

~~First time~~ through  
Lecture Roughs

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Foundations of Moral

Obligation.

J. B. White

You can't go it alone

Koestler

FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION

Lecture 1

What this course is not: It is not ethics for dentists, it is not a religious course, it is not a leadership course -- it is moral philosophy. It is similar to my Stanford experience. It is not for POW's. I am not a philosophy professor and don't mean to compete with your favorite teacher in that field. The moral philosophy that we treat most is popularly known as ethics, but this includes in this course, the study of epistemology, that is the study of knowledge, its limits and validity. We also study metaphysics, which is reality itself or being. The purpose of the course is to give you an opportunity to get your philosophical house in order, to put yourself on the epistemological, metaphysical and ethical map and to no longer rely on inconsistent slogans and the like. We are not treating the transient or the immediately applicable. We are aiming at the solid and permanent aspects of man's concerns. A long view of man's life and a vision of the greatness to which he may aspire. This is a subject for which we all seem to have a great interest. For as Sam Johnson said, "We are perpetually moralists, but geometricians only by chance." (I now skim the description of my course week by week, and say that today's introductory session is about prison because that is a very intense

environment in which issues surface readily and frequently.)  
And the message is unity over self. That none of us have  
the luxury of maintaining aloofness in an activist, competitive  
profession. Whether it be aboard ship or in an airplane or  
in an infantry company, we must be each other's servants.

On the epistemological map it's well to note that the  
early priestocratic Greeks worked mainly with stuff. Plato  
added another reality and he differentiated between mind and  
matter and body and soul, and it was in this reality of Plato,  
the forms, that men searched for nearly a thousand years.  
In about 1640, a French mathematician by the name of Descartes  
took up philosophy. He was a very bright fellow. At the age  
of seventeen he invented analytic geometry and you'll recognize  
his name as that which gave the cartesian coordinates theirs.  
Cogito ergo ~~sum~~ <sup>sum</sup> -- I think, therefore I am. He separated  
the world into thinking things and extended things. In many  
ways this was handy. Newton could practice his science which  
retained a validity up until the quantum theory. But on  
the whole it was a troublesome idea. I've seen the day when  
I wished it were true that mind and matter were separate.  
It was Kant, the German idealist of the 19th Century, who  
closed the loop in a sense by saying that mind plays a role  
in the description of the external world, that extended things  
do not exist without this camera lens type filter that the  
mind provides. In other words, if we see order in the universe,

Descartes - Separated just extended things  
(w/ Newton's work)  
Kant - Put mind back in

might it not be just a function of our lens rather than reality itself? Of course we pay more attention to ~~his~~ <sup>KANT'S</sup> ethical theories, in which he relies heavily on the motive of acts and on the morality of acts themselves. His opinion is the opposite of that of the academic who succeeds him in our course, John Stewart Mill, who says the motive is immaterial it's the results that count. And Mill was the prototype of the 19th Century English liberal, who became famous for the forwarding of such ideas as the inalienable natural rights of man and of unfettered individualism. <sup>— But w/ contours of Reason.</sup> The political manifestation of this 19th Century English liberalism was self-determination and internationalism. The balance of power, and the economic manifestation through the industrial revolution was laissez-faire economics. The great celebration of the gay '90's centered on this optimism. But certain novelists, particularly Dostoyevsky, had already suggested that all of this was about to collapse in a spiritual vacuum. That the stability of the church, <sup>of</sup> ~~in~~ the <sup>guild</sup> ~~guild~~, of the village, of the home, had given way to the relative instability, and certainly more impersonal, factory, barracks (conscription was in effect in many European countries, <sup>The public schools</sup> (and city life). The balance of power dream burst at Sarajevo in 1914 and the economic dream of laissez-faire met its Waterloo in the depression of 1929. Now I've given unusual concentration to the 19th Century for the simple reason that I want to introduce Vladimir Ilich Lenin, who made today's story, Darkness At Noon possible.

Lenin is thought by some historians to have been the man of the 20th Century. A true fanatic, a genuine idealist, and a tough practitioner of realpolitik who advocated cheating, lying on a zigzag trail toward worthy ends -- any means to his ends. Sometimes he is described as Hitler with a purpose.

You'll remember that in 1917 Russia was still in World War I in opposition to Germany, a revolution had taken place, the Mensheviks were in power and their leader was Alexander Kerenski. (Kerenski was director of the Hoover Library when I studied there in the early 1960's). Kerenski was sort of a socialist under the banner of "all power to the Soviets." Lenin arrived in an armored train from Germany and within a month had overthrown him as a leader of the Bolshevik party under the more practical slogan of bread, peace and land. He recalled Trotsky from New York, as the greatest Jew since Jesus Christ. But as you remember they later fell out over the issue of world revolution versus socialism in one country. Lenin died in <sup>24?</sup>~~1962~~; Stalin succeeded him in 1926. Lenin was a poor Marxist and Stalin might have been a poor Leninist. But it was Lenin who gave the modern ideology its name. He was tough, ruthless, and like many of the old ideologues, had a certain legitimacy that gave him a constituency through which he could operate. At the recent IISS Conference one of the hardnosed Scottish anti-communists

reluctantly admitted that the Soviet Union in the 1980's might be in more dangerous hands with the modern generation of non-war veterans for the reason that their ideology did not contain the idealistic content and that they would be therefore less stable under pressure. Hitler could not have run the purges of '36 and '38. Leninism is the name of the ideology and the party is the source of power, and we will read about that in a book he wrote in 1902 called "What is to be Done?"

Arthur Koestler was born in Hungary in 1905, was a European communist in the '30's, split with the party in '38, got in trouble in Spain, and spent his productive literary years in England. Commissar N.S. Rubashov is a fictional character, but N.S. Rubashov the prisoner is real to me. | He is prison-wise and as the book shows him being arrested | early in the morning, it brings back memories of a similar | situation in January 1969. When he comes into the prison he notices the acoustics, and the bricks, and thinks in terms of communication and tapping. He notices the names on the doors, and knows he is in an isolation block. He catalogs the gait of the guards, as he must ultimately know whether they are right-handed or left-handed and whether they have good eyesight or not. And he has a sixth sense of knowing when the people are using the peephole against him, like I do in the office early in the morning seeing the shade of light

Torture Sounds ↘ ?

change on the walls. The book describes the ~~purchase~~ <sup>Torture Sounds</sup> ~~heards~~, beginning with personal screams, people you can recognize, the rhythm gives you the methodology but in the end the impersonal whine, every man sounding the same. The morning sounds, the morning thoughts, death, body, humiliation. He is prison-wise and does not indulge in games of "justice" and when number 402 next door gives him three taps in the very code that he knows, and the very one that we used, and his answer to the question "Who?", Nicholas Salmanovitch Rubashov is met with silence. The man next door, a rather strange person, a Czarist dandy, is apparently terror stricken because he now is in colusion with the great Rubashov. Whether he likes it or not he cannot enjoy the benevolent quarantine of which walls are rights. Rubashov thinks that this terror stricken companion is probably "still of the simple belief that his subjective guilt or innocence makes a difference and has no idea of the higher interests which are really at stake." Those that are at stake are consistency, face, nation, politics. I remember Rabbit one time saying to me, "Are you shitting me?" I talk about the party and read on page 34 and page 61. They say they are hooked to one another not only for the sake of colusion and the fear it brings, but on the necessity for communication and love (page 21) and comradeship (page 113) as they announce the man going by the cell.

But even Rubashov, prisoner, tortured, is caught up in the system with a "twisted sense of duty which forced him to remain awake and continue the lost battle to the end." The important thing is that death is not an option under those circumstances. It takes a violent act to break the flow. Unity over self is necessary. You can always do better in the short run alone, but you need one another to maximize the overall advantage. Read the prisoner's dilemma and subsequent references on page 115 of Ethics by J. L. Mackie.

My solution in the "Land of Epictetus" is unity over self and compassion because it is neither Christian or American to nag a repentant sinner to his grave.

Mike Walzer was born in New York City in 1935, had a Harvard PhD at 26, teaches ethical and legal philosophy at Harvard. During the Vietnam War he wrote a series of essays on disobedience, war, citizenship, and we have Chapter 7 on POW's. He quotes the many jurists of the international law field of the 19th Century, who considered POW's "citizens of the world" -- that is to say not at war. And that the rules of benevolent quarantine replace those of "battle." Now, he laments, with a code of conduct the poor POW must not only face his captors but must look over his shoulder at his own country. It is an unwarranted infringement he thinks, in that it has positive commitments -- that is to say, you must harrass,



you must escape and help escape, you must sabotage -- as well as negative commitments. (It is clear that he would accept the negative commitments, i.e., don't confess, don't collaborate, etc.) He doubts the rights of the POW organization to recruit. (I reply with Secretary Calloway farce.) He has trouble with the wording of the code, "surrender of own free will", thinks it's odd. That is because he does not realize that death is not an option. That it is worded like that to prevent people from crossing over to the people's side, as they say. As life and death are not an issue in such a circumstance as this, an intensive military situation, so to participate or not to participate are not at issue. In many circumstances, to not participate is to betray. The ethical situation is often simple when one must choose between right and wrong. The difficult ones come up when no matter what you do you are wrong. POW's, he said, belong to humanity and to themselves. The fight should continue only for those who choose and all "have every right to choose not to fight." One alarming question he asks is, "What if refusal to collaborate endangers the entire camp?" This is a question that alarms me because it could arise only if the mutual distrust and the lack of unity had degenerated to a point where such a circumstance could occur. He further says that here heroism should not be demanded. They talk about Evans on the top of page 252, of Scot of the Antarctic, and of Oates on page 254, and I read from his letters on pages 255 and

256. The point being that sometime you are obliged to be a hero. Mike Pelehac and Farnborough Air Show provide the background for the VN diagram that I have sketched on the board. That is the justification for the course. That is the justification of behavior when you intend to go in harm's way. It is selfish to seek your own way. Joe did well with three prisoner stories: one, Socrates in his leg irons in the death scene; two, Bo~~le~~<sup>u</sup>ethias, who carried the Aristotilian scholarship through the Middle Ages, the guy that had the woman philosophy appear in the prison cell with theoretical and practical embroidered on her pockets; and the third was from Plato's Republic, the "Allegory of the Cave".

NO Free lunch: TAKE your Plague Like a man.

## LECTURE 2

### THE PROBLEMS OF GOOD AND EVIL

The problem today centers about coping with a nonsensical world. Man must have order in life, for aesthetic reasons, reasons of symmetry, for intellectual reasons (chaos is unintelligible), and for practical reasons so we can plan. In other words, there must be some kind of a moral economy in which virtue is rewarded and evil is punished, or we come to grief. When man sees no justice, he invents it - maybe in the form of Hitler, maybe in the form of insanity. In other words, I'll sketch on the board the diagram of the first drama critic, Aristotle. On the left I put good man and under it bad man; and to the right good destiny and under it bad destiny. A horizontal line from good destiny and good man is a happy but not very newsworthy drama. The bad man, the bad ends is justice; the northeast diagonal bad man, good ends is an affront to our sensibilities; and the good man (to the one half) to a bad end is the definition of tragedy. It's this tragedy that we talk about today in three pieces of literature. The first, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Solzhenitsyn paints a picture in a prison that is very familiar to me and others in the audience. It's a picture of stark physical circumstances and in some cases brutality, but in the picture only two people I think need to be identified today. First of all Ivan, who adjusts well

and becomes a conniving, tough, enigmatic prisoner of the best sort. Loyal to his comrades, contemptuous of the enemy and reactionary at any cost. One who has a little trouble is the Sea Captain, who on page 38 exclaims to the guard, "You've no right to strip people in the cold. You don't know Article 9 of the Criminal Code." And then Solzhenitsyn says they had the right and they knew the Article. You've got a lot to learn brother. And then we contrast it later, back on page 90, where that same Captain realizes that he was feeling nice and warm in his bunk and he didn't have the strength to get out in the freezing cold. And that this was the sort of thing that was changing him as he learned these things. From a bossy, loudmouth naval officer into a slow moving and cagey prisoner. And the third thing that I would notice in this book, and one that is disconnected from those first two ideas, is the discussion back in the back on page 195 between Ivan and his bunkmate, a devout Christian, about prayer. I think the message that the Christian is trying to tell him is the one with which I am so familiar, that it is unbecoming our dignity to pray for things. We didn't pray for that Ivan, Alyoshka said. The only thing on this earth that the Lord has ordered us to pray for is our daily bread. And of course by that he doesn't mean rations.

Now the very text on this subject of the problems of good and evil was the Book of Job. We read it from the

Dartmouth Bible which is a particular printing of the King James Version. The King James Version is a very beautiful prose. I read from Mary Ellen Chase's The Bible and the Common Reader, about this version of the Bible, she being an English professor at Smith College, now deceased. The King James Version was printed in 1611, and was in many ways the most familiar book to the English speaking people for a couple of hundred years. The Dartmouth Bible is an adaptation of that. She, on page 31, lists a bunch of famous authors who have obtained their orientation, their imagery and their very words from the King James Version.

Page 45, we contrast one of the verses from the Book of Job, as it is cited in many of the other editions and how much more vital and poignant the King James Version is. Mary Ellen Chase also has a chapter on the Book of Job. On page 244 she talks about its importance in literature and history.


The story clearly identifies Job as a perfect and upright man. It wasn't that he thought he was, or that people claimed he was, it states it as data. Satan challenges God. Does Job fear God for naught? And, of course, as a part of this plot, this wager if you will, Job is rendered poor, ill, destitute and is blasphemed. He lost his reputation. "He has stripped me of my glory and all my inward friends abhor me." That's what hurt. Job was first of all devoutly sweet; his wife not so sweet. As he lay on the ashes, she suggested

that he "curse God and die." His friends came to him, insisted that he must have done something wrong. He grew more and more impatient as he thought of what God had done to him. "He filleth me with bitterness. Thou knowest God that I am not wicked. I desire to reason with God." And he had the audience with God in the whirlwind - not at all together a satisfactory audience. God comes on strong, "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth. Canst thou bid to sweet influences of the Phlaedis; canst thou loost the bands of ~~Iron~~<sup>pl.</sup>" Job submits with contriteness as God says gird up thy loins like a man and serve me. <sup>DR10</sup>

Whether the end of the Book includes the happy ending or not is really a religious question. I get off at Chapter 42, Verse 9. That's a matter of individual preference. But this is the textbook from what we call one of the wisdom Books of the Bible which first raises this very important question on the lack of moral economy and how men cope with it. The fact that, if the ending was before the current ending, and to drive home the fact that men can not bear to think of this thing, and they had to supply their own end. For as the other wisdom Book, Ecclesiastes, says, "Man knoweth not his time. As the fishes are taken in an evil net and the birds are caught in the snare, so also are the sons of man snared in an evil time when it falleth suddenly upon them."

And the third book I would discuss is one in which that evil time fell upon the city of Oran in southern Africa and Algeria in northern Africa. It's a book written by Albert Camus, an atheist and existentialist, certainly a stoic. Born in Algeria in 1913 he was a writer in France during World War II, where he was a resistance fighter. In 1948 he wrote this book The Plague, which won him a Nobel prize. He was the darling of the avant-garde; died in an automobile accident in 1960. It's a fiction story about the evil that fell on Oran, a city known for its banality. It was a worn out city, a common place city in which rats suddenly started to die sometime in the 1940's. People were loathe to mention the word plague. Plague has a very nasty meaning to most Old World people. The history is as serious as that of war. One documented plague in Constantinople cost the city ten thousand dead per day for awhile. Finally, it became clear that not only were the rats sick, but the people started to become sick with the bubonic plague, a terrible way to die, with big festered sores, usually in the groin that had to be lanced and a high fever through which a person either does or does not live. And of course it is very contagious. The story was gory in its detail about how they had to try to keep people separated. The town, of course, was sealed off by the Prefect. The people were trapped there. There's no talk of communication outside the town. But how these characters lived within this dilemma is the story.

One aside: The people would not believe that the plague was hitting them. For one thing, it seemed so unreal, so stupid, like wars. They felt that if it was a war or a plague it would surely be short, because nobody would ever want to get involved in a long seige. This was long in terms of plagues, it started in April and ended in about February the next year.

There were all sorts of people. The main characters  become very saintly in this thing. But they were certainly not in the majority, because most people were not able to cope with it, as is so true in our everyday life. On page 97 we read that as things were, such influence is unavailing. For the most part the people there were men with well-defined and sound ideas on everything concerning exports, banking, and the fruit or wine trade. And we go on to quote that and wind up by saying "what struck one most was the excellence of the men's intentions, but as regards the plague, their ~~confidence~~ <sup>COMPETENCE</sup> was practically nil." And it's this situation that we find so many times, where we have people who are so competent in everyday life, but when they meet the unexpected, the unpredicted, particularly the distressing and the disaster. Among these people, often from the ranks of the less promising, come those philosophers, those men of good will, those men of great insight, men of moral strength, men of compassion and leadership, which carry the day. Of course, here we have the usual big dealers. Rambert was his name. He didn't belong there, his wife was up in Paris,



he'd gotten trapped, he had to get out, there was some mistake, he had to be put in touch with the underworld, who were going to smuggle him out the gate, and he spent most of the book racing around trying to make arrangements and meet people. Never got there; became a hero of sorts, philosophical, inward man, served his fellow men. He worked for the man who is really the hero of the book, a Dr. Reix. Medical doctor who analyzed the plague, really led the town. An atheist, a fatalist, a man who noticed one of the peculiarities of this plague, that it usually struck the robust and left the consumptive to the end. He was a philosopher, devoted to good works, who saw the rewards of life as being something like this, "For having known friendships and remembering it, and knowing affection and remembering it, all a man can win in a conflict is knowledge and memories." And it was this man who sterilized, met with sick, arranged through the Prefect for the burial, worked twenty hours a day doing good with no hope of reward and no belief in redemption, no belief in the goodness of it all. Dutiful, stoic, humanist.

The first to join him as a lay medical team member, Jean Tarrou, a newcomer, a heavy man, smoked a pipe. In the words of the author, an addict of life's normal pleasures without being a slave to any. He was a historian, that is to say, he kept a notebook of the events to which the narrator,

the doctor, presumably had access for an account of it later. His religion was never defined. He became a willing member of a group who helped the doctor at the peril of having the probability of getting the disease raised from normal to about three times normal. People had odd reactions in the plague. Fugitives were comfortable, the guilt-ridden were sometimes happy. The priest who gave an early sermon about God's punishment and this being Oran's version of the Book of Job, who prayed for love, met a very odd death - he died of the plague without symptoms, muttering some peculiar words like a Christian who sees a child's eye put out has the duty to volunteer for the same. The most memorable death in the book was that of Jean Tarrou. It came when the plague was waning, when the rats were back in the street, when the town had announced that the gates would be open in two weeks. He is stricken and went down like a man, with the words that he hoped that he didn't lose the match but that he hoped to put up a good fight. He died shuddering from the fever, after being happy that the doctor was honest enough to tell him that his dawn period of good feeling was not a good sign, but merely the normal remission of the early morning hours.

So we have, in particular in the last story, the case of heroism of duty; not in the context of a righteous cause; not in the context a confidence that redemption will come your way; not in the context of a feeling that all will be right with the world if you will only do your duty; but

rather a man who is committed to a cause of doubtful justice, of doubtful merit, a man who is committed to a position that no matter how he performs he will not be rewarded. And yet under these conditions performs his duty with merit as a matter of conscience. And I think the virtue there is the stronger variety.

In the books we learned that first you can learn to cope as Ivan did and as eventually the Captain did, and that you can meet this realization that an educated man must cope with, the lack of a moral economy in the world, either with your hat in your hand, as did Job, or with stoic bravery, as did Dr. Reix.

