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Manual of

THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

including

Sound Military Decision

1945

by

Vice Admiral W.S. Pye, U.S.N. (Ret.)

President, Naval War College.

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Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
January, 1945

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

FOREWORD	1
INTRODUCTION	ii-xxvi
Diagram of Operational Functions of Command	i-a
Definitions:	
The Objective	ii
The Physical Objective	iii
Task; Assigned, and Adopted	iii
Mission	vii
Course of Action; Complete, and Contributory	viii
Decision	viii
General Plan	viii
Diagram of Relationship between General Plan, Tasks, Missions, and Decisions	ix
Enemy Capability	ix
The Commander	ix
Relative Fighting Strength	x-xix
Directive	xix
Assumptions	xx
Freedom of Action	xx-xxvi

PART I

SECTION 1

MILITARY PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF A MILITARY

<u>PLAN</u>	1
A Military Situation	1
A Basic Military Problem	1
A Complementary Military Problem	2
A Complementary Freedom of Action Problem	2
Types of Basic Military Problems	2
Strategical and Tactical Problems	3
Principal Features of the First Step of a Military Plan.	4
Incentive to Action	5
Mission	5
Courses of Action	6
Strategical Offensive and Defensive	8
Strategical Initiative	8
Enemy Capabilities	10
Effect of Strategical Initiative upon Planning	11
The Decision and the General Plan	11
Relation of General Plan to Subordinate's Problem	12
Principal Features of the Second Step of a Military Plan.	13

SECTION 2

<u>HOW A MILITARY PLAN IS MADE</u>	17
Introduction	17

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Page No.

SECTION 2

The First Step - The Basic Estimate of the Situation	17
1-Basis for the Solution of the Problem	20
A-The Summary of the Situation	20
B-Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective, and Determination of Objective of Opposed Enemy Force	23
C-Consideration of Relative Positions of Own and Opposed Enemy Forces in relation to each other and to any indicated Physical Objective of other Character	27
D-Survey of, and Conclusions as to, Relative Fighting Strength	28
E-Examination of Preliminary Statement of Own Mission as to Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability, and Final Statement of Own Mission	29
F-Determination as to which Force, Own Command or Opposed Enemy Force, possesses the Strategical Initiative	30
2-Determination of Best Course of Action; Reaching the Decision	31
A-Formulation of Tentative Courses of Action and Test as to Relative Suitability	31
B-Analysis of Enemy Capabilities	34
C-Test and Comparison of Own Courses of Action Resulting in the Decision	37
Variations in the process of The Estimate of the Situation	39
The Second Step - The Completion of the Plan	42
1-Analysis of the Basic Decision to determine Complementary Problems	42
2-Solution of Complementary Military Problems	43
O.T.C. Problems and Suggested Procedure for Their Solution	43
Offensive O.T.C. Problems	43
Defensive O.T.C. Problems	44
Task Problems and Suggested Procedure for Their Solution	45
Task Problems Requiring Simultaneous Action	46
Task Problems Requiring Successive Action	48
3-Solution of Complementary Freedom of Action Problems	50
4-Synthesis of the Plan	50
The Assembly of Data for Information Paragraph	53
The Commander's General Plan	53
The Assembly of Measures or Plans to ensure Freedom of Action	54

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Page No.

SECTION 2

The Assembly of Complementary Military Plans, Task Organization, and Apportionment of the Command	54
For O.T.C. Problem	55
For Task Problem	58

SECTION 3

<u>HOW THE PLAN IS EXECUTED</u>	62
The Third Step - The Inauguration of the Planned Action by the Formulation and Issue of Directives	62
The Fourth Step - The Supervision of the Planned Action Responsibility of the Commander during the:	62
Preparatory Period	63
Operating Period	64
Staff Organization for Supervision of the Planned Action	65
The Intelligence Section	65
The Operations Section	67
The Running Estimate	68

PART II

<u>TABULAR FORM OF THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND, INCLUDING SOUND MILITARY DECISIONS</u>	71
The First Step-The Estimate of the Situation	72
The Second Step-The Completion of the Plan	77
Outline Form	76a
Detailed Form	77
Solution of the Complementary Military Problems	77
Offensive O.T.C. Problem	77
Defensive O.T.C. Problem	78
Task Problem Requiring Simultaneous Action	79
Task Problem Requiring Successive Action	79
Solution of Complementary Freedom of Action Problems	81
The Synthesis of the Operation Plan	83
The Third Step-The Inauguration of the Planned Action, Outline Form of Operation Plan and Despatch Order Form	84
The Fourth Step-The Supervision of the Planned Action.	88

FOREWORD

1. This manual is an abridged version of the Naval War College publication entitled "The Operational Functions of Command, including Sound Military Decision". It comprises

An Introduction which outlines the Operational Functions of Command and discusses certain features a prior understanding of which will facilitate comprehension of the procedure employed in the formulation and execution of military plans.

Part I which discusses the essential features of a military plan, the procedure used in formulating a military plan, and the methods by which the execution of a military plan is inaugurated and supervised.

Part II which outlines in tabular form the essential details of the Four Steps comprising the Operational Functions of Command, which form, after the explanatory matter contained in the Introduction and in Part I is understood, can be used as a guide in the formulation and execution of military plans.

2. The Operational Functions of Command discussed in this manual are those exercised by commanders on intermediate and lower echelons.


The operational functions of command for Intermediate and Lower Echelons are indicated graphically in the diagram below:

THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

DIAGRAM I

OF COMMAND

FOR INTERMEDIATE AND LOWER ECHELONS



The Operational Functions
of Command for intermediate
and Lower Echelons comprise
PLANNING And EXECUTION

INTRODUCTION

1. The Operational Functions of Command for commanders on Intermediate and Lower echelons of command are indicated graphically in Diagram I on the opposite page. These four steps constitute for the naval commander an orderly and logical process as a guide from the moment he realizes action is necessary until the completion of the planned operation.

2. Before proceeding with the detailed study of the Operational Functions of Command it is desirable that the student officer become familiar with many features which, in advance of such study, will be to his benefit. These features are discussed in the succeeding articles of this Introduction.

3. Objective. An objective in a military sense is an end in view, an effect desired, to be attained by the employment of military forces. It is an envisaged effect desired, an objective in mind. In the conduct of war each task which is accomplished contributes toward the accomplishment of some further task. A complete statement of an objective, therefore, consists of a task to be undertaken, and of the further task to the accomplishment of which the success of the smaller task will be contributory. The primary task is the immediate objective, and the task to which the primary task contributes is the further objective.

4. Results in war are attained through the actual or

threatened use of fighting strength directed with relation to something tangible, such as some physical element of the enemy's strength. General military usage, therefore, assigns to the word "objective" an alternate meaning, namely, something purely physical in nature, which is thus designated as a tangible focus of military effort. Action in relation to such tangible element (for example, its destruction, occupation or neutralization) will result in, or further the attainment of, an effect desired. Such physical target for the concentration of military effort, in naval terminology, is called a physical objective.

5. The Physical Objective. The physical objective thus establishes the physical basis of the objective in mind and denotes the direction of effort. The physical objective is always a definite area, force, type of vessel, individual ship, or possibly, only a geographical position. Thus, for example, the objective (in mind) being "the destruction of the enemy battleship", the physical objective is the enemy battleship. As used herein, the term "objective" or "military objective" when unqualified by the word "physical" means the objective in mind.

6. Task. A task is an action to be taken or an operation to be performed. An assigned task is one assigned by a superior in a directive. An adopted task is one decided upon by the commander himself, usually only when his current directive is inadequate, or, due to unanticipated conditions, inapplicable or impossible of execution.

7. It is most important that a task be correctly stated. An assigned task may prescribe:

(a) an action required. For example, "Proceed toward (position)." Such a task prescribes movement and indicates a desired change in the relative position of the force addressed, but it is incomplete, giving to the subordinate commander only a slight indication of his immediate objective. Tasks of such an indefinite nature should be avoided; they are permissible only when the situation cannot be adequately visualized, either because of the doubtful value of certain factors in the situation or of possible changes in circumstances, which make it impracticable at the moment to assign a more definite task.

(b) the required action and its physical objective. For example, "Attack the enemy naval forces at (position)." In this task the enemy naval forces at ----- constitute a definite physical objective, but no specific future condition to result from the attack is indicated. This task leaves the immediate objective in mind to be inferred and consequently is still incomplete, but in many such cases the condition to be created is apparent.

(c) the required action, the physical objective, and the condition to be created. For example, "Destroy the enemy naval forces at -----." Such a task when successfully completed results in a new condition which is the

immediate objective in mind of the action against the specified physical objective. A task expressed in such terms of accomplishment conveys precise information as to the immediate objective, yet does not preclude the use of initiative by the subordinate in his determination of how to employ his command in order to destroy the enemy naval forces. When practicable, tasks should be expressed in such terms of accomplishment.

8. Example of a properly expressed task:

"Northern Raiding Force (or Task Force 55) prevent BLUE PORT TOWNSEND convoy from arriving in SOUTHWESTERN ALASKA or in the ALEUTIANS."

9. Each commander in assigning a task so far as possible must make the objective of the task clear but should not, any further than is essential to proper coordination of their operations, restrict the initiative of his immediate subordinates by directing how each is to employ his command in attaining the assigned objective. It will be clear, however, that in the lower echelons of command effective coordination may require that assigned tasks be so specific that the subordinate will have no discretion as to what to do with his command as a whole, and will be governed as to how to perform his task largely by doctrine and by standard practice established by tactical instructions.

10. The assignment of tasks to immediate subordinates is an essential part of the operational functions of command from

the highest to the lowest echelons. A properly conceived task indicates directly or inferentially the immediate objective (or objectives) to be attained by the forces allocated to the commander who is assigned that task.

11. Tasks assigned by commanders of higher and intermediate echelons usually indicate strategical objectives and are so stated as to leave to the subordinate commander considerable discretion as to what he will do with his force as a whole in order to attain the indicated objective. However, in order that the will and intent of the high command may be carried out, the tasks assigned by each successive echelon of command must progress toward the ultimately essential details of the operation; but in each case without the commander concerned prescribing details which may more appropriately be left to the discretion of his immediate subordinates.

12. In order that proper progress may be made, each commander in the tasks he assigns must be more specific than was his immediate superior, as to one or more of the following points:

(a) the identification or limitation of the physical objective, or

(b) the action to be taken in relation to the physical objective, or

(c) the method or sequence of use of the forces, types of vessels or aircraft, or weapons by which the action is to be taken.

13. As a superior who assigns a task also has the responsibility for apportioning his available fighting strength, it is reasonable to expect that, unless unanticipated conditions are encountered, an assigned task will be capable of being accomplished by the allocated force without unacceptable losses.

