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ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

HISTORY OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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OF THE  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NO.  
MR. FRANK MCHUGH

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The History of the Naval War College

Interviewee: Mr. Frank McHugh

Interviewer: Mr. Anthony Nicolosi, with  
Mr. Robert Kirkwood

Subject: The History of the Naval War College

Date: March 23, 1983

N: It's March 23, 1983 and this is the Naval War College. We're in N22 of Founders Hall for an oral history recording session with Mr. Frank McHugh, an old time employee of the Naval War College and particularly the War Gaming Center. With us today are Mr. Bob Kirkwood, U.S. Navy (retired), and former employee of the War Gaming Department, and myself, Mr. Anthony Nicolosi, the director of the museum and Historical Collection at the War College. We're here particularly to ask Frank McHugh to reminisce a bit, if he would, about his long association with the War College.

Frank, could you tell me when you began working in the Naval War College?

M: Yes, March 1, 1934.

N: How old were you at the time?

M: Twenty-six, I believe.

N: Who did you work for when you first came to the War College?

M: Roy Everett.

N: Who was he?

M: He was in charge of the drafting room and he was a war gaming expert.

N: What did you do in the drafting room?

M: I went down on the board and plotted the moves and transferred them to the master plot.

N: So, your association with war gaming began at the War College from the very beginning of your employment.

M: Correct. The other thing I did was make maps and formation diagrams...

N: Where was War Gaming located at that time?

M: That room was located on the center wing, on the center of Luce Hall on the third floor. It moved shortly thereafter to its permanent location in Pringle Hall. Pringle Hall was just being completed when I got here.

N: And that was '37?

M: '34. I came in '34.

N: '34! That's right, the building was under construction in '34.

M: It was finished in '34.

N: Was that the third floor?

M: I believe it was. We moved up there. And to my knowledge, that war gaming setup was designed by Bill Chadwick.

N: Isn't that interesting.

M: The drafting room was upstairs, just over the game room; you go down to the game room. The blueprinting--all the printing was done by blueprint--that was right there. The pneumatic tubes, to send messages...

N: Yes, I remember seeing a lot of photographs...

M: They went down to the different rooms. If they were submarines, they would get put in a pneumatic tube and send it over to the plotting room. The plotting room was the one

with the, you know--it had curtains and screens, till you came into view, there was no radar there were screens dividing the forces.

K: Are you talking about Pringle coffee mess?

M: The coffee mess and lecture hall at that time.

K: Okay. I thought you said it started at the center of Luce Hall.

M: The drafting room was in the center of Luce Hall. There were two game rooms in Luce Hall--the east and the west--and they were just established when Pringle Hall came in. Kimball can tell you all about it. I think the two rooms on either side were the game rooms.

K: That's in Luce Hall.

N: I have pictures of the interiors of the war gaming room.

M: Yes, we were in Luce Hall. Pringle Hall, just after I came, opened up the master game room, it is now the lecture hall and coffee mess. And that scale was six inches to a thousand yards. The others, I believe are four inches to a thousand yards.

K: That's the tiles you're talking about.

M: Yes, the scale. And each one of those squares was duplicated on a plotting sheet, HO 50-50. And I doubt there's many of those around, but you transfer, you could put the numbers on the board on chalk, and match them up with a plotting sheet, and that's how you plotted the moves. The players moved the ships. The plotters, Ray Gaudet and I, would go on and make the move and transfer to the master plot, and during the tactical games, Johnny Wilson ran the mechanics of the tactical games, on the senior class; Johnny Lawton on the junior class; and Mr. Ward ran the strategic area.

K: This is the thirties, now--from the mid to the late thirties.

M: This is when I came. And it didn't change. Nobody left. Things remained the same. Nobody got promoted, nobody got a raise--they stayed exactly in the same place, year after year, yes.

K: That's the old Navy.

M: Well, it was. We didn't get back our fifteen percent cut, sometime.

N: This was during the depression, too, wasn't it?

K: A fifteen percent cut? It's been a fifteen percent cut.

M: Well, as I recall, when I came everybody in the government, including the services had a fifteen percent cut in pay. And sometime before World War II that cut was restored. Okay. Does that answer your questions on that, Bob?

K: I want to ask you another question. This whole operation became duplicated or transferred to the east wing of Sims at some point, didn't it?

M: Now, this was a long time later. This was in 1947 when, that was Barracks C, at the end of World War II... Now again, I can't prove all this, I don't have the facts on this, but I believe Admiral Spruance was president, he wanted the logistics, somebody wanted it to go to Bayonne Logistics School he wanted to hear it. That's what I heard. Admiral Eccles could tell you the story on that.

N: He has, several times over.

M: Okay, then you know the story on that. But I went down to the logistics department for two reasons: 1) I would



be junior and they wanted somebody who had been war gaming, and they said to me, "Do you want to go down?" which was tantamount for saying, "You'll go down." So I went down there and it was a game board setup which is now the coffee mess in Sims. And I plotted the games, at random games, the mechanics of the games for the logistics department. Now, C & S occasionally came down to use their game board. They also went to the NEWS. Joe Domingoes I believe came and went to the NEWS a few times--if he could fill in that--I never did go there. Ray Gaudet came down for the junior class. When the logistics department was changed to strategy and logistics and came back on the hill, they didn't know what to do with me--they put me in visual aids. That's a com center. And C & S moved down to Sims. And they put the war game room in where the wars or the color games are now. That was also an auditorium. And the tactical games were conducted on the floor there, and they also conducted called strategic games there. At that time the game board was in disfavor, tactical games would be phased out. War gaming about then reached its bottom....

K: This is in what year now?

M: This is after 47.

K: How you can jump from the thirties to the forties is,... so maybe you should go back.

N: Yes, but this is so very interesting and I can see the continuity that occurred...

M: Also, there wasn't really much change. The War College went on the same, the same people who were in the games, one difference was Freddie Wagner,... The war game setup was Hazard, Ward, Wilson, Wagner, Lawton, and Gaudet, and me. Freddie Wagner had a train accident when he was working for Brown and Sharpe and he hurt his leg. He signed off on it when it was healed--he thought it was healed, but it bothered him all his life and he was in the hospital for a long, long time. While he was in the hospital, John Lawton took over his job. There was a tremendous difference in pay, but John Lawton never did get the money. There was no, nothing there--he just... When I mentioned the secretary, I was doing the same work that somebody else was doing for a lot more money, so if you don't like it, get the hell out. I could understand his viewpoint, and he couldn't, there was no money.

N: There was no money.

M: And so, actually, for years Ward was the strategic dean. John Wilson was the tactical dean for the senior class, and Johnny Lawton for the junior class. Admiral Spruance was the director, I believe, of the junior class before World War II. Now, whether that was his job, I'm not

sure. But he was on the game board. I remember that. \*.