Joe Brennan talked about many ways that people have coped with this realization over time. The early Christians had trouble with and solved it in general with dualism, that is two Gods, one of darkness, usually Jehovah the Old Testament God; one of light, usually the New Testament God. The Old Testament God was usually attached to matter. That he had formed the earth of matter and that people were made of matter and this made matter a bad thing, and it caused trouble with Christ, who was a man of the earth, and could he have been matter or was he merely just a shadow of matter? And there were the Gnostics who were big in the Christian church from about 200 to 1300 and they caused a lot of trouble. The Manichees, I think that's another version of it, started

by a Persian, also dualist. The true God was the New Testament God, the bad God was the Old Testament God. Man who pushed matter. Particularly offensive forms of it were the Bulgamills <sup>Bogamills</sup> from Bulgaria. Well these guys were eventually burned at the stake. They were by that time known as Cathars and Simone de Montfort burned 200 of them in a field. I should make an aside that this all got started when they started worrying about the problems of good and evil and the early Christians said that it should have more Greek philosophic content and they used this Platonic essay by Pathagarus. <sup>Pythagoras</sup> It talked about <sup>TIMAEUS</sup> the sculptor fashioning the world and that he was not really God but it was his helper, Demiurge. And thus we came to the Gnostics and all those troublemaking Christians that were finally burned at the stake. St. Augustine was in and out of this movement, and thought maybe evil was a lack, or maybe men deal with a primordial sin, and was the original sin of which we are so familiar. Some have thought that evil is good in the long run and we know that the girlfriend we didn't marry turned out not to be so good after all and all that. The course we didn't take. Another way to do it is turn to another enterprise. There was a Spanish soldier who lost an arm at the Battle of Laponta and was five years in an Algerian prison. Then he went home and nobody payed any attention to him and he was ignored by the

government. He was disgusted and he went out and started writing funny stories and he wrote one about a stupid old man who was fighting windmills, and he gave him the name Don Quixote. Of course that was Cervantes, whose play is now on Broadway at \$24 a seat.

Joe wound up with Whitman's highest value being on his fellow man and one of his famous poetic lines, saying that "He who <sup>deserves</sup> <sup>my</sup> <sup>merit</sup> <sup>deserves</sup> my fellow man, <sup>deserves</sup> me." Maybe Job had the right word, "When he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold." Maybe that's the way to go, but I think the message for us here is that we should be aware as educated people that it's not odd to find that there is no system of reward and punishment that matches our idea of good and evil.

"CLASS" is NOT Bolting System unless you  
have SACRED matter. - Those who  
it will Look Like in 20 yrs.

LECTURE 3

PLATO

(Socrates  
Thoreau)

I think it is important to realize that the strategy and policy section on Thucydides overlaps this "Foundations of Moral Obligation" section on the classic Greek philosophers. Remember that Socrates was a hoplite in battles in his 40's. and that the times that he was serving in the Athenian army bracketed the birth of Plato in 427. Remember that Pericles died about 430, before Socrates got into service and that in his last battle, which was only in 424, Thucydides was the defeated general and he was relieved. Thirteen years later, by 411, Athens was on its knees. So we have the common life spans of Socrates and Plato going on for 28 years, during which time Thucydides died, Athens folded, the war ended late in Socrates life (about 404 - 5 years before he died), and then the tumult of the oligarchs and then the Democrats. The interesting thing is that Thucydides in all of his writings about the wars never mentions the great Athens of Pericles in which he lived, Pericles dying of the plague about 431, just before Socrates went into the service as a hoplite. The classic philosophers said little about this 'world war' that was going on during Socrates' most productive ages. Remember that on March 23, 420 B.C. The Clouds got third place in the great drama contest. I hope that lines it up.

1.40  
FOR NEXT  
Time, Read  
Funeral  
Oration +  
Thucydides

Socrates

<sup>whitehead</sup>  
Professor ~~White~~ has said that all modern philosophy is but ~~footnotes~~ to Plato. We know of Socrates as a man of modest beginnings and mild manners, but Plato on the other hand was something to contend with. He was first of all an aristocrat, he was an olympic wrestler, he was at least the "Whizzer" White of his time. Plato itself means broad shoulders. Plato was a Phi Beta Kappa, Harvard graduate, from the main line of Philadelphia, who went on to play professional football and finish Harvard Law School number 1 in his class.

Socrates, according to Plato, always said that "An unexamined life is not worth living." These dialogues that we discuss in this lesson are all about the trial and conviction and death of Socrates. Of course, he was charged by <sup>Meletus</sup> ~~Meletus~~, a democrat, with, in Socrates' words, "making ~~low~~ speculations about the heavens and the earth and the areas under the earth, ~~and~~ secondly, of misleading the young and third, <sup>of</sup> making the better argument seem worse. All ~~were~~ apparently capital offenses in Athens at that time. Now <sup>Meletus</sup> ~~Meletus~~ was no friend of Socrates, although Socrates is not very mean to him. <sup>Meletus</sup> ~~Meletus~~ was a democrat, Plato an aristocrat, Socrates a man of basically aristocratic sympathies. They were both opposed to the democrats. The <sup>democrats</sup> ~~democrats~~ <sup>democracy</sup> ~~democracy~~ <sup>were</sup> more of a town meeting form of democracy and not a constitutional democracy. <sup>It was</sup> ~~and~~ a mob. Both of these men ~~were~~ <sup>were</sup>

well up on the IQ scale, <sup>And there</sup> both very contemptuous of the idea of a majority of peasants telling them what to do. I like those men, Socrates and Plato, as you can tell from what I'm going to say about them.

Euthyphro is the name of a man as you know. And Euthyphro is also the title of the first dialogue and in it we see certain things about Socrates. First of all, he is basically a "law and order" type and he and Plato allude to the laws of Athens as you would the parents of a child. Another point: he distrusts the anthropomorphic extrapolation of God. He does not believe God would stoop to the quarrelsome pride of men grown large. In other words, his God and Job's God are noticeably different. Another point: he is the archetype of rationalist as opposed to the empiricist. He thinks that knowledge is accumulated by reason more than by sense data. He has a conscience - one of the first documented instances of conscience is his Daimon which always tells him not to do things. There is one exception, early in the Phaedo, where it tells him to do something. And it says, "Work at music and compose it." An odd thing, perhaps, but we're told that in Greece, music had a meaning of harmony or even of mathematics. It's not uncommon for people in contemplative moods to get preoccupied with music as a mathematical science. I remember in prison spending weeks trying to

whose?  
or something?



figure out the mathematical relationship between the frequencies of the piano keys adjacent. By playing with the scale structure, it became clear to me and to Shumaker that the frequency distribution, that is the percentage increase in frequency as you climbed the scale of the piano keys, is regular among keys in the ~~chromatic~~ <sup>chromatic</sup> scale. That is going from white to black to white to black to white to white to black, ~~to black~~. <sup>In</sup> other words, from D to D sharp the same proportion of increase in frequencies is experienced from a white to a black key as that from E to F, a white to a white. The question was, if the the A below middle C is tuned to 440 frequency, what is ~~A sharp~~ <sup>the frequency of</sup> A sharp? It turns out that this proportionate increase is constant throughout and by the calculations which I show here on my ~~paper~~ <sup>paper</sup> ~~book~~, the proportion is 2 to the <sup>power</sup> 1/12th, or as I figured ~~that~~ out by natural logarithms which I derived myself, the quantity is 1.0591. I came home to ask one of my friend's father, a harmony teacher, what that should have been. He said that Helmholtz' Sensations of Tone writes this up and he had established the criterion of the twelfth root of 2, exactly what I had, only that Helmholtz only carried it to three decimal places 1.059. <sup>this</sup> ~~his~~ fascination ~~which~~ gave me many pleasurable hours as it may have Plato. As in all philosophical writings of the time, of course Socrates draws

classical

distinctions. On moral questions he says we must use reason, not sense data. He tired early in his life of working with physical problems and stuck to the moral issues of justness and unjustness, of goods and bads, because, as he says, it's those we argue about, not about weights and measures. As an aside I might say, he was agreed with by Sam Johnson centuries later who said that we are all moralists by nature, but geometricians only by accident. Socrates was humorous. Euthyphro in this book was a setup, a clod, a straight man, which Socrates could mock with fake admiration for his knowledge. This mock humility of Socrates, which he does very lightly and delicately, is called "Socratic Irony". Another slightly humorous thing is his retort when accused of charging to go to his school, he said that he would pay students to listen to him talk. He's a realist; Athenians knew he was influential. He was the kind of a guy that can turn people around. Although he did not practice revolution, he could have fomented one and some of the authorities knew that to be true. The issues that he raises are universally interesting. Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? Or I could also say, does the Admiral give A's to good papers or is the paper good because he gave it an A? Or even more distinctly it might be said, does God apply the laws of logic or does he decree them? Another issue, is piety a special type

of justice, or is justice a special type of piety? Justice, of course, is sort of the mother of virtues of the Greeks. Then it turns out to be the major premise, justice, and a special form of it is piety, which can be diagramed. Similarly, fear does not necessarily imply reverence, but reverence necessarily implies fear. Reverence is a special form of fear. He takes Euthyphro around the track two or three times as they try to sort out piety, leads him into at least three dead ends, at which time Euthyphro disappears from the scene, a victim of reductio ad absurdum - the name of the game of contradictions, frustrating progress, which Socrates practices to perfection.

Apology, a second dialogue meaning defense in court. The scene, where Socrates in his words, charged with speculation about the heavens, earth, and areas under the earth, misguiding youth, and making the better argument seem worse, brings up the Aristophanes play, The Clouds. *The trial was in this being 399 Socrates did not claim slavery. He thought* and *the play had* appeared on "Broadway" 24 years earlier, *and* it was *a* preposterous *play* but he said he went to it as he would to a drinking party - to have fun, not to take it seriously, *and that* ~~and~~ those who thought it was prejudicial to his case shouldn't worry about it. He was charged with impiety, and yet, one of the Greeks had gone to the oracle Adelpi and recorded the fact that upon asking the oracle who was the wisest of all men, that they gave the name Socrates. Well, he took

this and really twisted it around with gay abandon because the god itself had said that he was the wisest of all men, and yet, he was accused of impiety. He was a very clever man, an honest man, but one who could really put people down delicately. Henry Kissinger, if you will. He says <sup>11</sup> ~~that~~ all I'm trying to do is to bring out the fact that men are not as smart as they think they are. <sup>11</sup> He interrogates ~~Meletus~~ <sup>Meletus</sup>, his accuser, <sup>and makes</sup> ~~Makes~~ a fool of him, of course. "Is there a man who believes in the existence of divine things and not in divinities, <sup>?</sup>" he asks him - having established that he believes in divine things. But, in spite of all of this suaveness, the bottom line is he's a good man. <sup>He</sup> ~~says~~ "Do your duty. Think not of danger or death, only of disgrace." A facile, clever man like Dave Hatcher, who when the chips are down <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ a death before dishonor person. Very unique, valuable people, these. When death was sentenced, he mused about afterlife. <sup>He</sup> ~~says~~ that he would like to partake of it, if it exists, <sup>for the purpose of consulting</sup> ~~to consult~~ with some poets and philosophers in heaven. But if it doesn't exist, at least, <sup>(he says)</sup> he'll get a good sleep and he's been waiting for one of them too. Marked contrast to what later comes out in Phaedo.

The third dialogue that we study, Crito (to judge), also a man's name, Socrates' best friend, emphasizes almost totally civil disobedience. His friend Crito <sup>said</sup> ~~says~~ now that he was sentenced, why not escape? <sup>Crito offered to</sup> ~~he could~~ pay off the guards. Socrates says, two wrongs do not make a right.

Kissinger X  
the Foss

Now remember in the previous dialogue, Apology, when offered freedom on pain of not teaching or not practicing philosophy, of discussing it, he refused that kind of freedom. He would not give his bond of giving those things up and <sup>made</sup> makes it an "appeal of conscience." He considers ~~that~~ <sup>the offer to have transgressed</sup> a matter of divinity, a divine affair. That's too precious for civil disobedience. But here, when he is offered the opportunity to escape he says he will not desert his country. That when you disagree, if you are convicted unjustly, you should try to convince your fellow countrymen that they're wrong but you can't forsake the country and scam. The difference he says is that in the first case it was a divine consideration and in the second it was merely a matter of administration of human law, death sentences, etc. When you mention civil disobedience, you think of Henry Thoreau, the man who <sup>said</sup> says that "the government that governs best, governs least." <sup>Thoreau</sup> ~~he~~ held himself above the law in every case, until he had made his decision. Thoreau held that private judgment is the rule. He is a philosophical anarchist, I would call him an empirical myopic, (letting his considerations of the Mexican War and the slavery issue of the 19th Century dominate his thinking). He would throw the country away as some would throw the country away over the issue of Vietnam. Perhaps Thoreau was also an opportunist. He is described by Rhinelander as being a practitioner of

Of course when you're sitting at Knox College, humiliated by it draft dept unit that you know your father did it how you can generate "the issue of conscience" out of Vietnam, just as Henry Thoreau said of Thoreau's concern in Mexican war - But think ahead - At least 10 yrs. Both look stupid + since now

natural law to the extent that law and morality are part of the same and they can't be separated. But ~~whatever~~, he <sup>always</sup> held that <sup>(The Separation of)</sup> his private judgement was the rule, whereas to Socrates private judgement is exercised ~~as~~ <sup>only</sup> as an exception. For instance, when he hears from his Daimon, a "voice of God" type of intervention.

Phaedo, the fourth dialogue is the most celebrated.

Phaedo, incidentally, was an ex-POW, friend of Socrates.

As in the case of all these dialogues, you can really discuss them at any one of three levels. As I am discussing it, now

as the story, the morals, the words. There is also, as I have alluded to, <sup>an entirely different way</sup> ~~a whole way~~ to look at these things for <sup>writing, and that is for</sup> their philosophical distinctions, <sup>this can be done almost</sup> without paying any attention

to what the subject matter, <sup>of</sup> ~~is~~ the first instance, <sup>is. This is certainly</sup> ~~as say~~ <sup>that book is</sup> ~~it's~~ supposedly

a manual for field soldiers, but it's really a bunch of philosophical distinctions wrapped in that <sup>package</sup> ~~clothing~~. And then in this case, and in many of the Socratic dialogues and others,

there's a third dimension of <sup>the</sup> ~~geometric~~ symmetry of the arguments. <sup>The dialog is A</sup> ~~a~~ thing of aesthetic beauty, <sup>because of</sup> the way the story

is put together. So if you were to write an article for Harper's magazine and it had to have not only a good story that was printable and saleable, but also be loaded with philosophical distinctions, <sup>but</sup> the second level one, and thirdly be symmetrically pure from an aesthetic viewpoint of construction,

you would be spending, I daresay, most of the winter doing it. The questions asked here are how should Socrates die and what is death? You know that he, <sup>with</sup> ~~for~~ this story, <sup>in a way that dominated world history</sup> thought for a bifurcated body and soul. <sup>thousand years</sup> The soul ~~being~~ permanent, the <sup>was</sup> body temporary, the soul <sup>was</sup> pure, the body contaminated.

(This <sup>is</sup> is not to be confused with a later Descartes bifurcation of body and mind which I talked about a couple of lectures ago). The rationalist's case <sup>is made</sup> time and again, "mind is the eye of the soul." He advocates temperance, justice, courage and wisdom, but not idly, as a do-gooder. He has definite ideas about all. For instance, in temperance, he is not meaning to save your indulgence for Saturday night. No, he has contempt for bodily pleasures, not for moral reasons so much as for rational reasons. ~~Because~~ That's the only way you can free the soul from slavery to corporal pollution. He also avoids pleasure from that viewpoint <sup>and always contemplating on</sup> and pain and desire and fear. <sup>Love</sup> These are all imperfections. The abstract precedes the concrete and of course the forms are the reality of which he speaks - "equality, beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, <sup>and</sup> Of course the soul is immortal and deathless. He talks about it appearing at birth from a prior existence and with his experiment with his slave boy working out some <sup>Pythagorean</sup> ~~Pythagorean~~ mathematical geometric identities, he proved to his satisfaction that the slave boy had known of these identities, known of the triangle, the circle,

the square, in a pure form before he was born and that <sup>his</sup> learning was really remembering. We are reminded of <sup>the Wordsworth</sup> words of a poem in which the baby is nearest God at birth and ever after that ~~is~~ <sup>sliding</sup> downhill as ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> becomes more and more contaminated, <sup>his</sup> ~~the~~ soul having emerged from heaven.

Plato talks about causality and differentiates between purposeful, intentional cause based on human will and the explanation that all actions proceed from physical or mechanical causes.

GET IT

Purposeful vs  
mechanical  
causality

<sup>The latter alternative</sup> ~~that~~ is the way ~~the~~ <sup>many</sup> highly structured materialists, <sup>advocates of strictly scientific objectivism</sup> ~~objective method~~ would see the universe ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> that's the way

Jacques Monod sees it and we'll read his <sup>Recent</sup> ~~book~~ book in the 9th week, Chance and Necessity. All ~~of~~ <sup>this</sup> ~~of~~ bears out the

truth of ~~what I said first,~~ <sup>the Whitehead audio,</sup> that all of European philosophy (and I include American and Western philosophy in general in that category) is merely a series of footnotes on Plato.

( I read them the funny passages about Aristophanes' play The Clouds and show them the cartoons. )



Aristotle was thought of it all - Practically  
Compulsion & Freedom can coexist - (Future)

#### LECTURE 4

#### ARISTOTLE

Plato, if you will remember, was a mathematician. A literary man, a poet, and an almost polarized rationalist. He believed that the source of wisdom was contemplation by the human mind to a much greater degree than the observation of facts and the measurement of data. Aristotle, a natural scientist, was a little more empirical than Plato - a little more a man of this earth. He was, however, still a rationalist who would deduce that women had fewer teeth than men and die thinking that was the truth without ever bothering to look in his wife's mouth. He was a straight thinking textbook author and as such sometimes rather dull commonsensical. He was popularized by Thomas Aquinas, a faculty member of the University of Paris in the 13th Century. When Aquinas the theologian came across Arabic texts which were improved translations of Aristotle's textbooks, you'll remember that he was the founding author of over a dozen disciplines. His major profession was that of a marine biologist, and of course he founded that discipline, but he additionally founded embryology, and as your sheet for today tells you, a modern molecular biologist finds so much similarity between Aristotle's explanation of the way the sperm cell dictates the formation of the fetus, that he

Aristotle

would recommend Aristotle for a posthumous award of the Nobel prize. Other disciplines that he founded are physics, astronomy, metaphysics, psychology. You will find that Aristotle is completely obsessed with categorizing things and all of those disciplines that I just mentioned are what he calls theoretical disciplines, wherein the primary emphasis is on knowing. He also founded a whole family of what he calls practical, or doing, disciplines: logic, aesthetics, drama criticism, and of course we remember what he said about the definition of a tragedy and it's the same tragedy that Brooks Atkinson applies in New York. Rhetoric, politics and ethics finish off this particular list of practical disciplines that Aristotle founded. Thomas Aquinas liked his deduction from first principles and tied Christianity to science. Although his emphasis on reason tended to downplay faith and made him unpopular with some theologians (Luther, for instance, called him a stinking goat) he did well by the church and he also and emphatically, shaped foundations for modern science.

Aristotle was born 15 years after Socrates had died. His life span overlapped that of Plato by 37 years and during that time he studied at Plato's academy in Athens. At the age of 42, after Plato had died, he went to Macedonia at the request of the king and there he was a personal tutor to the king's son, Alexander, who was later known as Alexander

the Great. After that period he returned to Athens, founded his own school called the Lyceum and he taught there until he died at the age of 62.

