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"POLICY - ITS RELATIONS TO WAR AND PREPARATION FOR WAR."

By

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The Century Dictionary defines Policy in the following terms:

1. "Polity; administration; public business.
2. Object or course of conduct, or the principle or body of principles to be observed in conduct; specifically, the system of measures or the line of conduct which a ruler, minister, government, or party adopts and pursues as best for the interests of the country, as regards its foreign or its domestic affairs; as, a spirited foreign policy; the commercial policy of the United States; a policy of peace; a public policy."

While Webster defines policy as "A settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, institution, body, or individual."

A Foreign Policy may be well called the "Sailing Directions" for the "Ship of State", and such a policy should be drawn in the same clear, positive, unmistakable terms as the sailing directions for the mariner. Our National Policy should be to preserve international comity by being in a state of thorough preparedness to meet any dangers that may threaten. There are many eminent statesmen - and also many men in the Naval and Military services - who ignore probable dangers and consequently make no consistent and cooperative efforts to place our forces on a footing to meet them. John Adams stated that "The National defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman", and yet we have never adopted a definite Military and Naval Policy - or a policy for National Defense. "In matters where the welfare of the nation are at stake, we ought to have a higher point of view than that of either political party. In a sense, the differences of opinion between the parties turn upon different views of the national welfare; but there is a distinction between the domestic questions and the antagonisms with other Powers."

In domestic affairs we are Democrats, Republicans, or Progressives, but in relation to other nations we should be Americans. Not that we all take the same view of questions of foreign policy - as in the present controversy with Mexico - but we all regard them, and wish to regard them, from a national rather than from a party point of view. In short we can differ about domestic questions without necessarily differing about foreign questions.

"History is on the side of common sense, which tells us that if a fight is among the possibilities of the future we ought to prepare for it in good time. The cardinal principle in the management of the external affairs of a nation is that policy should go hand-in-hand with readiness for a fight. Pretensions that cannot be made good against challenge should not be put forward. Readiness for war must be based on forethought in regard to that war, and it implies that a competent war-leader has considered the case, thought out his arrangements and prepared his forces." If, therefore, the Army and the Navy, when a war comes, are to be ready for it, the President and Cabinet must beforehand have adopted the recommendations of those who are to command our fleets and armies.

From the beginning to the end of the activities of war a nation is merged in its Executive Head, - and upon this authority rests the initiative, the preparation and the general plan and scope of operations. The most important function of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy is to secure and determine the connection between the national policy and the means of giving it effect. "Cooperation implies division and distribution of work. It means that the different tasks of war have been classified into those for which military force and those for which naval force are best suited, and that the Army and the Navy have been prepared for the services which each can best render." The task

of the Navy, assisted by the land forces at its base of operations, is to gain mastery of the sea and keep open the lines of communication, and when the lines of sea communication are secure, all the military forces will be available for action at any point in the whole theatre of war. "Who, then, is to hold the balance between the Military and Naval Commanders? This is the question that lies at the root of the whole matter, for the right conduct of a war involves the correct employment in relation to one another of both Army and Navy, so that the real commander or manager of the war is the authority who controls both the military and naval forces."

The supreme executive power alone can decide between the naval and military commanders and insure thorough cooperation, - and with us this function rests with the President. It is for him to hold the balance between his two advisers upon the conduct of war - and you cannot devise any method by which he can be relieved of this responsibility. The power that decides between the naval and military commanders and thereby settles the nature of the war, is the supreme executive head of the nation. Has any combined plan of operations for the defense of the country ever been worked out by the Army and Navy, and submitted for the approval of the President? Should not the question of cooperation for the National defense be fully considered and discussed by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and their principal advisers, - and the estimate of appropriations for both Departments be based on their decisions? Then Congress would be able to discuss and note with eyes open on tangible facts and recommendations, without the agitations and dissensions that have arisen with such regrettable frequency and injury to both services during recent years. "In the affairs of the world each nation is an individual, which must assert its claim to unhindered action

and development. In the international area the nation in the exercise of its powers is a unit, and for this purpose its character is something distinct from that of the individuals who compose it. When two nations disagree with reference to a matter, about which each of them thinks it of vital importance that it should have its own way, there is no known way of settling the dispute except by force. If each of the two nations feels that the matter of dispute is not one of life and death, they will agree to arbitrate or compromise; if one of them only has this feeling, that one will give way. But if neither can give way without ruining the nation or impairing the national honor, there must be war between them.

The necessity for a sound policy involves the requirement that a nation shall appreciate correctly the drift of the purpose of any other Governments with which it has relations; shall truly estimate the national end in view, and shall make a correct forecast of any probable conflict of purposes. When a collision is foreseen, there is scope for decision in regard to the moments when preparation and when action should begin, and the processes both of preparation for and the management of the war test the efficiency of the Government's control over the national resources and the excellence of the organization by which those resources are turned to account for the fighting."