14. An assigned task should not be modified or changed so long as the superior is fully aware of the existing conditions and is able to communicate his desires. When the superior is not cognizant of the new conditions and cannot be communicated with in time to receive new instructions, a commander, when necessary, should modify or even depart from his current instructions, but in doing so he accepts grave military responsibilities. At the same time he must recognize that to fail to take the required action may disclose a lack of the higher qualities of courage, judgment, initiative and loyalty.

15. Normally, therefore, when a commander is forced to adopt a task he is faced with unanticipated conditions and with a definitely allocated force; he must, therefore, adjust his task to one capable of accomplishment under the new conditions. He must still keep in mind his further objective which, as will be described later, is stated in the superior's general plan.

16. Mission. A commander's mission is the objective, the end in view of his plan; it consists of his assigned, or adopted, task (the immediate objective of his plan) coupled with the purpose of such task (the further objective of his plan), which latter is expressed in the first clause of the superior's general plan.

17. Course of Action. A course of action is an act or a series of acts to be carried out by one's command as a whole, which if executed successfully will accomplish, or will promote the accomplishment of one's mission.

18. A contributory course of action is one which, although inadequate by itself to accomplish the mission, will promote such accomplishment. A complete course of action is one which will fully accomplish the mission. It may be built up from several contributory courses of action.

19. Decision. The decision is the commander's conclusion as to the best course of action by which to accomplish his mission. It is that which will accomplish his assigned or adopted task in a manner which will adequately and effectively promote the accomplishment of the superior's general plan.


20. General Plan. The general plan is the statement of the objective of the directed operation. It customarily consists of the phrase "This force will", followed by two clauses:

(a) the commander's decision as to his best course of action, the what of his plan, and

(b) the purpose of his decision, the why of his plan, that is, his assigned, or adopted task.

Thus to each commander in the echelon of command, in turn, the task assigned to, or adopted by him, becomes the purpose of his decision and the second clause of his general plan.

DIAGRAM 2
RELATION BETWEEN GENERAL PLANS, TASKS,
MISSIONS AND DECISIONS IN
SUCCESSIVE ECHELONS OF COMMAND



21. The relationship between general plans, tasks, missions, and the decisions of commanders on successive echelons of command is shown graphically in Diagram 2 on opposite page. From this diagram it can be seen that the attainment of the objective of each commander contributes to the attainment of the objectives of each higher echelon; and, similarly, the failure of any commander to attain his objective reduces the chances of success in the attainment of the objectives of the higher echelons.

22. Enemy Capability. The term enemy capability is used in relation to activities of the enemy in a sense analogous to the use of "course of action" in relation to own forces. Each general line of action which an opposed enemy force may adopt is called an enemy capability. A capability differs from a course of action in that at times it may be only a summation in appropriate detail of the enemy operations or tasks required to attain his objective. Thus a capability may be compounded from an estimate of the operations most advantageous to the enemy without necessarily first determining the basic idea of the plan governing such operations.

23. The Commander. Throughout this text book the term "the commander" signifies the commander engaged in the making of the plan, the formulation of the directive, or the exercise of supervision of the planned action.

24. Own Command. The term "cwn command" relates to the forces under the command of the commander which are available for use in the operation which presently is being planned or executed.

25. Own Forces. The term own forces signifies forces of the same nationality as the author of the Estimate or Directive, or allied forces.

26. Relative Fighting Strength is determined by a comparison of the abilities of the fighting strengths of each of the respective forces to accomplish the desired effect, that is, to attain its respective objective. Likewise, consideration must be given to the characteristics of the anticipated theater of operations and to the operations of the opposed force as affecting the contemplated operations.

27. As a basis for a conclusion as to relative fighting strength, the commander must have

(a) an appreciation of own objective, a survey of the enemy's problem and a conclusion as to the enemy commander's objective.

(b) a consideration of relative positions of own and opposed enemy forces in relation to each other and in relation to any other physical objective involved,

(c) a survey of means available and opposed, and

(d) a survey of the characteristics of the theater of operations.

28. The application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent upon the ability of the human and material components

of fighting strength to develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat. These components as ranged on one side or the other constitute the means available and opposed. Analysis of these means requires a classification of the various factors which influence the situation.

29. Means available and opposed. The means is composed of factors of two classifications:

(a) General Factors, comprising

- (1) Political Factors,
- (2) Economic Factors,
- (3) National Psychological Factors, and
- (4) Means, other than military, pertaining to Information and Counter-Information.

These General Factors are seldom considered in Estimates made by commanders on intermediate or lower echelons, unless in some way the contemplated operations may affect neutrals, or have a particular psychological significance.

(b) Military Factors, comprising

- (1) Sea forces,
- (2) Air forces (Army, Navy and Marine Corps),
- (3) Land forces (Army, Navy and Marine Corps),
- (4) Combat efficiency of personnel; sufficiency, training, racial characteristics, morale, skill, and physical stamina,
- (5) Combat efficiency of material; armament, life and mobility; which latter is compounded of the elements of speed, radius and ability to operate un-

der those conditions of weather and visibility that will probably exist in the theater of operations, and

(6) Effectiveness of the Logistics support in relation to bases, facilities, supplies, and lines of transportation.

30. Political Factors comprise three sub-divisions:

Internal conditions. The prosecution of a war is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to which the government can make available necessary resources, both domestic and foreign.

External relations. The wartime factors which influence external relations include the effect of the clash between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and of the normal attitude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each belligerent. The diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and of the ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine the manner in which neutrality may be enforced.

Alliances. Alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret, directly influence a

grand strategical estimate. One state may have an alliance which, though not requiring active participation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts of a belligerent. Another state may have an alliance requiring active participation, while still another state may attempt to maintain strict neutrality. The estimate of the international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of a war increases. A correct appreciation of the status of each state concerned is of first importance in any broad strategic plan prepared by the Supreme Command.

31. Economic Factors. The capacity, organization, and mobilization of industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. The acceptance by the civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing upon the industrial capacity for war production of that state.

The ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national capacity to provide the material essential to the conduct of effective war.

The dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade, including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of supply, affects its strength. No state yet has complete self-sufficiency. Thus there is the necessity of

obtaining from foreign sources certain of the raw materials which are indispensable to war production. As each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the other, a portion of the fighting strength of the nation may be required for trade protection.

32. National Psychological Factors. The maintenance of a high national morale is a primary concern. It inures the nation against the full effects of surprise, fear, disappointment, despondency, and other weakening influences, while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which strengthen the moral fiber of a people.

Racial or national characteristics may indicate definite moral weaknesses, definite reactions to certain types of warfare such as bombing, or to certain types of propaganda. Reactions of various races or groups to the conditions of war have been sufficiently recorded on the basis of past performance, to prove of some value.

33. Information and Counter-information measures. Operations of war are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent possesses of the other. It is therefore of vital importance to weigh the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of obtaining, denying, and utilizing information.

Counter-information measures are no less important than those pertaining to the collection of information.

34. Military Factors. The consideration of the details of the military factors is most important in the solution of problems of the intermediate and lower echelons in which the relative fighting strength must be determined with the greatest possible accuracy. Data in relation to the characteristics of ships and aircraft, both own and enemy, must be kept up to date. Such data in regard to the enemy will become less and less accurate during the progress of a war but every effort should be made to make such data as accurate as possible.

35. In weighing the combat efficiency of the personnel, consideration should be given to morale, discipline and technical training, in addition to sufficiency, health and physical stamina of the personnel.

36. Deficiencies in technical training may seriously reduce fighting strength. Material equipment, even though it may represent the acme of perfection in design and construction, will not surely function unless skillfully operated and maintained. Even though mobility and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity which they represent is not susceptible of effective employment unless the methods of movement, that is, of effecting change in relative position, are intelligently planned and are developed to a point which assures facility of operation in the hands of skilled personnel. Tactical training, not omitting that required for joint operations, is an important factor of fighting strength.

37. Discipline. The objective of discipline is the creation and maintenance of the spirit of willingness to follow where the commander leads. The exercise of leadership is not restricted, however, to those occasions when the commander can be physically present. The exigencies of war and the requirements of control prevent the commander from being always, personally, in the forefront of action. These restrictions as to considerations of space, however, impose no limitations on leadership in terms of time.

38. The influence of the competent commander is a factor always acting to shape the situation according to his will, though the necessities of the moment may compel his presence elsewhere. The ability to create and maintain a faithful following who will execute the commander's will wherever he may be is, accordingly, a primary attribute of command.

39. The requirements of sound discipline are thus the correct basis for all training. By proper training of his command, by instilling in it a spirit of resolute determination and by otherwise fostering its morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, a commander may increase his own fighting strength and reduce that of the opposition. When a command is immune to the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack of confidence, and other weakening influences, it may more effectually employ measures calculated to upset the morale of the enemy.

40. Morale. A state of high morale, founded upon sound discipline, is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. An understanding of the human being is therefore an important feature of the science of war.

41. The Offensive Spirit. No characteristic of the personnel is of greater importance than the offensive spirit which is a result of high morale, just discipline, confidence in leaders, and self-confidence developed by sound and thorough technical training.

42. Characteristics of the Theater of Operations. The characteristics of the theater of operations have an important bearing upon the ability of a force to perform the particular operations that are essential to the attainment of its objective. No estimate of relative fighting strength can be considered complete unless the possible influences of the following characteristics of the theater of operations upon the development of fighting strength by both own and enemy forces have been carefully considered:

(1) Hydrography; depth of water, existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents, the rise and fall of tides, the availability of channels, and other pertinent features.

(2) Topography; the terrain as it affects suitability of sites for the development of bases, especially air bases, and as affects the defense of bases, or the operation of aircraft.

(3) Climate and weather; as it will have a bearing on operations, that is, the use of aircraft, the habitability of ships, the operation of light forces, and visibility for scouting operations.

(4) Daylight and dark periods; as affecting, for examples, air operations, night destroyer attacks, and submarine operations.

(5) Relative location and distance; that is, distances between and relative location of important positions within the geographical area of the theater. Consideration of these factors provides knowledge as to the availability of certain localities for use in logistics support of forces at other localities, and as to distances in relation to cruising radii of the various units which make up the commander's force.

(6) Lines of transportation and supply. This includes the usual sea routes which pass through the theater, especially the routes from home or enemy territory and it also includes particular focal points and restricted waters which are, or may prove to be, critical areas with respect to own or enemy forces.

