Report on EL 101 to President NWC

To President NWC Course Report on Stockdale-Brennan 1980

PROF BRENNAN

a superb report! Comprehensive and informative. Please route to Department Chairmen.

TO:

29 January 1980

From: Professor Joseph G. Brennan
To: RADM Edward F. Welch, Jr., USN 2-1-80
President, Naval War College
Via: Dean of Academics (COPY PROVIDED TO PROF CROWE)

Subj: Elective 101, FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION; Report on

One of my specified duties is to make a report on the subject course to be delivered to the President 15 January 1980. The report is set out below and covers the period from the initial planning of the course to the present.

1. History of the Course

The origins of EL-101 lie deep in certain crucial experiences of VADM James B. Stockdale, USN (Ret.), former President of the Naval War College, now President of the Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina.

These experiences include Admiral Stockdale's encounter with academic philosophy at Stanford University in the years 1960-62 when he was assigned to graduate study there by the Navy. This academic experience, including his important contact with Professor Philip Rhinelander of the Stanford Philosophy Department and his reading of Epictetus's ENCHIRIDION is described in Admiral Stockdale's letter of 24 November 1975 (Appendix A).

A second and determining source of EL-101 was the seven and a half years experience of Admiral Stockdale as a prisoner of war in Hanoi after his plane had been shot down over North Vietnam in September 1965. This experience is described in Appendix A as well as in the Stockdale article "The World of Epictetus" (Atlantic Monthly, April 1978), the latter required reading for the course since it was first offered at the Naval War College in the Fall of 1978.

Although we corresponded over a two-year period, Admiral Stockdale and I did not meet until the change of command at the Naval War College in October 1977, when Stockdale assumed the Presidency. At that time and later in December 1977 the possibility of organizing and team-teaching an elective course in moral philosophy at the Naval War College was discussed. I was then engaged by contract dated 1 February to act as Consultant to the President, Naval War College, to organize and later to teach with the President a course to be called "Foundations of Moral Obligation," to be first offered as an elective in the Fall trimester of 1978.

J.G. Brennan

REPORT ON ELECTIVE 101

"FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION"

29 January 1980

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Through the winter, spring, and summer of 1978, Admiral Stockdale and I met frequently for intensive discussions concerning the organization of the course. Study sessions were set up and further readings in philosophy were reviewed by the President. In turn, Admiral Stockdale gave me quantities of his own writings, correspondence, books, speeches, and suggestions from outside sources for modelling the course.

Gradually the course took shape as the reading list evolved. I drafted the unit notes or study guides to the basic philosophical readings that made up the core of the reading list. A sample of the unit notes is attached to the report as Appendix B.

The collaboration in preparing and (later) teaching the course was a happy one. Although Admiral Stockdale and I differed widely in temperament, profession, and personal background, we shared from the outset a number of basic convictions about teaching a course of the kind envisaged. These included shared beliefs that:

1. Reading in the humanities and classics is of major advantage to those studying moral philosophy for the first time.

2. Among other advantages, such reading tends to make the student aware of the long-time presence in Western thought of concepts found today in many popular psychological accounts of human action in moral situations often presented as novel and "scientific."

3. For the reasons above, the course should center on, though not be restricted to, important classical and modern readings in philosophy and the humanities. Moreover, whenever possible the readings should consist of primary, not secondary sources.

4. Questions of moral philosophy cannot adequately be discussed without some reference to epistemological, metaphysical, and religious questions.

5. The course should not be slanted <u>directly</u> toward specifically military subject matter or professional concerns. One reason for this is that reading and study which benefits a human <u>as</u> a human can hardly fail to benefit the human who is a <u>military</u> officer. This shared belief did not present inclusion in the course of certain items of reading which treat specifically of ethical situations in a military setting (for example, the Stockdale and Walzer essays on prisoners of war, and the Gabriel essay on managerial versus military ethics).

Admiral Stockdale and I also agreed that the course--despite its humanistic emphasis--should include one session or unit with readings in Marxist-Leninist material, and one session with readings on the relation of natural science to ethics.

2. Outline of the Course

The final outline of the ten-session elective course as organized is presented below in outline form. The full scope of the course can better be seen from the course description and reading assignment pages of the course syllabus attached as Appendix C and the Course Summary attached as Appendix D.

WEEK ONE - Introduction. The prisoner of war and the human predicament. The World of Epictetus.

WEEK TWO - The Book of Job and the Problem of Evil.

WEEK THREE - The Socratic Example. Four Platonic Dialogues.

WEEK FOUR - Aristotle and the Nichomachean Ethics.

WEEK FIVE - Law: of Conscience and the State. Kant and Hart.

WEEK SIX - Happiness as Utility; Justice as Fairness. Mill and Rawls.

WEEK SEVEN - Individualism and the Collective I. Emerson; Sartre; Camus.

WEEK EIGHT - Individualism and the Collective II. Lenin and Soviet Philosophy.

WEEK NINE - Science and Values. Monod and the Moral Ideal of Objective Knowledge. Wittgenstein and the Ethic of Silence.

WEEK TEN - Return to the Beginning. The Stoic Ideal and the Ethic of the Military.

3. Teaching of the Course, 1978-79

"Foundations of Moral Obligation" was offered first in the Fall trimester of the academic year 1978-79, and was repeated in the Winter trimester following. Enrollment limit was set at 50. In the Fall trimester, 50 students enrolled; in the Winter trimester 35 plus 15 auditors.

The course met for a double lecture period (Stockdale and Brennan) on Wednesday afternoons. The class then broke into seminar sections which met Thursday afternoons, each instructor alternating sections by week. A mid-term test and a final examination were given, and a short paper required. Description of the paper is found on page 2 of the course syllabus (Appendix C).

4. Public Response to the Course, 1978-79

"Foundations of Moral Obligation" attracted wide publicity in both military and civilian media. Admiral Stockdale made many addresses nationwide to civilian and military organizations during this period. In these public appearances he often made a point of describing the course in moral philosophy he was teaching at the Naval War College. The same held true of numerous newspaper, magazine, radio and television interviews Admiral Stockdale gave in the light of attention focused on him because of his fame as a Vietnam prisoner of war hero and winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor.

In February 1979 Time Magazine did a story on Admiral Stockdale and the course. TIME's reporter carried out extensive interviews with students in the course, with faculty and staff of the Naval War College, with the Admiral, and with myself. The reporter and photographer also attended a Wednesday afternoon meeting of the course. The story appeared in the Education section of TIME Magazine 19 February 1979 a copy of which forms Appendix E of this report.

5. Student Response to the Course, 1978

Response was generally favorable to the initial Fall trimester offering of EL-101, though certain dissatisfactions were frankly expressed and all parties agreed there were rough spots which needed to be ironed out.

Most of the comments written by students in their individual end-of-course questionnaries were more positive than the machine-tabulated summary of "degree of satisfaction" would indicate. (See Appendix F 1.) The latter showed FE-101 ranking 8th out of a field of 18 Fall electives. It should be noted that in this evaluation the first 9 of 18 electives were bunched on the high side (grade of 6 or better out of a possible 7).

Students liked the lectures and, for the most part, the readings assigned. The unit notes were singled out as being particuly helpful. Nearly all agreed the course was of high value to them. In answer to the question "To what extent do you estimate the future value to yourself of your Fall elective

course?" FE-101, 1978, ranked second highest of the 18 electives tabulated, topped only be FE-117, a course in advanced electronic warfare.

There were some complaints about the reading list being too heavy both quantitatively and qualitatively, but these were not major criticisms. Significant complaint concerned the weakness of the course seminars, a criticism both instructors considered justified. There was not enough structure to the seminars and there was a tendency to rely too much on unprepared class discussion to carry them. Steps were taken to strengthen the seminar structures in the second offering of the course (WE-1979), but even then there was room for improvement.

6. Examinations and Grades

A mid-term test and final examination were given--and still are in the course as taught at present. Grades for most of the class, in the first offering of the course in the Fall of 1978 tended to center in the 3.6--3.5 area (A minus, B plus)--an excellent performance for a group most of whom had had no previous experience with philosophy as an academic subject. Much of the reading was technical and difficult, and high standards of performance were exacted. About one-third of FE-101, 1978 did 3.6 or better; the rest tended to cluster at or near the 3.5 mark.

On the second offering of the course in the following trimester (WE-101 1979), the performance was even higher with 7 in the 3.65--3.70 group; 8 in 3.60; 7 in 3.55; 8 in 3.50; and only 2 below this mark.

In the third run of the course (FE-101 1979) in which class size was limited to 25 and the course taught without Admiral Stockdale by the present instructor alone, the pattern remained much the same--10 A's and 14 B's, one foreign student not receiving a grade. But most of the B's were actually B pluses, and the present instructor regrets that pluses and minuses are not to be recorded under the present grading system of the Naval War College.

When an instructor has (as in the above case) a large number of high B's (about 3.5 in the military grade system) he tends not to want to lump these with the smaller number of straight B's or B minuses. Thus he feels himself pressed from within to move the B pluses into the A category. This contributes to grade inflation. Moreover, most of the A grades in WE-101 1979 were A minuses. Hence, not recording pluses and minuses creates a misleading gap between the A minuses and the B pluses.

FE-101 1979: The Course without Stockdale

Admiral Stockdale's departure from the Naval War College on his retirement from the Navy to assume the presidency of the Citadel was a sore loss to the course. He did return, however, on 5 December 1979, to give a much appreciated valedictory lecture for the course and conducted a full hour discussion period following the lecture. He plans to do so again for WE-101 on 19 March 1980.

With myself as single teacher of the course, the enrollment limit was set at 25 for the Fall 1979 trimester. Full enrollment for the course as well as for the repeat of it in the current trimester (WE-101 1980) showed that there was continuing interest and support for the course. Student evaluations at the end of FE-101 1979--the first time through without Stockdale--gave the course high ratings (see Appendix E 3) and no mandate for change either in the course content, required readings or method of instruction.

