radio former  
To FU 8 pending Radio Intelligence traffic to Tokyo,  
4th Fleet and others

BELCONVEN 201305 in NA SA 4 Serial 673 of 18E  
is a report on our communications x Paragraph 2 may  
have fix areas. At 0946 picked up call CR 212  
(Shingot 2) which is believed to be a vessel in the AE area  
and which communicated with vessels in the AF and AG  
areas, call signs EA 4 Z and ILSE (the broadcasts on  
all frequencies were ) sending one dispatch to each

COM 14 202142 in NO HORI Serial 524 of 19E "According  
to [RADIO] INTELLIGENCE, there are American forces on  
TONGA TABU (FRIENDLY ISLANDS, BRITISH) AND BORA BORA  
(SOCIETY ISLANDS, POSITION 16°-30S, 151°-15' WEST) and  
also on FINI.

COM 14 202236 - TI Summary in RABAU and KOE PANG have  
been added to the list of Radio Intelligence Originators in

BELCONVEN 212245 in KI MI HI Serial 536 of 21E THE  
AF AIR UNIT sent the following radio message to the Commandant 14E  
NAVAL DISTRICT - AK (Pearl Harbor) on the 20E: WITH REFERENCE  
TO THIS UNIT'S REPORT DATED THE 19E, AT PRESENT WE HAVE  
ONLY ENOUGH WATER FOR TWO WEEKS x PLEASE SUPPLY US  
IMMEDIATELY COMMENT: THIS WILL CONFIRM IDENTITY OF AF x ADVISE.

COM 14 232002 in KUMIG Serial 714 part 192 says  
"US RADIO INTELLIGENCE (REPORT) - 2 PATROL PLANES call signs  
1V 239 AND 2V 239 WERE PATROLLING IN THE VICINITY OF JOHNSTON  
ISLAND x THEY LANDED AT JOHNSTON ISLAND AT 225. Comment by 14:  
Numerous messages of this type are sent daily, with particular  
emphasis on aircraft activity, number of planes, horizon in air,  
direction of scouting, etc., in the HAWAIIAN, ALASKA and SAMOA-  
CANTON area.

COM 14 232226 (TI Summary) in New Station TOYA 3,  
near KURE, originating Radio Intelligence reports to  
SASEBO, CANIKAI, and OMINATO. KOE PANG Station  
Secur well established as an intercept intelligence  
COM 14 231024 indicates a D/F to be set up at WAKE. (See below OPNAV  
241925)

COMSOPACFOR 240543 - CINCPAC INF TANGIER, IN CONNECTION  
WITH FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS SUGGEST USE OF RADIO DECEPTION TO  
CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT TASK FORCE IS IN THE NEW HEBRIDES -  
CORAL SEA AREA MAY CONTRIBUTE TO SOME EXTENT BY (A) DELAYING  
OR POSTPONING ANY NEW GUINEA INVASION (B) DIVERTING UNITS FROM  
MIDWAY FORCE TO THIS AREA OR, (C) CAUSING ENEMY TO UNDERESTIMATE  
FORCES AVAILABLE TO YOU, ... etc BELIEVE ABOVE PLAN MIGHT  
ACCOMPLISH DESIRED PURPOSE WITH VERY LITTLE ADDITION TO TRAFFIC ON  
RADIO CIRCUITS (See CINCPAC 284333 - TANGIER, COMSOPAC  
FOR)

COM 14 240654 TE TU 4 Serial 295 of 33E gives usual  
Radio Intelligence dope. Interesting part is that AOE radio  
station is NPR (Dutch Harbor, previously sent in). KCN Radio  
station is NHB (KODIAK). These two stations were trans-  
mitting to each other, also what appears to be a plane  
conducting a patrol, call sign DR 2H was sending to  
AOE a aircraft in the PALMYRA and JOHNSTON Island were  
also heard. Comment by 14 - IT IS APPARENT THAT ENTIRE  
RADIO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IS CONCENTRATING ON THE  
HAWAIIAN AND ALASKAN AREAS AND OBTAINING RESULTS.  
(AOE = DUTCH HARBOR!) KCN = KODIAK)