K: Spruance...

N: The staff members, '37.

K: Spruance was a captain, was it 1937?

M: It was in the thirties. Now, I can't tell you the year.

K: And what was he doing in war gaming again?

M: He was, you might today call it Game Director. I don't know what he was called.

N: We have his position listed in the register of officers for the War College, and offhand I don't recall what it is, either.

M: He might have been head of the Tactics Department. The Tactics Department really, as I recall, I didn't have much to do, except for plotting. As I recall, the Tactics Department was in charge of the games. The mechanics of the games was run by \*. They got the positions and they put them on the board, they got out the form. They had everything all set up so that when you went into the game, you were all set

to play. Joe was the historian. He went around in shorthand, went around to the different people listening to what they were saying and wrote the history. The moves were plotted from the game board by Ray and I. We took the sheets, we walked over to the master plot, transferred the moves. Johnny Wilson would check to see the ranges, check it for torpedo fire--because the torpedoes would be plotted on the master plot, not on the board. Then he would take the sheet upstairs, \*, and take the master plot, put it to a scale, to a standard size plate. He would edit it, so that there was no extraneous information. And he and Joe would get together, they'd do the history and the plates. When that was all okay, they'd go down to the photo shop and make a 3 x 3, 4 x 4 glass slide of that famous plate. And then they'd come back and toward the end they would take it and color in, like SS 42 would be orange--it was an orange SS. Orange for Japan, red was Britain, and blue was the United States. That's the only ones I remember. But they had other colors: black for Germany, yellow for Spain. That system went on for years. And toward the end they were trying to speed up the moves how to expedite move three. But you only can go so fast. Damage assessment took a long time. And then they started simplifying damage assessment--I had a list of the different factors you considered in gunfire, and I've forgotten the list, how many. But it was a large number. Were you under attack? Was this your opening salvo? Was it smoke? Was it kind of, was it a tight(/top?) spot, and then

later radar? And all these factors you went through and what you did, you computed the average damage for a 300 move and then modified it according to all these factors.

N: It was a very serious business, wasn't it Frank? Everybody was into it in a serious way...

M: They seemed to be, and they also had a bunch of students doing the damage assessment. One of the problems with the game board was the difference in speed between aircraft and ships. You had a three knot ship and a 300 knot aircraft. And one time we put the aircraft up on stands and had a little model \* so that the aircraft could move. Had all kinds of things for aircraft. Aircraft moves different. One time we had people running around the balcony, made it, that was the idea--was able to see what was going on under the foyer.

N: How long did a game take, Frank?

M: If I remember, Tony, it went on for a number of days--quite a number. And the only way you're going to get that is to go back and look at the games. Your memory is..., you're apt to remember the ones that stand out, rather than the errors. But try to remember, they gained a good part of the, game after game, and the games were tied in with the curriculum. Now, you have to check if this is fact, but

that's my recollection.

N: How do you assess the effect, I mean, what was the spinoff? How did the students view the results? Did they feel that it was something that was worthwhile?

M: I don't know. We really didn't, or I didn't talk to many of the students. Now some of the staff would come up and were very friendly. One was studying the Civil War while I was there, and they always weren't too busy.

K: Could I quote Frank McHugh's book at this point, which says that "they learned more than they realized at the time."

N: Excellent.

M: I talked to the students after I went down to Sims Hall, I used to talk to them at length, because, you see, I was part of C & S. You knew them. But we were upstairs and outside of the staff, we didn't see too many students. At least I didn't. And we didn't know them very well. George Hazard knew the staff. He'd been around here for so long, he knew most of the senior people. And they would come up and talk, like Admiral Wayne that used to write up, he wrote books, he wrote for the American Mercury Book Reviewers while I was on the staff. He illustrated the Saturday Evening Post, and he wrote stories for the Saturday Evening Post

newspaper. You no doubt know about him. When I was a kid I read his book, Six\_Bayonets, and I was quite honored to come here and see an author--a real live author! N: They made a movie out of it, didn't they? Six\_Bayonets?

M: I don't think so. This is a World War I story of the Marine Corps. I can think of his name after a while. \* cartoon that he made about Admiral \*. I think one of the cartoons showed this student telling the War College dream of playing golf, and \* War College \*....

N: We have that in my archives downstairs!

M: Okay, that's the guy I believe that drew. Thompson or Thomason. He was a Marine Corps colonel. And he wrote something about the Marines in China. That's where the Horse Marines were, was in China.

N: Yes.

M: "I'm Captain Jenks of the Horse Marines."

N: Do you recall seeing Spruance on the gaming board, ever?

M: Yes, he was very interested in gaming. One of the things they did before they started the game was to come up

to the drafting room and look at the plates of the last year's game. And I imagine that they changed things around to try something different. See, these are hazy recollections, but it seems to me that they took the British battle cruisers and would try them in the van and in the plan. Remember, we did not have battle cruisers. Our ships were very slow. But they had a large cruising radius. The British ships were fast and they had lots of coaling stations and they didn't need the cruising radius.

N: Frank, were they just integrating aircraft into the war game about this time, or had it been around? That would be a difficult question...

M: I suspect there was aircraft in the games when I came. Now there were submarines in the game.

N: Oh, there were?

M: Yes. It was on the Pacific they had scouting lines of submarines.

N: I've seen pictures of that.

M: Yes. But in the games you had the submarines.

N: Were you here when FDR visited the War College just



before the Second World War?

M: Yes. You could see the people walking to this. And one of the custodians used to stand out here and watch the people go by. We used to come out here for the graduations, too.

N: Well, FDR was here for a review of the Naval Training recruits in 1941. Did he come to gaming? He was crippled, of course, he couldn't...

M: I can't tell you. I think I remember Truman coming here, too.

N: Yes, Truman came here after...

M: Now, my boss told me about Teddy Roosevelt coming here. And it seemed to me (now this is a recollection, but) after Teddy Roosevelt came, he gave Navy officers Wednesday afternoons off for exercising. Now, the civilians didn't have it, but the officers went and took Wednesday afternoons off.

N: What kind of a place was the War College to work for? Was it a nice place? That's a leading question!

M: No, no, but it was a frustrating place in that there

was no place to go.

K: You mean you couldn't move up.

M: No, and you couldn't get any raises. Nobody left. That group that I talked to you about in the drafting room was here from when I came until George Hazard died.

K: George Hazard, your boss...

M: He was my boss.

K: He knew \*, right?

M: That's my understanding, yes, that he knew him. In those days, nobody would tell you anything. If you asked questions, no, I'm not kidding, they would not try to, if it were your job to plot, I used to say, "How do you assess damage?"