One reason for the continuing favorable response seems to lie in the initial organization of the course; the good quality of the readings is a factor in this. Another reason lies in the simplification of the course format this year. Although with Stockdale's departure a strong sense of inspiration and personal presence was lost from the course, the change to a smaller scale--from 2 teachers, 50 students; to 1 teacher, 25 students--made for a pedagogical situation easier to handle.

8. Lecture and Seminar Arrangements, 1979-80

The present teaching format of EL-101 includes an hour and 20 minute lecture period Wednesdays at 1330. After a break, the seminar meeting for one section follows. The class is divided into two sections A and B, each section meeting on alternative Wednesdays. In addition to the seminar meetings, at least one individual conference with the instructor is required.

The above arrangement requires that one seminar section be "on", the other "off" on each of the ten Wednesdays on which the course meets. Ideally, the "off" section should meet on Thursday afternoons. But most of the class seems to prefer to have this time for reading, study, or other purposes. In view of the rather heavy reading for the course, this arrangement seems justified for this, a transition year. The day after each seminar meeting a summary of discussion is typed up and a copy sent to all members of the class. In this way the "off" section, as well as the "on" have notes on each seminar meeting.

9. <u>Changes in the Reading List, 1979-80</u>

The original reading list drawn up in 1978 has so far worn well and has not been substantially altered. There are good readings in moral philosophy and related areas that are not on our reading list and which might have proved just as useful as those that do appear there. But one must choose, and the choice of one good reading item often excludes another equally desirable.

Since 1978 there have been a few individual complaints about the relevance or difficulty about certain items on the required reading list--Lenin's WHAT IS TO BE DONE? and Monod's CHANCE AND NECESSITY, for example. But complaints have never been numerous enough to justify dropping these items--not alwaysagreeable reading perhaps, but important nonetheless.

Three additions to the required reading list have been made since the first offering of the course, and no deletions. The additions are (1) Albert Camus's novel THE PLAGUE, related to material studied in the second and seventh session of the course; (2) R.A. Gabriel's "The Nature of Military Ethics" bythe co-author of CRISIS IN COMMAND; (3) Homer Smith's short novel KAMONGO, related to Monod's CHANCE AND NECESSITY of the 9th (science) week. The Gabriel and Smith readings have helped strengthen the representation of American writers on our list, still outnumbered by Europeans. A suggestion was made to drop Stephen Crane's short story "The Open Boat" from the required reading list, but protest from Coast Guard officers, two of whom had had experiences similar to those related in the Crane story, prevented this.

10. <u>Library Support; Reading and Course Papers</u>

Student of EL-101 have all the items of required reading furnished to them and therefore do not use the Naval War College Library for this purpose at present. But the Library gives valuable support to the course in at least two important ways--first, by maintaining a well-ordered shelf of readings forreadings that are recommended in the course but not required; second, by the availability of the general collection to the students writing their papers for the course.

Students are asked to write one paper for the course which need be neither long nor research-based. While most students like to write on topics that center on a personal experience in situation of moral choice, most often in a military setting, some use the research facilities of the Library for this purpose, and all appreciate the availability of the general collection, including periodicals and reference. The library gives students opportunity to browse and to look over books not on the course reading lists, but which they have heard mentioned in lectures and discussion, and which have aroused their curiosity.

11. Recommendations for the Future

The continued offering of "Foundations of Moral Obligation" seems warranted by the interest and support of the students. Naval War College students constitute a mature, critical, and discriminating graduate school body. Their interest and support of EL-101 is a better argument for continuing to offer the course at least one trimester per academic year than any reasoned justification of it in this report by the present instructor. The best answer as to why the course is useful is contained in the course itself and in the student response to it.

Some may consider relevant to the question of the offering of a course in moral philosophy at the Naval War College the growing popularity of ethics courses of various kinds in military institutions and programs. Whether what some call the "ethics explosion" represents something that is here to stay or only a transient fashion is not easy to answer from this point in time. Since EL-101 was first offered Admiral Stockdale and myself have received a number of invitations to participate in panel discussions of military ethics in programs sponsored by various military services. Both the Admiral and I have been consulted on the inclusion of an ethics section in the new Navy Leadership Management Training Program (LMET).

There is no doubt that in the future a growing number of questions about the place of ethics courses of segments in military education and training will have to be dealt with by military officers of all services, and "Foundations of Moral Obligation" may well prove a useful precedent in this respect.

12. Acknowledgements

In the formative stages of the course "Foundations of Moral Obligation" (EL-101) valuable help, suggestions, and advice were given at the Naval War College to Admiral Stockdale and myself by Professor Fred Hartmann, LCDR John Morse, USN, CAPT Robert Hall, USN, RADM Henry Eccles, USN (Ret.), and Mr. Melvin Lieberman.

Respectfully,



J.G. BRENNAN

Copy to:
Electives Coordinator

APPENDIX A

Letter of Admiral Stockdale
to
Professor J. G. Brennan

COMMANDER
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE WING U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

24 November 1975

Dear Professor Brennan,

I was honored to receive your inquiry about the comfort and strength philosophical readings gave me throughout my 7½ years in prison. Perhaps I can best explain how this came to be with a rather rambling chronology.

I came into the Navy as a Naval Academy Midshipman in 1943 at the age of 19. For the next twenty years or so I was a rather technically oriented person. I was a seagoing destroyer officer, an aviator, a landing signal officer, a test pilot and academic instructor at the test pilot school, a many-times-deployed fighter pilot and ultimately a squadron commander of a supersonic F-8 Crusader outfit.

In 1960 I was sent to Stanford University for two full years' study in politics/history/economics, etc. in preparation for later assignments in politico-military policy making. I loved the subject matter, but noticed that in many courses my interest would peak at about the time the professor would say, "We're getting into philosophy - let's get back to the subject." I had more than adequate time to get the expected Master's Degree, and suggested to my advisor in my second year that I sign up for some courses over in the philosophy corner of the quadrangle. He was dead set against it - thought it would be a waste of my time. He said, "That's a very technical subject - it would take two terms to learn their peculiar vocabulary." Finally, after I persisted, he said, "It's up to you."

It was my good fortune on that first morning that I wandered through the halls of the philosophy department, grey

haired and in civilian clothes (of course), to come by an open office whose occupant looked me in the eye and asked if he could be of help. When I told him that I was a graduate student in the humanities with no formal philosophy background he could scarcely believe it. When I told him I was a naval officer he asked me to have a seat. He had been in the Navy in WWII. His name was Phillip Rhinelander. To jump ahead, his background was as follows: As a Harvard lawyer he had practiced in Boston for 15 or 20 years before Pearl Harbor, volunteered for war service at sea, and thereafter took his PhD at Harvard under Whitehead. After tours as a dean at Harvard and Stanford, he was back in the classroom at his own request. He was in the midst of his two term "personal" course: The Problems of Good and Evil. This he had built upon the lessons of The Book of Job ("Life is not fair"). He offered to let me enter the course, and to overcome my shortcomings of background, to give me an hour of private tutoring each week. What a departure from the other departments! (In some, PhD candidates sat outside their advisor's office for hours on end awaiting a ten minute conversation.) I loved Rhinelander's class, and particularly our hour together each week. I remember how patient he was in trying to get me to realize the full implications of Hume's "Dialogues on Natural Religion" (I still have page after page of notes on that).

To jump ahead again, I completed the course in fair fashion, and went on to others from a visiting professor from Michigan named Moravcsik, but Epictetus had already come into play during my last tutorial session with Rhinelander.

As we parted after our last session, he reached up to his bookshelf and said something like, "As I remember it, you are a military man - take this booklet as a memento of our hours together. It provides moral philosophy applicable to your profession." It was The Enchiridion.

That night I started to peruse my gift. I recognized nothing that applied to the career I had known. I was a fighter pilot, an organizer, a motivator of young aviators,

a martini drinker, a golf player, a technologist - and this ancient rag talked about not concerning oneself with matters over which he had no control, etc. I thought to myself, "Poor old Rhinelander - he's just too far gone." Nevertheless, I read and remembered almost all of it - if for no other reason than that it was given to me by the man I had come to worship as the most complete human being I had ever met: a sensitive scholar, a man who devoted himself to teaching quality kids quality concepts after a full career of legal and academic administrative success, a music composer, a kingpin of all major phases of university life, and a sophisticated gentleman of kindness and generosity.

About three years after I had said good-bye to "poor old Rhinelander," while in the midst of my second combat tour against North Vietnam as a Wing Commander, I pulled off a target one September morning in the midst of heavy flak when all the lights came on (fire warning, hydraulic failure, electrical failure, etc.). As I sped over the treetops it became immediately apparent that I had lost my flight controls - by reflex action I pulled the curtain and ejected - and was almost immediately suspended in air 200 feet above a village street, in total silence except for rifle shots and the whir of bullets past my ear. So help me in those fleeting seconds before I landed among the waiting crowd I had two vivid thoughts. (1) Five years to wait (I had studied enough modern Far East history and talked to enough Forward Air Controllers in the south to fully appreciate the dilemma of Vietnam - I turned out to be an optimist by 2½ years). (2) I am leaving that technological world and entering the world of Epictetus.

The world view of the stoics, Professor Rhinelander had joked, was that their environment was a buzz saw in which human <u>will</u> was the only salvation. I was to spend over four years combatting a veritable buzz saw (until the torture and extortion machine was set in idle in the late autumn of 1969) and over three more years of simple deprived detention of the sort one would expect in a primitive, hostile country. Over four years were to be spent in solitary confinement, nearly half

of it in leg irons. Throughout, until 1970, every effort was to be made to break my will, to make me a cat's paw in tinhorn propaganda schemes. Real or fabricated "violations of the established regulations for criminal's detention" (e.g., tapping on the walls to another prisoner) would result in torture, with the end aim of sequential (1) confession of guilt, (2) begging for forgiveness, (3) apology, and (4) atonement (signing an anti-war statement). A similar sequence would be set up with particular gusto if I were found to be exercising leadership of others via the tap code ("inciting other criminals to oppose the camp authority").

