

THE MARITIME STRATEGY QUESTION AND ANSWER BOOK

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TABS

A. WHAT'S A MARITIME STRATEGY?

Q: WHAT IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY?

A: The Maritime Strategy provides the global maritime elements of United States national military strategy. The Maritime Strategy collects all strategic guidance from many sources into a single, cohesive framework that forms the nucleus from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Unified and Fleet Commander's maritime military options emanate.

Q: IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY, THEN, A NEW STRATEGY?

A: No. The strategy incorporates many well-known elements of United States and alliance planning for the use of maritime forces. It does not constitute a new national approach or a new national strategy. It is based on the fundamental tenet that we and our allies must, and will, stand collectively against the forces of the Soviet Union, as has been manifest by some forty years of mutual alliance cooperation and military planning on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. The Maritime Strategy is a codification of a number of strategic concepts and principles related to maritime strategy for some time. It reflects the best judgment of senior military leadership about the preferred strategic framework for meeting maritime responsibilities within the national military strategy. A carefully designed Maritime Strategy has always been an imperative for the United States, but the need for this sound strategy grew more important as the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge United States interests worldwide. Therefore, several years ago, the United States Navy reviewed and refined the existing maritime elements of our national strategy--elements with broad contours reasonably well understood, but which had not been submitted to the rigors inherent in codification. The result of that intensive effort was the Maritime Strategy, not a new strategy, but merely the articulation of the obvious character of modern deterrence and warfare, should deterrence fail and war occur.

Q: WHAT IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY?

A: The basic underpinnings of the Maritime Strategy are its roots in our national military strategy. The essential elements of our national military strategy are built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity in a context of global coalition defense.

The principal sources of this strategy are to be found in: National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which are presidential decisions on national strategy; the alliances, treaties, and agreements we have with countries around the world; the Defense Guidance (DG); the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD); and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

The guidance contained within the latter group of documents is reflected in the concepts and plans of the Unified Commanders. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts of the Unified Commanders and their naval component commanders. The Maritime Strategy melds those plans and concepts, combining them with the maritime theater guidance in the other vital source documents of our national military strategy, to provide a preferred strategic design for action.

The Maritime Strategy's principal objective is deterrence but, should deterrence fail, it is designed to achieve war termination through application of a full-forward pressure strategy within the context of global coalition warfare. Thus, the Maritime Strategy is derivative from, but completely consistent with, and a vital part of our national military strategy.

Q: ISN'T THE MARITIME STRATEGY JUST A PROGRAMMING DOCUMENT?

A: No. The Maritime Strategy is the baseline, integrated, coalition strategy encompassing all naval elements of a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Its programming aspects are secondary. Because it is so broad-based and comprehensive (as opposed to regionally-specific or prescriptive), it is able to serve as the underpinning for programmers to develop their annual requirements, at the same time driving the priorities of the research and development community in the direction that matters most--to support operational commanders in the execution of military strategy.

Q: IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY APPROVED BY JCS AND OSD?

A: No. The Maritime Strategy is signed and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). It has been briefed to individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of the Defense (OSD) Staff. The Maritime Strategy's "approval" by JCS and OSD comes from the fact that it is derivative from and completely consistent with JCS and OSD guidance to the Navy and Marine Corps.

Q: DOES THE NAVY EXPECT THE NATION TO ADOPT ITS MARITIME STRATEGY AS THE NATIONAL STRATEGY OF PRESENT AND FUTURE, INSTEAD OF A CONTINENTAL STRATEGY--THE KIND WE REALLY NEED TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE?

A: Maritime Strategy is not in opposition to a continental strategy. Rather, in fact, it is a strategic framework containing a wide range of options relating to maritime elements of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. The Maritime Strategy provides that the defense of Western Europe is essential to the interests, of the United States--and the strategy's primary thrust is oriented to that task. The Maritime Strategy protects the vital sea lines of communication providing logistics support to the Central Front in Europe. The strategy accomplishes that aim by defending United States' interests on the seas as far forward as possible, well within areas of ocean around Europe that the Soviets expect to control--and within which United States national military guidance requires the Navy to prevail with clear maritime superiority, "in harm's way."

Q: WHAT IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY'S RELATIONSHIP TO OPERATIONAL PLANS?

A: Its relationship is both derivative and advisory, drawn from those operational plans and formulating a strategic framework for their continuing development. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts of the Unified Commanders and their naval component commanders. The Maritime Strategy melds those plans and concepts, combining them with the maritime theater guidance in other vital source documents of our national military strategy. It presents a preferred strategic design for action in a framework of strategic options for operational commanders, thereby influencing the development of their operational plans.

Q: WILL THE MARITIME STRATEGY DIRECT THE MOVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL SHIPS IN WARTIME?

A: No, but it will influence decisions on such movements. It is important that one understand that the Maritime Strategy is not a detailed war plan, and does not contain specific instructions for individual ship or force movements. It will be up to the JCS and the CINCs to direct the movements of the forces in their theater during a war. Thus, while the CINCs will consult and be guided by the strategic concepts which underlie the Maritime Strategy and by the force employment options of the Maritime Strategy, the strategy is not a detailed war plan. That said, the Maritime Strategy's influence in development of such plans is substantial.

Q: "HOW DOES THE NAVY REFUTE CRITICS, WHO, BEING UNABLE TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS, CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA'S MARITIME STRATEGY IS BASED ON THE BEST U. S. CASE (IN WHICH WE CONTROL EVENTS FROM START TO FINISH), AND THAT IT DOES NOT DOVETAIL WELL WITH THE TOTAL NEEDS OF OTHER ARMED SERVICES OR THE NATION? WHY WOULDN'T MORE SELECTIVE AIMS ACCOMPLISH ESSENTIAL U. S. MISSIONS AT LESS RISK AND COST?"

A: Rather than being based on the best case, the maritime strategy is designed to create the best case, i.e., to enable us to control events so that war with the Soviets never starts; and if such a war were to take place, to enable us to control events so that we could terminate it favorably. This is in precise agreement with Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie's widely quoted admonition that, "the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy."

The maritime strategy is also designed to dovetail well with the requirements of the other U. S. armed services and those of our friends and allies. All contributed to its development; all have forces necessary to implement it; and all have forces which require its implementation in order to be effectively employed. More selective aims might well accomplish some U. S. missions at less initial cost; but they would undoubtedly thereby greatly increase the overall risk to ourselves and our allies.

No strategy is perfect; none is without risk. A risk-free war between the superpowers is a contradiction in terms. The maritime strategy has given those of us in the naval profession a way to organize our thinking, to better structure our efforts, and thereby to increase our prospects for deterring war--or, should deterrence fail, ending the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. It is only by continued discussion and debate that we can increase our strategic understanding and our preparedness, so essential to deterrence.

Q: WHO DETERMINES WHAT MILITARY LEVERAGE IS APPLIED DURING PHASE I OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY?

A: Critical deployment decisions early in the pre-conflict phase will in general be made by the National Command Authority, made up of the President and Secretary of Defense, advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Specific decisions about force deployment will be made by unified CINCs. How much leverage is actually created by force movement is a function of the effect that those movements have on Soviet perceptions of overall strategic advantage.

Q: WHAT TYPE OF REACTION DO THE OTHER SERVICES HAVE TO THIS PRESENTATION?

A: The public record speaks for itself; both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their support for the Maritime Strategy during their testimony before Congress. That is because the strategy itself is the synthesis of the maritime elements within the U. S. National Military Strategy. The other Services have made no public pronouncements on the Maritime Strategy; it is the preferred baseline strategy for the employment of maritime forces, not land or air forces, and has been developed by professional naval officers. The Navy does not presume to comment on Army or Air Force organizational concepts.

B. A FORWARD DEPLOYED STRATEGY

Q: WON'T CERTAIN ACTIONS ENVISIONED BY THE MARITIME STRATEGY PROVE PROVOCATIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION?

A: Not in our view. During a crisis, the Soviets would be contemplating the likelihood of the crisis evolving into open conflict between themselves and the United States, and of their prospects for success. It would be in their interests to limit such a conflict to a short war in one theater, and from their perspective the preferred theater would be Central Europe where they consider their prospects for success to be better than ever. The forward movement of forces during Phase I or a crisis scenario is designed to enhance deterrence and not to be provocative. The multi-theater threatening of the Soviet Union denies them the ability to execute their preferred strategy. This approach confuses the Soviet correlation of forces calculation.

A forward, global movement of U. S. forces acting in concert with a forward movement of our allies' forces would present the Soviets the prospect of a global, conventional war of uncertain duration. That prospect would serve to heighten Soviet uncertainties, and to skew what they term the correlation of forces away from a decidedly Soviet advantage. Deterrence would be served well by this global movement.

Were war to occur, maritime operations on the Soviets' flanks would also serve to heighten their uncertainties. In sum, the Maritime Strategy is not provocative. It is designed first to deter war, but should war break out, to achieve war termination for the U. S. and our allies through application of a full-forward pressure strategy on the Soviet flanks which removes their theater specific "short" war option.

Q: "HOW COULD THE SOVIET NAVY INTERFERE SERIOUSLY WITH U. S. OBJECTIVES IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR, IF ONLY A SMALL FRACTION DEPLOYED FORWARD? UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS, WHY WOULDN'T A PASSIVE DEFENSE LINE ACROSS THE GREENLAND-ICELAND-UNITED KINGDOM GAP PROTECT OUR SEA-LANES? WHY ARE U. S. MARITIME STRATEGISTS CONCERNED ABOUT A SOVIET FIRST SALVO, IF THE SOVIET NAVY STAYS HOME?"

A: First, of course, there is no guarantee the Soviet Navy will, in Mr. Collins' words, "stay home" forever and the "home" referred to extends thousands of kilometers out to sea. Should the United States unilaterally cede Soviet "home" waters as sanctuaries, Soviet forces, particularly submarines, could be expected to sortie in large numbers. It is far more prudent to engage these forces early and aggressively. Second, some of our allies live beyond Mr. Collins' proposed defensive line and within Soviet "home waters." Writing off our allies and friends as well as some of our own forces on the Northern and Southern flanks (and in the Pacific)--as many of the advocates of static defensive strategies imply--would destroy allied cohesion and cripple both deterrence and allied warfighting capability. A passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap could protect some transatlantic sea-lanes, but would condemn Norway to Soviet occupation and Iceland and the United Kingdom to a massive Soviet air offensive.

The maritime strategy seeks to do far more than simply protect sea lines. It also seeks to apply leverage on the Soviet Union and its strategic forces--in order to end the war or, even better, to ensure that war does not occur. All of these goals require our forces to move forward. This forward movement, coupled with the fact that some Soviet forces will be deployed out of area, results in the need to be concerned with the battle of the first salvo.

Q: "WHY DOES EXPOSING ADDITIONAL U. S. SHIPS TO SOVIET MISSILES" IN TIME OF CRISIS DETER AGGRESSION? WHAT DETERRENT DO WE PROPOSE IF TIME DOES NOT PERMIT ADDITIONAL FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS DURING A CRISIS?

A: Early forward deployments serve two deterrent purposes. First, they ensure no one can mistake our determination to meet our obligations to all of our allies (not just those nations where troops are stationed). In addition to this political deterrent, early forward movement makes it clear that the Soviets will not be able to accomplish their primary naval missions--defense of the homeland and protection of their SSBN force--by default. It also forecloses any single front advantage. There is no substitute for such a deterrent movement of forces; that is why both Admiral ~~Watkins~~ and Secretary ~~Lenman~~ stressed the importance of recognizing and reacting to crisis.

Q: "DO THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND NATO LEADERS APPROVE OF FRONTAL ASSAULT ON SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AT THE ONSET OF WAR IN WATERS WHERE RISKS ARE GREATEST? WHAT ALTERNATIVES DID THEY REJECT THAT WERE DESIGNED TO PRODUCE COMBAT ON TERMS MORE FAVORABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES OR LEAVE THE SOVIET NAVY IN ISOLATION?"

A: As Admiral Watkins carefully pointed out, the maritime strategy provides a foundation for naval advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA), i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense. The maritime strategy clearly recognizes that the unified and specified commanders (the commanders-in-chief) fight the wars, under the direction of the NCA.

The maritime strategy flows from explicit NCA guidance and is in concert with that guidance. As President Reagan has stated publicly: "Freedom to use the seas is our Nation's life blood. For that reason, our Navy is designed to keep the sea lanes open worldwide, a far greater task than closing those sea lanes at strategic choke points. Maritime superiority is for us a necessity. We must be able in time of emergency to venture in harm's way"

Secretary of Defense Weinberger has testified that the maritime strategy is a vital part of our overall strategy, especially with regard to eliminating the Soviet means of warfare as quickly as possible. NATO policy and strategy are totally congruent with the maritime strategy. This by design, since the NATO Strategic Concept and Concept of Maritime Operations are key bases of the strategy. The United States and the other NATO nations have consistently rejected approaches that would automatically sacrifice key allies or leave the Soviet Navy untouched, once Soviet aggression has occurred.

Q: "HOW CAN THE SECOND FLEET, EVEN WITH ALLIED ASSISTANCE, HANDLE ITS HUGE WARTIME RESPONSIBILITIES WITH ROUGHLY THE SAME SIZE U. S. FORCE PLANNED FOR USE IN MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS?"

A: While the area of potential action for NATO Striking Fleet, Atlantic, is very large, the area of probable action is not. The capabilities of allies in each area also differ. In line with the strategy's tenets to use sea power aggressively in forward areas, the NATO Striking Fleet (which is composed mostly of the U. S. Second Fleet) will primarily be concerned with battle for the Norwegian Sea. By winning that battle, we win the battle of the Atlantic. Thus the apparent disparity between forces and geography that Mr. Collins suggests does not exist.

C. NUCLEAR ISSUES - INCLUDING "THE ANTI-SSBN CAMPAIGN"

Q: DOES THE MARITIME STRATEGY CALL FOR AN ANTI-SSBN CAMPAIGN?

A: The Maritime Strategy calls for an aggressive ASW campaign against all Soviet submarines, including SSBNs. Attrition of Soviet SSBNs during the course of their ASW campaign will reduce the attractiveness of nuclear escalation from the Soviet perspective, by changing the nuclear balance in our favor. We must remember that despite recent advances, the Soviets still lack the ASW capability to destroy United States SSBNs. In addition to the effect on what the Soviets term the correlation of forces by attrition of their SSBNs, our nuclear posture will be improved through the deployment of carriers and TOMAHAWK platforms around the periphery of the Soviet Union. The net effect of these actions will make Soviet resort to vertical escalation even less likely, since their reserve forces are being degraded and the United States' retaliatory posture is being enhanced. Thus the Maritime Strategy not only is designed to achieve favorable war termination should deterrence fail, but also to strengthen nuclear deterrence even during the course of a global, conventional war with the Soviet Union.

Q: THE MARITIME STRATEGY "NEARLY IGNORES" NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA." HOW IS THIS CONSISTENT WITH PRUDENT PLANNING AND WHAT ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE IF NUCLEAR WAR COMES?

A: The strategy does not ignore the possibility of nuclear war. Instead, by altering the military balance-- specifically, the nuclear balance (in Soviet terms, the nuclear correlation of forces)--it seeks to make escalation unattractive to the Soviets. By doing this, we seek to deter nuclear war. Should deterrence fail, the basic outlines of the strategy will still be relevant, although there is obviously no strategy less difficult to implement once nuclear escalation takes place.

Q: "HOW COULD THREATS TO SOVIET SSBNS AND THE HOMELAND HELP CONFINE THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT, A PUBLIC OBJECTIVE OF U. S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY? DO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BELIEVE THAT U. S. OPERATIONS DESCRIBED WOULD PROVOKE NO SOVIET RETALIATION? ON WHAT BASIS?"

- A: A key feature of the strategy is to use maritime forces to contain crises and prevent global war from occurring in the first place, thus fulfilling the traditional maritime role of limiting the scope of conflicts. Should global war nonetheless occur, aggressive use of maritime power-- including threats to the Soviet homeland and Soviet SSBNs-- could hasten an end to the war and limit Soviet options by demonstrating that escalation is not in the Soviet interest. This forward, aggressive ASW campaign also helps focus Soviet Navy attention on protecting SSBNs and on providing continued defense in depth.
- Forces dedicated to this defense in depth cannot attack SLOCs.
 - Security of reinforcement and resupply effort is enhanced.
 - The threat to CVBFs is rolled farther back.

Secretary Weinberger has testified regarding the anti-SSBN mission, noting that Soviet knowledge of our capabilities in this area helps discourage them from going to war. The Navy believes such operations will not draw retaliation (if "retaliation" means nuclear escalation), because such escalation would serve no useful Soviet purpose.

Soviet writings are quite clear that they will undertake attacks on nuclear-capable forces with conventional forces where they have the capability. Indeed, destruction of enemy means of nuclear warfare is a declared Soviet Navy mission. It is difficult to understand why a Soviet doctrine of conventional attacks on nuclear forces--which has existed for years--is benign while a comparable U. S. strategy is somehow too dangerous or escalatory. Lastly, character of Soviet SSBN losses in this campaign will be gradual and not likely to be perceived as preparation for a U. S. first strike.

Q: WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST NATO FORCES DURING A CONVENTIONAL WAR?

A: Soviet use of CW/BW weapons is not considered a preeminent concern to mobile naval forces in the open oceans. In terms of amphibious operations or fixed targets on land, such as air bases, the threat however, is much greater. The targeting issue is also more difficult at sea where environmental factors can have an impact on the success of a chemical weapon attack. Even if targetted successfully, water wash-down capabilities and chemical protection measures would reduce the impact on maritime operations relative to its effect on land based operations.

It is important to keep in mind that chemical weapons, just like nuclear weapons, are viewed by the Soviets as weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets therefore would be extremely prudent regarding their use. In view of NATO's limited chemical weapon retaliatory capability, it has been NATO's declaratory position that Soviet first use of chemical weapons could result in a response by nuclear weapons. In view of this, it is considered highly unlikely that the Soviets would want to risk such a response.

Once the nuclear threshold has been crossed however, this becomes irrelevant. Chemical weapons use would then be considered in terms of military utility in a given scenario.

Q: WOULDNT IT BE IN THE SOVIETS' INTEREST TO ESCALATE TO THE NUCLEAR LEVEL AT SEA SINCE OUR CONVENTIONAL NAVAL FORCES ARE CONSIDERED SUPERIOR AND BECAUSE THE SEA IS AN ISOLATED THEATER, WHERE NUCLEAR WAR COULD BE CONTAINED, WITH LITTLE OR NO COLLATERAL EFFECTS ASHORE?

A: The Soviet decision on whether to escalate to the nuclear level at sea is an important one with considerable political content, and will thus be made not by the Soviet Navy, but by the Soviet central leadership. In making this decision, the leadership will consider not just the concerns of the Soviet Navy for performing a key mission, but the entire military situation, in which--for the Soviets--the sea is only a secondary theater compared to the land war in Europe. Given these priorities, any Soviet decision to escalate will be driven more by events on land than at sea. In short, it is highly unlikely the Soviet central leadership will decide that the sea is the place to initiate a nuclear war simply because the Soviet Navy is having difficulty protecting its SSBNs and maritime flanks.

A nuclear war confined to the sea also does not take into account declared U. S. and allied policy on this matter, which holds that if the Soviets escalate to the nuclear level at sea, the United States and its allies reserve the right to respond with nuclear attacks on land targets. The Soviets cannot dismiss this policy, and consequently understand that escalation at sea might well lead to escalation on land, thus risking the destruction of Europe or the Soviet Union. This in itself strongly deters the Soviets from escalating at sea.

Finally, escalating to nuclear war at sea would undermine the Soviets' nuclear no-first-use doctrine, as it certainly is not in the U. S. or our allies' interest or military advantage to initiate a nuclear war at sea. Soviet first use at sea could well lower NATO's nuclear threshold in Europe, disrupting their well-laid plans ashore and making a Soviet conventional victory in Europe less likely.

Q: "HOW MANY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OR NAVY WAR GAMES HAVE CENTERED ON A U. S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA? WHAT ASSUMPTIONS CONTROLLED THEIR CONDUCT? WHAT WERE THE OUTCOMES? HOW MANY TIMES HAVE UMPIRES RULED THAT A U. S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER WAS SUNK OR DISABLED IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR SCENARIO? WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME?"

A: We have played, and continue to play, war games centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea, as part of our overall gaming activity. Because, however, of the deterrent aspects of the maritime strategy and of Soviet strategy as we understand it, we do not consider a future war centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea as the most likely scenario. As with all games, a variety of assumptions have been used, and, therefore, a variety of outcomes emerged, which gave us the variety of insights we have needed to improve our tactics and programs.

Likewise, carrier attrition in games or exercises (it does happen) also gives us valuable and useful insights, which we then can and do act upon. In the real world, however, carriers have proven to be among the least vulnerable ships in our fleet, with an inherent mobility that makes them less vulnerable than land bases. The Falklands Conflict certainly proved many of our assumptions concerning the utility of our big carriers and their low vulnerability when properly equipped, operated, and protected--as in U. S. Navy practice.

D. WHAT ABOUT THE CENTRAL FRONT?

Q: HOW WILL THE MARITIME STRATEGY ENSURE WE WIN A WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS, IN LIGHT OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

A: We cannot, of course, ensure we will win a war. However, the Maritime Strategy is a strategy that contributes directly to success in the Central Front campaign because it provides for maritime operations directed against the vulnerable flanks of the Soviet Union. Those operations would serve to tie down forces, especially strike aircraft, which might otherwise be used to Soviet advantage against NATO ground and air forces in the Central Front. By exerting global pressure on the Soviet Union, the Maritime Strategy can help ease the burden for NATO forces in Europe and influence, both directly and indirectly, the result of the land battle.

Additionally, the Maritime Strategy would contribute to achieving war termination on terms acceptable to us and our allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the Soviet homeland, and by changing the nuclear correlation of forces.

Q: "WOULD AUTHORITATIVE SPOKESMEN DEFINE THE LONGEST SHORT WAR, AND EXPLAIN HOW NAVAL POWER COULD FAVORABLY AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF SUCH BRIEF COMBAT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY?"

A: Defining "the longest short war" is not the function of a baseline strategy that has been designed to provide overall guidance to national and naval planning and programming efforts, and to catalyze strategic operational thinking in the Navy and elsewhere. History, however, tells us that wars are likely to be longer and broader in scope than anticipated. A short, Germany-only war is not envisioned. Whatever the length of the war, timely reinforcement and resupply of NATO forces in Europe would be vital. Even a brief conflict would exhaust NATO's war reserve stocks. Thus, maritime forces assist in the Central Front campaign by assuring reinforcement and resupply, bolstering our alliances worldwide, tying down Soviet forces on the flanks or diverting other Soviet forces to them, and, if required, through the direct projection of amphibious and/or tactical power. The maritime strategy does not, of course, envision the Navy winning a war by itself. As Secretary Lehman makes clear in his article, "Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory, but the loss of it will certainly assure defeat."

Q: HOW DO THE PHASES YOU SHOWED RELATE TO THE LAND BATTLE?

A: There is a close and direct relationship between the Maritime Strategy and actions on the Central Front.

In Phase I, the preconflict deployment period, maritime forces will move into the Soviet Sea Control/Denial Areas, while Army and Air Force units rapidly deploy to forward positions in Europe. The force deployment rate will attempt to place 10 divisions in Europe in 10 days.

When hostilities commence and maritime forces seek to establish maritime superiority during Phase II, Army and Air Force units will engage Warsaw Pact Armies in concert with our NATO allies.

During Phase III, strikes on the homeland flanks of the Soviet Union will complicate the Soviet strategic problem enough to preclude a shift of units to the Central Front. Reducing pressure in that critical theater and threatening the enemy's flanks will lead the Soviets to conclude that the military option is too costly.

E. THE PACIFIC VIEW AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

Q: THE STRATEGY ASSUMES THAT NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC CAN DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO A EUROPEAN CONFLICT. THIS NEEDS TO BE ELABORATED SINCE "IMPLIED LINKAGES ARE MOST UNCLEAR."

A: Pacific operations are important for several reasons. First, as both Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins make clear, many of our most important allies and much of our important trade are in the Pacific. One need not accept any particular assumptions about the conduct of Pacific nations in a future war to recognize that U. S. interests demand that we not abandon the region in time of conflict. Pacific operations are directly relevant to a European war. The threat of U. S. combat operations in the Pacific serves to tie down Soviet forces, particularly air forces that could otherwise be committed to a European conflict. Our understanding of Soviet strategy is that the Soviets would prefer a single-front war--which would be to their advantage, by all analyses. Just as our World War II experience indicated that secondary fronts were required to defeat Germany, it is essential to any successful strategy that the Soviets be faced with a multi-theater challenge--as opposed to their preferred situation. Thus, the prospect of a war occurring in Europe is, in part, deterred by our actions in the Pacific.

Q: "WHAT PREVENTS THE SUPERPOWERS FROM FIGHTING REGIONAL WARS ELSEWHERE? WHAT INTERESTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD MILITARILY INVOLVE OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, IF REGIONAL COMBAT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ERUPTED IN EAST ASIA? HOW WOULD SUCH CONFLICT AFFECT U. S. MARITIME STRATEGY?"

A: It is in large part the deterrent effect of our national military strategy, of which our maritime strategy is a key component, that prevents the superpowers from fighting wars anywhere. Should deterrence fail, regional wars between the superpowers are possible, but it is unlikely that--given the focus of Soviet military forces--they would remain regionally confined for very long. Globalization is not automatic, and the strategy does not consider it such. Indeed, the strategy recognizes that the flexibility of maritime forces to contain and resolve regional crises is among our most important contributions to maintaining peace.

F. MEDITERRANEAN/SOUTHERN FLANK

Q: "WHAT THREAT TO WHICH U. S./NATO OBJECTIVES" COULD JUSTIFY THREE CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, "A CLOSED BODY OF WATER?"

A: U. S. forces will be in the Mediterranean because that is where our allies are. Five NATO nations have Mediterranean coastlines; three of them lie entirely within the region. A coalition strategy requires that we depend on our allies and, in turn, that they be able to depend on us. Carrier battle forces in the Mediterranean will provide air support for the land battle and will destroy Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. The fact that the Mediterranean is "a closed body" of water means that mutual support between land-based and sea-based forces--which is a key element of current U. S. naval thought--is particularly important.

Q: WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF U. S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA?

A: Although U. S. CVBGs do not operate in the Black Sea during peacetime, U. S. carrier based assets will contribute to regional warfighting objectives during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. These include neutralizing the Soviet air threat in the region, assisting Allied forces with their sea control and sea denial missions, and helping to thwart any Soviet ground attacks against our NATO allies.

G. SUSTAINABILITY AND ATTRITION

Q: WON'T THE MARITIME STRATEGY PUT MANY OF OUR VALUABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN DANGER OF BEING SUNK OR PUT OUT OF ACTION, EARLY ON IN A WAR WITH THE SOVIETS?

A: No. The strategy has been designed to take those threats into account to dispose of them. Its forward features will contribute to keeping sizeable Soviet forces bottled up. Of course, we must not lose sight of the fact that deterring war is the fundamental objective of the Maritime Strategy but, should war occur, no Fleet Commander-in-Chief or Carrier Battle Force Commander will unnecessarily hazard his forces.

If war has broken out with the Soviets, powerful U. S. Carrier Battle Forces will form up in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific. A vigorous ASW campaign, pursued by U. S. and allied SSN and maritime patrol air will pressure and attrite the Soviet submarine fleet, allowing further forward movement of our carrier battle forces. Long-range Soviet naval aviation will be attrited in outer air battles, permitting additional forward movement of our carrier battle forces thereby increasing pressure on the Soviet flanks.

War is inherently risky and dangerous, and we expect to incur losses. But the Maritime Strategy does not disregard those risks and, in fact reduces them, by applying pressure to, and attriting Soviet forces which might otherwise be used to our disadvantage.

Q: "HOW WOULD THE PRACTICE OF GLOBAL, EARLY, FAIRLY EVENLY DISTRIBUTED NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS DURING THE TRANSITION TO WAR PERMIT THE U. S. NAVY, ALREADY SPREAD THIN, TO CONCENTRATE ITS COMBAT POWER AT DECISIVE POINTS?"

A: Such deployments are designed--in conjunction with movements of our sister services and allies--to cede no vital area to the Soviets by default. Consequently, the vital Northeast Atlantic, Northwest Pacific, and Mediterranean must certainly undergo rapid buildups of significant naval forces. Concentration of U. S. Navy combat power at decisive points is precisely the aim of the maritime strategy, a concentration rendered more potent by its coordination with other joint and combined forces. Again, the maritime strategy is only one component of our national military strategy, and requires more than U. S. naval forces to achieve its goals.

Q: "ADMIRAL WATKINS SAYS WE MUST "WEAR DOWN THE ENEMY." "IS A NAVAL STRATEGY OF ATTRITION BEST SUITED FOR THE UNITED STATES, CONSIDERING ... THE IMPERATIVE NEED TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY FORWARD DEPLOYED ELEMENTS OF THE U. S. ARMY AND AIR FORCE SOON AFTER HOSTILITIES COMMENCE?" WHAT ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED?

A: In calling for maritime forces to wear down the enemy, Admiral Watkins is recognizing that the Soviet fleet will not sortie en masse for a single climatic battle. But this fleet must still be destroyed as quickly as possible. If we cannot accomplish this, the residual Soviet naval force-in-being could interdict our resupply efforts and deny us the leverage of holding the Soviet homeland and Soviet strategic forces at risk. While many alternatives in the maritime strategy have been debated, few have been "discarded" irrevocably. As noted earlier, the strategy is flexible enough to deal with the key uncertainties of warfare. Nevertheless, a strategy requires making choices, and we have consciously chosen the approach we consider to be the most likely to achieve success.

Q: "WHAT IRREDUCIBLE DECISIONS [TO PREVENT LOSSES OF FORCES EARLY IN THE CONFLICT] MUST BE MADE, AND HOW WOULD THEY PREVENT LOSSES?"

A: A host of decisions will have to be made, as events unfold, to prevent losses of forces early in the conflict. Among these are decisions regarding rules of engagement, alliance solidarity, timing of forward movement and reserve mobilization, budgetary authority, industrial mobilization, commitments to friendly states which are not formal allies, positions vis-a-vis unfriendly states besides the Soviets, and resource allocation priorities, especially airlift. To the extent such decisions are made so as to bring the whole variety of U. S. allied, and friendly forces to bear quickly and appropriately against the enemy, losses will be prevented. If we were not confident of our ability to make such decisions, we would need to build a much larger navy to accommodate the strategy that would then be necessary. Predicting all these decisions in advance is neither possible nor prudent; history clearly teaches that wars do not lend themselves to pre-scripting. Wars are won by the side with a coherent strategy and the capability for implementation of flexible options as events unfold.

Q: "HOW COULD 15 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS ... ACCOMPLISH ALL WARTIME TASKS PRESCRIBED BY THE MARITIME STRATEGY?" HOW WOULD THEY AVOID ATTRITION AND HOW WOULD WE REPLACE LOST OR DAMAGED CARRIERS?"

A: Our carriers will accomplish the tasks set forth for them by operating in multi-carrier battle forces for mutual support and protection, and by operating in conjunction with allied forces and the forces of our sister services. They will undertake tasks sequentially within a given theater since, as Mr. Collins correctly points out, there will never be enough ships to do everything we would want to do simultaneously. We do not expect to avoid attrition and we recognize there are no replacements. Unfortunately, it is the nature of war that ships are sunk and men are killed. But we believe that, properly operated, our carrier battle forces will be able to fulfill their many missions.

Q: "WHAT AREA [OF THE 56,000 SQUARE MILES OVER WHICH A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IS DISPERSED] CONTAINS THE SHIPS, AS OPPOSED TO AIRCRAFT ON THE WING: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE OFFENSIVE STRIKING POWER OF EACH BATTLE GROUP IF ONE SHIP--THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER--WERE SUNK?"

A: The 56,000 square nautical miles Admiral Watkins cited was for ships; aircraft increase that combat are significantly. One reason for Navy interest in Tomahawk cruise missiles is to disperse offensive power so that some offensive capability remains even if a carrier is put out of action. Nevertheless, the carriers remain the heart of our combat capability; that is why the Navy does not propose single carrier battle groups, but rather multi-carrier battle forces where the loss of a single ship is less likely and the consequences of such a loss less severe.

Q: SOVIET NAVAL AIR FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO ATTACK USN CARRIERS BEFORE THEY ARE WITHIN RANGE TO ATTACK THE USSR. HOW WILL YOU HANDLE THE SOVIET AIR THREAT?

A: This question presupposes several conditions which in themselves are not certain or even probable.

First, it assumes that USN battle forces have not deployed forward early during time of increasing tension. One of the primary tenets of our National Military Strategy (and drawing from its guidance, the Maritime Strategy), is a continual forward presence and a rapid early forward movement during time of tension to bolster deterrence and increase preparedness for war should deterrence fail. The effect of this early posturing is to place carrier battle forces in forward areas within striking range of Soviet and Warsaw Pact targets. At the same time U. S. and allied forces, acting in a coalition, will establish a layered defense in depth in anticipated of potential Soviet aggression.

Secondly, in order for Soviet naval air to attack carriers, timely I&W information must be available to the Soviet commander. Unlike a fixed base such as Bitburg, Germany, the carrier battle force will range over thousands of square miles of sea. Soviet targeting information even only 6 hours old would allow the carrier to move anywhere within a 100,000 square mile area. Thus an attack on a carrier is a far more difficult problem for Soviet aviation than the targeting of fixed facilities.

A third assumption seems to be that the aircraft carrier is a ship devoid of protection and easy prey to Soviet air attack. Just the opposite is in fact true. The U. S. Navy operates our forces in battle forces comprised of multiple carrier and battle ship battle groups. The combined defensive strength of four to six squadrons of F-14's armed with Phoenix missiles, acting in concert with the long range surface to air missile defense of several Aegis ships, provide a formidable barrier extending 300-500 miles out from the battle force. Again the analogy is appropriate: U. S. naval forces are capable today of engaging enemy forces hundreds of miles before they can reach their missile launch ranges.

H. "WAR TERMINATION LEVERAGE" OR WHATEVER HAPPENED TO VICTORY?

Q: HOW CAN WE BE SURE THAT THE MARITIME STRATEGY IS THE RIGHT STRATEGY FOR OUR MARITIME FORCES?

A: We believe the Maritime Strategy to be the right strategy since it is the best strategy for enabling our maritime forces to make a strategic difference. First and foremost, the Maritime Strategy is a strategy of deterrence; we hope to avoid war with the Soviets by dissuading their leadership from exploiting a crisis to the point of armed conflict between our forces and those of Soviet Union. The full, forward movement of forces provided for during Phase I of the Maritime Strategy is designed to achieve that deterrent effect.

Should war occur, however, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy which the United States most counter. In that case, the Maritime Strategy is designed to ensure that such a war will not be the war the Soviets elect, but rather that they will have to face the prospect of a prolonged, global war. The Maritime Strategy provides for maritime forces to do just that.

Furthermore, war games, fleet operations, and intensive internal strategic analysis, debate, and scrutiny have all confirmed the validity of the strategic principles which underlie the Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Strategy is the right strategy for our Navy and for our nation. It will remain dynamic and responsive to the legitimate lessons and conclusions derived from war games, fleet operations, crisis response lessons learned, and from internal strategic analysis.

Q: WHAT IS MEANT BY "WAR TERMINATION ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THE ALLIES"? DOESN'T THAT JUST MEAN A DRAW OR STALEMATE? WHY CAN'T WE TRY TO WIN THE WAR AND ACHIEVE VICTORY?

A: War termination under conditions favorable to ourselves and our allies implies ending a conflict with the Soviet Union only after certain minimum preconditions have been met, such as the restoration of the physical integrity of our allies' borders. A draw or stalemate on the ground, with Soviet forces occupying some portion of allied territory, will not be considered an acceptable condition for war termination under the framework of our various alliance structures; consequently we will continue to fight until our allies' borders are restored. War will be terminated once territorial integrity is restored and the vital interest of alliance members are taken into account. Questions of retribution against an enemy who forced war upon defensive alliances or reparations for war damage may have to be considered, however the concept of "total victory" or "winning the war" will be difficult to apply against an enemy who still maintains the strategic nuclear capability to end our (and his) civilization.

I. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AND SEALIFT

Q: "HOW LONG WOULD IT NOW TAKE TO ASSEMBLE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS SCATTERED AROUND THE WORLD, [AND] THEN MOUNT A DIVISION-SIZED ASSAULT ON WELL-DEFENDED SHORES? TEN YEARS FROM NOW? HOW WOULD THAT ACTION AFFECT ALL OTHER THEATERS, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE STRIPPED OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES?"

A: Assembly of amphibious shipping would obviously take weeks, simply because of the transit times involved. This is entirely consistent with the strategy's rejection of the notion that only the first few days of the war matter. The flexibility to concentrate amphibious forces for one large assault or to leave them dispersed for smaller assaults in different theaters is one of the inherent advantages maritime forces offer the United States.

Q: "SEALIFT BY THE END OF THIS DECADE WILL BE ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT WHAT FORCES, WHERE, UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? HOW CAN IT BE ADEQUATE, IF UNABLE TO MOVE ALL IMPERATIVE LOADS, INCLUDING STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF HEAVY ATTRITION?"

A: Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate for the movement of military forces in a global war with the Soviets, under demanding assumptions governing the national military planning process. Should a number of variables change--such as the geographic origins of the global conflict, the number and type of U. S. and allied ships available, attrition rates, tempo of operations in each theater, etc.--our requirements will be altered. Consequently, the Department of Defense and the Navy constantly reevaluate their sealift needs, and this is reflected in refinements to the maritime strategy and to the sealift procurement program. U. S.-controlled sealift to transport strategic raw materials is projected to be available, but will in all likelihood, be inadequate. In the absence of the desired rebuilding of our merchant marine, alternative policies would have to be implemented--possibly including greater use of foreign-flag shipping, economic tightening of the belt at home, and/or use of ships currently planned to carry military cargo.

J. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

Q: HOW IMPORTANT ARE OUR ALLIES TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY?

A: The contributions of our allies are vital to successful execution of the strategy. Neither our Navy nor our nation can "go-it-alone," and we do not expect to. The navies of our allies have many capable ships and aircraft which can and, we trust, will play significant roles in the effort to deter war with the Soviet Union, and to prosecute a war against the Soviet Union should deterrence fail. Their contributions would be vital to success. Our Navy conducts frequent bilateral and multilateral discussions, numerous combined exercises and frequent foreign port visits, all of which underscore the importance with which we gauge the contributions of our allies. We need our allies and they need us. Those needs would be greatly amplified during a period of grave crisis or war with the Soviet Union. Specifically our allies have important ASW, AA, and ASUW roles, and vital Mine Warfare responsibilities.

Q: WHAT IS OUR STRATEGY SHOULD NATO DISINTEGRATE?

A: While it is unclear from the question whether you are hypothetically discussing a peace-time fracturing of the alliance, a lack of NATO unanimity during a crisis with the Soviet Union, or the political decision in some European capitals to withdraw from a NATO/Warsaw Pact War, the principle objectives of the Maritime Strategy remain valid.

The Maritime Strategy is founded on U. S. National Objectives and Guidance as articulated in National Security Decision Directives and Secretary of Defense authored Defense Guidance (DG). Specifically, NSDD 238 and the DG task U. S. Naval Forces to be able to defend the United States, North American continent, the NATO countries, critical sea lines of communication, our Pacific Allies and other allies world-wide.