N: They wouldn't tell you.

M: Well, it was a tendency... as much as anybody, Johnny Wilson would. But there was a tendency to sort of say, "No." I was interested in the mathematics of that, but, and I think I could have done something. Everybody knew... I think there were forty civilians. Everybody knew everybody.

N:       What kind of a man was Hazard? He was kind of genius type, wasn't he, really sharp?

M:       When I came, he had apparently gone down below. As my understanding, he was a very sharp person. When I came, his office was on the third floor, there. He had vines growing up and down, and the setup there. He was the old type boss. And nobody left till he left in the afternoon. When he put his hat and coat on, everybody else would put his hat and coat on...

N:       How times have changed!

M:       And he could do everything there. I think Kimball can tell you this story better than I can. It was all hand lettering and he was very good at it, and he had this tremendously large \*. All the maps were produced up there. And he went up to the blueprint machine, but he did it wrong. Kimball was in there, and he took his hand \* and he got so mad, he said, "Get the hell home," and he had to stay all night and do that over again. He was so mad that anybody saw him. But he did it. Kimball was a crackerjack blueprinter, and when he was running that blueprint machine, he was singing. He was very happy. Now, I'm using fire effect diagrams, which were made all year and you have the Blue fleets. This was a continuous roll process; we used machines. Kimball would take those sheets and slice them

across, and right around the table; we'd all walk around cutting them, and we'd all walk around, you want the pages. And that's how you correlate them. All that work was done right there.

K:       What was that material?   What was being printed?

M:       The fleets, the fire effect diagrams. These were printed in volume. Now, we also printed the diagrams for all the games-formation diagrams, the approach diagram, the cruising disposition, the battle disposition--all those things were drawn. And at the end of the, when all these things were put together, the history was put together, and they were all stacked. Game after game after game within this closet. Now, I have someplace at home, I think I've got one of those. But the rest were all thrown out. And all the ships were destroyed. I've got some from Ray Gaudet. I think I sent Joe Domingoes' in before they lost them all. And they were around the War College and then Sims Hall and people began to take them. And those books that I have that I brought were stuff that I had that I found later on that would have been thrown out.

N:       Did things change very much when the Second World War came on?

M:       No. At that time there was a junior and a senior

class. I believe they started six-month courses and called them Command and Staff.

N: They called them Command and Preparatory Classes. Two courses: preparatory and senior...

M: Well, see you have the data now. Now, when the war started, George Hazard had been with the fleet plotting in World War I. The Navy asked for three to come from the War College, the plotters, and Admiral Kalbfus would not let the three go. The three would have been a necessity--John Wilson, John Lawton, and I. Freddie Wagner couldn't go, and Ray Gaudet had a wooden leg. And those were the three that would have gone. They didn't, he didn't let them go. It seems to me they had a plotting course here. They brought some officers in and put them through the course. And this would be the beginning of CIC. And that was at the beginning of the war.

N: What is your opinion of Kalbfus? There is an awful lot written about him.

M: The green book was his favorite, if I remember, and that was an ungodly thing--nobody could understand it. I never could understand it, I could never read it. The estimate, the estimate of the situation. I didn't know the man. I saw him in the hallway once in a while. The only

thing that I recall is, I believe it was he that had come in the game room, a cartoon that showed a player picking up a ship and going home. He didn't want to play. Now, I could never find that cartoon, so I had the artist make me one and I used it in lectures. And I believe that was the cause of changing the name from war gaming to maneuver room. And there's a letter... You may have a copy of that letter. It was sent to the fleet to change the name. Now I have a copy of that someplace. If you don't have a copy I can find it.

N: I would love to have one.

M: I thought you had a copy.

N: Well, we might, but I don't recall it offhand.

M: Well, I'm going to sell my stuff. If I find anything like that, you might as well have it. If I want to see it, I can always come in and see it.

N: Of course. No question about it. How about the Second World War period, Frank, did things speed up here?

M: I was away most of that time.

N: Oh, you went into the service.

M: I was drafted in the Army. John Lawton,... Kimball. Kimball took my place in the drafting room. They had a young girl come in to run the blueprinting machine. As I understand it, they were very busy with games for the six-month course. And about that time they were starting this plotting backwards--rear-view plotting. I came back and went back to my job in the drafting room.

N: When was that?

M: I got out of the service fall of '45 and I took a month off. I think I started either December of '45 or January, somewhere in there.

N: Your job was secure?

M: My job was secure. But some of the promotions they made, they lost out on.

N: Oh, they did?

M: Yes.

K: There was a well-known story around that Frank was assured that he would not be drafted.

M: It's been overemphasized. It's been changed. I've

heard it and it's not true.

K: Well, what did happen?

M: The... And I have the letter someplace. I think the secretary wrote to the draft board, saying that I was needed here. And he assumed that that would be sufficient. The chief clerk, Joe Whittier used to kid me about it, and I said, "Joe, I'm the only one of draft age in that group." I was only 35, I was ready for the infantry. They were looking for tough, hardened men. And he said, "You'll never have to go." I went down to the draft board to check and they said, "Oh, we won't take you till September, or something, anyway." I went home on Monday and there was a notice that I'd report the next Monday.

N: One week? Wow.

K: He was involved in a number of major campaigns in Europe and spent a long time in Italy and Rome...

N: I didn't know that. Is that right?

M: No. Let me see. Dan McFadden was a big, husky, young guy that went out and came back again and he didn't pass the physical. Did you know Harry? He was a frail. H went with me. He stayed in Le Havre, he didn't get into the battle. I



thought they'd put me into artillery or something like that. But at the time I went in they were looking for replacements for infantry and combat engineers--they expected heavy casualties. So I went to the replacement training center, which is a bad place to go to because they have no interest in you. All they want is for you to get good grades and pass and get out. So, that was the beginning. No, I got into a couple of campaigns, but I missed most of it.

K: You were with Patton at Castogne?

M: Toward the end. I was not in the whole campaign, no. Joe DiBiase is the guy that can tell you. I missed out on part of that campaign.

N: When did you start back at the War College again? You mentioned that...

M: Yes, it would be December of 1945 or January. I think I started before Christmas.

N: Yes, this was before Spruance came back and took over the presidency, wasn't it? Was he president at the time you came in? I think he started in '46.

M: I don't know. Who's president really doesn't affect the people up in the drafting room. No, actually, it has no

effect. The presidents in those days did come down on the game board and watch the games. Admiral Spruance was a good one for coming down on the game board and looking at the game.

N: I have a picture of him with his dog on the game board. Did he...?

M: I never saw him with his dog on the game board. No.

N: Well, let's take a look at this postwar period. How much did things change then? We picked up Sims Hall then, didn't we, '46?