The situation was thus framed in the above context. I was crippled (knee broken, eventually to become rigidly fused by nature; shoulder broken, partial use of arm); alone; sick (weight down 50 pounds); depressed (not so much from anticipating the next pain as from the prospect of my eventually losing my honor and self-respect); and helpless except for will. What conditions could be more appropriate for Epictetus' admonitions? As a soldier, I had bound myself to a military ethic:

(Chapter XVII of The Enchiridion)

"Remember that you are an actor in a drama of such sort as the author chooses - if short, then in a short one; if long, then in a long one. If it be his pleasure that you should enact a poor man, see that you act it well; or a cripple, or a ruler, or a private citizen. For this is your business - to act well the given part; but to choose it belongs to another."

I was crippled:

(Chapter IX of The Enchiridion)

"Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the will unless itself pleases. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will; and say

this to yourself with regard to everything that
happens. For you will find it to be an impediment
to something else, but not truly to yourself."

I was dependent on my extortionists for life support, and soon learned to ask for nothing to avoid demands for "reciprocity":

(Chapter XIV of The Enchiridion (last sentence))

"Whoever then would be free, let him wish nothing,
let him decline nothing, which depends on others;
else he must necessarily be a slave."

I could stop my misery at any time by becoming a puppet; was it worth the shame?

(Chapter XXVIII of The Enchiridion)

"If a person had delivered up your body to
some passer-by, you would certainly be angry. And
do you feel no shame in delivering up your own
mind to any reviler, to be disconcerted and con-
founded?"

Relief from boils, heat, cold, broken bones was "available" for the asking - for a price. What should I say?

(Chapter XXIV of The Enchiridion (selected sentence))

"If I can get them with the preservation of my own
honor and fidelity and self-respect, show me the
way and I will get them; but if you require me to
lose my own proper good, that you may gain what is
no good, consider how unreasonable and foolish you
are."

Epictetus was not the only valuable philosophic memory in my predicament: Job (Why me?...Why <u>not</u> me?), Descartes'

bifurcation of mind and body, and many other readings were invaluable.

It is important to note that I am speaking only for myself. Some of my prison mates had more doctrinaire religious concepts which served them well, some drew resolve from their concepts of political virtue, and so on in a broad spectrum of varying levels of sophistication. Thoughts of God and country helped me, too - but my "secret weapon" was the security I felt in anchoring my resolve to those selected portions of philosophic thought that emphasized human dignity and self-respect. Epictetus certainly taught that.

This has been a much longer explanation that I had planned, but I am enthusiastic about the wonders a man in your profession and discipline can bring about in the lives of people in need. I wish I had the qualification to be in your shoes, teaching in a good school. From firsthand experience I am committed to the position that the study of moral philosophy is a particularly relevant part of education. And though education, as one of my favorite quotations reads, may be but an ornament in prosperity, it is a refuge in adversity.

I wish you well and appreciate your dedication to the teaching of such an important discipline.

Sincerely yours,

J. B. STOCKDALE
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

Professor Joseph G. Brennan
Department of Philosophy
Barnard College
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027

APPENDIX B

WEEK FIVE

Unit Notes: On Kant's FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

JBS/JGB

Foundations of Moral Obligation

Naval War College

1978-1979

WEEK FIVE

Unit Notes: On Kant's FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

JBS/JGB

Foundations of Moral Obligation

Naval War College

1978-1979

Introductory Note (JGB)

We recall that there are two well-known ways of approaching the study of moral philosophy. One is to begin by asking what ends in life are good and how these can be achieved. The second is to start by asking what actions are right or wrong, and what principles will help us identify them. The first is the method of Aristotle; the second is the way of Kant. The first approach is characteristic of classical ethics, the second is found more often in modern ethical inquiry.

To Aristotle, the good man and the good life have first claim on the interest of the moral philosopher. The moral life is a skill, the art of living a life proper to a man as a man. A good cobbler is one who possesses and uses the skills that pertain to making and repairing shoes. A good soldier is one who has the skills proper to the art of warfare and the virtues we should expect of such a man, considering his role. A good man is one who has and uses the capacities to live well as a man. Of a good cobbler, we expect well-made shoes. Of a good soldier, we expect endurance and courage in battle. Of a good man, we expect the character and conduct that a good man should have. What that character should be Aristotle answers with his examination of the moral and intellectual virtues or excellences.

KANT begins by directing his attention to the moral act rather than to the good man. He asks at the outset: what constitutes an act of moral worth? How can we distinguish a morally right act from one that is morally indifferent or merely expedient?

Despite his discouraging technical vocabulary, Kant's ethical theory is simple, direct, and in many (though not in all) ways in accord with the ethics of common sense. Most of us believe that if we are to do what is right, we need to have moral principles and to act on those principles. An example of such a principle or rule may be, "Tell the truth," "Live and let live," or "Act with the courage of your convictions." Kant's famous moral principle, the Categorical Imperative, is more comprehensive:

> ACT ONLY ON THAT MAXIM THROUGH WHICH YOU CAN AT THE SAME TIME WILL THAT IT SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW.

Suppose I am faced with a moral problem which calls for decision and action. Can I honestly at that moment say to myself that I truly will that which I am about to do should be done by all? Done universally? Or am I making an exception in favor of myself? Kant believed that most moral truths could be

derived from the Categorical Imperative. While this rule cannot tell us exactly what to do or how to decide in a particular situation, it serves as an indispensable guide.

Kant[1] published his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785. It is a short treatise or essay, divided into three parts; the essay is prefaced by an Introduction, which we may pass over and go directly to the first section "Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to the Philosophical".

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[1] Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg, East Prussia (now Kaliningrad) in 1724. He lived all his quiet meticulous life in his native city, achieving distinction as professor of philosophy at the University of Königsberg. His most ambitious work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) is a study of theory of knowledge. In its pages Kant argued that the mind cannot know the external world as it is in itself, but only an orderly array of appearances (phenomena), the product of innate concept-forms of the mind acting upon sense experience. Kant's ethical writings followed. In them he claimed that, while as knowing beings we cannot penetrate beyond a phenomenal knowledge of the world, we must as acting, willing beings, postulate (though we cannot prove) an unconditioned realm of freedom beyond the causal necessity of the phenomenal world, a realm in which we ourselves have roots. Kant died in 1804.

I. MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES (ref. 1st sec. Found. Meta. Morals)

Kant's moral philosophy is often described as an ethic of motive in contrast to an ethic of consequences. An ethic of motive emphasizes the importance of the purity of motive in moral judgment; an ethic of consequences stresses the benefit of results. For Kant, an act of true moral worth must be done from a pure motive, that is, one free of any element of self-profit or expediency. To the objection that it is unlikely that any human judgments in moral situations are done from a completely pure motive. Kant would reply that moral philosophy is not a study of how people do act, but how they should act in those situations in which they wish to act as moral beings. Kant admits that is impossible to prove even a single case of an act done completely from a pure sense of duty i.e., doing the right for its own sake and without at least a touch of possible self-benefit in mind. The "dear self", as Kant says, is hard to escape. But this psychological fact does not damage his ethical model: "Even if there never were actions springing from such pure sources," he says, "our concern is not whether this or that was done . . . but what ought to be done."[2]

> [In common-sense morality we often judge in terms of motive, results or both. Will what I propose to myself to do bring beneficial consequences? Am I doing it because it is the right thing to do? Because it is my duty to do so? Or out of desire for vain-glory. Or because I believe it will help me or others who are in a position to do something good for me?
>
> Am I honest in business because I believe it is the best policy--for honesty will bring me a good reputation, hence more customers--or is it because I believe I ought to be honest, period. According to Kant, only the second is moral, though the first may in accord with the moral law, even praiseworthy.
>
> Concepts of law often overlap those of morality. Ideas of intent, motive, consequences, play varying but important parts in investigative and judicial processes. The intent of an act is the purpose or end I have in mind when I do it. If I strike a pedestrian with my car on a rainy night, the result or consequences may be injury to the pedestrian. But

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[2]Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (408) trans. L.W. Beck. Index numbers in parens refer to the standard Prussian Academy paging of Kant's complete works.

I did not intend to harm the victim; it was an accident. Since to the authorities I appear to have been sober and to have been driving at a reasonable speed, I am not held. Responsibility for the injury is not mine, since there was no intent to harm on my part, nor culpable carelessness.

Motive is that which moves or impels us to do a certain act. True murders are all intentional acts, but are committed for a variety of motives e.g., jealousy, robbery, revenge, mutiny, political aims.

In criminal cases, investigative procedure often attends to possible motive. Y had a large insurance policy which X was the beneficiary, so X had a possible motive for killing Y.

But in the courtroom emphasis is on intent and consequences. Is the victim dead? Was it done with intent (means rea; "malice aforethought") or was it an accident? If with intent, was the act premeditated, planned in advance, or was it committed in the heat of passion with no premeditation?

Absence of bad results or consequences may diminish but not wipe out legal (and moral?) guilt.[3] Attempted murder is judged a serious crime, though the ordinary penalty is not as great as if the attempt had been successful.]