To the degree that our National Objectives remain constant, then the Maritime Strategy remains valid.

Q: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH NAVY--PARTICULARLY ITS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS--IN THE EVENT OF NATO-WARSAW PACT HOSTILITIES.

A: French aircraft carriers are part of the French nuclear deterrent/response force and their operations would probably be guided by the French nuclear posture at the time. We might expect independent operations by the French CVs in the Western or Central Mediterranean Sea against naval threats, or under some circumstances coordinated French-U. S. operations against mutually agreed upon threats.

Q: HOW HAVE YOU INTEGRATED THIS STRATEGY WITH EUROPEAN WAR PLANS?

A: The Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) draw their guidance for formulating their war plans from MC-14/3, the NATO Military Strategy. Additionally, SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN, the three MNC's, have collectively articulated NATO's strategy for warfare at sea in th TRI-MNC Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). The U. S. Military Strategy draws from and is fully consistent with MC-14/3 and CONMAROPS.

A
Q: WHO DETERMINES WHAT MILITARY LEVERAGE IS APPLIED DURING PHASE I OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY?

A: Critical deployment decisions early in the pre-conflict phase will in general be made by the National Command Authority, made up of the President and Secretary of Defense, advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Specific decisions about force deployment will be made by unified CINCs. How much leverage is actually created by force movement is a function of the effect that those movements have on Soviet perceptions of overall strategic advantage.

Q: WHAT TYPE OF REACTION DO THE OTHER SERVICES HAVE TO THIS PRESENTATION?

A: The public record speaks for itself; both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their support for the Maritime Strategy during their testimony before Congress. That is because the strategy itself is the synthesis of the maritime elements within the U. S. National Military Strategy. The other Services have made no public pronouncements on the Maritime Strategy; it is the preferred baseline strategy for the employment of maritime forces, not land or air forces, and has been developed by professional naval officers. The Navy does not presume to comment on Army or Air Force organizational concepts.

Q: "HOW COULD THREATS TO SOVIETS SSBNS AND THE HOMELAND HELP CONFINE THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT, A PUBLIC OBJECTIVE OF U. S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY? DO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BELIEVE THAT U. S. OPERATIONS DESCRIBED WOULD PROVOKE NO SOVIET RETALIATION? ON WHAT BASIS?"

A: A key feature of the strategy is to use maritime forces to contain crises and prevent global war from occurring in the first place, thus fulfilling the traditional maritime role of limiting the scope of conflicts. Should global war nonetheless occur, aggressive use of maritime power-- including threats to the Soviet homeland and Soviet SSBNs-- could hasten an end to the war and limit Soviet options by demonstrating that escalation is not in the Soviet interest. This forward, aggressive ASW campaign also helps focus Soviet Navy attention on protecting SSBNs and on providing continued defense in depth.

- Forces dedicated to this defense in depth cannot attack SLOCs.
- Security of reinforcement and resupply effort is enhanced.
- The threat to CVBFs is rolled farther back.

Secretary Weinberger has testified regarding the anti-SSBN mission, noting that Soviet knowledge of our capabilities in this area helps discourage them from going to war. The Navy believes such operations will not draw retaliation (if "retaliation" means nuclear escalation), because such escalation would serve no useful Soviet purpose.

Soviet writings are quite clear that they will undertake attacks on nuclear-capable forces with conventional forces where they have the capability. Indeed, destruction of enemy means of nuclear warfare is a declared Soviet Navy mission. It is difficult to understand why a Soviet doctrine of conventional attacks on nuclear forces--which has existed for years--is benign while a comparable U. S. strategy is somehow too dangerous or escalatory. Lastly, character of Soviet SSBN losses in this campaign will be gradual and not likely to be perceived as preparation for a U. S. first strike.

Q: WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST NATO FORCES DURING A CONVENTIONAL WAR?

A: Soviet use of CW/BW weapons is not considered a preeminent concern to mobile naval forces in the open oceans. In terms of amphibious operations or fixed targets on land, such as air bases, the threat however, is much greater. The targeting issue is also more difficult at sea where environmental factors can have an impact on the success of a chemical weapon attack. Even if targetted successfully, wash-down capabilities and chemical protection measures would reduce the impact on maritime operations relative to its effect on land based operations.

It is important to keep in mind that chemical weapons, just like nuclear weapons, are viewed by the Soviets as weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets therefore would be extremely prudent regarding their use. In view of NATO's limited chemical weapon retaliatory capability, it has been NATO's declaratory position that Soviet first use of chemical weapons could result in a response by nuclear weapons. In view of this, it is considered highly unlikely that the Soviets would want to risk such a response.

Once the nuclear threshold has been crossed however, this becomes irrelevant. Chemical weapons use would then be considered in terms of military utility in a given scenario.

Q: WOULDN'T IT BE IN THE SOVIETS' INTEREST TO ESCALATE TO THE NUCLEAR LEVEL AT SEA SINCE OUR CONVENTIONAL NAVAL FORCES ARE CONSIDERED SUPERIOR AND BECAUSE THE SEA IS AN ISOLATED THEATER, WHERE NUCLEAR WAR COULD BE CONTAINED, WITH LITTLE OR NO COLLATERAL EFFECTS ASHORE?

A: The Soviet decision on whether to escalate to the nuclear level at sea is an important one with considerable political content, and will thus be made not by the Soviet Navy, but by the Soviet central leadership. In making this decision, the leadership will consider not just the concerns of the Soviet Navy for performing a key mission, but the entire military situation, in which--for the Soviets--the sea is only a secondary theater compared to the land war in Europe. Given these priorities, any Soviet decision to escalate will be driven more by events on land than at sea. In short, it is highly unlikely the Soviet central leadership will decide that the sea is the place to initiate a nuclear war simply because the Soviet Navy is having difficulty protecting its SSBNs and maritime flanks.

A nuclear war confined to the sea also does not take into account declared U. S. and allied policy on this matter, which holds that if the Soviets escalate to the nuclear level at sea, the United States and its allies reserve the right to respond with nuclear attacks on land targets. The Soviets cannot dismiss this policy, and consequently understand that escalation at sea might well lead to escalation on land, thus risking the destruction of Europe or the Soviet Union. This in itself strongly deters the Soviets from escalating at sea.

Finally, escalating to nuclear war at sea would undermine the Soviets' nuclear no-first-use doctrine, as it certainly is not in the U. S. or our allies' interest or military advantage to initiate a nuclear war at sea. Soviet first use at sea could well lower NATO's nuclear threshold in Europe, disrupting their well-laid plans ashore and making a Soviet conventional victory in Europe less likely.

^D
Q: HOW DO THE PHASES YOU SHOWED RELATE TO THE LAND BATTLE?

A: There is a close and direct relationship between the Maritime Strategy and actions on the Central Front.

In Phase I, the preconflict deployment period, maritime forces will move into the Soviet Sea Control/Denial Areas, while Army and Air Force units rapidly deploy to forward positions in Europe. The force deployment rate will attempt to place 10 divisions in Europe in 10 days.

When hostilities commence and maritime forces seek to establish maritime superiority during Phase II, Army and Air Force units will engage Warsaw Pact Armies in concert with our NATO allies.

During Phase III, strikes on the homeland flanks of the Soviet Union will complicate the Soviet strategic problem enough to preclude a shift of units to the Central Front. Reducing pressure in that critical theater and threatening the enemy's flanks will lead the Soviets to conclude that the military option is too costly.

F

Q: WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF U. S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA?

A: Although U. S. CVBGs do not operate in the Black Sea during peacetime, U. S. carrier based assets will contribute to regional warfighting objectives during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. These include neutralizing the Soviet air threat in the region, assisting Allied forces with their sea control and sea denial missions, and helping to thwart any Soviet ground attacks against our NATO allies.

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THE MARITIME STRATEGY

USNI PROFESSIONAL SEMINAR

In January the U.S. Naval Institute published a supplement to the Proceedings which has been called "...the most definitive and authoritative statements of THE MARITIME STRATEGY that are available in unclassified form."

The discussion of THE MARITIME STRATEGY will continue on 29 May 1986 at NAS Jacksonville as the Naval Institute gathers an impressive panel of experts for its 1986 professional seminar titled

THE MARITIME STRATEGY

You are invited to join us on 29 May as we focus on THE MARITIME STRATEGY and discuss the pros and cons of what Admiral Watkins, Secretary Lehman and General P.X. Kelley have presented in our January Supplement.

Our panel of experts will address all sides of the issue so that you can develop your own understanding of what is best for our nation's sea power and security.

All seminar attendees will receive a free copy of the USNI Supplement on the Maritime Strategy.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY

Date: 29 May 1986 **Time:** 1400-1600

Place: Base Theater, NAS Jacksonville

Moderator:

~~VICE ADMIRAL GERRY MILLER, USN (Ret.),
Former Commander, Sixth Fleet~~

MODERATOR:

CAPT J. A. BARBER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE

Panelists:

MR. ROBERT KOMER

Currently with the Rand Corporation, Mr. Komer is a former Under Secretary of Defense and has been called an "...arch critic of the naval strategy."

ADMIRAL WESLEY McDONALD, USN (Ret.)

Recently retired, Admiral McDonald's most recent billet was as CinC, U.S. Atlantic Command. He also served as CinC, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

MR. FRANCIS (Bing) WEST

Mr. West is currently a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is a consultant specializing in defense and international security.

VICE ADMIRAL HENRY C. MUSTIN, USN

Vice Admiral Mustin is currently Commander, Second Fleet, and has served as DepComNavSurfLant and as Director, Surface Combat Systems Division (OP-35).

1600 - 1700: U.S.N.I. RECEPTION (open bar)
Commissioned Officers' Club, NAS Jacksonville

Complete the attached postage paid reservation card and mail it today to ensure that you can participate in this important USNI Professional Seminar. Phone reservations can be made by calling (301) 268-6110, Ext. 238. Or you can call **TOLL FREE (800) 233-USNI**.

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Sign up a fellow officer for membership in the U.S. Naval Institute and you may attend the seminar and reception **FREE!** See the area on the reservation form designated for new members.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT ISN'T

The Maritime Strategy is a baseline strategy that is the nucleus from which our other strategy options emanate...it is the Navy's preferred Maritime Strategy...it considers national and coalition guidance, the various threats, force levels, and the inevitable trade-offs which occur during crisis and non-crisis operations.

In view of its crucial importance, we should have a clear understanding of what our Maritime Strategy is and what it isn't.

The Maritime Strategy is the maritime component of the national military strategy...it is consistent with national strategy documents and directives signed out by the Secretary of Defense and by the Commander-in-Chief.

The Maritime Strategy's central premise is to confront the Soviets with the prospect of a sustained global conflict...thus it is a global strategy which addresses a global threat... It is not, as it has been mistakenly characterized by some armchair strategists, a blueprint for a slugfest in the Norwegian Sea or for sailing aircraft carriers and battleships up and down the Volga River!

It is a strategy that can contribute directly to success in the central front campaign... it is not a strategy developed in contradistinction to a continental or central front strategy.

Some may have misunderstood other features of the strategy: It is not a detailed war plan, nor does it mandate firm time lines...it does not prescribe specific targets...it does not address tactics; those are the responsibilities of the Unified and Specified Commanders who are charged with fighting the wars.

It is a strategy of alliances, not an alternative to coalition warfare - to the contrary, it recognizes the vital importance of our allies. Further, it is a strategy which demands the highest degree of cooperation from our sister services.

The Maritime Strategy is a strategy that helps shape the development of Navy force structure and RDT and E efforts... it is not just a Washington-level exercise.

The Maritime Strategy is a dynamic and evolving set of concepts... it is not a rigid, or dogmatic treatise. Its adequacy is tested constantly by routine fleet operations, exercises, and war games.

In summary, the Maritime Strategy provides a framework for considering all uses of maritime power; it represents a renaissance in strategic thinking; it has focused Navy program development; and it has served as a catalyst for tactical development and war-fighting plan formulation in the fleet.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: TALKING POINTS

A. Definition

- Maritime Strategy (MARSTRAT) defined as the Global Maritime Elements of U. S. National Military Strategy.
- MARSTRAT is the U. S. Navy's preferred baseline strategy for conventional global war with the Soviet Union.
 - Strategy objectives are:
 1. Deterrence of conflict
 2. Escalation control
 3. Contribution to war termination on terms favorable to U. S.
 - MARSTRAT developed as a counter to the strategy of the Soviet Union; our strategic goal is not to impose defeat on the Soviets but to deny them a military victory.
 - MARSTRAT is a strategy of alliances, not a Navy "go-it-alone" plan. MARSTRAT demands the highest degree of cooperation with both allied forces and those of our sister services.
- Maritime Strategy helps to shape the Navy POM (Program Objective Memorandum) and influences the budget - not the other way around. Additionally, MARSTRAT guides the development of Navy force structure and RDT and E efforts.
- The Maritime Strategy is a flexible and dynamic set of concepts applicable across the spectrum of conflict. It is not a rigid dogma, but will continue to evolve based on changes to both the threat and the global environment in which our naval forces must operate.

B. Strategy Highpoints

- Baseline strategy with fundamental points of controlling key ocean areas and threatening the vital interests of the Soviet Union.
- Considers national and coalition guidance, threats and force levels.
- Maritime components of National Military Strategy.
- Designed to:
 - Control crisis
 - Deter war
 - If deterrence fails:
 - Destroy enemy maritime forces
 - Protect U. S./Allied sea lines
 - Support U. S./Allied land battles
 - Secure favorable war termination
- Addresses events along spectrum of conflict from peacetime presence to crisis response to global war.
- Takes into account the requirements of joint and allied operational commanders.
- Details on phases:

1. Phase I: "Deterrence or Transition to War"
 - Early, forward, decisive moves
 - Rapid, forward movement of U. S. naval forces world-wide
 - Strategic sealift surge
 - Allied navies/air forces already forward
2. Phase II: "Seize the Initiative"
 - Sea control forward ensures SLOC integrity (denies short war option)
 - Bring naval forces to bear on several axes
3. Phase III: "Carry the Fight to the Enemy"
 - Power projection options provide incentives for Soviets to deescalate/withdraw
 - Key is successful war termination, not unconventional surrender

C. What the strategy is not:

- Not a detailed war plan, nor does it dictate firm time lines
- Not a Navy "go-it-alone" strategy (it demands the highest degree of cooperation with sister services)
- Not an alternative to coalition warfare (it is a strategy of alliances)

D. Impact of Strategy on Force Structure: 600 Ship Navy Force Structure.

- Requirement for minimum of 600 ship Navy flows directly from Maritime Strategy.
- Strategy generates tactical imperatives and warfare tasks.
- Warfare tasks shape requirements in:
 - Force structure
 - Modernization of weapons and sensors
 - Readiness of major forces for combat
 - Sustainability measured in logistics readiness
- 600 ship Navy built around 15 deployable (combat ready) battle groups is the minimum force level required to meet strategic objectives.
- Since it is a minimum level, Navy must actively seek the assistance both of our allies and sister services. Hence the strategy demands increased attention to issues such as interoperability and commonality of communication links.
- Maritime Strategy provides foundation for building our annual budget. Navy's planning/programming cycle begins with re-examination of current strategy to identify:
 - strategic concerns and uncertainties
 - programs and plans to negate the most critical strategic concerns and to hedge against the most significant uncertainties.
 - conversely also helps to identify what we might term "accelerators" or actions which are net force multipliers.

- Decreases in ship procurement funding would cause the Navy to reexamine shipbuilding plan to consider the impact. Recommendations for program reduction would be made so as to minimize adverse effects on our ability to execute strategic concept and attain objective.

SECNAV quote: "Those who would argue that defense spending should be curtailed in times of deficit should ponder the cost of war itself, should deterrence fail for want of adequate preparedness."

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT ISN'T

The Maritime Strategy is a baseline strategy that is the nucleus from which our other strategy options emanate...it is the Navy's preferred Maritime Strategy...it considers national and coalition guidance, the various threats, force levels, and the inevitable trade-offs which occur during crisis and non-crisis operations.

In view of its crucial importance, we should have a clear understanding of what our Maritime Strategy is and what it isn't.

The Maritime Strategy is the maritime component of the national military strategy...it is consistent with national strategy documents and directives signed out by the Secretary of Defense and by the Commander-in-Chief.

The Maritime Strategy's central premise is to confront the Soviets with the prospect of a sustained global conflict...thus it is a global strategy which addresses a global threat... It is not, as it has been mistakenly characterized by some armchair strategists, a blueprint for a slugfest in the Norwegian Sea or for sailing aircraft carriers and battleships up and down the Volga River!

It is a strategy that can contribute directly to success in the central front campaign... it is not a strategy developed in contradistinction to a continental or central front strategy.

Some may have misunderstood other features of the strategy: It is not a detailed war plan, nor does it mandate firm time lines...it does not prescribe specific targets...it does not address tactics; those are the responsibilities of the Unified and Specified Commanders who are charged with fighting the wars.

It is a strategy of alliances, not an alternative to coalition warfare - to the contrary, it recognizes the vital importance of our allies. Further, it is a strategy which demands the highest degree of cooperation with our sister services.

The Maritime Strategy is a strategy that helps shape the development of Navy force structure and RDT and E efforts... it is not just a Washington-level exercise.

The Maritime Strategy is a dynamic and evolving set of concepts... it is not a rigid, or dogmatic treatise. Its adequacy is tested constantly by routine fleet operations, exercises, and war games.

In summary, the Maritime Strategy provides a framework for considering all uses of maritime power; it represents a renaissance in strategic thinking; it has focused Navy program development; and it has served as a catalyst for tactical development and war-fighting plan formulation in the fleet.

MARITIME STRATEGY

A. What it is:

- Baseline strategy with fundamental points of controlling key ocean areas and threatening the vital interests of the Soviet Union.
- Considers national and coalition guidance, threats and force levels.
- Maritime component of National Military Strategy.
- Designed to:
 - Control crisis
 - Deter war
 - If deterrence fails:
 - Destroy enemy maritime forces
 - Protect U. S./Allied sea lines
 - Support U. S./Allied land battles
 - Secure favorable war termination
- Addresses events along spectrum of conflict from peacetime presence to crisis response to global war.
- Takes into account the requirements of joint and allied operational commanders.
- Details on phases:
 1. Phase I: "Deterrence or Transition to War"
 - Early, forward, decisive moves
 - Rapid, forward movement of U. S. naval forces world-wide
 - Strategic sealift surge
 - Allied navies/air forces already forward
 2. Phase II: "Seize the Initiative"
 - Sea control forward ensures SLOC integrity (denies short war option)
 - Bring naval forces to bear on several axes
 3. Phase III: "Carry the Fight to the Enemy"
 - Power projection options provide incentives for Soviets to deescalate/withdraw
 - Key is successful war termination, not unconventional surrender

B. What the strategy is not:

- Not a detailed war plan, nor does it dictate firm time lines
- Not a Navy "go-it alone" strategy (it demands the highest degree of cooperation with sister services).
- Not an alternative to coalition warfare (it is a strategy of alliances)

C. Departure from Previous Strategy/Exercises in Strategy:

1. Strategy:
 - Between 1970-1974, USN strategy reflected four largely disaggregated goals:

- Power projection
- Open Ocean Sea control (emphasis was here)
- Presence
- Strategic deterrence
- In 1974 new CNO, ADM Holloway, considered the foregoing too compartmentalized. Attempted to frame U. S. Naval Strategy in terms of an offensively oriented and coordinated global operations (e.g., creation of "Battle" groups/forces). Owing to OSD pressure and guidance focus remained on defensive sea control - blunting threats to the SLOCs, etc...
- 1979-1980, ADM Hayward as new CNO reinvigorated concept of offensive sea control. Effort begun to articulate a Navy-wide strategy in which the Navy could make a strategic difference in the event of protracted conventional conflict. Point defense of SLOCs, began to be viewed as less important, and emphasis placed on sequential operations in high threat areas.
- Features of this new forward strategy:
 - Emphasis on offensive operations in and near enemy home waters (utility of big deck CV's)
 - Threatening those assets on flanks which Soviets hold dear
 - Global, coalition approach
 - Cooperation of/with sister services
- New SENAV Mr. Lehman in 1981 gave a substantial impetus to this strategy development effort. Directed that it be articulated in a Navy-wide Maritime Strategy designed to maximize the deterrence value of Navy/Marine Corps forces in peacetime, and to prevail if deterrence fails.
 - Effort accelerated and refined under present CNO, ADM Watkins
- Strategy has been relatively stable for the last four years, though it is continuously refined and applied to training and exercises

2. Exercises:

- Since 1981 the strategy has led to significantly greater emphasis on:
 - Joint/combined exercises with multiple CVBGs
 - More USN/joint/combined exercises in forward areas such as the Northern Pacific and Norwegian Sea

Examples:

- o OCEAN VENTURE 81. First time in 20 years 2 CVBGs in Norwegian Sea. Integrated all National Sensors. Objective: Transit high threat area, to launch strikes/reinforce N. Norway then proceed to North Sea and Bay of Biscay to launch strikes into Central Europe and conduct defended lane convoy exercise. Severe weather throughout.

- Exercise in July 1985 was largest exercise since 1975. Involved more than 3/4 of the Northern and Baltic Fleets. Designed to test ability of Soviets to engage NATO forces farther from the "vital" seas. The exercise demonstrated that there are dynamic and interactive strategies in competition. More than 50 Soviet surface vessels, 32 SSN's from the Northern Fleet, and seven diesel subs from the Baltic fleet were engaged.
- Soviets have also shown an improved capability to react quickly and effectively to an increasing number of regional crises in Middle East, Indian Ocean basin, Africa, and Southeast Asia. This too bespeaks a global strategy and a determination to compete wherever Soviet interests are at stake.

Impact of Strategy on Force Structure: 600 Ship Navy Force Structure.

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- Since it is a minimum level, Navy must actively seek the assistance both of our allies and sister services. Hence the strategy demands increased attention to issues such as interoperability and commonality of communication links.
- Maritime Strategy provides foundation for building our annual budget. Navy's planning/programming cycle begins with re-examination of current strategy to identify:
 - "strategy stoppers"/uncertainties
 - programs and plans to negate the most critical "strategy stoppers" and to hedge against most significant uncertainties.
 - conversely also helps to identify what we might term "accelerators" or actions which are net force multipliers.
- Decreases in ship procurement funding would cause the Navy to reexamine shipbuilding plan to consider the impact. Recommendations for program reduction would be made so as to minimize adverse effects on our ability to execute strategic concept and attain objective.

SECNAV quote: "Those who would argue that defense spending should be curtailed in times of deficit should ponder the cost of war itself, should deterrence fail for want of adequate preparedness."

- o NORTHERN WEDDING 82. 160 ships, 250 aircraft, 10 nations. Objective: Transit high threat area with amphibious task force and REFORGER shipping to conduct reinforcement on Northern Flank. Very successful.
- o FLEETEX 1-83. Objective: Evaluate CINCPAC OPLAN for defense of Aleutians. First battle force size exercise: Pacific Northwest since WWII. Integrated 3 CVBG battle force under theater commander.
- o READEX 2-83. Combined battle force exercise with two CVBG's and a surface SAG (USS Mississippi). First fleet exercise with USS Ticonderoga.
- o Current series of exercises for FY-85 including OCEAN SAFARI, FLEETEX-85, Solid Shield, etc, all designed to strengthen Navy's ability to carry out the Maritime Strategy.

3. Impact of Exercises/Experiences on Strategy:

- Navy's senior operational commanders review it individually and as a group twice a year.
- Tested repeatedly in war games/simulators particularly annual global war games at NWC in Newport.
- Fleet exercises become the "crucible" for testing refinements.
- Lessons have been learned from Falkland Islands war, Lebanon, the Grenada intervention, and our monitoring of Soviet exercises and deployments. Lessons learned factored into refinements of our strategy.

Impact of Navy's Maritime Strategy on Soviet Exercises:

- Soviet naval exercises increasing in scale and scope.
- The evolution of recent Soviet exercises reflects traditional concern with the security of the seaward approaches to USSR. Also, manifests determination to exploit improved capabilities in terms of more sophisticated surface/subsurface combatants and improved command and control. There also has been increased attention to combined arms in Soviet naval exercises. For example: exercise in September 1983 involved world-wide coordinated ops by more than 40 surface combatants, plus aircraft and submarines, in the Norwegian Sea, North Atlantic, Baltic Sea, Med, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and Northwest Pacific. Demonstrated Soviet ability to operate large numbers of naval forces simultaneously in several locations throughout the world.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

1

Q: What is the Maritime Strategy?

A: The Maritime Strategy provides the global maritime elements of United States national military strategy. The Maritime Strategy collects all strategic guidance from many sources into a single, cohesive framework that forms the nucleus from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Unified and Fleet Commanders' maritime military options emanate.

2

Q: Is the Maritime Strategy, then, a new strategy?

A: No. The strategy incorporates many well-known elements of United States and alliance planning for the use of maritime forces. It does not constitute a new national approach or a new national strategy. It is based on the fundamental tenet that we and our allies must, and will, stand collectively against the forces of the Soviet Union, as has been manifest by some forty years of mutual alliance cooperation and military planning on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. The Maritime Strategy is a codification of a number of strategic concepts and principles related to maritime operations that have been part of the national military strategy for some time. It reflects the best judgment of senior military leadership about the preferred strategic framework for meeting maritime responsibilities within the national military strategy. A carefully designed Maritime Strategy has always been an imperative for the United States, but the need for this sound strategy grew more important as the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge United States interests worldwide. Therefore, several years ago, the United States Navy reviewed and refined the existing maritime elements of our national strategy--elements with broad contours reasonably well understood, but which had not been submitted to the rigors inherent in codification. The result of that intensive effort was the Maritime Strategy, not a new strategy, but merely the articulation of the obvious character of modern deterrence and warfare, should deterrence fail and war occur.

3

Q: What is the Maritime Strategy's relationship with the National Military Strategy?

A: The basic underpinnings of the Maritime Strategy are its roots in our national military strategy. The essential elements of our national military strategy are built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity in a context of global coalition defense.

The principal sources of this strategy are to be found in: National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which are presidential decisions on national strategy; the alliance, treaties, and agreements we have with countries around the world; the Defense Guidance (DG); the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD); and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

The guidance contained within the latter group of documents is reflected in the concepts and plans of the Unified Commanders. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts of the Unified Commanders and their naval component commanders. The Maritime Strategy melds those plans and concepts, combining them with the maritime theater guidance in the other vital source documents of our national military strategy, to provide a preferred strategic design for action.

The Maritime Strategy's principal objective is deterrence but, should deterrence fail, it is designed to achieve war termination through application of a full-forward pressure strategy within the context of global coalition warfare. Thus, the Maritime Strategy is derivative from, but completely consistent with, and a vital part of our national military strategy.

4

Q: Isn't the Maritime Strategy just a programming document?

A: No. The Maritime Strategy is the baseline, integrated, coalition strategy encompassing all naval elements of a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Its programming aspects are secondary. Because it is so broad-based and comprehensive (as opposed to regionally-specific or prescriptive), it is able to serve as the underpinning for programmers to develop their annual requirements, at the same time driving the priorities of the research and development community in the direction that matters most--to support operational commanders in the execution of military strategy.

5

Q: Is the Maritime Strategy approved by JCS and OSD?

A: No. The Maritime Strategy is signed and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). It has been briefed to individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of the Defense (OSD) Staff. The Maritime Strategy's "approval" by JCS and OSD comes from the fact that it is derivative from and completely consistent with JCS and OSD guidance to the Navy and Marine Corps.

6

Q: Does the Navy expect the nation to adopt its Maritime Strategy as the national strategy of present and future, instead of a continental strategy--the kind we really need to defend Western Europe?

A: Maritime strategy is not in opposition to a continental strategy. Rather, if fact, it is a strategic framework containing a wide range of options relating to maritime elements of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. The Maritime Strategy provides that the defense of Western Europe is essential to the interests of the United States--and the strategy's primary thrust is oriented to that task. The Maritime Strategy protects the vital sea lines of communication providing logistics support to the Central Front in Europe. The strategy accomplishes that aim by defending United States' interests on the seas as far forward as possible, well within areas of ocean around Europe that the Soviets expect to control--and within which United States national military guidance requires the Navy to prevail with clear maritime superiority, "in harm's way."

7

Q: What is the Maritime Strategy's relationship to operational plans?

A: Its relationship is both derivative and advisory, drawn from those operational plans and formulating a strategic framework for their continuing development. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts of the Unified Commanders and their naval component commanders. The Maritime Strategy melds those plans and concepts, combining them with the maritime theater guidance in other vital source documents of our national military strategy. It presents a preferred strategic design for action in a framework of strategic options for operational commanders, thereby influencing the development of their operational plans.

8

Q: Won't certain actions envisioned by the Maritime Strategy prove provocative to the Soviet Union?

A: Not in our view. During a crisis, the Soviets would be contemplating the likelihood of the crisis evolving into open conflict between themselves and the United States, and of their prospects for success. It would be in their interests to limit such a conflict to a short war in one theater, and from their perspective the preferred theater would be Central Europe where they consider their prospects for success to be better than even. The forward movement of forces during Phase I or a crisis scenario is designed to enhance deterrence and not to be provocative. The multi-theater threatening of the Soviet Union denies them the ability to execute their preferred strategy. This approach confuses the Soviet correlation of forces calculation.

A forward, global movement of U. S. forces acting in concert with a forward movement of our allies' forces would present the Soviets the prospect of a global, conventional war of uncertain duration. That prospect would serve to heighten Soviet uncertainties, and to skew what they term the correlation of forces away from a decidedly Soviet advantage. Deterrence would be served well by this global movement.

Were war to occur, maritime operations on the Soviets' flanks would also serve to heighten their uncertainties. In sum, the Maritime Strategy is not provocative. It is designed first to deter war, but should war break out, to achieve war termination for the U. S. and our allies through application of a full-forward pressure strategy on the Soviet flanks which removes their theater specific "short" war option.

9
Q:

Won't the Maritime Strategy put many of our valuable aircraft carriers in danger of being sunk or put out of action, early on in a war with the Soviets?

A: No. The strategy has been designed to take those threats into account and to dispose of them. Its forward features will contribute to keeping sizeable Soviet forces bottled up. Of course, we must not lose sight of the fact that deterring war is the fundamental objective of the Maritime Strategy but, should war occur, no Fleet Commander-in-Chief or Carrier Battle Force Commander will unnecessarily hazard his forces.

If war has broken out with the Soviets, powerful U. S. Carrier Battle Forces will form up in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific. A vigorous ASW campaign pursued by U. S. and allied SSN and maritime patrol air will pressure and attrite the Soviet submarine fleet, allowing further forward movement of our carrier battle forces. Long-range Soviet naval aviation will be attrited in outer air battles, permitting additional forward movement of our carrier battle forces thereby increasing pressure on the Soviet flanks.

War is inherently risky and dangerous, and we expect to incur losses. But the Maritime Strategy does not disregard those risks and, in fact reduces them, by applying pressure to, and attriting Soviet forces which might otherwise be used to our disadvantage.

10

Q: How will the Maritime Strategy ensure we win a war against the Soviets, in light of Soviet conventional superiority in Central Europe?

A: We cannot, of course, ensure we will win a war. However, the Maritime Strategy is a strategy that contributes directly to success in the Central Front campaign because it provides for maritime operations directed against the vulnerable flanks of the Soviet Union. Those operations would serve to tie down forces, especially strike aircraft, which might otherwise be used to Soviet advantage against NATO ground and air forces in the Central Front. By exerting global pressure on the Soviet Union, the Maritime Strategy can help ease the burden for NATO forces in Europe and influence, both directly and indirectly, the result of the land battle.

·Additionally, the Maritime Strategy would contribute to achieving war termination on terms acceptable to us and our allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the Soviet homeland, and by changing the nuclear correlation of forces.

11

Q: Will the Maritime Strategy direct the movement of individual ships in wartime?

A: No, but it will influence decisions on such movements. It is important that one understand that the Maritime Strategy is not a detailed war plan, and does not contain specific instructions for individual ship or force movements. It will be up to the JCS and the CINCs to direct the movements of the forces in their theater during a war. Thus, while the CINCs will consult and be guided by the strategic concepts which underlie the Maritime Strategy and by the force employment options of the Maritime Strategy, the strategy is not a detailed war plan. That said, the Maritime Strategy's influence in development of such plans is substantial.

12

Q: How important are our allies to the Maritime Strategy?

A: The contributions of our allies are vital to successful execution of the strategy. Neither our Navy nor our nation can "go-it-alone," and we do not expect to. The navies of our allies have many capable ships and aircraft which can and, we trust, will play significant roles in the effort to deter war with the Soviet Union, and to prosecute a war against the Soviet Union should deterrence fail. Their contributions would be vital to success. Our Navy conducts frequent bilateral and multilateral discussions, numerous combined exercises and frequent foreign port visits, all of which underscore the importance with which we gauge the contributions of our allies. We need our allies and they need us. Those needs would be greatly amplified during a period of grave crisis or war with the Soviet Union. Specifically our allies have important ASW, AAW, and ASUW roles, and vital Mine Warfare responsibilities.

13

Q: How can we be sure that the Maritime Strategy is the right strategy for our maritime forces?

A: We believe the Maritime Strategy to be the right strategy since it is the best strategy for enabling our maritime forces to make a strategic difference. First and foremost, the Maritime Strategy is a strategy of deterrence; we hope to avoid war with the Soviets by dissuading their leadership from exploiting a crisis to the point of armed conflict between our forces and those of the Soviet Union. The full, forward movement of forces provided for during Phase I of the Maritime Strategy is designed to achieve that deterrent effect.

Should war occur, however, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy which the United States most counter. In that case, the Maritime Strategy is designed to ensure that such a war will not be the war the Soviets elect, but rather that they will have to face the prospect of a prolonged, global war. The Maritime Strategy provides for maritime forces to do just that.

Furthermore, war games, fleet operations, and intensive internal strategic analysis, debate, and scrutiny have all confirmed the validity of the strategic principles which underlie the Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Strategy is the right strategy for our Navy and for our nation. It will remain dynamic and responsive to the legitimate lessons and conclusions derived from war games, fleet operations, crisis response lessons learned, and from internal strategic analysis.

14

Q: Does the Maritime Strategy call for an anti-SSBN campaign?

A: The Maritime Strategy calls for an aggressive ASW campaign against all Soviet submarines, including SSBNs. Attrition of Soviet SSBNs during the course of the ASW campaign will reduce the attractiveness of nuclear escalation from the Soviet perspective, by changing the nuclear balance in our favor. We must remember that despite recent advances, the Soviets still lack the ASW capability to destroy United States SSBNs. In addition to the effect on what the Soviets term the correlation of forces by attrition of their SSBNs, our nuclear posture will be improved through the deployment of carriers and TOMAHAWK platforms around the periphery of the Soviet Union. The net effect of these actions will make Soviet resort to vertical escalation even less likely, since their reserve forces are being degraded and the United States' retaliatory posture is being enhanced. Thus the Maritime Strategy not only is designed to achieve favorable war termination should deterrence fail, but also to strengthen nuclear deterrence even during the course of a global, conventional war with the Soviet Union.

COMMONLY HEARD OBJECTIONS TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY

INVALID OBJECTIONS

(I.e. arguments that are flat out wrong)

- The Maritime Strategy is being advocated in contrast to a strategy of support for NATO.
 - Associated with Ambassador Robert Komer and other "NATO firsters"
 - Actually a resource issue -- 600 ship Navy vs. tanks and troops for Europe
 - COUNTER: Simply not true; strategy recognizes primacy of NATO. NATO is not the same as the central front and Navy need not fight on central front to support NATO.
- The strategy is a "Navy only" plan to fight the war without regard to the CINCS, the JCS or the NCA.
 - Associated with some non-Navy CINCS.
 - COUNTER: Misses point. In wartime we will do what President/Unified Commanders direct. Idea of Maritime Strategy is to offer professional consensus on how NCA should use maritime power.
- The strategy is a budget document only of interest in Washington.
 - Sometimes associated with retired flags or defense commentators.
 - Some validity to this charge in early days but not now.
 - COUNTER: Far more than budget document. Now being reflected in war plans and CINCS concepts. Represents the professional consensus of the senior Navy leadership on how to use maritime power.
- The strategy is John Lehman's or Jim Watkins' strategy and won't outlast them.
 - Associated with professional defense cynics.
 - COUNTER: Misses point; the strategy is the professional consensus of the senior leadership of the profession. All probable candidates for CNO are supporters.

COMMENTS REFLECTING DIFFERING STRATEGIC JUDGEMENTS

(I.e. where we have considered the issue but made a specific strategic choice that differs from the critics)

- Real problems is the collapse of Central Front due to a loss of the air war in Europe. Strategy ties up airpower that should be on central front.
 - Associated with tactical Air Force officers
 - Navy view is that we do more for the air war in Europe by tying down Soviet strike and air defense assets.

- Strategy is for conventional war but "we all know" war will be nuclear
 - Associated with DOD civilians with nuclear background
 - Navy view is that strategy will help keep war conventional; it will be more difficult to cross nuclear threshold in real life than in discussion.

- Strategy ignores high-technology assets (cruise missiles, etc) which are basis of U.S. advantage over Soviets
 - Associated with high-tech R&D exponents in and out of government
 - Navy view is that this comments misses the real strength of the strategy: that it deals only with current forces

- Strategy's emphasis on Pacific is irrelevant to the "real" war in Europe
 - Associated with NATO-oriented analysts
 - Navy view is that if Soviets want a war confined to Europe it stands to reason that we should not give them their preference.

COMMENTS WHICH ARE IN ESSENCE JUDGEMENT CALLS
(I.e. areas where no one can be sure who is right)

- Early deployments will be provocative
 - Associated with many in NATO (Lord Carrington's staff, for example)
 - Navy sees these as a deterrent rather than a provocation

- Sinking SSBNs will cause nuclear escalation
 - Associated with traditional strategic analysts who argue that second strike forces should remain secure.
 - Navy view is escalation serves no useful purpose for the Soviets. Soviets are more likely to be driven toward war termination. Note that SSBN attrition is gradual; never a single act that is dramatic enough to cause Soviets to escalate.

- We can't implement the strategy
 - Associated with some Navy officers who think that we can't survive if we attempt forward operations.
 - Consensus of the senior leadership is that the strategy can be executed.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

NJ
002
003
DIST:

IN REPLY REFER TO
3050
65/117
26 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: MARITIME STRATEGY

Encl: (1) Article Outline
(2) Draft International Security Article

1. International Security, the quarterly journal of Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs plans to devote much of their fall issue to maritime topics. The issue will open with two articles setting forth the case for and against the Maritime Strategy.

2. As Vice Admiral Jones told you, Lint Brooks was asked to write the piece supporting the Strategy. He has done so with substantial assistance from Rear Admiral Bill Pendley, Captain Mike Hughes, Captain Pete Swartz of OPA, and Captain Tom Da... of OP-603. An outline is at enclosure (1). The complete article, intended for an academic journal and thus footnoted and documented, is at enclosure (2).

3. When published, this article will continue the effort you began with your Proceedings article to ensure the Strategy is understood outside the Navy.

*Lint
Super Job.
get rid of
ref
72
"National
Strategic
Policy"
c/c: 06-*

V.R.,

P. D. Butcher

P. D. BUTCHER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans, Policy and Operations)

Copy to:
VCNO

P.S. As an aside, Lint was detacher on FRU., 4/25 @ which time I presented him with an COM with his wife in attendance.

164818

★★★★

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

30 April 1986

(OO Control #)

(Date)

CNO COMMENT SHEET

Subj: MARITIME STRATEGY

Ref: (a) OP-06 Memo 65/117 of 26 Apr 86

1. The CNO made the following comment/notation on referenced material:

"Lint -

Super job. Get rid of references to 'NSDD-72' and use 'National Strategic Policy'."