Like Plato he thought that the good of the state was prior to the good of the individual, that is to say that the general was prior to the particular. Both of his most practical disciplines, politics and ethics, dealt specifically first with the state and second the individual. I want to talk a little about his politics. The book was never finished. He believed that man was a social animal, that to live outside the society would be an act performed only by a beast or by God. As an aside, this contrasts markedly with the later concept of the social contract theory which is based on the assumption that man forms a tacit or written contract to form a society because it's such a tough world, dog eat dog, outside such an arrangement. Hobbs was sort of the spokesman at the far extreme of the social contract group who described life without society as ~~horrid~~<sup>British</sup> nasty and short. With the social animal theory he was the favorite of both Jefferson and Madison and he had an idea of the relative merits of various government setups. Three he called good, four he called bad. Three, in order of goodness, first monarchy, second aristocracy (that would be a group of the best) and third (the worst of the best) polity, in which upper-middle class citizens rule through a constitutional

government very similar to ours here. Of the bad, the best of the bad was a democracy where they had the lower-middles without a constitution and then oligarchy, a few powerful and rich. Remember when we talk about the powerful and rich we're not talking about merchants, that is people in trade, those people were not even citizens. The second from best, the aristocracy, you would think of them as the good guys on Bellevue Avenue and the oligarchy as the bad guys on Bellevue Avenue. The worst of the worst tyranny, which I list as monarchy to the minus one. On his ethical theories I have about nine different points which he hangs to. First, he falls in with the idea that he prefers a morality of virtue rather than a morality of acts. In his view and in Plato's view, character is the key and a good man or a better man or a best man has a virtuous disposition of character. That is the Greek view, some interpret it as the New Testament view, and I do. The morality of acts has also quite a following. That is the view of Kant which we will study next week. Acts are right or wrong. The Napoleonic codes are an example of that type of viewpoint. The Old Testament, the old Jews and their legalism lend itself to that, and Aristotle says from a practical standpoint this morality of acts applies to politics to some extent and mentions the fact that a good citizen can be a bad man. A second idea that you can hang your hat on with Aristotle is his not requiring the same degree of detail of proof for

propositions of various disciplines (too bad our social scientists who now want to quantify everything didn't read Aristotle). Thirdly, he has this idea of making your own character. You're not born with a character, you make it, through practice and to some extent through study. He would differ from Plato's dialogue Meno in saying that virtue might be enhanced by studying about it. The main emphasis is on training yourself, and you learn to do that by practice of being courteous, courageous, generous, having propriety, and so forth. A fourth idea is his idea of dynamics. That this morality, this ethical excellence is gained through activity. Happiness is activity of the soul in accordance with virtue he says. Now that's a very loaded statement. I want to talk about what he thinks of each of those four words: happiness, activity, soul and virtue. Activity is living well and acting well and it is an art and it is the dynamics of which I speak. Happiness, you will remember, he classifies as the highest good. It's the best because it is never wanted for the sake of anything else. It is an end in itself. It is possibly better translated as well-being and a man who has happiness will have a nice family, enough money, friends, reputation, he'll be a citizen of a good country and have health. Now this form of happiness as Aristotle sees it is not achievable by children, they don't have enough experience, or by those who are too <sup>humbly</sup>umber-

situated to win honor, or by those poor souls who suffer a misfortune so severe that their nobility cannot shine through. His idea of soul is translated as life. He has three forms of life: vegetable, animal (human really), even vegetables have souls by his definition. The highest form of the soul is in human and the highest activity of the soul of humans concerns the use of their intelligence or mind. As an aside, we will later find out that some of the hard materialists see mind and brain as the same. He, like Bergson, would say that mind is a coat and brain is a coat hook. He had the same idea of mind that most of us do. The last of the four key words, virtue, again he categorizes into two types: intellectual virtues and moral virtues. Intellectual virtues are based on the broad meaning of reason. In the Greek simile man's reason would be to him as the navigator of a ship would be to the ship. One of the things about intellectual virtues is you cannot get too much of them, you cannot two-block them. A statesman cannot have too much wisdom. Moral virtues on the other hand are those in which a mean should be struck. Now a mean by Aristotle's use here is not a compromise, he's not a fence sitter. It's as though he were aiming at the center of the target. Courage is thus bordered by rashness on one side and cowardice on the other, and balance of true courage is established by practical wisdom. Reason is not always the key to moral virtues. The Greeks would say they're irrational.

If I said that you would think I meant crazy. What I mean is what I have to say is arational or unrational, they can or cannot partake of reason, whereas intellectual virtues must. The fifth point I want to hang my hat on is other moral dilemmas, the free choice versus compulsion argument. That is to say, what about the man who's forced to do something? Should he be punished? The hardnosed, old Navy line would hold that if a big storm came up and a ship washed aground, the captain should be relieved. Aristotle would not do that, he would not relieve for cause in every grounding. He wasn't a dogmatist on that. He would want to examine the situation. Nor would be he a soft line dogmatist. If you were tortured and then you signed a confession, would Aristotle excuse you? Not necessarily. He would note that compulsion and choice can coexist and that under torture, although voluntary character of what one does is diminished, it is not necessarily extinguished. We must look at what the other options were. In the sixth case we have the problem of free will versus determinism. The question is framed as how can a fatalist or a determinist be held responsible for his acts? If what is going to happen is going to happen anyway, how can morality be a part of his contribution? Aristotle is more of a libertarian than a determinist in the first place, that is the opposite side of the scale, and he does not take the bait on this argument.

He is the sort of guy who says, "Now wait a minute, let's sort this out. To what extent is this thing determined?" But he does not in any of these cases where I show him as coming down in the middle, really make a compromise. Rather he clearly, first of all, identifies the dilemma, and that's of great value, and secondly, in the case of many of these as I've said, he said the distinction is a false one because we must look farther than the buzz words of determinism, free choice, and so forth. Seventh, like most Greeks he does not bear down on the intellect versus the will problem. That is to say, he does not deal with the problem of known wrongdoings. (Next week under Immanuel Kant we will go into this at great length. In his view will drives action, intellect drives thought.) Remember Plato thought that the problem of crime was a problem of education. Aristotle is not so sure. Again, the common sense showing through. He would say, "A weakness of will may preclude some men from doing what they know to be right." (St. Paul would substitute all for some above, believing that all men were vulnerable to lapses of will; Aristotle would not admit to that.) Eighth, in his eccentricities on justice, again he falls back on common sense. He believes in reciprocity in the abstract. Not direct, but proportional reciprocity. Children and parents would not necessarily exchange privileges on

WEAKNESS  
of will "  
vs. Disturbance  
drive



an even scale. The son that came to the father and says, "You don't go to bed until 11 o'clock, I'm going to stay out until 11 o'clock" would get no place with Aristotle. Nor would a junior to a senior relationship. In other words, common sense again. In science, as in the ninth point I have here, in the induction/deduction dilemma, which involves really philosophy of science or logic, or epistemology most accurately (that is the theory of knowledge), Aristotle's scientific model is deductive. He says that the way to work is from first principles which may be derived inductively, from observation or the first principle may be conceived by rational processes, such as his induction of the theory of women's teeth. In general he would take his fish collection, which was the largest in the world, and as a marine biologist he would examine these fish and then come up with certain first principles. Like, fish have gills and then make that known and what follows from that. This shattered some scientists. It would shatter Dr. Hess, whom I used to work with, who claimed that science was inductive, mathematics was deductive. We were doing dimensional analysis with ~~dimensionist~~ <sup>dimensionless</sup> parameters measuring fuel consumption and many of you know that type of work. This idea of his gripped Francis Bacon who wanted to correct his Organum, that's the name of the volume he did on logic, he held that to be deductive and Bacon wanted a Novum Organum which would

be the new Organum for inductive logic. So, he took a lot of heat from various knowledgeable people on this but in hindsight as is so often the case with Aristotle, he may have been right. I'm told that the higher the sophistication of the science, the more <sup>de</sup> inductive it is and our nuclear physicists and our molecular biologists, I'm told, spend more time scribbling on paper than they do in the laboratory. We've already noted the regard that some scientists, particularly in the molecular biology field, admire the incisive conclusions of Aristotle in the scientific world. Plato, you remember, insisted on knowing your danger. He insisted on getting reason into every aspect of life. Neither Aristotle nor Plato admired the blind charge, but were they perhaps too soft on impulsiveness? (Here I read T. E. Lawrence card 27, mark A, "That's where I sheared off the mathematical element, etc."). Aristotle says that virtue is a function of how a man handles fear, how he avoids running away from danger. I am reminded of the CMH San Jose convention and the newspaper article about the man who fell on his knees in France in World War I. That was a way of handling fear. Another T. E. Lawrence quote. (I read card 29, the Moslem viewpoint). If fear is a necessary condition to courage as Aristotle suggests, how about Captain McWhirr of the ship NANSHAW in our Conrad article for today? Is McWhirr dumb? He is certainly unimaginative. He has

them picking up dollars in the Chinese compartment in the midst of the storm much as Black Jack Reeves had men being put on report for having their sleeves rolled up in the heat of battle. I read quotes on page 310 and I make note of the fact that the captain's unconsciousness in kind of a Ray Raehn type of viewpoint. Like Ray, however, the man had a sense of decency as well as a sense of endurance. One remembers that the Greeks always included endurance as a defining characteristic of courage. Plato in fact called courage the endurance of the soul. At this point I read speech box card 235 about Gentleman Jim Corbett. You need courage to win fights, you also need it to win wars. At this time I read cards 25 and 25A of the Clausewitz collection in the speech box. Another aspect of courage is that it seems to rise in people when the conditions for its use are put before them. (I read page 263 at the bottom and 264 at the top of "The Open Boat" by Stephen Crane.) As another example I read from the Glenn Gray collection, cards 35 and 35A. Fighting germinates thus in the nature of being itself and what could be more Greek than Glenn Gray's statement?

Greeks, you remember, categorize their virtues, not by the number as we will next week see Kant doing with his categorical imperative, but consider them outgrowths of products, of proper dispositions of character. An obvious way to demonstrate in such a context is to have a model or

paradigm and thus Aristotle has his Magnanimous Man. (I used to think magnanimous meant forgiving, but that happens to be the third definition in Webster's Unabridged, and Aristotle is right he is describing a truly magnanimous man.) This word magnanimous means a great soul in Greek and the man, you remember has pride. (Not a vice as it is with Christians.) But Aristotle would agree with St. Paul in that if the man were "puffed up" as St. Paul described his Prideful Man, Aristotle would not consider it virtuous. With proper pride Aristotle, however, would say, "Let's face it. A man should not be ashamed of making an accurate appraisal of his own nobility." In fact, would say Aristotle, "If vaingloriousness is to the right of the bulls eye, self-deprecation is to the left. They're both defects." The Magnanimous Man is not a show off; he never evidences surprise at the turn of events. He is a real cool guy. His description does not emphasize warmth or concern for the feelings and rights of others, he is a bright and noble god, more like McArthur than Bradley. A chivalrous gentleman perhaps. (I conclude with readings from Tom Wolfe, sheet number 7, "Jousting with Sam and Charlie".)

Odd thing about Aristotle: he defines moral virtues simply as those which do not wholly depend on the intellect.

is honesty one? -- (in terms of  $\$$  - ?) ... (in terms of Speed <sup>-?</sup> (Lyric))  
if so, can you have too much of it?

The moral law within (unconditional & Absolute)  
The stars heavens above (modified by lens of mind)  
& The problem of what to do when BOTH options are wrong  
(lying)

LECTURE 5

IMMANUEL KANT

For the first five minutes I'm going to talk about things that pertain to the course in general and are studies of the past. Today we leave the Greeks, I hope with the memory that they see ethics as a matter of character, that they see the virtue expectation linkage in terms as follows: from a cobbler we expect good <sup>LASTS</sup> ~~lathes~~, good shoes, good workmanship; from a soldier we expect endurance, courage and a long list of other attributes.

Today we make the jump into modern philosophy. Today and a week from today, we will discuss first Immanuel Kant, who as you know advocated a morality of acts. Next week we will be with John Stuart Mill, a morality of consequences. There are other differences between them. Kant held that the moral law was within one's self and Mill with his advocacy of morality which brings the greatest happiness for the greatest number takes himself out of the inner moral law and into the social law without; the civic coercive law out there there in society, not in here in me. We bridge this gap today with our readings in Hart in which we will discuss civic law out there contrasting natural law and the law of the legal positivists. A concept of law will follow my initial discussion of Kant.

Kant

With regard to the course, I would urge you to keep your head out of the box in the manner in which we were all instructed to do so in Survival School. We all know how to operate. We are not here to learn fairness or objectivity, and least of all, relativity or tolerance. You're too old to discuss things like that and I think you've demonstrated by your past career and your capabilities that you understand them. You can get into the skins of any of these modern philosophers and walk around and spend hours tracing through each rationale. But we don't have time for that in this quick summary course, we must scan and categorize. For the reason, first of all, to (1) see that it's all been thought out before, those intuitive, brilliant thoughts we occasionally have in our early morning hours; (2) we study these grand old ideas when extended to their logical extremes in full run and see how they all get a little spooky out at the frayed edges; and I think (3) we must remember that we are here gaining confidence in ourselves and a vocabulary with which we can defend our prejudices.

Speaking of two-blocked positions, meet a Immanuel Kant. This absentminded (Joe would say cagey) professor was born in Konigsburg, East Prussia five years before George Washington and he lived longer, into the early years of the 19th Century. In all those years he was never more than 40 miles from the house in which he was born. He was never

married, he was small, frail, and the townspeople set their clocks by him. If the lantern went on in his room all knew that it was 4:45, they knew that for sixty years. When he left the house at 7:00 they knew he had prepared his lecture (and he gave good lectures - dynamic lectures, as he said, were not here to study philosophy but how to philosophize) and when the light went out in his room everybody in Konigsburg knew it was 10:00 p.m. But for all his apparent anonymity he left his mark. As you remember, the stoics and other Greeks and Romans from antiquity, had attributed an indwelling reason to the universe. Reason that we could observe and see it out there. But Kant's first mark was that of relocating the source of order of the universe. Kant said the order we know is necessary for science, is not necessarily out there in the heavens, but in here in our brains. His second mark was an outgrowth of this epistemological stand, the outgrowth of his moral philosophy, which included the first complete philosophical doctrine of the autonomy of the person. A person as a precious, sacrosanct, inviolable being. Never a means always an end. Moreover, this is evident to any person, he said, who has right reason and good will. This precious person that comes out of his doctrine of philosophy, is not dependent, he stresses, on religion or faith, but on critical reason. Some are skeptical of the fact that he never let religion or faith enter his philosophy. For you see, he was a very religious man, a pious man, whose

parents, humble folk, had been pietists. He often recalled the simple and pure lives of his parents and in the home in which he lived. He was an admirer of the American Revolution. The counterpart of a doctor of philosophy, of course, but he taught not only metaphysics and ethics and those things which philosophers teach, but also anthropology, math and physics. And those were exciting days in physics because new on the street were Kepler and Newton's new laws. A body tends to remain in motion until disturbed, etc.

He was teaching Newton's laws as fact, and yet he was sensitive and brilliant enough to realize that the idea of these laws ran contrary to the philosophical positions of many highly respectable scholars. (Kant was brilliant. In college he was said to be an excellent card player but gave up the game because he could find nobody who did not slow him down in his bidding and playing.) Hume, you know, would have scoffed at the idea of a Newtonian Law. Hume would have called it a probability perhaps, or even admitted that it was psychologically true. What I'm trying to describe is the tension between Hume and Kant. Although their lives overlapped they had never really met. Kant had read Hume's books, Hume being about 30 years older, but this was an argument that I will dramatize - of epistemology. It is not an argument of the right formula to describe motions or any practical aspect of those formulas or any practical



thing as we might discuss the best way to get to the moon, or the best way to defend sealanes. The epistemological arguments have much deeper roots. If you will remember, we have the rationalists on the one pole, who believed that all worthwhile knowledge originates in the mind, and the empiricists on the other, who believed that it's only obtainable through concrete evidence observed by the senses. Rationalist Plato believed that reality was in the forms and that the heavens were mere duplications of real heavens elsewhere. <sup>(Rationalist)</sup> Descartes in cogito ergo sum believed that his existence rested not on his weight or measure but on the fact that his mind knew he existed. Hume, the polar empiricist, would never admit that two successive pool balls hit mathematically and exactly in the same way would go in the same direction. He was the sort of guy, if asked "Do you believe in infant baptism?" would have answered, "Believe in it? I've seen it done." Another empiricist of similar, an old Newport resident, Berkeley, who gave the organ to Trinity Church, was a man who disputed the fact that there was noise when the trees fell in the woods, unless he or someone was there to listen to it. These ideas of these empiricists come up in practical life. Charlie Hertzfeld, brilliant scientist and my companion on the CNO Executive Panel, often chews out PhD briefers for the idea of mixing up opinions and data. He doesn't want any confusion to exist.

(not a metaphysician)  
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That when they're talking data it's not something generated in their minds, it's empirical.

Let's take a peek at the philosophically technical world of epistemology. What type of statement is "F equals MA"? To the philosopher it is (a) an apriori statement, before experience. We observe somebody in motion and assume that all act the way of the test specimens. And (b) it is a synthetic statement, that is, not analytic. It is a statement of supposed facts, not like the statement, "A bachelor is an unmarried man" an analytic statement beyond refutation. So, says Hume, Newton is making a statement of fact before all the results are in. And Hume would also say, "I will go along with that statement, it sounds right to me and the arithmetic seems to check, but to me it's just a statement like, 'You can't trust an Irishmen' (which is a statement he believed in, followed, had good results with, and believed to be close enough for government work). But when you start building bridges with it then," he says, "I wonder." Because as Hume said, "I like eggs and I like them everyday and nothing is as alike another egg as an egg. And yet ever so often I find a bad one."

Kant would say to Hume, "You're wrong. Yes, I can say that Newton was right." Kant further announced to the philosophic world, "I solemnly suspend all metaphysicians from their past until they can answer this question: How are apriori synthetic judgements possible?" This is a very

important question and it applies all the way from "F equals MA" to "You can't trust an Irishman." All of those series of statements in between that make positive statements about test samples that are not universally exposed to tests. Kant was not strictly a metaphysician. A critical philosopher he cagily called himself. He made this statement, and he answered it in this way: "Yes, a priori synthetic judgements are possible because of the power and unique capabilities of the human mind." Hume, he might say, thinks the mind categorizes bits, like some sort of sophisticated computer. The mind experiences, says Kant, more than bits. It experiences patterns, connections and it is equipped with universal concept forms which projected outward tie together discreet bits into patterns, rules, universal laws, unities, wholes, etc. Kant makes this statement, not based on mysticism or animism or religion or hope or some spark of life, but by critical reason he believes that it is clear that the power and unique capabilities of the human mind are able to bridge this gap of empiricism that bothers Hume and a host of others.

What did Kant's theories extrapolate to when run all the way out? Some foolishness, as you will see in the moral section of this lecture, some practicality, but brilliance across the board. I think it can be said that the history of philosophy and science was changed by this little absent-

minded professor. He died not knowing that his books would be cursed and praised by different schools of nuclear physicists 130 years later. All of those physicists agreed that he was right, Heisenberg and the Copenhagen school of the '30's and all, when they found that previous formulas didn't work on quantum mechanics. Because, they agreed, that he had the handle on the situation when he said that mind becomes an actor in the experiment and in certain situations you have to go to other means of proof. The book Physics <sup>(MATH + LAB DONT JIBE)</sup> and Philosophy which we'll study for Lecture 9 is an account by Heisenberg of the difficulties of developing methodology of quantum mechanics ever since the Michelson-Morley experiments of 1885. Kant's name runs throughout and on page 90 he says, "Modern physics has changed Kant's statement about the possibility of synthetic judgements apriori from a metaphysical one into a practical one and the synthetic judgements apriori thereby have the character of a relative truth." Now I show my mind diagram. Under reason, freedom, God and immortality must be presumed. They must be presumed to correctly account for the moral side of the equation. But they are knowledge and not psychology, and not sociology, and not practicality. So also are all the other segments of this diagram in his mind. He says as knowing beings we can have only phenomenal knowledge of the world and that is the combination of the world out there as screened to the human mind or as seen in our perspective. The mind as he sees it is a sort of lens.

The orderly world of common sense and science is in the mind rather than out there. The metaphysical side: the knowledge that transcends empirical testing, God, freedom, and immortality are on the knowing side. Experience he says has shown this diagram comes not in bits but in packages. By intuition we sense the world; by understanding we grasp the world with our categories; and by reason we have metaphysical ideas. Note that his use of reason, applying only to those metaphysical ideas, is not (as was Aristotle's definition) that of intelligence as a whole. So much for the part of Kant that says, "What can I know?" - the epistemological side. Let us now turn to the moral side, "What shall I do?" Kant's moral realm which he insists is independent of religious belief is even higher than the knowing realm. For you cannot account for man and all of his majesty by assuming he is limited to the phenomenal world. The moral realm, moreover, is autonomous. It is not a branch of sociology or psychology. As moral beings we are not confined to the phenomenal world. The roots of our being are not confined to time, space and causality as are they in the phenomenal world according to our diagram. That time, space and causality world is practicality's turf - science's turf. Moral acts have roots in "things as they are in themselves." This is an acting vice knowing side of man and is based on words like: will, hope, want. He says as a moral being I should act like one. All I need is right reason and good will.

How am I able to know the "moral law within me"? Is this the conscience which Socrates' daimon suggests or that St. Paul's Gentile's "law in their hearts" suggests? Perhaps. But Kant, cagey Kant, never called it conscience because he did not want it to be labeled a subjective moral judgement. All of this remember, he insists, is critical reason. Kant says an autonomous self does not need the compulsion of external law. That's the law of which we will talk later, the natural law or the positivist law. I am not limited by categories of mind, I'm not just another molecule of the phenomenal world, might say Kant. How do I know moral law? By recognizing the ought within me. Unconditional ought. No ifs, buts or benefits. I oughtest cause I oughtest, cause it is morally right. That is categorical. If I ought because it will benefit me, for instance, if I say honesty is the best policy, Kant would not consider that necessarily praiseworthy. It would be a morally permitted statement - in conformity with moral law, not springing from it, because you stand to gain from being honest. That's what your statement implies. That's a hypothetical imperative not a categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has two formulations. One, that you act so that your act will become universal law, and two, following, naturally, that you should treat others as ends, as persons, as autonomous beings capable of moral legislation. The idea is that if

you can legislate morally as in one above, why not others and thus treat them as ends as in two above. Unlike Aristotle and Mill, Kant does not believe that virtue and happiness are the same. Kant's morality, duty can be painful. Perhaps this is Kant's answer to Job. But like Aristotle who said we make our own character here on this earth, Kant would also say you give your own morals here and you do so by applying the categorical imperative. Reason does not command. You must know of God, freedom and immortality but nothing will happen until will gets into the act. In this position he agrees with St. Paul who said, "Reason is not enough for good works." St. Paul and Kant both agree that will is the driving force and Kant says that conformance to this categorical imperative is the yardstick of success. Kant says seek virtue for its own sake, not for payoffs. A typical Kantian statement would be, "A dollar's worth of work for a dollar's worth of pay." A morality of motive somewhat similar to Christ in Mathew 5 when He said, "He who looks at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery already in his heart." So also Kant would say that the motive was the thing and the results were just incidental.