We may illustrate Kant's criterion of moral worth by the following example: We hear of a man giving a large sum to a worthy charity. The results are good: misery is relieved and people are helped. We have been led to believe that the donor gave the money from a sense of duty, because he believed he was doing the right thing for the sake of the right. Now suppose we discover that the donor gave the money in order to make a favorable adjustment on his income tax. Results still good, we might say, though our opinion of the moral worth of the man who gave may decline. Kant would say

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[3] The moral teaching of Jesus as related in the New Testament often stress the importance of motive, consequences being considered secondary. "You have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say unto you that whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has committed adultery with her already in his heart." (Mat. 5:27-28) Yet he also said "By their fruits you shall know them," seeming to recognize the importance of consequences. (Mat. 7:20)

the man who gave money to charity simply to get a favorable adjustment on his income tax had done an act that was not of moral worth. It was in accord with the moral law, but did not spring from it. It may be praiseworthy, but not as a moral act. The true moral act must arise directly from a good will, a will that seeks the good with no thought of possible benefits accruing to the "dear self." Such a good will is <u>unconditioned</u>, that is, has no strings attached, not commitments to benefit, not even to happiness--though a good will <u>deserves to be happy</u>.

Kant's own examples (397-398) make his position clear. A person who is honest, one whose natural amiability produces kindly deeds almost automatically, one who takes care to preserve his life, all these perform acts of moral worth only if these acts are done from a sense of duty (I ought to do this because I ought, that's all). If the storekeeper is honest because it is good business to be honest, if the amiable person does good simply out of natural inclination to please, if I take care to preserve my life simply out of prudence--none of these are acts of true moral worth, though all of them are consistent with moral law. They are in accord with duty, but did not arise out of a pure motive of duty.

I give my promise to do something. Why should I keep my promise? So that others will keep their promises to me? For the sake of social harmony? So that I will have and keep my good reputation? If I keep my promises because I am determined by one or more of these considerations, my promise-keeping is not an act of moral worth. That does not mean it is an immoral act. It may be praiseworthy. But it is not an authentic moral act. Only if I keep my promise because it is my duty to keep it will the act be of moral worth. Only if I act on the belief that I ought to do this because I ought to is this a truly moral act.

<u>Mill's Objection and a Possible Reply</u>

In Kant's uncompromising stand on the side of the need for pure motive in the moral act, he takes a position opposed to the main line of British ethical theorists, such as Hume, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Seventy-five years after Kant's <u>Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals</u>, Mill declared that the moral rightness of an act depends, not on the motive, but on the consequences or results of the act:

> . . . Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the moral worth of the agent. He who saves

a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble.[4]

In reply to this Kant would have reiterated his claim that only those actions done out of pure sense of duty are of true moral worth. The man who saves another from drowning out of hope of reward has performed an act that is in accord with duty, but not prompted by duty. Such an act may well be praiseworthy, but it is not an authentic moral one.

But we may ask Kant: if the morality of an act resides entirely in the purity of motive, in the sense of duty which impels us to do it, in the sense of "ought" with no strings attached--what about the role of consequences or results? Does Kant exclude them altogether from the moral situation? Does he not know that good motives alone will not get good things done? Common-sense moral reasoning tells us that results as well as motives and intent have to be weighed in moral situations; the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

In his ethical writings, Kant does not answer these questions as clearly or as directly as we would like. But even today contemporary students of Kant believe that examples can be adduced to show that Kant's theory of the moral judgment does not necessarily exclude the important roles of consequences. Here is one illustration:

> "Imagine two soldiers who volunteer for a dangerous mission; because they seek a task they ought to undertake, they voluntarily assume the responsibility for it. Certainly their act will have consequences; equally certain is the fact that they desire certain consequences for their act. The most careful consideration of these consequences, calculation as to how to achieve some desirable consequences and avoid others less desirable, and an ardent desire to attain the goal do not in the least detract from the morality of the men's actions if they are indeed acting on the conviction that it is their duty to do these acts; their concern with the consequences may be an essential part of their conduct, necessary for the fulfillment of the obligation they have placed upon themselves."
>
> "Now imagine that one of the men is killed before reaching his destination, while the other is successful; what moral judgment do we pass upon them? So

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[4] J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberal Arts, pp. 23-24.

far as we judge that their motives were equally good (and of course, as Kant repeatedly says, we cannot be sure what anyone's motives really are), we judge them in the same way. Their acts are judged to be equally moral, in spite of the fact that one succeeded and the other failed. Each did his "best," and what he earnestly attempted and the motives which led him to do what he did are the proper objects of moral judgment; what he accomplishes lies to a large extent beyond his control."[5]

Kant sums up his position on the role of motive and consequence in ethical judgment: "Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in any principle of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect." (401) By placing the moral worth of an action wholly in the motive, Kant affirms the autonomy of ethical judgment, the independent sovereignty of the moral realm. If the moral worth of an act is located in the consequences, Kant believes that the moral kingdom must thereby become (as we might say) a second-class power, dependent on and derivative from factual, empirical non-moral activities. If the basis of the rightness of "Don't cheat" or "Do your duty" lies in the fact that obeying such maxims promotes social harmony, and that breaking them tends to be socially destructive, then ethics is no more than (again, as we might say) a branch of socialogy. If the foundation of the moral rightness of "Have the courage of your convictions" or "Be kind where you can" lies in our own emotional self-fulfillment, then ethics is just a branch of psychology.

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[5] L.W. Beck, Intro., Kant, Found. Meta. Morals (Lib. Arts), p. ix. In Beck's example, note should be taken of the words "duty" ("their duty to do these acts") and "moral judgment" ("what moral judgment do we pass upon them?") "Duty" may mean (1) moral duty (2) legal or professional duty. We may be compelled by others to do our legal or professional duty but, Kant would say, we can never be compelled to do our moral duty. In the example quoted, Kant would say, the soldier whose act is of true moral worth must be moved by the pure sense of moral duty, though this may be inextricable from his professional duty in this particular case. The term "moral judgment" as used by Beck in the passage quoted means how we estimate the moral worth of another's act. But Kant uses "moral judgment" always to mean how I judge my own act before performing it. These distinctions, however, do not invalidate the commentator's attempt to show that an ethic of motive, like Kant's need not exclude the important role of consequences in the moral situation.

But psychology and sociology are positive sciences; they try to describe how things are. Ethics is a normative science; it endeavors to tell us what should be. Even if there never were a single disinterested human act, an act done from a pure sense of duty, done for the sake of what is right in itself, it is the task of moral philosophy to describe what such an act would be like. "Even if there never were actions springing from such pure sources," Kant says, "our concern is not whether this or that was done, but that reason of itself and independently of all appearances command what ought to be done." (407-408). To put the matter in words other than Kant's: moral values are moral ideals; that they are never perfectly realized does not mean they have no bearing on human life. Sailors of ancient Greece could not reach the stars, yet they steered their frail ships by them.

II. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (ref: 2nd sec. Found. Meta. Morals)

As rational beings we act according to principles, says Kant. That is, we act according to rules or laws more general than individual decisions or acts. Now to act morally is to act as a being with will regulated by reason.[6] This principle

[6] Kant's use of the term "reason" is special and technical, a sense he carries over from his earlier CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. For Kant, "Reason" does not mean intelligence or mind as a whole, but a certain limited, though important, part or aspect of mind or the knowing process.

Kant distinguishes three stages or faculties of knowledge. By Intuition or direct apprehension we sense or take in the external world. By Understanding we grasp the casual connections and uniformities that give the world its lawlike character and make science possible. Reason provides us with metaphysical ideas, such as God, Immortality, and Freedom, which cannot be proved by experience, but which are important regulative principles.

For Kant, it is Reason that provides our Will with the laws or principles of moral judgment, particularly the Categorical Imperative. For Kant Reason produces metaphysical ideas, concepts not testable like those of natural science which are given by the Understanding. One of reason's concepts is that of Freedom, the notion that we, unlike material objects, are not bound or conditioned by physical laws. Hence the title of Kant's essay - Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.

presents itself to us in the moral situation under the form of an imperative. (414) Now imperatives are commands; all of them contain the idea of "ought." That is "You ought to do this," may be written, "Do this!" "You ought not to do this," may be written, "Don't do this."

There are two kinds of imperatives, hypothetical and categorical. (415) Hypothetical imperatives take the form, "I ought to do this, for such and such a reason." The categorical imperative, by contrast, takes the form, "I ought to do this, because I ought." No reason is attached to the categorical Ought. In the case of the hypothetical imperative, the "ought" is conditional; the categorical imperative's "ought" is unconditional. If my maxim is "Be honest in business, for that is the best policy," then my maxim derives from a hypothetical imperative--a reason of self-interest is attached. But if my maxim is "Be honest, because it is your duty to be honest, it is the right thing to do, that's all," then my maxim derives from the Categorical Imperative.

"There is one imperative," Kant says, "which directly commands a certain conduct without making its condition some purpose to be reached by it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the material of the action and its intended result but the form and the principle from which it results. What is essentially good in it consists in the intention, the result being what it may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality." (416)

Hypothetical imperatives are counsels of prudence. "Be attentive to your duty so that you'll earn promotion," and "Don't commit adultery; its consequences are destructive to the family," are not (according to Kantian ethics) moral but prudential advisements. To follow them in practical life may be prudent and in accord with the moral law, but, as stated, they do not spring from the moral law as from a source. This law--the categorical imperative--has its source in pure reason and lays an absolute command on the will, not just a counsel. (419) But Kant admits that it is hard to point to an actual pure instance of this commands effect:

> "For instance, when it is said, 'Thou shalt not make a false promise', we assume that the necessity of this avoidance is not a mere counsel for the sake of escaping some other evil, so that it would read, 'Thou shalt not make a false promise so that, if it comes to light, thou ruinest thy credit"; we assume rather that an action of this kind must be regarded as of itself bad and that the imperative of the prohibition is categorical."

"But we cannot show with certainty by any example that the will is here determined by the laws alone without any other incentives, even though this appears to be the case. For it is always possible that secret fear of disgrace, and perhaps also obscure apprehension of other dangers, may have had an influence on the will." (420)

Kant holds that there is only one Categorical Imperative, that all other moral imperatives (that is, imperatives of duty) can be derived from it. It is:

ACT ONLY ACCORDING TO THAT MAXIM BY WHICH YOU CAN AT THE SAME TIME WILL THAT IT SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW.