Action: CAPT Brooks

Copy to: OP-09
OP-06

Please provide answer/comment/report action taken not

later than _____

DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE FROM THE SEA:
AN ADVOCATE'S VIEW OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- Background and purpose of the strategy
- Shape programs, operations, professional education

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

- National Military Strategy
 - Drawn from NSDD 32 and other public statements
- Soviet Military Strategy
 - Part of overall integrated strategy
 - Main Soviet Navy missions are protecting homeland and defending SSBNs
- Available Forces
 - Stress that strategy is for today's forces as well as future

THE MARITIME STRATEGY DESCRIBED

- Straightforward description based on CNO Proceedings article

ASSUMPTIONS EXPLICIT AND IMPLIED

- Description of several assumptions inherent in the strategy, including:
 - As a global power, the United States has militarily important interests beyond NATO.
 - There will be no immediate collapse in Central Europe.
 - The best use of sea-based airpower is not directly in Central Europe.
 - Nuclear weapons use is not inevitable.
 - The approach to protecting the sea lanes must be different than in the past. (i.e. can't accept World War II levels of attrition).
 - NATO is not the same as the Central Front.
 - The European campaign is not the same as the war.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

- Containing crises and advancing United States policy goals
- Deterrence
- War Waging
 - Protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCS).
 - Directly supporting the land battle on the European flanks.
 - Tying down forces, especially air forces, which might otherwise be available for the European battle.
 - Denying the Soviets their preferred strategy.
 - Defending other allies.
- War Termination
 - Unique leverage by altering Soviet correlation of forces

- Limitations
 - The Maritime Strategy (like any other use of maritime power) cannot alone bring victory in a war against a major land power.
 - The United States Navy alone cannot implement the Maritime Strategy or any conceivable alternative to it. (allies and other services are needed)
 - There are inherent uncertainties in this or any other strategy that, by their nature, can never be resolved short of war.
 - There are plausible conflicts for which the Maritime Strategy (but not necessarily maritime power) is inapplicable. (i.e. limited wars not against the USSR aren't explicitly considered)

CRITICISMS VALID AND OTHERWISE

- Risk
 - Navy can't do it (Admiral Turner thesis). COUNTER: Professional consensus that we can.
 - Will cause escalation if we go north and, especially, if we attack SSBNs. COUNTER: Not valid (extended discussion of escalation and Soviet views of it).
- Relevance
 - Not relevant to Central Front. COUNTER: Tie down forces, defend SLOCS.
 - Pacific operations not relevant. COUNTER: Global responsibilities, tie down forces, deny Soviets their preferred strategy.
 - Critics miss war termination point as well as impact on deterrence when they question relevance.
- Resources
 - Real issue with many critics. Argue either:
 - The Navy doesn't have a real strategy, only a speech it uses for budget purposes. COUNTER: Critics misunderstand strategy; Navy has set forth its strategy in detail.
 - Even if the Maritime Strategy is a good idea, the United States can't afford it since building a capable fleet diverts resources that are needed to improve European defense. COUNTER: Not clear resources "saved" go to NATO; even if they do we compete on Soviet terms that way.

CONCLUSION

- Brief summary of argument
- Most important legacy is growing emphasis on strategic thinking within Navy.

DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE FROM THE SEA:
AN ADVOCATE'S VIEW OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY

by

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"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

- Sun Tzu, The Art of War

For the past five years Navy officers and their civilian colleagues have been taking to heart the centuries old dictum of the first great theorist of conflict. They have been studying war. While military reformers have focused on the need for improved military strategy in a land campaign, a renaissance of strategic thinking has been taking place within the United States Navy. This renaissance has been marked by a series of internal and external discussions and debates in which naval strategy has received more attention than in any peacetime era since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan.¹ One important result has been to weave traditional naval thinking into a coherent concept of using early, aggressive, global, forward deployment of maritime power both to deter war with the Soviet Union and to achieve U.S. war aims should deterrence fail. The concept, which has come to be called "The Maritime Strategy," was initially codified in classified internal Navy documents in 1982 and gradually revealed to public scrutiny through Congressional testimony and public statements culminating in a January 1986 Supplement to the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, the professional journal of the Navy and Marine Corps.² This supplement, jointly authored by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, has been called "the nearest thing to a British 'White Paper'...that we are likely to encounter in the American political system."³

Both uniformed and civilian experts agree that the days of separate land, sea and air strategies are long gone. No meaningful single-service strategy is possible in the modern era, a fact the Navy has recognized both in its increasingly frequent references to the Maritime Strategy as "the maritime component of

the National Military Strategy"⁴ and in its explicit inclusion of the contribution of Army and Air Force operations in describing the strategy.⁵ Given this, why have a concept and document like as the Maritime Strategy at all? Navy leaders give several reasons. First and foremost, the strategy embodies the professional consensus of the leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps on how to deter or, if necessary, fight, a future war. As such it "offers a global perspective to operational commanders" and "provides a foundation for advice to the National Command Authorities."⁶ In addition, the strategy gives "coherence and direction to the process of allocating money among competing types of ships and aircraft and different accounts for spare parts, missile systems, defense planning and the training of forces."⁷ Civilian observers quickly add another purpose, to ensure those programs are properly funded;⁸ unquestionably the Maritime Strategy has contributed to the Navy's success in articulating and justifying programs before Congress. To these reasons should be added one more, seldom explicitly expressed but important nonetheless. The strategy provides a common frame of reference for Navy and Marine Corps officers, a way of considering the purpose of their profession and a catalyst for strategic thought. While it has not been noted in the public debate, a significant effort is underway within the Navy to ensure its officers understand the strategy and their role in it and are active in its continued refinement. Thus the Maritime Strategy not only is the professional consensus of senior leaders as to how the Navy should fight today, but is also a vehicle for transmitting that vision to the future through programs, plans and people.

While the strategy represents the consensus of the Navy's military and civilian leadership on the best employment of maritime forces in war, it has been greeted with anything but consensus outside the Navy. Critics assert that "a primarily maritime strategy cannot adequately protect our vital interests in Eurasia because it cannot adequately deter a great land-based

power like the U.S.S.R."⁹ or that "even the appearance of such a campaign could trigger dire consequences,"¹⁰ or that "a classic strategic error has been made in devoting so much money to the aircraft carriers and all that goes with them."¹¹ Some of this criticism represents honest differences of opinion among reasonable men. Other critics misunderstand the strategy. Still others are simply wrong. Finally, some criticism reflects the fact the strategy does not support critics' preconceived force structure preferences. This essay seeks to demonstrate that, far from being irrelevant or dangerous, the ongoing renaissance in Navy strategic thinking offers a method of keeping the national strategy of the United States -- which includes both global commitments and a commitment to the continental defense of Europe -- viable in an era of nuclear parity and substantial imbalance in European land forces. Critics should welcome the new emphasis on forward maritime options as strengthening deterrence and aiding the nation in continuing the historic American guarantee of Western Europe's security while still denying the Soviets the initiative in other areas of the world.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The Maritime Strategy cannot be considered without first understanding the national military strategy it is intended to implement, the Soviet military strategy it is designed to counter, or the forces with which it would be implemented.

National Military Strategy

Self-styled military reformers often assert the United States has no national strategy.¹² Such a claim is understandable. No public document sets forth an overall military strategy except in generalities. The 99 page annual report of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, devotes only a page and a half to United States military strategy, describing its fundamental elements as "nuclear deterrence supported by negotiated arms reductions...strong

alliances; forward-deployed forces; a strong central reserve; freedom of the seas, air, and space; effective command and control; and good intelligence."¹³ Statements by civilian leaders are similarly general.¹⁴ Indeed, early in the Reagan administration the Secretary of Defense specifically rejected "early elaboration of some elaborate 'conceptual structure,' a full-fledged Reagan strategy."¹⁵

There is, however, a national security strategy, promulgated by the President on 20 May 1982 in National Security Decision Document (NSDD) 32. It designates the Soviets as the main military threat, rather than more common but less significant adversaries such as Libya. To counter this threat the strategy calls for balanced conventional forces, expects a war to be global, envisions sequential operations during that global conflict, places increasing importance on allied contributions, and directs the forward basing of United States forces in peacetime.¹⁶ "In what was probably its most significant strategy innovation, the Reagan administration consciously and formally substituted the threat of escalation in space and time for the threat of escalation in weapons," thus leading to a stress both on prolonged conventional conflict and on denying the Soviets the ability to choose the geographic limits of that conflict.¹⁷

In the developing and refining of the Maritime Strategy, Navy leaders took into account this NSDD, other Administration documents, the war plans of the Unified and Specified Commanders¹⁸ and the treaties and other agreements the United States has with 43 nations, the most important of which is the North Atlantic Treaty. From this series of documents, many unavailable to the public, Navy leaders concluded that "our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidarity."¹⁹ This view of American and NATO military strategy is the first factor shaping the Navy's Maritime Strategy.

Soviet Military Strategy

The second factor shaping the Maritime Strategy is Soviet military strategy and the role of the Soviet Navy within that strategy. The Maritime Strategy is based on a Soviet strategy which assumes any future war with the West "would be a decisive clash on a global scale....a coalition war;"²⁰ a war which the Soviets would prefer to fight with conventional weapons, but one which is "still a 'nuclear' war in the sense that the nuclear balance is constantly examined and evaluated in anticipation of possible escalation" and where the Soviets place "high priority on changing the nuclear balance, or as they term it, the nuclear correlation of forces, during conventional operations."²¹ Soviet war aims would be to defeat and occupy NATO, to neutralize the power of the United States and China, and to dominate the post-war world.²² The probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in such a global war would be a "combined arms assault against Europe where they would seek a quick and decisive victory....the Soviets would, of course, prefer to be able to concentrate on a single theater...."²³

The most important Soviet Navy roles in global war would be protecting (in Soviet terms, "ensuring the combat stability") Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and protecting the approaches to the Soviet homeland. Consistent with the Soviet stress on the nuclear correlation of forces, the Soviet Navy must give high priority to destroying Western sea-based nuclear assets, including aircraft carriers, SSBNs or ships equipped with land-attack cruise missiles, although for the foreseeable future the Soviets can expect to have essentially no capability to locate United States ballistic missile submarines. Other traditional naval roles, such as attacking reinforcement and resupply shipping or supporting the Soviet Army, are clearly secondary, at least at the start of a war.²⁴

To implement this strategy the bulk of the Soviet Navy must be used to protect defensive bastions near the Soviet Union, with only limited forces deployed into the broad ocean areas. This

essentially defensive initial role for the Soviet Navy is confirmed by the overwhelming majority of Soviet naval exercises.²⁵

Available Forces

The final factor shaping the Maritime Strategy is the structure of the military forces available to carry it out. As will be discussed more fully below, much public debate over strategy is really a debate over what forces the nation should procure for the future. While in theory strategy should determine forces, in practice the relationship is a reciprocal one, with available forces determining the limits of achievable strategy. The first duty of the professional military is to determine how to deter, or if necessary fight, a war today, and today's wars cannot be fought with future budgets. Thus while Navy leaders have repeatedly used the Maritime Strategy to justify the ongoing buildup (actually a "buildback") to the so-called 600-ship Navy,²⁶ they are equally quick to stress that the strategy is for "today's forces, today's capabilities, and today's threat," with "today's forces" invariably including those of allies, especially NATO.²⁷

THE MARITIME STRATEGY DESCRIBED

The strategy derived from these three factors is deliberately broad and general. Since it provides global guidance, rather than a detailed timetable, the strategy has no timelines attached. Based on the premise that "Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable component of our forces for deterring strategic nuclear war,"²⁸ it includes port visits and peacetime exercises to support alliances and short notice response in time of crisis to deter escalation. While recognizing the importance of these aspects of the strategy, the Navy has devoted most of its attention -- and critics have devoted almost all of theirs -- to those aspects of the strategy dealing with global conventional war.

The Maritime Strategy categorizes a global war as unfolding in three phases. In the first, Deterrence or the Transition to War, recognition that a specific international situation could lead to hostilities requires rapid, worldwide forward deployment of the Navy and Marine Corps (along with similar deployments by other services).²⁹ Actions taken in this phase will include deployment of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces (particularly submarines) into Soviet defensive bastions, the assembly and forward movement of multi-carrier battle forces, and embarkation of Marine amphibious forces. At the same time, execution of Presidential authority to call up Reserves and to place the Coast Guard under Navy control will help prepare for the implementation of plans for sealift to Europe. The massive nature of the forward movement (indicating national will) and its global nature (indicating an unwillingness to cede any area to the Soviets, to prioritize our allies, or to allow the Soviets their preferred strategy of concentrating on a single theater) are both designed to reinforce deterrence which being easily reversible if deterrence prevails.

Should deterrence fail, a second phase, Seizing the Initiative, comes into play. The object is establishment of sea control in key maritime areas as far forward and as rapidly as possible. United States and allied ASW forces will wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. Carrier battle forces will fight their way into the Norwegian Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Pacific approaches to the Soviet Union, depending on their location when hostilities begin. The integrated nature of modern naval warfare is especially relevant to this phase. For example, in the Norwegian Sea, air superiority is needed to permit operation of Maritime Patrol Air ASW aircraft which in turn are needed to destroy Soviet cruise-missile carrying submarines which in turn is necessary to protect aircraft carriers and missile ships which are required to ensure air superiority which is essential for offensive operations. The strategy assumes that

use of amphibious forces or the strike power of carrier battle forces against targets ashore may also be appropriate in this phase and Navy leaders specifically note that "the main threats to our fleet during this phase are ... missile carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation /land based in the Soviet Union/. The United States cannot allow our adversary to assume he will be able to attack the fleet with impunity from inviolable sanctuaries."³⁰ The last essential aspect of this phase is the establishment of a logistics structure to support sustained forward operations, including advanced bases, sealift and mobile logistics support forces.³¹

The final phase, Carrying the Fight to the Enemy, begins once sea control has been established and involves using carrier air power and Marine amphibious forces directly against targets ashore. At the same time the vigorous ASW campaign, including the campaign against Soviet SSBNs, would continue. Direct conventional attacks on the Soviet homeland, while not ruled out (or required) in earlier phases, would be more likely in this phase in order to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy.

Throughout all phases of the strategy, close cooperation with allied navies and with other services, particularly the United States Air Force, is mandatory. Naval operations in the Baltic and Black Sea, for example, would be almost entirely allied responsibilities. Allied contributions in Mediterranean and Norwegian Sea ASW and in worldwide control and protection of shipping would be significant. Consistent with the direction given by NSDD-32, the strategy envisions sequential operations, but within theaters rather than between them; the so-called "swing" strategy of earlier years, which envisioned much of the Pacific Fleet operating in the Atlantic in time of war, has been rejected.³²

The overall objectives of this strategy, in the words of Admiral Watkins, are to

- Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the conflict will be

- neither short nor localized.
- Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and as a necessary step for us to realize our objectives.
 - Influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power.
 - Terminate the war on terms acceptable to us and to our allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces.

ASSUMPTIONS EXPLICIT AND IMPLIED

In addition to embodying a specific view of United States and Soviet strategy, the Maritime Strategy incorporates a number of inherent assumptions, assumptions seldom made explicit by Navy spokesman. Among the more important of these are:

As a global power, the United States has militarily important interests beyond NATO. Europe and NATO are vital interests of the United States. The United States is committed to the defense of Europe by treaty, by its own self interest and by the simple fact that over three hundred thousand American troops are stationed on European soil. In addition, however, the United States has formal defense agreements of varying types with a number of nations outside Europe. Demonstrating American readiness to honor commitments to, for example, Japan and Korea, is also vital. An important function of any peacetime military strategy is declaratory; announcing a willingness to abandon Pacific allies in time of global war is unlikely to contribute to either deterrence or the furthering of peacetime foreign policy goals.

There will be no immediate collapse in Central Europe. Maritime power inherently requires time to take effect. If land and air forces in Germany are overrun in days, neither the Maritime Strategy nor any alternate use of seapower is likely to be able to prevent that event (although as will be argued below there is an implicit assumption that loss of Central Europe is the loss of a campaign, not a war).

The best use of sea-based airpower is not directly in Central Europe. In time of war, the Navy will, of course, fight wherever it is told to do so by the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders. The Maritime Strategy, among its other purposes, provides the pre-war professional consensus of the Navy's leadership about where it should be told to fight. While Navy leaders stress that the flexibility of seapower allows many options, there is an implicit assumption that Germany is not the optimum location for employing carrier air power. The relatively small increase in airpower from early arriving carriers, the command and control complexity of adding sea-based forces to a complex air war, and, above all, the fact that it is not in NATO's interest to allow the Soviets the luxury of their preferred strategy, all argue for using sea-based airpower to tie down and divert Soviet forces elsewhere rather than being used directly on the Central Front.³⁴

Nuclear weapons use is not inevitable. By altering the nuclear correlation of forces, the Maritime Strategy seeks to make nuclear escalation "a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day."³⁵ Lacking the ability to directly influence the nuclear decision ashore, however, the strategy must assume that early use of nuclear weapons in Europe is not required, since nuclear use at sea will almost certainly follow.³⁶

The approach to protecting the sea lanes must be different than in the past. It is arguable the allies won the World War II Battle of the Atlantic not by sinking submarines, but by building ships faster than they could be sunk. In that conflict, in both theaters, interdiction of strategic raw materials, the resources of war, was an important mission. It is tempting to use that experience as a model for the future. The strategy, however, recognizes "we will neither be able to tolerate attrition typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we require."³⁷ The most frequently discussed economic shipping is oil from the Persian

Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz; Navy "analysis shows the straits could be closed for about 2 months without...impacting... warfighting capability...."³⁸

NATO is not the same as the Central Front. Unlike other assumptions, this premise is frequently articulated by Navy leaders. It deserves mention none the less because of the erroneous charge the Maritime Strategy is somehow an alternative to NATO support. In contrast, the framers of the strategy clearly assume that defense of those allies on the flanks (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Turkey, Greece) must have equal priority with defense against a Soviet thrust in Germany since "No coalition of free nations can survive a strategy which begins by sacrificing its more exposed allies to a dubious military expediency."³⁹

The European campaign is not the same as the war. The Maritime Strategy, like the overall military strategy it supports, recognizes that the defense of Europe is vital to the United States. But as strategists outside government have pointed out, military leaders "need to consider unpleasant as well as satisfactory futures."⁴⁰ Destruction of the Soviet fleet and establishment of maritime superiority are necessary to prevent defeat in Europe and provide leverage for war termination; they also enable the United States to ensure its own security and to enhance deterrence by demonstrating the ability to continue the conflict regardless of the outcome in Europe.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Containing Crises and Advancing United States Policy Goals

While the attention and the debate in recent years has focused on those aspects of the strategy dealing with global war, the most common use of the United States navy is to advance United States foreign policy aims in circumstances short of global war. An important aspect of this role is responding to crises, both to contain specific crises and to demonstrate the national will that is an inseparable component of deterrence.

Success in such Third World efforts limits the expansion of Soviet influence and thus preserves the status quo.

Given innate Soviet conservatism and the lack of any plausible incentive for the Soviet Union to risk destruction in order to change the status quo, war in Europe is not likely to occur as a long-planned act of Soviet policy. Instead a modern equivalent of the downward spiral of August 1914 during a European crisis, perhaps one growing out of an extra-European situation, offers the most plausible path to war. Containing extra-European crises is, therefore, of obvious importance to the West. As the chief agent for dealing with Third World crises, the navy has a unique role to play in preventing escalation of a local problem to the point where war in Europe might seem necessary or inevitable to the Soviets. Navy spokesmen routinely emphasize that Navy and Marine Corps forces were used in 80% of the 250 instances of American military force employment since World War II, a point no less valid for being frequently stated.⁴¹

Deterrence

The most important contribution any strategy can make is to deter, or help deter, major war. Contemporary concepts of deterrence require a capability not only to inflict punishment but also to deny war aims by holding at risk the military capability of a potential aggressor. In addition, since deterrence exists in the mind of an adversary it depends on perceptions of national will as well as of national capabilities. How are navies and the Maritime Strategy relevant to deterrence?

First, maritime forces help demonstrate national will. Easy to move both physically and politically, the fleet can be deployed as a unilateral United States action, non-provocative because reversible. Fleet movements in time of crisis can both demonstrate American commitment to all her allies and, by their global nature, demonstrate that any war will not unfold along preferred Soviet lines. Such movements are an important

political deterrent, precluding the Soviets from believing they can coerce individual allies and fragment the alliance through what might be called a "political blitzkrieg."

Second, early forward fleet movements demonstrate that the Soviets will be able neither to cut off Europe from the United States nor to draw down remote theaters to reinforce Europe. Thus they must win quickly in Europe or not at all. Since, as John Mearsheimer has argued, the Soviets probably cannot win quickly, their remaining rational choice is to not attack at all.⁴²

Finally, the Maritime Strategy recognizes that the United States must deter, not a collection of American theoreticians and scholars, but a Soviet leadership that constantly calculates the nuclear correlation of forces and uses those calculations in the decision making process. By making it clear at the outset that Soviet SSBNs will be at risk in a conventional war, the strategy alters Soviet correlation of forces calculations, and thus enhances deterrence.⁴³

War Waging

War is the ultimate test of any strategy; a strategy useless in war cannot deter. Since Soviet strategy views Europe as central, a counter strategy must contribute directly or indirectly to the European battle. Maritime power can make four significant contributions:

Protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCS). Any strategy for war in Europe must ensure the unimpeded flow of supplies to Europe, the overwhelming majority of which must go by sea. The potential threat to these lines of communication represented by the Soviet submarine force is immense. Sea lane interdiction, however, is a lower priority Soviet Navy task than protecting sea-based strategic forces or homeland defense.⁴⁴ Thus early aggressive forward ASW operations directly protect the reinforcement and resupply of Europe, initially by tying down the Soviet submarine force in a pro-SSBN protective role and ultimately by destroying Soviet general purpose submarines.

Directly supporting the land battle on the European flanks. While Soviet literature suggests the Western TVD (NATO's Central Front) would be the scene of the decisive conflict, the Soviets also envision operations in the Northwestern TVD to seize northern Norway and in the Southwestern TVD to attack Thrace and to seize both sides of the Turkish straits.⁴⁵ A considerable fraction of the available combat power to thwart these thrusts is in the form of carrier based aircraft, with three or four aircraft carriers potentially available in each theater.⁴⁶ Success in such defense serves both military and political aims by interrupting Soviet strategy and ensuring that alliance cohesion is not sacrificed by an apparent unwillingness to defend all members of an alliance which extends from Norway to Turkey.

Tying down forces, especially air forces, which might otherwise be available for the European battle. Some 1700 Soviet tactical aircraft are deployed in the Far East TVD, compared to 2300 Soviet and 1600 other Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft available in the Western TVD.⁴⁷ While the more capable forces are in the European area, Far East tactical air forces could be made available to augment them if not pinned down by the necessity to defend against aggressive forward employment of American carrier and amphibious forces in the Pacific. There is no suggestion here that the Soviets necessarily plan on such a shift; rather the result of maritime operations in the Pacific will be to limit Soviet flexibility to respond to changing conditions.⁴⁸ Maritime forces are less likely to have an effect on a possible Soviet decision to shift ground forces from the Far Eastern to the Western TVD. Such forces are more difficult to transfer and are held in place by the constant Soviet need to consider the position of China. While it is exceptionally unlikely China would find it in her interest to become a belligerent, active use of naval power, by demonstrating a clear United States intent to remain a Pacific power, may encourage a Chinese posture of armed neutrality rather than cooperation, thus complicating Soviet decision making.

Denying the Soviets their preferred strategy. Two-front wars are difficult. While the United States and its allies cannot open a "second front" through maritime power, the global use of such power can have a similar strategic effect on the minds of Soviet leaders, and it is in the minds of leaders that decisions to continue or terminate wars are made. Denying the Soviets their preferred strategy of a short, single theater war is an important, though intangible, contribution of maritime forces.

In addition to contributions directly relevant to Europe, maritime power and the Maritime Strategy offer a means for defending other allies. NATO, while America's most important defense commitment, is not her only one. It is not possible to predict which nations will become involved in a global war with the Soviets; Soviet paranoia may cause them to see enemies all around them and to preemptively attack those enemies. Thus, for example, Japan might well be the target of Soviet aggression in the context of a global war.⁴⁹ If such allies are attacked, it will be important to defend them; if they are not, it may still be important to the United States' post-war position for them to realize they would have been defended.

War Termination

Should deterrence fail, the most important contribution of the Maritime Strategy, as well as the least understood, will be in war termination. While deterrence is chief component of United States policy, deterrence can fail. In that case maritime power may offer a unique form of war termination leverage through its ability to dramatically alter the nuclear balance, or, in Soviet terms, the nuclear correlation of forces.⁵⁰ While Soviet doctrine may be shifting towards a conventional war option, Soviet leaders still assume a war between the two superpowers has a high probability of escalating and therefore place great importance on the constant calculation and evaluation of the nuclear correlation of forces.

The Navy can alter those Soviet calculations, most obviously by attacking SSBNs which, as a probable component of Soviet strategic reserves, are central to correlation of forces calculations. Such attacks offer significant war termination leverage. In addition to altering the Soviet estimate of their own nuclear capabilities, maritime forces can also increase the magnitude of the nuclear threat the Soviets must face. As the Soviet fleet is eliminated, both carrier strike aircraft (which the Soviets view as a significant nuclear threat) and nuclear Tomahawk missiles will be in a position to threaten the Soviet homeland. Objectively, the incremental increase in allied nuclear capability these forces offer is small. Similarly, the destruction of even a large fraction of the Soviet SSBN force will result in only a limited decrease in total Soviet nuclear strike capability. But the Soviets, with their military conservatism and penchant for constant algebraic calculation of the correlation of forces, will not ignore either factor. They will evaluate the correlation of forces as growing constantly less favorable.

The fear that the war may escalate and the fact that such escalation is less and less attractive every day provides a powerful incentive for war termination. It is particularly powerful if combined with a prospect of stalemate on the Central Front (i.e. if NATO, while not winning there, is at least not losing), and with war termination terms which seek neither Soviet dismemberment nor the destruction of the socialist system in the Soviet Union, but rather the restoration of the status quo ante bellum.

Limitations

By its very nature, the Maritime Strategy considers only one aspect of United States military capability and only some of the military tasks United States armed forces might be required to undertake. Thus there are inherent limitations in its applicability and in the contribution maritime forces can make.

Among the more important are:

The Maritime Strategy (like any other use of maritime power) cannot alone bring victory in a war against a major land power. This point is self-evident; it needs to be stated nonetheless because -- in conversation if not in print -- maritime critics often act as though "maritimists" were claiming that nothing else but a navy is needed. They should (and probably do) know better. As the Secretary of the Navy has noted, "Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory but the loss of it will certainly assure defeat."⁵¹

The United States Navy alone cannot implement the Maritime Strategy or any conceivable alternative to it. Again the point is self-evident, again it requires restatement. Just as a land-based defense of Europe is inconceivable without allies, so too the Maritime Strategy cannot be implemented without the major contributions from allied navies, at a minimum those of NATO and, depending on circumstances, those of Japan and other non-NATO nations as well.

There are inherent uncertainties in this or any other strategy that, by their nature, can never be resolved short of war. One element of the strategy, for example, is early forward deployment of forces in time of grave crisis. From the coastal areas of the United States, it takes at least a week to reach the Norwegian Sea, at least nine days to reach the area off Japan, and at least ten days to reach the Mediterranean.⁵² Thus timely forward movement depends on receiving and reacting to warning. It is, by definition, impossible in advance to be certain such warning will be available, be recognized and, most important of all, be acted upon.⁵³

In a broader vein, the strategy seeks to counter a specific Soviet strategy and a specific Soviet Navy role within that strategy and thus might prove inappropriate to counter a different Soviet approach. If, for example, the Soviets were to deploy their entire submarine force to the open ocean before the outbreak of war, a very different United States approach to ASW

might be required. By adopting a declaratory strategy of threatening SSBNs, the United States limits Soviet options to change their strategy before hostilities; by conducting a successful forward ASW campaign NATO limits Soviet ability to adopt an alternate strategy during hostilities. While the strategy thus seeks to limit Soviet options, no one can be certain Soviet wartime strategy (or Soviet decisions on the use on non-use of nuclear weapons) will be as their pre-war doctrine suggests. Finally, should war come, the Maritime Strategy, like the national military strategy, seeks war termination on favorable terms and shares the inherent uncertainties embodied in such a goal.⁵⁴

There are plausible conflicts for which the Maritime Strategy (but not necessarily maritime power) is inapplicable. The first is a major conflict (Vietnam scale) not involving the Soviet Union. Drawing on NSDD-32 guidance that the Soviets are the main threat, the Maritime Strategy does not deal directly with such conflicts except in terms of crisis response and containment. Such a limitation is acceptable since only the Soviet Union offers a sufficient challenge to require a global strategic response. Similarly, the strategy does not deal with a regionally limited conflict outside Europe in which the United States and Soviet Union are directly involved. This latter point is significant in light of the occasional criticism that the Maritime Strategy is inconsistent with the national policy to limit the scope and intensity of war⁵⁵. The strategy deals with the case in which war has spread to Europe; in such a case war is, in essence, already global and a global maritime response is appropriate. There is little in Soviet doctrine to suggest that any stakes other than Europe are important enough for war with the United States; however and wherever a future war may start it will ultimately be over Europe.⁵⁶ If, however, a regional war does occur and does remain limited, a variation of the Maritime Strategy would be required. Although it was a major concern of the Navy in the 1950s and 1960s, this point has not been

addressed publicly by today's Navy leaders; presumably such a strategy would involve global operations on the high seas against Soviet general purpose forces and direct projection of power ashore within the region of conflict.

CRITICISMS VALID AND OTHERWISE

Critics of the Maritime Strategy focus on three major issues: risk, relevance, and resources. They argue the strategy won't accomplish anything important, is too dangerous, or costs too much, thus diverting resources from where they are really needed. In each case there is a legitimate issue buried in the criticism, but in each case the critics are, on balance, wrong.

Risk

Those who focus on risk have two concerns. The first is that the Navy is incapable of implementing such an aggressive and ambitious strategy. While the strategy deals with more than aircraft carrier operations, critics often frame their arguments as assertions about carrier vulnerability when operating in close proximity to the Soviet homeland.⁵⁷ Retired Admiral Stansfield Turner's name is frequently invoked to buttress the judgement that such operations are excessively risky. Admiral Turner finds it difficult "to believe thoughtful military planners would actually do this," is certain that no President "could possibly permit such a high risk effort,"⁵⁸ and suggests he has "yet to find one Admiral who believes the U.S. Navy would even attempt it."⁵⁹

Absent actual combat, estimates of the Navy's ability to operate carrier battle groups in so-called "high-threat" areas are professional military judgements, best made not by those who must rely on experience with past fleet conditions, but by the men who would have to carry out such operations today. Chief among this latter group is the Commander of NATO's Striking Fleet Atlantic. Writing recently, the current Commander, Vice Admiral

Henry Mustin, said

...concern over our forward strategy is frequently couched in terms of whether U.S. aircraft carriers...can survive in the Norwegian Sea in a conflict with the Soviet Union. No one has ever said that war with the Soviet Union would be easy. In war, ships get sunk, aircraft get shot down and people get killed. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be very formidable....they would not be invincible. The Striking Fleet can get ...assistance in beating down Soviet air attacks through joint operations with NATO AWACS and Norwegian air defenses -- including the U.S. Air Force -- and we have demonstrated this capability in exercises....The Soviets... acknowledge that a moving target ranging over thousands of square miles of blue water is much more survivable than a fixed airfield ashore. No one suggest that we should abandon all airfields in Norway at the start of hostilities, and yet some quake at the notion of less vulperable carriers operating hundreds of miles at sea.⁶⁰

The second risk issue concerns escalation. Critics see the strategy as provocative and likely to result in war rather than deterring nuclear war. They condemn the Pacific aspects of the strategy because it "threatens to fuel the arms race there," makes Japan "partner to a provocative strategy over which the Japanese have no influence," and "it seems virtually certain that such a conflict would 'go nuclear'."⁶¹ Others see dual capable Navy ships (i.e. those capable of employing both nuclear and conventional weapons) coupled with offensive forward operations as eroding "the time-honored firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat, raising the likelihood of nuclear war."⁶² Operating aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea to defend Norway or threaten Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula is also viewed by critics as risking escalation. The most serious criticisms, however, deal with the risks associated with attacking Soviet SSBNs.

To many, deliberate attacks on SSBNs seem dangerously escalatory and destabilizing, and must be avoided. One critic claims that of "all the possible Navy strategies, this one is the most likely to cause the other side to reach for nuclear

weapons."⁶³ Basing their logic on traditional theories of arms control, in which secure second strike strategic forces are indispensable to stability, such critics conclude that attacks on SSBNs offer the spectre of a "use or lose" situation. While critics of the first sort fear the strategy cannot succeed, critics focusing on escalation fear it will, and in doing so lead to nuclear war, perhaps at sea, perhaps involving a strategic nuclear exchange.

The facts are not so clear. With regard to Pacific operations, critics and advocates are seeing the opposite sides of the same coin. Forcing the Soviets to divert resources and attention from Europe is a strength of the strategy, not a weakness. Japan's central role arises not because the United States seeks to involve its allies in war, but because the United States has treaty obligations to defend Japan and there is good reason to believe the Soviets will threaten that nation regardless of what actions the United States takes. Little in history suggests that removing United States naval forces will reduce the chance of attack on Japan or, for that matter, of North Korean attack on United States and South Korean forces under cover of a more general war.

Concern that United States actions at sea could force the Soviets to use tactical nuclear weapons to counter American naval superiority, especially aircraft carriers, are based on a misreading of Soviet doctrine. The Soviets place nuclear weapons under the same tight political control as does in the United States. An extensive study of Soviet military literature found

...no literature evidence to support the view that release authority for tactical nuclear weapons is a Navy matter nor that a tactical nuclear war at sea alone would be initiated by the Soviets. The decision to initiate tactical nuclear war at sea appears neither a Navy decision nor one that will hinge on Navy matters.⁶⁴

Simply put, a nation with a military dominated by artillerymen, a strategy focused on land, and a doctrine that suggests nuclear war cannot be limited⁶⁵ is not going to cross the nuclear threshold based on at-sea tactical considerations.

This leaves the most difficult question: attacking SSBNs. The disagreement between those who see the risk of escalation and those who see war termination leverage in such attacks is based on very different models of escalation.⁶⁶ Those with intellectual roots in traditional arms control theory view threats to SSBNs, by general agreement the most secure component of strategic forces, as escalatory by definition. They further assume that this conclusion is universally valid, based on an objective reality that does not depend on the particular characteristics of the decision makers involved. Even viewing escalation through this lens, it is not clear the stability model is valid. The loss to conventional attack of one SSBN at a time over a period of days or weeks provides no single event sufficient to warrant the catastrophic decision to escalate to the strategic level.⁶⁷

Advocates of the anti-SSBN facet of the strategy, however, reject the conclusion that traditional arms control theory offers the proper escalation model. They base their assessment of escalation risks not on arms control theory, but on Soviet military doctrine. Soviet Navy acceptance of attacks on SSBNs as an integral component of conventional war has been made clear by such authoritative spokesmen as former Soviet Navy Commander Sergei Gorshkov, who noted several years ago that, among the "main efforts of a fleet," the "most important of them has become the use of the forces of the fleet against the naval strategic nuclear systems of the enemy with the aim of disrupting ...their strikes...."⁶⁸ Such an approach is no more than the at-sea analogue of the priority, long recognized in the West, which the Soviets give to the destruction of nuclear weapons during the conventional phase of the land war.

Not only have the Soviets long accepted anti-SSBN operations as a legitimate military task (and one they would undertake were they able to do so), they have also long assumed the United States will conduct such operations in time of war. Such an assumption is reasonable from the Soviet standpoint, both because

of doctrinal mirror-imaging and because senior naval officers in Congressional testimony have consistently stressed the practical difficulties of distinguishing between types of submarines and have indicated all types of submarines would be legitimate wartime targets.⁶⁹ Thus, while in the West the explicit acknowledgement that attacking SSBNs was a component of the overall Maritime Strategy was news,⁷⁰ in the Soviet Union it was not.⁷¹

Even if Soviet doctrine did not recognize the prospect of attacks on SSBNs as legitimate, escalation serves no useful Soviet purpose. A nuclear strike on the United States would result in immensely destructive retaliation. It is difficult to see why the Soviets would elect the physical destruction of their country unless the only alternative were its political destruction. If, therefore, allied war termination aims do not extend to the breakup of the Soviet state or the replacement of the Soviet leadership, but rather to some form of restoration of the status quo ante bellum, a Soviet nuclear strike is exceptionally unlikely.⁷²

Once again, critics and advocates are seeing two sides of the same coin. Almost by definition, any United States action important enough to exert war termination leverage carries some risk of escalation. But no war with the Soviet Union is without immense risk and the escalatory risk associated with conventional attacks on SSBN forces at sea should be acceptable as a unique means of gaining war termination leverage. Threatening SSBNs by conventional means carries far less risk of escalation than does the use of tactical nuclear weapons to restore a declining battlefield situation, a risk NATO has accepted for years.

Relevance

Quite apart from any notion of risk, some critics question the relevance of the strategy even if it works and even if it were risk free.⁷³ As one of the more prolific critics asserts, the "basic flaw in any maritime strategy is that, even if we,

swept the other superpower from the seas and pulverized all its naval bases this would not suffice to prevent it from dominating the European landmass."⁷⁴ The short answer to this criticism is that no one ever claimed it would. Even the most vigorous advocates of maritime power do not suggest it is a substitute for ground forces and airpower in Europe. Wars are won on land, but they can be lost at sea.

In discussing the issue of relevance, the proper issue is whether some alternate employment of maritime forces is more relevant. The first alternative critics propose deals with protecting the sea lanes to Europe. Critics and supporters alike agree with the need to protect United States resupply shipping. They differ over how such a mission should be accomplished. The Maritime Strategy seeks to discourage early Soviet forward deployments by adopting a declaratory strategy of threatening SSBNs, thus forcing the Soviets to withhold general purpose naval forces to protect those SSBNs, and to preclude later deployment by conducting a successful forward ASW campaign. In contrast, critics typically advocate what they term "defensive sea control," asking "why wouldn't a passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap protect our sea lanes? Why are U.S. maritime strategists concerned...if the Soviet Navy stays home?"⁷⁵

Advocates of such a Maginot Line strategy miss several points. First, of course, there is no reason to assume the Soviet Navy, particularly its attack submarine component, will "stay home" once it is clear the United States has no plans to challenge the bastions. Second, such a passive strategy cedes control of the Norwegian Sea (and of the coast of Norway) to the Soviets, violating the obligation of the United States to defend all its allies. Finally, such a strategy foregoes both the advantages to the ASW campaign of early deployments and the war termination and deterrent leverage attained by holding Soviet SSBNs at risk.

Critics recognize the relevance of SLOC protection: they simply disagree about how to do it. In contrast, critics question whether it matters if other aspects of the strategy are accomplished at all. Specific doubts have been raised about the warfighting relevance of forward power projection and of Pacific operations, and about the relevance to deterrence of the strategy as a whole.

While they take issue with using amphibious forces and carrier battle groups in forward power projection operations, critics have yet to come up with attractive alternatives. In theory, alternatives are available. Aircraft carriers could be used to engage Soviet clients and surrogates (China, Vietnam), used to augment the air battle over the Central Front, or maintained as some form of strategic reserve. Amphibious forces instead of being employed as envisioned in the Strategy,⁷⁶ could be committed early in the war to augment defenses in Europe or used against Third World Soviet surrogates. On examination none of these alternatives appears attractive.