Kant's moral reasoning of the categorical imperative has some shortfalls and I think they're best brought out along with other shortfalls in the subject in a book called

Lying by Sissela Bok, wife of the President of Harvard University. Sissela mentions, of course, that Kant said, "By lying a man throws away his dignity as a man." Some other viewpoints on lying: St. Augustine, "God forbids all lies." But St. Augustine worried about lying and some of the benefits that accrue from it occasionally - to the sick, to the aged, to children, for instance - and allowed as how he would pardon good lies, if there is such a thing, but under no circumstances would he ever praise a liar.

So we find St. Augustine coming out very similarly to Kant, of course St. Augustine predating him by a ~~century~~ or more, but being a little bit hesitant. Kant is never hesitant.

Another viewpoint: Grosche's, the international lawyer, and many other early protestants who say, "Truth goes only to Grotius those who deserve it." And excluded of course would be murderers, enemies, etc. Samuel Johnson says, although he is against lying, exceptions can be made. For instance, if a murderer asks, "Which way did he go?" Kant would never agree to that. The test case that comes up in all these philosophical arguments is what happens if you are standing in the door and a man comes by bleeding, running, screaming. He goes down the hall, into the third door on the right, and behind him comes a man with a razor and a fiendish look in his eye and says, "Which way did he go?"



If he asks Immanuel Kant, he says, "Third door on the right." There's no other way to go. Kant here, and many philosophers in this moral regime, failed to worry about the case when what you do is always wrong in some way or another. That's the more natural real life situation. Sorting out right and wrong are rather simple. Sorting out the lesser of two evils is a little more complex and we see this in the utilitarian's position. Utilitarians on the surface rather like white lies, they think they're practical and often trivial. Signing letters like "Cordially yours", doctors distributing placebos rather than real pills. But the utilitarians disagree on what's utilitarian in complex situations when there's always something wrong and they start to think that lies are neutral. Sissela opposes this and in her second chapter awards any lie a negative buoyance to start with. Much as Aristotle would, when he said, "Lies start out and persist in being mean and culpable."

I hope I've introduced some discussion items that will be interesting for tomorrow's seminars. I've not even talked about not lying to enemies and you can imagine what my position would be on that. Where do you stand on bureaucratic lying, what do we do about that? Writing letters of recommendation, writing fitness reports that are inflated and in any real sense, lies. Or how about the chips, we have so many to spend, we tell people we're not here, we give them false excuses for not doing this or that. I don't propose to turn this bureaucracy around, but I propose that

we look at it for what it is. A thing that can contaminate us all.

What  
are Hart  
notes?

Phil on Hart:

NATURAL LAW "There are objective Rights + Things  
that can be known"

LECTURE - 6

John Stuart Mill

From the stern Kant, we move to a practical utilitarian, nutty, Englishman who practiced eccentricity and thought that individual liberty was supreme and that the less the government interfered the better. James Mill, father of John Stuart was a bright Scot at the University of Edinburgh, who had difficulty in his early married years, developing an intellectual interest with his wife. Shortly after they had their first son, John Stuart in 1806, he hooked up with a 60 year old learned, rich, and eccentric English legal and moral writer by the name of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham was writing and thinking a lot about humane reforms, prison reforms. He designed the prison, and gave it a name, Panopticon. This was a very strange and interesting man, Bentham. But also a very bright one. This prison, shaped like a wagon wheel, would have provided air, libraries, exercise areas for prisoners in the most efficient manner. Part of Bentham's theory was that the purpose of prison was reform, not vengeance. He had a lot of other ideas that are familiar to us. Utility in ethics, he thought that this idea of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people ought to be the driving force behind their actions. He was very <sup>Methodical?</sup> mythological. He broke down this happiness into seven categories by what he called

filicific calculus. Happiness was a function of its intensity, of its duration, of its certainty, of its immediacy, of its ability to induce additional pleasure, that is its ability to multiply, its freedom from the bad after effects, and so on and so on. A prisoner of thought, action, and eccentricity. Twenty years after meeting James Mill, Jeremy Bentham signed up to have his body given to the medical school of London University for research. One of the first to do that, also one of the first to have some rather original provisions included in that agreement with the University of London, that once his organs were removed his skeleton was to be cleaned, and scraped and stuffed. Dressed in his clothes, a wax head was to be made to resemble his countenance. His hat was to be placed on that. Moreover his actual head was to be embalmed heavily, and today if you go to the library of the University of London you can see in the glass the stuffed, clothed, and hatted skeleton of Jeremy Bentham. And at his feet as he sits on the chair is his real head, embalmed. Bentham had gotten, in those early years of little baby John Stuart's life, on his feet financially. He fixed him up with a job in India House, the East India Company, where James being bright, rose rapidly through the hierarchy. Bentham had been a child protege.. Had learned many subjects early in life. He and James Mill started making plans for little John Stuart, and they decided that they would tutor him and that he was not to be polluted with other contact with other

kids. That he would be a test case because he was obviously bright and at the age of three he commenced Greek and Latin study. By the age of seven he had read all of the Platonic dialogues, in the original Greek. Understood them all except, he said he was a little unclear about some of the concepts of Theaetetus. Of course he had no friends. And by the age of fourteen was more like a college professor than a boy and probably wouldn't have enjoyed them had he had them. Not only was he schooled in the classics, but in economics and so forth. And at that age he entered the East India Company working for his father, who by this time was in charge of it, the title being Chief Examiner. And by the age of seventeen John Stuart had been made a member of the board of directors which would be in our world like a seventeen year old boy being appointed to the Board of Directors of Standard Oil of California. Of course, he had a nervous breakdown at the age of twenty. But although he was in deep depression and nervousness the mere handling of a top job in a big enterprise could be accomplished. He could have worked straight through a nervous breakdown, hold down a Pentagon job without any trouble. In fact, he proceeded ultimately at a rather early age to relieve his father as Chief Examiner of that great trading company. He came out of the doldrums about four years after he went in. He, at twenty-four, met and fell in love with a twenty-three year old woman. The problem was that she was married. Her name was Harriet Taylor,

that was her married name. She had two sons and was later to have a daughter. Mister Taylor, kindly, complacent and tolerant coped with the fact that John Stuart Mill practically moved into the house, and for twenty years the social couple of the residence was not Mr. and Mrs. Taylor, but Mrs. Taylor and John Stuart Mill. Twenty years of what is described as platonic courtship, they took trips together, had an active intellectual life. The Thomas Carlyles, that is the famous man of letters and his wife, frequently refer in their memoirs to their associations with Harriet and John Stuart. In fact, Thomas Carlyle gave that couple the only manuscript of a large tome on the French Revolution that he'd finished, when the Taylor maid found it, thought it was junk and burned it. But the Carlyles did not sever relations over that and were friends of the couple until after Mr. Taylor died and into their marriage which followed at a decent interval. Harriet was intellectual as I said and possibly somewhat peculiar. I cite the description of her found in the memoirs of Thomas Carlyle's wife. She describes Mrs. Mill as a "peculiarly affected individual, not easy unless she startles you with unexpected sayings, if she was going to utter something kind and affectionate she speaks in a hard stern voice. If she wants to be alarming or uncivil she employs the most honeyed and affectionate tones. "Come down and see us," she said one day "you will be charmed with our house, it is so full of rats." "Rats," cried Carlyle "do you regard them as

an attraction?" "Yes," she said softly, "they are such dear and innocent creatures." Whatever of her personality eccentricities, she was said by Mill to have been a great help to him in the many books that he was putting out at this time, Principles of Political Economy, On Liberty, Utilitarianism. He had previously written A System of Logic. One of his last major works was The Subjection of Women. Harriet Taylor was known to be a women's libber, vigorous, and early and Mill ofcourse, supports women's suffrage, women's rights. He was the epitome, in fact sort of the <sup>founding</sup> crowning father, of the Nineteenth Century English liberalism. He is a man that believes that evil springs from ignorance or environment, that man is correctable, that education solves many problems. He wants freedom of action, home rule for the Irish, anti-slavery. He was quite an advocate of the northern cause of an America, during its Civil War. He was the kind of guy that could run Standard Oil, write books about logic and political economy, and philosophy and live with the wife of a neighbor all simultaneously without any trouble whatsoever. After his retirement he and Harriet traveled to France, and at about the 8 year point of their marriage on that trip she caught tuberculosis, some say from him, because he had a low order form of it. But she died and was buried at Avignon, France. And he spent most of his remaining life there with her grave, consoled by her daugther Helen, who was born after their courtship had started.

Harriet Taylor Mill's tombstone now in Avignon, France has a long epitaph, part of which I'll read: To the beloved memory of Harriet Mill, the dearly beloved and deeply regretted wife of John Stuart Mill. Her great and loving heart. Her noble soul. Her clear powerful original and comprehensive intellect made her a support and guide to the husband and his instructor in wisdom and his example in goodness, etc., etc.

Before Mill died, he had time to become the Godfather of Bertrand Russell who studied later under Alfred North Whitehead, as did Professor Brennan. And so we close this loop. We are talking about people <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ lived not too long ago. The reformers, the Nineteenth Century ~~British~~ British liberals. Politically opposed by the more self-satisfied Tories, sponsors of the idea of the government that governs least, governs best, free trade, the sanctity of the individual, who in his choice of acts, in affect votes a legislative responsibility to influence the morality of others and of course, the way he should do that is to act in a way that will give maximum happiness to the maximum number. Notice that although we contrast Mill with Kant, in that Kant is preoccupied with motive, Mill concentrates only on results, Kant on actions. Again Mill on the completed work, both endowed persons with ability, in fact with obligation to act in a way that sets the pattern for all. In this early Nineteenth Century in other words, intellectuals on the continent in at least two countries were making, each



in its own way, a plea to elevate and honor the integrity of the individual.

In his book On Liberty, he deals with personal ethics of the individual. I think that it is clear to us all, as we walk through these various philosophers, it's awfully hard to find anyone that seems to have it all put together the right way. I read again from the book Lying, by Sissela Bok, wife of the President of Harvard. On page 49, utilitarians also differ from Kant in stressing the differences in seriousness between one lie and another. They are therefore much closer to our actual moral deliberation in many cases where we are perplexed. In choosing whether or not to lie, we do weigh benefits against harm and happiness against unhappiness. We judge differently the lie to cover up an embezzlement, and the lie to camouflage a minor accounting error. We judge both of those to be different in turn from a sympathetic lie, told to avoid hurting a child's feelings. In making such judgements the difference has to do precisely with the degree to which the lie may cause or avoid harm, increase or decrease happiness.

But as soon as more complex questions of truthfulness and deception are raised the utilitarian view turns out to be unsatisfactory as well. First of all the more complex the acts the more difficult it becomes to produce convincing comparisons of their consequences. It is hard enough to make estimates of utility for one person keeping in mind all the different alternatives and their consequences, but

Good Link  
on Family  
of all members

to make such estimates for several persons is often well nigh impossible except once again in the starkest cases. The result is that even apart from lying those concepts which are most difficult to resolve such as questions of suicide or capital punishment causes as much disagreement among utilitarians as among everyone else. And the second reason to be weary of the simple seeming utilitarian calculation is that it often appears to imply that lies apart from their result in harm and benefits are in themselves neutral. It seems to say that a lie in a truthful statement which achieves the same utility are equal in that they're not then a contradiction between such a view and the principle of veracity which I, that is Mrs. Bok, set forth in chapter two, In that chapter she started lying out with a negative vote at least a negative weight against which further consideration should be played.

So we have here the personal ethics of the utilitarian, described by Mill in On Liberty. Remember that his aim was the good of humanity, freedom of will versus government. He described problems of authoritarianism, of monarchies, and even of democracies with the tyranny of the majority. The Black Letter Law was the freedom to do anything. A man should be free to do anything he wants, except when it interferes with the freedom of others. Mill was a practical man, like Hobbs and Hume, trying merely to cope with reality as he saw it. That is, we are human and therefore selfish and that we have to somehow practically cope

with this in society. Not a metaphysation. He might agree with the wag who said that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what people believe upon instinct. He was an empiricist. A man who had to be shown from experience. Now think about what he stood for. He would never have supported the hard hat legislation for motorcycle riders. It's their head, they can do what they want with it. Nader would have never lasted with him, with his seat belt regulations. He would probably have admired me, as I used to tell my pilots that they could design their own flight gear, and that they could wear what they wanted, as long as it didn't interfere with the rights of others. And I think as long as it didn't hurt anybody else, Mill would've had no objection to a man's suicide. He warns that morality tends to take the character of those in power. He admired nonconformism, would've suggested that auto-icons, as he called the stuffed skeleton when dressed and given a good coating of varnish would serve as driveway decorations, wherein a person might well choose to have his grandparents and great grandparents displayed as objects of art in the front yard. Mills said "If all mankind minus one were one opinion and only one person were the contradictory opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing

F.H. Bradley  
↓

This is Bentham

mankind." He believed in freedom of the press.

Talked in chapter two of On Liberty about how it's impossible for a man often to make a judgement about a man being misinformed and evil. And that therefore censorship on those grounds is highly questionable, and if there is some evil done to the country or its national security, that the burden of proof is on the government, not on the man. Men have defining characteristics of cordiability, and perfectability and they can't improve with instruction, and why not give them the benefit of the doubt. After all both Marcus Aurelius and St. Paul, both bright and virtuous men, made some bum decisions. At one point St. Paul opposed Christianity and throughout his life Marcus Aurelius, the Roman Emperor and Stoic did. Mill advocated, naturally, freedom of religion. He himself was agnostic, but he was very respectful not only of Christianity, but the Greek culture which he admired for its development and assertiveness. Humans, they saw not as machines, but as trees. And as we cultivate a tree we cultivate freedom. That's the way that we should think of ourselves, said he. But tolerant of other views even Christianity, which to him was full of don'ts and static, the Ten Commandments and so forth. Down, he says, with collective mediocrity. You see where he is going? He's going the way of all men of great ability, this man who can run business, who can write philosophy, make love with diligence and inspiration. (I now read selections on pages 19 and 20 of Durant's Lessons of History.)

And this condition in which freedom and equality are sworn and everlasting enemies and when one prevails the other dies seems to me to make good sense. And you will notice, that throughout Mill's writing that he's having a little trouble with the intricacy of his argument. Back on page 10, where he defined the basic Black Letter Law of utilitarianism namely "that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness and wrong as they tend to promote the opposite of suffering or pain". He seems to have forgotten the possibility of the calculus showing the overall maximization of pleasure at a time when we have maybe 10% of an oppressed minority, and this ate on him. And he put in chapter 5 to try to patch that. And he made a plea for justice as we will see when we discuss that book. But Rawls, in some of the readings that you have, who made a name for himself by saying all we need to do to make Mill right is to add a little fairness. And that is the way that we will handle that oppressed minority idea, and all we do is add a little pinch of liberty and a little pinch of equality, and somehow they are going to get together and somehow Rawls and I don't see eye to eye or at least he doesn't see eye to eye with the Durants. Because he is asking for his cake and to eat it too. Fairness, what's so universal about that? Ed Young, my good friend here in Newport, former publisher of the Providence Journal, tells about his days on the Baltimore Sun with H. L. Menkin. When that old iconoclast was visited one day by somebody who tried to

be delicate with him in objecting to some of his columns and said all we ask of you, is that you be fair. He lit up like a light bulb, and said "You'll get no fairness here. What in the world gives you the idea that I have an obligation to be fair".

The second book Utilitarianism that you read, is of course, Mill's treatise on social ethics, and he asks what is the basis of moral right and wrong. And like Aristotle says the way to start on that problem is to ask what is the most desirable end. The highest good and like Aristotle says it's happiness. And like Aristotle says it's that end to which all different "goods" contribute. Mill equates happiness with pleasure as did his father's friend Bentham. Not quick pleasure, but in doing satisfaction, but Aristotle didn't even go that far. To Aristotle, pleasure was just another lesser good. So although Mill and Aristotle ride along through happiness, Aristotle gets off the wagon when he starts equating it with pleasure. Now there are lots of objections that we've talked about and that would occur to people. Somebody might ask, "Well why don't you desire health and love and so forth," and he says, "They're all parts of happiness. Secondly, what pleasure is short term affairs," Mill would say, "I mean human high pleasure not animalistic low physical pleasure." You might accuse him of having a selfish proposal, that is a man looking for his own happiness, and of course his answer is, "I mean the community of humans including you, of course, but everybody." This old

question about the 10% oppressed, he says that would be unjust. I patched that in chapter 5, and that says justice must prevail and we should never abuse even one man. Justice is the practical application to law. To which I reply, you're asking for your cake and to eat it too, John Stuart. Some might say what is going to drive this? What's the motive? Do you have sanctions against people who don't obey the general happiness theory? And he said, ofcourse you have sanctions. You have external sanctions. The opinion of fellow men their praise of an unselfish act, a heroic deed. In fact he would say that self-sacrifice is the noblest virtue of the utilitarian. Self-sacrifice willfully done, never a duty, something that can be extracted. Then he says that there is internal sanction, conscience. Now he does not commit himself on what the source of what that conscience is. Whether it's innate or can be taught. But he is an empiricist, and in another writing he says virtue is best taught and can be by example. We may know things intuitively he says, but the base of intuitive thought is experience. So in summary utilitarianism, intricate, improvised somewhat is just in common language an expression, a model of Anglo-Yankee practicalism. Now it's been said "The history of Anglo-American ethics has been the correction of John Stuart Mill's mistakes". But after all he said a model.

Not a perfect model perhaps. The Stoics have never bought it. To them basing everything on the utility of use,

would've been a rather low-brow measuring stick.

Rightness to them ofcourse would have been in conformance with God's reason, as reflected in nature and although the Christians are able to come down on both sides of this issue, I think that they would all object to the idea which is basic to utilitarianism and that man has been made to be happy, and it is our job to support that design, but St. Paul and Christ would say, "Man is not necessarily made to be happy. He becomes happy only by the grace of God."

Thank you.



Industrial man (N some books) will not be pronounced  
By tyranny of Reason - or the "Piano Keys"

## LECTURE 7

### Emerson and Dostoevsky

Let us continue the circular patten of this lecture series. From the Commissar Robashov's cell in Darkness At Noon to the "World of Epictetus" the Stoic Ideal. We have only two more stops after this lecture before the summary.

Where have we been? From the prephilosophic Job, to the methodical rational Greeks. To the rational Kant, who took us from "out there" to "in here". To the rational Mill, who had total faith in reason. To the John Stuart Mill who hoped that reason would bring enlightenment. To the Mill who urged the co-development of man's enlightened self-interest and his natural sympathy or compassion for his fellows. He built a model of an ideal society under the maxim "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness and wrong as they tend to promote suffering and pain".

Thus whether the metaphysical Greeks or the empirical Mill, a common thread exists. All heretofore had assumed that man would act rightly, if he knew what was right. That education was the salvation of mankind. Certainly John Stuart Mill did. He structured a rational plan (Nineteenth Century English liberalism) to ameliorate the maladjustment brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Harking back to my first lecture, these were adjustments of the guild, home and church

giving way under the press of industrialization to the regimentation and impersonalization of the factory, of the barracks, of the government operated school.