[A maxim is a rule, and Kant has in mind a rule one sets for oneself. My maxim may be non-moral (morally indifferent) such as "Jog four miles a day" or "Keep my IN basket clear." My maxim may be moral, such as "Tell the truth," "Always act according to what I believe is morally right," or "Keep promises." My maxims meet the conditions of the categorical imperative if I can honestly say that I will that my maxim (e.g. "Keep promises") be adopted universally--that is, I can truthfully say that I will that everybody should keep promises, etc.]

UNIVERSALIZATION as a Test of the Morality of Judgment:

Two basic notions that Kant emphasized in his ethical writings are now commonplaces in contemporary moral philosophy:[7] the first is that moral judgments are imperatives, that is, judgments best expressed in the form of prescriptive statements like "Don't cheat" and "To thine own self be true," rather than in the form of descriptive statements like "It's raining" or "Pressure varies directly with temperature." A moral judgment may be expressed in the form of a declarative sentence, such as, "You ought to act with the courage of your convictions," but this easily translates into the imperative form, "Act with the courage of your convictions."

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[7] "Moral judgments," says R.M. Hare, "are a kind of prescriptive judgments, and . . . they are distinguished from other judgments of this class by being universalizable." FREEDOM AND REASON, Oxford 1963, p. 4.

The second important notion stressed by Kant is that moral judgments are universalizable, that is, a test of them is to see whether they will hold good when expanded from particular to general form, or cast in the form of a rule. "Promises should always be kept" is the universal form of "You should keep the promise you gave to that man." "I'm going to do this, despite your advice, because I believe it's the right thing to do," can be universalized to "Always do what you believe is right."

[Common-sense morality confirms that universalizing is a useful method of testing the moral character of judgments. The mother who says to her child who has pocketed some store candy without paying for it, "What if everybody did that?," is calling her child's attention to the universalisability test. Since the mother probably wants to wake the child up to the destructive social consequences that would follow the universalisation of what her child did, Kant would say that her judgment is probably prudential rather than purely moral. Still, Kant would admit that such a test may licitly be used to see whether a proposed action is in accord with the moral law, even if it does not spring from a pure motive of duty or sense of right for right's sake.

In common life, if a proposed action fails the universalizability test, this does not necessarily mean the action is morally wrong; it may simply be nonmoral or morally indifferent. For example, suppose my maxim is "Practice the bagpipes every day"; this cannot be universalized, for if everybody practiced the bagpipes every day, public mental health might be endangered. The fact that my maxim "Become a naval officer" cannot be universalized does not mean that my maxim is not legitimate, even meritorious.]

Autonomy: Persons as Ends, Not Means.

The Categorical Imperative, then, is a law or rule given by reason to our will. It tells us in a moral situation that we must act only in accord with those principles which we can honestly declare we would want to become universal law. By means of the Categorical Imperative we may test our moral judgment in a particular case; if we find we are making an exception in favor of ourselves, our proposed action fails the test of the Categorical Imperative. "When we observe ourselves," says Kant, "in any transgression of a duty, we find that we do not actually will that our maxim should become a universal law.

. . . we only take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves or for the sake of our inclination, and for this one occasion." (425)

Now, according to Kant, if I can formulate the categorical imperative as a law to command my moral decisions (and I can), others can do as well. That is, others like myself are capable of legislating morality to themselves by means of the categorical imperative, for others, like myself are beings capable of good will and right reason.

Therefore, according to Kant, I must treat others, who like myself possess this moral sovereignty, as autonomous beings, as persons, as ends in themselves, and not as means only or as instruments to be used. A person is not a utensil:

> Now I say that man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of inclinations only have a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth. . . .
>
> Beings whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature . . . have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called 'Things'; on the other hand, rational beings are designated 'Persons' because their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves, i.e., things which may not be used merely as means. Such a being is thus an object of respect. . . (428-429)

So Kant derives from the Categorical Imperative a practical imperative:

> ACT SO THAT YOU TREAT HUMANITY, WHETHER IN YOUR OWN PERSON OR IN THAT OF ANOTHER, ALWAYS AS AN END AND NEVER AS A MEANS ONLY.

This practical imperative not only requires that I treat others as ends in themselves and never only as means, but also that I treat myself as such:

> Man, however, is not a thing, and thus not something to be used merely as a means; he must always be regarded in all his actions as an end in himself. Therefore, I cannot dispose of man in my own person so as to mutilate, corrupt, or kill him." (429)

The application of this rule to suicide and other self-inflicted harm to the self (alcohol? drugs?) is obvious.

Kant says that this practical imperative--"Treat others as ends, never as means only"--cannot be derived from experience. That all persons are ends in themselves, hence of absolute worth and entitled to treatment with dignity and respect, cannot be proved by pointing to empirical fact. It must be derived from pure reason, that is, that part or activity of mind which constructs ideal, but authoritative, entities which regulate our conduct and thought without themselves having a ground or basis in the world of sense experience.

[Note on the concept of Person

Kant's doctrine of persons as rational beings, ends-in-themselves, is one of many important sources of the teaching of personal individualism, the doctrine that each individual human is unique, worthy of dignity, and of absolute value. Itself a secular version of the Christian teaching that all human souls are equally dear in the sight of God, Kant's doctrine is also consistent with Rousseau's teaching of "natural rights" and with subsequent political and psychological theories based on the assumption of natural rights, and the sovereignty, dignity, and absolute value of human personhood.

A contemporary example: MICHAEL WALZER, referring to wartime rape of women by soldiery (his specific example is the case of Moroccan soldiers fighting with Free French Forces in Italy in World War II) holds that such rape is a crime in war as well as in peace because "it violates the right of the woman who is attacked. To offer her as bait to a mercenary soldier is to treat her as if she were not a person at all but a mere object, a prize or trophy of war. It is the recognition of her personality that shapes our judgments." Just and Unjust Wars, N.Y. 1977, p. 134.

Walzer notes, however, that SIMONE WEIL has attacked this way of talking about "rights" in her essay "Human Personality." Talk about rights, Weil says, turns "What should have been a cry of protest from the depth of the heart into a shrill nagging of claims and counter-claims . . . if a young girl is being forced into a brothel she will not talk about her rights."

But Walzer does not cite another passage from that same essay of Simone Weil that bears on the fallacy of separating "personhood" from the indivisible unity of the human being in question. Says Weil:

"What is cruel and an offense against justice is to say 'You do not interest me,' not 'Your person does not interest me.' There is something sacred in every man, but it is not his person. Nor yet is it the human personality. It is this man, no more, no less."

"I see a passerby in the street. He has long arms, blue eyes, and a mind whose thoughts I do not know, but perhaps they are commonplace. It is neither his person, nor the human personality in him, which is sacred to me. It is he. The whole of him. The arms, the eyes, the thoughts, everything. . ."

"Not without infinite scruple would I touch anything of this. If it were the human personality in him that was sacred to me, I could easily put out his eyes. As a blind man he would be exactly as much as human personality as before. I should have destroyed nothing but his eyes."

"What would stay my hand is the knowledge that if someone were to put out his eyes, his soul would be lacerated by the thought that harm was being done to him."

"At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being." <u>Selected Essays</u>, 1934-43]

<u>Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends</u>

Kant's categorical imperative, whether in its basic form:

Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law.

or as the practical imperative:

> Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.

has two characteristics: (1) it is <u>a law given to ourselves by ourselves</u>. It is not external, not a regulation imposed upon us from the outside. (2) it is <u>universal</u>, that is, it applies or should apply to all persons, not just to ourselves.

Both these elements are included in what Kant calls the <u>Autonomy of the Will</u>,[8] which he regards as the foundation of the moral law.

> "Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself . . . Hence the principle of autonomy is: NEVER CHOOSE EXCEPT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE MAXIMS OF THE CHOICE ARE COMPREHENDED IN THE SAME VOLUTION AS A UNIVERSAL LAW." (441)

If we think--as we must--of all persons including ourselves as possessing autonomy of the will, i.e., the capacity to prescribe law not only to oneself but to will that it be universal, then we can envision an ideal moral kingdom, a <u>kingdom of ends</u>, a realm in which each of us is self-law-giver as well as prescriber of universal moral principles. In this realm of ends, each autonomous self would move in harmony with each and every other autonomous will according to the same principles. All moral law would come from within; it would no longer be legislated from the outside. Given persons of good will and right reason, take away greed, selfishness, evil teachings, each of us autonomous moral beings--law-giver to ourselves as well as legislator to all--would move in concord with every other sovereign will. Such would be the kingdom of ends, a moral ideal that Kant holds as a model of what could be and should be rather than what in fact is: a world of moral conflict where State and external law are necessary to prevent unenlightened man from injuring his fellows through greed and ignorance.[9]

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[8]The word "autonomy" derives from the Greek "autos" (self) and "nomos" (law).

[9]Kant's notion of an ideal moral progress toward a completely enlightened state in which external law would no longer be necessary--each one of us a law to ourselves, yet legislating for all--is one of the foundation-stones of philosophical <u>anarchism</u>, the political <u>form</u> of which rejects all external government as bad.

III. THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM (ref. 3rd sec. Found. Meta. Morals)

The argument of the third and concluding section of Kant's essay may be briefly summarized:

To act morally is to act freely. Moral choice cannot be determined by physical necessity. The freedom of the will is autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself. (447)

The will is subject not to the laws of necessity such as govern physical events, but according to its own laws. Natural events are determined by external causes; the will has its own casuality in virtue of which we regard ourselves and others as true agents, truly responsible for moral choice.

But freedom of the will cannot be proved; it must be assumed. We cannot help but think of ourselves as free in respect to our wills. We cannot help but think of ourselves as the authors of our acts in moral situations. We cannot demonstrate freedom of the will by argument, nor prove it by appeal to experience of men. Nevertheless we cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom. (448)

Freedom of the will cannot be proved by speculative reason, nor can it be disproved. This shows that such freedom is possible and involves us in no contradiction with the principle of natural necessity. (462)

Freedom of the will is not an empirically proven fact, but an idea of pure reason. We cannot act morally without assuming it.