Use of carriers against surrogates may be useful and necessary during the strategy's second phase (See the Initiative). One advantage of mobile, flexible forces is that they can be diverted to alternate tasks. But no operations against any surrogate appears to have as much prospect for direct influence over the Soviets as does the existing strategy. It is difficult to see how surrogates can be more relevant to a NATO battle than the NATO flanks themselves.⁷⁷ Using carriers as a strategic reserve denies the early benefits of mobile forces and fails to recognize that Soviet strategy increasingly assumes that "the role and significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations /has/ become incomparably greater."⁷⁸

The remaining option, using Marine Corps or carrier air power (perhaps without the carriers) in Central Europe is, therefore, the alternative critics presumably prefer. Several problems arise. First, because carriers are the chief United States tool for responding to crises, and because crisis control is an

important aspect of war prevention, one cannot be certain where carriers will be at a war's start, thus making integrated European planning difficult. Second, the 50-60 fighter and attack aircraft per carrier are a relatively small addition to the 2100 ground attack and 900 interceptor aircraft already in place in Europe⁷⁹ but, by virtue of their ability to threaten different areas, can tie down far more resources on the flanks and in the Pacific. Since Soviet aircraft in these areas are distributed across a wide battle area, carrier aircraft can be concentrated in numbers which do make a difference. Finally, while direct use of carrier airpower in Germany may or may not be more relevant to the Central Front, it is less relevant to NATO as a whole. NATO's effectiveness depends on its solidarity which in turns requires the defense of all its members.

Similar arguments apply to amphibious forces. They may be required to act against surrogates or, if the European ground war goes badly, to "support a NATO defense which is in extremis on the English Channel coast."⁸⁰ Given the option, however, their use as mobile reserves capable of forceable insertion and flexible operation seems preferable to some alternate plan for early integration of these comparatively light forces into the direct defense of Germany.

Maritime critics reserve a special form of criticism for Pacific forward operations. Accustomed to thinking in theater terms, critics doubt the relevance of global operations and urge against any form of horizontal escalation.⁸¹ Since Pacific operations are unlikely to draw ground forces from other theaters, they are deemed useless, even though the critics acknowledge the Soviets "might reinforce their Pacific Fleet air forces."⁸² But air power is exactly what will be crucial in a European war. The result the critics denigrate would be a clear gain for NATO forces; indeed, even if the Soviets do not reinforce the Far Eastern TVD but simply fail to draw on its resources to augment the West, maritime power will have made a significant contribution. The argument that a return to the

swing strategy of the 1970s would be more relevant than aggressive forward operations in the Pacific is fallacious even in terms of European defense; it is even more so when the political impact on America's Asian allies is taken into account.

The most important criticism to analyze is the allegation that the Maritime Strategy is irrelevant to deterrence. The first question is what it is one seeks to deter. Mearsheimer, for example, in focusing on deterrence of large-scale conventional attack in Europe, concludes that denying the Soviets the ability to conduct a blitzkrieg is both necessary and sufficient for deterrence, and that maritime forces are irrelevant to such denial.⁸³ This approach may be flawed. First, it ignores what was termed earlier a "political blitzkrieg," a fragmenting of the alliance in a crisis if the United States appears to be prioritizing allies. Second, conservative Soviet planners must consider unfavorable outcomes as well as favorable ones. Real decisions are always based on difficult judgements; by demonstrating an ability to deny the Soviets their preferred strategy and to adversely alter the nuclear correlation of forces, an announced Maritime Strategy can make failure of a blitzkrieg even more unattractive and thus enhance deterrence.

A more general problem with the assertion that maritime forces are irrelevant to deterrence is that it considers only the deterrence of large scale conventional attack in Europe. Such an attack is only likely to be considered after serious deterioration in the international situation. By responding to Soviet global encroachment, containing extra-European crises, demonstrating United States support for allies, and serving as a well-understood symbol of national will, maritime forces can deter the Soviets from the type of adventurism which could escalate into a grave crisis warranting Soviet consideration of war. This form of deterrence complements rather than substitutes for that provided by the ability to deny a blitzkrieg, just as wartime global maritime operations complement direct defense in Europe.

The most important problem with those who argue against the Maritime Strategy on grounds of its relevance is that they ignore the entire question of war termination. It often seems that, for all their stress on innovation at the theater level, at the strategic level critics are espousing a strategy whose components are reinforce Europe, pray for a miracle, and be ready to use nuclear weapons if no miracle occurs.⁸⁴ Ensuring alliance solidarity and providing war termination leverage appears to supporters of the Maritime Strategy to be eminently relevant.

Resources

Arguments about the relevance of the Maritime Strategy are often really arguments about resources, focusing not so much on how existing forces will be used as on what will be procured for the future.⁸⁵ Much debate about any strategy is really a debate about money. This is as it should be; strategy should guide resource allocation. Critics who recognize this thus attack the strategy precisely because it has helped justify the ongoing naval buildup. They assert either that there is no strategy, only a budget document, or that the United States can't afford to buy the Navy required to implement such a strategy. Neither point is valid.

The Navy doesn't have a real strategy, only a speech it uses for budget purposes. Professional Navy officers are frankly puzzled by this criticism. In contrast to the rather fuzzy descriptions of national strategy indicated above, the Maritime Strategy has been set forth in considerable detail.⁸⁶ Assertions that the Navy has no strategy are based on a misunderstanding of what strategy is. The official JCS definition of military strategy is the "art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force."⁸⁷ In this sense the Maritime Strategy, whether one endorses or condemns it, clearly qualifies as a global strategy. Operational details -- whether aircraft carriers will hide in the Norwegian fjords or fight

through the center of the Norwegian sea, whether the Sixth Fleet will engage Soviet forces in the Central Mediterranean before moving to the Aegean, how attack submarines and other ASW forces will balance their two important missions of attacking Soviet SSBNs in bastions and clearing Soviet anti-carrier forces from the approaches to the Soviet Union, the sequence in which the Pacific Fleet will operate over one-half the surface of the world, who will lay mines and when -- all these belong not in a global strategy, but in the theater campaign plans shaped by that strategy. Those who expect such details in the Maritime Strategy are confusing the operational or theater level of war with the global or strategic level.

Even if the Maritime Strategy is a good idea, the United States can't afford it since building a capable fleet diverts resources that are needed to improve European defense. Some critics who might be prepared to accept the validity of the strategy for current forces still conclude the United States cannot afford the type of future navy such a strategy implies. They argue that if only the funds devoted to new carrier battle groups were shifted to Central Front defense, NATO would be capable of successful direct defense, preserving the territorial integrity of the Alliance without the need for risky attacks on Soviet strategic forces. The argument is superficially plausible. On closer examination, however, it is flawed.

The first flaw is the implicit assumption that funds "saved" from the navy would be devoted to European defense in sufficient quantities to dramatically alter the situation. There is little in recent history to suggest such a proposition is valid. NATO's unwillingness to devote sufficient resources to direct defense in Europe is a long-standing problem; there is no logical reason to assume the Alliance would become more willing if the United States reduced spending on its navy.

The second flaw in this argument is a blurring of time frames. If increased conventional capability is a solution at all, it is a solution for the future. But strategists have an

obligation to decide how to fight a war today. While the Maritime Strategy logically requires the naval buildup which has come to be called the 600 ship navy, the strategy is valid today, before all of that navy is at sea. Alternatives aren't.

Finally, those who would shift resources away from maritime capabilities have elected to compete with the Soviets almost entirely on their terms. Such an approach -- opposing one of the largest land armies in history in a high intensity conflict on the territory of our allies -- carries with it the twin possibilities of the political collapse or the devastation of NATO, possibilities equally as grave as the escalation risks critics deplore.

CONCLUSION

The Maritime Strategy -- the early, aggressive, global use of naval power in a future war with the Soviet Union -- offers unique benefits, benefits that more than justify continuing to use the strategy today and procurement of the type of Navy which will allow its use in the future. While it is not without risk -- a risk free war with a nuclear superpower is a contradiction in terms -- its risks are not as great as critics assert. While maritime forces cannot alone prevent war or guarantee victory, they are directly relevant to deterrence, to a war in Europe, and to war termination. While there will always be arguments over resources in the American budgetary process, the strategy is clearly a prudent use of resources. Most of all, the Maritime Strategy offers a vehicle for the professional military, especially the Navy and Marine Corps, to apply sound strategic thinking to the solution of national problems. It is particularly ironic that military reformers, who applaud -- correctly -- the flexible operational and theater level concepts embodied in the Air-Land Battle Doctrine fail to see that these same concepts on a strategic and global scale underlie the Maritime Strategy.⁸⁸

The challenge for critics is not to bemoan Navy successes in budget battles, but rather to look for serious alternatives to those aspects of the Maritime Strategy they find unpalatable. As this paper demonstrates, there are serious objections to the alternatives most frequently set forth, objections which, to maritime advocates, are far more persuasive than any drawbacks the critics have yet discovered with the Maritime Strategy.

In Billy Budd, Melville noted that "Everything is for a time remarkable in navies." What has been remarkable about the United States Navy recently is its attention to strategy and to a reexamination of the fundamental purposes of maritime power in both deterrence and war. Like all intellectual trends, this one will not last forever. Its immediate legacy is a maritime component of national strategy which can contribute to deterrence, promote alliance solidarity, ensure unimpeded reinforcement of Europe, divert Soviet resources and attention from the Central Front, and provide unique war termination leverage. Its mid-term legacy is a larger and more capable Navy and an increased understanding within that Navy of the need to plan, train, and operate with other services and with allies. Its long-term legacy, perhaps the most important of all, is the forging of a new professional consensus on the purpose of the Navy and the importance of systematic thought and study. It is ironic that those outside the professional military who have called for more strategic thinking by those in uniform have failed to recognize that fact.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a bibliographic summary of the professional debate, see Captain Peter M. Swartz, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography," Supplement to United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 41-47 and his "1986 Addendum" to the bibliography, United States Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter cited as Proceedings) forthcoming. Both the volume of the literature and the seniority of the military authors are significant. See, for example, Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," Supplement to United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, p. 2-17; Admiral Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," Proceedings Vol. 111, No. 8 (August 1985), pp. 34-38; Admiral Wesley McDonald, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, Vol. 111, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 46-53; Vice Admiral H.C. Mustin "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea," Naval War College Review (hereafter cited as NWC Review), Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (March-April 1986), pp. 2-7. Contrast these articles by the Chief of Naval Operations, Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and Commander of NATO's Striking Fleet Atlantic, all appearing within eight months, with the historical paucity of articles on strategy in Navy professional literature documented in Linton F. Brooks, "An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in Their Professional Journal," NWC Review Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January-February 1980), pp. 46-56. Only three articles by flag officers on any aspect of strategy appeared in a typical five year period in the 1960s. Of 719 articles in Proceedings during 1964-1968, only two were directly concerned with overall naval strategy.

2. The term "Maritime Strategy" has two meanings. It refers physically to a series of briefings at various levels of classification maintained by the Strategic Concepts Group of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. A scripted version of this briefing is extensively distributed throughout the Navy over the signature of the Chief of Naval Operations and is frequently updated. More generally, "Maritime Strategy" refers to the overall professional consensus of Navy and Marine Corps leaders on the proper use of seapower; it is in this second sense the term is used in this essay.

3. James A. Barber, Jr., "From the Executive Director," Supplement to United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, p. 1.

4. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 4.

5. Ibid., p. 5.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. John F. Lehman, Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy," Supplement to United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, p. 36.

8. Norman Friedman, "US Maritime Strategy," International Defense Review, Vol. 18, No. 7 (1985), p. 1072.

9. Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Publishers, 1984), p. 67.
10. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank" in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 100.
11. Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984), p. 264.
12. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War, passim., for example.
13. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1987, p. 8. The discussion of strategy is found on pp. 7-9.
14. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration, 1981-1982," in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 82-116.
15. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration," Address, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, June 17, 1981, quoted in Huntington, "Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration," p. 89.
16. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY 85: Part 8, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 3854 describes key elements of NSDD as seen by the Navy. These significant hearings, joint testimony of the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, occurred March 14, 1984. Hereafter cited as FY 85 SASC Hearings. See also Huntington, "Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration," pp. 92-102.
17. Huntington, "Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration," p. 101.
18. The commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, are by law responsible for planning for actual combat operations. Unified commands include the Atlantic, Pacific, European, Southern (Central and South America), Central (Middle East), Space and Readiness Commands. The Atlantic, European (which includes the Mediterranean), and Pacific (which includes the Indian Ocean) are most relevant to naval forces. Specified commands include those with forces of a single service only, presently the Strategic Air Command and Military Airlift Command.
19. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 4.
20. Soviet Military Power 1986, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 10. Discussion of Soviet strategy and doctrine is drawn from this publication; Watkins, "Maritime Strategy;" Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985); and the testimony of Rear Admiral John Butts, Director of Naval Intelligence, Senate

Armed Services Committee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY 86: Part 8, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 4344-4370. While excellent and accurate non-government publications are available on these topics, these references are more representative of the official viewpoint and thus of actual influences on the Maritime Strategy.

21. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 7. The Soviet stress is based on the view a war "would probably escalate to nuclear conflict," although they would prefer it remain conventional. Testimony of Rear Admiral Butts, p. 4367. This view may be changing. For a detailed discussion of evidence that Soviet doctrine contemplates conventional war, see James M. McConnell, "Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development," World Politics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (April 1985), pp. 317-343. See also fn. 65.

22. Soviet Military Power 1986, pp. 13-14.

23. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 7.

24. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 7; Soviet Navy missions are described in Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 11-18. On the vulnerability of United States SSBNs, although occasional press allegations are made that such SSBNs will be vulnerable in the near future, CIA officials testified on June 26, 1985 that "we do not believe there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could pose any significant threat to U.S. SSBNs on patrol." Cited in Jonathan E. Medelia, "Trident Program," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, February 6, 1986.

25. See the chart of Soviet observed exercises in Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 7.

26. The term "600 ship Navy" refers not only to a specific size but also to a specific composition, including 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship battle groups, 100 attack submarines, amphibious shipping for the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amphibious brigade, and "an adequate number" of ballistic missile submarines. See, among many others, Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy," p. 35.

27. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 4.

28. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 7. See also Figure 3, p. 8, for a curve invariably used in Navy briefings showing a "Spectrum of Conflict" from peacetime presence to strategic nuclear war. Despite this there is no public explication of the Navy's role in strategic nuclear war beyond simple assertions of the importance of SSBN survivability. Unless otherwise noted the remainder of the description of the strategy is from Watkins, "Maritime Strategy."

29. The stress on early movement results from the distances involved, the importance of attack submarines reaching forward areas before conflict begins and the belief early forward operations have deterrent value. U.S. attack submarines have been

surge deployed to verify their ability to conduct such early forward movements. FY 85 SASC Hearings, p. 3888.

30. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 12.

31. There is an old military saying that "amateurs discuss strategy; professionals discuss logistics." One of the important and little noticed results of the growing prominence of the strategy within the Navy is a renewed interest in wartime logistics support.

32. On the Pacific roots of the Strategy see Harlan K. Ullman, "The Pacific and U. S. Naval Policy," Naval Forces, Vol. VI, No. VI (1985), pp. 36-48. On the current situation, including why a swing strategy is wrong, see Foley, "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," pp. 34-38.

33. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 14.

34. For an alternate view see Captain Andrew C. Jampoler, "A Central Role for Naval Forces?...to Support the Land Battle," NWC Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 6 (November-December 1984), pp. 4-17.

35. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 14.

36. Given the stated policy of NATO to use nuclear weapons if necessary this is a significant assumption. In a September 1983 interview, for example, General Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said "if we are attacked conventionally, we can only sustain ourselves conventionally for a relatively short time. I then will be forced to...ask for the authorization...to use nuclear weapons." Quoted in Armed Forces Journal International (September 1983) p. 74. For an argument that an immediate collapse requiring nuclear use will not occur see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 165-188. The unlikelyhood of initial nuclear use at sea is discussed below; see fn. 64 and accompanying text.

37. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 11.

38. FY 85 SASC Hearings, p. 3854.

39. Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy," p. 37.

40. Colin S. Gray, "Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, Vol. 112, No. 2 (February 1986), p. 41. A similar point is made in F. J. West, Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," NWC Review, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5 (September-October 1985), pp. 5-19.

41. Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," p. 8.

42. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence. Since Mearsheimer argues that denial of a quick victory is, in itself, sufficient for deterrence, he would, of course reject the argument that early fleet movements have utility. Even in terms of his own theory, this conclusion ignores the risk of a political blitzkrieg.

43. This point and the resultant escalation risks are discussed at more length below.

44. Soviet Military Power 1986, pp. 88-89.

45. Ibid., pp. 61-62. TVD stands for "Teatr Voennykh Deistvii" or "Theater of Military Operations." TVDs are the basic Soviet organizational structure for planning strategic operations. See ibid. pp. 11-14 for additional details.

46. Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy," p. 36 gives somewhat larger numbers; these relate to the future when all of the planned 15 carrier battle groups are available.

47. Soviet Military Power 1986, p. 13.

48. For the effect of Far East operations--or lack thereof--on Central/East Europe in World War II see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to Berlin (Vol. II) (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1983), especially Vol. I pp. 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295 and Vol. II, pp. 43, 132, 156.

49. Soviet Military Power, 1986, p. 63.

50. The discussion of both war termination and the escalation considerations associated with it is drawn from Linton F. Brooks, "War Termination Through Maritime Leverage," in Keith Dunn, ed., Conflict Termination and Military Strategy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, forthcoming).

51. Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy," p. 36.

52. These figures assume a 20 knot speed of advance which may well be optimistic under some scenarios.

53. Early forward fleet movement, which can be unilaterally undertaken by the United States, not only can be done in advance of NATO as a body recognizing the extent of a crisis, but also may serve a "pump priming" function in convincing allies to act.

54. Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) documents the inherent difficulty of war termination and the tendency of states to continue fighting well past the point where they "should" stop. These problems apply to any attempt at war termination, including the approach inherent in the Maritime Strategy. A particular problem in a war with the Soviet Union is ensuring United States war aims are not perceived as extending to the destruction of the Soviet state or the replacement of Communist party control. In commenting on an early draft of Brooks, "War Termination," Steven Cimbala observed the Soviets may not perceive United States war aims as limited if their homeland and strategic forces are at risk and second echelon forces are being attacked on Warsaw Pact (or even Soviet) territory. This underscores the need for some method of communicating the nature of U.S. war aims during hostilities.

55. See, for example, John Collins, "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings, Vol. 112, No. 2 (March 1986), p. 20.

56. A key consideration in responding to such wars is the prospect of United States forces being maldeployed should the conflict spread. This problem is somewhat less severe for naval forces because of their mobility.

57. "To venture U. S. carrier battle groups close enough to the Soviet Union to launch air strikes on the Soviet Navy's home ports is to venture into the jaws of defeat." Jeffery Record, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/1984), p. 13.

58. Admiral Stansfield Turner and Captain George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Fall 1982), p. 126.

59. Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Comment and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982/1983) p. 457.

60. Mustin, "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea," p. 3. A related argument is the extent to which the use of nuclear weapons might make the Navy unable to carry out its strategy. See, for example, the questions of Senator Sam Nunn in FY 85 SASC Hearings, pp. 3878-3879. See fn. 64 and accompanying text for reasons why such use is unlikely. There is no open-source evidence the Navy has a coherent plan for continuing or modifying the Maritime Strategy should nuclear weapons be used. See Captain Linton F. Brooks, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare," Proceedings, Vol. 106, No 1 (January 1980), pp. 28-33; Lieutenant Commander T. Wood Parker, "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy," NWC Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (January-February 1980), pp. 3-16; and Robert C. Powers, "The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on Naval Strategy," Military Science and Technology, Vol. 1, No. 5 (October 1981) on the impact of tactical nuclear weapons on war at sea. Despite the title of the last, none deal with strategy.

61. William M. Arkin and David Chappell, "Forward Offensive Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the Pacific," World Policy Journal, Vol. II, No. 3 (Summer 1985), pp. 482, 288, 492.

62. Michael T. Klare, "Securing the Firebreak," World Policy Journal, Vol. II, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 229. See also Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War?" and Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/1986), p. 3-31 for similar points.

63. Barry Posen, quoted in Michael R. Gordon, "Navy Says in a Nonnuclear War It Might Attack Soviet A-Arms," New York Times, January 7, 1986, p. A14.

64. James John Tritten, Declaratory Policy for the Strategic Employment of the Soviet Navy, RAND Report P-7005 (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1984), p. 210. Tritten's conclusions are based on a content analysis of over 260 documents authored by or in the name of the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy or the Soviet Minister of Defense. See also Donald C. Daniel, ASW and Superpower Stability (London: IISS, forthcoming), especially chapter 6. Daniel argues that since it is impossible to prevent some retaliation, escalation will not occur unless the Soviets believe the United States is about to launch a first strike.

65. "Any so-called limited use of nuclear facilities will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear arsenal." Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogharkov, "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day," Moscow Krasnaya Zveda, p. 3.

66. I am indebted to Barry Posen for this point.

67. Much of the discussion of Soviet response to SSBN losses is based on insights provided by Bradford Dismukes of the Center for Naval Analysis, both in personal discussion and in his

npublished CNA paper "Pros and Cons of the Pro-SSBN Mission; What will the future bring?" June 1980.

68. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov, The Seapower of the State, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 221.

69. John Perse, U.S. Declaratory Policy on Soviet SSBN Security, (Arlington, Va: Center for Naval Analysis, forthcoming).

70. Gordon, "Navy Might Attack Soviet A-Arms in Nonnuclear War," ignores all aspects of the strategy except anti-SSBN operations. A similar exclusive anti-SSBN focus is found in other press accounts. Swartz, "1986 Addendum."

71. Valentin Falin, "Back to the Stone Age," Izvestiya, January 23, 1986 p. 5 and January 24, 1986, p. 5 provides a strident Soviet attack on the Watkins article, replete with quotes such as "It is hardly possible to imagine anything worse." Of the 26 paragraphs in the two articles only three deal with anti-SSBN operations, primarily as a vehicle to attack general United States nuclear policy and the Strategic Defense Initiative. There is no suggestion such operations are either new or impermissible.

72. Absence of escalation, of course, is not the same as successful termination. See fn. 54 for war termination difficulties.

73. Risk and relevance are obviously related. Those who believe forward maritime operations contribute little will see no point in accepting even minimal risk.

74. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?, p. 106.

75. Collins, "Comment and Discussion," p. 20. A similar argument is found in Turner and Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected." Even recognizing that Turner and Thibault are discussing future forces more than current strategy, their article is curious. While discussing sea control to ensure resupply they appear to ignore both ASW and Soviet submarines.

76. General P.X. Kelly, Commandant of the Marine Corps and Major Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr., "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," Supplement to United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, p. 18-19.

77. The sole exception is Cuba. "It will be a real problem to get merchantmen moving through this area...until Cuba is taken care of either politically or militarily." Lehman, FY 85 SASC Hearings, p. 3870. To avoid diverting forces, Cuba must be induced or coerced to remain neutral.

78. Ogharkov, "The Defense of Socialism," p. 3.

79. Soviet Military Power 1986, p. 89 for European figures; FY 85 SASC Hearings, p. 3857 for composition of carrier air wings.

80. Kelly and O'Donnell, "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," p. 26.

81. Joshua M. Epstein, "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes on a Recurrent Theme," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/1984), p. 19-31.

82. Ibid., p. 23. Epstein suggests the Soviets will draw down forces facing China. Forcing the Soviets to face such a decision would complicate their planning, further denying them their preferred strategy. To make the maritime case, however, it is not necessary that the Soviets transfer any forces to the Far East, simply that they be inhibited in transferring forces from the area.

83. John Mearsheimer, Remarks at the Naval War College, May Conference on "Maritime Strategy: Issues and Perspectives," May 15-17, 1985. Mearsheimer also doubts the strategy can be executed or that the President will permit it to be attempted.

84. This specifically does not apply to Mearsheimer, who believes ground and air forces on the Central Front can restore NATO's territorial integrity. Private discussions with military officers reveal relatively few who accept this view.

85. Despite the title Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?, this is Robert Komer's real issue. Komer accepts the strategy as an acceptable use of the Navy today; his concern is with spending for the future. Private discussion.

86. In addition to Watkins, "Maritime Strategy," (the only statement to discuss the rationale for anti-SSBN operations); Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy;" and the FY 85 SASC Hearings cited herein, see the sixteen authoritative descriptions by senior Navy officials cited in Swartz, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography," and his forthcoming "1986 Addendum."

87. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 January 1986), p. 228.

88. For a discussion of these conceptual similarities, see Rear Admiral William T. Pendley, "The Navy, Forward Defense, and the Airland Battle," prepared for Tufts Fifteenth Annual Conference on "Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balances Toward the Year 2000 and Beyond," April 16-18, 1986. Despite these conceptual similarities, many Army officers are sceptical of the Maritime Strategy, primarily for fear it has or will divert resources from Army forces to the Navy.

Comment and Discussion

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"Footprints in the Sand"

(See C. La VO, pp. 84-88, January 1986 Proceedings)

Jerome Schneier, Academy of Certified Social Workers, Chief, Social Work Services, VA Medical Center, Pittsburgh—The special about prisoner of war experiences is most poignant and reflects well on an exceptional group of people who are indeed survivors.

At the Highland Drive Veterans' Administration (VA) Medical Center in Pittsburgh, we are making special attempts to provide services for former POWs. Providing services to these veterans is a priority at all VA medical centers. Many POWs suffer from delayed psychological effects, resulting from their imprisonment, torture, and starvation experiences. We also know that some of them are reluctant to turn to the VA for the medical help that they are entitled to.

The vignette about Mike Gorman and his attitude—that the government owed him nothing—is characteristic of this stoic group. However, we find the scars produced by the POW experience are deep. The World War II and Korean veterans are in an age category where they are now faced with retirement, loss of spouse or colleagues, and other stressful situations. The camaraderie which can be found in former-POW groups and the act of looking back at the POW experience with peers can help alleviate some pain, albeit belated. The Veterans Administration welcomes former POWs to accept the services available to them, which they so rightly deserve.

Captain Keith Oliver, U. S. Marine Corps, Instructor of English, U. S. Naval Academy—While your articles on hardware, tactics, and strategy are consistently timely and useful, the occasional forays into the "right side" of the brain are most welcome, as was the case with Mr. La VO's piece in the January issue of the Proceedings.

Modern weapon systems notwithstanding, please never discontinue your representative tributes to the "smiling sailor with strong, hairy arms and a coarse stubble, hugging his family after six months at sea."

"The Maritime Strategy"

(See Supplement, January 1986, G. M. Harned, pp. 26-28, February 1986 Proceedings)

John M. Collins—Authoritative summations of U. S. maritime strategy and the 600-ship Navy by the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy, contained in your January supplement, are very enlightening. Short, simple answers to the following questions would make both statements even more useful.

► *The U. S. Maritime Strategy described nearly ignores nuclear war at sea, in response to an assumption that Soviet leaders prefer "to achieve their goals with conventional means"* ("The Maritime Strategy" Supplement, pp. 7-14). How does the Navy reconcile resultant concepts with Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie's widely quoted admonition that "planning for certitude is the greatest of all military mistakes"? Has the Navy developed an alternative strategy for naval nuclear war, to be implemented if the stated assumption proves incorrect? How does it differ?

► *U. S. maritime strategy assumes that any war with the Soviet Union "almost certainly . . . will involve Europe"* (p. 11), then presents Europe as the centerpiece. What prevents the superpowers from fighting regional wars elsewhere? What interests, for example, would militarily involve our European allies, if regional combat between the United States and the Soviet Union erupted in East Asia? How would such conflict affect U. S. maritime strategy?

► *U. S. naval "deployments to the Western Pacific directly enhance deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe" and, should deterrence fail, would limit "the Soviet's ability to concentrate their forces on Central Europe"* (pp. 10-13). Would authoritative Navy spokesmen elaborate, because implied linkages are unclear to most laymen? Clarify in particular how significantly U. S. naval operations would limit Soviet land and air power.

► *Some officials have "questioned whether the Navy could influence a 'short war' in Central Europe," but "such a proposition is indefensible today"* (p. 36). Would authoritative spokesmen define the longest short war, and explain how naval power could favorably affect the outcome of such brief combat be-

tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Federal Republic of Germany?

▶ U. S. naval deployments during the transition to war "must be global as well as early" (p. 10). Fairly even distribution is indicated (p. 36). How would that practice permit the U. S. Navy, already spread thin, to concentrate its combat power at decisive points?

▶ Intelligence assessments suggest that "initially the bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small fraction deployed forward. Soviet exercises confirm

such an interpretation" (p. 7). How could the Soviet Navy interfere seriously with U. S. objectives in a conventional war, if only a small fraction deployed forward? Under such conditions, why wouldn't a passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap protect our sea-lanes? Why are U. S. maritime strategists concerned about a Soviet first salvo, if the Soviet Navy stays home?

▶ "The United States must be in position to deter the Soviets' 'battle of the first salvo' or deal with that if it comes," by

"rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis" (p. 9). Why would exposing additional U. S. ships to Soviet missiles be more likely to deter than invite a (nuclear?) first salvo? What deterrent do U. S. maritime strategists propose, if the warning time is too short for required reinforcements to deploy forward?


▶ U. S. "maritime forces must wear down the enemy forces" (p. 11) is a naval strategy of attrition best suited for the United States, considering present projected naval balances and the imperative need to reinforce and resupply forward deployed elements of the U. S. Army and Air Force soon after hostilities commence? What alternatives have been debated and discarded?

▶ "We are prepared to accept the risk that our nation will make the right decisions to prevent losses of forces early in a conflict . . ." (p. 38). What irreducible decisions must be made, and how would they prevent losses?

▶ The need for "aggressive forward movement" of U. S. naval combatants "is obvious" (p. 9). "If war comes, we will . . . fight our way toward Soviet home waters" (p. 11), to destroy Soviet fleets, bases, and support structures "in all theaters" (p. 13). Do the President, Secretary of Defense, and NATO leaders approve a frontal assault on Soviet naval strength at the onset of war in waters where risks are greatest? What alternatives did they reject that were designed to produce combat on terms more favorable to the United States and its allies or leave the Soviet Navy in isolation?

▶ "As the [U. S.] battle groups move forward, we will wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet . . . ballistic missile submarines," even in conventional war, and threaten "direct attack against the [Soviet] homeland . . ." (p. 11-14). "Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no useful purpose for the Soviets . . ." (p. 14). How could threats to Soviet SSBNs and the homeland help confine the scope and intensity of conflict, a public objective of U. S. national military strategy (see U. S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's FY 86 posture statement)? Do the President and Secretary of Defense believe that U. S. operations described would provoke no Soviet retaliation? On what basis?

▶ The United States could conduct "forcible entry by the 55,000 men of a Marine amphibious force" (p. 12). How long would it now take to assemble amphibious ships scattered around the world, then mount a division-sized assault on well-defended shores? Ten years



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from now? How would that action affect all other theaters, which would have to be stripped of amphibious capabilities?

▶ *The U. S. Navy needs 'the same size fleet to meet peacetime deployments as we do to fight a war' (p. 35). How could 15 carrier battle groups, even with an increased operations tempo, accomplish all wartime tasks prescribed by the maritime strategy? How could they avoid attrition during high-intensity naval war (nuclear or conventional)? How could we compensate for disabled or destroyed carriers, of which none are readily available from the Naval Reserve?*

▶ *'In wartime, purely U. S. forces in the Sixth Fleet would have to include three or four carrier battle groups, operating to meet NATO commitments' (p. 34). What threat to which U. S./NATO objectives would justify that size force in the Mediterranean, a closed body of water?*

▶ *'The Second Fleet is the heart of the Atlantic strike fleet for NATO.' It is responsible for naval operations in all of the Atlantic and neighboring waters, including bits of the Arctic Ocean and the Caribbean. Four or five carrier battle groups are required (p. 34). How could the Second Fleet, even with allied assistance, handle its huge wartime responsibilities with roughly the same size U. S. force planned for use in Mediterranean operations?*

▶ *Pacific fleets need seven carrier battle groups, two of which must 'meet our commitments in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, East Africa, the Persian Gulf area, and Southeast Asia' (p. 34). What threats underpin U. S. wartime force requirements for the Third Fleet and the Indian Ocean, if the Soviet Navy remains in home waters, as U. S. naval intelligence estimates indicate?*

▶ *'One often hears self-appointed strategic experts suggest that' a carrier battle group 'represents a single target.' In fact, it disperses over an area of 56,000 square miles (p. 12). What area contains the ships, as opposed to aircraft on the wing? What would happen to the offensive striking power of each battle group, if one ship—the aircraft carrier—were sunk?*

▶ *'By the end of the decade, we will have adequate sealift for the movement of military forces. But we will neither be able to tolerate attrition typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we will require' (p. 11). Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate to support what forces, where, under what circumstances? How can it be adequate, if unable to move all imperative loads, including strategic raw materials,*

even in the absence of heavy attrition' ▶ *'I also have confidence in the Maritime Strategy because we test it in exercises, in war games, and in real-life scenarios' (p. 15). How many Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Navy war games have centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea? What assumptions controlled their conduct? What were the outcomes? How many times have umpires ruled that a U. S. aircraft carrier was sunk or disabled in a conventional war scenario? When was the last time?*

Finally, how does the Navy refute critics who, being unable to answer these questions, conclude that America's maritime strategy is based on the best U. S. case (in which we control events from start to finish), and that it does not dovetail well with the total needs of other armed services or the nation? Why wouldn't more selective aims accomplish essential U. S. missions at less risk and cost?

"The Father of 'Forcible Entry'"

(See R. S. Rogers, pp. 62-70, November 1985 Proceedings)

Victor Suthren, Deputy Chief Curator, Canadian War Museum, Ottawa—Mr. Rogers's article on Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Abercromby is a most interesting study of an early practitioner of "forcible entry"; it may be inaccurate, however, to portray Abercromby as the father of the amphibious assault.

In 1758, British land forces were inserted into the Cape Breton coastline, in the face of considerable French opposition, to attack the Fortress of Louisbourg. In the following year, one of the most significant landing operations took place at Quebec, where the naval forces of Admiral Sir Charles Saunders of the Royal Navy deposited James Wolfe and his army ashore to defeat the French under Marquis de Montcalm de Saint-Véran, and thus end, for all practical purposes, the French empire in America. Indeed, the poorly trained but enthusiastic New England force that took Louisbourg in an earlier assault in 1745 was a seaborne force. Even as early as 1739, the British, under Admiral Edward Vernon, carried out what can only be described as an amphibious assault against Portobelo in the Caribbean.

Mr. Rogers is quite right to point out Abercromby's refinement of the science of amphibious assault, but that he gave birth to it is less defensible an argument in the light of history.

Rear Admiral William Pendley, U. S. Navy, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—John Collins raises a number of interesting and important questions in his comment on the January 1986 Maritime Strategy Supplement. One reason why Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley prepared the supplement was to promote discussion inside and outside of the naval profession. Therefore, I would like to respond to Mr. Collins's questions.

Some general observations first: The maritime strategy is not an inflexible blueprint or a detailed war plan. Such plans are properly the province of the unified commanders, who must fight future wars. The strategy seeks to provide these commanders with the best collective professional judgment of the senior uniformed and civilian naval leadership of how to employ maritime forces to deter war or—should war come—to meet U. S. objectives, given our best understanding of Soviet strategy. Thus the strategy, like any such broad document, ignores many possible alternatives which are properly the subject of contingency planning. Many of Mr. Collins's comments raise questions about such alternatives: it is important for us to consider them, but we must first set forth a baseline strategy. Such a baseline is what the supplement presented.

Because of space limitations, my answers must be less complete than I would desire. I have attempted to address the main theme of every question. Many of the questions did not lend themselves to the "short simple answers" Mr. Collins requested since we do not anticipate a global war with the Soviets being either short or simple.

The maritime strategy "nearly ignores" nuclear war at sea. How is this consistent with prudent planning and what alternatives are available if nuclear war comes? The strategy does not ignore the possibility of nuclear war. Instead, by altering the military balance—specifically, the nuclear balance (in Soviet terms, the nuclear correlation of forces)—it seeks to make escalation unattractive to the Soviets. By doing this, we seek to deter nuclear war. Should deterrence fail, the basic outlines of the strategy will still be relevant, although there is obviously no strategy less difficult to implement once nuclear escalation takes place.

"What prevents the superpowers from fighting regional wars elsewhere? What interests, for example, would militarily involve our European allies, if regional combat between the United States and the

Soviet Union erupted in East Asia? How would such conflict affect U. S. maritime strategy?" It is in large part the deterrent effect of our national military strategy, of which our maritime strategy is a key component, that prevents the superpowers from fighting wars anywhere. Should deterrence fail, regional wars between the superpowers are possible, but it is unlikely that—given the focus of Soviet military forces—they would remain regionally confined for very long. Globalization is not automatic, and the strategy does not consider it such. Indeed, the strategy recognizes that the flexibility of maritime forces to contain and resolve regional crises is among our most important contributions to maintaining peace.

The strategy assumes that naval operations in the Pacific can directly contribute to a European conflict. This needs to be elaborated since "implied linkages are most unclear." Pacific operations are important for several reasons. First, as both Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins make clear, many of our most important allies and much of our important trade are in the Pacific. One need not accept any particular assumptions about the conduct of Pacific nations in a future war to recognize that U. S. interests demand that we not abandon the region in time of conflict. Pacific operations are directly relevant to a European war. The threat of U. S. combat operations in the Pacific serves to tie down Soviet forces, particularly air forces that could otherwise be committed to a European conflict. Our understanding of Soviet strategy is that the Soviets would prefer a single-front war—which would be to their advantage, by all analyses. Just as our World War II experience indicated that secondary fronts were required to defeat Germany, it is essential to any successful strategy that the Soviets be faced with a multi-theater challenge—as opposed to their preferred situation. Thus, the prospect of a war occurring in Europe is, in part, deterred by our actions in the Pacific.

"Would authoritative spokesmen define the longest short war, and explain how naval power could favorably affect the outcome of such brief combat between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Federal Republic of Germany?" Defining "the longest short war" is not the function of a baseline strategy that has been designed to provide overall guidance to national and naval planning and programming efforts, and to catalyze strategic operational thinking in the Navy and elsewhere. History, however, tells us that wars are likely to be longer and broader

in scope than anticipated. A short, Germany-only war is not envisioned. Whatever the length of the war, timely reinforcement and resupply of NATO forces in Europe would be vital. Even a brief conflict would exhaust NATO's war reserve stocks. Thus, maritime forces assist in the Central Front campaign by assuring reinforcement and resupply, bolstering our alliances worldwide, tying down Soviet forces on the flanks or diverting other Soviet forces to them, and, if required, through the direct projection of amphibious and/or tactical air power. The maritime strategy does not, of course, envision the Navy winning a war by itself. As Secretary Lehman makes clear in his article, "Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory, but the loss of it will certainly assure defeat."

How would the practice of global, early, fairly evenly distributed naval deployments during the transition to war "permit the U. S. Navy, already spread thin, to concentrate its combat power at decisive points?" Such deployments are designed—in conjunction with movements of our sister services and allies—to cede no vital area to the Soviets by default. Consequently, the vital Northeast Atlantic, Northwest Pacific, and Mediterranean must certainly undergo rapid buildups of significant naval forces. Concentration of U. S. Navy combat power at decisive points is precisely the aim of the maritime strategy, a concentration rendered more potent by its coordination with other joint and combined forces. Again, the maritime strategy is only one component of our national military strategy, and requires more than U. S. naval forces to achieve its goals.