M: Here's what I can tell you about that: in '47 I went to Sims Hall, the logistics department. Let's see, they had the east wing and part of the connecting between that and the center wing. Admiral Eccles was in charge. I was off in the corner in the room that had the garbage chute on the outside I believe. There was grass where the parking lot is now, and the out door was boarded up and there were cracks about that big \*. Finally I got that thing fixed, and of course by that time I moved out.

N: This was a drafting room for the war gaming down there?

M: Yes. I was part of Mr. Ward's outfit. He was in charge then. But I was down at Sims Hall. And what had happened was I was on my own hours. And that went on, I think, till '51.

N: Were those logistics games that were being played on that side?

M: There were not many played. The one I remember there was Captain Bill Eldebridge, and someplace we have a picture of them showing... it was a demonstration game and they all made a move. There were training circles. And then I had the game moved and I would run the games, make the drawings, \* the torpedo \*

N: Now, the other type of games were junior class games?

M: Well, they were called C & S \*. And some of them came down to Sims Hall. Some of them went to the BZ trainer. I tell you, I was not down there. I think Joe Domingoes went down there, and I know Kimball did. I can't tell you any more about those. I can't tell you about the C & S games down there because, I think I was in one or two with Ray Gaudet. But I didn't know too much about them.

N: Do you remember what Admiral Bates was like during that period? Did you know him at all? He was working on the

World War II Battle Evaluation Group.

M: He was working on the Battle Evaluation Group. I knew him on the game board as a commander before World War II. There's a picture of him in Life magazine and I believe I can point him out to you. Commodore Bates during the day, Admiral Bates at night. He was very outspoken. He knew me sometimes. Other times, he didn't know me. He and Nicholas knew each other pretty well, I believe. They were in a big argument one day and he came into my office with me to settle it. I wisely refrained from doing so. He knew Mr. Ward pretty well and one day they went in and just dropped two grades, and there was nothing he could do about it. And this is my understanding, that Commodore Bates, when he was in Washington, found and got the grade back. Mr. Ward would not ask for it. He is a gentleman. He wouldn't fight for these things. At that time, the secretary said, "War gaming?" He said, "You can call them paper hangers, I don't care." I forget his name. War gaming was very volatile.

N: It was.

M: Yes, it was. War gaming comes up and down.

N: What about the concept of NEWS? When does that come into...?

M: 1945 or 6. It was based on the PPI. There was an Admiral Ennis. That information is around, too. It should be in the records, in the training device center, I think or started this. They brought up, as I understand, some of these PPIs and put them in the game room. Now, the whole context of gaming, that whole idea of NEWS is brought up, but Mr. Ward, who was the war games expert, had nothing to do with it. They started from scratch. It was a shame. Because some of the mistakes they made were \*. I went to visual aids from Sims Hall.

N: When was that, Frank?

M: '51. And I went, they gave me a job because of cartographics. I made them lots of maps. At that time I learned how to make \* which you don't use anymore. Pocket calculators are much better. But I made them and some went out to the Fleet for reviewing. In 1955, I believe, the Strategic War Game was introduced by the Naval Warfare Class--the Naval Warfare Course, I guess it was then. Parker Olsen was the commander here, as I understand, was instrumental in this game. And he went all over trying to find good information on gaming from different groups that were coming in now, Rand. And he got tied in with the George Washington Logistics Research Project, and they were going to have a digital computer, and they were going to make an economic model and process the model and produce the results

by teletype, here. The following year, most of them left. And there was a captain here that had the game, and he came down and asked me if I would work on that game. So he got me an office next to the Marine Shack, right over here in Luce Hall, and I worked there mornings; and afternoons in visual aids. And I rewrote the rules for the game, and I was in that game in '56; and then in '57, C & S wanted to know if I would go down there to the NEWS; and the secretary wanted me to stay here. But I had a choice--first time in my life I had a choice. Now, I liked the strategic end, very interesting. I was doing the economic model and also the other; but mainly the economic model, and the nuclear effects model. So I tried to figure, which would I do? They were talking about physicists down there. They had Ed Murphy as a physical scientist started down there. And I finally thought, "Well, I never worked with equipment." So, I said I'd go down to the NEWS. And I moved down there. So I had to stay for the last game--the strategic game. And after that game, I went down there just in time for the first game on the NEWS. And when I got down there, there was no damage computer, and they said, "You're here to assess the damage for this game." And one thing I did was watch the blinking lights to find out who was shooting. But that was a good move. From then on, I liked NEWS--got along very well. We were part of C & S. It was called the EMBS section--the Electronic Moving Board System. There was a captain here in charge of C & S, and he wanted to get the name with an

acronym, and he came up with NEWS--Naval Electronic Warfare System. Now, Ed Murphy and I told him not to do it, because it did not simulate electronic warfare. He was the boss, he put it in.

N: So, from then on you continued to work in Sims Hall?

M: I stayed in Sims Hall, until last July. I left Pacer. And then I worked... So I had the advantage of working on the game board, the chart game, the NEWS, Wars, and NWS. And a lot of these things were reoccurring. The Navy Electronic Warfare simulator was designed to replace the game board. The terminology \*, the designers went down to the game board and watched the people. Now, the A factor, the M factor, were factors taken out of the damage assessment book. They were the very same things.

K: These factors you're talking about are factors that are used in the Analog computer?

M: Yes. They had an A factor and an M factor. Now, they were told (and this is how ridiculous things...) that the umpires could, during the game, change the M factor, change the outcome. Does that sound familiar? So they did. And they changed the outcome in ways they never thought would happen. Unfortunately, for some ungodly reason, they had two--an air and surface. I talked to the man that ran the

project from here, called Navalex. I just said, "Why don't you put sonar." He used to get very mad because he told me that they were going to put it in, and he came to the War College and they said, "Take it out. Submarines are not important."

N: This was during the early fifties?

M: Yes, between the forties and the fifties. This thing went on and on. And, I think it was Admiral Conolly, finally said, "Let's go with it." And he was right.

N: That was '52, wasn't it? Or '51. He was president...

M: I don't know the year, because I worked with his son. I was here when the son worked with me when his father was killed in the air crash. He was president of Long Island University.

N: Yes, it was '53, I believe.

M: No, no.

N: No? Later?

M: Oh, yes. Because he was with me, working with me on the NEWS. He was a young lieutenant commander. And one of



the things I always said, that he was a young lieutenant commander and I was a GS-12; when I met him as an admiral, I was still a GS-12! The Navy moves up fast. That's something the Navy doesn't realize. But I met him one day on the plane, Bob Conolly, and he worked,... he was the first operations research analyst that the Navy sent there. Before that, I was an operations research analyst, and I had nobody to check me, which in a way was good.