In the moral life, "reason seeks the unconditionally necessary and sees itself compelled to assume it." (463)

APPENDIX C

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE ELECTIVES PROGRAM

1979-1980

FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION

EL 101

PROFESSOR J.G. BRENNAN

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE ELECTIVES PROGRAM

1979-1980

FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION

EL 101

PROFESSOR J.G. BRENNAN

COURSE DESCRIPTION

EL 101 - FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION

Since Socrates, moral philosophy has been taught both as a technical discipline and as a guide to life. Basic ideas to be discussed in this course include right, good, honor, duty, freedom, necessity, law, justice, happiness, insofar as these pertain to the human situation generally and to the military method in particular. Lecture topics, discussions and readings will be drawn from both classical and modern sources, including the Old Testament, the Socratic Dialogues of Plato, the ethical writings of Aristotle, Kant, Mill, and Sartre. There will be supplemental readings in Emerson, Thoreau, Dostoyevsky, Conrad, Koestler, and Solzhenitsyn.

STUDENT REQUIREMENTS

Readings: Required and Recommended

Required readings are listed below by week. Recommended readings will be on Library reserve, but are not required reading. Unit notes for most weeks' topics will be distributed in advance of the particular week and are to be considered required readings.

Novels and stories on the required reading list lend themselves easily to reading in advance of the beginning of the course. Attention to these readings in advance, if convenient, is suggested so that a greater amount of time may be made available for the more technical readings.

Writing Requirements

There will be a mid-term test in the 6th week for which responsibility for the reading through the 6th week will be assumed. There will be a final test at the end of the course.

A short paper (about five typewritten pages, double spaced) will be handed in at the beginning of the 8th week session. The topic, of the student's own choosing, should be related in some way to a question of ethics or a problem of moral judgment that has touched the student's professional or general interests. A personal experience, a stimulating item of reading, an unusual (or usual) military situation, reflections on ideas raised in any part of the course--all these would be acceptable as suitable material for the paper.

Grading

Student performance will be graded. Grades will be apportioned as follows:

Oral Participation	20%
Mid-Term Examination	20%
Final Examination	30%
Writing Assignment	30%
	100%

READING ASSIGNMENTS

WEEK ONE - From 20th Century Technology to the World of Epictetus. The Meaning of Moral Philosophy.

Required: Stockdale, J.B., "The World of Epictetus," Atlantic Monthly, 1978.

Koestler, A., Darkness at Noon. (A Novel)

Gabriel, R.A., "The Nature of Military Ethics."

Walzer, M., "Prisoners of War."

WEEK TWO - The Book of Job. Life Is Not Fair. The Problem of Evil.

Required: Job, "The Book of Job," Old Testament.

Solzhenitsyn, A., One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch. (A Novel)

WEEK THREE - Socrates: Doctrine and Example. Civil Obedience and Disobedience, Can Virtue be Taught?

Required: Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo.

Recommended: Plato, Meno in DIALOGUES OF PLATO.

Thoreau, H., Civil Disobedience.

WEEK FOUR - Aristoltle. Happiness as Living Well and Faring Well. The Moral and Intellectual Virtures. Courage as Balance and Endurance.

Required: Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. (Selections)

Crane, S., "The Open Boat." (Story)

Conrad, J., Typhoon. (Short Novel)

Recommended: Plato, Laches, in DIALOGUES OF PLATO.

WEEK FIVE - Kant and Hart. Ethics of Duty and Conscience. Internal and External Law. Ethical Meaning of "Ought" and "Right."

Required: Kant, I., Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 9-59.

Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law. Chapters 8 and 9.

Recommended: Bok, S., Lying.

WEEK SIX - Mill. Morality as Social Utility. Justice and the Greatest Happiness Principles.

Required: Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism.

Recommended: Mill, J.S., On Liberty.

Rawls, J., "Justice as Fairness."

Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice.

Kristol, I., "On Equality."

WEEK SEVEN - Individualism and the Collective - I.

Required: Emerson, R.W., "Self-Reliance" in Emerson, Essays.

Sartre, J-P., "Existentialism Is a Humanism" in Kaufmann, W., ed., Existentialism from Dostoyevsky, to Sartre.

Dostoyevsky, F., "Notes from the Underground" in Kaufmann, Existentialism.

Camus, A., The Plague. (A Novel)

Recommended: Whitman, W., "Song of Myself" from Leaves of Grass.

Camus, A., The Myth of Sisyphus.

WEEK EIGHT - Individualism and the Collective - II.

Required: Marx-Engels, The Communist Manifesto.

Lenin, V.I., What Is to be Done?, in R.C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology.

Dostoyevsky, F., "The Grand Inquistor" from The Brothers Karamazov.

Recommended: Chernyshevsky, N., What Is to be Done? (A Novel)

DeGeorge, R., Soviet Ethics.

WEEK NINE - Science and Values. Does the Universe Have Meaning or Purpose?

Required: Monod, J., Chance and Necessity, Chapter 1, 2, 7, 8, 9.

Smith H., Kamongo.

Sinsheimer, R.L., "The Presumptions of Science," DAEDALUS, Spring 1978.

Recommended: Watson, J., The Double Helix.

Wilson, E.O., Human Nature.

WEEK TEN - Return to the Beginning. Epictetus. The Stoic Ideal and the Ethics of the Military Man. Philosophy as Technical Analysis and Way of Life. The Socratic Example.

Required: Epictetus, Enchiridion.

Malcolm, N., Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir.

Plato, Phaedo, (rereading of opening and death scene).

Recommended: Gray, G., The Warriors.

APPENDIX D

COURSE SUMMARY

JBS/JGB

Foundations of Moral Obligation

Naval War College

1978-79

COURSE SUMMARY

JGB

Foundations of Moral Obligation

Naval War College

1980

EL 101 FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION

A SUMMARY

Moral philosophy may be defined as the inquiry into those principles upon which we base our judgments of what ends are good and what actions are right.

FOREWORD

Some people get along well enough by leaving considerations of good ends and right actions to their intuitive responses. In the highly structured bureaucratic environments in which military officers, generation after generation, seemingly spend higher and higher proportions of their lives, there is a great temptation to let personal standards go at that. The exponential rise in the flow of communication, particularly of the printed word with its endless stream of particularized guidance, programmatic blueprints, acronyms and ever-new buzzwords has the effect of deadening one's moral sensitivity. The way of life on the treadmill, following the horde down the prescribed track by the numbers, gives one the false sense of security that personal philosophies of ordered value systems will be issued by "the system" when the need arises. The twists and turns of the fortunes of war have a way of throwing operational skippers and others out into new decision-making territory where all previous bets are off--and, needless to say, no philosophic survival kits are issued. One can suddenly find himself in a position of not only having to establish law for himself, but of being obliged to write it for others and demand their compliance. This can be a shockingly new ball game - in which the dishonesty of issuing orders that cannot be obeyed, the willingness to commit oneself to the full consequences implicit in one's policies, the consideration of the possibility that the middle road may lead straight to the bull's-eye of disaster, and the squarely faced realization that one's orders will carry no more authority than the issuer is willing to give them by carrying them out himself by example - replace the usual considerations of conformity and measured reasonableness. As a hedge against being surprised to find yourself without a "they" to guide you - and as a hedge against the pitfalls and treachery that even home-base bureaucracy can provide, a little forethought and philosophic reading is a good investment. As it is well to take some of Epictetus's wisdom with you as you make a 90 second parachute trip from the world of technology to his world of elemental values, so it is well to take some of Immanuel Kant's wisdom with you when you take the twenty minute automobile trip from the Pentagon to the Congressional commmittee hearing table.

J. B. Stockdale

FIRST WEEK

The readings of this session concern men in prison because that environment is intense, extortion-prone and hermetic. They include "The World of Epictetus" by VADM J.B. Stockdale. Professor Michael Walzer's essay on the obligations of a prisoner of war, and a fictional account as given in Koestler's novel DARKNESS AT NOON, the story of a man in prison, faced with death, forced to examine his past and to rethink his moral commitments. Richard Gabriel is co-author of the controversial book by Gabriel and Savage, CRISES IN COMMAND (1978). His paper, "The Nature of Military Ethics," summarizes the claim argued in the book concerning the contrast between the military and the entrepreneurial ethic.

SECOND WEEK

The existence of evil in the world has produced one of the oldest problems upon which humans have pondered. Religious and poetic expression of this enigma we find in THE BOOK OF JOB of The Old Testament. "JOB" is a work by an unknown author writing in an ancient era before philosophy had been developed as an intellectual and moral discipline.

The frame of Job's story is religious, the supreme meaning: the ways of God. How are His ways justified to men? Why do the good and the just suffer undeservedly? Job reasons with God and receives an answer in terms of the incommensurability of the finite and the infinite. God's ways are not our ways.

Modern parables are joined to our thoughts on the Book of Job. Albert Camus' novel THE PLAGUE (read for the seventh week) tells the story of a man fighting a losing battle; he fights on knowing that his own efforts are unavailing. Solzhenitsyn's novel ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVITCH is the chronicle of a simple man, unjustly imprisoned in an arctic Soviet labor camp. He endures the cold and hardship with a shrug, gives his bleak day a little meaning and value by outwitting the system to the extent of an extra spoonful of soup, a second piece of bread.

THIRD WEEK

Socrates was the man who gave philosophy a decisive turn toward moral inquiry. Before this old Athenian, philosophy had been hardly more than primitive physics. As Plato dramatises the thoughts and events of Socrates' life, we consider the questions of the just and the unjust man; the problem of duty to our

country; whether moral values can be taught; should we obey or disobey an unjust law? Through Plato's PHAEDO, we visit Socrates in prison during the final hours of his life and hear his last discourse to his students. That discourse sets out two themes, of metaphysical and moral implications that had profound impact on the West--the Platonic doctrine of the Forms, and the teaching of the separable and immortal soul.