"How could the Soviet Navy interfere seriously with U. S. objectives in a conventional war, if only a small fraction deployed forward? Under such conditions, why wouldn't a passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap protect our sea-lanes? Why are U. S. maritime strategists concerned about a Soviet first salvo, if the Soviet Navy stays home?" First, of course, there is no guarantee the Soviet Navy will, in Mr. Collins's words, "stay home" forever and the "home" referred to extends thousands of kilometers out to sea. Should the United States unilaterally cede Soviet "home" waters as sanctuaries, Soviet forces, particularly submarines, could be expected to sortie in large numbers. It is far more prudent to engage these forces early and aggressively. Second, some of our allies live beyond Mr. Collins's proposed defensive line and within Soviet "home waters." Writing off our allies and friends as well as some

of our own forces on the Northern and Southern flanks (and in the Pacific)—as many of the advocates of static defensive strategies imply—would destroy allied cohesion and cripple both deterrence and allied warfighting capability. A passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap could protect some transatlantic sea-lanes, but would condemn Norway to Soviet occupation and Iceland and the United Kingdom to a massive Soviet air offensive.

The maritime strategy seeks to do far more than simply protect sea lines. It also seeks to apply leverage on the Soviet Union and its strategic forces—in order to end the war or, even better, to ensure that war does not occur. All of these goals require our forces to move forward. This forward movement, coupled with the fact that some Soviet forces will be deployed out of area, results in the need to be concerned with the battle of the first salvo.

Why does "exposing additional U. S. ships to Soviet missiles" in time of crisis deter aggression? What deterrent do we propose if time does not permit additional forward deployments during a crisis? Early forward deployments serve two deterrent purposes. First, they ensure no one can mistake our determination to meet our obligations to all of our allies (not just those nations where troops are stationed). In addition to this political deterrent, early forward movement makes it clear that the Soviets will not be able to accomplish their primary naval missions—defense of the homeland and protection of their SSBN force—by default. It also forecloses any single front advantage. There is no substitute for such a deterrent movement of forces; that is why both Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman stressed the importance of recognizing and reacting to crisis.

Admiral Watkins says we must "wear down the enemy." "Is a naval strategy of attrition best suited for the United States, considering . . . the imperative need to reinforce and resupply forward deployed elements of the U. S. Army and Air Force soon after hostilities commence?" What alternatives have been considered? In calling for maritime forces to wear down the enemy, Admiral Watkins is recognizing that the Soviet fleet will not sortie *en masse* for a single climactic battle. But this fleet must still be destroyed as quickly as possible. If we cannot accomplish this, the residual Soviet naval force-in-being could interdict our resupply efforts and deny us the leverage of holding the Soviet homeland and Soviet strategic forces at risk. While many alternatives in the maritime strategy have been debated,

few have been "discarded" irrevocably. As noted earlier, the strategy is flexible enough to deal with the key uncertainties of warfare. Nevertheless, a strategy requires making choices, and we have consciously chosen the approach we consider to be the most likely to achieve success.

"What irreducible decisions (to prevent losses of forces early in the conflict) must be made, and how would they prevent losses?" A host of decisions will have to be made, as events unfold, to prevent losses of forces early in the conflict. Among these are decisions regarding rules of engagement, alliance solidarity, timing of forward movement and reserve mobilization, budgetary authority, industrial mobilization, commitments to friendly states which are not formal allies, positions vis-a-vis unfriendly states besides the Soviets, and resource allocation priorities, especially airlift. To the extent such decisions are made so as to bring the whole variety of U. S., allied, and friendly forces to bear quickly and appropriately against the enemy, losses will be prevented. If we were not confident of our ability to make such decisions, we would need to build a much larger navy to accommodate the strategy that would then be necessary. Predicting all these decisions in advance is neither possible nor prudent: history clearly teaches that wars do not lend themselves to pre-scripting. Wars are won by the side with a coherent strategy and the capability for implementation of flexible options as events unfold.

"Do the President, Secretary of Defense, and NATO leaders approve a frontal assault on Soviet naval strength at the onset of war in waters where risks are greatest? What alternatives did they reject that were designed to produce combat on terms more favorable to the United States and its allies or leave the Soviet Navy in isolation?" As Admiral Watkins carefully pointed out, the maritime strategy provides a foundation for naval advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA), i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense. The maritime strategy clearly recognizes that the unified and specified commanders (the commanders-in-chief) fight the wars, under the direction of the NCA.

The maritime strategy flows from explicit NCA guidance and is in concert with that guidance. As President Reagan has stated publicly: "Freedom to use the seas is our Nation's life blood. For that reason, our Navy is designed to keep the sea lanes open worldwide, a far greater task than closing those sea lanes at strategic choke points. Maritime superiority is for us a necessity. We must be able in

time of emergency to venture in harm's way . . ."

Secretary of Defense Weinberger has testified that the maritime strategy is a vital part of our overall strategy, especially with regard to eliminating the Soviet means of warfare as quickly as possible. NATO policy and strategy are totally congruent with the maritime strategy. This is by design, since the NATO Strategic Concept and Concept of Maritime Operations are key bases of the strategy. The NATO policy of "sustained conventional defense in forward areas against large-scale conventional aggression" is fully reflected in the maritime strategy. The United States and the other NATO nations have consistently rejected approaches that would automatically sacrifice key allies or leave the Soviet Navy untouched, once Soviet aggression has occurred.

"How could threats to Soviet SSBNs and the homeland help confine the scope and intensity of conflict, a public objective of U. S. national military strategy? Do the President and Secretary of Defense believe that U. S. operations described would provoke no Soviet retaliation? On what basis?" A key feature of the strategy is to use maritime forces to contain crises and prevent global war from occurring in the first place, thus fulfilling the traditional maritime role of limiting the scope of conflicts. Should global war nonetheless occur, aggressive use of maritime power—including threats to the Soviet homeland and Soviet SSBNs—could hasten an end to the war and limit Soviet options by demonstrating that escalation is not in the Soviet interest. Secretary Weinberger has testified regarding the anti-SSBN mission, noting that Soviet knowledge of our capabilities in this area helps discourage them from going to war. The Navy believes such operations will not draw retaliation (if by "retaliation" Mr. Collins means nuclear escalation), because such escalation would serve no useful Soviet purpose. Soviet writings are quite clear that they will undertake attacks on nuclear-capable forces with conventional forces where they have the capability. It is difficult for me to understand why a Soviet doctrine of conventional attacks on nuclear forces—which has existed for years—is benign while a comparable U. S. strategy is somehow too dangerous or escalatory.

"How long would it now take to assemble amphibious ships scattered around the world, [and] then mount a division-sized assault on well-defended shores? Ten years from now? How would that action affect all other theaters, which would have to be stripped of am-

amphibious capabilities?" Assembly of amphibious shipping would obviously take weeks, simply because of the transit times involved. This is entirely consistent with the strategy's rejection of the notion that only the first few days of the war matter. The flexibility to concentrate amphibious forces for one large assault or to leave them dispersed for smaller assaults in differing theaters is one of the inherent advantages maritime forces offer the United States.

"How could 15 carrier battle groups accomplish all wartime tasks prescribed by the maritime strategy?" How would they avoid attrition and how would we replace lost or damaged carriers? Our carriers will accomplish the tasks set forth for them by operating in multi-carrier battle forces for mutual support and protection, and by operating in conjunction with allied forces and the forces of our sister services. They will undertake tasks sequentially within a given theater since, as Mr. Collins correctly points out, there will never be enough ships to do everything we would want to do simultaneously. We do not expect to avoid attrition and we recognize there are no replacements. Unfortunately, it is the nature of war that ships and men are killed. But we believe that, properly operated, our carrier battle forces will be able to fulfill their many missions.

"What threat to which U. S. NATO objectives" could justify three carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean, "a closed body of water?" U. S. forces will be in the Mediterranean because that is where our allies are. Five NATO nations have Mediterranean coastlines; three of them lie entirely within the region. A coalition strategy requires that we depend on our allies and, in turn, that they be able to depend on us. Carrier battle forces in the Mediterranean will provide air support for the land battle and will destroy Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. The fact that the Mediterranean is "a closed body" of water means that mutual support between land-based and sea-based forces—which is a key element of current U. S. naval thought—is particularly important.

"How can the Second Fleet, even with allied assistance, handle its huge wartime responsibilities with roughly the same size U. S. force planned for use in Mediterranean operations?" While the area of potential action for NATO Striking Fleet, Atlantic, is very large, the area of probable action is not. The capabilities of allies in each area also differ. In line with the strategy's tenets to use sea power aggressively in forward areas, the NATO Striking Fleet (which is composed mostly

of the U. S. Second Fleet) will primarily be concerned with the battle for the Norwegian Sea. By winning that battle, we win the battle of the Atlantic. Thus the apparent disparity between forces and geography that Mr. Collins suggests does not exist.

Secretary Lehman's article suggests that two carrier battle groups from the Pacific Fleet may be required in the Indian Ocean. "What threats underpin U. S. wartime force requirements" in the Indian Ocean if "the Soviet Navy remains in home waters?" The Navy does not exist simply to destroy the Soviet Navy. Indeed, in a strategic sense, destruction of the Soviet Navy is only a means to the end of controlling the sea, projecting power ashore, and bringing pressure on the Soviet Union. No one can predict the course of a future war or the areas in which U. S. forces will be involved. Secretary Lehman was simply recognizing the possibility that carrier battle groups might be required to support U. S. military operations in the Indian Ocean. One advantage of sea power is that naval forces have the flexibility to go or not go, depending on the military situation. Obviously, if in an actual war there was no military purpose served by carrier battle forces in the Indian Ocean, those forces would be used elsewhere by the unified commanders.

"What area [of the 56,000 square miles over which a carrier battle group is dispersed] contains the ships, as opposed to aircraft on the wing? What would happen to the offensive striking power of each battle group if one ship—the aircraft carrier—were sunk?" The 56,000 square nautical miles Admiral Watkins cited was for ships; aircraft increase that combat area significantly. One reason for Navy interest in Tomahawk cruise missiles is to disperse offensive power so that some offensive capability remains even if a carrier is put out of action. Nevertheless, the carriers remain the heart of our combat capability; that is why the Navy does not propose single carrier battle groups, but rather multi-carrier battle forces where the loss of a single ship is less likely and the consequences of such a loss less severe.

"Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate to support what forces, where, under what circumstances? How can it be adequate, if unable to move all imperative loads, including strategic raw materials, even in the absence of heavy attrition?" Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate for the movement of military forces in a global war with the Soviets, under demanding assumptions governing the national military planning

process. Should a number of variables change—such as the geographic origins of the global conflict, the number and type of U. S. and allied ships available, attrition rates, tempo of operations in each theater, etc.—our requirements will be altered. Consequently, the Department of Defense and the Navy constantly re-evaluate their sealift needs, and this is reflected in refinements to the maritime strategy and to the sealift procurement program. U. S.-controlled sealift to transport strategic raw materials is projected to be available, but will in all likelihood, be inadequate. In the absence of the desired rebuilding of our merchant marine, alternative policies would have to be implemented—possibly including greater use of foreign-flag shipping, economic tightening of the belt at home, and/or use of ships currently planned to carry military cargo.

"How many Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Navy war games have centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea? What assumptions controlled their conduct? What were the outcomes? How many times have umpires ruled that a U. S. aircraft carrier was sunk or disabled in a conventional war scenario? When was the last time?" We have played, and continue to play, war games centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea, as part of our overall gaming activity. Because, however, of the deterrent aspects of the maritime strategy and of Soviet strategy as we understand it, we do not consider a future war centered on a U. S.-Soviet nuclear war at sea as the most likely scenario. As with all games, a variety of assumptions have been used, and, therefore, a variety of outcomes emerged, which gave us the variety of insights we have needed to improve our tactics and programs.

Likewise, carrier attrition in games or exercises (it does happen) also gives us valuable and useful insights, which we then can and do act upon. In the real world, however, carriers have proven to be among the least vulnerable ships in our fleet, with an inherent mobility that makes them less vulnerable than land bases. The Falklands Conflict certainly proved many of our assumptions concerning the utility of our big carriers and their low vulnerability when properly equipped, operated, and protected—as in U. S. Navy practice.

"How does the Navy refute critics, who, being unable to answer these questions, conclude that America's maritime strategy is based on the best U. S. case (in which we control events from start to finish), and that it does not dovetail well with the total needs of other armed ser-

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vices of the nation? Why wouldn't more selective aims accomplish essential U. S. missions at less risk and cost?" The above explanations should help refute any critics who had been heretofore unable to answer these questions. Rather than being based on the best case, the maritime strategy is designed to create the best case, i.e., to enable us to control events so that war with the Soviets never starts; and if such a war were to take place, to enable us to control events so that we could terminate it favorably. This is in precise agreement with Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie's widely quoted admonition that, "the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy."

The maritime strategy is also designed to dovetail well with the requirements of the other U. S. armed services and those of our friends and allies. All contributed to its development; all have forces necessary to implement it; and all have forces which require its implementation in order to be effectively employed. More selective aims might well accomplish some U. S. missions at less initial cost; but they would undoubtedly thereby greatly increase the overall risk to ourselves and our allies.

No strategy is perfect; none is without risk. A risk-free war between the superpowers is a contradiction in terms. The maritime strategy has given those of us in the naval profession a way to organize our thinking, to better structure our efforts, and thereby to increase our prospects for deterring war—or, should deterrence fail, ending the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. It is only by continued discussion and debate that we can increase our strategic understanding and our preparedness, so essential to deterrence.

"Will WWII Catch Us Unaware?"

(See E. Gradelius, pp. 168-170, March 1986 Proceedings)

John F. Vanderift, Sr.—Frankly, Commander Gradelius's piece scares the hell out of me—especially that part about the electromagnetic pulse effect neutralizing our electronic superiority. No computers means no Navy. Also, that neutron bomb business eliminates the nuclear winter threat theory of the "Peace-At-Any-Price" crowd.

As the former skipper of three ships during the World War II nastiness, I prefer to spend the rest of my years navigating my easy chair over the turbulent surface of my den rug, not holding my breath for fear the next one will be loaded with fission bomb particles.

Rear Admiral William Pendley, U. S. Navy, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—John Collins raises a number of interesting and important questions in his comment on the January 1986 Maritime Strategy Supplement. One reason why Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley prepared the supplement was to promote discussion inside and outside of the naval profession. Therefore, I would like to respond to Mr. Collins's comments.

Some general observations first. The maritime strategy is not an inflexible blueprint or a detailed war plan. Such plans are properly the province of the unified commanders, who must fight future wars. The strategy seeks to provide these commanders with the best collective professional judgment of the senior uniformed and civilian naval leadership of how to employ maritime forces to deter war or—should war come—to meet U. S. objectives, given our best understanding of Soviet strategy. Thus the strategy, like any such broad document, ignores many possible alternatives which are properly the subject of contingency planning. Many of Mr. Collins's comments raise questions about such alternatives; it is important for us to consider them, but we must first set forth a baseline strategy. Such a baseline is what the supplement presented.

Because of space limitations, my answers must be less complete than I would desire. I have attempted to address the main theme of every question. Many of the questions did not lend themselves to the "short simple answers" Mr. Collins requested since we do not anticipate a global war with the Soviets being either short or simple.

The maritime strategy "nearly ignores" nuclear war at sea. How is this consistent with prudent planning and what alternatives are available if nuclear war comes? The strategy does not ignore the possibility of nuclear war. Instead, by altering the military balance—specifically, the nuclear balance (in Soviet terms, the nuclear correlation of forces)—it seeks to make escalation unattractive to the Soviets. By doing this, we seek to deter nuclear war. Should deterrence fail, the basic outlines of the strategy will still be relevant, although there is obviously no strategy less difficult to implement once nuclear escalation takes place.

What prevents the superpowers from fighting regional wars elsewhere? What interests, for example, would militarily involve our European allies, if regional combat between the United States and the

Soviet Union erupted in East Asia? How would such conflict affect U. S. maritime strategy?" It is in large part the deterrent effect of our national military strategy, of which our maritime strategy is a key component, that prevents the superpowers from fighting wars anywhere. Should deterrence fail, regional wars between the superpowers are possible, but it is unlikely that—given the locus of Soviet military forces—they would remain regionally confined for very long. Globalization is not automatic, and the strategy does not consider it such. Indeed the strategy recognizes that the flexibility of maritime forces to contain and resolve regional crises is among our most important contributions to maintaining peace.

The strategy assumes that naval operations in the Pacific can directly contribute to a European conflict. This needs to be elaborated since "implied linkages are most unclear." Pacific operations are important for several reasons. First, as both Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins make clear, many of our most important allies and much of our important trade are in the Pacific. One need not accept any particular assumptions about the conduct of Pacific nations in a future war to recognize that U. S. interests demand that we not abandon the region in time of conflict. Pacific operations are directly relevant to a European war. The threat of U. S. combat operations in the Pacific serves to tie down Soviet forces, particularly air forces that could otherwise be committed to a European conflict. Our understanding of Soviet strategy is that the Soviets would prefer a single-front war—which would be to their advantage, by all analyses. Just as our World War II experience indicated that secondary fronts were required to defeat Germany, it is essential to any successful strategy that the Soviets be faced with a multi-theater challenge—as opposed to their preferred situation. Thus, the prospect of a war occurring in Europe is, in part, deterred by our actions in the Pacific.

Would authoritative spokesmen define the longest short war, and explain how naval power could favorably affect the outcome of such brief combat between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Federal Republic of Germany?" Defining "the longest short war" is not the function of a baseline strategy that has been designed to provide overall guidance to national and naval planning and programming efforts; and to catalyze strategic operational thinking in the Navy and elsewhere. History, however, tells us that wars are likely to be longer and broader

in scope than anticipated. A short, Germany-only war is not envisioned. Whatever the length of the war, timely reinforcement and resupply of NATO forces in Europe would be vital. Even a brief conflict would exhaust NATO's war reserve stocks. Thus, maritime forces assist in the Central Front campaign by assuring reinforcement and resupply, bolstering our alliances worldwide, tying down Soviet forces on the flanks or diverting other Soviet forces to them, and, if required, through the direct projection of amphibious and/or tactical air power. The maritime strategy does not, of course, envision the Navy winning a war by itself. As Secretary Lehman makes clear in his article, "Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory, but the loss of it will certainly assure defeat."

How would the practice of global early, fairly evenly distributed naval deployments during the transition to war "permit the U. S. Navy, already spread thin, to concentrate its combat power at decisive points?" Such deployments are designed—in conjunction with movements of our sister services and allies—to cede no vital area to the Soviets by default. Consequently, the vital Northeast Atlantic, Northwest Pacific, and Mediterranean must certainly undergo rapid buildups of significant naval forces. Concentration of U. S. Navy combat power at decisive points is precisely the aim of the maritime strategy, a concentration rendered more potent by its coordination with other joint and combined forces. Again, the maritime strategy is only one component of our national military strategy, and requires more than U. S. naval forces to achieve its goals.

How could the Soviet Navy interfere seriously with U. S. objectives in a conventional war, if only a small fraction deployed forward? Under such conditions, why wouldn't a passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap protect our sea-lanes? Why are U. S. maritime strategists concerned about a Soviet first salvo, if the Soviet Navy stays home?" First, of course, there is no guarantee the Soviet Navy will, in Mr. Collins's words, "stay home" forever and the "home" referred to extends thousands of kilometers out to sea. Should the United States unilaterally cede Soviet "home" waters as sanctuaries, Soviet forces, particularly submarines, could be expected to sortie in large numbers. It is far more prudent to engage these forces early and aggressively. Second, some of our allies live beyond Mr. Collins's proposed defensive line and within Soviet "home waters." Writing off our allies and friends as well as some

of our own forces on the Northern and Southern flanks (and in the Pacific)—as many of the advocates of static defensive strategies imply—would destroy allied cohesion and cripple both deterrence and allied warfighting capability. A passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap could protect some transatlantic sea-lanes, but would condemn Norway to Soviet occupation and Iceland and the United Kingdom to a massive Soviet air offensive.

The maritime strategy seeks to do far more than simply protect sea lines. It also seeks to apply leverage on the Soviet Union and its strategic forces—in order to end the war or, even better, to ensure that war does not occur. All of these goals require our forces to move forward. This forward movement, coupled with the fact that some Soviet forces will be deployed out of area, results in the need to be concerned with the battle of the first salvo.

Why does "exposing additional U. S. ships to Soviet missiles" in time of crisis deter aggression? What deterrent do we propose if time does not permit additional forward deployments during a crisis? Early forward deployments serve two deterrent purposes. First, they ensure no one can mistake our determination to meet our obligations to all of our allies (not just those nations where troops are stationed). In addition to this political deterrent, early forward movement makes it clear that the Soviets will not be able to accomplish their primary naval missions—defense of the homeland and protection of their SSBN force—by default. It also forecloses any single front advantage. There is no substitute for such a deterrent movement of forces: that is why both Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman stressed the importance of recognizing and reacting to crisis.

Admiral Watkins says we must "wear down the enemy." "Is a naval strategy of attrition best suited for the United States, considering . . . the imperative need to reinforce and resupply forward deployed elements of the U. S. Army and Air Force soon after hostilities commence?" What alternatives have been considered? In calling for maritime forces to wear down the enemy, Admiral Watkins is recognizing that the Soviet fleet will not sortie *en masse* for a single climactic battle. But this fleet must still be destroyed as quickly as possible. If we cannot accomplish this, the residual Soviet naval force—being could interdict our resupply efforts and deny us the leverage of holding the Soviet homeland and Soviet strategic forces at risk. While many alternatives in the maritime strategy have been debated,

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"How does the Navy refute critics, who, being unable to answer these questions, conclude that America's maritime strategy is based on the best U. S. case (in which we control events from start to finish), and that it does not dovetail well with the total needs of other armed ser-

vices of the nation? Why wouldn't more selective aims accomplish essential U. S. missions at less risk and cost?" The above explanations should help refute any critics who had been heretofore unable to answer these questions. Rather than being based on the best case, the maritime strategy is designed to create the best case, i.e., to enable us to control events so that war with the Soviets never starts; and if such a war were to take place, to enable us to control events so that we could terminate it favorably. This is in precise agreement with Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie's widely quoted admonition that, "the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy."

The maritime strategy is also designed to dovetail well with the requirements of the other U. S. armed services and those of our friends and allies. All contributed to its development; all have forces necessary to implement it, and all have forces which require its implementation in order to be effectively employed. More selective aims might well accomplish some U. S. missions at less initial cost, but they would undoubtedly thereby greatly increase the overall risk to ourselves and our allies.

No strategy is perfect; none is without risk. A risk-free war between the superpowers is a contradiction in terms. The maritime strategy has given those of us in the naval profession a way to organize our thinking, to better structure our efforts, and thereby to increase our prospects for deterring war—or, should deterrence fail, ending the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. It is only by continued discussion and debate that we can increase our strategic understanding and our preparedness, so essential to deterrence.

"Will WWII Catch Us Unaware?"

(See E. Gradelius, pp 168-170, March 1986 Proceedings)

John F. Vandegrift, Sr.—Frankly, Commander Gradelius's piece scares the hell out of me—especially that part about the electromagnetic pulse effect neutralizing our electronic superiority. No computers mean no Navy. Also, that neutron bomb business eliminates the nuclear winter threat theory of the "Peace-At-Any-Price" crowd.

As the former skipper of three ships during the World War II nastiness, I prefer to spend the rest of my years navigating my easy chair over the turbulent surface of my den rug, not holding my breath for fear the next one will be loaded with fission bomb particles.

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The Maritime Strategy

(See Supplement January 1986 G. M. Harned, pp. 26-28, February 1986, J. M. Collins, pp. 18-22, March 1986, R. N. Griffin, p. 25, May 1986, R. S. Hibbs and W. Pendley, pp. 83-87, June 1986, D. M. Limer, pp. 24-27, July 1986 Proceedings)

John M. Collins—I appreciate Admiral Pendley's responses to my earlier questions about the Maritime Strategy. The following inquiries deal with matters related to the maritime strategy which are not included in the January Supplement. They fall into three categories: high-intensity conflict, low-intensity conflict, and future U. S. Navy needs.

High-intensity conflict. The maritime strategy for high-intensity conflict slights three Soviet specialties that could give the Soviets decisive advantages if the U. S. Navy does not prepare to cope with them:

▶ Soviet coastal defenses are the world's most comprehensive and in-depth. Land-based aircraft, missile boats, and mines are among the many components.

▶ Unexcelled Soviet minelaying capabilities also pose potential threats to U. S./allied sea lines of communication terminals and critical naval choke points. Soviet mineclearing capabilities are even more impressive.

▶ U. S. intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviet Navy is well-equipped to conduct offensive and defensive chemical warfare. At least some means of deterrence is vital.

Can U. S. maritime strategy be considered completely valid without addressing those Soviet capabilities? If so, why? If not, what amendments are mandatory?

Low-intensity conflict: U. S. maritime strategy focuses almost entirely on high-intensity naval conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, although most national defense officials believe that low-intensity, non-Soviet contingencies are much more likely.

Is there a separate maritime strategy for low intensity conflicts? If not, why not? If so, what are its principal concepts? How does it interrelate with the high-intensity strategy?

Future U. S. Navy needs: Strategic decisions today determine the size, characteristics, employment options, and effectiveness of tomorrow's forces. Navies, more than any other military service, need strategic vision to make resources meet future goals, because of superexpensive ships, prolonged development-production-deployment times, and service lives spanning several decades.

Billy Mitchell's bombers, soon after World War I, convinced U. S. naval visionaries that battleships were about to be

overtaken by events. They began a new Navy based on aircraft carriers, of which seven deployed during the Great Depression well before World War II. Admiral Gorshkov completely reshaped the Soviet Navy between 1956 and 1986. He found ways to implement his innovative concepts, despite the dominance of Soviet ground forces and the absence of an ocean going naval tradition.

U. S. naval superiority in the 21st century demands similar vision and vigor, taking political, economic, social, military, and technical trend lines into account. Nuclear armed anti-ship missiles, for example, are making surface warfare a most perilous occupation. Quiet submarines drastically reduce the value of passive listening devices. Antisatellite weapons will make it risky to rely on command, control, and communications (C³) in space. Overseas shore installations are pawns in an unpredictable game of international politics. The U. S. Marine Corps finds it increasingly difficult to justify amphibious assault as its primary mission. The list of such problems is lengthy.

Prevailing U. S. maritime strategy promises "more of the same." It concentrates on current issues. What evolving concepts and programs prepare for the future? What role do the following representative factors play?

▶ **Greater dependence on:** Speed (50 to 100-knot Navy/alternative hull forms) Submerged combat (including amphibious) and logistical functions

Naval trad elements besides SLBMS (such as Hydra)

Non-acoustic antisubmarine warfare detection devices

▶ **Less dependence on:** Surface ships (especially large aircraft carriers)

Forward bases for logistics and C³ Easily detected electromagnetic transmissions

Undetended space C³

▶ **better relationships between:** Maritime, continental, and space strategies Sea- and shore-based naval air power Navy and Merchant Marine

Marine Corps size and missions

This list of factors is far from complete. Our Navy leaders should be able to add much more.

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- an ultra-modern wide-screen theater that will carry viewers into a stunning panorama of sight and sound on the importance of the seas to our nation.
- the Lone Sailor statue, the major symbolic figure of the memorial (pictured here).
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

09 MAY 1986

Subj: ATLANTIC COUNCIL MARITIME STRATEGY FORUM

1. On 30 April I attended an Atlantic Council Forum on "The Maritime Strategy: Helpful or Harmful to U. S. and Allied Security?" The forum was the third in a series of national security issues forums sponsored by the Council and was held at the University Club. Forum participants included LGEN George M. Seignious II, USA (Ret), former Director, U. S. ACDA and President of the Atlantic Council; Dr. Stanley Heginbotham, Congressional Research Service; Ambassador Robert Komer; and Mr. Bing West. (List of participants and biographies at TAB A).

2. Dr. Heginbotham initiated the panel discussion with a fairly authoritative overview of the origins and development of our current Maritime Strategy. He ended his presentation with two thoughts for the following panelists to frame the discussions; for Mr. West:

- Is the prolonged conventional war assumption made in the Maritime Strategy valid?

and for Ambassador Komer:

- Although the Navy is criticized for their strategy the Army has been considerably less successful (for various reasons) in building a credible strategy for the Central Front.

3. Mr. West, in the role of Maritime Strategy advocate, presented a very good defense of the Strategy. The key points in his presentation were (brief outline at TAB B):

- Reiterated importance of denying Soviets their single theater preferred option.
- Maritime Strategy provides President with a viable conventional option, without which he would be faced with two unacceptable alternatives; go nuclear or capitulate.
- This Strategy keeps Pacific allies on our side.
- Strategy is a concept of how to fight. This is important because deterrence can fail.
- Our Maritime Strategy can change nuclear balance.

- He emphasized the ultimate criteria for judging the Strategy is whether U. S. is better with or without it? His answer, "better," because:
 - Provides important options
 - Complicates Soviet war planning
 - Confident Navy makes sense

4. Ambassador Komer then took the floor. He ran through his standard litany of Maritime Strategy criticisms. His presentation was not particularly well prepared, not very coherent and, certainly not as convincing as Bing West's. Major points:

- Strategy is a unilateral, Navy go-it-alone strategy that ignores our Allies and sister Services.
- Even if the Navy can sink the entire Soviet Fleet, so what? The war will be won or lost on Central Front.
- Maritime Strategy pays lip service to but never substantively addresses how maritime forces contribute to war termination.

5. Forum was very worthwhile for promoting better understanding of the Strategy. Bing West is a very persuasive advocate and I strongly recommend we arrange to have him give his presentation to OP-60 and the OP-603 branch. This would be particularly important and germane as we are beginning work on Version IV of the Strategy and some of his thinking may be useful in helping us to better defend and package this next version.

Very Respectfully,
Tom Kall

MARITIME STRATEGY

Bing West's Presentation at
Atlantic Council - Graphics

1. WHAT IS IT?
2. MEASURES OF THE STRATEGY.
 - A. GEOPOLITICS
 - B. DETERRENCE OF NIBBLING
 - C. DETERRENCE OF GLOBAL WAR
 - D. FIGHTING A GLOBAL WAR
3. CRITERIA FOR DECIDING IF THE STRATEGY IS HELPFUL OR HARMFUL
 - A. US POLICY WITHOUT THE STRATEGY
 - B. US FORCE STRUCTURE WITHOUT THE STRATEGY

WHAT IS IT?

- CONCEPTS ABOUT HOW TO FIGHT THE SOVIET UNION
- GENERAL
 - CONVENTIONAL, NOT NUCLEAR
 - GLOBAL, NOT ONE THEATER
 - CONDITIONAL WAR
 - PROTRACTED, NOT SHORT
 - FOCUS IS TWO SUPERPOWERS
 - END WILL BE ONE SUPERPOWER

- NAVAL
 - BETTER
 - ATTACK AND DESTROY
 - CHANGE NUCLEAR BALANCE
 - HOLD ACCESS WORLDWIDE FOR US
 - KEEP PACIFIC (JAPAN, PRC) WITH US
 - APPLY MOBILIZED REINFORCEMENTS
 - PROJECT POWER AS CINCS REQUEST

WHY IS IT?

- WHY A CONCEPT OF HOW TO FIGHT?

1) DETERRENCE DOES FAIL

2) NATO NUCLEAR THREAT RESTS ON CREDIBILITY OF MUTUAL SUICIDE

3) NOT APPROPRIATE IN ALL CASES

LIMITS OF DETERRENCE

"OUR DETERRENT STRATEGY FAILS, IF WAR EVER OCCURS."

(RADM JEROME PLASKINS, 13 OCT 1940)

(GENERAL JACK VESSEY, NOV, 1984)

"WE HAVE WARNED THE JAPANESE OF OUR STRENGTH. WE WILL
DEPLOY TO SHOW THEM WE ARE SERIOUS." (VADM THOMAS FAY,
17 DEC 1940)

HELPFUL OR HARMFUL?

FOUR MEASURES

1. GEOPOLITICS

- US NAVAL CONFIDENCE
- SOVIET LACK OF CONFIDENCE

2. DETERRENCE OF NIBBLING

3. DETERRENCE OF GLOBAL WAR

- MULTIPLIES SOVIET UNCERTAINTY

(NEXT SLIDE)

4. FIGHTING A GLOBAL WAR

- CHANGES NUCLEAR BALANCE
- KEEPS PACIFIC
- MOBILIZATION ACCESS WORLDWIDE

US DETERRENT THEORY

1. REASSURE ALLIES

- FORWARD PRESENCE
- INVOLVED IN FIGHT

2. CONVENTIONAL DIRECT DEFENSE

- STRONG
- YET QUESTIONABLE

3. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FINAL OUTCOME

- MARITIME STRATEGY CHANGES TERMS OF THE CONFLICT
- A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE
- SOVIETS PERCEIVE WAR CANNOT BE CONFINED AS THEY WISH

4. NUCLEAR RETALIATION

- NUCLEAR LINKAGE ESSENTIAL
- UNACCEPTABLE COSTS
- BUT NO CERTAINTY OF USE

IS STRATEGY HELPFUL OR HARMFUL?

1. CONSIDER U.S. RESOURCES WITHOUT IT:

- PROBABLY THE SAME ALLOCATION
- IF LESS NAVAL,
 - DOUBTFUL IF CONGRESS ALLOCATES MORE TO W. GERMANY
 - DOUBTFUL IF U.S. ARMY ALLOCATES MORE TO W. GERMANY

2. CONSIDER U.S. POLICY WITHOUT IT:

- LIMITS PRESIDENT'S OPTIONS
- MAKES SOVIET WAR PLANNING EASIER
- LIMITS NAVY AND GEOPOLITICAL CONFIDENCE

CONCLUSIONS

1. A CONFIDENT US NAVY MAKES SENSE.
2. AN UNCERTAIN, NOT-SO-CONFIDENT SOVIET UNION MAKES SENSE.
3. A CONFIDENT WESTERN ALLIANCE MAKES SENSE.
4. A CONVENTIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO INITIATING NUCLEAR WAR MAKES SENSE.
5. THE EUROPEANS WILL NOT ACCEPT A CONVENTIONAL OPTION.
6. THEREFORE RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTION BY A COMPARTMENTED PROGRAM.

SUMMARY

- A STRATEGY OF CONFIDENCE

- - INCREASES UNCERTAINTY IN SOVIET CALCULUS ABOUT NATO AND
LARGESCALE CONFLICT

- - INCREASES OUR FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IN GEOPOLITICS

Komer
agrees w/
last 2 charts.

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Maritime Strategy and Nato Deterrence

F.J. West, Jr.

The 1970s was a period of malaise and turmoil for US national security interests and organizations. For the US Navy the period was no exception. At the beginning of the decade, Navy force planning stressed ASW and convoy protection in the context of a Nato war, and procurement considerations such as the Sea Control Ship were hotly debated. Considerable respect was given publicly to Soviet naval power, including statements that the Soviets could have defeated the Sixth Fleet during the 1973 Middle East War, that the US Navy had less than a 50 percent chance of prevailing in a major US-Soviet war, and that a sea line of communication (SLOC) to our allies and geopolitical friends (i.e., the PRC) across the Western Pacific might not be maintained in a major conflict. While some of these assessments may have been for public consumption in order to influence budgets, they did reflect a defensive and pessimistic tone.

Similar resonances could be heard in the other services, while in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1977 an effort was made to codify the self-perceptions of reduced capabilities by assuming a reduction in foreign policy commitments; e.g., US forces would not have to transit the Norwegian Sea to reinforce Norway. In the resultant furor over capabilities versus commitments, the Department of the Navy produced its own version of naval missions and capabilities, called Sea Plan 2000, asserting that a Nato war would actually be global in nature—due to the worldwide interests and alliances of both superpowers—and that US naval forces should, where prudent, attack and not sit back on the defense. A goal of a 600-ship Navy was suggested. Special emphasis was given to attack submarines, which were designed for the offense; to the introduction of phased-array radar AAW cruisers into fifteen carrier battle groups; and to enhanced electronic warfare.

Working with the fleet commanders in chief and testing the development and employment concept through repeated wargaming at the Naval War College, two successive CNOs—Admirals Thomas Hayward and James Watkins—steadily developed an overall concept for the wartime employment of naval forces. The plan was a conceptual strategy for maritime forces;

Mr. West has served as Dean of the Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War College, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and is currently associated with The Hudson Institute.

Table
Maritime Strategy Concepts

Numbered listing indicates a Warfighting Concept and, where applicable, a related Deterrence Concept follows.

1. *Warfighting Concept:* War termination without use of nuclear weapons.¹
Deterrence Concept: "Aggressiveness on the part of our ships is the greatest deterrent we can have. And the Soviets really understand that."²
2. *Warfighting Concept:* Nonnuclear option to put at risk Soviet nuclear force.³
3. *Warfighting Concept:* Three flanks of the homeland are every bit as important to the Soviet Union as Central Europe.⁴
Deterrence Concept: "We simulate running strikes into the Crimea. I would not preclude an opportunity to go in and clobber the Soviets at the right time and the right place . . . I think it is unlikely [on Northern Flank] at a very early stage."⁵
4. *Warfighting Concept:* Our operations are sequential in a global war strategy.⁶
Deterrence Concept: ". . . if the NATO Treaty means anything, it means we have to protect and to hold Norway. The minimum reinforcement plans require both the Marines and the ACE mobile force to move by sea. They all have to go by ship, to Norway, after the conflict breaks out. If we allow the Norwegian Sea to be controlled by the Soviet Union, Norway is untenable."⁷
5. *Warfighting Concept:* "If we are swift enough, we would move rapidly into an attack on Alekseyevka."⁸
Deterrence Concept: ". . . we cannot disavow the capability to hit [with tactical air] their forces that are threatening our forces"⁹
6. *Warfighting Concept:* "Very carefully planned and coordinated rollback operation with heavy SSN combat in the upper Norwegian Sea."¹⁰
7. *Warfighting Concept:* "We have to know how effective the SSN surge would be against the Soviet bastion force around the SSBNs. It is very critical to force them back up in there."¹¹
8. *Warfighting Concept:* ". . . sequential rollback of the Soviet defenses."¹²
9. *Warfighting Concept:* "War is inherently unpredictable . . . so nullify the [Soviet] submarine force in the Norwegian Sea . . . a tough sea . . . may take a week, a month or three months."¹³
10. *Warfighting Concept:* "Seizing the initiatives is essential. We have to move up north of the GIUK Gap. We have to control the Norwegian Sea and force them back into the defensive farther north, under the ice, to use their attack subs to protect their nuclear missile submarines, to use their attack subs to protect the Kola and Murmansk coasts, and similarly their Pacific coast. If we try to draw a 'cordon sanitaire' and declare we are not going to go above the GIUK Gap, . . . then they have the capability to use their attack subs offensively against our SLOCs."¹⁴
11. *Warfighting Concept:* "Our submarines have to go and nullify the Soviet submarine force before we can send any surface ships, certainly before we send the Marines up there in amphibious craft . . . we cannot control the Norwegian Sea if we cannot operate carriers there. In order to put forces into that area, we have to provide air support for them . . . in the subsequent phases of the operations."¹⁵

it did not give tactical rudder orders to the fleet and unified CinCs, who are responsible for the development and execution of operational war plans. Instead the maritime strategy provided the policy parameters for operations, relating campaign options and employment choice risks and realities on the one hand and strategic principles and national goals on the other. When Secretary of the Navy John Lehman began speaking publicly about the forward employment of US naval forces—to place Soviet forces on the defensive and to protect distant US allies—he was drawing upon an empirical body of doctrinal concepts.