(7) Facilities and fixed defenses; facilities for the supply, upkeep, repair, and operation of the commander's forces and of the opposing force, as well as the fortifications, mine fields, nets, balloon barrages, and the like, within the area; other features which may render a port or

base of value, or which may indicate a possible necessity of denying it to the enemy.

(8) Communications; in strategical estimates, more particularly in broad ones covering large theaters, study of communications involves examination of the regional system of communications including radio, cable, and at times, land wire communication facilities, with a view to providing essential communication with one's immediate superior, with bases of supply, and with an important intelligence center.

43. Directive. (See U.S. Fleet "NAVAL DIRECTIVES AND THE ORDER FORM" - COMINCH P-1). A directive is a communication inaugurating and governing military conduct or action. By the issue of directives, a commander communicates his plan to his immediate subordinates. A plan continues to be exclusively a plan so long as it concerns the originating commander alone. When, however, the commander promulgates a plan with a view to its execution, such plan becomes a directive.

44. A directive from a superior, therefore, normally is the primary source of information and direction upon which a commander bases his plan of operation.

45. No military operation should be initiated without a directive to govern its inauguration and its conduct as far into the future as conditions reasonably can be predicted from available information and data. An effective directive must be based upon a plan. A sound plan is the best basis for suc-

cessful action. An unsound plan affords an infirm foundation for effective action. A perfect plan poorly executed may not provide as firm a foundation for success as may a reasonably good plan carried out with accuracy and resolution.

46. Assumptions. Often complete and accurate information as to enemy forces and intentions is lacking, hence many naval plans consider certain contingencies which, in order to make a plan possible, are accepted as Assumptions. An assumption used as a basis for a plan does not mean a conjecture, guess, or probability. It means solely a condition that is assumed will exist in order to constitute a basis for a plan; but, manifestly, the nearer the assumptions are to the existing conditions, the sounder and more effective will be the plan based upon such assumptions. A subordinate considers the assumptions stated in a superior's directive as facts until there is factual evidence to the contrary.

47. Freedom of Action, as the term is used herein, means that quality of effectiveness of the command which ensures the commander that, limited only by its materiel characteristics, any act which he may direct his command to perform will be executed with the minimum interference.

48. Given a force of definite material characteristics the development of its maximum fighting strength requires that to the greatest possible degree, it possess Freedom of Action.

49. The ensurance of Freedom of Action, within the field of responsibility of the commander, requires consideration of such matters as:

(a) Efficient provisions for the exercise of command such as:

- (1) Effective command organization,
- (2) Efficient communications.

(b) Efficient personnel, requiring

- (1) The offensive spirit,
- (2) A state of high and stable morale founded on
- (3) Sound discipline
- (4) Effective technical training

(c) Adequate logistic support,

(d) Adequate intelligence,

(e) Security, involving

- (1) Counter-intelligence
- (2) Radar
- (3) Maintenance of Secrecy and exercise of vigilance
- (4) Precautions against surprise attacks.

(f) The initiative with the possibility that the enemy may be surprised.

50. Command Organization is most effective when, through the establishment of authority commensurate with responsibility and through the assignment of tasks to commanders with appropriate capabilities, the highest possible degree of unity of command is attained. Effective command organization is essential to the development of fighting strength. Although command organization does not constitute a complementary Freedom of Action problem, it must be kept clearly in mind when organizing

task forces, designating commanders of such forces, and in apportioning the command.

51. Communications. Efficient exercise of command is impossible without effective communications. These have become so complex, due to the various types of equipment employed, to the many frequencies, codes, ciphers, and secret and confidential call signs involved that failure to ensure a common understanding of the plan to be used may make effective operation impossible.

52. Communication plans are prepared by specialized personnel, but each commander is directly responsible for ensuring that the plan to be used by his command is suitable and adequate to the effective conduct of the contemplated operation, is within the capacity of the communication equipment of his command, and is thoroughly understood by the communication personnel.

53. In most cases communications plans prepared by the higher echelons include all essential plans for the intermediate and lower echelons and, consequently, commanders of the intermediate and lower echelons need only to make certain that their directives state definitely the communication plan to be used, that the communication facilities of the command are adequate to meet the requirements of the plan, and that the communication personnel are adequately trained and instructed in relation to the plan. Every military plan must contain instructions in relation to the communication plan to be used.

54. At times, organization and the apportionment of forces may be affected by the unavailability of certain communication equipment in some ship or larger unit. In amphibious operations communications have become so complex that ships have been specially fitted out with additional communication equipment, to make them more effective as command, or headquarters ships.

55. Offensive Spirit, High Morale, Sound Discipline, and Effective Technical Training of personnel are essential to the development of maximum fighting strength. In long range planning by the high command definite plans to increase the offensive spirit, heighten morale, improve discipline, and to improve technical training are necessary. For the intermediate and lower echelons there is seldom adequate time to make and to execute plans to improve these conditions in advance of an operation; hence, these features must often be accepted as they exist. In such cases, in making plans, these features are considered under the heading Military Factors, in respect to the relative combat efficiency of personnel.

56. Logistics support is of primary importance to every commander. It is concerned with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following:

Materiel: such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, food, water, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, and general supplies.

Personnel: in relation to adequacy, replacements, health, morale, and transportation.

Facilities: repair facilities afloat, and advance base construction and equipment.

Note: Permanent facilities, fortifications, and fixed harbor defenses such as mines, booms and nets are generally considered in connection with the characteristics of the theater of operations.

57. Logistics support frequently exercises a dominant influence in naval strategy. The limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the ultimate limit upon a commander's strategic plan. A relatively satisfactory situation in relation to logistics is vital to the success of any military operation.

58. While logistics has some bearing on a tactical estimate, the logistics situation will rarely change sufficiently during a battle to affect the outcome unless at the beginning of the battle such situation was unsatisfactory. Shortage of ammunition or fuel might, however, so seriously reduce fighting strength or mobility as to be a decisive factor.

59. In most Military Plans provision for Logistics Support constitutes an important element of the plan. The provision of adequate logistics support in most cases presents a Complementary Freedom of Action problem which must be solved.

60. Intelligence may be considered of two general classes, that required in advance as a basis for planning and that required during execution. Intelligence which is adequate for the formulation of plans by a high echelon may be entirely inadequate for the planning of a lower echelon. Each commander should ensure

that the intelligence available to his subordinates is adequate to their needs.

61. When strategically offensive operations are contemplated, particularly if such involve amphibious operations, the commander in visualizing the operations to be performed by various task forces may find that available intelligence does not furnish adequate data for his subordinates to prepare their detailed plans. In such cases it may be necessary to conduct preliminary minor operations with a view to obtaining the required intelligence, or to request some other force or agency to obtain it. Under such conditions a complementary Freedom of Action problem relating to Intelligence is presented. The solution of such problem is made by an Intelligence Estimate and results in an Intelligence Plan.

62. The Intelligence Plan will consist of the tasks to be assigned to agencies under the commander's control, and of requests to be made on collecting agencies not under the commander's control. The Intelligence Plan is the basis for a minor directive, or directives. When task forces or agencies required to take action are close together, their activities should be contained in one directive.

63. Security involves both military and non-military action. Counter-intelligence will at times comprise military action such as action against enemy scouting forces or enemy air reconnaissance. It will also involve plans for interference with enemy radio communication. Radar plans must provide for radar guard

both against aircraft and, during dark, against surface craft. The maintenance of secrecy and exercise of vigilance normally are adequately covered by standard practice. Precautions against surprise attack such as anti-submarine activities and fighter aircraft patrol, are considered in connection with the solution of complementary military problems.

64. Many of the various features of Freedom of Action above discussed are covered by standard practice in the form of "Instructions", but some features require specific plans. Certain plans, such as communications, logistics and intelligence plans, are normally prepared in the higher echelons and subordinate commanders are primarily responsible for compliance of their commands with the prescribed plans of their superiors.

65. Thus commanders on the intermediate and lower echelons may have few complementary Freedom of Action problems to solve. They are, however, responsible that at all times there are available to their immediate subordinates proper and adequate instructions and plans to ensure Freedom of Action.

PART I

Section 1

MILITARY PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF A MILITARY PLAN.

1. A Military Situation. A military situation exists wherever there are opposing military organizations. Each situation results from a combination of circumstances which are the effects of certain causes or factors. These basic factors in a military situation are:

- (1) Respective Objectives of the opposed military forces,
- (2) Relative Positions of such forces in relation to one another, to their respective physical objectives, and to geographical positions available for logistic support,
- (3) Relative Fighting Strengths of the opposed forces,
- (4) Freedom of Action of opposed forces; their respective abilities to carry out required military operations with the minimum of interference.

2. A Basic Military Problem. A basic military problem exists when there is a realization by the commander of a desire, or need, to employ the fighting strength of his command to change the character of the current military situation to a more favorable one; or to take action to maintain the character of the current situation against an attempt of the enemy to make the situation more favorable to him. Step I, the Estimate of the Situation is the process by which a basic military problem is solved resulting in the basic decision.

3. A Complementary Military Problem is one which, as a result of an analysis of the commander's basic decision, is found to be inherent in the accomplishment of such decision. For instance, if the basic decision is "to destroy the opposed enemy force", one complementary military problem may be to locate such enemy force; a second, how to operate to destroy the enemy force after it is located. Complementary military problems normally are solved by the process of Step II.

4. A Complementary Freedom of Action Problem is a problem whose solution is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the command in the performance of operations required to accomplish the decision. Such problems which may require separate plans usually pertain to security, communications, logistics, and possibly intelligence. There is no specific process for the solution of complementary Freedom of Action problems but suggested forms for several types are included at the end of the Tabular Form, Part II of this manual.

Types of Basic Military Problems.

5. Military problems differ in character with different echelons of command. For example, the highest command determines grand strategical objectives only and hence deals primarily with political, economic and national psychological factors, with military forces as masses, and with military operations only in broadest outline.

6. The problems of the next lower echelon, the High Command in the Field, are more limited in scope. The High Command

receives a broad directive from its superior assigning an objective and allocating definite forces for use in accomplishment of such objective. It is faced, therefore, with the more simple problem of what to do to accomplish the objective with the allocated force. The High Command in the Field is concerned with the selection of physical objectives, the actions to be taken in relation to them, and the allocation of forces to suitable subdivisions. The High Command is seldom concerned with detailed plans for the conduct of the operations of such subdivisions.

7. Below the echelon of the High Command are the problems of commanders on the intermediate and lower echelons. On these lower levels a commander's discretion as to what to do usually is even more restricted. He may be assigned a task so stated as to leave him no discretion as to what to do with his force as a whole. Nevertheless he will still have plenty of latitude in determining how his force is to be used, the selection of the tasks to be accomplished by subdivisions of his force.