N: How did the War College change during that period, Frank?

M: I can only tell you about, really, about Sims Hall. Sims Hall, and up on the hill were as far apart as Washington and Kokomo.

N: They still are, I guess.

M: To illustrate, I took some classified material up to the furnace to be burned.

N: In Luce Hall?

M: Yes. They used to burn it in the furnace there. And I can't think of the custodian's name, but he said to me, "I'll burn it for you, after I finish the War College's!"

N: That's about right!

M: That's exactly right. That's exactly the idea.

N: Well, how was it down in Sims Hall? Was it...?

M: We were part of C & S. It was very good, because you go in on the planning for the game. Ed Murphy and I set up the NEWS, so we'd have to know what they were going to do. We'd go in on the critiques. And I programmed the damage computer, and they'd program the DNL--Detectable \*. Horrendous job. And all of a sudden, he quit. So I got both. It taught me a lesson--be sure you learn all the parts of the job. You never know. I have some idea, but I haven't gone into detail. So during the critiques, you would get called upon, why did this happen? And then as the games became more aggregated, then I gradually took over. I did all the damage assessment for years, until Frank Nadolny and Dave Barnhart took over damage assessment and I went into working with the WARS.

N: Was there any transition in the NEWS development after it was instituted?

M: Yes, there were.

N: There were quite a few...

M: There was a big improvement \*. They put the \* in. And, another thing, they called them (and this is something you would never know) they called them specific names--air, surface. So, in programming the moves initially, to put a submarine, I would put the submarine, D would be an aircraft in the system, at 45,000 feet. And then you'd have to give a depth charge, see, a range... So I had two sets of figures: one that's a set that you tell the people; the other set you couldn't, because to get that effect, you had to give them a different range. Now, when they put the other \*, \* put A, B, and C. And then you could do anything you want with them. But once the players \* want the submarine to go down deep, and you could see it going down, you press the buttons and you could see it, and you change. You must remember those altitude and depth levels.

K: Yes.

M: Everybody would come in, a new group would come in to the NEWS, and we'd give them a training period.

N: Did the fleet use the war gaming at all during this period?

M: Yes, the fleet started war gaming when the NEWS came in. To my knowledge, there was never any fleet gaming here, which was, one of the directors of the war gaming \* very

angry when he told him that. He must have been telling people fleet gaming had been always at the War College. It started because he remembers big system was only being used by the War College in July,... No. They used it in the spring--the War College--so they had it in the fall \*. So why not use it for the fleet? And I think Commander Sapp, who was the head of \*, may be the one who thought of it. I don't know. So they started having the fleet war gaming course. They had two a year. And they were trying to advertise... Now I lectured to Naval Warfare on war gaming, and that was one of the things I tried to bring up--when you go into the fleet, you can always come back here in war gaming.

N: How much lecturing did you do during this time, Frank; and when did you start lecturing, really?

M: Somewhere around '58, something like that. When the war gaming department was small, I did most of them. As it got larger, people would take different ones. And I finally wound up with an Introduction to War Gaming, and I wound up with \* NCC, and I used to give them one on probability--I always called it not research type, but very down to their level. It was very good to talk to NCC--you had to come down and say specific terms. You couldn't generalize-- \* .

K: How did you come to write the book Fundamentals of War

Gaming?

M: There was nothing on war gaming, and somebody said to me, "You go ahead and write a book. Tell us about war gaming." I had written one on visual aids--a pamphlet on visual aids at the War College, and a few other things. So, I started and I had no idea what I was going to do. It wound up bigger than I thought. It first came out in a smaller volume...

K: What year would that be, Frank, '60, '66?

N: I've got one edition of '66...

M: There was an earlier edition called \* The Manual of War Gaming Submarines, and I went into the history more than I... I went back into the history of the War College, and there was that Air Force sergeant ...

N: Eure? E-u-r-e.

M: Yes. \* and he found more stuff out. In fact, some of the people in the Navy didn't like him because he could tell them about the War College. And he found out McCarty Little...

N: Yes. We've got a number of his unpublished writings

in my archives. He wrote the history of the buildings here, it's the only history we have.

M: He knew the price of the building? Oh, I just started, too. When they started the fleet war gaming course, they wanted somebody to go back and talk about manual gaming and I used to have a talk on the game board \*. And I had one on damage assessment, I had one on NEWS gaming, and I did one on naval warfare. I always get into the reserves, to the fleet war gaming courses, to C & S.

N: You must have had a lot of research on that (truck?), Frank, because it goes way back in time...

M: Yes. Well, it was interesting. You've got some misinformation here. They brought all of the Colonial Dames, I think, or some organization, when I first came down to the NEWS, and they brought over some of the old naval officers that had been here and they wanted me to talk on the game board about \*, so I talked to these people on the game board and I didn't get any wrong business. But I've heard people describe the game board and it's completely wrong. And this is perpetuated. Now I've heard some things about the NEWS. I was there when the reporters asked the head of the war gaming department a question and his answers were wrong. But what can you...? You can't sit there and say.

K: But it still goes on.

M: Sure, it goes on.

N: But that stimulated you to write the book, actually. That was a stimulation to you, to get things right, to do...

M: I think that they wanted Ray Brookes. It might have been Ray Brookes. There was a guy who read books here who, \*, who took and they called the operations department--operations section, \*. They always had engineering and operations. Now, they'd call it by different names. But,... and I was in operations, and I think there was nothing around and I had written something and presented something and he wanted some more. He said, "Why don't you write a book, go ahead and write this." So I wrote it. And I did a lot of work on my own, and I could never have finished that book.

N: What was the reaction to it when you, I guess you submitted it to the college here

M: It went through.

N: It just went through.

M: Oh, yes. The head of the department said, he read it

over and he said, "I wish you'd change 'real world' to 'the actual world.'"

K: Change happy to glad.

M: I was amazed how that's gone over. I got a call from New Orleans the other day, and a fellow was on the phone, he must have been on for an hour talking about naval war gaming. If I had known how it was going over, I would have probably hesitated to write it, because I've had calls, I've got a letter someplace from the Commandant of the Marine Corps who called about it. I've got all kinds of things. And people want to know where to get something. Most of the facts in there are facts I like to verify it.

N: There's still a great deal of interest in it now. People are calling up about it.

M: It's amazing how well it went over. Now, much of that stuff is originally, I had the pregame procedures. Then I developed for the talk a series of pregame procedures, and I found later on a joint war game manual and they flow from one to the other, and you've seen them \*. A lot of people use them.

K: I did a bibliography two years ago for a war gaming course and looked through a lot of books and found that the



books all tend to refer to Frank's book.