FOURTH WEEK

We then turn to the NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS of Aristotle, Plato's pupil, a work that stands as the first textbook of moral philosophy. To Aristotle, right actions are what we expect of a good man. Just what constitutes a good character must be considered before asking what actions are right or wrong. For right actions follow from a good character, and a good character is built up by practice of those virtues or excellences proper to a human. We read Aristotle on the moral virtues as means or balance between excess and defect. Courage--which Plato called Endurance of the Soul--is defined as the mean between excess of rashness and the defect of cowardice. Courage is the supreme virtue of the military man, for death is the most terrible of evils, and fearlessness in the face of death the highest moral excellence. Aristotle applies his criterion of the mean to the other virtues--generosity, self-control, self-respect, truthfulness.

The theme of endurance stands out in two stories of courage at sea that are read in conjunction with Aristotle on character and courage--Stephen Crane's story "The Open Boat" and Conrad's novel TYPHOON.

FIFTH WEEK

We turn now to a crucial work in modern ethical theory, Kant's FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS. Central to Kant's theory is the idea of duty, certainly a concept inseparable from the military vocation. Opposing every attempt to reduce moral judgment to expediency and profit, Kant emphasizes the absolute and unconditional character of the moral command we give ourselves. As autonomous beings, capable of being a law to ourselves, we can say "I ought to do this because it is right."--Not because it will profit me, make me feel better, be good for business, grease the wheels, serve some other purpose. Kant's Categorical Imperative provides the formula for the supreme command of duty--"Act so that you can will your act to become universal law." And to those who say "Kant's ethics is all very well in theory, but in practice it won't work," Kant replies that he is not describing how people DO act or what DOES work, but how people OUGHT to act and what SHOULD work.

SIXTH WEEK

To Kant, the substance of morality lies in the quality of our motive, in the freedom of our intent from self-profit and narrow expediency. Hence he understresses the role of consequences or results in the moral situation. By contrast, John Stuart Mill's UTILITARIANISM endeavors to locate the nerve of morality in consequences rather than in motive. Those actions, he says, are morally right which tend to result in the increase of general happiness. Such acts, even though done from self-seeking motives, are still morally right acts--though we may not esteem very highly the moral worth of the person who does the right thing for hope of reward. In Mill's writing we see clear stress on what have become the traditional virtues of liberalism--fairness, impartiality, evenhanded justice, respect for <u>just</u> law, tolerance for all so long as they do not infringe on the rights of others.

Mill's essay "On Liberty", the twin of his treatise on utilitarianism, emphasizes the supreme value of the individual person in vocabulary different but in meaning not far from Kant's stress on the autonomy and inviolability of the individual person--his right to follow the law of his own nature. To Mill this may lead to the most radical nonconformity so long as it does not damage the liberty of others.

SEVENTH WEEK

The theme of individual sovereignty finds American expression in Emerson's 19th century essay SELF RELIANCE and in our own time, post-World War II Europe, Sartre's EXISTENTIALISM. To the existentialist, what a man is rests with himself. We are not born with characters, but we make them by our acts. A man is the sum of his deeds, and the responsibility for them rests squarely on his own shoulders. What we are is up to us.

Anticipating Sartre, Dostoyevsky's NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND preaches an extreme form of individualism which denies the Socratic axiom that when we act we cannot help but choose what we think to be our good. The Underground Man asserts that men do not reason things out that way, that they will go knowingly, willingly, toward their own certain destruction. People will deliberately choose that which is harmful, forbidden, shattering. Here Dostoyevsky is reacting to a certain fashionable moral optimism of his time, based on the claim that the way to happiness is that of reasonable self-interest. Camus' novel THE PLAGUE is relevant to themes of both the second week (Problem of Evil) and this week's study of Existentialist ethics.

EIGHTH WEEK

In contrast to the extreme ethical individualism of Existentialism stands the collectivist ideology of Marxism-Leninism, illustrated by Marx's COMMUNIST MANIFESTO and Lenin's WHAT IS TO BE DONE? The latter is a classic treatise in the techniques of securing a social and political end, judged by its author to be supremely good, by any means whatsoever. The end justifies the means, in the case of the supreme social and political good, for what else would justify the means in this case? As reflective commentary on these classics of Marxism-Leninism, we consider the confrontation of Christ and the Grand Inquisitor from Dostoyevsky's novel THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV--a parable not only of a Church run wild but of Communism in the same situation as well. In both, the dread figure of the Interrogator takes center stage. He has arrived from post-medieval Seville--or perhaps from 20th century Hanoi. Some attention is given to Dialectical Materialism and to contemporary Soviet philosophy.

NINTH WEEK

Marx and Lenin believed their social doctrine to be "scientific". But most contemporary scientists working in physics, chemistry, biology, and related natural sciences, consider this a misuse of the word "science." What then is the relation--if any--between science and ethical values? We are told that organisms depend to some degree on their "genetic programs" which are "pre-wired" into their nervous systems. Although humans rely to a much greater extent on their brains, what is the connection between behavior, including ethical behavior, and genetics? No study of moral philosophy would be complete today if it ignored the presence of science and its effects in our world, or overlooked the role of technology in our lives. Jacques Monod's CHANCE AND NECESSITY presents the case not for the <u>dialectical</u> materialism of Marx and Engels (which Monod considers a form of sheer animism) but for <u>scientific</u> materialism--the doctrine that reality is constituted of physical, chemical, and biological elements only. Organic life, consciousness, mind, are to Monod more or less complicated states of purely physical entities in various states of combination or energy levels. Monod claims that science is <u>value-free</u>, that it deals with what <u>is</u>, not with what <u>ought</u> to be. For him, the only ethical commitment an enlightened person should make today is to the "objective" method of the natural sciences, a method which Monod believes constitutes the <u>only</u> path to truth. We examine critically the limitations of this ethical puritanism, noting particularly the failure of the author to recognize that the ethical value of knowledge itself is a doctrine as old as Aristotle, that Monod's own admirable work in helping unlock the secrets of organic life is morally as well as scientifically

important, that science has in itself moral potentialities--these residing in science's proven power to transform the worse to the better, to improve the human condition. The philosophy of the scientist in Homer Smith's story, KAMONGO, (written about 40 years earlier) is similar to that of Monod.

TENTH WEEK

The theme of science and technology leads us back to the beginning of the course where men in 90 seconds parachute from the world of 20th century technology into primitive conditions where nothing is "given" but one's own resources. In this situation, one is forced to fall back on the power of his will.

Marx's dialectical materialism posited a Godless universe, yet one with meaning. For to Marx, history and matter itself moved and developed according to laws that could be learned by men, used, and exploited for human advantage so that a social order deemed unjust could be overthrown and replaced by one thought just.

Monod's scientific materialism posits a Godless universe devoid of meaning. There is no Plan, no rationale, no design, no God, not even dialectical laws of matter. Like his friend Camus, Monod believes that the only meaning of life is the meaning we humans put into it. In Monod's case, this meaning is dedication to the objective methods of science. There is no meaning or value in the Universe as such.

Pagan Stoicism and the Christian religion constitute two responses to this, answers that overlap, for Stoicism was the philosophical forerunner of Christian doctrine. Stoicism was a materialism WITH GOD, a materialism in which the universe had meaning, rationale, purpose, BECAUSE that universe was part of God. God is not separate from the material universe, like spirit from dead matter. God is immanent in the universe; He is its inseparable cause. The Stoic's belief in the relation of our world to God was not far from Paul's "In Him, we live, and move, and have our being." By His divine mind or reason (Logos), God gives the universe--as soul gives to body--its life, its lawlike, orderly, rational character. From this metaphysical doctrine, the Stoic draws conclusions pertinent to personal ethics. Just as the universe--God's visible aspect--is sufficient unto itself, so our way should be that of self-reliance. We should endeavor to do what is in our power to control, to accept with equanimity whatever happens to us that we cannot control. We should try to learn the causes of things (not very different from Monod's "ethic of knowledge") and through this knowledge develop the ethical virtue of understanding and compassion toward all things. We are one with Nature and with all

that is comprehended in Nature. Thus the Stoic ethical ideal of scientific understanding, of knowing things through their causes, of accepting the reality of a shared common human nature, regardless of our condition--rich or poor, powerful or weak, sick or well--paved the way for Christianity. For two basic doctrines of Stoicism--the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man--were taken up into Christianity and made part of a world religion whose God takes account of the fall of a sparrow, as well as that of a kingdom.

Through the Manual (ENCHIRIDION) of the Stoic Epictetus we are reminded of the double role of philosophy as it developed in the West--philosophy as doctrine and philosophy as a life lived. Socrates lived what he taught, dedicated his life to his teaching--that was the one thing (and yet it was everything to him) that he held above the law. In the technical philosophy of our own time, this is matched by Ludwig Wittgenstein, (we read Malcolm's memoir of him) whose philosophy of linguistic analysis seems remote from ordinary concerns; yet its technical character did not prevent him from giving the same absolute commitment to his profession that Socrates gave to his. Wittgenstein said that encounter with him should produce moral change; ethical values could not be talked about, they must be lived.

What are the limits, if any, of the moral as well as the professional commitment to duty that may be found in the military life. The ancient Greeks thought of moral virtue or excellence as that which could be expected of a man. What are the virtues or moral excellences that may justifiably be expected of a military officer? To what extent do these coincide with the professional excellence that may be expected? To what extent do they transcend or go beyond the latter?

In his introduction to our edition of Epictetus's ENCHIRIDION, Albert Salomon notes that the Roman Stoics coined the formula: Vivere militare! (Life is being a soldier) and says that the ENCHIRIDION is "a manual for the combat officer." The course ends with the question: to what extent is this still true today?