8. Thus with each successive link in the chain of command, the tasks assigned to subordinates become more restrictive, and consequently the subordinate's discretion as to what to do, becomes less.

Strategical and Tactical Problems.

8. It is the province of strategy to determine and to assign objectives such that their accomplishment will assist in winning the war, and to allocate and to produce at the required time and place, an adequate and suitable force to attain each

assigned objective against anticipated enemy resistance.

9. In judging the strength and character of the force required to attain a definite objective, strategy must of necessity visualize the nature of the anticipated operations and the strength and character of the expected enemy resistance.

10. It is the province of tactics to determine dispositions, formations and procedures to insure the most effective use of the available weapons.

11. In problems of the higher echelons both the basic and complementary military problems are strategical in character. On the intermediate echelons the basic problem is strategical and the complementary problems may be either strategical or tactical. In some instances such as when the basic decision is "to destroy the enemy fleet" the tactical problem presented may be so complex as to require a Step I solution in order to determine a general plan for the tactical procedure. Such problems must be solved well in advance of contact and must therefore be based upon many assumptions. A problem is tactical in character whenever the accomplishment of the commander's mission requires the formulation by him of a plan involving dispositions for, or methods of, use of weapons.

Principal Features of the First Step of a Military Plan.

12. A Military Plan is a basis for the conduct of a military operation, usually a written document prepared in a recognized form comprising two major subdivisions:

(a) the Estimate of the Situation, the determination of the commander's decision as a basis for his general plan, and

(b) the Completion of the Plan, the determination and solution of the inherent complementary problems, both military and freedom of action.

13. A Military Plan when expressed in the form for issue to subordinates, is a directive.

14. A military problem involving the formulation of a military plan exists whenever a commander comes to a realization of a desire, or need, to use the fighting strength of his command to change the current military situation to one more favorable, or to prevent the enemy from changing it to one more favorable to him. Such realization by the commander constitutes for him an incentive to action.

15. Incentive to Action. The incentive to action comes to a commander:

(a) usually upon the initiative of a superior, through the medium of a directive by which the commander is assigned a definite task; or

(b) less frequently upon the commander's own initiative, because of the current situation becoming or threatening to become so unfavorable as to demand action; or becoming so favorable as to warrant initiating action in order to take advantage of opportunities presented.

Mission.

16. When a commander is directed to take a prescribed action in relation to a definite physical objective, he is assigned a task. When, in addition, he is told the purpose of such task,

he is assigned a mission. A mission is a task coupled with its purpose.

17. When unanticipated conditions are encountered, a task assigned by the superior may be inapplicable or impossible of execution. In such case the commander because of inadequate time or inability to communicate with his superior, may be forced to adopt a new task upon his own initiative. In doing so he must keep in mind not only the new conditions but also the necessity of promoting to the maximum the general plan of his superior's latest directive.

18. An acceptable mission must be suitable to attain the effect desired, feasible by reason of relative fighting strength, and acceptable as to costs, i.e., will not result in losses incommensurate with the value of the accomplishment of the task, or entail such losses as to seriously threaten the attainment of further objectives.

19. A commander who does not thus evaluate his mission, but relies on the infallibility of judgment of the superior who gave him the mission may often make a mistake. He may find that he is unable to accomplish the mission with the forces available to him. It is especially important that a mission resulting from a task adopted on the commander's own initiative be carefully evaluated.

Courses of Action.

20. In order to solve a basic military problem, a commander must consider what acts of his force as a whole

may accomplish his mission; in other words, he must formulate and consider various courses of action. Acts to be performed by subdivisions of the force are not courses of action; they are tasks which will promote the accomplishment of the course of action. An understanding of the nature of the most common types of naval operations will help to visualize the different aspects of courses of action.

21. Naval warfare, especially in wars in which the keeping open of sea routes is of vital importance, consists of operations conducted with a view to gaining, maintaining, or disputing the control of sea areas. Such operations may be classified in three general types:

(1) Operations in Sea Areas Not Under Control:

such operations as attacking enemy trade, interrupting enemy lines of transportation and supply, raiding suitable enemy physical objectives, protecting own trade and lines of sea transportation, interrupting enemy conduct of overseas expeditions, and interrupting enemy establishment of new bases.

(2) Operations for Securing Control of Sea Areas:

such operations as destroying enemy naval forces by decisive battle, threatening important enemy land areas or trade routes, containing enemy naval forces by distant blockade, reducing enemy naval forces by attrition, destroying detached enemy naval units, conducting amphibious operations against enemy held territory, and the establishment of new bases.

(3) Operations in Sea Areas Under Control: such operations as protecting expeditions against enemy territory, attacking physical objectives in enemy coastal areas, preventing own enemy overseas expeditions, protecting own trade and lines of sea transportation, and defending own coastal and critical areas.

22. Strategical Offensive and Defensive. A force that initiates action with a view to changing the character of the current situation to one more favorable to itself is operating on the Strategical Offensive. A force whose aim is to maintain the character of the current situation, that is, to prevent it from becoming more unfavorable, is operating on the Strategical Defensive.

23. Strategical Initiative. In most cases one of the forces possesses the initiative as to time of inaugurating the operation, and as to route and destination in oversea movements. That force which possesses such initiative is said to possess the Strategical Initiative. In most cases this is possessed by the force operating on the strategical offensive.

24. The determination of which force possesses this Strategic Initiative becomes important to the commander at an early point in the planning. If he decides that his enemy has it, he will consider all those things that the enemy may do before he considers his own courses of action. But when the commander possesses the Strategic Initiative he will consider his own possible courses of action first, and then consider the enemy's capabilities which threaten the successful carrying out his plans.

25. Seldom are opposed naval forces so equal in fighting strength that both seek a decisive naval engagement at the same time. If one side is definitely superior in strength, the other will be seeking to avoid decisive engagement. Thus, in order to force an unwilling enemy to fight, it is often necessary to threaten some physical objective on land, or an important line of transportation or supply. Hence in most cases the physical objective for a force having the Strategic Initiative will have a definite geographical character. The physical objective of the force which does not have the strategic initiative will usually be all, or a definite part, of the enemy force.

26. Naturally the great advantage to the force that possesses the Strategic Initiative is the ability to choose time and place, while lesser advantages include saving of forces, by ability to dispense with widespread search operations, and the certainty of knowing that the enemy must conform to the pace that is set for him. Above all, the Strategic Initiative greatly facilitates the concentration of

superior power at the decisive point at the right time.

Enemy Capabilities.

27. Each general line of action which an opposed enemy force may reasonably adopt is called an Enemy Capability.

Before a commander can come to a decision as to his own best course of action, he must consider the enemy capabilities.

28. In planning it is always necessary to figure out what things the enemy may do. In making such an analysis, there have been in the past two general methods of procedure, namely, the Method of Intentions and the Method of Capabilities.

(a) Method of Intentions

Using all available information we attempt to forecast the enemy's intentions. This method would be used, and made the basis of the commander's own plans, only when the commander is very sure that his forecasts are accurate. If the forecast is correct, a great advantage is gained. But reliance on a faulty forecast may prove disastrous.

(b) Method of Capabilities

The commander does not concern himself with what the enemy is most likely to do. He studies all courses which the enemy is actually capable of undertaking, and takes them into account in his planning. In using this method, no one capability is discarded, until later information indicates that it has been discarded by the enemy.

29. The chief danger of the first method is that of reaching an unjustified and preconceived idea of what the enemy will do, and thus of failing to recognize the fact that he possesses other capabilities. While the trouble with the second method is that the enemy may often be capable of so many different actions as to render the commander's own planning exceedingly difficult should he take cognizance of all enemy capabilities.

30. The best manner of employing these two methods seems to be that of deducing reasonable enemy capabilities by the Method of Capabilities, and then making a list of probable actions by the enemy, based on a priority table drawn up by the Method of Intentions. In this manner no reasonable capability is overlooked, yet the most probable ones are put at the head of the list and given the greatest weight in planning.

Effect of the Strategical Initiative upon Planning.

31. When own command possesses the Strategical Initiative, it is necessary to consider only those capabilities which will prevent the commander from accomplishing his task. But when the enemy has the Strategical Initiative, then all of the enemy capabilities must be considered. In this case the commander's courses of action are limited to courses which will contribute to preventing the enemy from attaining his objective, and are dependent upon the commander's estimate of the enemy's capabilities.

The Decision and the General Plan.

32. After a careful evaluation of all reasonable courses of action weighed against all reasonable enemy capabilities,

the commander selects the course of action most suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to costs, which will accomplish or more nearly accomplish his mission. This best course of action becomes his decision, his solution of his basic military problem.

33. This decision coupled with its purpose, the assigned or adopted task, and preceded by the words, "This force will" constitutes the commander's general plan.

Relation of the General Plan to the subordinate's problem.

34. Since the general plan of the immediate superior states his decision and the purpose of such decision, the subordinate is thus informed of the immediate and the further objectives of his superior. This is of importance to the subordinate as the subordinate's plan must so far as possible further both of such objectives. This knowledge is of the utmost importance to the subordinate should an unforeseen situation arise necessitating the adoption by such subordinate of a new task; he can thus act intelligently on his own initiative because he knows what his superior is trying to accomplish.

35. The reaching of the decision, the solution of the basic military problem by the process of the First Step, is only a portion of the job of planning. The Second Step, the solution of the complementary problems (military and freedom of action), by which is produced the detailed plans which are required to complete the Military Plan, is often the more extensive part of such plan.

Principal Features of the Second Step of a Military Plan.

36. The Second Step in planning, the Completion of the Plan comprises four sections:

Section 1 - An analysis of the basic decision to determine the phases into which the operation logically divides, and the complementary military problems involved in the accomplishment of each phase,

Section 2 - The solution of such complementary military problems,

Section 3 - The determination and solution of the complementary freedom of action problems involved in the execution of the required military operations, and the solution of such problems,

Section 4 - The synthesis of the operation plan which assembles all data required for preparation of the plan in the form of a directive.

37. The nature and scope of the detailed plans required depends upon the character and complexity of the contemplated operation and to some extent upon the position of the commander in the chain of command. As a rule, higher echelons in regard to complementary problems, are concerned more with complementary freedom of action problems than are commanders on lower echelons. In regard to detailed military plans the reverse is true.

38. Complementary problems, both military and freedom of action, are so diverse in character that no standard process for their solution is practicable. However, in Part Two of

the Manual, there are provided several suggested sample procedures which should assist the student.

39. Complementary Military problems are of two types:

(a) a problem which for the most effective accomplishment of the mission requires that the command be operated in tactical concentration, that is, under the commander's immediate tactical command. Problems of this type are called O.T.C. (officer in tactical command) problems.