M: They wrote an anthology of this and a critique of all the different books on games and they were very kind to me. \* read this whole article about it. And Hubert always came up to see me. He and Brewer were working for \* at that time. But that's about the story.

N: Well, how about wars? When did that come in? That's fairly recent, isn't it?

M: Wars came in... go back a ways. When the NEWS was completed, it started in '45, I believe. It might have been '46. The concept was an analog system--a digital system would be coming into effect around the early-middle fifties. When the NEWS was completed, one of the first things why don't we supplement this with a digital system? For example, they're only handled... I've got to remember now. Twenty-four forces on the side, \* individual forces, you could control them, you could get detection from them, you could fire weapons. And in fact, one of the early, one of the, 1960, somewhere \* to Washington,... not to Washington--to New York, and we went to a small computer program there. I said, "What do you want to use it for?" Well, we want to change scale. Now, the NEWS was set up with a hundred \* representing forty miles, four hundred, four thousand. And then somebody added a thousand. And the

feeling was that you'd start at the four thousand, change to a thousand, change to a four hundred as the chips closed. This was the game board. You could bring them together, and in fact on the chart maneuver you'd start them out and you (put them on?) the game board for tactical. Not all of them. So, the same scale, from zero to four thousand units is used regardless of the ocean scale size. So when you jump from four thousand to one thousand, everybody had a different number; and they said we could use this computer to reprogram (guessing at it?). Red Brookes said to this programmer, "Can you do that?" "Sure. Nothing to it. I'll have it for you by 4:30." The next, 4:30, I'm a little late. The next day, there's nothing to it, actually. It's a linear function. Then he finally got it. But all you had to do was draw a line on a piece of graph paper, you get the same thing. So that's sort of played out. I proposed to the head of the department that we take one table, the news umpire, and we go down and watch what they did, and write it out, step by step by step. And then, when that was finished, give it to the umpire and tell him to use it. If he found changes, he'd make the changes. Then we'd go to NUSC and get the programmer to program that and we could hook up with NUSC and have a remote terminal. It wasn't enough money for the program. So C & S started their logistics. Remember the logistics problem C & S used to have? Now, maybe they didn't have that when you were here, but they had a logistics problem and he went over there himself and got them to

program some of that, and then the program \* . but that was how those people started talking about a digital system. Oh, then, we need more images, so why not have a digital system that will control forty-eight more images. And you get onto that and then the war started. And Captain Henry was the department head. He went down to see \* and he was highly impressed with that system. That system, two twenties and it was really, it was set up by Logran and the \*... the Irish guy in charge of that, for Navalex... And they came to the War College, and that was the beginning of the WARS.

N: What year was that, though? That was in the seventies, wasn't it?

K: That sounds like about seventy-seven.

M: Yes. I went down to San Diego in 1970 to work on that system. Johnny Johnston was here and he was a project officer. The system was played like all of the systems \* and somebody would set up a model and come here. The man who had gone over them had left and another guy wanted something else. And they also, they're optimistic. The programmer came with me and sat down to talk about damage assessment, and he said, "Oh, we can do that with no problem." I said, "Now put it together." "No problem, no problem. You don't understand the great capacity of digital computers. We can't do it today." There's so many complexities. There's so much

processing. Now, you can take and start adding details, and that processing grows at an exponential rate. And that's one of the problems in war gaming. Now, I believe in the simple approach where you have a probability and use that as an outcome. Mine warfare. You can have a whole computer devoted to just mine warfare. Where is each mine? When is it activated? When do the ships come?

N: You were on the scene when this was going on, weren't you Bob?

K: Yes, I was a student here in '71, and then I went down for the C & S staff at Sims for duty after graduating in the senior course. And after a few months they disestablished the C & S course, or the faculty--they had a separate faculty. They disestablished that and I went to war gaming in January or February of 1973, and was there until '78-'79.

M: You didn't think you be around there a decade later, did you?

K: Well, I walked up the hill as a student, and saw the bay and the old building and I said to myself, this is too beautiful.

M: Well, I left the War College in '74, and then went to work for Pacer.

N: That's '74?

M: Yes.

K: You worked a long time...

M: I was working at Pacer. I wrote the detailed statement of plans. It's not as your author, it's the War College...

N: What is that? What does it stand for? Naval war games...

K: Naval warfare gaming system.

M: Or naval war gaming system. Okay, that covers about everything...

N: ...before? How did it change, or was there any change?

M: Yes, there was change.

N: But strictly speaking, you were doing the same type of work?

K: \* the present big gaming system that we have, Frank

wrote the detailed special requirement...

N: I don't appreciate that statement. Would you tell me a little bit about that?

M: What are the requirements for the system?

K: I'm saying the description of war gaming in the modern digital system which embodies the principles of war gaming in which you have...

M: Now, that's not one that's authored by,... It's put out by Navalex and...

K: It doesn't have...

M: It's done under contract. It's released to the company or for the War College, and they, it's part of the \*. It's not done as an individual author, and other people contributed to it.

N: When you left war gaming finally, after your contract relationship, how did you look back on things, I mean, did you see a natural progression in the science of war gaming? Were you satisfied with what you saw? Was it being more effective in how it was being used?

M: War gaming is very amorphous, and people coming and going there's a cycling thing, people coming and going, and many times you start the same thing over again. A new person comes in. This was very true of the NEWS. You have to describe the NEWS inevitably. People would come up with this idea that had been thrown out four times, but it was a natural idea, and it would go through. Now, many of the improvements on the NEWS were one-time improvements. The person in command would want to push it, and by the it's spent it's long since gone, and the thing was never used.

N: There's something definitely wrong with that kind of a system.

M: Well, it's inevitable in the short-span organization. There was no one there in the long term that had the authority to say, "No."

K: It's still a problem.

N: It is still a problem.

M: It's a problem. They had at one time (someone battery charge??) that wasn't in the system. In order to simulate it they took the firing keys and modified them to simulate battery charging. Well, after a while they didn't use them and people forgot that this key that's supposed to have

certain delays you set in there, that wouldn't delay at all. It would be something different. And with the people coming and going that maintain the system, this is sometimes forgotten. And I had one bad problem there one time setting up the scaling of the master plot and getting the thing wrong. And I kept going back and saying, "I checked my figures, I went over them, I went over them." And to the chief who was running the thing, I said to him, "You go to Chuck Ames and check that out." He didn't go to Chuck, but they were wrong. I had tried this thing several... Now, I wrote... Chuck Ames and I wrote the NEWS program, which was a big thick book covering all the details of programming, so we were fairly familiar with it. He hesitated to go to somebody like Chuck and ask him questions.

N: But why?

M: I suppose it's,... when you're in charge of something...