Now that the Panama Canal is nearing completion, what is to be our policy in the Pacific with regard to the Oriental Nations? Is it not time for Congress to give most serious thought to national defense, to setting the Army and Navy in order, - and for the Government to realize that the United States must be the dominant power in the Pacific? A firm, consistent national policy conducted openly and fairly; to concede without controversy unimportant trifles, but boldly to refuse the surrender of undoubted rights or established

interests; - accompanied by or rather based upon effective naval and military preparedness, will undoubtedly make for lasting peace. If a nation is united and determined, and her forces are ready, no power will lightly pick a quarrel with her, - and a judicious diplomacy will find her friends.

"Nations go to war not because of so called violation of treaties, but in pursuance of their own ends and welfare.

"The Nation upon whom you can rely is the one which in its interests and for its own purposes must needs be opposed to the enemy who confronts you." Nations do not conduct their affairs upon sentimental, but upon business lines, and there can be no greater delusion than that of too many humanitarian politicians, who imagine that peace can be pursued by sympathetic conventions and a profession of universal brotherhood.

"War is a form of political action, the only means by which a nation can assert against challenge its conception of right. The first and last object in any policy must be the right. A state which knowingly departs from justice is preparing its own downfall, and injustice due to ignorance is hardly less dangerous. But the right can too often be maintained only by force, and the great test of character for nations as for men arises when they are confronted by the dilemma which requires them either to risk their existence in a conflict for the support of what they believe to be right, or to commit moral suicide by acquiescence in what they know to be wrong." "A community of thirty or forty millions of persons is not lightly nor easily set in motion, but when it moves it has the momentum of an avalanche. Resistance to the policy of a great modern nation must sooner or later bring into action to overcome it, the whole of the resources over which that nation has control. A modern nation is too vast and too complex a mass to be easily stirred, - but once aroused to action it represents a terrific force."

We may see our Government forced against its will to say No to a foreign power. Then will be laid bare the issue of war, the preparation for which our leaders have been blind, as was witnessed in 1898. "For many years our primacy among the republics of the Western Hemisphere has been unchallenged, and we may proudly say that all nations have had free access to its water and its shores."

Our position in the Pacific is now assailed by the naval activity of an Oriental Power, and up to date we have engaged in diplomatic exchanges, in evasion of the issue at hand, and in reduced building policy for the Navy. If we showed plainly that we were not to be trifled with either in our Island possessions or on the Pacific Coast of the two Americas, we should command much higher respect and dignity as a World Power. "A war would be a calamity, say our statesmen! Do they imagine that the other Power is eager to bring upon itself the calamity of defeat? Consequently, that other Power is organizing and building so as to be able to throw into a fight the whole of its manhood and the whole of its material wealth, - while our statesmen sit idly by and fail to build up and organize our Naval and Military forces, yet knowing that we are not prepared for a life and death struggle to settle the supremacy of the Pacific."

This same Asiatic Naval Power is engaged in sending large numbers of its people to the various countries of South America and to Mexico, where the immigrants are received with favor by the governments and with no prejudice by the inhabitants. The incomparable advantages in Mexico and South America for the immigrant have led the Japanese Government to subsidize a direct steamship service to those countries. How long will it be before the natives of those countries become alarmed at this influx of Japanese and their monopoly of all the utilities? Then a serious situation will

be brought up to us, - a more serious situation than the unsettled one in California. What will be our policy? Already we hear many statesmen and professors and political writers proclaiming that the Monroe Doctrine should be allowed to lapse with the opening of the Panama Canal or be limited to the Equator. "It is fortunate, indeed, that precisely at the time when such ideas, - which may with difficulty escape the characterization of unpatriotic, - are put forth, the necessity of guarding the Panama Canal is presented to the American people to give the Monroe Doctrine new vigor, new force, and to clothe it with possibilities of national protection and national aspiration of which the anti-canal era was perhaps but vaguely aware." A German Diplomat of "high authority and position" sees in the opening of the Panama Canal a separation by water of the two continents; therefore, he would carry the separation into the political policy of the United States. He would give us full control as far south as the canal and would permit the world to have a free field from Panama to Terra del Fuego. The European states, he believes, should be allowed to settle their disputes with the republics south of the canal in their own way, and without reference to Washington. The role of the United States as guardian protector of the whole hemisphere is to his mind a thing of the past. Perhaps this diplomat will live long enough to know that the Panama canal, instead of weakening the Monroe Doctrine, has only strengthened it. "If the Monroe Doctrine was essential to the safety of this country when its territorial jurisdiction stopped with the Rio Grande, how shall the Doctrine be regarded now that this country has acquired rights in Panama and has Porto Rico for one of its possessions? Is it to be asserted that because we are nearer now than ever before to South America that we are going to ease up on the Doctrine?" B"By pushing its authority down to Central America the United States has