(b) a problem which for the most effective accomplishment of the mission requires that the operation be conducted by the command operating in subdivisions:

(1) by simultaneous actions in relation to two or more physical objectives, or

(2) by successive actions in relation to the same physical objective,

and for the accomplishment of which the commander determines and assigns a task to each subdivision. Problems requiring the operation of the command by subdivisions are called task problems.

40. Whenever two or more ships are in one formation, or one disposition, there is an Officer in Tactical Command. In every operation, therefore, on some echelon there will exist an O.T.C. problem.

41. In most operations conditions require the accomplishment of tasks by subdivisions acting more or less independently, consequently the task problem is the type most

frequently encountered by officers on intermediate and higher echelons.

Phases of an Operation.

42. The accomplishment of many basic decisions requires operations in more than one phase; usually a preliminary phase and a final phase. Each phase presents a complementary military problem. The phases required are determined by an analysis of the basic decision.

Complimentary Freedom of Action Problems.

43. The nature of complimentary freedom of action problems has been discussed in the Introduction. Some suggestions as to the process to be used in their solution are contained in Part II at the end of the Tabular Form.

The Synthesis of the Plan.

44. Section 4 of the Second Step is The Synthesis of the Plan, the bringing together of its parts in the proper relationship, preparatory to the formulation of such directive or directives as may be required. This section usually involves a consideration of only one new feature of the operation plan, namely, the final organization and apportionment of the command.

45. All of the factors which affect the organization and apportionment of the command will be viewed in the best perspective if previously completed portions of the plan are assembled in advance of the final consideration as to organization and apportionment. This bringing together of the parts

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of the operation plan is likewise an essential preparation for the formulation of essential directives. The Synthesis of the Plan, is designed to meet these requirements.

OUTLINE FORM OF
THE FIRST STEP IN PLANNING
THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Section 1 - The Establishment of the Basis for the Solution of the Problem.

Sub-section 1-A - The Summary of the Situation.

- (a) General Situation,
- (b) Enemy Forces,
- (c) Own Forces,
- (d) Assumptions.

Sub-section 1-B - The Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective and the Determination of the Objective of the Opposed Enemy Force.

- (a) The Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective;
 - (1) A recognition of the Incentive to Action,
 - (2) Derivation of Own Mission.
- (b) The Determination of the Objective of the Opposed Enemy Force;
 - (1) Survey of the Enemy's Situation,
 - (2) Analysis and statement of the Effect Desired by the Enemy; his Objective.

Sub-section 1-C - The Consideration of the Relative Positions of Own and Opposed Enemy Forces in relation to each other and to any indicated Physical Objective of other Character.

Sub-section 1-D - survey of, and Conclusions as to, Relative Fighting Strength.

- (a) Survey of the means available and opposed,
- (b) Survey of the characteristics of the Theater of Operations,
- (c) Summary and Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.

Sub-section 1-E - The Examination of the Preliminary Statement of Own Mission as to Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability, and Final Statement of Own Mission.

Sub-section 1-F - The Determination as to which Force, Own Command, or Opposed Enemy Force, Possesses the Strategical Initiative.

Section 2 - The Determination of the Best Course of Action; Reaching The Decision.

Sub-section 2-A* - Formulation of Tentative Courses of Action and Test as to Their Relative Suitability.

Sub-section 2-B* - Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

Sub-section 2-C - Test and Comparison of Own Courses of Action Resulting in The Decision.

*Note: When enemy force possesses the Strategical Initiative, Sub-section 2-B precedes Sub-section 2-A.

SECTION 2

HOW A MILITARY PLAN IS MADE

1. The First Step in planning is the process by which the commander solves his Basic Military Problem. This step is not complete until the commander has reached a decision which, in his opinion, is within the capacity of the available units of his command to accomplish in one major operation. On the opposite page is an outline form of The Estimate of the Situation. Part II contains an outline form in greater detail.

2. The basic Estimate of the Situation, however, does much more than to produce the basic Decision. It so familiarizes the commander with the details of the situation, the character and relative strength of the opposed forces, the courses of action practicable to his own command, and the enemy capabilities, as to provide the essential ground work for the Second Step in planning, and for the Fourth Step, the supervision of the planned action.

3. Standard form for a basic Estimate of the Situation. A standard outline form is used at the Naval War College for a basic Estimate of the Situation. This form, when used as a guide and check-off list, will ensure that all factors in the situation are considered in logical sequence, and, within the limitations of the professional ability and mental power of the commander (the problem solver), will result most uniformly in reaching sound military decisions.

4. In the conduct of war no commander should be restricted

to the use of any set form in solving his military problems. There is no such restriction. The form employed at the Naval War College has been developed primarily for training officers in a logical process of thought. It can, however, be used to advantage by commanders whose experience has not been such as to warrant their making an Estimate without a form to be used as a guide and check-off list. In many cases during war, decisions will have to be made without a chance to prepare a written Estimate. Adequate training in the logical process of thought here presented will ensure that even in emergencies, the commander's mind will consider essential features in a logical sequence.

5. The Extent of the Estimate. The Estimate should be as thorough as the time available will permit. From the instant that a directive is received from a superior assigning an officer to command of a task force (group or unit) his process of estimating the situation should be continuous. In large naval operations, in amphibious operations, and in initial land operations, the period of time required for the preparation of the forces normally will be sufficient to permit a complete Estimate, a written document requiring hours, in some cases days, to prepare and usually requiring effective collaboration by many staff officers. On the other hand, after an operation has begun, an unanticipated major change in the situation may require reaching a new decision by a short, almost instantaneous mental estimate.

6. The larger the operation that is under consideration the smaller is the effect of minor changes in the situation; hence, as a rule, in large operations, especially for a force possessing the strategical initiative, it is possible to complete the First and Second Steps, planning, and the Third Step, the formulation of essential directives, before there is such a change in the situation as to seriously reduce the effectiveness of the decision. In training by problem solving at the Naval War College this condition usually is assumed to exist.

7. In most cases in which a commander is required to make a written Estimate of the Situation he will have received from his immediate superior a directive which:

(a) outlines the situation as the superior understands it, often including, as a basis for his plan, his assumptions as to enemy future action, and conditions that will exist during the execution of the directive,

(b) states the immediate superior's general plan, thus indicating the objective, the end in view of the coordinated effort of the force as a whole, and, hence, the common further objective of his several immediate subordinates,

(c) allocates to him a definite force by the employment of which he is to attain his assigned task without unacceptable losses, in a manner to provide mutual support to coordinate commanders, and to promote coordinated effort for the accomplishment of the superior's general plan,

(d) assigns to him a task, thus indicating his immediate objective,

(e) restricts his operations to a definite theater of operations, usually by designating a specific physical objective (the lower the echelon the higher the degree of rigid specification of the physical objective),

(f) prescribes the hour for inaugurating the action, and

(g) limits acceptable costs, at least inferentially, by indicating in the general plan the further effect desired.

SECTION 1 OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The Establishment of the Basis

for the Solution of the Problem.

8. It is essential in advance of the beginning of the actual solution of a military problem that there be collected, recorded, and studied, all data relating to the essential features of the situation. This preparatory work normally should be accomplished by the commander's staff; it is called the Establishment of the Basis for the Solution of the Problem. Much of the data so prepared will be equally valuable later in the Second Step, and in the Fourth Step. The more thorough the establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem the more effective will be the military plan, and the supervision of the planned action.

Sub-section 1-A - The Summary of the Situation.

9. The first act in the solution of any problem should be to state it clearly and concisely. Sub-section 1-A of the Estimate of the Situation, therefore, is a summary of the

situation by which the commander familiarizes himself with the details of the current situation, in order that his problem may be clearly understood.

10. The summary of the situation is the groundwork of the Estimate of the Situation. Unless it is reasonably accurate the Estimate will be faulty. Facts must be used as far as available. All information acquired after, or information received with a time of origin later than the hour of issue of the superior's directive, must be considered, giving to unverified information such weight as is warranted by its evaluation. Assumptions stated in the information paragraph of the superior's directive are, by his immediate subordinate commanders, to be acted upon as facts unless and until factual evidence proves them to be in error.

11. The summary should show in broad outline as much of the general situation as may have a bearing upon the solution of the problem, the opposing forces by numbers and types, as situated in or moving toward localities, thus indicating present and possible future positions relative to each other and to geographic points and areas. It may include statements as to present activities of own and enemy forces, and it may recite significant occurrences.

12. The data for the summary is obtained:

(a) from Paragraph 1, Information Paragraph, of the immediate superior's directive, and, possibly, from later information, as to:

- (1) The General Situation,
- (2) The Enemy Forces,
- (3) Own forces other than those listed in the Task Organization of the superior's directive, and
- (4) Assumptions used by the superior as a basis for his plan.

(b) from the Task Organization and Paragraph 3, Task Paragraph, of the superior's directive, as to the composition of coordinate commands, and of their assigned Tasks.

(c) from the Task Organization, Paragraph 3, Task Paragraph, and from the State of the Command Board (see note below) for all essential data concerning own command.

Note: The State of the Command Board is a combination of a wall-board and a card index maintained by the Operations Section of the Staff, which contains all essential data in respect to each unit of the command; including location, present employment, logistics situation, characteristics, and state of efficiency.

13. The Summary should:

(a) Omit comparisons and details as to characteristics of forces; (consideration of these is deferred until Sub-section 1-D).

(b) Present such data from the directive from the superior as has a bearing upon the solution of the problem, in the sequence in which it appears in such directive, followed immediately by data in relation to coordinate and own commands.

By this procedure the data recorded will be available for use in the Fourth Step, the Running Estimate, and, also, such of this data as will be required for inclusion

in the Information Paragraph of the commander's own directive, later to be formulated, will appear in the proper sequence. Each commander in preparing the Information Paragraph of his own directive will include only such of this data as is essential to an understanding by his subordinates of the situation in so far as it concerns the plan of his force as a whole, and as may be necessary as a guide to any subordinate who may, by circumstances, be required to act upon his own initiative.

14. This summary merely assembles available data of enemy and own forces in relation to numerical strength, types, and positions of forces, as a basis for the later consideration of objectives, relative positions, and relative fighting strengths, all of which considerations are essential as a preliminary to the final adoption of a mission, and for use later, in Section 2 of the Estimate, in determining enemy capabilities and in considering own courses of action.

Sub-section 1-B - The Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective, and the Determination of the Objective of the Opposed Enemy Force.

15. By "Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective" is meant the determination and full understanding of that which the superior desires the commander to accomplish. This appreciation results in a preliminary statement of his mission. Such preliminary statement of the mission must be tested as to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability before it can be considered

a final statement of the mission. These tests cannot be made until Sub-sections 1-C and 1-D have been completed.