What is the Maritime Strategy?

The maritime strategy “is the Navy’s current determination as to the best overall conventional Maritime Strategy for global war today.”¹⁶ The principles of the strategy set forth here are excerpted mainly from the informative SecNav/CNO testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 14 March 1984. They are summarized in the accompanying Table. It must be stressed they are general strategic guidelines and it is the CinCs who design the campaign plans. The maritime strategy provides a strategic framework by establishing general policy parameters that are useful guides to operational thinking.

Warfighting Aspects. As Dr. Robert Wood of the Naval War College has stated, “Any deterrence strategy that does not consider how the war will be fought and terminated is a hollow shell.”¹⁷ The maritime strategy is concerned with the actual employment of naval forces capabilities; that is, with consideration of how a major US-Soviet war would be fought. The strategy does not address the employment of nuclear weapons, but employs conventional forces and campaigns to safeguard Western interests and to secure leverage for cease-fire negotiations.¹⁸ Its premise is to plan for a *protracted* conventional conflict.

The strategy takes seriously Dr. Henry Kissinger’s observations that it is foolish to base the security of the West upon the threat of mutual suicide.¹⁹ The US Navy is confident that, with the coordination of the other US services and allies, the wartime naval missions of the West can be accomplished, the offensive can be seized and Soviet naval power can be gradually destroyed, enabling Western military assets to be deployed across oceans around the globe. These principles have been stated repeatedly by naval officials and similar statements have been contained for the past several years in the OSD Posture Statements, reflecting a growing consensus about the wartime employment of conventional naval power and how confidence in those capabilities reinforces the stability of deterrence.

From the Table, five principles of combat emerge.

8 Naval War College Review

First, nuclear weapons are not used.

Second, sequential operations in a protracted war are planned. There are no fixed time lines or fixed plans for execution in a rote manner.

Third, offensive sea control is stressed repeatedly because the best defense is a good offense. The United States presumably conserves naval resources by attacking rather than by defending a "Maginot Line" like the GIUK Gap. Rollback ASW campaigns in the Pacific and the Norwegian Sea are proposed to prevent Soviet submarine interdiction of the SLOCs. Marines contribute, especially on the northern flank, to prevent the forward basing of Soviet aircraft to attack the SLOC. Soviet Naval Aviation bases, where vulnerable, will be hit. Offensive orientation seeks to pin down, bottle up, or destroy Soviet forces, conceding no sanctuaries.

Fourth, war termination leverage is sought. There is the option of changing the nuclear balance by nonnuclear attacks. The Soviet Navy will be destroyed; there will be few or no ocean areas the Soviets can claim to control during cease-fire negotiations. It will be a US option to grant any sector or no sector of ocean to the Soviets. After a cease-fire or during negotiations, the United States can use all the seas for commerce, reinforcement, SSBN patrols and the application of power.

Fifth, by dominating the oceans the strategy emphasizes the eventual application of the effects of US mobilization (e.g., \$1 trillion a year), and of non-European allied mobilization (e.g., another \$500 billion a year).

In sum, the warfighting principles of the strategy are:

- nonnuclear,
- protracted coalition war with sequential and rollback operations,
- offensive pressure to protect SLOCs,
- war termination leverage, and
- control of the seas to apply effects of a massive Western mobilization.

Only two of the five principles relate to sea control—the maritime strategy in its essence is not maritime; it is a conventional war strategy.

Deterrence Aspects. In large measure, US naval planning is based on the logic of how to fight if deterrence breaks down. In the event of actual conflict, as former SacLant Admiral Harry Train, USN (Ret.), has expressed it, there are only a limited number of options.²⁰ First, it is possible that the Soviets would be stopped and would then quickly accept a cease-fire on status quo ante terms in order to avoid possible escalation. This is unlikely. Second, the Allies could be quickly pushed back and accept a cease-fire on Soviet terms. This is also unlikely. Third, the Allies, losing ground, could initiate a full nuclear exchange, killing hundreds of millions of people. Fourth, the Allies, losing ground, could employ nuclear weapons in a "limited" way and the Soviets would respond in kind. Tens of millions would be killed and either the Allies would accept a cease-fire on negotiated terms or continue the war without

further resort to nuclear weapons. Fifth, the Allies, despite initial setbacks and loss of ground, could continue a conventional war until able to negotiate an acceptable termination of hostilities.

Because the first two are unlikely and the next two are unacceptable, naval planning proceeds from the fifth case. It is based on two assumptions. The first is that officers must plan seriously for actual conflict involving current capabilities. This is in marked contrast to the long prevailing attitude that, since the current allied forces are unable to provide a successful defense, the goal of planners is to list the resource requirements for a successful defense ten years hence and not to think through the course of a conventional war if those requirements are not fulfilled. The second assumption is that history supports real capabilities rather than deterrent theories. Deterrence has failed time and again when an aggressor should have remained deterred (e.g., Japan initiating war against the United States or Argentina seizing the Falklands).

Nato planning derives from a different wellspring. Having fought a terribly destructive war forty years ago, the West Europeans are determined not to repeat the experience. Nuclear weapons, because they risk the mutual suicide of nations, have been perceived as the guarantor of nonwar. Therefore, many West Europeans tend to take warfighting seriously only as a means legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons. The role of the hundreds of thousands of Allied troops in West Germany reeling under the impact of Soviet aggression is to engage the pitched emotions of the 16 Nato nations, making credible any desperate Western resort to nuclear war. Therefore, the "deterrent-only" theory views any serious planning for conventional defense as weakening deterrence because it weakens the supposed automatic resort to nuclear weapons.

The "deterrent-only" theory is based on the credible possibility—in the event of major conflict—of catastrophic nuclear destruction of Europe and, as well, of the American and Soviet homelands. This means there can be no clear firebreaks between battlefield, theater and strategic levels of nuclear war. Why? Because to many West Europeans, firebreaks provide a means for the destruction of Europe alone, while the United States and the Soviet Union remain intact—this does not sufficiently enhance the deterrence of war in Europe. The SS-20s in the western Soviet Union targeted against Western Europe provide one link between the destruction of Europe and that of the superpowers, while the Pershing II and US cruise missiles in Western Europe targeted against the SS-20s provide another. Clearly, the West's nuclear weapons are not seen as redressing Western shortcomings in conventional forces.

Under this theory Nato conventional forces must at least be strong enough to put up a stout defense, to prevent any quick fait accompli by a Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg. Enough time and treasure must be expended that the peoples and

policymakers of Western Europe and the United States fully appreciate that the war is a struggle to the death. Once the West is deeply and emotionally committed, then resort to nuclear weapons is credible.²¹

Critics argue that this theory of total, even suicidal, commitment is incredible, not least because those advocating the theory are doing so in order to avoid very modest peacetime increases in conventional forces. If the democracies of the West are unwilling to support even five percent GNP for defense in peacetime, critics have observed, they will not choose the final sacrifice in wartime. True, they admit, the ferocity with which the Western democracies fought in two world wars, despite having voted against defense appropriations even on the eves of both conflicts, suggests that the level of sacrifice cannot be predicted in advance. But, they point out, the objective in previous wars was to build strength in order to win and preserve or restore the societies of the West, while the deterrent-only theory for a future war is to blow up the societies.

In brief, reliance on nuclear weapons has led some to view as unacceptable any defense planning which lessens the likelihood of the nuclear apocalypse, because that is perceived as the *essential* element for deterrence. In contrast, by assuming a protracted conflict, the maritime strategy rejects the assumption of the early resort to nuclear war. Thus it is a threat to the theory of "deterrence only." Those wedded to the deterrent theory refuse to plan for conventional warfighting because such a plan might include initial setbacks or destruction and maneuver within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); such plans are politically unacceptable in most West European nations. Therefore, the current Nato strategy is principally about the deterrence of war.

How do the five principles of maritime warfighting relate to deterrence? Deterrence encompasses, inter alia, these following concepts:

- Forward presence—the aggressor sees he will have to fight Americans.
- Reassurance of allies—by forward presence, by the nuclear umbrella, by contacts and rhetoric, and by credible plans matched to capabilities and to the seriousness of the threat.
- Direct Conventional Defense—the standard interpretation is to add bulk to the Central Front to defend against a blitzkrieg. All too common West European wisdom is that this defense cannot be done given Soviet strength, and so should not be done, because it would undercut the nuclear automaticity which is the true deterrent of any war. The common American view is that direct defense has less than an even chance today, but could be successful if all the allies contribute some real growth per year to their defense budgets for ten years. Unfortunately, the present Warsaw Pact modernization rate is exceeding the modernization efforts of the Nato allies.

The maritime strategy contributes to direct defense by insuring continuous reinforcement across the SLOC for protracted war. Thus the Soviets are

faced with two tasks: break the center; and seize the flanks and choke off reinforcements. If the Soviets cannot choke off allied reinforcements, they face a long war against an economically superior opponent. With the US maritime principles of rollback pressure on all the Soviet flanks, the probability of the reinforcements—and so of a protracted war—is high.

- Uncertainty about the terms and costs of the war—this refers to efforts (sometimes called retaliation, horizontal escalation, analogous response, etc.) which indicate to a potential aggressor that a war will *not* be fought on his terms or on his choice of territory. For instance, the public voicing of possible Nato planning options to seize East German (GDR) territory or create an uprising in Eastern Europe would add to Soviet uncertainty about the terms of a war.²² This assumes the GDR is vulnerable to a Nato counteroffensive—such action would gain territory for Nato bargaining purposes, encourage the defection of Warsaw Pact armies and lead to the disintegration of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.²³

The maritime strategy adds to Soviet uncertainty by declaring that, regardless of how well the Soviets are doing on the Central Front, the US naval policy is to:

- apply pressure globally,
- possibly change the nuclear balance,
- prolong the war,
- apply to Europe the effects of US mobilization (\$1 trillion),
- assist in the mobilization of Japan and other allies (\$500 billion),
- possibly transport hi-tech military items to the PRC,
- apply pressure on the Soviet flanks,
- attack Soviet bases,
- destroy the Soviet Navy, and
- prevent the Soviet use of any ocean for any reason.

Added together, these capabilities point to a conflict of different dimensions than a blitzkrieg on the Central Front. In deterrent terms, this increases Soviet uncertainty and complicates Soviet planning.

In sum, the maritime strategy adds to deterrence through:

Direct Defense, by making it clear that the Soviets must achieve two tasks: break the center, and seize the flanks to choke down the massive reinforcements which will be coming across the SLOC. The maritime strategy makes seizing the flanks and squeezing the SLOC very difficult.

Increasing Uncertainty about the terms of the war. Whatever else the war will be, it will *not* be limited in time to one month or in focus to the Central Front theater. If the Soviets attack, they must expect a world war of protracted (if not nuclear) dimensions. Because the blitzkrieg cannot cap the US defense budget or prevent the transoceanic movement of the US assets eventually produced, in war the Soviets would face a severe long-term problem on a global scale.²⁴

Critiques

If the maritime strategy seeks to enhance deterrence, why is it attacked so stridently and persistently by several critics? Three reasons are apparent. First, the Navy has not explained its concepts. It is Pentagon style to give briefings, because that is the only way to get the ear of busy officials. But briefings are elliptical and there has been no rigorous, comprehensive analysis setting forth the maritime strategy. Two CNOs—Hayward and Watkins—have been personally responsible for the strategy and have done so with a handful of assistants. Routine staff support has been thin. Most naval officers are, and should be, first and foremost operators. Some tend to be impatient with concepts, viewing them as irrelevant or academic. In the maritime strategy, the Navy had a good idea which could add a dimension—protracted war—to deterrence and to war plans. (Another contribution to deterrence has been the Army War College work on maneuver and campaign strategies, which, although possibly at variance with Nato quasi-linear defense, would seriously contest any Soviet blitzkrieg on the Central Front.) But whether the Navy will develop and refine the strategy it has announced remains to be seen. There are about ten articles written attacking the strategy for every one written to explain it. Many who champion the Nato deterrent strategy, are skeptical of the maritime strategy, while the central thesis of this article is that the maritime strategy actually contributes to Nato deterrence.

Second, critics and proponents alike mix and confuse warfighting and deterrent concepts. The maritime strategy was developed as a discrete set of warfighting concepts and, later, concepts about deterrence were added. To the extent that warfighting concepts are realistic (and perceived as realistic by the Soviets), they are also deterrent. They are not two separate branches of the same tree, but are more closely intertwined. Recently, the Navy has been developing an agenda for bilateral negotiations with allies, for crisis management, for signaling to the Soviets, and for dealing with the repertoire of concerns to policymakers in international security affairs. All of these are legitimate issues but when they are lumped together, there is confusion about which concepts apply if a US-Soviet conflict occurs. There is not a clear distinction between those theories that enhance deterrence of a major conflict and those that apply to managing crises.

Third, some critics have genuine disagreements with one or more of the essential principles of the maritime strategy and do not believe US naval power contributes to stability in proportion to the resources it receives.

The principles of the strategy address warfighting and articulate a set of means in a protracted conflict that are premised on avoiding massive nuclear destruction. The maritime strategy says that having a coherent plan for warfighting—as the Soviets do—strengthens deterrence. If war comes it still

might go nuclear, but if war comes and does not go nuclear, the maritime strategy seeks to contribute to a termination satisfactory to US interests.

Nato Europe prefers to observe that, since any war is unsatisfactory to Western interests, no realistic planning for conventional war can be done beyond a short forward defense because such plans would reduce the automatic resort to nuclear weapons and so might encourage the Warsaw Pact to use its superior conventional strength.

This is a serious dilemma. The US Navy, together with allied support, can probably achieve its wartime tasks of insuring allied resupply worldwide and of delivering mobile firepower, while threatening to destroy all Soviet naval assets. In similar fashion, US and allied tactical air can probably destroy Soviet tactical air, and should, given that Nato invests twice as much in tacair systems. But these achievements do not offset the extraordinary Soviet investment in land, armored warfare.

On a GNP or per capita basis, Western Europe spends considerably less on defense than does the United States. By the standard, quantitative measures, the allied inputs are not equal to the conventional warfighting task, unless early setbacks and initial loss of territory are accepted as a real risk. Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle has identified this as a critical concern stating, "If we are serious about emphasizing conventional defense and avoiding 'first use' of nuclear weapons, we must be serious about the staying power of our conventional forces."²⁵

The democracies of Western Europe appear to be willing to accept added risk rather than to increase peacetime spending. Their preferred solution is to rely upon an automatic linkage between Soviet conventional aggression and an allied nuclear response. Serious US Navy thinking and planning for protracted conventional conflict upsets the comfortable theory of automaticity—which may not prove to be very automatic if put to the test.

Another West European reservation is that US naval planning is too global/diffuse in scope and slow in response. Nato Europe links an attack upon one nation as an attack upon all. Therefore, many believe the onslaught of hostilities will spread quickly to the Central Front as the key battlefield in a ferocious and short (probably less than 30 days) war. In contrast, the US Navy is spread out in the North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Mediterranean and Western Pacific. The Central Front is not central to naval forces and naval forces are not central to the Central Front.

Also, while Nato land forces are tied to a political deterrent policy of forward defense along a thin line which permits little maneuver backward or forward, naval forces are freer to employ maneuver, testing the enemy before being committed far forward. The military logic for naval forces is to delay full-scale engagements until enemy capabilities have been probed, while Nato land forces do not have the luxury of delay or for large geographic maneuver. Conceivably, large-scale naval battles may not begin until weeks

after momentous land battles have been decided. Hence, those planners that believe the Central Front is the key, quite logically want to reduce resources for naval forces and insure that those naval forces procured be committed early-on in a way which supports the Central Front battle.

SLOC support for the Central Front is perceived by some as achievable with less investment in carrier battle groups. Carriers in turn are perceived as contributing less per dollar in allied tactical air than fixed air bases near the Central Front. Only if one views conflict with the Soviet Union as occurring on several fronts, on a scale and length comparable to the previous two world wars, does the mobility inherent in naval airpower make sense in a major conflict.

In 1984 the perception of allied tactical air superiority gave rise to proposals for its full utility against Soviet armor. Emerging Technologies (ETs) would, on a cost-effective basis, enable Nato to target, attrite and disrupt Soviet vehicular forces 100-300 miles in the rear through the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) launched primarily from tactical aircraft and secondarily by land-based intermediate-range missiles. The concept of Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) or "Deep Strike" has the added political benefit of placing some potential pressure on the Warsaw Pact (at least the GDR would not be a sanctuary) without appearing to make Nato, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, look too offensive-minded in peacetime.

The trend in US tactical air forces is toward PGMs, and FOFA has been conceptually linked to the US Air Force.²⁶ It is doubtful whether serious planning should rely on the application of naval tactical air in or beyond the Central Front for the initial weeks of a major war. The Soviet submarine and air-to-surface missile threats, the demands of other regions and the sheer ocean distances naval forces must traverse all suggest that naval tactical air not be planned as a substitute to—although it should complement—land-based tactical air in the region of the world most densely populated by land-based air systems.

By virtue of its environment and its systems, US naval forces show marked differences in planning assumption when compared with Nato Central Front doctrine and the deterrence theory of automaticity. These differences can be papered over, but they are serious. US naval planners look to employ conventional systems, even if that means initial setbacks. They look at theaters around the globe, not at one battlefield. They envision a long struggle, perhaps punctuated by episodic cease-fires, and not a short war. They view deterrence as resting on the conventional capabilities to achieve policy objectives, not capabilities to achieve an emotional commitment and intensity of sacrifice to compel the initiation of nuclear war without calculation of the consequences.

Nato Europe has not yet recognized the seriousness or the extent of the evolution in US naval doctrine and strategic thought. Within American circles, there are reservations and suspicions about the naval doctrine. Critics

suspect naval motivations are for reasons of force structure justification, especially of large-deck carriers. (The cutting edge of naval strategy, however, begins with the attack submarine and ASW.) Others believe that the naval effort is misdirected strategy in terms of geopolitics and that these resources would be more useful if allocated to Europe to stop a Soviet blitzkrieg. This reallocation of forces presumes that the US Congress would vote to do even more for Western European nations (which are equally as wealthy per capita as the United States), who as a general rule are content to put forward half the effort of the United States on a per capita basis. It also presumes conflict will occur in the Central Front, and that other areas of Western Europe and the globe would benefit less from the mobile power of US naval forces. Because the strategic challenges to US interests have been increasing outside the Central Front, the argument for more US Central Front forces at the expense of more flexible forces is open to serious question.

The US naval focus has been on persuading all US armed services that the issue is not a force structure debate but rather the need to develop a conventional warfighting concept. This is because the initiation of nuclear war is not militarily sensible, especially when rhetorically cited as a reason why wealthy nations do not have to provide prudently for their common defense by conventional means.

Naval planning strained of the salt water, is a plan for a protracted, conventional conflict. Since democracies often do not sacrifice sufficiently for security during peacetime, the planning recognizes there may well be initial setbacks if war occurred. In its realism, it can strengthen deterrence. Given Soviet nuclear strength, the Western initiation of nuclear war, after a conventional setback, is becoming less credible. What is becoming more credible is the weakness of the Soviet economy and the enormous strength of the US economy and the economies of other allied or friendly nations. In a major conflict, regardless of how the first month of conventional war went in certain theaters, the Soviets would have to calculate the one-year, two-year, and three-year consequences of US economy with a \$1 trillion annual defense budget with an additional \$200 billion annually devoted to strategic defense.

With or without the Central Front, US naval planning has been based on analyses of how to fight conventionally. Because this involves a protracted war (meaning possible destruction in Europe) Nato Europe has not addressed the issue, preferring to cling to a deterrence-only theory. Yet naval planning can be explained as reinforcing, not reducing, deterrence. As the credibility of initiating nuclear war weakens, so the comparative strength of mobilization economies rises in the calculus of those who must make the decision to go to war. The effect of more than a trillion dollars per year in US conventional and nuclear forces would weigh very heavily on the decisionmakers in the Politburo when weighing the risks of major conflict. Lastly, US naval

planning is premised on a basic assumption: a military professional must have a concept and plan for how he is going to fight.

Then, what are the serious objections to the maritime strategy?
There are four.

First, *that US naval losses by offensive sea control would be much higher than if the United States stayed south of the GIUK gap, stayed out of the Seas of Japan and of Okhotsk and, in general stayed defensive and let the war play out to a conclusion on the Central Front.*

This is a professional military judgment about net power. The available evidence suggests that the United States has the power to press forward and that losses on the SLOCs would be higher if defensive sea control were employed.

Second, *if the Soviet blitzkrieg destroys the Central Front, the war is terminated and over.*

Why? If we define blitzkrieg as an attempt to quickly destroy an opposing army by penetrating its front and driving into its rear, then there have been several successful blitzkriegs. If we place blitzkrieg within the context of successful "war termination," then the evidence about blitzkriegs is mixed. Hitler's blitzkrieg against Poland precipitated hostilities with England and France. Hitler's blitzkrieg against France did not end the war with England, and Hitler's blitzkrieg against Russia failed to put the Soviet Army out of the war.

How could the Soviets use a blitzkrieg attack along the inner-German border as a means both to start and terminate a war with Nato, including the United States? Such an attack would have to achieve two objectives—the defeat of Nato's forward deployed armies and the neutralization of allied (e.g., US, UK, Spain and Japan) ability to mobilize and continue to fight in force. It is difficult to imagine that the latter objective can be achieved by the Soviets without major operations on the flanks of Nato designed to change the geography of a US-Soviet SLOC war. If this is true, then the US Navy has considerable influence on how long a war would last.

The unstated assumption of a blitzkrieg leading to war termination must be that the United States would be deterred, by the Soviet threat of nuclear attack, from persisting in conventional attacks and full-scale mobilization. Hence, the Soviets win by forcing the United States to accept surrender terms by the threat of nuclear attacks. This point of view, if correct, would really undermine West European confidence and Nato cohesion because it is a double denial of US stated policy. First, it denies that we would initiate nuclear strikes rather than accept the loss of West German territory and second, that we would be deterred from retaking territory out of fear of Soviet nuclear strikes.

A successful blitzkrieg 4,000 miles from the United States does not solve a central Soviet dilemma: how to cap the US defense budget, prevent a shift in

the nuclear balance in favor of the United States and prevent the United States from applying massive reinforcement, sooner or later, across the SLOCs. The old adage applies: "if striking a king, strike to kill." How a blitzkrieg against the European Central Front would result in the de facto surrender of the United States is not clear. Most likely, the war would not be over; it would be just beginning.

Third, *if the Soviet blitzkrieg does not succeed, the Soviets will accept terms.*

This is not to say that SLOCs are not relevant to the essential battle, or to the deterrence of that battle. The logic here is that the Soviet General Staff would plan an attack only if quick victory were anticipated. Only increased Nato strength on the Central Front will lessen Soviet confidence in a quick victory, and therefore only increased Nato forces on the Central Front contribute to deterrence against the blitzkrieg.

This logic has three questionable assumptions. First, it requires more resources, especially West European, at a time when West European (and US) defense budgets show no real growth. Second, it denies that a US/allied capability to change the terms of the war (e.g., to a global war) strengthens deterrence. This denial is implicitly a denial of the nuclear deterrent, which also lessens Soviet confidence by threatening to change the terms of the war. Third, it denies that the Soviets must seize the flanks and choke off the US reinforcement through the Atlantic SLOCs, in addition to seizing the center. If an initial Soviet blitzkrieg is halted in the center and the war appears to be going favorably for Nato (i.e., little or no loss of territory), a Soviet decision to accept a cease-fire and negotiate is likely only if Soviet prospects for continued conflict look bleak. If initial defensive success on the Central Front is bought by Nato at the cost of losing Norway and the ability to sustain the SLOC, then a decision by the Soviets to avoid a protracted conflict via negotiations is not likely since, without the SLOC, Nato loses the advantages in a protracted war.

The maritime strategy complicates Soviet planning and confidence because the Soviets must seize the flanks as well as the center. Despite the pace or direction of the land battle in the center, as the fighting drags on allied tactical air begins to assert itself. (Confidence in allied tactical air is the critical assumption for endorsing FOFA or "Deep Strike.") With Nato controlling the seas and air, Soviet movement against the flanks would be difficult and probably would not have the characteristics or timing of a blitzkrieg. Hence, the strategy complicates the Soviet timetable for a quick victory and a quick cease-fire, because it says the war will be protracted, global and fought on terms chosen by Nato as well as those chosen by the Soviet Union.

Fourth, *if the Soviets can be stopped in their initial blitzkrieg, the war can be terminated because the allies will be willing to initiate nuclear war.*

This logic does not explain why the initiation of nuclear war by the allies is more credible after a conventional defense of weeks, rather than of days. The

incentive to escalate is the same in either case: conventional setbacks on the Central Front. The consequence of escalation—disaster—is not different in the two cases.

In summary, the maritime strategy seeks to enhance deterrence by indicating to the Soviets that aggression against the Central Front may encounter: successful direct defense; nuclear escalation; or a protracted conventional war with different terms added to the conflict (e.g., a shift in the nuclear balance, a SLOC to the PRC, the mobilized economies of Japan, Asia and other countries, pressure against the Soviet flanks, a long war in Europe and the eventual effects on the nuclear and conventional balances of a trillion dollar US defense budget). Given that the United States possesses a reasonable set of capabilities for the maritime strategy, it is not clear why we should deny ourselves the deterrent effects which that strategy offers.

The Navy is suggesting that a war between the superpowers and their allies could remain conventional. Regardless of the initial outcome on the Central Front, the Soviets would have to contend with the eventual application of the technological and industrial might of the United States. Unless the Soviets could persuade the United States to cap its defense budget, eventually the nuclear balance would favor the United States. Unless the Soviets could seize the flanks and approaches to Eurasia and choke the transit of allied material, eventually US naval superiority would result in the buildup ashore of a massive amount of Western military power. This concept of a protracted war is dismissed by some who believe, as did the Japanese in 1941, that the United States does not have the will to sustain such a war, or that the Soviets will initiate nuclear war if they are in danger of losing territories they seized in their initial conventional attack.

Others reject the possibility of protracted conventional war because to entertain the possibility would weaken a deterrent which they believe to rest upon the credible threat of Nato's initiation of nuclear war if losing territory in the conventional war. However, the credibility of this threat to commit mutual nuclear suicide has eroded. That credibility cannot be reinvigorated by refusing to examine the conduct and consequences of protracted conventional war.

The Navy and Marine Corps, however, do use resources which, Congress and world events permitting, could be dedicated to a further strengthening buildup of US forces in West Germany. Those resources would not in themselves yield confidence in Nato's initial defense. That defense would require renewed West European dedication and resource increases which are not forthcoming. It is generally accepted that the odds for successful Nato initial defense are decreasing because the West has chosen not to allocate the required resources. So the choice is not between confidence in a successful Nato initial defense and plans for a protracted

conflict. Neither is the choice between such plans and the nuclear deterrent; it is not suggested that the nuclear forces which provide the linkage to the nuclear deterrent be reduced.

The protracted war option increases deterrence because it adds to Soviet uncertainty. Even should the hypothetical major war not escalate to the nuclear level, the Soviet Union—no matter how successful its initial blitzkrieg in one theater or another—would have to reckon eventually with the full force of a mobilized America that has control of the seas and whose forces could be applied to any theater. As Germany and Japan learned, initial success in war against the United States is transitory. Knowing that US defense planners have thought through the course of a protracted conventional war, wargaming on a global scale year after year, complicates the calculus of Soviet planners and contributes to the deterrence of war.

Notes

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Robert W. Komer

MARITIME STRATEGY VS. COALITION DEFENSE

The United States is in the throes of another fundamental reexamination of defense strategy and posture comparable to that leading to primary reliance on nuclear deterrence in the early 1950s. This culminates a process which began over 20 years ago, as U.S. planners first began to grapple with the implications of likely Soviet catching up in nuclear capabilities. Now that nuclear stalemate is a fact of life, U.S. attention is turning to alternative strategies relying even more on conventional capabilities than the current strategic doctrine of flexible response. While crucial nuclear issues must still be addressed, this article will focus chiefly on the leading non-nuclear alternatives now under debate.

To oversimplify, one is a maritime supremacy strategy which tacitly acknowledges Soviet military predominance on the Eurasian landmass and stresses U.S. exploitation of the medium which we can most readily dominate—the sea. The other calls for trying harder to generate a credible conventional defense of such high priority areas as Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf littoral, primarily via greater coalition burden sharing and a more efficient collective effort. At present the Reagan Administration is trying to ride both horses. Since conventional capabilities are so much more expensive than nuclear, however, economic constraints may force on it the necessity for choice.

II

The chief factor impelling the United States toward a new strategy has been the gradual improvement of Soviet nuclear capabilities, to the point where they make a U.S. deterrent strategy based primarily on nuclear retaliation lose a great deal of its earlier utility and appeal. Of course, from the dawn of the nuclear

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age there have been voices arguing that nuclear weapons of mass destruction were too terrible ever to be used, hence that adequate conventional strength was also essential to deterrence. Nor has fear of U.S. nuclear retaliation stopped Soviet exploitation of vulnerable targets in the Third World, although it has no doubt helped deter any Soviet designs on major U.S. allies. Indeed, the United States itself has been self-deterred by the awesome nature of the atom it unleashed. Though the United States fought two major limited conflicts at a time when it enjoyed massive nuclear superiority, it never seriously contemplated nuclear escalation.

Instead the United States, seeing that defense-on-the-cheap via "massive retaliation" would have declining deterrent credibility as the Soviets gradually caught up, took the lead in seeking alternative strategies less dependent on nuclear escalation. Gerard Smith describes how as early as 1958 he convinced John Foster Dulles that "massive retaliation" was becoming outdated and got the Secretary to so advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs).¹ The Kennedy Administration, spurred by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, shifted in 1962 to a "flexible response" doctrine which called for building up conventional forces to permit an initial non-nuclear threshold (and make it more credible).

However, U.S. attempts to get NATO agreement to this revised strategy ran into strong European resistance, not least to the costly conventional buildup entailed. Our allies still preferred nuclear defense on the cheap, especially since the United States (for its own reasons) kept footing most of the nuclear bills. Not until late 1967 did NATO officially adopt "flexible response," and then only in a deliberately ambiguous compromise formulation (MC 14/3). This permitted the Europeans to interpret the strategy as calling for a brief conventional "pause," with only a modestly strengthened tripwire to trigger nuclear escalation, whereas the Americans favored building toward an indefinite conventional defense.

In 1973-75, after our long Vietnam entanglement, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger returned to the fray. He found our allies almost as reluctant as ever to pay the price for a more "stalwart" conventional defense. Then the Carter Administration picked up the cudgels. Its Long Term Defense Program and other arms cooperation proposals were aimed primarily at co-opting our NATO allies into a sustained non-nuclear mutual buildup, to be funded by at least three-percent annual growth in defense spend-

¹ Gerard Smith, *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I*, New York: Doubleday, 1980, pp. 10-11.

ing. As so often, our allies embraced the goals but, in contrast to the United States, have fallen short to date on their performance.

We simultaneously responded to growing European concern over the adverse "Euro-strategic balance" (Helmut Schmidt's phrase) being created by Soviet SS-20 missile and *Backfire* bomber deployments at a time of strategic nuclear stalemate. But this long-range theater nuclear force modernization program was not the centerpiece of our NATO initiatives. It was more an add-on designed to reassure our allies that no "gap" in the deterrent spectrum would be allowed to develop while we all focused on thickening NATO's conventional shield. Even 572 missiles (464 ground-launched cruise missiles—GLCMs—and 108 Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles) were not regarded as providing NATO with a militarily adequate escalatory option. Besides, GLCMs (with relatively long flight times) are not much of a first strike system; instead, they would serve primarily to prevent the U.S.S.R. from holding Europe a nuclear hostage.

Nor was the United States ever enthusiastic about the buildup of British and French nuclear forces. We regarded them as superfluous, potentially destabilizing (could we rely on de Gaulle not to pull the nuclear trigger?), and almost inevitably funded at the expense of U.K. and French conventional forces. Though we aided U.K. nuclear force modernization, most recently in promising to provide Trident II missiles, this was essentially because we saw the U.K. as determined to modernize anyway, and hence calculated that we might as well help it do so less expensively in order to minimize the impact on its conventional NATO contribution.

In short, it is we Americans who have been trying for over 20 years to get our allies to move away from dangerous over-reliance on nuclear weapons. It is allied governments which have clung to the U.S. nuclear crutch, primarily because of their reluctance to pay for adequate conventional forces. Thus it is ironic to find a large segment of European opinion accusing the United States of wanting to fight a theater nuclear war at Europe's expense.

Similarly, the United States has almost always taken the lead in efforts to help tame the nuclear monster via arms control. The apparent interruption of this process—when the Congress failed to ratify SALT II and then the Reagan Administration deliberately held back so that the United States could negotiate later from a "position of strength"—turned out to be a grave tactical error, which the Administration is belatedly seeking to rectify. Its hesitancy, at a time when the superpower nuclear competition is creating such high levels of destructive power on both sides, has

stimulated a rising popular reaction in the West. This climate has contributed to outside proposals for a U.S. "no-first-use" pledge, various forms of nuclear freeze, or even unilateral disarmament. At bottom these are symptoms of an underlying fact of life—that the advent of nuclear stalemate makes a NATO strategy based primarily on nuclear retaliation less and less appealing to the very people it is designed to protect.

This factor has spawned another problem—growing questioning of a Western alliance system based primarily on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Reliance on the U.S. nuclear commitment to defend Western Europe has long been the glue which held NATO together. While many centrifugal tendencies have created recurrent strains in the alliance, the decreasing credibility and appeal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is surely the most serious to date. As former Secretary Schlesinger has said, "the fatal flaw in the Western alliance system is its over-reliance on nuclear deterrence."²

Another impetus to the search for a new U.S. strategy is the so-called "three front" problem created by the emergence of a power vacuum in the oil-rich Middle East. After 1945, U.S. strategic thinking focused primarily on defense of Europe and Northeast Asia, and the U.S. force posture was geared to a sizing scenario of "2½ wars," i.e., coping with the Soviet threat in Europe and a Sino-Soviet threat in the Far East, plus a limited war somewhere in the Third World. Exploiting the Sino-Soviet split enabled the Nixon-Ford Administration to accommodate to America's post-Vietnam defense cutbacks by sizing our forces for only "1½ wars." But the demise of our Central Treaty alliance (CENTO), the fall of the Shah, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan have now compelled the United States to assume the added burden of countering Soviet ability to dominate Persian Gulf oil—the economic lifeblood of our chief allies. The Carter Administration sought to fill this new strategic vacuum—hence also to deter Soviet exploitation of local instability—by boldly asserting the Carter Doctrine and backing it up by creation of a new Rapid Development Force (RDF). But severe resource constraints, plus the sheer distance of the United States from the area, have led many critics to aver that the emperor has no clothes.

U.S. difficulty in coping with the "three front" problem (including Northeast Asia) has been compounded by the widening gap between U.S. and Soviet defense spending. While the U.S.S.R. has been slowly but steadily increasing its defense effort for nearly 20 years, the United States first diverted no less than \$300 billion

² "The Handwriting on the Wall May Be a Forgery," *Armed Forces Journal*, March 1982, p. 28.

in today's dollars to fighting the Vietnam War and then cut spending in the aftermath. Not until Fiscal Year 1977 did real U.S. defense outlays turn significantly upward. Since the United States spends so much more proportionally on volunteer personnel, the gap between U.S. and Soviet defense *investment* has become even wider. Indeed, though NATO as a whole still spends slightly more than the Warsaw Pact, even total NATO defense investment is considerably less than the Pact's. Thus the Western alliance has a lot to do to catch up.

III

These painful developments have created what the Joint Chiefs of Staff call a serious "mismatch between our strategy and our resources." As the Chief of Naval Operations colorfully put its maritime aspect, "we have a one-and-a-half ocean navy to deal with a three ocean war." NATO deterrence/defense capabilities in Europe are also below the level of prudence. Credible protection of Persian Gulf oil demands far more of an effort than presently projected, especially in fast sealift/airlift and in regional facilities on which to base the RDF if we can get it there in time.

This disconnect between our strategic aims and our capabilities to achieve them is becoming increasingly critical at a time when nuclear deterrence on the cheap can no longer be so heavily relied upon to deter anything but nuclear escalation, yet when substituting conventional deterrence is exceedingly expensive. It is difficult to see how the United States can assure adequate conventional deterrence/defense in three widely separated geographic theaters without much higher defense outlays than are currently foreseeable, or much greater help from its allies. ↗

To its credit, the Reagan Administration has launched a more vigorous attack on the "mismatch" problem than any of its last three predecessors. It has sought \$1.6 trillion in defense authorizations for 1982-86. Unfortunately it also seems to have adopted an even more ambitious strategy. Rejecting the 1½-war or even 2½-war scenarios, it calls for developing the capability to meet an even wider range of global contingencies simultaneously if necessary, including "horizontal escalation" by carrying a war "to other arenas" more advantageous to us, if we are disadvantaged at the point of initial attack.³ According to press leaks, a Pentagon study indicates that up to \$750 billion more, a nearly 50-percent increase, would be required to provide the forces the Joint Chiefs

³ Joseph Kraft, "Pros vs. Wingers," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1982, p. A-19. See also Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1983*, U.S. Department of Defense, February 8, 1982, Washington: GPO, 1982, pp. 1-14-17 (hereafter cited as *Posture Statement*).

consider necessary to carry out this strategy.

Given current economic prospects, there is no way in which such huge add-ons are likely to be voted. Nor is it likely that our allies will be prepared to vote comparable increases to help close the gap. Even with economic recovery, neither the U.S. Congress nor allied parliaments will find such huge add-ons politically tolerable, except perhaps in a serious crisis—by which time they might well be too late. Hence the Administration, now that it has rediscovered the resource constraints endemic to free societies, has belatedly begun to face up to the necessity for choice.

This necessity is stimulating a lively strategic debate in Washington, which parallels the corollary debate over how much the United States can afford to spend on catching up with the Soviet military effort. Regrettably the professional body to which the Administration would logically turn for advice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is far less able to reassess strategy than to clamor for more resources, a systemic weakness which underlies the long-overdue need to reform the system by which the nation gets top level military advice.

Indeed, given the way the U.S. system works, how much does "strategy" in fact lay a peacetime basis for U.S. defense programs and force posture? As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1979 to 1981, I sympathized with the JCS complaint about the "mismatch between our strategy and our resources," but found it essentially a plea for more resources to carry out the same old strategy. Indeed the "single service veto" makes the present JCS system institutionally incapable of choosing between different strategic options if Service oxen would be gored. As I then argued, to the extent resources remained constrained, we ought to rethink our strategy too, and try harder to gear our force posture to our strategic priorities. Instead it tends to be dictated by service parochialism and such domestic political considerations as which defense contractors get what. The systems analysis approach which dominates Defense Department decision-making also often dictates sub-optimal decisions based on weapons systems cost-effectiveness rather than on strategic needs. But the essence of peacetime strategic decision-making must be to face up to the tough choices between competing missions and related capabilities when we can't do everything we want.

IV

As the United States grapples with this necessity, two broad competing schools of thought have emerged in the Pentagon.