K: These are smart, energetic officers who come for a short time and are accustomed to making decisions, and just... you know, the civilian War College family just kind of bears with them, with the shock until they go away and another group comes.

M: Now, there was a delayed fire, in the NEWS, they used



to get \* the minute you pressed the firing key - whammo. You had a hit or a miss and damage was assessed. Well, now, that doesn't happen. First of all, damage is,... you never know the damage for a long time. But when you fire a long-range missile there's a certain time between that missile impacts, and the same with a torpedo. But in the NEWS there's this huge drum that's turned around once every sixty seconds. And that's sample--the sampling interval. You know my sampling interval stories, that some of those people who were trying to,... sampling interval made no difference? Well, the sampling interval'd go around, and when you pressed the firing key, as soon as that swung around to you, would sample your firing key. And the firing post would go down into the system. It would take the target and the firing weapon, firing vehicle, measure the range, go into the ADSSG they called it--the analog data selective system storage, and pull out the data and say, "Did you get a hit?" If you got a hit, what was the damage, and then you would randomize the damage around the mean. And that was an accurate binomial distribution. You should have a delay. They spend all this money on delays. Now, the delay, when you press the fire key, there's a timer set in there, you delay the impulse going down. But how could you set the timer? You set it before the game. Now, you fire a torpedo at a ship, and the ship is moving away, this fire \* it measures the range at the time later on. Now, we didn't know what range anything can be fired at. (I think?) \* once or twice \* and I know the guy

was a terror and he pushed it through. You get somebody that's a gung ho guy, he pushed it through. A lot of money spent. That system,... I used it for a few other things--\*, and other things \* like I used DNO. \* you could take the system and a digital system could be used the same way. But it was never used to delay the fire.

N: Can you make an analogy between what war gaming represents to you today and how it was played back when you first came here? I mean, wasn't war an efficient thing, or did it become a more efficient thing? Or can you use the term efficiency to make a relationship between the two? Or did it remain the same--just a technology change?

M: I think it was given more thought than a few years ago because there was more time. Today people come, they spend two days and they're gone. There's no formal critique \*. There's not the records kept of the games. And there's not the replay. A game is played here and they keep saying it's a one-time play, and there's a lot of confusion between playing and iteration. The scientists are in favor of iteration. And I gave a talk at one of the labs--Dahlgren, one of the Navy labs. And one of the questions came up--this can't be a game because there's no iteration. Regardless how, what sort of a distribution you give, you cannot foresee the future from that distribution. You can only take a sample from it. So what you're getting is too much talk

about it. All the game does is give you some indication of what can happen. But to my idea, from my experience, a game is for the people who have to plan it and then play it, because now they have to plan there's an opponent, and he might do something they hadn't thought about. If you're a submariner, you've spent all your life in submarines, now you have to think about aviation. You have to think about logistics. Some of these are good things I have seen an oiler out there with no escorts, just because... You know how the Navy likes to plan. You've heard of the Naval Planning Process...

N: I've heard of it, yes.

M: And all the annexes. Everybody writes an annex. He writes the aviation annex, and I write the communications annex, and you write the logistics annex. We're busy--we're very busy. We put them together in a pile and stuck it in a safe. Now you're bringing out the triad, they may not mesh. This, to me, has been the greatest part of fleet gaming. Now, Rob could tell you more about that, because, look, he's experienced in the fleet. I'm not.

N: What I'm trying to get at here is war gaming, at its conception, was viewed upon as a tremendous asset in the educational process. It became more than that, ultimately, but it was because it intrigued officers into wanting to

understand more fully by a medium which was a valid medium. And so it occupied their attention, their energies, their native talents, their imagination to a limited degree. I mean, the technology was primitive. Yet, during that time, when William McCarty Little got it off the ground and it developed until the turn of the century there, it was a very vital part of the curriculum system. And it seemed to me that the students felt that it was a valuable part of the curriculum system. You know what I mean?

M: I have always tried to get some feedback and it's very difficult. Admiral Nimitz liked gaming.

N: I remember that.

M: I wonder what he would have said when he left here as a student \*. I think that, sometimes, that gaming is like any school subject. You might have studied history in college, you might have said, "Well, what good would that do?" and then twenty years later, suddenly found, "Hey, I can use this now." Geography--I had geography in grammar school and I thought it was boring. But when I came to the War College we used to be having strategic areas all over, I found the knowledge of geography quite useful.

N: Yes, but war gaming wasn't meant to be a precise solution. I mean, William McCarty Little...

M: \* solution.

N: Okay, right. And maybe therein lies its value. I mean, William McCarty Little said something ridiculous like, well, it wasn't really ridiculous, but he said, "The principle applies if it flies, and it doesn't apply if it doesn't fly!"

M: He also said, "It's exact because it's mathematical." He was very enamored of his mathematics. When you draw a plan in the Navy, in the Army, in the Marines or business, you draw up a plan and you get out there in business and you execute it, and you find out that the product doesn't sell and you have to go back and change it. Well, this is what happened in... The students come here. \* the military planning process. So they go through the planning. The last step in the military planning process is supervision of the planned action. The supervised planned action, that's the gaming part. So that's the only part in that plan. So you can supervise it now if you find that, a carrier was (sunv?). You have to make provisions now to change your plans, and that's the benefit of it. Now, it doesn't mean that if you went to war it would happen that way, but it means that you have thought of these things... I think it was Napoleon who said, "I have always fought the battles in advance and thought them through," and that's what helped you.

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N: And therein lies the value of war games.

M: That's to my mind. Now, Rob can give you a better... I've only seen one aspect of it. He's seen it from the Navy aspect, he's been out in the fleet when they had sailing ships.

N: Are we forced to generalize about this still, Bob?

K: Yes. It depends on \* experience. You're educated to talk about it \*. It's just one of those things where you can study it at your desk and you may find all kinds of things suddenly become obvious about which were not obvious when you're studying at your desk.

N: Do you think that would be obvious in a real situation?

K: Sure, time and space \* I wish we had a quote. We had a lot of things, logistics, time and space, organizations--things that are very important but would fall through the cracks when they're just being studied out of context, but when you game them they suddenly crop up. Very important then.

N: But you would add more time to the students...