Now this idea of rational ordering of the system to cope found disciples all over the world, especially in Russia. Where in 1862 a radical, Chernyshevsky, a reader of John Stuart Mill, took the latter's building block of enlightened self-interest (omitting its counterpart of compassion for fellows) and wrote a revolutionary novel, entitled What Is To Be Done. He wrote this in the Peter and Paul fortress prison in St. Petersburg, where he had landed for his revolutionary activities. His leading character Racmatoff, scion of a land owning family of aristocratic lineage, went off to St. Petersburg at sixteen and rationally decides to support the revolutionary cause. He does so in a spartan manner. No booze, no sex. He builds character by sleeping on a bed of nails. A revolutionary hero. One, moreover, of the select few, who give "the people fervor". In the author's words, "as a few choice herbs give flavor to tea." An avid reader of this novel of Chernyshevsky, fifteen years later as a teenager was Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The spartan purity and charismatic personality of Racmatoff impressed V.I. Lenin. In fact in 1902, forty years after the original was printed, Lenin wrote his own book same title What Is To Be Done. Said Lenin of the original "The book made me over completely."

The greatest merit of Chernyshevsky lies in his showing that any right minded and truly decent person (does that sound like Mill or Plato) must be a revolutionary.

What about plans, reason plans for the structure of society and the behavior of man. Is it the nature of man to allow himself to be marshalled and programmed even by reason, even for his own good? Mills says, "Yes" Chernyshevsky, "Yes", Lenin, "Yes and no." All three of these men had plans. All plans were different, but they were nevertheless plans.

This week we'll talk of some guys of roughly the same generation who say not only "No", to that question but "Hell no". That is that the nature of man is not to allow himself to be marshalled and programmed even by reason. If in my hypothetical question manipulated and programmed seems a little too harsh, substitute the word manipulate. It still won't work. Men do not like to be marshalled, and they can sense it when it is going on.

This week we study a mood, an intellectual theme, a certain skepticism too diversified to be called a philosophy but consistent enough to be recognized as a force. A force which had a great affect on the 20th Century. And if not the authors of this force, this mood, its prophets all lived in the mid-19th Century. But rather than being political philosophers these prophets were novelists, poets, lecturers and that tells

us something right there. Some strains of this mood or theme became known as existentialism but all forms of it can be categorized as extreme individualism, self-reliance.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, the American exponent of extreme individualism, was a man who combines Kant's autonomy of moral law and Yankee independence. Born in Boston in 1803, a seventh generation puritan clergyman. His father died when he was eight, leaving his poor mother and several kids. And she had to pasture her cow, we are told, on the Boston Common. Ralph Waldo went to Boston Latin school and to Harvard, where contrary to common belief, he was not a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Ordained a Unitarian minister when twenty-three. Three years later he married a 19 year old girl who ~~died~~ died of tuberculosis a year later. Following this he went abroad, met the English poets Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle. I don't know whether he met Carlyle's friend Mrs. Bentham or not. He came home, soon quit the ministry over a theological hangup about the eucharist, remarried and became a lecturer. A popular lecturer, but nevertheless we are told, very dependent on his notes. And these notes consisted of sheets of varying colors and ages of paper all patched together in various ways with overlays of paste. He is said to have stopped his lecture in midsentence more than once, having lost his place and abruptly left the stage. His famous Harvard oration the first of two "Phi Beta Kappa speeches" was entitled "The American Scholar" and that scholarly organization named its magazine

The American Scholar, a name which it still bears. A second Phi Beta lecture at Harvard a year later was very controversial, in that he played down the validity of religious creeds. This was too much even for the Utilitarians, and he was not invited back to the campus for nearly thirty years. When he was, however, in 1866, he was given an honorary degree. The Philosophy Department at Harvard still meets in Emerson Hall. And so this individualistic speechmaker, reeve of Concord, (a reeve incidentally is a man the city charges with running in the stray pigs), the West Point examiner and the abolitionist, made a name for himself in our country's history. ✓

What did Emerson say? "Trust thyself, accept the place Providence has found for you". "Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind." "What I do is all that concerns me, not what people think." (This is all part of a movement known as transcendentalism, which can be roughly described as placing reliance on intuition and conscience. It gets its name from the idea that the nature of man transcends human experience.) Said Emerson, "Conformity makes one's faults in all particulars. Every 'community of opinion' is in error. "There to not the real to, therèfor not the real for." "A foolish consistency is a hobgoblin of little minds". ✓  
With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. Emerson preached individualism, personal pride in all things, even in religion, even before God. "As soon as man is at one with God he will not beg". (Reminds me of Henley's Invictous, which was passed to me in prison. "I am the master 1.

of my fate. I am the captain of my soul"). Emerson: "Prayer is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view". "Prayer as a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft". The nature of man transcends human experience. His primary wisdom is intuition. "The essence of genius is spontaneity and instinct". Trust your instinct, not the plans of others.

My old hypothetical question. "Is it the nature of man to allow himself to be marshalled and programmed, even by reason even for his own good?" Emerson says not only "No" but "Hell no."

From the European side, the "Hell no" guy from the 19th Century is the Russian Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky. Incidentally these 19 Century men of reason, Mill and Chernyshevsky and those 19 Century men of dissent, Emerson and Dostoevsky were all of the same generation, all born within twenty-five years of one another, and all died within fifteen years of one another. All four were alive and writing when V.I. Lenin was born, and he borrowed from all four, as we'll see in the next lesson.

Fyodor Dostoevsky, novelist, precursor of existentialism, and Christian philosopher of the very orthodox Eastern variety, was in my words a man who thought not necessarily that the road to hell was paved with good intentions, but necessarily that the road to heaven was paved with bad intentions. Bad intentions, which take man against his better judgement,

first to degradation and then hopefully to revelation or illumination when he sees the bottom of the barrel and then perhaps to atonement, salvation or redemption. Men, thinks Dostoevsky, are victims of powerful urgings to sin deliberately against their own interests merely in order to free themselves from "the tyranny of reason" of having to obediently accept the idea that "two and two are four".

See book

This all sounds familiar to us here is 1978, but it was a striking revelation in the literature of Dostoevsky a hundred years ago. Dostoevsky, the precursor of modern psychology was in a real sense a philosopher. A novelist who, as we will read in the next lesson, had a Roman Catholic Cardinal say, in the Grand Inquisitor story of his Brothers Karamazov, "It is to mankind's advantage to live in one unanimous, harmonious antheap of universal unity".

Substitute the word society for antheap, that is to say in one harmonious society of universal unity, and you could credit the line to Mill, Chernyshevsky or even Lenin. But Dostoevsky's sarcastic substitution, namely "antheap" -- I think you will agree when you read it all in context -- spells out Dostoevsky's utter contempt for all social manipulation, whether it be that of Mill or of Lenin. A very skillful writer.

Fyodor Dostoevsky was born in Moscow in 1821, of an aristocratic father and bourgeois mother, who died when he was sixteen. He was brought up by the father, medical doctor, described as "miserly, greedy and corrupt". Young

Dostoevsky was educated as an engineer and got into the Tsar's army as an officer. And then got into trouble, in deep trouble. Stupidly, you might say, but almost as if he were driven against what surely was his better judgement. He had taken up with a 25 year old functionary in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Petrashevsky was his name. An atheist, a sort of a two bit tinhorn radical who had gathered together a group of about twenty-five officers to join him, not so much as revolutionaries, but as spreaders of hate and discontent in such matters as demanding freedom of the press, etc. Now these committed kids, not sensing the tenor of the times, took no precautions after the 1848 uprising in France, when of course, the Tsar's alert squad closed in on such groups as that of Petrashevsky. All were arrested. A prior infiltrator named Diane Tinely testified against Dostoevsky for reading a letter which pooh poohed religion and political orthodoxy. (This dreamy careless kid was more lucky than some. One of his friends was arrested for nodding ascent, after having heard him read the letter. And he was particularly lucky in not being caught by the parts of a printing press, which he had been detailed to acquire.) During the trial, all were kept in Peter and Paul prison in St. Petersburg in the years 1849-50. The same prison where Chernyshevsky had written the first What Is To Be Done, twelve years before. He was kept for almost a year in solitary during the trial. Twenty-three of the band Risso kept and the military court sentenced twenty-one of them to death. Unknown to them the Tsar reduced the sentences. But as a method of teaching them a lesson

KNO - Chernyshevsky wrote it  
in prison 12 yrs  
1837-1849



they acted out the mass executions, even to lining them up before the firing squads. (Dostoevsky filed this story as all of his life experiences in his head, and he later had one of his characters talk about the fact that there was no greater torture in the world than dying before a firing squad, because there seemed to be plenty of time to think about it beforehand and no hope of escape. The Tsar's final sentences had the head of the gang, Petrashevsky, get life imprisonment in the salt mines and Dostoevsky got four years in a Siberian prison to be followed by eight years as a private in exile in the Siberian regiment. He served the entire sentence. It was Christmas eve, 1850 when they welded the fetters shut over his ankles and these chains were on him, not to be broken for four years. He later described his experiences at the prison at Omsk in a book called The House Of The Dead. In it he describes the horrors of solitary, which some of us are familiar with, and also the horrors of never being alone, which some of us are also familiar with. He talks about the bath, when the cellblock was taken to the bath.

"When we open the door into the bathroom itself, I thought we were entering hell. Imagine a room 12 paces long and the same in breadth, in which perhaps as many as a hundred, and certainly as many as eighty, were packed at once. For the whole party were divided into only two relays, and we were close to 200; steam blinding one's eyes; filth and

grime; such a crowd that there was no room to put one's foot down. I was frightened and tried to step back, but Petrov at once encouraged me. With extreme difficulty we somehow forced our way to the benches around the wall, stepping over the heads of those who were sitting on the floor. Asking them to duck to let us by. But every place on the benches was taken. Petrov informed me that one had to buy a place and at once entered into negotiations with a convict sitting near the window. For a kopek the latter gave up his place, receiving the money at once from Petrov who had the coin ready in his fist, having providently brought it with him into the bathroom. The convict I had ousted at once ducked under the bench just under my place, where it was dark and filthy, and the dirty slime lay two inches thick. But even the space under the benches was all filled; there, too, the place was alive with human beings. There was no spot on the floor as big as the palm of your hand where there was not a convict squatting splashing from his bucket. Others stood up among them and holding their buckets in their hands washed themselves standing; the dirty water trickled off them on to the shaven heads of the convicts sitting below them. On the top shelf and on all the steps leading

up to it, men were crouched, huddled together washing themselves. But they did not wash themselves much. Men of the peasant class don't wash much with soap and water; they only steam themselves terribly and then douche themselves with cold water - that is their whole idea of a bath. Fifty birches were rising and falling rhythmically on the shelves; they all thrashed themselves into a state of stupefaction. More steam was raised every moment. It was not heat; it was hell. All were shouting and vociferating to the accompaniment of a hundred chains clanking on the floor..."

It was here in prison among men "course and raged and embittered" who stank like swine and whose constant company was the worst of all torments, that Dostoevsky's reserved and hyper sensitive nature received the first seeds of that idealization of "the people" which forms so important a part of his later political and religious creed, "The more I hated individuals," says a character in The Brothers Karamazov "The more I loved humanity." His love of humanity and of God were all formed there in prison. Amid the gloomy, hostile face of the other convicts he said, "I could not fail to notice some kind and cheerful faces. There were bad people everywhere, and among the bad were the good ones." It might be too bold a paradox to maintain that but for Siberia, Dostoevsky would never have developed his idealization of the Russia people. "Judge the Russian people," (he wrote more than twenty years

after) "not by the degrading sins which it so often commits, but by the great and holy things to which in the midst of its degradation it constantly aspires." "Judge the people", says Dostoevsky "not by what it is, but by what it would like to become." And it was here in the Siberian prison that he acquired the terrible scourge of epilepsy. But he learned tolerance. He met in Siberia men who had been sentenced for offenses condemned not merely like his by the state, but by the generally accepted sanctions of moral law, for crimes of murder, lust, theft. And these men not only felt no conventional repentance or remorse of their deeds, but displayed in the ordinary commerce of life as many qualities of courage, generosity and loving kindness as their fellows, and enjoyed a large share of general esteem. It was in this House of the Dead that Dostoevsky first learned to perceive the inadequacy not merely of human law, but of the ordinarily accepted code of moral values, and to ponder on a quest for a remoter truth beyond the frontiers of good and evil as ordinarily defined. And on page 55 I read that Dostoevsky was in his thirty-third year when the fetters were struck off his feet in the prison blacksmith's shop and he walked once more in the world of free men; but it was a world transfigured for him forever by the experience through which he had passed.

Perhaps it is understandable then, after this prison experience and then eight years as a private in exile, and several more years with a sickly wife when she was on her death bed and he, poverty stricken, epileptic and so stricken with

piles that he could not sit down, that his mood was not sanguine as he wrote Notes From The Underground.

My hypothetical question again. "Is it the nature of man to agree to be marshalled and programmed, as Mill the liberal would have it, as Lenin the totalitarian would have it, or as the analytic geniuses, the authors of the American Vietnam escalation policies would have it, a hundred years later? Not no, but hell no.

As an aside, don't get the idea that Dostoevsky was some kind of a wild shellshocked crank. He was a very bright man. And after Notes From The Underground he wrote such novels as, The Brothers Karamazov, of course, and Crime And Punishment, The Idiots and The Devils, from which Lenin drew some notes about revolutionary zeal, even though presented in its negative aspect by the author. He was a learned man, a well read man. As early as 1870 he was dropping remarks about the euclidean nonsense. The intellectual euclidean geometry which challenged the idea that in space parallel lines never met. And so reading of Dostoevsky's novels of that era will have references that most M.I.T. graduates fifty years later, assumed that were not known until Einstein publicized them.


Notes From The Underground. I am a sick man I am a spiteful man. I dislike acknowledging that two times two is four. I prefer "one's own free unfettered choice, one's own caprice". "Man is not a piano key." You all have probably read part one of the Notes From The Underground, and I took time out this week to read part two, which I think

is very moving and very interesting. And if any of you have ever worried about having made an ass of yourself, in public and with your friends, read the Underground Man's account of his experience along those lines and you'll feel better ever after. He has that same crazy way about him of contradicting everything he says and so forth, but in hindsight, it comes off not so crazy after all. Part two is written presumably by a forty year old man telling about some of the experiences he had as a twenty-four year old. And at that time, when he was twenty-four years old, he was some kind of a military uniformed office functionary. And this functionary was one who had terrible problems. He dropped his eyes whenever people looked at him directly. Nobody paid any attention to him. He tried every way he knew to get into society, he even was walking down the street one night and saw a scuffle going on in a billiard room where fighting had broken out between the players and they were hitting each other over the head with pool cues, and he went in and tried to antagonize them and to get hit over the head with a pool cue, and they wouldn't even pay any attention to him. He had trouble meeting certain people on a footpath and he couldn't understand why it was always he who got out of their way. And he recognized these people and they seemed to assume that he would get out of their way. And this seemed to worry him and he went and got new clothes and a new outfit and he decided that on a long program that he would not give way, that they would give way, and had a

minor success and said that he had kept his dignity and that was what made it all come together. Of course on the fateful occasion of his reunion with some schoolmates, schoolmates that thought of him as a ant, in his eyes anyway, were very surprised that he came to this little get together, particularly the class hotshot, Zerkhov was in his eyes contemptuous of him. They were getting ready to go out the next night to the Hotel de Paris, to a supper party, to which he invited himself, against his own better judgement. They had changed the time of arrival and he arrived, nervous as a cat at five and had an hour to wait because they had moved it up. He had to borrow money to attend the thing and during the evening he proceeded to get drunk and say things he wished he hadn't and then they more or less ignored him in the conversation and he paces like a caged animal outside the room glaring at them while they continued their evening and made contemptuous glances and off hand remarks about him until they're ready to go on to the next stop, which was a whore house. He again, against his own better judgement, makes arrangements for him to accompany them. To rejoin the party. They go in one cab and he of course has to follow in another and when he gets there, they were not available. He remembers being in this place once before and having one of the inmates, a woman, give him the impression that she was repulsed by him and then he felt maybe that's good enough for her and he wishes that she would show up again so that he could repulse her again.

Instead they produce a rather sullen girl who looks almost like an animal as she glances out of her eyes, and her name is Lisa. And after two hours of silence in bed, he again obsessedly fights a dual between good and evil, and lets evil win and he in a very learned and, she describes it, bookish way makes the case against prostitution. Starting out by telling her how he wishes that she would give it up, that he had been by one of the houses recently and saw a coffin being taken out and nearly dropped. Carried head first with a consumptuous victim undoubtedly in it. They took it to a certain pauper's field where the caskets had to be burried in the water. And he told about another women that he saw in her old age bleeding at the mouth being let out of a house in the cold winter where she'd been beaten up. This naturally worked on the girl, as Stoic and animal-like as she was and she finally started clutching the pillow and digging in and beating it with her fists. In fact even bit her own arm, which he later discovered. So in other words he aroused the rage of herself against herself. She really took him into her confidence and he invited her impulsively to come by his flat and left the address. The next day, full of remorse, he wrote a letter that he thought was clever, making light of the fact that he had borrowed money from his friends and then he said about worrying about her coming and being remorseful about having inviting her. He has a sort of a butler or scout who takes care of him and who is contemptuous of him with whom he frequently fights and he was in one of his arguments with him when suddenly she appeared.



Then against his better judgement he fouls her by telling her that he was really the previous night some weeks before making fun of her and laughing at her. Hoping, presumably to reduce her to tears, but in his description of what he was trying to do she reads though it and sees his remorse and loneliness and tries to help him. Once this turn of events takes place he rejects her again and tries to give her the ultimate insult of paying her for a visit for which of course nothing sexual was accomplished. Then she left and he later found the bill that he had thrust in her hand, wadded up in the corner. Then he rationalizes in this seesaw pattern, that at least he has done her the favor of giving her the resentment of insult which is better than leading her on. This mixed up guy says in the final analysis we have all come to looking upon real, living life as work, as an effort and we privately agree that it is better in books. But he will not use the escape mechanism of bookishness or reasonableness which he considers a copout on real life. For as was said in part one, <sup>^</sup>you see gentlemen, reason is an excellent thing there's no doubting that. But reason is nothing but reason and satisfies only the rational side of man's nature. While will is a manifestation of the whole life. That is the whole human life including reason and all the impulses.  <sup>u</sup>

Well it's really the impulses that this whole lesson is about. The shortcomings of reason, and the necessity for man to express himself and not to be, as our Underground Man said, "considered a piano key, which when struck with the

right touch will play all the resonances." It was this sort of spirit that permeated the cell blocks in which I lived in prison. Where when we were being programmed and boxed and tracked with a perfectly rational plan of cooperation, sometimes not even for propaganda, just to be let alone, the conditions to get used to coping with their version of reason. And although some would say that it was religion or patriotism and so forth, the thrust behind the resistance movement, I think, was the impulses, the resentment, the human contempt that we all have for being programmed. On the national scale I can tell the old story of Tony Sokol, my mentor at Stanford, a militarist if I ever saw one, who was contemptuous of my reading list which included Schelling, and Brody, Kahn, he said were mere economists whose rationality dominated their discipline, and who said that they did not know about war. They did not know the impulses. They did not know what made men tick. That in war people get mad, and reason is a poor guide. And I'd lay in my bunk, and heard in the streets of Hanoi outside the contemptuous jeers as our escalation policy, in which they were to be programmed, failed. As the man says in the book Crisis In Command, you cannot manage people to their deaths. They have to be led. And leadership is more than reason. It's reason and the impulses and the whole human life.

### Postscript:

Joe wound up with a talk about two men who wanted to be philosophy professors, John Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, who were friends: Broke over Camus' novel The Rebel, post World War II, in which he made the point that when a rebel becomes a revolutionary he becomes corrupt and the model was Stalinist Russia. U.S.S.R. being pictured as the greatest lie of the century eating its own children. Camus, who had for six months been a member of the communist party, was opposed on this totally by John Paul Sartre, who although never having been a party member idolized the Soviet Union, particularly after World War II. They made up later in death. When at the age of 46 Camus was destroyed in an automobile accident, John Paul Sartre wrote a eulogy, praising him for savoring every instance of his existence, for grabbing all he could from his future death. John Paul Sartre's girlfriend is Simone de Beauvoir. Sartre's real tome was in 1943 and its title was Being And Nothingness. In it he said that we humans are composed of both being and nothingness, whereas non-human objects and organisms are composed of being alone. That is to say, humans by being composed of nothingness are always projected towards the future. The future being nothing, not there yet. In this way he said we define our human freedom. For whereas a tiger has no way to change his programmed existence, a man can change. He can change professions, he can erase the past. Albert Camus's works include The Fall,

which is his version of the Underground Man. He will be  
65 on November 7th, 1978.

IS IT TO MAN'S ADVANTAGE TO LIVE IN AN AUTHORITY?