APPENDIX E

February 19 Time Magazine

THIS PROF LEARNED THE HARD WAY

Vice Admiral Stockdale and his class discuss moral obligations

This Prof Learned the Hard Way

A former P.O.W. runs the Naval War College and teaches too

The lecturer is all Navy: blue uniform, gold braid, seven rows of ribbons, a lined, leathery face and a full mane of white hair. Like a captain on his bridge, he paces back and forth before his students, 45 mature, mid-career military officers taking a year of graduate studies at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The lecturer, Vice Admiral James Stockdale, 55, is accustomed to speaking before sizable groups of men. As a wing commander aboard an aircraft carrier, he had to brief his pilots before every mission. But now he is talking about moral dilemmas, not military targets. Stockdale is not only president of the 94-year-old Naval War College but also a philosophy teacher who designed his course, "Foundations of Moral Obligation," to combat what he calls "the deadening of moral sensitivities."

Jim Stockdale brings to his classroom a unique set of credentials: a bachelor's degree in engineering from Annapolis (he finished 130th in the class of 1947, behind Jimmy Carter, who was 60th, and CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who was 25th); a master's in international relations from Stanford; and a doctorate in heroism from 7½ years as the senior American P.O.W. at Hoa Lo prison, the infamous Hanoi Hilton.

In 1977 Stockdale was named president of the Naval War College, which sits on a windswept point overlooking Narragansett Bay. Among his first acts was to draft Joseph Brennan, 68, professor emeritus of philosophy at Columbia University, to help him design and teach a course on military morality. "The twists and turns of the fortunes of war have a way of throwing operational skippers and others out into new decision-making territory where all previous bets are off," says Stockdale.

Every Wednesday Stockdale and Brennan team for a two-hour lecture; on Thursdays the class joins the discussion in a 90-min. seminar. "This isn't a leadership course," says Stockdale. "It's a walk through the classics." For ten weeks, his students contemplate man as moral animal. The reading list is long and demanding: Socrates, Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Sartre, Emerson, Dostoyevsky, Marx and Lenin. Frequently the class dwells on the unfairness of fate as illustrated by Job in the Bible, by Camus in *The Plague*, by Solzhenitsyn in *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. And by James Stockdale as a sorely tested P.O.W.

As a prisoner (right)

Stockdale came to philosophy as a 38-year-old Navy fighter pilot enrolled in a master's program at Stanford's Hoover Institution. Part of his reading was this passage from the *Enchiridion*, a manual for Roman field soldiers by the philosopher Epictetus: "It is better to die in hunger, exempt from guilt and fear, than to live in affluence and perturbation." It was a lesson Stockdale would draw on repeatedly after parachuting from his crippled A-4 jet and landing in North Viet Nam on Sept. 9, 1965.

Before he was finally released on Feb. 12, 1973, Stockdale endured 2,714 days of imprisonment, including three years in solitary confinement and more than a year in total isolation. He was tortured for days on end and, by his own count, was reduced to total submission 15 times. But he also thwarted his captors on quite a few occasions. In 1969, when the North Vietnamese were about to use him in a propaganda film, he battered his face to a puffy pulp with a wooden stool and chopped off his hair with a razor, slashing his scalp in the process. The enemy no longer found him photogenic.

Seven months later, his endurance sapped, Stockdale realized that if his interrogation continued, he would probably give up secrets. He finally employed a lesson he had learned from Thomas Schelling's 1960 *The Strategy of Conflict*, a work he had come across at Stanford. He stabbed his wrists with broken glass, producing pools of blood that horrified his guards and made them end their interrogations. "I felt the only way I could really deter and stop the flow of questioning was to show a commitment to death," remembers Stockdale. "I don't think that I intended to die, but I intended to make them think that I was ready to die." That act earned him the Medal of Honor.

Stockdale's experiences probably qualify him as much as anyone alive to lead career military officers into the labyrinth of moral questions that have come out of Viet Nam. Ethics is taught in many forms in service academies and postgraduate institutions. But Stockdale wants to create a model specifically designed to help the military "regain our bearings." Says he: "Today's ranks are filled with officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the better business schools—that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils. This course is my defense against the buzzword-nomograph-acronym mentality."

Stockdale's record serves as a defense against that sort of mentality among the 345 students at the Newport school. Says Air Force Lieut. Colonel Norman McDaniel, a fellow P.O.W. of Stockdale's and now one of his students: "A lot of training in the military tells you how you should act, but it doesn't give you the why. We're at a stage of moving from responding to what other people tell us to do to having more choice." Not an easy concept for military men, but as Stockdale puts it, "No philosophical survival kits are issued" when man goes to war. ■

APPENDIX F

Appendix F_1 - FE 101 OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTIVE COURSE

Appendix F_2 - WE 101 Summary

Appendix F_3 - FE 101 Summary

II. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTI[illegible] COURSE

FE 101 1978

1. To what degree were you satisfied with your electives course as a whole?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

(Appendix F,

SUMMARY STATISTICS

DATA GROUP	MEAN	STD DEV	SAMPLE SIZE	HISTOGRAM 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
FE 101	6.03	1.01	34	0	0	1	2	5	13	13
FE 102	5.42	1.61	12	0	1	1	1	2	3	4
FE 103	5.90	0.89	20	0	0	0	2	3	10	5
FE 104	6.35	0.90	17	0	0	0	1	2	4	10
FE 105	6.40	1.02	10	0	0	0	1	1	1	7
FE 106	6.38	0.48	8	0	0	0	0	0	5	3
FE 107	6.30	0.64	10	0	0	0	0	1	5	4
FE 108	5.90	1.14	10	0	0	0	2	1	3	4
FE 109	NO RESPONSES ON FILE									
FE 110	6.00	0.71	4	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
FE 111	5.63	1.27	16	0	1	0	2	1	9	3
FE 112	5.92	0.86	12	0	0	0	1	2	6	3
FE 113	3.92	0.83	13	0	1	2	7	3	0	0
FE 114	5.83	1.46	6	0	0	1	0	1	1	3
FE 115	6.53	0.50	15	0	0	0	0	0	7	8
FE 116	6.06	1.03	16	0	0	1	0	2	7	6
FE 117	6.43	0.73	7	0	0	0	0	1	2	4
FE 118	5.69	0.82	13	0	0	0	1	4	6	2
NCC	6.00	0.82	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
CNW	5.81	1.12	103	0	2	1	13	12	46	29
NC+S	6.00	1.15	117	0	1	5	7	17	37	50
USN/USCG	5.99	1.16	119	0	1	4	10	16	37	51
USA	5.76	1.35	34	0	1	1	6	2	11	13
USMC	5.88	0.86	32	0	0	1	0	8	16	7
USAF	5.82	1.15	22	0	1	0	1	4	10	6
USCIV	5.85	0.86	13	0	0	0	2	0	9	2
TOTAL	5.91	1.14	223	0	3	6	20	30	84	80

WE 101 Summary

Appendix F_2

14 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL WINTER ELECTIVES STUDENTS

Subj: Electives Winter Trimester End-Of-Course Questionnaire

PLEASE RETURN TO THE ASSISTANT ELECTIVES COORDINATOR SP 219 NOT LATER THAN 23 MARCH 1979

I. STUDENT BACKGROUND QUESTIONS:

1. Winter Electives Course: WE 101

2. College: (check one) NCC ____; CNW ____; NC&S ____

3. Branch of Service: (check one)

USN ____ USMC ____ USCIV ____

USA ____ USAF ____ USCG ____

II. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTIVE COURSE

1. To what degree were you satisfied with your electives course as a whole?

mean/dev/sample

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 | 7 (very high) 6.35/.68/26

2. The objective of the Electives Program is to provide students with a spectrum of learning opportunities which will accommodate diverse student backgrounds and interests. To what extent have the Winter trimester electives course offerings accomplished this objective?

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 | 7 (very high) 6.19/.79/26

III. SPECIFIC EVALUATION OF YOUR WINTER ELECTIVES COURSE

1. The Quality of Instruction in your Winter electives course was:

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 | 7 (very high) 6.58/.69/26

29 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL FALL ELECTIVES STUDENTS

Subj: Electives Fall Trimester End-of-Course Questionnaire

PLEASE RETURN TO THE ASSISTANT ELECTIVES COORDINATOR SP-219
NOT LATER THAN 14 DECEMBER 1979

I. STUDENT BACKGROUND QUESTIONS:

1. Fall Electives Course: FE 101

2. College: (check one)

NCC ______ CNW ______ NC&S ______

3. Branch of Service: (check one)

USN ______ USMC ______ USCIV ______

USA ______ USAF ______ USCG ______

II. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTIVE COURSE — MEAN / DEV. / SAMPLE

1. To what degree were you satisfied with your electives course as a whole? 6.64 / .48 / 22

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

2. The objective of the Electives Program is to provide students with a spectrum of learning opportunities which will accommodate diverse student backgrounds and interests. To what extent have the Fall trimester electives course offerings accomplished this objective? 6.45 / .66 / 22

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

III. SPECIFIC EVALUATION OF YOUR FALL ELECTIVES COURSE

1. The Quality of Instruction in your Fall electives course was: 7.00 / .00 / 22

(very low) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very high)

APPENDIX G

TOTAL ENROLLMENT EL-101 TO DATE (15 JANUARY 1980)

APPENDIX G

TOTAL ENROLLMENT EL-101 TO DATE (15 JANUARY 1980)

The following tables represent an unofficial count:

1. Enrolled by College since September 1978:

CNW	61	
CNC&S	61	
NCC	1	(plus 2 audit)
Civilian	7	
Total	130	

2. Enrolled by Branch of Service since September 1978:

USN	70
USMC	24
USA	16
USAF	11
USCG	2
Civilian	7
Total	130

3. Auditors:

	Official	Unofficial
FE-101 '78	None	None
WE-101 '79	4	14
FE-101 '79	2	None
WE-101 '80	3	None
Total	9	14