Significantly, both schools accept the premise that credible deterrence now requires that the United States and its allies be prepared to fight a longer conventional war with the U.S.S.R.—not just achieve a brief conventional “pause” which serves primarily as a tripwire for nuclear escalation. This is not to say that the United States should abandon nuclear deterrence, or fail to maintain adequate capabilities for this purpose, but that in an era of nuclear stalemate such capabilities serve more to prevent the other side from nuclear escalation than to deter conventional conflict. According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the United States is not seeking to recapture nuclear superiority, as indicated by the fact that only 15 percent of his proposed five-year defense program—close to the historical average—is devoted to nuclear modernization.⁴

Both schools also recognize the need for maritime superiority, since sea control is indispensable to our overseas force projection strategy. But they differ sharply over what this means and what kind of navy is essential for the purpose. One school emphasizes maritime supremacy as the dominant consumer of constrained defense dollars. It believes that the United States, as a continental island, must put primary reliance on its ability not only to command the seas but to use them for offensive force projection against the U.S.S.R. The other school bases its case on traditional balance of power considerations, hence continues to stress a more balanced land/air/sea strategy and posture aimed at helping our allies hold on to such areas of vital interest as Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and Western Europe. It is most powerfully articulated by the U.S. Army.

The first school naturally tends to be more unilateralist in outlook, not relying unduly on what it regards as our feeble and weak-willed allies.⁵ The second, believing that allied contributions are indispensable to any viable deterrent strategy, emphasizes rejuvenating our alliances and moving toward more of a coalition defense of those land areas around the Eurasian periphery which remain vital interests of the West.

The tension between these schools is reminiscent of the long-standing debate over “maritime strategy vs. continental commitment” which recurrently flared up in times past between the

⁴ *Posture Statement*, p. 1-17.

⁵ Some of the most vocal advocates of a bigger navy also tend to be those who favor pulling troops out of Europe, often ignoring the fact that this would cost a great deal, not save money, unless the forces involved were demobilized.

Admiralty and War Office of another island nation—the U.K.⁶ It also reflects the same underlying constraint which fueled the earlier debates in Whitehall—the peacetime unwillingness of democratic governments to spend what is necessary for preparedness, even when they recognize that far higher costs in blood and treasure would result if unpreparedness leads to war. This constraint makes service competition for scarce budget dollars drive strategic argument in the United States—as earlier in the U.K.

At least the maritime supremacy school faces up to the fiscal facts of life and makes strategic choices. Since the United States must control the seas in any case to project force overseas, and because it (and its allies) are far more dependent on overseas trade and resources than the autarkic Soviet Union, the naval primacy advocates contend that the United States must cope with expanding Soviet naval capabilities even if the needs of other services suffer.

This traditional institutional preference of the U.S. Navy, like the Royal Navy before it, has acquired new relevance from what its adherents see as NATO's failure to generate sufficient capabilities to offer high-confidence defense of Western Europe, and the emergence of new threats to vital U.S. interests (such as Persian Gulf oil) from growing Soviet capabilities for force projection into the Third World. Ergo, this school criticizes what it regards as the Eurocentric focus of previous U.S. strategy, which even called until recently for "swinging" much of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific to the Atlantic in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.

In any case, it argues, allied shortcomings make credible land/air defense of Europe futile, while we lack sufficient allied help or even bases in the area to permit successful land/air defense of the Gulf oil fields. Therefore, to deter attack on them we must rely principally on threatened "horizontal escalation," a capability to retaliate against Soviet aggression where command of the sea confers a U.S. advantage—not where Soviet land power is at its closest and strongest, like Europe or the Persian Gulf. For example, why not develop the capacity to sweep the Soviet navy, its merchant fleet and fishing trawlers from the seas?

A related argument of the maritime supremacy school is that direct U.S. regional conflict with the Soviet Union could not be contained. Our forces at sea face each other at so many places, and are so mixed up together, that anti-submarine skippers or submarine captains would have to exercise the inherent right of

⁶ See, for example, Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars*, London: Temple Smith, 1972; and Brian Bond, *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

self-defense. This logically buttresses the "horizontal escalation" argument. If any regional conflict involving both superpowers will inevitably escalate in any case, then why not seize the initiative elsewhere?

Allied to this perception of likely rapid global expansion of any U.S./U.S.S.R. regional conflict is the maritime supremacy school's contention that the United States must be prepared to carry the war "simultaneously" to the enemy in all relevant theaters, at least at sea. From this presumably springs the costly requirement for at least 15 big-carrier battle groups, preferably nuclear-powered.

It is important to note at this point that the issue is not whether sea control is essential. It is—for any viable conventional strategy. The real issue is what kind of and how expensive a Navy we want. In the Carter Administration, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's policy guidance for strategic and program planning also stressed the need for command of the sea whenever and wherever essential. But rather than near-simultaneity, with its large demands for big ships, he proposed to exploit the inherent flexibility of naval power for "sequential" operations, hitting the enemy first in one place and then shifting strike forces to hit them in another. For this, 12 big carriers were deemed to suffice.

The demand for 15 big-carrier battle groups is not generated primarily by the classic maritime mission of protecting sea lines of communication to permit vital trade and overseas reinforcement. Instead, these big fast carriers with their complement of costly F-14 and F-18 fighters and fighter-bombers and their accompanying *Aegis* cruisers for anti-bomber or missile protection, are designed primarily for offensive force projection against Soviet land targets—among other things to cripple the Soviet navy in its home bases. The maritime school sees this as the best way to maintain sea control, and to permit countervailing operations where the Soviets are most vulnerable.

These are legitimate strategic arguments, not Service propaganda that we must meet treaty commitments "to 40 nations," or that we need 600 ships or some other magic number. In fact, if one counts allied as well as U.S. ships, the present total is more than 900 ships, with more than double the tonnage of the ships of the U.S.S.R. and its allies.

v

Nonetheless, there are serious questions as to whether a strategy of maritime supremacy built around 15 big-carrier battle groups

would suffice to protect our vital interests overseas. First, many critics contend that the big carrier is vulnerable to Soviet Naval Aviation *Backfire* bombers firing anti-ship missiles, as well as to cruise missiles and submarines. With Soviet sea-surveillance satellites combing the earth's oceans, can big-carrier task forces avoid detection and missiles fired at them from sea, air, and ultimately even land? Already most of the \$17-billion cost of a new carrier battle group must be spent on self-protection, which leaves each carrier with only modest offensive power against land targets at realistic ranges—presently a dozen or so A-6 bombers carrying conventional bombs.

Are carrier-launched bombers the best way to attack shore targets anyway? Perhaps so for many Third World targets, but for attack against heavily defended targets on land, senior admirals like former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt argue that proliferating long-range cruise missiles like *Tomahawk* on existing and new ships provides a better and less vulnerable mode of attack. That the current Navy leadership is also persuaded of their efficacy is suggested by its plans to put over a thousand *Tomahawks* in submarines, cruisers, and even four refurbished battleships.

Nor do professionals like Admirals Zumwalt, Worth Bagley and Stansfield Turner see big carriers as essential for sea-lane control. Long before the civilian "reform caucus" in the Congress, they were arguing that we should invest instead in smaller carriers and in innovative new small ship technology like hydrofoil and twin-hull platforms and vertical or short takeoff (VSTOL) aircraft. In many respects, the transition of the Royal Navy to a primarily sea control force is a useful model.

In any event, how seriously could carrier strikes hurt a great Eurasian heartland power like the U.S.S.R.? This is the basic strategic flaw in the maritime supremacy strategy. Even if all Soviet ships were swept from the high seas and all Soviet home and overseas naval bases put out of action, could this prevent the U.S.S.R. from retaliating by overrunning Europe and the Middle East oil fields, emasculating or cowing China, or mounting a land-based missile and air threat to nearby Japan which would dwarf Hitler's 1944 V-1 and V-2 threat to wartime England? Sweeping up the Soviet navy, nibbling at the U.S.S.R.'s maritime flanks, even dealing with Soviet surrogates like Cuba, South Yemen, Ethiopia and Vietnam would hardly suffice to prevent a great Eurasian heartland power like the U.S.S.R. from dominating our chief allies, any more than naval superiority was decisive in

defeating Germany in two world wars.

Thus a predominantly maritime strategy would offer little hope of preventing a decisive shift in the military balance of power against the United States and its remaining allies. Somehow, maritime strategists—whether in Whitehall or the Pentagon—tend to ignore those basic balance-of-power factors which compelled Britain for three centuries to intervene repeatedly on the Continent, and which must be the basis of U.S. strategy as well.

Another major flaw in the maritime strategy is that it would play hob with the alliance system itself. At a time when Soviet military capabilities are outstripping those of the United States, perhaps our most important remaining strategic advantage over the U.S.S.R. is that we are blessed with many rich allies, while the Soviets have only a few poor ones. This has enabled us collectively to fashion a mutual defense at far less cost than if we each had to defend ourselves alone.

But our chief allies would quickly perceive the implications of a maritime supremacy strategy, particularly if budget constraints compelled us to write off as unsustainable our land/air commitments to the defense of Western Europe and Persian Gulf oil. Few would welcome a maritime strategy aimed primarily at naval dominance, even if it protected their own trade, if the price were to expose them to defeat at home. Our already restive allies would correctly perceive such a U.S. strategy as at best a form of unilateral U.S. global interventionism and at worst a form of neoisolationism. Pressures for accommodation with the U.S.S.R. would be powerfully enhanced.

In fact, could the United States even conduct a successful "countervailing strategy" of sweeping the Soviets from the oceans and bottling them up in the narrow seas without active cooperation from our allies? Barring the Dardanelles would require Turkish participation. Closing the Baltic exits would be difficult without the Scandinavians and U.K. Penning up the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk would require the cooperation of Japan. If the United States could not guarantee their security, it is doubtful whether any of them would cooperate.

The maritime strategists also point out, inconsistently with their taste for horizontal escalation, that a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and even a direct Soviet thrust at Persian Gulf oil are the least likely contingencies. The more likely contingencies are in the volatile Third World, well suited for use of flexible naval power based on big carriers and strong Marine amphibious forces for forcible entry. True enough, but it is risky to fall prey to this

"likelihood fallacy." By the same token, nuclear conflict is the least likely contingency of all; should we therefore not bother to maintain strong nuclear deterrent capabilities? Just because the likelihood of direct threats to our most vital interests is relatively low is no reason for not continuing to invest heavily in keeping them low. The Western alliance has survived the "loss" of Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, South Yemen, even Vietnam. Could it survive as well the loss of Europe or Persian Gulf oil?

VI

If maritime supremacy is a "no-win" strategy, does the alternative of rejuvenating our alliances via more rational burden sharing offer sufficient promise of credible conventional deterrence/defense of Western Europe, Northeast Asia and Persian Gulf oil at a politically acceptable cost? Here the issue is less one of military desirability than of economic feasibility and political will. The "coalition" school sees our present strategy as sound, and focuses chiefly on how to generate sufficient collective capabilities to make it work.

The Western coalition still dwarfs the Soviet bloc in overall economic strength. Moreover, the relative growth in allied gross national product (GNP) vis-à-vis that of the United States would logically suggest that the United States could expect its allies to assume a larger share of the burden of collective defense. To date, however, this has not occurred. While modestly increasing defense spending, none of our major allies has yet picked up much of the slack created by the diversion of U.S. resources to the Persian Gulf, or responded adequately to the alarming growth of Soviet military power. Japan, the ally with the second strongest economy, has contributed the lowest proportion to the common defense, behind even little Denmark in the proportion of GNP it spends.

Nor have the allies given much more than lip service to the concept of more rational burden sharing. Though the Western coalition still spends more collectively on defense than the entire Soviet bloc, paradoxically its high manpower costs, plus the waste and inefficiency inherent in its overlapping and duplicatory defense establishments, permit Soviet bloc defense investment to overshadow that of the allies.⁷ National particularism and the

⁷ The Defense Department's *Posture Statement*, *op. cit.*, p. II-7, estimates that Warsaw Pact military investment has exceeded that of NATO plus Japan since 1973, and is currently about 15 to 20 percent larger. Since NATO/Japan investment entails much larger duplication, lesser economies of scale and less interoperability than the Warsaw Pact's, however, the Defense Department speculates that the real bloc advantage is more like 30 to 40 percent.

search for commercial advantage still reign supreme.

Given vigorous U.S. leadership (without which nothing much seems to happen in NATO), it might be possible to change the shape of this problem. The experience of the Carter Administration in attempting to fashion a stronger and more efficient NATO defense is instructive on this score. During the period from 1977 to 1980 it launched a comprehensive set of initiatives, including (1) a series of short-run "quick fix" defense improvements to demonstrate seriousness of purpose; (2) a proposed Long Term Defense Program designed to rectify through collective effort some of the most serious deficiencies in NATO capabilities; (3) a sizably increased NATO infrastructure program; (4) an effort to hold all allies to the three-percent real annual budget growth pledge adopted in 1977;⁸ (5) expanded cooperation in armaments research development and production, spurred by a U.S. pledge to allow more of a "two-way street" in reciprocal procurement; and (6) expanded "host nation support" for U.S. forces. Note that all the above dealt with *conventional* force needs; only the seventh initiative, a proposed long-range theater nuclear force modernization (LRTNF) program, was aimed at preserving nuclear deterrent credibility during the period of conventional buildup. All told, these initiatives added up to a major attempt, the most wide-ranging ever launched in NATO, to realize the benefits inherent in a more effective coalition approach.

That this attempt has enjoyed only limited success to date seems attributable less to faulty design than to the economic downturn and accelerated inflation triggered partly by the second major round of oil price increases in 1979. In the event, even the modest three-percent real growth target proved too high, though it did serve (and is still serving) as a useful lever to jack up collective defense spending higher than otherwise—including that of the United States. The hardest nut to crack was greater armaments cooperation, but even here significant gains were registered in joint projects like U.S. adoption of the German 120-mm tank gun, purchase of other allied military equipment, and several innovative joint development projects.

Another cause of the slowdown was diversion of U.S. attention to the perceived threat to Western access to vital Persian Gulf oil, consequent upon the fall of the Shah of Iran and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. By 1980 U.S. emphasis shifted to shoring up feeble Western deterrent capabilities in the Indian Ocean area. We

⁸ This target level was not set because it was deemed militarily sufficient but because allied consensus deemed three-percent real growth the maximum politically feasible rate.

warned our European and Japanese allies that this would necessarily involve significant diversions of resources otherwise earmarked for NATO and Pacific defense. At least this had the desirable impact of compelling U.S. and allied planners to face up to the necessity of a more "rational division of labor," as advocated by Chancellor Schmidt. Since only the United States has the costly long-range force projection capabilities needed for Persian Gulf deterrence/defense, and allied contributions could at best be only limited, it makes military sense for the allies to concentrate on shoring up their own home defense capabilities (compensating *inter alia* for any U.S. diversions). While the United States accepted Schmidt's concept, the European compensatory add-ons are as yet hard to find.

Though the 1977-79 initiatives have had only limited success (the next Administration's failure to keep pressing them added to their loss of momentum), a new incentive is coming increasingly into play. *To the extent that our allies perceive as we do the need for a stronger conventional deterrent to offset the declining credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella at a time of nuclear stalemate, it should be possible to fashion a stronger consensus to this end.* At the very least the United States should put this proposition to its allies.

However, a note of caution is necessary here too. Their memories of World War II's destructiveness still vivid, the Europeans are fearful of a replay which over time could create casualties and damage comparable to a nuclear exchange. U.S. talk of extended conventional conflict feeds these fears, besides entailing peacetime preparedness outlays that even constrained U.S. resources are inadequate to fund. Hence NATO must realistically continue to stress deterrence—as the best way to forestall in the first place a conventional as well as a nuclear war which no one could really win. A strong initial defense which can outlast a Soviet blitzkrieg maximizes deterrence; historically speaking, general staffs do not plan long wars; the attacker invariably seeks decision in the first campaign, knowing that if he fails, all else becomes uncertain. To do otherwise is just too risky, especially in a nuclear age.

Yet, is even initial conventional deterrence/defense of NATO Europe feasible at reasonably affordable cost? The Warsaw Pact threat is formidable, and at present NATO can only put up a thin linear defense without much depth to absorb an armor-heavy breakthrough. But this defense could be greatly strengthened by several relatively inexpensive defensive measures which, taken together, would hardly be beyond Alliance grasp. For example, NATO should capitalize on the fact that the urbanization of Central

Europe is creating a form of urban barrier system which is already a serious obstacle to large-scale armored maneuver. If West Germany would reconsider its political reluctance to fortify the inner German border, this barrier could be supplemented by a classic economy of force measure, field fortification (my model is the old Siegfried line, not the Maginot) along the few well-known corridors of likely enemy advance. Manning this urban barrier system largely with additional reservist infantry units formed from the large pool of European conscripts would help create a defense in depth to slow down any Soviet blitzkrieg, while freeing up allied armored units for their optimal counterattack role.

Nor need NATO be mesmerized by misleading equipment counts like a three-to-one superiority of Warsaw Pact over NATO tanks. The equation is much more complex. Proliferation of ground and helicopter-launched anti-tank missiles, mines delivered dynamically on the battlefield by artillery and rocket launchers, and other defensive systems would all help to equalize the balance. Promising systems to attack Soviet follow-on forces at longer ranges are also under development.

NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons also tend to leave out the main sources of rapid reinforcement—nearby France and the United States.⁹ Using prepositioned equipment and flying over its forces, the United States plans to double its ground forces and triple its tactical air forces in Europe within less than two weeks, provided that the Europeans contribute bases, depots and other facilities, and some of the air/sealift. This “transatlantic bargain” is so favorable to Europe that it is hard to grasp why our allies (especially West Germany) still cavil over funding the modest NATO infrastructure increases required.

But perhaps the greatest single added input, through both forces and logistic support, could come from France. For example, it would be difficult to sustain for long the reinforcements the United States plans to send to NATO without additional lines of communication across France. Practical French cooperation with her allies, beyond what is already discreetly under way, is far more important than whether she rejoins NATO's military wing. Hence, it is to be hoped that France will examine whether the declining credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not force a reexamination of a policy which no longer accords with her own interests—and is certainly hard on her allies. It may not be too much

⁹ A good example of this omission is the new official NATO release on *NATO and The Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons*, undated but issued in May 1982.

to say that whether NATO can achieve a credible non-nuclear initial defense posture in the crucial Center Region will depend on the key role played by France.

Of course, many other measures (especially high technology) are available to strengthen non-nuclear defense; the above were selected largely to show what could be done at reasonable cost, though they involve difficult political choices. As one measure of what added funding NATO needs, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Bernard Rogers, estimates that his new 1983-88 force goals could be met with only four-percent real defense budget growth. Assuming economic recovery, it is hard to believe that the Alliance could not afford added defense outlays of this size.

Deterrence/defense against a Soviet military threat to Persian Gulf oil is a trickier proposition. Only one thing is certain—that a maritime strategy of sweeping the Soviet fleet from the Indian Ocean could not prevent a Soviet sweep overland to seize the oil fields themselves. Nor could marines landing at the Straits of Hormuz. Sea power would only suffice to secure the oil access routes, of no strategic value if we lose the oil fields themselves. While the area's geographic remoteness and lack of adequate U.S. basing facilities would greatly handicap sustained U.S. defense of the oil fields, fast enough deployment of even limited forces to create a "tripwire" would compel Moscow to consider the risks of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation if it pressed home an attack. In considering the deterrent value of such a Rapid Deployment Force, it is worth remembering that neither superpower has seen to take on the other directly.

VII

The rapid economic growth of Japan, and the emerging parallelism of strategic interest between China, Japan and the United States, make East Asia the theater offering the most interesting new strategic opportunities. With the world's third largest GNP and still impressive economic growth, Japan's defense outlays of less than nine-tenths of one percent of GNP make it an obvious candidate for greater burden sharing, especially when it is the largest single consumer of Persian Gulf oil. Moreover, Japan's selfish reliance on U.S. and South Korean taxpayers for the better part of its own defense smacks of a "free ride" which enhances Japan's commercial competitiveness at the expense of its allies. Under these circumstances, Japan is becoming a favorite target of U.S. defense planners, seeking ways of getting Japan to contribute more to its own defense, including that of the adjacent sea lanes

on which its livelihood depends.

Given Japan's special political problems, its further contributions to the common defense could be largely indirect. Increased Japanese economic aid to threatened countries around the Soviet periphery would free these countries to spend more of their own resources on defense. For example, South Korea has a good case in seeking concessional loans from Japan, on the ground that Korea, in spending over six percent of GNP on its own defense, is providing Japan a better defensive buffer zone.

The parallel strategic interest of the United States, Japan and China in deterring the U.S.S.R. also creates a potential two-front threat-in-being which Moscow cannot ignore. Already from one-fourth to one-third of Soviet conventional forces are tied down opposite China and Japan, even though neither nation has much offensive capability for threatening Soviet territory. Offering Western technology, financed directly or indirectly by Japanese loans, to strengthen China's defensive capabilities would be a classic strategic option, historically employed to deter a strong opponent by confronting it with risks of a two-front conflict.

On the other hand, if reducing the likelihood that the United State might be confronted (as the JCS fear) with a simultaneous "three front" war is strategically desirable, the most promising prospects also lie in East Asia.¹⁰ In all likelihood, Japan and China would see advantage in remaining neutral, at least initially, in the event of a U.S.-Soviet clash. So would Vietnam. With little offensive capability, they would stand to lose far more than they gained by becoming belligerents. Moreover, it is hard to see what the U.S.S.R. would gain from attacking Japan and China until it had achieved its logical wartime objectives in Western Europe and the Persian Gulf. On this score it is worth remembering how Japan and the U.S.S.R. stayed neutral vis-à-vis each other throughout most of World War II. A reexamination of U.S. Pacific strategy in the light of such real-life possibilities seems long overdue.

VIII

In sum, a skillfully executed coalition strategy would seem to offer a reasonable prospect of achieving credible non-nuclear deterrence/defense in the three main regions of vital U.S. interest. Naturally the United States must also be prepared to meet lesser

¹⁰ It is interesting that the maritime supremacy school never suggests that the United States pull back forces from Northeast Asia, even though our chief ally in that area is the very ally which contributes proportionally least to collective defense. Could it be because the Pacific is a Navy-dominated theater?

contingencies in other regions, but these are hardly the chief determinants of the size of our defense spending. Moreover, still lurking in the background would be the threat of nuclear escalation if such deterrence/defense failed.

But will even modest added investment on the order of four-percent real growth in defense spending be forthcoming, and will it suffice against growing Soviet force projection capabilities? The prospects will depend on several factors: (1) sufficient Western economic recovery to facilitate higher defense spending; (2) growing allied realization that nuclear stalemate at ever higher levels of destructiveness dictates greater investment in non-nuclear defense; (3) positive and consistent U.S. leadership aimed at achieving these preconditions; and (4) last but not least—and equally dependent on U.S. leadership—more rational burden sharing on a scale not achieved since World War II itself.

Whether this last is achievable will basically determine whether a politically realistic rate of increase in defense spending will suffice to meet coalition needs. As Secretary Brown used to tell his fellow NATO defense ministers, if NATO only could increase total defense spending in real terms by three percent per year, and at the same time achieve an additional three-percent per annum increase in the efficiency with which it spends these still constrained resources, we might be in shooting distance of the goal. Nor is this an issue for NATO alone. Since our vital interests are global in scope, similar increases—and similar improvements in input/output ratios—would be essential in the East Asian theater and the Persian Gulf.

Actual experience in peacetime cooperative programs over the last 35 years is cause for both hope and despair. In a real sense NATO has already achieved a level of peacetime defense cooperation unique in the history of alliances. It has a functioning peacetime command structure, a variety of multinationally funded programs, and a frequently updated set of common plans and force goals. But these accomplishments tend to mask the fact that NATO is still basically a classic alliance of sovereign states—composed of 14 disparate national force structures each with its own doctrine, procedures, tactics and equipment, its own national logistic support, research/development, procurement, and training establishment and overhead. The wasteful overlap and duplication are enormous. Lack of standardized or even interoperable equipment is more the norm than the exception. That more has not been done, despite recurrent efforts over the years, is testimony both to the strength of local nationalism and to the potentialities if only this and other obstacles could be overcome.

In fact, the steps to rationalize NATO's defense posture started in 1977-79 as the result of U.S. initiatives suggest what determined and consistent leadership might be able to accomplish. Europe's continued dependence on U.S. military support, no less essential in the conventional than in the nuclear sphere, tends to make it responsive over time. Among the many possibilities, the Long Term Defense Program initiatives for an integrated air defense, a common command/control/communication program, standardized electronic warfare systems and common munitions stockpiles deserve to be reinvigorated. As called for by the recent Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment passed almost unanimously by the U.S. Senate, we must pool alliance industrial resources more efficiently to avoid wasteful duplication and achieve economies of scale. Standardization and interoperability must also be insisted upon by governments and parliaments, lest their lack lead to the prospect of NATO disaster on the battlefield against much more homogeneous Warsaw Pact forces.

IX

Up to this point neither of the two contending schools of strategy has yet achieved a dominant position. Indeed, it is unlikely that a clear declaratory choice would or should be made between them in real life. There are important virtues in ambiguity. Moreover, judging from Secretary Weinberger's statements and his latest annual report, he embraces the objectives of both schools. He seeks enough defense spending to meet "simultaneously" all requirements for both—and for doing more in yet other areas of the globe. But the Administration's ambitious call for an eclectic strategy and posture, even including costly preparations to sustain a protracted conventional war, is hardly realistic either. The reported Pentagon estimate that at full funding the Administration's declared strategy would require \$750 billion more than the \$1.6 trillion now projected may be a slight exaggeration—but if it is even approximately correct the amounts would be politically impossible. Given current economic difficulties, on top of the resource constraints on defense spending endemic in democratic states, something will have to give.

Thus, regardless of the Administration's declaratory strategy, U.S. defense budgets will have to be stretched out. The Administration and Congress will have to confront tough choices between strategic missions and between various capabilities to carry them out. These choices will over time be tantamount to deciding which strategy will in fact predominate.

Indeed, this seems to be happening already. The kind of 600-ship navy being sought by the Administration and Congress is proving to be so expensive as to be achievable only at the expense of other critical defense needs. Only the Navy has received major force structure increases; those requested by other Services have been mostly deferred. The Navy is the only Service whose share of the FY 1983 budget request has been significantly increased over its FY 1982 share, largely in order to fund two new big carriers in one year. In a decision with major strategic overtones, the Senate authorized these carriers but deferred procurement of the new AH-64 attack helicopter (with its high-quality *Hellfire* missile), which the Army is depending on for NATO defense against Warsaw Pact armor and for coping with a Soviet armored thrust into the Persian Gulf oil region. This illustrates how, if the United States funds a 600-ship Navy built around 15 big-carrier battle groups, it may be impossible to equip adequately either our NATO-oriented ground/air forces or the kind of RDF we need. In short, the Administration and Congress may be backing into a maritime supremacy strategy by default, even if this is not their intent.

Hence it is crucially important that such choices among competing resource allocations be illuminated by a clearer perception of their likely strategic consequences. For these consequences will not be lost on our alert enemies or allies, who carefully analyze what we build as well as what we say. Illuminating these choices is the central purpose of this article.

If we opt consciously for a maritime supremacy strategy, based on the kind of massive naval buildup the Navy seeks, let us recognize that resource constraints will probably dictate that this be at significant expense to already inadequate NATO and Persian Gulf commitments. Let us also recognize how much this will undermine the network of alliances on which the United States must increasingly depend. Indeed, the basic flaw in any maritime supremacy strategy is that it does not suffice to protect the vital strategic interests in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf which we share with our allies.

On the other hand, the basic flaw in a more ambitious coalition strategy aimed at protecting these interests is that the coalition may be unable to generate collectively sufficient conventional capabilities to do so. Almost inevitably, given the decline of U.S. economic power vis-à-vis our allies at a time when nuclear stalemate dictates greater reliance on far more costly conventional forces, the United States will have to seek greater sharing of the common burden from our industrialized allies. If only modestly

increased U.S. and allied defense spending is in prospect, then all will depend on whether we can spend that money more efficiently, via greater and more rational burden sharing and increased Alliance cooperation—on a scale never achieved before.

On balance, however, the advantages of the coalition approach so far outweigh those of a primarily maritime strategy that the most sensible course would be to try. What other alternative do we really have? America would find it difficult to live and prosper in a world in which we dominated the seas but our chief competitor dominated the economic resources of the Eurasian land mass.

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Robert William Komer

Ambassador Komer has had a long and distinguished career in almost every major part of our foreign policy/national security establishment--the White House, NSC, State, DoD, and CIA. He is widely known as a "most unbureaucratic bureaucrat." Most recently he was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 1979-1981.

After serving overseas in World War II (pvt. to 1st Lt.), he drafted National Intelligence Estimates in the new CIA, rising to chief of the National Estimates Staff. After participating in the Eisenhower NSC apparatus, he joined the "New Frontier" in 1961 as the senior Middle East/South Asia man on the NSC staff. President Kennedy dubbed one of his peacekeeping operations "Komer's War" in Yemen. Komer rose to be Deputy Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs in 1965-66.

In 1966 the President made him a White House Special Assistant to supervising the so-called "other-war" in Vietnam. He later became the chief architect of and advisor to the Vietnamese Government's new pacification program. As U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, he negotiated the revision of U.S. base agreements in 1969.

Subsequently at the Rand Corporation Komer and his team authored three major studies on how best to revamp NATO's defense posture. These provided the basis for the Carter Administration's NATO initiatives of 1977-79, of which he became chief architect as Advisor on NATO Affairs to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Then, as chief civilian policy and strategic planner in the Pentagon, he played a key role in developing U.S. strategy and programs to help defend vital Persian Gulf oil.

Ambassador Komer is currently writing, lecturing, and consulting. He has written such books as *Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense* as alternate strategic choices for the United States, and *Bureaucracy at War*, which assesses key reasons for the poor U.S. performance in Vietnam.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA -- THE HONORABLE R. W. KOMER

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SCHOOLS

Harvard College, B.S., 1942 magna cum laude, PBK
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, M.B.A., 1947
National War College, 1957

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS

Mar 1981/Present	Author, Lecturer, Consultant The Rand Corporation
May 81/Dec 82	Visting Fellow, George Mason University
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Sept 77/Oct 79	Advisor to Secretary of Defense on NATO Affairs
Jan/Sept 77	Consultant to the Secretary of Defense
1969-1976	Consultant with The Rand Corporation
1968-1969	U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
1967-1968	Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS (with rank of of Ambassador)
1966-1967	Special Assistant to the President
1965-1966	Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
1961-1965	Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
1958-1961	Alternate NSC Planning Board Member and Staff Assistant
1947-1961	Central Intelligence Agency, including Chief of National Estimates Staff
1943-1946	U.S. Army, Service in Fifth Army Hq, 34th Div. Allied Force Hq, the War Dept. Office of Military History

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AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

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Sec. State's Distinguished Honor Award, 1968
Department of Defense Medals for Distinguished Public Service,
June 1978 and January 1981
Bronze Star, 1944
National Order of Vietnam, 1968
Vietnam Gold Economy Medal, 1968
Revolutionary Deveopment Medal (Vietnam), 1968
Grand Cross with Star and Sash, German Order of Merit, 1983

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The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea

Vice Admiral H. C. Mustin, U.S. Navy

NATO's maritime strategy is a cohesive statement, incorporating collective inputs from all of the nations, for the employment of naval forces in support of the overall NATO strategy. The maritime strategy is based first on deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the NATO maritime strategy is designed to mount a defense far forward in order to protect the territory of its member nations. The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy is drawn both from the NATO and the U.S. national military strategy; it provides that the Navy and Marines will wage global, coalition warfare in conjunction with the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the military forces of our allies.

There are those who take issue with this forward strategy. This criticism ignores the real world: NATO is short of maritime forces to the extent that we cannot perform simultaneously all required maritime tasks to implement a basically defensive strategy in the high north. Therefore, if NATO is to keep the initiative at sea we must defend forward through offensive operations. This means that U.S. Marines and U.S. naval forces, operating in conjunction with NATO forces, must be in position for early and vigorous offensive action if the need arises. Maritime forces have a decisive role in defending and, in the event of invasion, restoring the integrity of the NATO islands in the high north and of Norway, all of which are separated from the rest of Europe either by water or non-NATO countries.

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines are part of NATO's Striking Fleet Atlantic. Support of the land battle by the Striking Fleet will be critical on the flanks: the loss of northern Norway would be a determining factor in the battle of the Atlantic as would the loss of Iceland; the loss of Greenland would be severe; losing control of the Baltic Straits would allow the Soviet Baltic Fleet access to the Norwegian Sea. Therefore, NATO has adopted at sea an offensive posture which seems superficially to contradict the premise of a defensive alliance, and some say that indeed it does. This is nonsense. NATO is a defensive alliance *politically*, but there is no logical, historical or legal reason to insist on a *military* strategy that is purely defensive. In fact, history has demonstrated that no purely defensive strategy has ever won a war. In

Vice Admiral Mustin is the Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic.

reality, the geographical spread of the high north is such that we would be self-imposing a very serious limitation on our forces if we were only going to react to events. The combination of large area and thinly spread forces has led NATO to the conclusion that reaction is not a prudent posture. The immediate defense of territory may require early augmentation of Norwegian forces by external NATO forces in the form of U.S. Marines, the U.K./N.L. Amphibious Force and/or Canadian forces.

The concern over our forward strategy is frequently couched in terms of questioning whether U.S. aircraft carriers, as the centerpiece of the Striking Fleet, can survive in the Norwegian Sea in a conflict with the Soviet Union. No one has ever said that war with the Soviet Union would be easy. In war, ships get sunk, aircraft get shot down and people get killed. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be very formidable foes, and we who would have to fight them are very much aware of their capabilities. But they would not be invincible. The Striking Fleet can get early warning and assistance in beating down Soviet air attack through joint operations with NATO AWACS and Norwegian air defenses—including the U.S. Air Force—and we have demonstrated this capability in exercises.

The Striking Fleet can deal with Soviet surface forces with relative ease. Since our forward aircraft carriers provide defense for Iceland and the U.K., we anticipate a full court NATO press on Soviet submarines with antisubmarine forces from those nations, with forces organic to the Striking Fleet, and with U.S. and NATO submarines. The Soviets recognize the threat from our carriers to a much greater degree than do many in the free world; they also acknowledge that a moving target ranging over thousands of square miles of blue water is much more survivable than a fixed airfield ashore. No one suggests that we should abandon all airfields in Norway at the start of hostilities, and yet some quake at the notion of less vulnerable aircraft carriers operating hundreds of miles at sea.

Our strategy is not a hell-bent-for-leather dash northward to the Kola Peninsula; as John Lehman has said, "We're not going to lob A-6s into the men's room of the Kremlin." Admiral James D. Watkins, the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, has testified to the Congress and stated on numerous other occasions that we do not propose to race blindly into the jaws of waiting Soviet forces. We are going to choose the time and the place of naval engagements, because our forces have the balance and the strategic mobility to afford us the option of making such a choice. Our forward strategy contains elements of risk, of course, but the naval forces that NATO is building, manned by the outstanding professionals who drive the ships and fly the aircraft of the alliance, are eminently capable of carrying out our strategy successfully. It goes without saying that NATO's Military Committee and Defense Planning Committee would never have

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approved a strategy which they perceived to be a loser, nor would the U.S. Navy have concurred in the highly unlikely event that they had done so.

Another question concerns whether the successful execution of our strategy would exert a decisive influence on Soviet decisionmakers in a war between the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. In other words, what difference would successful naval operations make? There are those who believe that the ultimate outcome of a war in Europe will be decided in a matter of days or weeks on the ground in Central Europe. Without doubt, wars are decided on the land, but it is overly simplistic to construct a false dichotomy in which the alliance must choose between a war at sea or a war on land. All NATO commanders agree that naval power is indispensable for the defense of Europe; land forces are organic to success at sea. Maritime operations and continental operations complement each other. The real question that my senior NATO colleagues and I wrestle with is how to best employ maritime forces to achieve overall NATO strategic objectives.

It has become almost a cliché among serious strategic thinkers to observe that while one cannot win the land war in Europe at sea, one can just as surely lose it at sea. Senior NATO leaders openly acknowledge that NATO does not, in fact, have a strategy without the employment of maritime forces because NATO depends on the sea for direct support of the land battle, for military reinforcement and resupply, and for defense against seaborne attack and for sustenance.

Some also argue that we should reject a forward strategy and instead establish a maritime Maginot Line near the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom "gap" behind which we could protect the sea lines of communications to Europe. These arguments fail to acknowledge that the defense of NATO is much more than just the defense of West Germany. We cannot afford to forfeit the tactical initiative to the Soviets and concentrate on escorting convoys across the Atlantic. Such a posture would raise issues regarding the fate of Norway, Iceland, the Baltic approaches, and, indeed, the United Kingdom. These allies are of no less strategic importance than the allies on the Central Front; a strategy that amounted to a *de facto* writeoff of our northern allies would be unconscionable.

Nonetheless, there are those who apparently are willing to abandon the Norwegian Sea to the Soviets. I believe that if we allow the Warsaw Pact to turn the NATO flanks, the pact will eventually succeed in cutting off our allies in the center from resupply and reinforcement. The best means of protecting the sea lines of communications and bolstering the full alliance is by the conduct of offensive sea control operations far forward. The key to winning the battle of the Atlantic is winning the battle of the Norwegian Sea; it is no accident that the Soviets have constructed their navy to fight the critical battle in the high north. NATO's maritime objectives in the Norwegian Sea are to repel a Warsaw Pact amphibious assault on north

Norway, to support the defense of Norway against land threats, to prevent Soviet use of facilities in Norway, and to contain the Soviet Northern Fleet or destroy it at sea. In turn, these objectives provide for defense of Greenland and Iceland: if we control the Norwegian Sea, the Soviets would have severe problems in mounting sustained threat to the nations in the region. Should we concede this area in advance to the Soviets, we would be unilaterally granting them one of their dominant strategic objectives without requiring them to fire one shot to earn it.

The final issue involves the question of whether our forward strategy, which could include strikes against Soviet naval bases, would be unduly escalatory. War is not an idle exercise in intellectual polemics. There will always be risks and uncertainties, including the uncertainty of the actions of an adversary. We have learned the hard way that restraint on our part in military matters is by no means a guarantee of restraint on the part of the Soviets. The Striking Fleet is charged formally by NATO mission to conduct offensive operations to contain and neutralize the Soviet maritime threat, and these operations include destroying the threat at its source. Such operations will be a decisive feature of our campaign to defeat aggression from the Warsaw Pact.

One must consider the vital importance of conventional forces to deter below the nuclear threshold—and then acknowledge that a key element of that deterrence is a credible capability to strike the Soviet Union with *both* conventional and nuclear weapons. Put another way, deterrence with conventional forces must contain a credible threat of retaliation with nonnuclear means against targets that the Soviets value enough to give them pause. Without such a retaliatory capability—against both the Soviet homeland and the Soviet Fleet—NATO's maritime posture does not contribute to overall deterrence. If the Striking Fleet is to be an element of conventional deterrence, it must be in position to deliver convincing retaliation to Soviet adventurism. This retaliation by definition must include strikes into the Kola—the maritime equivalent of the "Deep Strike" concept for the land battle.

In summary, the alliance's basic strategic objective is the protection of the territory of its member nations. Our ability to meet this objective in the high north has been brought into question by the steady growth of Soviet maritime forces. Over the past 31 years we have continually reevaluated and evolved our strategy to account for the significant changes in the maritime balance of forces. In countering Warsaw Pact activities, our NATO forces are guided by three major principles: *containment*, including tying down Pact forces in defensive tasks by creating allied threats from the sea against the enemy's coastal areas; *defense in depth*, including striking enemy bases and facilities which support his forces at sea as well as amphibious landings as required in the high north; and, most importantly, *keeping the initiative*, because distances

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are too great in the region for maritime forces to be deployed in time to prevent critical damage being done by the Soviets were NATO solely to chase after events. (From such a posture, the alliance would be able to do little more than note each incident in turn and then decide shrewdly that each was a hopeless cause where no NATO reaction would likely be effective.)