M: We don't have much time now. These games were conducted in a short space of time. Now, I would slow the games down. The tendency now is to go fast to make decisions in real time. But when you're learning something, you're going to need a little more time to learn to make a decision. That's my theory. And again, remember I'm only saying this from a technician's point of view. But that's my feeling. If you bring a bunch of students up in the Command centers, and you turn that clock fast, it will do things. They haven't time to think them through. Now, on the battlefield they haven't time, either. But they also have a large staff, and also, presuming they have more experience when they get into these positions, Lieutenant Commander Atkins as an admiral has had more experience when he becomes an admiral, hopefully. The other thing about students, today's naval officers, their experience is segmented. Years ago, I can remember the captains coming up and telling about the gun turrets. They could tell every detail. They just spent long hours \* years working in the gun turret. All they had was the gun and the torpedo \*. There was no radar, there was no sonar. They stayed in the Navy a lot longer. Now, they're out of the Navy in 20 years. They have radar, they have sonar, they have missiles. Naval warfare is much more complicated. So you bring these things together, you have a war game. You can bring them together. And also teach these things in probabilities. You can fire a missile that has a .6 probability, and you can fire two and expect a hit because

\* say, well, .6 times two is 1.2 \*. But you can go many times without hitting again. Or you can get two hits in a row with a .1. Morison covers that in his history--the naval warfare, particularly. Torpedo \*. He covers that well. I quoted him someplace because he covers that very well. But those are the kinds of things. And if you go through some of his books on the chance factor in war gaming--should you use average values in the game, should you use the chance factor...? And that's still going on. Now I have a theory in technical games: you should use the chance factor. In campaigns you should use the deterministic model. That's what I would use if I were. But again, these are all personal views.

N: Yes, the technology has changed tremendously.

M: But you're doing the same thing.

N: But you're doing the same thing.

M: Right now you have a pocket calculator. But you could do the same thing with a log table. It took you longer, but the only thing is you understood it when you did it with a log table. I could sit down and now,... in fact, I used to have the secretaries doing a lot of these things with a pocket calculator. But if you took away the pocket calculator, you could do it.



K: One of the secretaries almost quit because this nice lady was \* asked to do these calculations that she just didn't understand.

M: They did a good job on them. I tried, for instance, Lanchester's Law to illustrate that. Now, do you know that admiral who said learn Lanchester's Law first, he saw the problem empirically. I've got his book someplace. And I was trying to repeat the... Now he claimed that \* the game board. They also used Lanchester's Law at the game board here, and I had someplace a lecture that they went from here to Annapolis to illustrate the law by the game board. Now, that lends itself to the game board where you have deterministic values. That was interesting. That was around the fourth \*. You should read that sometime. He wrote the first articles in 1914, and then wrote the book in 1916.

N: I've got one more question for you that has to do with the people associated with war gaming. During the formative years, you know we had William McCarty Little here from the very beginning up till about 1915 when he died, and he provided a certain continuity in development...

M: And prestige to that continuity.

N: Okay, prestige?

M: Yes.

N: But also he, in the person of himself, made possible the transitions smoothly into another dimension of things, and he kept things on an even keel, so to speak. Because he was around.

M: Now, you're saying "smoothly." I don't think it was smoothly.

N: You don't think so?

M: No. You read between the lines in some of these and there's no transition that's "smoothly."

N: All right. But anyway, he was around to see it all through, and if there were any serious questions they could always rely upon his corporate memory, right?

M: Right.

N: And then Hazard came by and the same thing was true.

M: Hazard had tremendous prestige. And that was about at the end. Now he didn't toward the end. He, Hazard, it was sad, to watch a man go the way he did.

N: It's unfortunate, yes.

M: And they were sad at how he let everybody else down \*.  
But he was very able, and the people here \*.

N: Well how do you feel about this ingredient--about  
having a corporate memory an individual?

M: You need someone... in fact, you need two people, I  
think. Years ago I proposed that we get in to the war gaming  
department two boys just finishing school, majors in  
economics. Economics is an imprecise science as is war  
gaming. I proposed that you get them from Newport, because  
they perhaps would stay. Newporters tend to stay in Newport.  
And start them on the NEWS and then go and start learning the  
WARS so they could know the wars in and out and could program  
it. It would save the Navy a lot of money. You wouldn't need  
those contractors. The Navy would have benefitted from it.  
But they have civil service and they have... You also have  
to give them the authority as well as the responsibility.

N: I would think so. Yes.

M: But there are bound to be changes. This is not  
unusual and the Army War College had a man there setting up  
the games, Clinton. Now, he took a game and he did a pretty  
good \* programmer. He and his wife programmed the game, and

then they got... He went into business for himself and brought the game down here and was in Europe the last time I talked to him. RAK research analysis and... First there was ORO. You probably know all this. The Army wanted to get rid of the head of the outfit, and they couldn't, so they dropped the ORO and sent new people in and they got their new director. RAK did the Army war gaming for years, and that's where I get the idea of having one table at a time to digitize the games. That's how they did it. They took the intelligence section, they took another one,... The guy that wrote that book on \* simulation and business in war, and I was in contact with him \*. I think you have the book. I have it at home.

K: I don't own a copy, no.

M: But you know the one, yes. Al Houser.

K: Yes.

M: The Navy's planning analysis group panned it. They did computer gaming for years. When CSC got the bid, I said, "Why don't you get some of these guys? They know computer gaming." But they didn't.

N: Well, I don't have any more questions. Do you, Rob?

K: No, I'm talked out.

N: Any comment you want to make, Rob, before we close this off?

K: No, I don't think so.

N: Well, we thank you very much...

M: That's a new \* contracting \*

N: Frank, thanks a lot. We appreciate this very much. And Bob, I want to thank you, too, for coming along.

M: Well, I said to Mary, eventually I got to go over there. So I've got to go. And I found those books and I guess this is a good time to bring them.

N: Yes. This is probably about five or six years overdue, you know. I've been seeing him on the street all this time, saying, "We've got to get together."

M: Well, I'm afraid if I didn't bring those books, they'd be lost in \*.

N: Well, we're delighted that you did...

M: And if I find anything else sometime that I think is of value, I'll bring it over.

N: Well, now we've got an archival rapport with war gaming... What's his name? Tom \*?

K: He's going to be \*?

N: Well, he's our go-between, him and this Suller. We set up a system whereby they'll have routine deposits of material, permanent retention material with us for the first time.

M: Okay, about '74, I checked all the statements for the war gaming department--the weekly schedules that came out.

N: Fantastic.

M: I said to Rob, we had to get rid of these, to see if you wanted them.

N: By all means. We have so very little on war gaming, you know, and we'd be more than willing...

M: I'd never throw them out if you could use them.

N: No. If you're going to throw anything away, and you

know you're going to throw it away, give us the option.

M:       Every one of those. Now I asked the secretary to make it a point to go down every single week and pick those up. And if they didn't have any, make a copy. Now I also tried to keep some of them that the War College puts out themselves. But I do have the schedules. And in using those schedules you always have to realize that there's sometimes a change. That's the way a historian familiar with a subject can go wrong. But anyway, if you want to get rid of them, you need some space...

K:       Give it to him.

N:       By all means. Thanks a lot.