## LECTURE 8

### THE ETHICS OF THE COLLECTIVE

To retrace our steps, we've come from the rationalism of the Greeks to Kant to Mill - both of whom stressed freedom as an advantageous attribute; Kant saying God freedom and immortality must be assumed and Mill, talented man that he was, obviously preferred freedom over equality and got in trouble by trying to correct it later. Each thought of the nobility of a man. It is to the categorical imperative to legislate the morals for all or to have the good sense under utilitarianism to make decisions that would create the greatest happiness for the greatest number. But all of the above systems were systems and the presumption behind these systems was that men could be taught what was right and once they knew what was right they would do it. I asked the hypothetical question, "Is it the nature of man to allow himself to be programmed (manipulated) even by reason, even for his own good?" Mill, of course, said yes; Emerson and Dostoyevsky we learned in the last lesson said no. Perhaps because of the destabilizing effect of industrialization men were no longer willing to be programmed. Emerson said no, "Nothing is sacred but the integrity of my own mind." Dostoyevsky said hell no and inferred that the road to heaven was paved with bad intentions in which men propelled themselves headlong knowingly into degradation till they saw the bottom

of the barrel then hopefully would have revelation, follow that with atonement and hopefully redemption. Men, in this 19th Century, would not succumb to the tyranny of reason. They would not, as Dostoyevsky's Underground Man said, "Be a piano key who vibrated harmoniously in accordance with reason when struck." So we had, in this instance, systems dependent upon man's willingness to do what was right and men who gave no such assurance. To design a system that will work, you've got to have "push-pull rods" that do the job. As the economists say, you can't push a string, you must pull it. And thus, idealists who are determined to make ideal systems work, more or less logically fell into this dilemma of forcing men to be free.

The pitfalls of such a maneuver as forcing men to be free were predicted by Dostoyevsky in his novel The Brothers Karamazov written about 100 years ago when the old prisoner was 58 years old. It's the story of sons killing their detested father (perhaps modeled after Dostoyevsky's own father). The story of human freedom in the Grand Inquisitor part of this novel was told by one of the Karamazov brothers to another. Told by Ivan, the second son, who might be typified as a cynic, to Alyosha, the baby of the family, a novice in a monastery and the sentimental favorite of the story. This story which Ivan told and which both he and Alyosha admit is fictional, had two characters, Jesus

Christ and a 90 year old cardinal we know as the Grand Inquisitor. The cardinal in Spain during the inquisition was finishing a hard day of burning heretics at the stake when he saw off in the distance a man walking through the crowd, performing miracles, healing children, returning sight to old ladies. He soon realized that it was Jesus Christ returned to earth and came to the conclusion (to make my point quickly) that Christ must be executed to save the Church. Now two misconceptions were not present. First of all, it was Christ, there was no mistaken identity and secondly, the cardinal was not an empire builder, he was too old to profit from such a thing. So he had Christ thrown into jail, condemned to death. Most of the story takes place during his subsequent interrogation of his prisoner Jesus. The Grand Inquisitor says, "Thou didst reject the one infallible banner which was offered to thee to make all men bow down to thee." Of course he meant that Christ had refused Satan's three temptations described in the Books of Mathew and Luke. "In those three questions the whole subsequent history of mankind is, as it were, brought together in one whole, and in them are all the unsung contradictions of human nature." That is to say, Christ damned men to freedom, he damned men to find their own ways through the maze of good and evil on this earth. Specifically, first the devil dared him to make stones into bread. Christ

replied, "Man does not live by bread alone." By this he refused in the Grand Inquisitor's eyes, social services and this led to the error of allowing men who wanted freedom to overcome those of lesser capabilities who might have preferred <sup>Equality.</sup> ~~quality~~. Christ thus spawned elites which led to religious wars, etc. Secondly, Christ refused to demonstrate his immortality by plunging off the cliff. "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God," he said. The Grand Inquisitor inferred from that that he had refused mankind the miracle of mystery, the authoritarianism, the paternalism humans craved. Sometimes when they can't get it, they invent it (Hitler). Thirdly, when taken by Satan to the high mountain and shown all the kingdoms of the world and told, "All these things I will give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me," Christ refused and thus missed the opportunity to establish a community of nations. Satan said, "It is to mankind's advantage to live all in one unanimous, harmonious antheap of universal unity." The old Christian philosopher, Dostoyevsky, gives himself away in that word "antheap". "Nothing," says the Grand Inquisitor, "has brought mankind more suffering than freedom of conscience. Didst thou forget that man prefers peace, even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil." The Grand Inquisitor tells Christ that he mocked men, that he left them to drench the earth with blood. To finish the story, Christ was silent and the Grand



Inquisitor pressed him, "Why dost thou look silently and searchingly at me with thy mild eyes." The Grand Inquisitor wanted Christ to be angry, "I don't want thy love, for I love thee not." You see, the Grand Inquisitor knew who he was. "And of what use is it to hide anything from thee? Do I not know to whom I am speaking?" The cardinal longed for Christ's bitterness. *discussed with the story Alyosha demanded* "What happened?" asked Alyosha.

*to know what happened next.*

Ivan told him that Christ kissed the bloodless lips of the Grand Inquisitor. "Go and come no more," shouted the Grand Inquisitor and turned Christ out into the darkened street. "And the old man?" asked Alyosha (meaning of course the Grand Inquisitor). Ivan replies, "The kiss glows in his heart but the old man adheres to his idea." His idea, I think, was to force men to be free, to give them: one, social services, two, the safety of authoritarianism, and three, the right to live in an anthep.

Marx, trained as a philosopher, in his "Manifesto" says that the specter of communism is hung in Europe, let's expose it. Marx, it is said, combined the three main intellectual forces of Europe into one ball of philosophy, the dialectic of Hagel, the recently formulated economic theory of the Englishmen Adam Smith and Ricardo, and the revolutionary theory of the French Revolution. He said that the history of class struggle dominated all world events. That the bourgeoisie who had emerged in their recent revolutions had

destroyed pride in people's work, had destroyed the ecstasies of religious fervor, had converted poets into wage earners. Moreover, as he described the progression of society through feudalism and capitalism and prior, he showed an accentuating whip with the evils of the bourgeoisie exceeding those of the feudalists. He predicted an epidemic of overproduction, the bourgeois forged weapons that brought death unto itself. Thus, we have the idea of the self-destruction and the inevitability of the process. He said something that would not even please the women's libbers. He said that under the bourgeoisie the differences of sex were no longer distinctive. He concluded that to the proletarian, who was the victim and in the majority, that law, morality and religion must be considered so many bourgeoisie prejudices. All previous revolutions, you see, (previous historical movements as he called them) were driven by minorities. That the proletarian movement was the first revolution conducted by a majority and thus the last. Christianity, he said, had been defeated by rationalism in the French Revolution. Marx's remarks were quite militant in places and although he did not use the term "dictatorship of the proletariat", he was famous for *X Marx* coining that expression, and it was so noted in a footnote. He winds up with a call to arms, "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains, and they have a world to win."

Marx's writing tracks pretty well. It's the best description I know of the difficulties of a society accommodating the process of industrialization. (Somewhat like the difficulties now being experienced in Iran.) But he extrapolates excessively and he takes the trends and tries to run them up the flagpole. General Weyand, ex-Chief of Staff of the Army, in 1976 at Carlisle Barracks talked about the dangers of excessive extrapolation and said that on that bicentennial year we should remember that if a man bent on computerization and extrapolation had addressed the transportation problem of the United States in the centennial year of 1976, he would have had to conclude that they would be in difficulty at the bicentennial year. Transportation would have almost ground to a stop because the horse manure would have been piled so high that the wagons could not get through. Marx was an economic determinist. Thus, he founded economic history. Certainly something that is here to stay. With regard to the inevitability of his prediction, I quote one of his adherents, Bertrand Russell, some 50 years ago. Russell says, in his book The Dictionary of the Mind that, "Considered purely as a philosopher, Marx has grave shortcomings. He is too practical, too much wrapped up in the problems of his time. His purview is confined to this planet and within this planet to man. Since Copernicus

it has been evident that man has not the cosmic importance which he formerly arrogated to himself. No man who has failed to assimilate this fact has a right to call his philosophy scientific." Of course Marx referred to his philosophy as scientific socialism. Das Kapital, his economic text is a complete washout to all modern, even left wing, economists I'm told. He was a utopian dreamer, but so was Mill, and why was he so much more prominent in history. First of all, Mill was a liberal and the liberal dogma, if you can hang a dogma on a liberal, is doubt. They always leave open the possibility that they're wrong or that somebody else is wrong. Remember how Mill thought in his "Freedom of the Press" section, that there's no way to make sure at the time an article is published whether it is right or wrong. Thus, they try to rule in the name of doubt and they don't accumulate a very long lasting or powerful following. But mainly, Marx exceeded Mill because he had a Lenin.

Wrote in  
Mandel's  
Autism?

Lenin, as you know, was a Russian revolutionary whose brother was killed, who migrated to Europe and came back into Russia at the time the Mensheviks were starting a revolution. He came back from Germany at a time when the Kaiser was about to collapse from a two-front war, the Mensheviks were staying in the war and he knew that Lenin would try to get them out. In a new book called The Life and Death of Trotsky by Robert

Tayne, McGraww-Hill, \$14.95, it is said that, "Just as the Japanese Imperial General Staff had bankrolled the revolutionists of 1905, so the Imperial General Staff of Germany supplied in 1916-17, not only the famous "sealed train" which permitted the Bolshevik leadership to enter Russia, but the millions of dollars that enabled the tiny party to take power and then eliminate its less ruthless allies." Perhaps this explains the Bolsheviks prediliction to deal in intrigue and subversion. Of course, the man that Lenin overthrew was Kerenski (I tell of Kerenski and the Hoover Library). Lenin knew how to run a revolution. He would not fall for the trade unionism which he called opportunism, he would cut that sort of thing off at the pass. Pragmatic and spontaneous? Hardly. No, father knows best. He had a deductive system and says, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." He starts his zigzag paths all for the ends, means means nothing. Dreaming is necessary for progress, but don't mix dreams with reality in your mind. He, of course, in his "What Is To Be Done?" established the fact that he needed an alert corps to keep revolution from getting too far ahead and of course he had a great sense of timing.

I read from double red line items in Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder including Lenin's 1921 quote on lying at page 134.

Why do people like it? (I talk about <sup>Podrei</sup>~~dead year.~~)  
I talk about "Soft-Soap Fairy" and "We do have order" in  
Vietnam. (I talk about Rabbit and the four traits.) (I  
talk about the relief of command at Las Vegas <sup>HANOI</sup> when the party  
members assembled to the new boss.) (I talk about how the  
gooks were brought off the Hanoi streets and put into prison.)  
(I talk about how the guards sang at night.)

It is no joke in primitive countries and I remember the  
picture of Lenin looking down at me in a Las Vegas courtyard.  
For, "It is to mankind's advantage to live in one unanimous,  
harmonious antiheap of universal unity," as the Grand Inquisitor  
said.

At Oxford in September I joined the ideology subpanel.  
Ideology is not dead, but it is an albatross about the Soviet  
Union's neck. It was said by various speakers that they  
no longer talk of the state withering away, but that the  
thing that was most ominous was the rise of shallow, chauvinistic,  
frustrated technocrats without the restraint that comes  
from experience with power or the idealism of the Bolsheviks  
(perverted, no doubt, but real) of a utopia as a goal. These  
skeptics are dangerous and too sophisticated for Marxian  
ideas like, "Does wage labor create property? No it creates  
capital. That is to say, that kind of property which exploits

wage labor... Capital is not a personal but a social power... In bourgeois society, the past dominates the present; in communist society the present dominates the past." That starts to sound kind of squirrely after awhile. But Leninism, and that is the term given by the authorities at Oxford, is still alive. They offer a materialist world without God, but with meaning by their dialective development of nature and the rational laws that follow therefrom, proceeding by contradiction toward a utopia.

Next lesson we will pass to a new type of materialism. A materialism also without God, but in addition, without meaning. Materialism that considers Marx's idea of economic forces behaving with will and acting like humans as sheer animism (like primitive spirits). They offer, these molecular biologists, modern materialists, scientific materialism versus the Marxian pseudoscientific, at least as Bertrand Russell would say. Is this modern scientific method the last word? There will be plenty to think about. Does man live by bread alone?

In the final chapter we talk about materialism with God - stoicism.

P.S. This is Joe's addendum as I understand it. He warns us that there are two kinds of idealism and two kinds of materialism. There is what you might call popular idealism and that is the idea of hitting for an idealistic end. Like

a utopianism or having a very difficult problem set out for one's self that is going to take ideal conditions to meet. The philosophic idealism, the more meaningful term, is one in which reality is mind, thought, reason or consciousness. A kind of metaphysical idea of reality, known as idealism. Materialism also has a popular and a philosophic sense. The popular materialist is a guy who loves cars and refrigerators, the typical American. But the philosophical materialist says that being is physical, or energy, or stuff (not mental).

Dialectical materialism is <sup>Hegelian</sup> thought combined with philosophical materialism. The greatest slander you can commit in the Soviet Union is to label something as idealism.

Marx's thesis for his PhD dealt with democraticist theory of atoms which joined "by chance and necessity" to form molecules. On <sup>H</sup>Hegel, he tried to finish Kant's work. Kant's two doctrines of epistemology and morality were thought to be left undone and a German had to tie them together. Hegel tried to do so. He borrowed from Aristotle. Aristotle's god, a self-thinking self, a self-thinking spirit, and generated a cosmic process in which spirit tries to realize itself by becoming more aware of itself, ever expanding, throwing off history. Hegel writes of the confrontation between Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Lenin was not really a philosopher but he loved the subject and read a lot of it particularly in



the 1908-1912 era, often in Paris where he was in exile, or at Capri with his friend Gorkey. Lenin opposed Ernst Mauthner's idea, the old German having said that scientific concepts are useful fiction, not photographs of what is really out there. This idea of useful fiction is always abhorrent to the Marxist and we see it in in the Copenhagen school in the book Philosophy and Physics.

Stalin was responsible for founding the first Soviet philosophy journal and it became a government organ. He got into a controversy started by a Soviet philosopher, Marr, on the subject of linguistics. This crazy idea of Marr's, held that man first communicated by signs and that it evolved to language, but that the end would be when dialectical language could be generated and no longer would man have to talk but that thoughts would be transmitted through ways without words. This was too much for Stalin. He said nuts. A universal dialectic language is idealism and that of course killed it.

In "What Is To Be Done?" says Lenin, "The masses must be controlled," no spontaneity allowed. The thing that Joe finds so interesting is the original "What Is To Be Done?" by Cherevchensky and he thinks it particularly interesting that both Dostoyevsky and Lenin, two of the giants of the age, could get excited over such a romantic piece of literature. Dostoyevsky hated it; Lenin loved it. Cherevchensky says,

and maybe this is what Lenin loved, "If you don't want to get your hands dirty, don't get into politics."

Lenin's life was one of suppression. All to be a politician. He loved music, but he couldn't stand it because it made him want to stroke people's head, but that would be a disaster because he couldn't afford to be nice to them, he had to conk them.

## LECTURE 9

### SCIENCE AND VALUES DOES THE UNIVERSE HAVE MEANING OR PURPOSE?

13 DECEMBER 1978

We last talked about dialectical materialism, today we will talk about scientific materialism and next week stoicism, which is a form of materialism - the amalgamation of nature and God. The history of materialism goes back to the pre-Socratic Greeks. Most people are somewhere between the belief of total materialism or total idealism. To the total materialist of the sort we're reading about today the only reality in the world is stuff - stuff and motion. To the idealist, the other pole of the sort Plato was, the only reality in the world is mind - mind and motion. The pre-Socratic Greeks were strictly materialists. They worked with stuff. They were not concerned with distinctions of mind versus matter or body versus soul, that came with Socrates and was enunciated by Plato. This idealism introduced by Socrates dominated intellectual thought for a thousand years until Descartes emerged in the 1600's. Descartes the skeptic; skeptical about everything. First of all, he had to prove to himself that he existed and he did so by basing it on the fact that he thought. I think, therefore I exist, cogito ergo sum. The next step in his skeptical approach to things was to prove that God exists and he did that

with what is simple but hard to refute, goes down in history as the ontological proof. He says that I have an idea of perfection and that God is perfection and I couldn't have the idea unless he existed, and therefore he exists. The third proof is the existence of the universe and it goes like this: That I exist, God exists and he would not fool me, therefore I am not dreaming, the universe exists. The God, world, I system that he talked about bifurcated mind and body. The bifurcation of mind and body was really started by Plato in Phaedo where he talked about the immortality of the soul. The soul was eternal, the body was temporal. Now this bifurcation causes a lot of philosophical consternation as we will see with Descartes, but Aristotle kind of killed that by having the soul the living part of the body, but he later said there was a part of the soul that might leave after death. He effectively killed this bifurcation however, and it was Descartes who rejuvenated it. He said, in so many words, the body is a machine. We can describe the world without reference to God or ourselves, the objective world, the world that became the world of Newton. And in that world he thrived until we saw that you could not really leave the self out of it, Kant predicted that, and those that tried to work quantum mechanics in the 20th Century found it to be true. Descartes saw the possibility of making mechanical dolls that would talk and move like men. He called them automata. He said that they could

be taught to talk with language inflexibility, provided that it was understood that they depended on their output only on what man put into them. This fall I was at the Naval Research Lab on Point Loma being told in a Top Secret briefing about the progress in artificial intelligence and was warned that although you could talk to these things their language was inflexible and I must remember that their output was dependent on the input. Remarks of Descartes a little over 300 years ago on the same subject, with the same conclusions, were unclassified. The 18th Century Frenchmen loved this materialism and they even envisioned poetry as being a product not of the mind but of a machine, the body, and the verse was just the escaping steam of the spouting teakettle. Well, given materialism, and given also the 19th Century evolutionary <sup>hypothesis</sup> ~~theory~~ of Darwin, we launch today's discussion of the epistemology of the modern molecular biologist, Monod. Darwin's evolutionary <sup>hypothesis</sup> ~~theory~~ is rather harsh. Mind and body were descended from animals he said, and the real question that comes down on today's lesson is, "Does this evolution, plus history, plus chemistry, plus physics, explain life?" Some say yes in its entirety, and Monod is among them, and some say no. Living at the same time as Darwin was Marx. Darwin did not state whether he was a materialist or not because he wasn't a philosopher, he was a biologist. Marx considered himself a materialist in his own eyes, but in Monod's eyes he was a rank idealist, the metaphysician, given to such

things as animation of productive forces and so forth, which put him in the screwball camp as Monod sees it. Engels rejected spontaneous generation which was popular all the way up to the time of Pasteur. That is to say that the right temperature and combination of mud could hatch without prior organic life, maggots. Aristotle believed that; Shakespeare believed that. Engels rejected vitalism. So in those senses, Marx was like Darwin, but they don't like to be compared and they shouldn't be, they're too different.

Dialectical materialism that we studied last time is materialism without God, but with meaning. The meaning being that Marx thought the universe behaves in a law-like way and that if we study history we could learn the laws and we could change the world. Scientific materialism, that of Monod, is materialism without God and without meaning. The only ethical commitment man should have is to the objective method. The world works by chance and necessity. Next week we will talk about another materialism, stoicism, which is a meld of stuff with God. God to the stoics is a part of nature; nature is God's body. But today Monod is covered well in the outline. I'll only note that he rather well defines living matter as being purposive, that is having telionomic tendencies, that is its organs are functional, secondly that its structures develop from within instead of from without as a table might

be made, and third, reproductive invariance by species. Species is defined as those living things who can reproduce fertile offspring. Humans are obviously a species. A breakdown of species would say be between horses and jackasses. The jackass breeds a mare, they produce a mule, but that is a sterile animal and thus jackasses and horses are of different species. Monod's universe is blind, has no law-like character. Change is rendered by genetic mutations and these come about by chance. Alterations once in the DNA structure however, are in the realm of necessity. The origin of life is by chance, dependent upon among other things, the generation of carbon. The origin of human beings would also, in Monod's view, be by chance. He gives some talk of human spirit but believes that goodness and meaning in the "nature of things" is sheer childishness.