NATO maritime commanders can no more decide to fight only in some areas than land commanders can propose defending only some parts of Europe. The forward commitment of maritime forces is essential to the success of NATO's overall strategy because of NATO's vital dependence upon the sea. All senior commanders agree—as demonstrated repeatedly throughout military history and as true today as it was in the campaigns of Alexander the Great—offense is the best form of defense.



The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic

Robert S. Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr.

In certain critical regards, the role of the US Navy in the North Atlantic has not changed fundamentally since the United States entered World War I. In both World War I and World War II, the United States allied with the United Kingdom to form the principal maritime power against the predominant landpower on the continent. In both wars, the major task of the US Navy in the Atlantic was to protect the movement of men and material to Europe so that the dominant landpower could be defeated. In World War II, it was also necessary to force armies ashore onto enemy-controlled territory. Every major campaign in which US ground forces participated began with an amphibious landing.

Submarines posed the toughest threat, although containing the opponent's surface fleet—which was a considerable power, even if not dominant—was a matter of great concern. In World War II, the addition of long-range, land-based airpower provided another dimension to the threat that greatly strained the ability of the Allies to protect convoys.

Today, the Soviet Union, the preeminent landpower on the continent, has a potent, but not dominant, navy. The defense of Europe remains a principal long-term security interest of the United States, and the US Army is central to the successful defense of Europe. Since most of the US Army resides in the United States, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEur) strategy for the Central Front requires Army help in Europe, making sure the reinforcements and resupply get to Europe is the foremost task of naval forces

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Mr. Hanley is a Naval Reserve officer and a Ph.D. candidate in Operations Research at Yale where he is studying game theoretic approaches to policy analysis and the development of strategies. He recently became Assistant Director for Strategic Studies after serving as a consultant to the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College where he has worked closely with the Strategic Studies Group for the past four years.

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in the North Atlantic. Given the obvious similarities between past and present requirements, why should current maritime strategy be any different from the convoy-protection schemes that were proven in World Wars I and II?

The Battle for the Atlantic

The World War II battle for the Atlantic is often used as the prototype for planning campaigns against sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in many projected global war scenarios. Although submarines come to mind first, mines, long-range bombers, merchant cruisers, and capital ships also played major roles in the battle for the Atlantic.

The Germans began the war with 56 submarines, 10 of which were not fully operational. Only 30 of this number were capable of extended open-ocean patrols, while the remaining 26 were essentially "North Sea ducks." On 1 September 1939, when the Germans invaded Poland, 17 U-boats were at their war stations in the Atlantic, and 14 (8 of which were loaded with mines) were in the North Sea. The first British ship sunk was by a U-boat on 3 September, the day that Britain declared war. By the end of the month, 41 Allied and neutral ships, representing 154,000 tons, had been bottomed. On 17 September the carrier HMS *Courageous* was sunk. This, combined with a near miss on *Ark Royal*, caused the British to quickly abandon the use of carriers in submarine hunter groups.¹ The Germans had succeeded in prepositioning their submarine force before the start of the war, which immediately had a telling effect.

The British were not prepared for an antisubmarine war. "Neither Germany nor England realized that World War II in the Atlantic would closely resemble World War I," with Germany attacking Allied tonnage while England defended the sealanes and imposed a blockade of Germany.² "It was thought better to spend limited budgets on battleships, carriers, and other big ships that took a long time to build, rather than on a multitude of escorts and other small craft which, it was believed, could be improvised when war broke out."³

Facing makeshift defenses, German U-boats sank 114 ships, over 420,000 tons, at a cost of nine submarines.⁴ As the U-boats returned from their initial surge to be refitted and rearmed, the effect of mines came to the fore. In November and December 1939, merchant shipping losses to mines were more than twice the losses to U-boats. Although air attacks were mostly a nuisance in the early days, air-dropped mines made the North Sea hazardous.

The Germans occupied Norway and swept through to the coast of France in the spring and summer of 1940. Operating bombers from French bases, the Germans caused all convoys to be routed through the northwest approaches. Reconnaissance aircraft operating from Stavanger in Norway and Merignac in France covered both the southwest and northwest approaches, vectoring

U-boats and bombers to attack shipping. Even though they had fewer U-boats in the summer of 1940 than at the beginning of the war, by operating out of bases on the French and Norwegian coasts the Germans were able to keep more submarines in the shipping lanes than in the earlier days of the war.

As with the submarines, the Germans had sent the cruisers *Graf Spee* and *Deutschland* to sea before the war. Neither accomplished much. In December 1939 *Graf Spee* was spotted, chased into the River Plate, and scuttled; *Deutschland* was not found, but sunk only two ships before returning to port. As the war went on, the Germans continued to use cruisers and, beginning in April 1940, armed merchants for commerce raiding. Although frequently deterred by escorts, cruisers and armed merchants proved devastating when they encountered unescorted shipping—this most frequently happened in the South Atlantic. The armed merchants actually sank a much larger number of ships than the warships, because they were difficult to identify and operated in areas remote from the European theater where convoy escorts were not routinely provided.

Nothing demonstrated the value of escorts more vividly than the transit of convoys PQ 17 and PQ 18 to Murmansk during the summer and autumn of 1942. Fearing a superior German surface force, the escorts of convoy PQ 17 were ordered to scatter. The convoy was then attacked by aircraft and U-boats, resulting in the loss of all but 13 of the 36 ships in the convoy. The following convoy, PQ 18, was supported by a total of 51 warships, including a carrier—with 12 fighters and 3 ASW aircraft—and two submarines as escorts. Although savagely attacked, 27 of the 40 ships in the convoy got through. The German aircraft and U-boats took such losses that the Germans could not sustain their air strength in the far north and never again had great successes in the Norwegian Sea.⁵

Throughout most of the war the U-boats accounted for the greatest proportion of tonnage sunk. Because open area search proved ineffective, the escorted convoy, supported by land- and sea-based air, became the best way to sink U-boats. The U-boats could not perform their mission without approaching the convoy. Usually they had to surface to maneuver to an intercept position in order to attack and reposition for follow-on attacks. Airborne radar search in the vicinity of the convoy made surface maneuvers extremely hazardous. Eventually, the losses were so great that the German submarine fleet was recalled from the Atlantic to await the production of snorkel-equipped submarines.

The principal lesson derived from the battle for the Atlantic was that “the defensive strategy of sailing ships in convoy and of providing the convoys with powerful surface and air escorts did most to accomplish that decisive victory...the most effective way of defeating the U-boat was by waiting for it in the vicinity of the prey which it was seeking.”⁶ The role of naval forces was focused on protection of the SLOCs to Europe by controlling key islands—

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Iceland and the Azores—and establishing barriers and screens through which the enemy must proceed to attack high-value shipping.

Comparing the Current Situation to World War II

Given the terrible losses inflicted on unprotected shipping in World War II and the continued importance of reinforcement and resupply of Europe, there are strong feelings that the US Navy should be devoted to SLOC protection in the North Atlantic. However, differences in Soviet priorities, US alliance commitments, war-termination objectives, and technological advancements over the last 40 years bear close scrutiny.

The principal difference between the situation now and World War II is the addition of nuclear weapons to the strategic equation. In the 1950s, the nuclear strike threat posed by US attack carriers triggered the development of submarine, surface, and air-launched cruise missiles to destroy the carriers before they could come within striking range of the Soviet Union. As first *Regulus* and then *Polaris* submarines became operational in the US fleet, the threat of a submarine nuclear strike came to dominate Soviet concerns. This has been reflected in the priority given to construction of a Soviet SSBN force and the emphasis on construction of ASW forces, to destroy enemy SSBNs and protect Soviet SSBNs from Nato submarines. Although the introduction of US SSBNs initially had almost no effect on the employment of US naval forces, countering these SSBNs and ASW forces has been a major motivation for the development of the modern Soviet Navy.

Although the German submarine force had essentially one mission—to attack Atlantic sealanes and sink as much Allied tonnage as possible—the Soviet submarine force has three missions, and the anti-SLOC mission is third on the list of Soviet priorities. In recent writings, Soviet commentators have scorned the German concept of the indiscriminate sinking of Allied shipping in favor of the destruction of enemy troop shipments, military cargo, and strategic material during sea transit and at port terminals, with the simultaneous destruction of the shipping-related shore installations.⁷ The Soviets also emphasize the use of mines, primarily submarine and air delivered, as having wide use in sea blockade operations. Denying Nato the use of channel ports either by capture, destruction by air attack, or mine blockade offers the Soviets options other than open-ocean submarine attack for preventing the reinforcement and resupply of Europe. Given these priorities and alternative Soviet approaches to SLOC interdiction, it appears that a modern battle for the Atlantic could have a distinctly different character from that in World War II.

Another obvious distinction between the situation now and that of World War II is the existence of Nato. The primary reason that most Nato countries participate in the alliance is to ensure the defense of their territory in the

event of Warsaw Pact aggression. The United States continues to support Nato as the most effective means for containing Soviet power and influence. The responsibility for defending the territory of all Nato allies is explicit. Whereas in World War II, Germany controlled Europe before the involvement of US forces, the maintenance of US Army units in Germany today guarantees US involvement from the outset of a Nato-Warsaw Pact conflict. The combination of a commitment to defend allied territory and immediate US involvement in the war implies a greater role for US naval forces in support of the European land battle at the beginning of war than occurred during World War II.

Because US defense policy is based on deterrence, focusing on war-termination objectives is difficult. However, the objectives can be bounded. Since World War II, US policy toward the Soviet Union has been aimed at containing the Soviet empire. The most likely scenario for global war is considered to be the Soviet use of force to extend its borders, countered by use of force by the Western alliance (including Japan) to contain the Soviet expansion. Therefore, the objectives of the war are seen as initially limited for both sides. Because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has identified a clear firebreak between the use of any nuclear weapons and an intercontinental exchange—indeed, the United States has had to maintain a policy of continuity in the scale of nuclear weapons' use to extend deterrence over Europe—the use of nuclear weapons at the outset of a Nato-Warsaw Pact war is unlikely. The means and ends of the war are therefore closely linked by the existence of nuclear weapons. Turning this argument around, the security of the United States is immediately threatened only by Soviet nuclear weapons; therefore, the United States is unlikely to adopt war-termination objectives that box the Politburo into the use of nuclear weapons as the best hope of survival. In short, the maximum warfighting objective is something short of "unconditional surrender."

Since defense of the allies' territory is the reason for the existence of Nato, restoration of prewar territorial boundaries is a reasonable lower bound for US-Nato war-termination objectives. This objective has been referred to as *status quo ante*, but it implies much more than prewar status. Restoration of territory means that the Soviet offensive has been stopped and reversed. Soviet general-purpose naval and air forces would have been largely destroyed, and the Nato alliance would be intact. The major source of Soviet legitimacy and influence is its military power. Having demonstrated that it is not invincible and having caused the destruction of its satellites' armies, the Kremlin would be besieged with problems in maintaining the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. There would be less spare military equipment to support radical movements, and the Soviet system as a model would be tarnished, reducing Soviet influence in the Third World. Focusing on requirements for the restoration of Nato territory is necessary

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to define likely roles for naval forces in the North Atlantic in a future Nato-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Technological change has always influenced the roles of different types of forces in warfare, but the effect of new technology has been difficult to predict. The development of internal combustion engines between the world wars led to vast increases in the capabilities of aircraft, tanks, and submarines. Yet few foresaw the way these platforms would ultimately dominate the land and sea battles. Besides the continued development of these platforms since World War II, ballistic missiles, helicopters, smart weapons, and information technology have created possibilities that have not been tested in full-scale war. Because the application of information technology to ocean surveillance is in constant use, there is a large body of data to suggest that if war were to occur today, we would know when the Soviet fleet deployed and where we could find both the surface and submarine forces.

This ability to confront the enemy directly rather than draw him to us has profound implications for the future of war at sea. The current situation finds the United States leading our opponent by a wide margin. This technological lead must be skillfully exploited to offset the superior numbers of Soviet forces as opposed to relying primarily on attrition, as was done in World War II.

The several important factors discussed above should at least induce caution in applying the World War II experience to current planning in the use of naval forces in the North Atlantic. Nonetheless, until a few years ago naval strategic thought was effectively dominated by the practices of World War II. The prevailing strategic vision was one of refighting the battle for the Atlantic. Innovation in general naval strategy was either stymied by memories of World War II or was seen as largely irrelevant as long as national strategy relied on the use of nuclear weapons. However, as the Soviets achieved parity in intercontinental nuclear weapons, the national deterrent strategy of "massive retaliation" became less credible. "Flexible response" is less definitive about the circumstances for employment of nuclear weapons. But as the Soviets have deployed hundreds of SS-20s and continue to upgrade intermediate-range nuclear weapons overhanging Europe, any continued reliance on nuclear weapons has increasingly been called into question. Motivated by a perception that conventional forces alone are likely to be used at the outset of a Nato-Warsaw Pact war, and that the Navy's absence from the strategic debate had been harmful, a renaissance in naval strategic thought began in the early 1980s. The major product of this renaissance so far has been the forward maritime strategy.

The Forward Maritime Strategy in the Atlantic

Both the "forward" and the "maritime" aspects of the strategy deserve a few words. Since the forward aspect of the strategy receives the most attention, it should be highlighted first.

According to the future battle for the North Atlantic envisioned a few years ago, the Navy's role—protecting the reinforcement and resupply of Europe—was obviously necessary but clearly did not satisfy the needs of Nato or exploit the full capability of modern naval forces. Moreover, the pattern of Soviet naval development was leading us to believe that the Soviet Navy would be perfectly happy with our building a barrier of naval forces across the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) gap and staying on the North Atlantic side.⁸ The picture was one in which both sides had adopted a strategic defense, with Iceland the focus of contention between the lines.

This strategic view was obviously deficient. By focusing the major battle around Iceland, the Arctic and the defense of northern Norway were implicitly sacrificed at a time when the Soviets were building their Northern Fleet, modernizing their air and ground forces on the Kola Peninsula, and both hardening their military infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula and expanding their lines of communication in the north. Alone, the United States cannot contain the military power of the Soviet Union in Eurasia. Alliance cohesion is required both going into war and for sustaining containment after war termination. Forfeiting the defense of any Nato ally gives the Soviets a leverage point to start destroying the alliance. Therefore, a revision in maritime strategy to fight at least as far forward as northern Norway was seen as necessary to prevent an increase in Soviet influence in Scandinavia by virtue of their military might, to deter Soviet aggression in the north, and to prevail in war.

Moreover, control of northern Norway and the Norwegian Sea is essential for Soviet naval operations in the North Atlantic. The Northern Fleet is the only Soviet naval force that has a fighting chance to operate in the Atlantic during war; therefore, the Soviets have put most of their striking power in that fleet. As of 1983, 64 percent of the Soviet *Typhoon*, *Delta I-III*, and *Yankee* SSBNs, and 66 percent of the Soviet Navy's post-1967 combat ships, operated out of the Kola Peninsula and White Sea ports. To reach the Atlantic, these forces have to proceed around the northern cape of Norway, across 1,000 miles of the Norwegian Sea, and through the GIN gap. Denied air cover and facing Nato submarines and land- and sea-based aircraft, the Northern Fleet faces an arduous, if not impossible, task.

However, should the Soviets control and operate from the Norwegian airbases as far south as Bodo, US sea-based airpower could be contested down to the GIN gap, Nato surface force operations in the Norwegian Sea could be denied, and Nato submarines would be facing a 1,000-mile gauntlet of ASW forces. Soviet access to the North Atlantic SLOCs would be greatly improved. Soviet control of Norwegian airbases south of Bodo would imperil the lines of communication between the British Isles and the Low Countries, contributing to the loss of Denmark. Should Nato have sustained the forward defense of West Germany, the loss of Norway would mean that its northern

flank would now be turned from Jutland. Thus, for pragmatic warfighting reasons in addition to treaty commitments, the defense of Norway is crucial for control of the North Atlantic and successful defense of Europe.

Another aspect of the "forward" sense of the strategy is its emphasis on the initiative. The technological superiority of US naval forces can be largely nullified by leaving the time and place for the engagement to the opponent. On the other hand, our taking the high ground early enough increases the Soviets' calculation of the costs of achieving their objectives by force and of the risks of perhaps not succeeding at all. Therefore, adopting a philosophy of strategic offense for the war at sea is an important aspect of the forward maritime strategy.

The Germans started World War II with their submarines at their warfighting stations. Their immediate successes altered the way the British fleet operated, because the British had no effective countermeasures. With the Nato plan providing for immediate US entry into a global war, the Soviets would find the Nato SSNs at their wartime stations. The Soviets, like the British in World War II, would have no effective countermeasures. Therefore, demonstrating to the Soviets that the waters of the world, particularly the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea, are unsafe for Soviet fleet operations is a primary role for Nato submarine forces at the outbreak of war.

Rapid deployment of a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) to Norway is another means for assuming the initiative. Recognizing the need for non-Norwegian ground forces to offset the Soviet buildup in the north, but not wishing to increase tensions, in 1981 the Norwegians agreed to an arrangement whereby the heavy equipment for one MAB would be prepositioned in central Norway. This arrangement permits a rapid response to indications of a Soviet assault by airlifting marines rather than having them stationed in Norway. This initial movement of marines is not as susceptible to interdiction by growing Soviet seapower as the alternatives of flying the MAB in and marrying up with maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) or movement in amphibious ships.

A brigade of Marines does not represent enough force to take the offensive against the Soviets in northern Norway, but it does provide a credible defensive force. The initiative is gained by stopping the Soviet ground assault and creating a "sink hole" for Soviet airpower over northern Norway. If the air over the North Cape is hotly contested, Nato will control the air over the Norwegian Sea. Because the Marines' ground elements are relatively light compared with a Soviet motorized rifle division, because of their using helicopters rather than armored vehicles for mobility, they are well suited to fight in the mountainous terrain of northern Norway.

The strategy is called "maritime" rather than "naval," because it is a combined arms strategy for the maritime theaters, not simply a strategy for

the employment of submarines and carrier battle forces. Combined arms, put simply, means using all of the forces available to the commander in the theater in such a manner that attack on one element of the force exposes the enemy to counters from another element. US and allied forces will play essential roles in stopping a Soviet thrust into northern Norway and in sinking the Soviet Navy. In budget battles it is relatively easy to partition the threat and decide which platform performs which missions. In global war games, as in war, he who brings to the battle whatever forces are required to achieve superiority generally wins.

The Issues

No strategy is free of risk. Objectives always strain the resources available for satisfying them. The Soviet priorities for the Northern Fleet and the Kola military complex have initiated a shift in Nato's maritime strategy in that direction. In assessing this shift, the following questions deserve to be answered.

- In going forward, are we leaving our rear vulnerable?
- Is force applied on the flank not better applied in the center?
- In working toward success using conventional weapons, are we not risking escalation to nuclear war?

How does a strategy for defense of northern Norway and control of the Norwegian Sea square with the requirement to protect the North Atlantic SLOCs? Without control of the air over the Norwegian Sea, Soviet Navy surface forces cannot long survive. The further south toward the Atlantic they venture, the more dense are the Nato forces they must face and the shorter is the expected duration of their survival. The Soviets understand this well; therefore, they can expect to concentrate principally in the Norwegian Sea where they can provide mutual support and be supported by naval ASW aircraft and bombers. Soviet surface forces do not appear to have a significant role in North Atlantic SLOC interdiction. This leaves the long-range bombers and submarines, as in World War II.

In World War II, open-ocean ASW search was not effective against the U-boats. Fearing the rapid buildup in Soviet submarine forces following World War II, the United States put significant effort into ASW surveillance. The development of SSBNs by both the United States and the Soviet Union increased the importance of the ability to find a submarine that was not trying to approach a target, but was using the broad ocean expanses for cover. The United States has succeeded in developing this capability, whereas the USSR has not.

The Soviets understand the risks inherent in independent submarine operations. In his writings, Admiral Gorshkov criticizes the German failure to adequately support their submarines in the North Atlantic with balanced

surface and air forces. Should Nato hold northern Norway and continue operations from northern Norwegian airfields, Admiral Gorshkov's submarines would face the same situation in the Norwegian Sea that the Germans faced in the North Atlantic, with the addition of the Nato submarine threat. Only able to sink surface ships or surfaced submarines during World War II, the US submarine force was directed to develop an ASW capability in 1949. The SSN, now the most potent ASW platform in the fleet, would subject Soviet submarines to attack from the time they leave port. As they proceed into the Norwegian Sea, Nato's land-based aircraft would be added to the submarine threat, and surface- and sea-based air ASW forces would thicken as Soviet submarines proceed south. Certainly Soviet naval forces have been built to fight, but what losses can they sustain in attempts to reach the North Atlantic without sacrificing their ability to conduct their primary mission of defending their SSBNs?

Although having other, more active roles, US carriers will play a significant role in protecting SLOCs against both submarine and air forces. In World War II, carriers in the North Atlantic were used primarily for convoy escort. Because sinking carriers is a higher Soviet priority than sinking shipping, the best way that carriers can protect the SLOCs is by drawing off and destroying submarine and air forces that would otherwise be used against shipping. Positioned to fix Soviet naval air forces or to strike should Soviet naval air be concentrated in another theater, carriers can keep Soviet naval bombers from being assigned to antishipping missions. To those who view being the target as an ignominious role, Samuel Eliot Morison would respond, "The convoy [in World War II] was not a defensive weapon, as so often charged by ignorant or prejudiced people, but the best sort of offensive."⁹ In a future global war it is likely that the carriers will force the decisive battle for the Norwegian Sea again. Conducted under circumstances of our choosing, this battle could again result in destruction of the enemy's capability to prevent shipping from reaching the Arctic, and degradation in enemy northern forces for the duration of the conflict.

The Marines in northern Norway also have a direct role in protecting the North Atlantic SLOCs from Soviet long-range bombers. The Soviet lines of approach to the North Atlantic take them either over the Baltic from the vicinity of Leningrad and through the air defenses of Denmark, southern Norway, and northern England, or over Sweden, which has one of the strongest air forces in the region, or over the North Cape. Should Soviet naval air be unable to cut the corner around the North Cape flying from the Kola Peninsula, they would not have the range to reach the GIN gap. Operating from behind this forward air defense, the outer air battle would become much more manageable, permitting carrier operations into the Norwegian Sea without undue risk and further removing the battle from the North Atlantic SLOCs.

Viewed in this light, the defense of northern Norway appears an effective means of protecting SLOCs. Conversely, the loss of Norway has grave implications for the ability of US naval forces to defend shipping on the North Atlantic. Operating from Norwegian bases the Soviet submarines and bombers would be 1,000 miles closer to the North Atlantic SLOCs.

Given force levels that are inadequate to continuously escort all critical shipping, protection will come largely from knowing where the enemy is and where he is not. Ocean surveillance systems will provide a new ingredient necessary for the efficient use of limited escort resources. The details of convoying deserve renewed attention. Issues such as convoying versus protected lanes, distributing critical cargoes, and shipping routes have been largely abandoned for more glamorous issues like the outer air battle. We need to better understand how to use the escorts that will be available. But these are matters more of tactics than strategy, and they need to be placed in strategic perspective to prevent the difficulties from appearing insurmountable when they are really quite manageable.

Another concern is that the strategy calls for moving forces further forward at a time when the Soviets are increasing their naval operations in the Western Hemisphere, developing a capability of striking the continental United States with cruise missiles, and supplying their clients in the Caribbean Sea and Central America with predatory weapon systems.

Soviet naval forces cannot survive in the Western Hemisphere for an extended period of time in war. The high priority for sinking US SSBNs warrants the expenditure of some forces in an attempt to catch them coming out of port. Only the latest, most capable Soviet submarines have any chance of succeeding in this mission. Whereas other Soviet forces are likely to be recalled to the Soviet Union, these modern Soviet SSNs, possibly armed with land-attack cruise missiles, would probably remain in waters contiguous to the United States. Thus, the cruise missile threat comes from a platform that most likely has a higher priority mission.

Presuming that the Soviet cruise missiles have a conventional variant, the military relevance of several 1,000-pound bombs targeted on the United States at the outbreak of war is questionable. Because this issue has more emotional than military significance, it must be handled primarily for its ability to distract support from the overall Nato defense policy.

A more immediate and militarily relevant problem is the increased military power of Soviet client states, particularly Cuba. Since 1979, Cuba has acquired three *Foxtrot*-class submarines and several squadrons of MiG-23 aircraft, essentially doubling their high-performance aircraft to about 300 and providing an air-to-surface attack capability.¹⁰ Although it is difficult to prove that these new weapon systems are not intended for defensive purposes and that Cuba's interests would be served by allying with the Soviets in a Nato-Warsaw Pact war, Cuban *Foxtrot* submarines and MiG-23 aircraft

clearly constitute a major potential threat to shipping in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. During World War II, U-boats had some of their best hunting in the gulf and Caribbean, inflicting tremendous losses until coastal convoying routines were worked out. Shipping through the gulf and Caribbean would be even more important to a modern war effort than it was during World War II, and all gulf shipping must pass through the Florida Strait or the Yucatan Channel within tens of miles of Cuba. The greatest threat to shipping could occur before the ships reach the North Atlantic. Therefore, a portion of the North Atlantic strategy must include sufficient forces to ensure that Castro understands his interests are not well served by supporting the Soviets in war, and to defeat any attempts to attack shipping should he try.

Having made a strong assertion that naval forces can have a decisive effect on the outcome of the battle in northern Norway, the temptation is to question whether the Marines and carriers would be better used by committing them to the battle on the Central Front in Germany. The short answer is no. The ground combat element of an MAB is roughly equivalent to half of a Soviet motorized rifle division in manpower, but with comparatively little armor. The lack of armor is offset by the air combat element's attack aircraft. Whereas the terrain and respective orders of battle would make an MAB a decisive force in Norway, on the Central Front they would be relatively insignificant, considering that the Warsaw Pact divisions number over 100 and that north German terrain is ideally suited for armor. Using this measure, and considering the implications of the loss of Norway for ultimate success on the Central Front, reassigning the MAB committed to Norway to the Central Front is clearly a mistake.

It is likely that at least one additional Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), consisting of three MABs, will be assigned to the European theater. The major power of an MAF lies in its mobility. A mobile amphibious assault force exerts a force-multiplying effect by requiring the enemy to distribute a larger number of less mobile forces over wide areas. However, if the threat of amphibious landings is removed by committing the Marines to one position, the enemy may be able to concentrate his superior forces and reverse the combat power advantage. Therefore, if committed, the Marines must either be assigned terrain better suited to their capabilities than to armored forces, or be followed by heavy forces to exploit the initial advantage. After landing, marines should be reconstituted as an amphibious force as soon as possible to reestablish the enemy's need to defend in many places.

The Danish Isles provide the type of terrain that is best suited for amphibious forces, and an MAF in conjunction with Danish Army units could provide an effective defense against Soviet amphibious and airborne assault. The defense of Denmark is necessary to protect the northern flank of the Central Front, to prevent the outflanking of Norway from the south, and to

prevent Soviet naval and air access to the North Sea and the North Atlantic. However, committing marines to this task before it is clearly necessary removes a major threat to Soviet-held littorals and may permit reassignment of forces to the Central Front. To expect that Nato naval forces operating on the flanks can cause Warsaw Pact forces to be drawn from the Central Front may be too optimistic, but to expect naval power-projection forces to fix Warsaw Pact forces for the defense of their littorals is not unreasonable.

Should the Marines not be fully committed, they could play a major role in restoring allied territory once the fronts are stabilized. Soviet advances in both Norway and Germany would have flanks exposed to the sea. Amphibious landings could contribute to the collapse of these fronts, causing Warsaw Pact forces to retreat to prewar borders and creating the conditions necessary for a cease-fire agreement.

In summary, in the early days of a Nato-Warsaw Pact war, the several hundred sorties per day and 35,000 combat troops that could be provided to the Central Front by a three-carrier battle force and MAF in the North Atlantic pales in comparison to the thousands of sorties and millions of men that would be engaged in the first battles. However, as the losses mount, these forces would loom larger, to the eventual point that their application on the Central Front may prove decisive.

Thinking of reversing Soviet offensives and winning decisive conventional battles smacks of élan and raises concerns that conventional warfighting strategies weaken deterrence and increase the chances of inadvertent nuclear war. A counterpoint should be made that any deterrent strategy that does not consider how the war will be fought and the conditions under which it can be terminated is a hollow shell that will crack when tested, and as such is not much of a deterrent.

The forward maritime strategy is first a deterrent strategy. Deterrence, whether based on mutual destruction, denying opponent objectives, or threatening countervailing interests of the opponent, relies on increasing the opponent's calculation of risk and cost to the point that a mutually acceptable compromise can be reached. The forward maritime strategy uses all three bases for deterrence, both to deter the use of force and to deter the use of nuclear weapons should war begin. The possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict of this magnitude remains. But if our limited objectives are clearly stated and supported by our actions, the chances of Soviet first use of nuclear weapons will be reduced, even if we are winning decisive battles. Having a strategy that is consistent with the US Navy's means is a prerequisite to its being able to define achievable objectives clearly and to develop a common understanding throughout the Navy of the actions necessary to support those objectives so that the signals sent to the Soviets are coherent, should direct confrontation ever occur.

Future Roles for Maritime Forces in the North Atlantic

The roles of naval forces in the North Atlantic are being reshaped by the Forward Maritime Strategy. Phrases such as "protect the SLOCs" are being superseded by phrases such as "sink the Soviet navy," and this is producing a profound change in the image of naval warfighting. Sea control is required for power projection, and projection of power by maritime forces plays a major role in the defense of the alliance. Given Soviet priorities and Nato capabilities, sea control can be established more rapidly by going after the Soviet fleet rather than awaiting their attack. Power-projection forces can then be brought to bear where necessary to shore up defenses and to take advantage of any opening the Soviets provide. We are now looking beyond the early days of war when sea control should be essentially established, and we see the roles of carrier battle groups and marines more clearly. Presently, we can also see the shape of a coherent national military strategy involving all theaters of a global war. In the past, the relationship between naval and land strategies was vague, and the strategies for the several theaters of war were different and, to a large extent, disconnected. We understand better what winning strategies are, and what they require for success. Knowing how to improve our chances of winning contributes greatly to our chances of deterring war, which, of course, is the ultimate role of naval forces.

Notes

1. B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: Putnam, 1970), p. 370.
2. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 27.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Liddell Hart, p. 371.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 592.
6. S.W. Roskill, *The War at Sea 1939-1945* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 10-11.
7. Milan Vego, "The Role of the Attack Submarines in Soviet Naval Theory," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1983, p. 61.
8. Michael McCgwire, *Soviet Naval Development—Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 176.
9. Morison, p. 27.
10. *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1984).

ANTI-SSBN OPERATIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WAR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The attached paper argues that anti-SSBN operations in conventional war as depicted in the Maritime Strategy are not provocative and contribute to both deterrence of war and deterrence of nuclear escalation. Major ideas covered are:

- Soviet perceptions of relative nuclear strength are important in their decision-making process.
- Soviets have declared their intention to attack enemy nuclear forces and infrastructure in the conventional phase of war.
- Soviet SLBMs are primarily nuclear reserve forces. Soviets also have shore-based nuclear reserve forces.
- Gradual degradation of Soviet SSBN force, vice elimination, is unlikely to be perceived as beginning of damage-limiting first strike.
- Failure to engage Soviet SSBNs may be perceived by Soviets as evidence of our inability or lack of resolve to do so.
- A primary mission of Soviet Navy is to preserve and protect the SSBN force. Soviet naval forces required for this task cannot be attacking SLOCs. Forward operations force Soviets to address (with forces) threat near their shores.
- Ability to distinguish between types of Soviet nuclear submarines cannot be expected in "heat of war".
- U. S. Navy actions, with NCA approval, as depicted in the Maritime Strategy are reactions to Soviet provocations. Lack of positive response to Soviet provocations does not serve deterrence.
- Real issue is how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation and thereby affect the land battle.
- Forward allied operations result in:
 - Soviets assigning more forces to primary missions,
 - Reduce Soviet capability for nuclear warfare at all levels,
 - Reduce Soviet potential threat to RE/RE,
 - Roll back Soviet submarine threat to CVBFs,
 - Demonstrate alliance resolve and credibility of flexible response.

In conclusion, aggressive maritime operations serve to raise the nuclear threshold and are provocative only in the sense that they may provoke a Soviet decision to seek a negotiated settlement.

ANTI-SSBN OPERATIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WAR

OVERVIEW.

There has been considerable misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Navy anti-SSBN operations within the ASW campaign depicted in the Maritime Strategy. These operations have been described by some as dangerously provocative and, if carried out, surely leading to nuclear escalation by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we contend that these operations will enhance deterrence and encourage the Soviets to negotiate an early settlement of the conflict. Likewise, in peacetime, Soviet uncertainty about the security of their sea-based nuclear forces undoubtedly adds further to deterrence.

BACKGROUND.

Prior to discussing the strategic implications of such operations, the factors influencing the strategic equation must be addressed.

First, in our Maritime Strategy, and this discussion, we use National Intelligence Estimates to depict Soviet likely perceptions and operations. These estimates are produced, not by the Navy, but by the national intelligence community.

- Nuclear weapons have a central place in Soviet military thought. A war between the superpowers may not involve immediate nuclear weapons use, but the nuclear balance is constantly examined and evaluated by the Soviets in anticipation of possible escalation. Because of this aspect of Soviet doctrine, the Soviets place a high priority on controlling the nuclear balance, or as they term it, the correlation of forces in terms of nuclear forces during conventional operations.
- The Soviets have clearly indicated their intention to conventionally attack all nuclear capable enemy forces at the outset of war, with particular attention paid to our own and allied SSBNs. In fact, "anti-enemy naval nuclear forces" is a publicly declared mission of the Soviet Navy. The tasks within this mission include anti-SSBN, anti-carrier warfare, and anti-(nuclear)infrastructure warfare. The Soviets, believing NATO nuclear escalation is probable, intend to conventionally destroy enemy nuclear forces (both at sea and ashore) to diminish the impact of a NATO decision to escalate. From their perspective, anti-enemy nuclear operations in the conventional phase are a military imperative.

- Additionally, the Soviets expect attrition of their SSBNs in war and have structured their forces accordingly. As early as 1972, Capt 1st Rank Shatrov asserted in Soviet writings that by 1975, Soviet SSBNs would be vulnerable to U. S. 688-class submarines. Fleet Admiral Gorshkov stated in 1978 that pro-SSBN, along with anti-SSBN operations, are the two factors which determine the military importance of the oceans. Furthermore, many scholars now believe recent Soviet writings strongly suggest Soviet intention to be ready to fight and win a conventional war while deterring at the nuclear level--a concept inconsistent with some academicians' postulations of early or inevitable Soviet nuclear escalation in response to SSBN losses. Even the Soviets themselves now talk of nuclear escalation as probable rather than inevitable.

Second, in Soviet strategy, SLBMs are primarily dedicated to a nuclear reserve role, not first strike.

Third, we will degrade the force, not eliminate it. Although some SSBNs would be engaged very soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the degradation of the Soviet sea-based nuclear reserve would be a gradual process. Gradualness is valuable because it gives the Soviet NCA days, tens of days, to understand what's happening and make rational strategic choices--not the minutes or hours they would face from a U. S. threat to destroy their land-based nuclear forces. The gradual, sustained character of the operations hardly suggest that the U. S. is conducting a damage-limiting first strike.

Finally, the ability to distinguish between Soviet SSNs, SSGNs, and SSBNs in the heat of battle cannot be expected. In most cases, if the target is not engaged soon after initial detection, we risk losing our own SSNs as the Soviets can be expected to attack as soon as they achieve detection.

DISCUSSION.

As a primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to protect its strategic strike force, the Soviets have placed the majority of their SSBNs in bastions near the Soviet homeland. Conventional naval forces both defend these SSBNs and provide strategic defense of the Soviet Union itself. Soviet forces required to defend both the SSBNs and provide strategic defense in depth cannot be committed to other missions. If we did not attack forces far forward, they might also conclude that we lacked either the capability or resolve to do so -- a perception unlikely to lead the Soviets to negotiations.

In peacetime, as well as periods of grave crisis (Phase I of the Maritime Strategy), it is important to demonstrate military readiness and alliance resolve. The Soviets appreciate the potential strategic risk to their naval forces, including their SSBNs. Soviet and U. S. submarines have been off each other's coasts for decades and that has not been provocative. In a period of grave crisis, the NCA would decide on appropriate reactions to Soviet provocations. Our planning is designed to react to the extent necessary to deter further Soviet provocations, indeed war, or if deterrence fails, to be ready to fight effectively. Deterrence is in the mind of the adversary. We believe that when he is confronted with increased military uncertainty or certainty of a military defeat, he will not attack. Thereby, deterrence is preserved.

The Soviets place great weight on the nuclear correlation of forces, even during the time before nuclear weapons may be used. Maritime forces can influence that correlation, both by destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines and by improving our own nuclear posture, through deployment of carriers and Tomahawk platforms around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Some argue that such steps will lead to immediate escalation, but escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable, given the Soviet land orientation. Within the context of a general conventional war, there are strong disincentives for both sides to escalate to nuclear weapons. Neither we nor the Soviets can rule out the possibility that escalation will occur, but aggressive use of maritime power can make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day. Any action the allies take which achieves sufficient leverage to encourage war termination presents the Soviets with a decision to negotiate or escalate.

The real issue, however, is not how the Maritime Strategy is influenced by nuclear weapons, but the reverse: how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation and thereby affect the land battle. As our maritime campaign progresses, prolonging the war also becomes unattractive, since the Soviets cannot decouple Europe from the United States and the risk of escalation is always present. Maritime forces thus provide strong conventional pressure for war termination that can come from nowhere else.

From a purely military perspective, forward SSN operations with attacks on the broad range of Soviet naval targets, including SSBNs, will result in the Soviet Navy placing greater emphasis on defending their SSBNs and the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union. In a conventional war, to the extent these operations are successful, we reduce the Soviet capability to conduct tactical, theater, or strategic nuclear warfare; we reduce the potential threat to the reinforcement and resupply (RE/RE) of Europe; we roll back the Soviet submarine threat to our CVBFs which will be moving forward for power projection operations, and, most importantly, we demonstrate alliance resolve.

CONCLUSIONS.

Our aggressive ASW, AAW, and ASUW campaigns will decrease the Soviet capability for nuclear war at the tactical, theater, and strategic levels. To the extent this degradation in nuclear forces lowers their confidence in the results of escalation, Soviet escalation is deterred. Concurrently, the successful protection of the RE/RE to NATO acts to postpone (hopefully obviate) a NATO requirement to escalate. U. S. Navy actions with NCA approval, as depicted in the Maritime Strategy, are reactions to Soviet provocations.

The Soviets are not believed to consider that the destruction of strategic assets, such as SSBNs, during the conventional phase of conflict would by itself trigger an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. If so, it is unlikely they would publicly declare their own intention to conventionally attack our nuclear forces. Indeed, the Soviets expect attrition of naval forces and the nuclear escalation decision is more likely to be determined by events on the Central Front. Attacks on the Soviet sea-based nuclear reserve are not alone provocative, since the Soviet ability to use both mobile land-based and residual sea-based nuclear forces for war termination leverage will remain despite our actions at sea. Selected strikes against Soviet SSBNs designed to degrade, but not eliminate, the Soviet sea-based nuclear reserve serve to raise the nuclear threshold. Any allied action with sufficient leverage to encourage negotiations to terminate the conflict will present the Soviets with a decision to negotiate or escalate. Because of their degraded nuclear posture, we believe they would negotiate.