16. Sub-section 1-B (a) comprises:

- (1) A recognition of the incentive to action, and
- (2) Preliminary statement of own mission.

17. Sub-section 1-B (a) - (1) - A recognition of the incentive to action. When a superior assigns a task he allocates forces supposedly adequate to accomplish it; when the commander adopts a task on his own initiative, the task must be one that is commensurate with the definite force previously allocated to him by his superior. A recognition of the incentive to action, therefore, is essential as a basis for even a preliminary statement of the mission.

18. When the incentive to action is a directive from a superior and there has been received no later information indicating a marked change in the situation from that presented in the directive, it is sufficient at this point in the Estimate to record the following data in regard to such directive: originator, file number (reference number if a despatch), date and hour of issue, and means, place, date and hour of receipt.

19. When the incentive to action has been upon the initiative of the commander himself due to the changed situation making the commander's current directive inapplicable, or impossible of execution, he should record the data listed above, in regard to his latest directive, and then record briefly the

information, or the actual conditions, which has caused him to initiate action, or to modify or to change his current plan of operations. The commander then is prepared to consider a preliminary statement of his mission.

20. Sub-section 1-B (a) - (2) - Derivation of Own Mission.

When the incentive to action is a directive from a superior and there are present no conditions unknown to such superior at the time of issue of the directive, the preliminary statement of the mission usually is a simple matter. It will be recalled that among the responsibilities of a superior in issuing a directive, are the following:

To set forth his general plan,

To assign a specific task to each immediate subordinate, and

To provide adequate means for each immediate subordinate to accomplish the task assigned to him.

21. As a consequence of the fulfillment of these responsibilities when the incentive to action is a directive, and no conditions exist that were not known to the superior when the directive was issued, a preliminary statement of the mission as obtained direct from such directive should be suitable, feasible, and acceptable.

22. The formulation of a preliminary statement of the mission is more difficult in cases in which, due to conditions of which the superior is not aware, or if aware of them is

unable to communicate a new directive, the commander acts upon his own initiative. In such cases the assigned task of the superior's directive being inapplicable, or impossible of execution, the commander must adopt for himself a new immediate objective as a basis for a new task. In many cases the conditions which have made it necessary for him to act are such as to create an urgent need for a specific type of operation, offensive or defensive, which need will dominate the choice of the nature of such immediate objective. But his selected task, to the maximum extent possible, must assist in the accomplishment of the superior's general plan and the further objectives of still higher echelons.

23. The statement in Section 1-B (a) (1) of the conditions necessitating action by the commander together with the superior's general plan and the indicated further objectives of higher echelons, constitute the basis for the commander's selection of a preliminary statement of his mission. Having completed the preliminary statement of his mission, the commander then proceeds with the Estimate in the same manner as if such task had been obtained directly from his directive.

24. After the preliminary appreciation of his own objective the commander next considers the objective of the enemy, thus;

Sub-section 1-B (b) - The Determination of the Objective of the Opposed Enemy Force.

25. Sub-section 1-B (b) comprises:

(1) Survey of the enemy's situation, and

(2) Analysis and statement of the effect desired by the enemy; his objective.

26. In most instances the Summary of the Situation will present adequate data for a "Survey of the enemy's situation". Only major points which have a bearing on his possible objective need be repeated here. Additional data is provided in the directive from the immediate superior by means of assumptions, and by the wording of his general plan and task assignments. When the enemy force possesses the strategical initiative such data normally is adequate as a basis for determining the effect desired by the enemy.

27. When own command obviously possesses the strategical initiative, unless the enemy commander's mission can be definitely determined, it is most advantageous to assume that his objective is to prevent the accomplishment of own mission. When unanticipated conditions arise they should be carefully studied in connection with the superior's directive, in order to determine the enemy commander's objective.

28. The commander should determine such enemy commander's objective and state it. Some idea of such objective, as well as the preliminary statement of own mission, is essential to a consideration of relative positions and relative fighting strength.

Sub-section 1-C - The Consideration of Relative Positions of Own and Opposed Enemy Forces in relation to each other and to any indicated Physical Objective of other Character.

29. Having completed the consideration of own and of the

onemy commander's objectives, together with the data of the Summary of the Situation, the commander is in a position to consider the relative positions of the respective forces with relation to each other, to any indicated geographical or other physical objective, and in relation to the possibility that either force, own command or the opposed enemy force, may receive assistance from coordinate commands, or reinforcements from any source. When junctions of forces are indicated, or arrival at any definite geographical position is involved in the plan, time and distance calculations may be most important.

30. As a basis for a determination of the feasibility and acceptability of the mission formulated as a result of Section 1-B (a), and for the analysis of enemy capabilities in Section 2 of the Estimate, a survey of, and a conclusion as to, the relative fighting strength of own and opposed enemy forces are essential.

Section 1-D - Survey of, and Conclusions as to, Relative Fighting Strength

31. Relative fighting strength is measured by the ability of the means available to accomplish the mission by operations of the contemplated type, in the anticipated theater of operations, against the opposition of the means opposed. Sub-section 1-D comprises:

- (a) Survey of means available and opposed,
- (b) Survey of the characteristics of the theater of operations, and

(c) Summary and conclusions as to relative fighting strength.

32. The factors comprising the means, and the characteristics of the theater of operations were discussed in the Introduction and will not be repeated here.

33. Having completed the survey of the means available and opposed and of the characteristics of the theater, the commander, as an aid in reaching his conclusions, should summarize the pertinent information by arranging strength and weakness factors for own and enemy forces in parallel columns. With the circumstances attending the particular operation in mind, he should carefully review each of the factors of means in relation to the indicated operations in the particular theater, class each as to a strength or weakness factor for himself or his opponent, and enter it in the proper column. A strength factor for one is not necessarily entered as a weakness factor for the other; what is required is a well-digested summary of the factors which give to one side an advantage or disadvantage as compared to the other. In determining what factors to evaluate and in assessing their relative value, the commander considers only such as can possibly affect the effort to be made in the theater under consideration.

Sub-section 1-E - The Examination of the Preliminary Statement of Own Mission as to Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability and Final Statement of Own Mission.

34. At this point in the Estimate, the deduced enemy

objective having been stated, and the survey of, and conclusions as to, relative fighting strength having been completed, the commander should examine the preliminary statement of his mission, determined in Sub-section 1-B (a) (2), as to its suitability, feasibility of accomplishment, and acceptability as to costs.

Sub-section 1-F - The Determination as to which Force, Own Command or Opposed Enemy Force, Possesses the Strategic Initiative.

35. In this last sub-section of the Establishment of the Basis for the Solution of the Problem, the commander determines and records whether his command or the opposed enemy force, possesses the strategical initiative. It must be remembered that in any campaign, or large operation, the minor operations of some task forces need not all be of the same type. Even in a strategically offensive operation, one or more task forces may be assigned defensive tasks. It is important for each commander to decide whether his particular task affords him the advantages of the strategical initiative.

36. The Estimate procedure up to this point has established the basis for the solution of the problem. Section 2 of the Estimate, discussion of which follows, is the procedure for determining the best course of action, and reaching the decision.

SECTION 2 OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The determination of
the best course of action; reaching the decision

37. It is assumed that at this point, Section 1 of the Estimate having been completed, the commander is thoroughly familiar with the situation, with his own and the enemy objectives, and with the potential fighting strength of each of the opposed forces. He is now prepared to consider possible courses of action by which to accomplish, or to promote the accomplishment of, his mission, and to estimate the capabilities of the opposed enemy force.

38. Section 2 of the Estimate of the Situation comprises three sub-sections. Sub-section A deals with own courses of action. Sub-section B deals with the capabilities of the enemy force. Sub-section C consists of tests and comparisons by which is determined the best course of action, the decision.

39. The plan of the force which does not possess the strategic initiative must to a large extent be based on the assumed plan, or at least upon the potential capacity, of the force which does possess it. For this reason, when the enemy force possesses the strategic initiative Sub-section B precedes Sub-section A.

Sub-section 2-A - Formulation of tentative courses of action and test as to their relative suitability.

40. This sub-section is designed to facilitate the formulation of tentative courses of action which are worthy of further consideration. It does not take the place of professional judgment and imagination, but it does provide a means of determining the limits within which imagination should be confined.

41. Sub-section 2-A (1) is "Repeat own mission from Sub-section 1-E". Repetition of the mission at this point is merely to impress it upon the mind.

42. Sub-section 2-A (2) is "Analyze own mission in order to determine wherein, and to what extent, discretion as to a choice of a course of action is limited by the statement of the mission". This analysis is to determine whether or not the task of the mission is so restrictive as to constitute a predetermined course of action. This determination is essential because, as will be learned later, the process of the Estimate of the Situation is much simplified when the assigned, or adopted, task is so restrictive as to be considered a predetermined course of action.

43. Sub-section 2-A (3) is "State the assumptions and requirements of the directive by which the superior has restricted the choice of a course of action."

In many instances, a commander's discretion as to choice of a course of action is restricted by the superior's directive by:

(a) assumptions as to the enemy strength, location, and intentions stated in Paragraph 1 of the directive, and in some instances by

(b) requirements as to time, or as to coordination, such as between coordinate commanders.

Because of the restrictions which such assumptions and requirements may place upon the commander's discretion as to his choice of a course of action, it is essential that these be listed immediately after the analysis of the mission.

44. Having completed the analysis of his mission, unless he decides that his mission constitutes a predetermined course of action, and having reviewed the assumptions and requirements of the directive, the commander must visualize possible courses of action.

45. Sub-section 2-A (4) is "Select suitable physical objectives for the command as a whole, and respectively the actions which might be taken in relation to them, thus formulating tentative contributory or complete courses of action for further consideration".

46. There are no substitutes for professional judgment and creative imagination in visualizing courses of action. A careful consideration of the situation, of the mission, and of any restrictions imposed upon the commander by his directive, is essential to orient and to limit imagination. There must be no effort to conjure up courses of action merely for the sake of argument. The value of a course of action not anticipated by the enemy, however, must not be forgotten. It is assumed that professional judgment will restrict the formulated tentative courses of action to such as may reasonably be considered to be within the capacity of the command.

47. Sub-section 2-A (5) is "List the formulated tentative courses of action and test each in detail as to suitability, assuming for the moment that each will later be found to be feasible and acceptable."

48. Each tentative course of action should be tested as to suitability, that is, as to:

- (a) Conformity as to nature,
- (b) Completeness, and
- (c) Desirability as to urgency.