COM 14 240804. TOYA 7 SERIAL T27 OF 24E is another  
R.I. message uninteresting except that he says NG Z ((ALAMEDA))  
is the radio station at "KMC". (KMC = ALAMEDA)

OPNAV 241925. YAKI 9 Serial 389 of 20E concerns moving Radio  
Station from WAKE IS to PEARLE Island... the D/F station presently  
listed for AA (WAKE) is to be placed on PEARLE Island

OPNAV 241930 TOYA 7 Serial 719/23E "ONE CONTACT EACH  
BETWEEN COMPATWINA 2 AND AF (MIDWAY), AG and AE and between  
AE, AG and the Patrol long Cond. From these indications and other  
recent traffic observations, it would appear that there is  
considerable movement of patrol planes to all the Pacific Bases."







OPNAV 241930 (continued) HAMIS Serial 719 of the 23<sup>rd</sup> mentions planes heard in the AH ((Hawaiian)) Area yesterday and also what was assumed to be a Outmarine hearing 61° from PY ((Jaluit)) - other a/c heard on the aircraft frequency, one appeared to have moved from AI to the AE area.

COM 14 242006. TE TU 4 Serial 292 of 22<sup>nd</sup> is <sup>Radio</sup> intelligence report and says, in part, "NGT-2 ((M)) is at AOI. NGT-2 ((M)) is radio station at DANENA and AOI from previous translation is ADAQ. Another part says: "NGT-3 is at KISKA. AOC by previous translation is at AATU. This should place AOB in the vicinity of KISKA. In OSE 8 Serial 725 of 24<sup>th</sup> says that radio station NPG ((M)) is at KM ((Men Island))

COMBATWINGS P.H. 250405. ALL PLANES MAINTAIN <sup>(STRUCT)</sup> RADIO SILENCE EXCEPT TO REPORT CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY OR OWN EMERGENCIES EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BELOW. NO WEATHER REPORTS OR RADIO TESTS WILL BE MADE. PLANES EQUIPPED PROPERLY OPERATING ABD (IFF) EQUIPMENT WILL NOT MAKE "PLAN" REPORTS ((Patrol planes routinely transmitted "PLAN" on reaching limit of assigned search sector on commencement of their return leg)). PLANES NOT SO EQUIPPED WILL MAKE NORMAL "PLAN" REPORTS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY SUPERSEDING ALL CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS. DO NOT INITIATE SPECIAL APPROACH PROCEDURE FOR SEARCH PLANES. PASS INFORMATION TO ALL RESPONSIBLE LOCAL PARTIES

Belorumen 251105. NAMU 7 Serial 567 of 23<sup>rd</sup> "THE FOLLOWING CODE WAS FOUND AMONG THE PAPERS TAKEN FROM THE PILOT OF AN AMERICAN PLANE SHOT DOWN OVER THIS PLACE ON THE 23<sup>rd</sup>. REMAIN- DER gives Q signals which are local additions to the regular Q code used by the Department of Civil Aviation aircraft and ground stations. NOT CONSIDERED CLASSIFIED MATTER

COM 14 250040 (TI Summary)... TOKYO RJ. at 0800/24<sup>th</sup> sent an urgent to CincS <sup>5<sup>th</sup> Fleet</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet Patrol Force info OMINATO

Belorumen 260421 - 24 May Yokosuka Naval Station Commander's Report #59. At 2200/24<sup>th</sup> one of our submarines will be proceeding to the East 20 miles south of HACHISIJIMA. From tomorrow ENEMY SUBMARINE INTERFERENCE will be broadcast by Japnav ITC on 33, 4639, 9260, 13640 and 18500 ((KCS)) at 0830 and 1730 DOLC. When there are no reports, press telegrams will be broadcast.