We've got to understand evolution. It's well explained in a book called Komongo by Homer Smith and it's a story of a long conversation on a tramp steamer coming back from Africa through the Red Sea between a physiologist and an Anglican priest. They have long discussions about the particular kind of evolution which the priest sees as evidence of God's purpose and the physiologist sees as a natural miracle. And really that's the bottom line of this whole lesson, that we're talking about the same things and what one man sees as a natural miracle another as a God-like miracle. To understand evolution you have to understand that it holds that to survive you have to adapt and

change through the pressures of environment the chance casualties to the rope ladder of nucleotides in the DNA molecule. Nucleotides are the building blocks of this DNA molecule and there are only four types. It's like an alphabet with four letters. But there are five billion pairs of these nucleotides in each one of our DNA molecules that give us our genetic roadmap and if we tried to lay out each one of our individual genetic codes on typed sheets, single-spaced, normal sized, we would each be equipped with a set of instructions of 4,000 volumes of books 500 pages each. The Viking lander by contrast, had a genetic program comparable to that of a single bacteria. Now this ladder of these nucleotides has a self-repairing aspect as casualties occur but is not totally efficient, and that is good. You have to mutate to survive. Example: The melanin mutation of certain moths in England. These moths, which were white and got their protection by hanging on to white birch trees, suffered a DNA accident that caused some of them to come out gray. The gray moths on white trees were eaten by birds and they would have become extinct and that mutation would have failed to take were it not for the fact that the industrial revolution was coloring brick walls gray with smoke. And those moths with that mutation survived as a result of it. Is that God's plan? Is that an accident or a natural miracle? You tell me. Another example of evolution came about by the genetic accident, if you want to call it that, is that of man's brain becoming big. Nobody



willed it to be big and the mothers who gave birth to these big-headed babies didn't will that they would be big or have anything to do with it, except to be a part of a gigantic process which saw over time big-headed babies survive and simultaneously women with big pelvic girdles survive, because the women without the big pelvices lost their children in childbirth. Big, broad mothers gave birth to survivable offspring and everything else fell by the wayside. A genetic accident, a miracle or God's will? Who knows. Some remnants of this uniqueness, and man is unique mainly for his brain, human beings are the only animals whose birth is painful and they are the only animals who have an incompletely sealed cranium on birth. Komongo is a lung fish. That's the native word for this fish that this physiologist was seeking in Africa. He told the story with reluctance to the Anglican priest because he felt that he was describing not a success story of evolution but a failure. These lung fish were the heroes of the planet 400 million years ago because they, by being trapped in pools when the tide went out, had suffered the accident, a few of them, of developing lungs to replace their gills and they could survive when other fish died. They became kind of a cross between an alligator and a fish and they're still alive. They live very interesting lives now. They dig into the mud; they can go without food for five years and they stay there for protection on the sheer chance that the waters will rise to flush them out in time for them to eat some more. But they are,

according to the physiologist, in an evolutionary deadend. They haven't changed since they performed this great service of getting us all on legs. They did not go legs. Sometimes, he says, evolution is regressive. The whale had legs and lost them and is now going the wrong way. Birds' wings are a blind alley to him, hands would be much more useful. And the physiologist says to the Anglican priest, "The progress you see in this great evolutionary process is just an illusion." Hippopotami, gorillas are too big, they're getting too specialized. They're going to disappear. Specialization means extinction. The physiologist says, "Life is an accident. Humans are an accident." The padre says it's a divine thing, that we alone have speech, we alone know through our great minds that we will die, that we can abstract, and that our minds our great. The physiologist says the evolution of the brain is great, but it's a matter of degree not of a new kind. They both agree that man's evolution, at least that of his brain, has stopped over the past 20 thousand years. The size of his body has increased due to nutrition but his intellectual evolution has not. We must differentiate between the accumulation of knowledge and the capacity to use it. Joe Alsop tried to tell me that since Julius Caesar we had developed better minds. That's bunk. Does the universe have a purpose? Does evolution have a purpose? Does life have a purpose? Or is it just as the physiologist says, "An eddy in the second law of thermodynamics."

The history and newness of human life is portrayed by Carl Sagan in his book called The Dragons of Eden. He writes of a cosmic calendar. He compresses all time since the Big Bang evolution of the universe into a hypothetical calendar year, the Big Bang occurring on January 1st and we're looking back toward that previous year on New Year's Eve. The first worms didn't appear until December 16th and the first fish the 19th. The first dinosaurs appeared Christmas Eve, mammals on the 26th and the birds on the 27th. Humans didn't appear until an hour and a half ago, 10:30. All recorded history is in the last 10 seconds and America was just discovered one second ago. And that brain that we have was developed rapidly. With it has come memory, visual recall and it processes data at rates by powers of 10 greater than the Viking lander cameras. This high data rate goes mainly with perceptual and cognitive abilities that bypass verbal and analytic consciousness. We have big brains, the largest ratio of brain mass to body. Aristotle knew this, it took us until a few years ago to prove him right. Functional lobes of great importance and myriads of synapses or electrical connectors. Our brain is not competitive with any other living, thinking organ. But it's new. Rational, verbalized thought is maybe only a 100 thousand years old. Maybe not even that old. Julian Jaynes in his new book Origin of Consciousness relates the development of our verbalization to a cataclysmic geological event in the second

millennium BC, and says that the Old Testament, from book to book, displays our acquisition of verbal and thinking abilities. In the Book of Amos there are no words for mind or think or feel or understand, we are back in the bicameral mind, as he called it, where we do not think, but we just respond to experienced auditory hallucinations (voices of God) coming in the right temporal cortex. Now this right functional lobe is the intuitive side of our brain. The left is what I call the Pentagon side, the rational side. The rational, calculating, writing side. Descartes closed these two sides with analytic geometry. The diagrams are on the right, intuitive side and the numbers are on the left, rational side. It turns out that most scientists do the best work on the right side, not the left. They do it on the right and they have to prove it and they have to use the left to make people understand. Von Stradonitz in 1865 finally visualized (intuited) the shape of the benzene atom in organic chemistry. It had been impossible for him to come by it by analytic means, but he proved it, and it was bought. Einstein's relativity was an intuitive thought and he had to generate three rational analytic proofs, left side oriented, in order to prove it. Homer Smith in Komongo really winds up with a question, "Does this rapid evolution of our brain portend the rapid descent and extinction of humans?"

I think it's important to realize that all the votes aren't in. I quote from the New England Journal of Medicine of June '78 from Professor of Medicine at Cornell, Lewis Thomas, who is also president of the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City and he says, "One way of looking at nature is to put together all the facts learned thus far from the scientific revolution of this century, and to conclude that now is the time to make sense out of this information. If you do this, you are likely to agree with the current view in high fashion, that making sense of nature is really no great problem. In this view, the ultimate answer, if you are so naive as to go looking for ultimate answers, is that it simply makes no sense, no sense at all. The world is meaningless...This could very well turn out to be the right way of looking at nature for all I know, but I'd prefer to wait until we have a lot more data. Personally, if I could manage, I'd rather stick around awhile longer, around 5 centuries, say, and then see how it looks...The trouble is we are so young. In the geologic time, we arrived a few minutes ago, and we've been trying to think together for only a few seconds. We are the most juvenile of all living parts, still fumbling without new brains, still learning language together in the infancy of our species....Our part of the world is unfathomable because we have not learned enough, but it surely is not absurd. We have some kind of importance here, for all our bewilderment. We are a significant part of the System.

What we do with ourselves and the rest of life, makes a difference. But this does not mean that we are really in charge, not in the sense taken for granted by most of us for all the millennia of our existence. We have responsibilities, even though we're not yet just sure what they are, but we do not in any real way, run the place. It runs itself." (It reminds of the Book of Job.)

What has all this to do with the foundations of moral obligations? Well I think it has a relevance because to have any idea of ethics you have to know the philosophic territory. On my trip west I had a long talk with Sidney Hook and he talked about this philosophical base. He said that if the landlady wants to predict how well she's going to receive her payments, she needs to know her boarder's philosophy a lot more thoroughly than she knows what's in his trunk. The nature of the man, of his conception of right and wrong, obligation and honor, are a lot more important than how much money he has. So, if to be either responsible or to be susceptible of arching off in different directions in response to fads and buzzwords, one should have some idea of the nature of the universe as well as the nature of the man. You should also have a respect for intuition. In modern parlance to reply to "How did you arrive at that conclusion?" to remark, "It is just from my intuition." is to be thrown out. But some of the most valuable men I've known in my life were really right side men. Great pilots, great LSO's, great performers in prison, were not those that

verbalized and figured as well as we do, but in many ways I think they're more valuable under pressure.

We live in a materialist world. But is that the whole story? John Dewey said, "There is not quality so indispensable to the successful prosecution of science as imagination. Find me a people whose early medicine is not mixed up with magic and incantations, and I will find you a people devoid of all scientific ability." If man at his best is inventive, we can see the importance of metaphysical inquiry. Professor Brennan tells me that professional philosophers lean toward the idealistic side, it's the amateurs, particularly the biologists, who come down hard on the side of materialism. After all, that's the most obvious, that's the Pentagon way. Whitehead has said that, "All modern philosophy is but a footnote to Plato." That in itself tells us something about the efficacy of idealism. Whitehead also says, and this hits Monod right on the head, "Scientists animated by the purpose of proving that they are purposeless, constitute an interesting subject for study." Epicurus said several hundred years ago, "He who says all things happen by necessity can hardly find fault with those who deny that all happens by necessity; for on his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity."

Monod says that science is value-free. If he means knowledge in itself has ethical value, that's an old idea, Aristotle said that. But if he means that scientific work cannot affect the

human condition, when human condition is an element of moral philosophy, then he's wrong. (Moral philosophy is inquiry into what actions are right and what ends are good.)

Before I let Joe get started on Wittgenstein, I want to mention two things about him. First of all, he had a brother named Paul who was a great pianist who lost an arm in World War I, continued his piano playing with one hand. The family was so rich that he could commission composers to do "one hand" classical compositions for him and I was privileged a few months ago at the Newport Music Festival to hear an American artist do one of the Wittgenstein one hand piano numbers, accompanied by a cello and violin. Secondly, when at Cambridge he told his friend Malcolm that when he came to America the American he wanted to meet more than anybody was Betty Hutton and of course she is out here at the gambling casino in Newport as a hostess and when I met her the other night I wondered if I had been Wittgenstein if he would have been more thrilled than I.

Joe said, "Why in the world," he is asked, "did you run in the technical, linguistic Wittgenstein into this course?" And the answer is that he was one of the three most powerful influences of the 20th Century English philosophy, sharing the limelight with G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Although he had Jewish ancestors he became a Protestant and later a Catholic and all the while declared himself a non-Christian. There was some question about his mental stability. His father was an



Austrian Dale Carnegie who became very wealthy in steel. Some compare Ludwig to Socrates. Both are philosophy teachers, both ex-military with good records (Ludwig in World War I was in the Austrian army and was later a prisoner of war), both faced death nobly. To Wittgenstein ethics was very important, but had to be lived, could not be taught. His Tractatus was to have solved all philosophical problems by linguistics. He tried to do to philosophy what Russell had done with Whitehead in Mathematica Principia (also the name of a book). That is to say, he tried to reduce the subject to logic. Wittgenstein said, "All significant statements can be portrayed in symbolic logic." (All you had to do was to define the variables.) His final sentence in that book was, "Whereof one cannot speak, one must be silent." (He made no statements about God not because he disbelieved in Him, but because he could make no meaningful statements about Him.) Wittgenstein wrote and then went and taught farm kids. (Old aristocratic German habit.) Wittgenstein: "Your son should go to college." Farmer: "No, I need him here on the farm." Wittgenstein: "He'll carry manure better." He played a clarinet under the bedclothes while he was teaching in the farm areas. In 1929 he went back to Cambridge with Moore and Russell. They gave him a PhD on his goofy book, the first one he had written and later he discarded as irrelevant. G. E. Moore was department chairman at Cambridge in philosophy and G. E. Moore wrote Principia Ethica and it begins with the

notion that most philosophic problems are caused by confusion in language. That is, there are two worlds: people and things, and language and confusion between the two causes trouble. G. E. Moore's two highest goods in Principia Ethica are (1) personal affection and (2) aesthetic enjoyment.

Wittgenstein's second book was called The Philosophic Investigations. He put students under oath not to divulge its contents. He said, "The task of philosophy is to rearrange language to escape from its bewitchment." Wittgenstein hated gassers, as they called them, people who blabbed a lot about religion and love and things that were very important. To teach philosophy made him nervous and finally he wound up spending all his time in daytime movie theaters watching American films with Carmen Miranda and Betty Hutton. He taught us two things: (1) commitment; the doctrine of philosophy is important but you have to live it, and (2) the doctrine of silence. Like the old church fathers he practiced that theological virtue of not talking about important things.

## LECTURE 10

### RETURN TO THE BEGINNING, EPICTETUS, THE STOIC IDEAL

20 DECEMBER 1978

To review the front of the course summary that I distributed yesterday afternoon, I asked "Are ethical values already part of the package that is furnished you by the Establishment?" I would answer my own question by saying, "No." Moreover, even the package is bogus. That package that we are equipped with in this military life might be entitled, "Rational decisions on the employment of weapons and the allocation of resources." I'd believe that even that package which we are force fed is deceiving and a loser. I'm back to the Crisis in Command argument against the entrepreneurial ethic and an advocacy of a return of the gladiatorial ethic.

It is for that reason that we have spent 10 weeks plowing through material which I believe will give one a background from which to construct an ethical framework. The weeks went like this:

1. The world of Epictetus, the world of Commissar Rubishov, the world of Mike Walzer. The latter, Professor Walzer of Harvard, advocated the legitimacy of dropping out of military life in certain circumstances that he believed conformed to international law and personal right. I think a

reading of "The world of Epictetus" and the world of Rubishov in the book Darkness at Noon will convince one that you cannot go it alone. You are your brother's keeper, regardless of what Walzer says.

2. The Book of Job, A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch, and Camus' Plague. There is no rosy lining; life is not fair; take your plague like a man.

3. Socrates, and he is contrasted with Thoreau on the subject of the defiance of the Establishment. Thoreau reserved the right to defy the Establishment at every turn. It was always his choice. Defiance was his rule. Socrates, in contrast, reserved defiance only for hallowed matters (in his case, he defied the government rather than give up teaching). Socrates was loyal in many cases where it was to his disadvantage to be so. He thought it was his duty as a citizen. Whereas Thoreau was defiant as a rule, Socrates was defiant only as an exception. The word that followed from this is, look ahead before you oppose your boss. Thoreau looked pretty silly in opposing the Mexican War; I think others will look pretty silly for similar reasons soon in regard to other wars.

4. Aristotle. The man of common sense whose most poignant remark to me was that compulsion and free will can coexist. Pain, inconvenience, pressure, you name it, are never total excuses for selling out.

5. Kant's epistemology and Kant's ethics. To me the most interesting thing was his concept of the order of the universe being framed in the human mind and the wisdom of his understanding of this mind in the sense that God, freedom and immortality must be presumed.

6. John Stuart Mill. Is man designed to be happy? He had a hell of a time trying to prove it. He was and still got mixed up trying to combine in his ethical framework liberal doses of both liberty and equality. I agree with Will and Ariel Durant that liberty and equality are sworn and everlasting enemies and when one prevails the other dies. You can't work both sides of the street.

7. The 19th Century, the Age of Rebellion. Ralph Waldo Emerson, the existentialists, Dostoyevsky. In the latter's book Notes From the Underground we saw that men do not like the carrot and the stick. They can oppose the tyranny of reason, they can oppose being played like piano keys. Men don't like to be programmed. This sort of came in with the Industrial Revolution but it's been around to some degree all along.

8. Marx, Lenin, the ethic of the collective. It was Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, the Cardinal, who said with regard to human freedom that, "Nothing has brought man more suffering than freedom of conscience." He suggests that man does want to live in a "harmonious antheap of universal unity." Do I agree. No. Neither does Christ. I don't think you do either and that's why we are free.

9. Scientific materialism. Can one escape choice and values behind the screen of scientific objectivity? The answer is no. Where one man sees chance, another can see purpose.

So as we come to number 10, in a world where:

- (a) where you are your brother's keeper,
- (b) where there is no rosy lining,
- (c) where defiance to the institution is usually short-sighted,
- (d) where pain is no excuse for complicity,
- (e) where God, freedom and immortality seem to fit,
- (f) where liberty and equality are sworn and everlasting enemies,
- (g) where men don't like to be programmed,
- (h) or live in a harmonious antheap, and
- (i) where moral responsibility can't be escaped, even in a laboratory,
- (j) stoicism is not a bad thing to read.

I would have changed the preface to another St. Paul quote which seems to epitomize the stoicism we read about. In his letter to the Romans St. Paul said, "We rejoice in our suffering, knowing that suffering produces endurance, endurance produces character and character produces hope."

Stoics are hard on themselves. They watch themselves like the enemy. (Page 37: "The conditioning characteristic of the philosopher is that he looks to himself for all help or harm. He employs his energies moderately in all directions. He keeps watch over himself as over an enemy and one in ambush." We read in our outline of the stoics belief in the rightness of nature, they're proud, self-contained. Somewhat like Aristotle's Magnanimous Man, but with humility. Discretion, gentleness, moderation and propriety are often listed as characteristics of the philosophical stoic. Both the Greeks and the Christians are close to the stoics. Socrates' words are the last in the essay of The Enchiridion and your outline brings out their advocacy of the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God later affixed to Christianity. Self-sufficiency is the key word, not "sharing" or "interacting" or "cooperating". These latter words are so more frequently heard now, often used by a frightened group huddled to brace themselves against nukes or to respond to the like of Jim Jones.

As I thumb through The Enchiridion I see applications of phrase after phrase. Page 17 means to me, at the top, concern yourself with your attitude, not what people think of you. Very similar to the book Man's Search for Meaning by Victor Frankl. Frankl says that man's last freedom is always to be able to choose his attitude in any given set of circumstances.

This idea of not caring about what people think of you means also to me, do not masquerade. Do not follow the rhetoric of your supposed profession, as McNamara did, and get yourself out on the end of a limb where you're supposed to fight, unless you've really got the belly for it as you go inbound. Don't try to act like a prison commander when you don't support escapes. In either case, McNamara's or the latter, it's possible to construct arguments that will get you off the hook. McNamara did it by trying to write national strategy in the same format that he wrote budget programs. That is a methodology of getting himself and all of Washington "inside the paper". You're just delaying disaster and his disaster was already set in concrete by the middle of 1965. A reading of Oley Sharp's book makes it clear that he wasn't going to fight and that was all there was to it. He talked a good game. Another ploy is to say, "Let's weigh what we may lose versus what we may gain." When applied to prison escapes the pros are already beaten when they use that format because you know you're going to lose more than you gain. Page 19, top: "Live in harmony with nature." If you're going to get in a fight, know you're going to get a bloody nose. If you're just like you were going to get in a bath, know you're going to get pushed and pilfered. Page 20: Upon every accident remember to turn toward yourself and inquire what facility you have for its use. Harness your resources. Don't curtail



adventurous souls, give them their heads. They like it better and they're going to do the organization some good. Page 21: "It is better to die of hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence and perturbation." Don't double yourself. Don't carry around excess emotional baggage. Tell your buddies all you were tortured to repeat, particularly if it applies to him. This gives him tactical advantage and gives you moral relief. Page 22: "Whoever would then be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing which depends on others, else he must necessarily be a slave." Don't be a player. Stay off the hook. Work together, unity over self. Don't join up, make them hurt you. Remember that you are an actor in a drama of the sort the author chooses. If short, then a short one; if long, then a long one. If it be his pleasure that you should enact a poor man or a cripple or a ruler or a private citizen, see that you act it well, for this is your business to act well a given part. But to choose it belongs to another. If you're going to get in a war you've got to play the part of a soldier. If you're in a prison you've got to play the part out. In our case it was usually to get caught with communication which was forbidden, to take torture, to confess, to make an apology and to make an atonement. You have to fight back. "Find the other man's limits, know your own and demonstrate a commitment he will find it unprofitable to challenge." Pride in self-respect.

Page 26. In some cases entertainment is sold, supper is sold. In some people's houses it is sold for praise. Have you nothing then in place of supper? Yes, indeed. You have not to praise him whom you do not like to praise, not to bear the influence of his lackeys. Page 27: Don't fret around. Know yourself and think of all costs and names. Don't change professions, you can't be two people. Be in tune with nature. "Anyone who operates in the world of theory that does not conform to empirical reality is a hazard to navigation." Page 31: Prescribe to yourself some character and demeanor such that you may preserve both alone and in company. In his essay on rhetoric Aristotle tells us that as a leader you must persuade and this may be done (1) by appeal to reason (logos), (2) by appeal to emotions (pathos), or (3) by having the appeal of a good character (ethos). Particularly in areas where there is no certain answer, the good character of the speaker is a much more persuasive instrument than his reason or his appeal to emotions. Page 33: Never shrink from responsibility when you see that it is to be done. Somebody always has to be the first guy to blow the whistle. As I was with Al Brudner over the radio when I asked that they be required to have a license. That the license cost two weeks in irons and it had to be renewed after one week on the radio. You have to tear down the camps and build them up, repetitively, repetitively, repetitively.