49. The hypothesis of feasibility and acceptability of these tentative courses of action is made at this point because no real test as to feasibility and acceptability can be made until the capabilities of the opposed force have been considered.

50. Sub-section 2-A (6) is "Compare the above listed tentative courses of action as to suitability and relist them in order of relative suitability".

51. This comparison and listing of tentative courses of action in order of relative suitability is important because it provides the sequence in which these courses of action will later be tested for feasibility and acceptability. Usually the best course of action is that highest in order of suitability which is unquestionably feasible and acceptable.

Sub-section 2-B - Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

52. Sub-section 2-B, provides a method of determining such enemy capabilities as are worthy of further consideration. This sub-section precedes Sub-section 2-A when the enemy force possesses the strategical initiative. It cannot replace pro-

fessional judgment and imagination; it merely indicates a method of limiting consideration to those enemy capabilities which have an important bearing upon the solution of the problem.

53. Sub-section 2-B (1) is "Repeat enemy objective from Sub-section 1-B". The enemy objective is the basis for consideration of enemy capabilities and should be repeated here.

54. Sub-section 2-B (2) is "State any assumptions contained in the directive which restrict the enemy capabilities which need be considered by the commander".

55. When the superior includes assumptions as to enemy intentions in his directive, he has in effect reduced the number of enemy capabilities which must be considered by his subordinates. Such assumptions are made primarily to ensure uniformity among subordinates in their estimate of the enemy capabilities. It is essential, therefore, that any such assumptions contained in the directive be stated and carefully considered in their relation to enemy capabilities.

56. Sub-section 2-B (3) is "List and analyze enemy capabilities within the above limitation".

57. In determining the enemy capabilities both the Method of Capabilities and the Method of Intentions are used. Neither should be neglected.

58. Sub-section 2-B (4) is "Test enemy capabilities as to suitability from the enemy point of view."

59. As is the case with courses of action, the enemy capabilities are tested for suitability, from the enemy point of view, without consideration at this time as to their feasibility

and acceptability. Here, also, it is assumed that professional judgment will restrict enemy capabilities to be considered to those which reasonably may be within the capacity of the enemy force.

60. Sub-section 2-B (5) is "Relist enemy capabilities in order of relative suitability and note that capability which according to present information appears to be the most probable."

61. The test for suitability of enemy capabilities from the enemy point of view, because of our incomplete information in regard to the enemy, can seldom be considered as more than an approximation. It is always important to give full consideration to that capability which, as a result of investigation by the Method of Intentions, appears to be the most probable.

62. In Sub-section 2-A there has been made a careful study of own courses of action, which, under the restrictions imposed by the directive, are considered suitable, or relatively the most suitable, to accomplish, or to promote the accomplishment of the mission. In Sub-section 2-B a similar study of enemy capabilities to attain, or to promote the attainment of, the enemy objective has been made. In Sub-section 2-C, which follows, the tentative courses of action are tested as to feasibility and acceptability and compared as to relative effectiveness, thus determining the best course of action, the decision.

Sub-section 2-C - Test and Comparison of
Own Courses of Action
Resulting in the Decision

63. Sub-section 2-C (1) is "Test each tentative course of action of Sub-section 2-A (6) for facility of execution, extent of utilization of own strength and exploitation of enemy weakness. Eliminate any course of action which fails to meet this test."

64. These tests are largely independent of enemy capabilities. Simplicity is an essential of effective operation. Proper utilization of own strength and exploitation of enemy weakness give the greatest promise of success. Courses of action which fail to meet these tests normally should be discarded.

65. Sub-section 2-C (2) is "Test as to prospects of success and acceptability as to costs each remaining course of action in relation to each enemy capability."

66. This test is the crucial part of the Estimate. It may be necessary in making this test for the commander to visualize the operations involved in executing the course of action. Likewise, it may be necessary to visualize the enemy operations incident to any one or more of the listed enemy capabilities. It is undesirable to become involved more than is absolutely necessary in a consideration of detailed operations and, therefore, the consideration should be limited to that which is absolutely essential in order to determine the prospects of success and the acceptability as to costs of each course of action in relation to each enemy capability.

67. Frequently the commander of a force which does not possess the strategical initiative can find no course of action which fully meets the tests of feasibility and acceptability. Under such conditions the choice of a course of action is based upon relative feasibility and acceptability.

68. Likewise, the commander whose force does not possess the strategical initiative may find the enemy capabilities so divergent that it is impossible to oppose them all. In such cases it frequently is necessary to limit enemy capabilities to be further considered in planning by making definite assumptions in relation to the enemy's objective. Such assumptions should be used only when the limitation of enemy capabilities to be further considered is absolutely essential, because if such assumptions are incorrect the enemy may attain his objective unopposed.

69. Sub-section 2-C (3) is "Compare retained courses of action in relation to each other in regard to effectiveness". Sub-section 2-C (4) is "Decide upon the best course of action and state it as the decision coupled with its purpose."

70. The only courses of action which need be compared are those which have not been eliminated by previous tests. The qualifications of the best course of action depend to some extent on whether own command or the opposed enemy force possesses the strategical initiative.

71. When own command possesses the strategical initiative, the best course of action normally is that one highest in suitability rating of Sub-section 2-A (6) which adequately meets the

tests as to prospects of success and acceptability as to costs, considered in relation to:

(1) that enemy capability which appears to present the most effective opposition to the accomplishment of own mission, and

(2) that enemy capability which, judged by the Method of Intentions, appears to be the most probable.

72. When the opposed enemy force possesses the strategical initiative, the best course of action normally is that which, without unacceptable losses, offers the best chance of success against:

(1) that enemy capability which, relative to other enemy capabilities, if accomplished, would have the most serious effect on the plans of higher echelons of own forces,

(2) the most probable enemy capability, and

(3) as many other capabilities as possible.

73. The statements of the last two paragraphs are of general application only. Each problem must be decided upon its own merits by the comparison of relative effectiveness of the various courses of action.

74. With the statement of the best course of action as the decision coupled with its purpose, the Estimate of the Situation is complete.

Variations in the process of
The Estimate of the Situation

75. The standard form of the Estimate of the Situation covers the situation when (1) the task of the mission is within

the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation and the task is not so restrictive as to constitute a predetermined course of action, or when (2) the decision of the basic Estimate is of such scope as to be within the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation. There are two variations from the standard form of the Estimate of the Situation just described.

Variation 1 occurs when the task of the mission is within the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation and is so restricted as to constitute a predetermined course of action.

Variation 2 occurs when the decision of the basic Estimate is of such scope as to be beyond the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation.

The Estimate of the Situation - Variation 1

76. Variation 1 of the Estimate of the Situation is used when as a result of Sub-section 2-A (3) (analysis of own mission) the commander accepts the task of his mission as a predetermined course of action.

77. In such case it is unnecessary to complete Sub-section 2-A of the Estimate form. Sub-section 2-B, however, must be completed in full in order that the commander may have a complete comprehension of enemy capabilities. Of Sub-section 2-C only that portion will be required in which the predetermined course of action is tested as to prospects of success and as to acceptability.

The Estimate of the Situation - Variation 2

78. Variation 2 of the Estimate of the Situation is used when the decision of the basic Estimate is of such great scope as to be beyond the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation, or if tactical in nature, of such scope as to necessitate a second Step I process in order to provide a general plan for tactical action. A decision to be used as a basis for a plan must be capable of accomplishment in one major operation; hence, when the decision of the basic Estimate is of too great a scope for such use, an additional Estimate of the Situation is required, the mission for which problem is the decision of the preceding basic Estimate.

79. The form for such additional Estimate is the same as that for the basic Estimate, but the information and data used should be restricted to those which have a bearing upon the more limited course of action.

80. Normally the decision of such additional Estimate in strategical problems will be a complete course of action compounded from two or more contributory courses of action each of which is within the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation, and which must be accomplished in succession in order to accomplish the decision of the basic Estimate; in tactical problems, a general tactical procedure.

81. Each of these contributory courses of action will be the objective of, and will constitute the basis for, a separate plan. Frequently, however, only one plan, that to accomplish the first contributory course of action, need be prepared immediately.

OUTLINE FORM OF
The Second Step in Planning
THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN

Section 1 - An analysis of the decision in order to determine the complementary military problems involved in its accomplishment.

Section 2 - The solution of the complementary military problems.

Section 3 - The determination of the complementary Freedom of Action problems involved in the execution of the required military operations, and the solution of such problems.

Section 4 - The synthesis of the operation plan, which comprises:

(a) The assembly of information and intelligence data to be incorporated in the Information Paragraph of the commander's directive,

(b) The statement of the commander's general plan,

(c) The assembly of measures or plans to ensure Freedom of Action,

(d) The assembly of complementary military plans, the Task Organization and Apportionment of the Command:

(1) For an O.T.C. problem.

(A) For a preliminary phase.

- (I) The plan of movement,
- (II) Sortie Plan (if required),
- (III) Cruising dispositions,
- (IV) Task organization and apportionment of the command.

(B) For a final phase.

- (I) Methods of deployment (if required),
- (II) Battle Plans.

(2) For a Task Problem, either preliminary, or final phase.

- (I) The statement of tasks,
- (II) Task organization and apportionment of the command.

THE SECOND STEP - THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN

1. The Second Step in planning is the process by which the commander completes his plan both as to its military features and as to measures or plans to ensure freedom of action. This Step must produce in appropriate detail such amplifications of the basic plan as may be required for the execution of his decision, including all of the data required for the preparation of the directive to be issued by him.

2. This Step does not lend itself to standardization to such an extent as does Step I. There are, however, in the Second Step of the solution of all basic military problems four distinct sections as shown in the outline on the opposite page.

Section 1 - An Analysis of the Basic Decision.

3. Except in the lower echelons of command where problems are relatively simple, an analysis of the Basic Decision is essential in order to determine the complementary problems inherent in its accomplishment.

4. Even when the decision is within the capacity of the force to accomplish in one operation, such accomplishment will frequently present to the commander two or more distinct though intimately related complementary military problems, one or more concerning preliminary phases of the operation, and one concerning the final phase, in which latter phase the accomplishment of the decision is completed.

5. By this analysis the commander determines:

(a) whether one, two, or more phases are required in the accomplishment of the Basic Decision;

(b) the type of complementary military problem presented by each phase, and

(c) the mission for each preliminary phase problem. (The mission of the final phase problem is the same as the Basic Decision being analyzed).

6. By such analysis the commander will avoid confusion in the solution of complementary military problems and thus will simplify and facilitate the completion of his plan.

Section 2 - The Solution of Complementary Military Problems.