OLD ONE BUT PERTINENT TO THIS COLLECTION

COM 14 270946 MAY 1942. A SARU Serial 369 of December 30 1941 says in part: "IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF SENT THE FOLLOWING CIPHER MESSAGE TO THE NAVAL AIR STATION MIDWAY AT 1635 THE 19<sup>th</sup> -- "AT ABOUT 2000 THE 23<sup>rd</sup>, THE [ ] AND [ ] WILL ARRIVE MIDWAY AND WILL BECOME TASK FORCE 17. PRESERVE RADIO SILENCE" Such a message was sent in a system now superseded. ((a cipher captured on RUM? -- 19 December prior to fall of WAKE))

CenPac Daily Intelligence Bulletin # 73 270233  
... "JAPANESE RADIO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES INCREASING WITH EMPHASIS ON HAWAIIAN AND ALBERTANIS AREAS"

COM 14 290216 KIRI 4 Serial 337. Only fragmentary says that investigation of CORRIDOR facilities and examination of captured Communications personnel has revealed the following: TZW is the Comdr at BELCONNEN, J9M is ComSW Pacific NPO ((Pearl)) changed call signs daily. (List of major commands unenciphered calls followed). Any or all stations is "NERK". Also cipher instructions are a book of about 8-10 pages. 7 sheets are used for enciphering

OPNAV 291652 ... Radio Intelligence type messages being sent by JALUIT, on air unit in the Marshalls and at WAKE to 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet among other addresses. This is only OPNAV TI seen to date - could it be enroute Com 14.

COM 14 292726. (TI Summary) ... All Radio Intelligence Center busy with TOKYO sending info to Subcmdr 6<sup>th</sup> Air Attack Force. SARPAN appeared with RI traffic ... 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet flagship shift noted 28 May, may be addition to Combined Fleet system of scrambled station numbers to baffle Radio Intelligence. Numbers jumped at random today.

OPNAV 300430. NEYONI Serial 511 of 21 May. The following new regulations regarding relaying and retransmitting messages is to be added to the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of the Naval Communications Instructions #9 and to be put into effect from [95682] date sum. (Part 1) when relaying or retransmitting messages which include the originator's name in the text of the message, the frequency used by the ship or station is to be multiplied by 2 and then 255 added to that figure and the result put in parentheses. For example if the reception of the message was on 4600 KCS, (9455) would be used to designate this. This is to be added (at the head of messages) (Part 2) If the date on which the originator sent the message is different from the date of relay or second transmission, on effecting the relay or retransmission, a numeral showing the date of the original transmission will be designated, using 2 numerals, and placed in parentheses - For example (over)



For example: if it was the 2nd, it would be shown as (2) and this then placed after the numerals designating the time of relay or retransmission, etc.

TANQUER (CTF 13) → TF 13 INFO CTF 18 -  
306027 Deception message see CincPAC 286333 (page 104)  
and ComSubespac (A) 240543 (page 93)

COM 14 312106 T/I Summary ... Tokyo Radio Intel  
addressing traffic to Northern Forces.

Bellemere 310233 To YA 7 Serial 7537 27 May.  
Report of American Communications (1) Call "NERK" (string 3)  
made contact with Station NSA at 1442. Bearing was 89 for PQ (Kussmeier) (2) From 1400 to 1530  
intercepted transmissions for 6 aircraft on BN-3 (DSN)  
channel (using frequency 75) Comment: This comprises DSN AS TOWNVILLE which works 4/c on 3575 and 6275, among others."

COM 14 020024. T/I Summary ... Various Radio Intell.  
Centers very active, with Tokyo at 2210 on the 1st  
sending URGENT over 1300 count to all major  
commanders (Tokyo RZ took over intelligence Summary for CTF.  
as of 1 June.)

CincPAC 020347 (79th Intelligence Bulletin) ENEMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNUSUALLY ACTIVE ...

COM 14 030046 (T/I Summary) ... Radio Intelligence  
activities maintain a constant stream of traffic ...

COM 14 032034 (T/I Summary) ... Tokyo Radio  
Intelligence sent urgent 4 Kana to collection MU SE 5,  
believed represent NORTHERN STRIKING FORCE ...



Direct Quote References  
Japanese & Comment