Now this rehash of The Enchiridion may sound like a pretty strenuous operation but I think that it's a mistake to think that people want stability at any cost. The same Victor Frankl's psychiatrist in Man's Search for Meaning says, "I consider it a dangerous misconception of mental hygiene to assume that what man needs in the first place is equilibrium. What man actually needs is not a tensionless state, but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of him." William Ernest Henley, an Englishman, was born in 1849. He died at the age of 54 when he fell off a train that started with a jerk. That was not unusual because he was crippled. In fact he had been crippled since he was at age 12 when he got TB of the bone. His leg was amputated and his second leg was about to be amputated when he got ahold of Dr. Lister, the famous antiseptic expert. Dr. Lister saved the second leg. He <sup>Henley</sup> had a very sad life. His only daughter died at 5 1/2 years when he was 45 years of age. But he was a man of letters, he was a robust, hotheaded man. Because he bad-mouthed Robert Burns he lost the Chair of English Literature at the University of Edinburgh and had it not been for a similar outburst he would have followed Tennyson as the poet laureate of Great Britain. He was a great man of prose and verse and the greatest editor in history says his biographer. He wrote this poem which could well be appended to The

Enchiridion, "Invictus":

Out of the night that covers me,  
Black as the pit from pole to pole,  
I thank whatever gods may be  
For my unconquerable soul.

In the fell clutch of circumstance  
I have not winced nor cried aloud.  
Under the bludgeonings of chance  
My head is bloody, but unbowed.

Beyond this place of wrath and tears  
Looms but the Horror of the shade,  
And yet the manace of the years  
Finds and shall find me unafraid.

It matters not how strait the gate,  
How charged with punishments the scroll,  
I am the master of my fate:  
I am the captain of my soul.

I might tell you that that poem was sent to me at a time of great tension in Hanoi. I had established communication from outside the camp which I had previously been the boss of, at a time when there was a great pressure on me. Whenever

I was taken inside to bathe, they went into what I called the "Ted Williams shift" where I was the only man outside, everybody else locked up. As it was in the case of all communications, once we had established this net which was possible only due to a rare good fortune of architecture, which allowed us a straight shot during the noon hour, where my hand could be seen by the people in the cellblock across the wall, we did the two things that come natural to prisoners. First of all to make up a cover story to cover what you're going to say when you get caught and (2) to have a backup comm system. Our backup comm system which was made up by a guy named Dave Hatcher, was that should I be moved we would exchange notes left in a bottle under a sink in a bathing area in a spider infested hole. There was a vertical wire on that privy and if it was bent north it meant there was a note for me and if it was bent south it meant there was a note for Dave, and if it was straight up and down there was no note, and if it was bent up against the building it meant there was a purge on and not to go fooling around with it. Sure enough, I got moved and sure enough one day this wire was pointed north and I looked under that sink and there was that little bottle and it was a note and I put it in my crotch and walked into the cell when my guard came to the door and I got it out and opened it up and there wasn't much to say apparently because all there was was the full text of "Invictus" and you might know how pleased I was to get that.

At Stanford the other day I saw my old professor Bailey, and Phil Rhineland, and Bob North. I told North about how McNamara's demise in North Vietnam gave the enemy the greatest boost of anything in the war and how they thought Nixon was a dove going in. Rhineland of course had put me on Epictetus. Bailey was the great historian to whom I related my thanks for his many favors and his good ideas. It was to Tony Sokol, 82, that I addressed many of my comments and I gave him the story of how he told me that he did not read the strategy books that I was reading because they were written by economists and economists are rational. He reminded me that Clausewitz says there are two sides to wars, the objective and the subjective, and one is reason and one is emotion, and that these people are rationalists and were going to get us in trouble because they were trying to play tricks with people. Of course, it was three years later and I was shot down and two years after that I was lying in a cell in Hanoi thinking about how correct Tony had been. Those people out there under bombardment were not going to worry about some sort of concept wherein if they continued to resist over a certain number of months they would start to have low water pressure. They were much too close to the war for that sort of hogwash.

I'm going to tell just a few prison stories to wind up. The game plan was, as you know, to impose fear and guilt and the progression went from communication to being caught to torture to confession to apology to atonement, and in some few unlucky cases, to blackmail for the atonement. They had a great value on propaganda but to smash our organization had a greater value than that. It is my contention that the sine qua non of the art of war is philosophical consistency, to be in tune to the nature of your profession, and the nature of war and the nature of fighting. That is to say, to be at least equally atuned to the powers of charisma, comradeship, spontaneity, instinct and personal honor as to the rational powers of management and statistic keeping. Literature tells us many of these lessons and I'm going to quote from Glenn Gray, author of The Warriors and T. E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I will also quote from Clausewitz, he, of course related to history. The modern trends, particularly those of Arthur Schlesinger, pooh-poohs the idea that history has its lessons, but I think he's wrong, because if you get a story of man, the continuum is man himself, and if he reacts in a similar pattern to similar disturbances over several hundred years span, you've learned something. According to Clausewitz:

"If war is an act of force, the emotions are necessarily involved in it. If war does not originate from them

it still reacts upon them and the degree depends not upon the stage of civilization but upon the importance and duration of the hostilities."

Well that though should hardly be controversial after our experiences of the last years. But strategic literature of today is strangely reminiscent of the literature of the defense economics of the 60's. The most modern book I read was one by the '74 Brookings Institution called U.S. Tactical Air Power, by a young PhD, William D. White. I noticed that Dr. White received his Masters in Economics in the year '68.

White:

"Waging war is no different in principle from any resource transformation process and should be just as eligible for the improvements in proficiency that have accrued elsewhere from technological substitution."

Clausewitz:

"War is a special profession, however general its relation may be and even if all the male population of a country capable of bearing arms were able to practice it, war would still continue to be different and separate from any other activity which occupies the life of man."



White:

"It is better that wars be fought as much with dollars and as little with lives as technology will permit. There is strong evidence to suggest the ascendancy of weapons over warriors."

Clausewitz:

"It is not the loss in men, horses, guns, but in order, courage, confidence, cohesion and plan which come into consideration whether the engagement can still be continued. It is principally the moral forces which decide here."

Lesson One: It is my view that leaders are born not made - that there are men who can make  $2 + 2 = 5$ . We shouldn't be embarrassed about this as I think Americans generally are. The Communists are strangely unembarrassed about it. I think we should acknowledge the fact that a few people just naturally have clout with others. The Communists identify them and use them. So should we.

Now I have to give you a little background on a sort of Communist game plan in the prison. You have probably heard most of this, but I'll be quick. It was very simple. They brought the full power of the camp system or government system to one end: to break our will. I quote Clausewitz: "War

is an act of violence to break the enemy's will." Their violence consisted of torture. We have very strict definitions in our community about what torture is. It's the intentional application of pain over a well defined, finite time span for a desired end. Some people went through this two and three times, some ten and more. Irons - sometimes this was pain, sometimes it was inconvenience so we had to learn to distinguish between them and base our response accordingly. Some people months, some people years. Cuffs - that's a science in itself. Sometimes inconvenience, sometimes very painful. Again the spectrum varied from weeks to months. Finally, a special kind of violence, if I may use the word, isolation or solo. I won't differentiate between the two here. (There are those in the audience who know the difference.) The basic idea of both is that you were not permitted to communicate by any means.

On top of this violence were rules stressing the perils of communication and other things and once you broke these rules then the method was very simple. It's the same used by them on their own people I think. First, the attempt to impose on you the feeling of guilt, then punishment, then apology, then atonement, in that order. Atonement usually was a forced statement of an anti-war nature. So propaganda had a high value, a very high value. But the highest value

was the prevention of our organization. The charge as it was quoted was "inciting others to oppose camp authority." So that's the name of the game. We had organizations in almost every prison and inevitably they were periodically broken down by some sort of an inadvertent compromise. A purge followed, people were sorted out. They pieced together under torture enough information to destroy the regime and then we would rebuild knowing full well that a future purge was inevitable.

One such organization was in the prison we called Las Vegas in '67. Like all others it got its momentum from a few drivers; most of them senior but not all certainly; some were junior. That purge was a bad one like several others and I was the focal point at the end, having been the boss in that case. I hope that I can make it clear that in the purge I gave it a good go because I'm going to tell you about some things that I was forced to do.

After several weeks of pretty tough living, I was about to run out of gas as they bored down on me for more and more information. So I had to deflect the argument or spill my guts. I was at that point. Now what they wanted was a list of my central committee. I was being interrogated not by the top guy, a man we later knew by Major Bai, but by a third echelon and so I would be tortured and then they would take

what I had said or written back to the hierarchy. Hours or days later it would come back and either it was blessed or it was not. They were very particular about this documentation. They were talking about war crimes at that time and I think that may have been part of it. This is summer-fall of '68, August, September, October. But I knew what I wanted to do last of all was to give them the names of those key men who would not ordinarily be key suspects, in many cases Air Force captains and Navy lieutenants - the junior people who were frequently the key communications men and often the most innovative people within particular cell blocks. So they kept this central committee thing up. They had no idea of the scope of our communications or the refinement of it. At that time we had about 200 prisoners' names. Most of us had memorized them. Maybe 50 of them were in this camp and many had been moved to others. So I took a calculated risk. I said okay, I'll give you the central committee (although they must have known we didn't have such a thing). I'll give you our organization. They were pleased that I finally "bowed down" and left paper. I wrote 200 names in a row. I knew this was going to blow it because they would be shocked to realize that we knew who was in all their camps. I put them in order of seniority and I said that's our organization. It's like a worm that goes back together. You cannot defeat us because always the top men will take charge and there's no committee. It's

an autocratic system. Well they didn't like that. They came back and I persisted. They said, "Our senior officer says that is unsatisfactory but we won't pursue it farther provided you show where your central committee stops." So I drew a line under the junior Navy commander and said okay that's my central committee, from here on up.

Now back again to the torture because the next requirement was that I write down what each "committee" member did. So again it came time to act and I again tried to think the best way to do that, so I used their words. I said so and so - senior officer in such and such a cell block - followed out my orders to incite others to oppose camp authority and that he was very effective in this and communicated and relayed my orders. What I wrote sounded like a citation for a medal. I wrote that one after another down this rather short list, same words in each case and they didn't like it at all. There was no dirt in it, you know, there was nothing they could get their hands on. But they came back and said you forgot a very important element. You must put in there in addition that each "had the innate ability to do so." I thought that was rather odd. Then I remembered a conversation, a very animated argument that I had had with an infamous interrogator named Rabbit some months before when I said to him, "You're so proud of being a party member, what are the requirements to be a party member?" In the heat of that by-

gone argument he stepped outside his cautious pre-coached script and replied that "there are only four. First you've got to be 17 years old. Secondly you've got to be smart enough to understand the theory. Third you've got to be selfless" (as a missionary might be selfless) "and fourth and most important you have to be a man who has the inborn ability to influence others." And it came to my mind that all this time that was the thing they were really trying to find out about us. They were no master psychologists. They were just practical, often very ordinary men. But they were looking for this spark because that's how you get nominated to be a party member. And I could surmise who were party members and I'm sure my prisonmates could too. As we'd peep out of holes we could see these meetings of a few key officers and enlisted men. Those were the guys who could control the emotional climate of the North Vietnamese command. The Communists make a profession of identifying these people. Those were the men who "ran" their system; those were the men, regardless of rank, who "ran" our system, and they knew it. In their own ranks they institutionalized the charismatic power by party membership. In the enemy ranks they kept them in solitary confinement and branded them "war criminals."

One add-on here. It was late in the afternoon and they were griped in general because I had been able to squeeze through the crack there on a solution that was satisfactory

to neither of us. They said "hurry up, hurry up" as I was adding this innate ability remark and as I picked up one sheet they said, "Don't bother with him, he's harmless." The guy whose name they threw out was a perfectly honorable officer who rigorously self-disciplined himself to the Code of Conduct. But I thought about him, he just had no clout with the others and he was what you would call a man who did not like to make waves. He just wasn't the kind of leader the rest were and this they already knew. They learned this in the stress situations of long interrogations. That was what they were interested in. Is this guy a threat? Can he stir up trouble? Or will he just mind his own business? Lesson: You can't tell the players without a program and a smart fighter knows his men, and as best he can, his enemy, not only by rank but by charismatic clout.

We learned lessons about the power of comradeship. Lesson Two: Glenn Gray, the World War II combat infantryman, discusses the nature of fighting on grounds that modern angels fear to tread.

"War reveals dimensions of human nature above and below the acceptable standards of humanity. In the end any study of war must strive to deal with gods and devils in the form of man. It is recorded in the holy scripture that

there was once a war in Heaven and that the nether regions are still supposed to be the scene of incessant strife. Interpreted symbolically this must mean that the final secrets of why men fight must be beyond the human in the nature of being itself."

And I talk in many cases here about men who fought from the nature of there being. And I'm talking about comradeship. Gray again:

"The feeling of belonging together that men in battle often find a cementing force needs first to be awakened by an external reason for fighting but the feeling is by no means dependent on this reason. The cause that calls comradeship into being may be the defense of one's country, the propagation of one's true religious faith or a passion of political ideology. It may be the retention of honor or the recovery of a Helen of Troy."

Of course I had many experiences which echoed this feeling about comradeship.

Three: We relearned lessons of the power of spontaneity, instinct. As our old friend Clausewitz said:

"In action most men follow a mere instinctive judgement which hits the mark more or less successfully according as they have in them more or less genius."



Planning has its limits in other words. T. E. Lawrence as he describes his leadership problem with those heroic and flamboyant Arabs. He came to a frustration point.

"So I sheared off the mathematical element and plunged into the matter of the biological factor in command. The 'felt element in troops' not expressable in figures. It had to be guessed at by the equivalent of Plato's 'X'." (One of those very specific and sensitive Greek words which has no equivalent.)

"And the greatest commander of men was he whose intuitions most nearly happened."

"Nine-tenths of tactics were certain enough to teach in schools, but the irrational tenth was like a kingfisher flashing across the pool and in it lay the test of generals. The instinct of the irrational tenth."

I have an example of that. It was when an instinct, an irrational one I'm sure, precipitated a riot. At the time there were those among us preaching a philosophy that I've seen the limitations to time and again: "We stand to lose more that we stand to gain." The event occurred in 1971 and was known as the Church Riot. Ironically, I was

one who was saying, "We are fat. Although all are not communicating, things will work out well. Wait." But somehow there was a wisdom in the group - that even though we'd never had it so good it was time for a challenge to the authorities. It was a time when after the Son Tay raids we'd been put in big cell blocks - the only time some of us were ever in them. Communication between the blocks was "prohibited," but the blocks ringed a prison in the center of Hanoi. We had everybody there; the first time, thanks to the Son Tay raids and those Army troops, because the Vietnamese were afraid and brought them all in from outlying camps. But we were in search, I think subconsciously, of an issue and the issue became a golden one. They prohibited church services. The sense of our cell block's mood was "damn logic." "We'll have church and we'll see what happens." And so we had church. And so the door burst open and the guards with the rifles came in and hauled out those men who were leading in prayers and so on. And somebody, again this kingfisher flashing across the pool on a Sunday afternoon, started singing the Star Spangled Banner and everybody joined in and we had more patriotic songs. This was a confrontation of unprecedented audacity. Then somebody down at the end of the cell block remembered an old chant that we used to yell in the Naval Academy messhall the night before the Army-Navy

game. "This is table #7, this is table #7. Table 8. Table 8, where in the hell are you?" And they yelled it to building 8 next door and they started singing. Finally this went on all night - all blocks singing - and the guards were in the windows with their guns and tear gas and so forth. The next morning they marched us seniors off and put us back in irons. Of course a rationalist would have said we lost more than we gained. But when I looked back in hindsight, we gained the greatest of all things. We gained unity. We gained a tradition, we brought almost everybody in those cell blocks, some containing men previously too shy to communicate, aboard and into our organization. So we gained - not because of but in spite of "reason".

This is not unique in history and I again quote Lawrence talking about instinct:

"The Arab leaders showed a completeness of instinct, a reliance upon intuition, the unperceived foreknown which left our centrifugal minds gasping, like women they understood and judged quickly, effortless, unreasonably."

Four: We learned some lessons about the exemplary power of personal honor, the power of example. T. E. Lawrence described in some detail how the Arabs had no traditional discipline in the way we know it. That doesn't mean they weren't effective.

"Any of our Arabs could go home without penalty whenever the conviction failed him. The only contract was honor."

Well it's not well known but individually in Hanoi, the staying there of a particular man, the one man, you, your only contract was honor.

The Vietnamese had a program the inception of which we perceived in 1967 when they gave a series of broadcasts about how generally the Americans were unsat in their attitude and how they were going to take the most reactionary and put them in permanent punishment and how those who repented and truly repented would go home before the war was over. The way they handled this, it was obvious that it was the early release program, the Fink release program as we called it. There were certain requirements. One was that you had to attract their attention and give them reason to believe you would behave in a "reasonable manner" when you got home. You wouldn't tell all the bad things.

Well, almost to a man the whole idea was repugnant to us. For two reasons. One was you had to say things detrimental to your government. There were four propaganda requirements somebody told me. It was a pretty bad scene, particularly the tapes you had to make. But secondly, you were taking a special favor. Both concepts were against the Code of Conduct and the thing was repugnant. In 1967 we put out orders against accepting a Fink release for the few

who needed orders on the subject. The idea of the counter-spy tactic was frequently discussed from the time the program started. Why not take a man and tell him, order him to go home, whereupon he would play games with the Vietnamese and say yes I have repented, I truly repent and I think the United States is full of baloney and so forth and woo himself into their favor and go home with some American peacenik crowd and then be our emissary in Washington, our agent.

Well this had a lot of drawbacks. One, it was not probable you'd get a man with enough information from one of the harder camps who could ever win favor with the Vietnamese. But even if you did, by some grand act he would put on, his reputation would be severely damaged. You just could never explain to everybody, unless he was a well known standout prison performer, that he came home correctly with orders. So we let that ride until we had a very strange occurrence about six months before we were released. A man with a reputation of wide and great stature was called to a quiz unexpectedly. One of his relatives had become anti-war and was apparently influential enough so that even this guy was offered a chance to go home by the Vietnamese because the word had been put in through the American Left Wing that it would be good to get him out. They were willing to take a chance on his intimate knowledge of torture, I guess. They thought the war was soon to end so they'd spot him what he had for information. Well a message was formed to try to order him to go home. We asked him to go home as our hero.

The reputation problem was solved. The problem of a man like that hooking up with the Vietnamese on a mutual basis was solved. So it wasn't too bad an idea but we felt it necessary to leave him a loophole. We said, "If this is morally offensive to you, you can refuse to obey our order." We sent the proposition to his cell block. In the next possible communication period, his answer was, "I'll go over the wall or I'll go out with all of you, but that's the only way I'll leave this place." We all gained strength from our shipmate's self-respect. Lesson - moral strength rubs off.

So ends the examples of charisma, comradeship, spontaneity, instinct and personal honor. All very subjective stuff, not at all in tune with that program of "rational decisions or employing of weapons and the allocations of resources." Now we're through with Philosophy I and have got to go back to life in the street surrounded by barbarians always. But before you go I want you to be aware that others before you have made this arduous trip back to reality and faced the ridicule of their comrades for spending hours whiling away time with the likes of Aristotle and Plato. A poem was written by Louis MacNeice back in the '40's which my professor at Stanford, Professor Maravchek, cited as an example of sensitive observation of the intellectual scene. I want to bring you the last of it. It talks about a philosophy major who is leaving Oxford.

Louis MacNeice

Autumn  
Leaves

"Life in the particular always,  
dozens of men in the street.  
And the perennial if unimportant problem  
of getting enough to eat.

(Memory cloud)

So blow the bugles over the metaphysicians,  
let the pure mind return to the pure mind;  
I must be content to remain in the world of appearance  
and sit on the mere appearance of a behind.  
But in case you should think my education wasted  
I hasten to explain  
that once having studied the classics  
you can never really again  
believe anything that anyone says and that of course  
is an asset

in a world like ours;  
Why bother to water a garden  
that is planted with paper flowers?  
O the freedom of the press, the late night final,  
tomorrow's pulp;  
One should not gulp one's port but as it isn't  
port, I'll gulp it if I want to gulp  
But probably I'll just enjoy the colour  
and pour it down the sink  
For I don't call advertisement a statement  
or any quack medicine a drink.

Good-bye now, Plato and Hegel (and I would add Epictetus  
and Clausewitz and Lawrence and Gray),  
the shop is closing down;  
They don't want any philosopher-kings in Newport,  
There ain't no universals in this man's town."