taken along with it the Monroe Doctrine; in other words, The Doctrine is brought just that much nearer South America. Instead of the canal having cut the Doctrine in two, it has made it more than ever a policy for South America as well as for North America. The primary reason for the original enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine was the instinct of self-preservation of this nation; the primary reason for the canal is the desire to add to our military security by adding to the mobility of our Navy. Protection of the canal, then, means the protection of the United States." "In the introduction to his "Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence" Rear Admiral Mahan calls attention to the importance of the Navy in the maintenance of the two great policies to which this country is committed, the Monroe Doctrine and restriction of Asiatic immigration." "Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peace amid international conflagration, he says, "neither the one nor the other can be sustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant Navy. In the struggle with which the book deals Washington at the time said that the Navy cast the deciding vote. To the Navy, also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eighty years later the successful suppression of the movement of secession. At these two principal national epochs control of the water was the most determinative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend the successful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned; the two most essential to the part this country is to play in the progress of the world. The question of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem of the twentieth century in which no country is so largely and directly interested as the United States. It is essentially a naval question, the third, in which the United States finds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy."

Dr. Johnston of Harvard says "The development of the

German Navy has been a manifestation of the energy and skill of her people, of her ardent desire to obtain economic outlet by means of colonial conquest and of the military tendencies of her Government. She does not disguise her anxiety to acquire naval stations on the great Atlantic trade routes, and territorial possessions, which she will probably get some day. All this in a frankly military power like Germany constitutes a menace to peace, especially should she cast her eyes on the West Indian Islands, several of which might easily come into her possession, or on South America; and substantially it is the British fleet, and not our own, that has stood between us and this threat these last few years. Great Britain has played the imperial part, and shielded the mid-Atlantic from danger. But should she be tempted some day to evade war by coming to terms with Germany, then it would be our own fleet unaided which would have to enforce the policy of President Monroe - a very heavy task. But, unfortunately, our position in the Atlantic is about to be weakened, because the opening of the canal and unhappy necessities call for our fleet elsewhere. Great Britain has abandoned the Pacific; we are about to enter it. The change is fraught with great consequences for all the English speaking communities. For at the present moment the only naval power in that ocean, in one-half of the globe, is that of Japan. The withdrawal of the British battle squadron from the Pacific was the result of various factors. One of these was the destruction by the Japanese of the Russian naval force in the East, and their treaty alliance with Great Britain, which contained a guarantee for India. Under these circumstances it appeared to the British Government not only that its battleships had become unnecessary in the East where their allies were now clearly preponderant, but that they might as well be used at home, to keep down the rising German Navy. Since then the Japanese naval power has grown so fast

that it is unthinkable that Great Britain should ever consider detaching to the Pacific Ocean a battle squadron large enough to weigh against Japan and provide such a squadron with its necessary base. The withdrawal of the British fleet really gave uncontested supremacy to Japan, though at the time this was not generally recognized. The danger of a conflict of interests between Japan and the English speaking countries was already present - expansion, racial and economic. In Canada and in this country and in Australia, the incidents of anti-Asiatic legislation need only be recalled.

At the present moment the natural resistance of California to Japanese expansion has brought us within sight of a deplorable struggle. And first and foremost all this leads us to the obvious, the great duty of protecting ourselves. With a conflict possible, we should be in a position to resist aggression and to maintain what is ours. In a military sense we are obviously enough helpless. We have no fleet in the Pacific; we have no adequate military force at any point. With an American fleet well based in the Pacific and in control of the central routes of that ocean through Honolulu and Guam, Australia and Canada will instinctively, of necessity, turn to that fleet for their eventual security, should the problem of Asiatic expansion come to a head, and it surely will sooner or later. Australia and Canada, now that the mother country is powerless in the Pacific, will inevitably turn to us for, let us say, friendly assistance, the instant we establish a sound and essential military defense of the triangle San Francisco-Honolulu-Panama.

All that we need is to rise to a larger view of our responsibilities, to place an adequate fleet in the Pacific, and an adequate army on our threatened coast."

"Throughout all history," says Wilkinson, "the controlling and the deciding factor in successful conclusion of war has rested with that antagonist whose national policy and

foresight had created and maintained a Navy of sufficient strength and efficiency to insure it the mastery of the sea when the inevitable contest came."

Professor Emerson of the University of Vermont recently said: "What we call religion, education, civilization, is often a very superficial thing. Bulgaria had learned the lesson of preparedness in war - and preparedness doesn't mean a year or two in the army, then back to civil life; it means a great standing army, equipped and ready to strike that first blow which decides a conflict today. War is one of those inevitable things by which the will of God is worked out. Europe is preparing for a struggle on a scale of which we have no conception. Through war nations have in some fashion come to the development of type. War disciplines the individual. Furthermore, it disciplines him to seek the attainment of high ideals. This lesson has been taught in the past, and it appears to me that it will be taught again in the future, in spite of the Hague and peace conferences."

The period which sees the completion of the Panama Canal, with consequent larger responsibilities devolving upon the United States near the equator, would seem to be the appropriate time to give additional emphasis to the Monroe Doctrine, to proclaim the doctrine of the white-man's supremacy in the Pacific, - and to provide adequate naval and military force to make these policies effective.

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