7. The Estimate of the Situation, the solution of the Basic Problem, constitutes a ground work for, and is of the utmost value in the solution of, complementary military problems. The material contained in the Summary and Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength, Sub-section I-D(c) of the Estimate, constitutes the basis for tactical decisions.

8. There is a marked difference in the process of solution of O.T.C. problems and of Task problems; and for this reason the processes are discussed separately. Suggested outlines of procedures for solution of complementary military problems are contained in Part II, the Tabular Form.

Classes of O.T.C. Problems and Suggested Procedure for their Solution.

9. O.T.C. problems are of two classes; offensive and defensive. Offensive O.T.C. problems are final phase problems,

with missions such as "to destroy the enemy force -----" or "to drive off the enemy force -----", and are almost entirely tactical in nature. Defensive O.T.C. problems usually are preliminary phase problems such as:

(a) To arrive, without having sustained unacceptable losses, at a position from which it is intended to initiate a final phase plan against a definite shore objective; or such final phase problems as:

(b) To assure the safe arrival of a convoy at a definite port, or

(c) To reach a defended base, or to effect a junction with reinforcements, in order to avoid being brought to action by a superior force.

10. In each of these cases of defensive O.T.C. problems the tactically defensive force possesses the strategical initiative because it has the initiative as to choice of route to be taken, and because its mission for this problem can be accomplished if the enemy force does not intervene in adequate strength between it and the geographical point it desires to reach.

11. From the above discussion of the nature of defensive O.T.C. problems it will be apparent that the solution of such a problem requires:

(a) the determination of that route and speed which, subject to various limiting conditions, will ensure the arrival of the command in time at the desired geographical position with the least possible damage from the enemy, and

(b) the tactical dispositions and procedure which will be most effective in reducing damage from such enemy forces as may be encountered.

12. In the first part of the solution each practicable route must be considered as to advantages and disadvantages, then compared in order to select the most favorable route.

13. The second part of the solution gives consideration to such offensive action as may be taken by the enemy and determines appropriate defensive action to be taken by own command.

Task Problems and Procedure for their Solution.

14. A task problem is presented when the commander as a result of an analysis of his decision, has determined that for the phase under consideration, the accomplishment of the mission requires the operation of the command in subdivisions. The commander must:

(a) determine essential actions to be taken in relation to definite physical objectives, called tasks, and any requirements as to coordination of subdivisions in accomplishing them, and

(b) designate task force commanders and (after considering measures and plans to ensure Freedom of Action) apportion the units of the command to the respective task forces.

15. Task problems are of two general classes: problems which for their most effective solution require:

(a) simultaneous actions by subdivisions of the command in relation to two or more physical objectives, or

(b) successive actions by subdivisions of the command in relation to the same physical objective.

16. In each of these cases the commander determines the tasks and issues such instructions as may be necessary to ensure effective coordination between subdivisions. It will be evident that in an operation requiring successive actions by different subdivisions against the same physical objective, there may be required, in advance, definite instructions in order to ensure coordination. Also, during the execution of the operation the supervision of the planned action, of necessity, will be more essential and more positive than in an operation of the simultaneous action class.

17. Among the successive action class of task problems the most common and probably the most important is the preliminary phase problem involving scouting operations, maintaining contact after it is made, and concentrating the command preparatory to major action. Procedures for the solution of the two classes of task problems differ widely and are therefore discussed separately.

The Solution of Task Problems Requiring
Simultaneous Action in Relation to
Two or More Physical Objectives

18. The tasks to be accomplished by subdivisions of own command have a strategic background, and, as in the Estimate of the Situation, it is desirable to consider first the tasks, physical objectives and actions to be taken in relation to them, of that force which possesses the strategical initiative.

19. When own command possesses the strategical initiative the required tasks are logical developments of the course of action adopted as the decision, and in all probability have been visualized in the earlier consideration of such course of action. In this sub-section detailed consideration should be given to the approximate fighting strength available for assignment to each task.

20. When the enemy force possesses the strategical initiative the condition is quite different. Each enemy capability may have physical objectives different from those of any other capability. Using those enemy capabilities which in the Estimate were considered worthy of test against own tentative courses of action, the commander must attempt to determine and list for each such capability, the tasks which it involves. In connection with each such task the commander must estimate the approximate enemy fighting strength which the enemy may be able to make available for each task.

21. For the force which does not possess the strategical initiative the physical objectives usually will be important elements of the opposing force, or physical objectives on shore which it is desired to seize, attack, or reinforce to preclude the action contemplated by the force possessing the strategical initiative.

22. When the enemy force possesses the strategical initiative each enemy capability together with its indicated tasks should be listed. It may be found that some one task is common to all enemy capabilities, thus indicating an enemy task which, if

effectively opposed, will have an effect in countering every enemy capability. On the other hand, the enemy capabilities may be so divergent that it will be impossible to oppose the tasks of more than one capability. In this case precedence in creating opposition should be given to that enemy capability whose successful accomplishment would have the most serious effect on the objectives of own higher echelons, and to that capability which judged by the Method of Intentions appears to be the most probable. The difficulty in estimating what the enemy commander plans to do is ample evidence of the advantage accruing to the force which possesses the strategical initiative.

23. As a result of his considerations the commander must determine the tasks which he considers most suitable for the accomplishment of his mission and state them in order of relative importance. Then, after making a tentative apportionment of his fighting strength, he should consider each task in relation to feasibility and acceptability. It must be remembered that in the case of the force not possessing the strategical initiative, feasibility and acceptability are only relative.

The Solution of a Task Problem Requiring
Successive Actions by Different
Subdivisions in Relation to
the Same Physical Objective

24. The most usual form of problem in this class is that in which own command is seeking to bring to decisive action the enemy force which is its physical objective. In such problems the enemy objective force possesses the strategical initiative

and, therefore, the scouting operation, which is an essential task of a portion of own command, must be based upon a careful and comprehensive study of possible routes, one of which the enemy objective force may take in attempting to reach its destination.

25. This study must take the form of solving a defensive O.T.C. problem from the point of view of the commander of the objective enemy force. Only by placing himself in the position of the commander of the objective force and solving his problem can the commander determine the areas in which it will be profitable to conduct search operations.

26. Having determined these possible areas the commander must determine what portion of his force he can use for scouting, and the present position of such force in relation to the areas in which scouting may be profitable. Further examination may indicate that it may be impossible to scout on all possible enemy routes, or possibly that several routes may be scouted in succession. If only a portion of all possible routes can be covered, the commander must determine the one or more routes which appear to be the one or ones which will be selected by the enemy commander. A complete knowledge of methods of search is essential to the most effective employment of scouting forces.

27. The sample procedures given in the suggested procedures in Part II, are not to be considered as forms to be used in the solution of all problems of the class to which they pertain. They are included merely to indicate to beginners a sequence of consideration of various features which in some instances are acceptable.

Section 3 - The Solution of Complementary Freedom of Action Problems.

28. As was pointed out in the discussion of Freedom of Action in the introduction most provisions of this character are measures incidental to complementary military problems. In many instances, however, provisions for effective communication, for logistic support, and for intelligence will require complementary plans. When these are too extensive to be incorporated in the directive they are issued in the form of annexes to such directive.

29. Communications plans are now standardized and as they are prepared by specialized personnel such plans will not be further discussed.

30. A Logistics Plan, or an Intelligence Plan, may be of such extent and complexity to require a Logistics or an Intelligence Estimate. There is no standard procedure for such an Estimate but there is included in Part II a sample form to indicate the general character of such an Estimate.

Section 4 - The Synthesis of the Plan.

31. Section 4 of the Second Step is The Synthesis of the Operation Plan, the bringing together of its parts in the proper relationship, preparatory to the formulation of such directive or directives as may be required. This section usually involves a consideration of only one new feature, namely, the final organization and apportionment of the command.

32. When the complementary military problem is an O.T.C. problem, a tentative organization and apportionment of the com-

mand will have been determined in the process of developing cruising dispositions and battle plans. Such tentative organization and apportionment need be reconsidered in this section only if there has been developed during the consideration of matters pertaining to Freedom of Action, any condition which can be improved by a modification of such tentative organization and apportionment.

33. When the complementary military problem is a task problem, tentative estimates of the fighting strength available for the accomplishment of each task will have been made in the process of the solution of the problem. In this section the commander lists the tasks to be performed, and after reviewing relative positions and factors pertaining to Freedom of Action, determines upon the final organization and apportionment of his command which will produce the most effective accomplishment of his plan.

34. In this section the commander reviews the tasks to be performed, stating them in order of relative importance, or in some cases in chronological order, and considers all matters pertaining to Freedom of Action in relation to each task, as developed in the preceding section. He then proceeds to select his task force commanders and so to apportion his command to his respective task forces as to produce the most effective effort toward the accomplishment of his own general plan.

35. In task problems the final consideration as to task force commanders and as to apportionment of his command is of the utmost importance. Nowhere else in his plan are his profes-

sional knowledge and judgment put to a more severe test. Here, without time to plan the execution of each task, he must visualize the requirements of each task force commander and attempt to meet them. He must know the characteristics of each unit of his command, and their relative combat efficiency for each type of operation.

36. He must endeavor to employ his forces economically, each task force being adequate to accomplish its task against anticipated enemy opposition without unacceptable losses. Frequently, this ideal cannot be attained, especially in commands which do not possess the strategical initiative. In such cases the commander may have to permit certain enemy tasks to be executed unopposed while he concentrates his force in opposition to certain other enemy tasks which if completed would be the most detrimental to his own plan. The success of his plan will frequently depend upon the most judicious apportionment of his command to his various task forces.

37. All of the factors which affect the organization and apportionment of the command will be viewed in the best perspective if previously completed portions of the plan are assembled in advance of the final consideration as to organization and apportionment. This bringing together of the parts of the plan is likewise an essential preparation for the formulation of essential directives. Section 4, the Synthesis of the Plan, is designed to meet these requirements.

38. The first sub-head of Section 4 is:

(a) The Assembly of Information and Intelligence Data
to be incorporated in the Information Paragraph
of the Commander's Directive

39. At this point it will be beneficial for the student officer to reread "COMINCH P-1", in which is outlined the contents of the Information Paragraph of a Directive. Attention is invited to the fact that a verbatim duplication of the Information Paragraph of the superior's directive is seldom acceptable as the Information Paragraph of the commander's directive. Nor is a mere reference to such superior's Information Paragraph acceptable; the subordinate commander may not, probably will not, have a copy of such directive.

40. The aim of the Information Paragraph is to inform subordinate commanders of all they need to know as a basis for their respective plans, and to guide them in making decisions should a situation arise which requires them to use their own initiative in modifying their assigned tasks. Every directive should, in so far as concerns the main features of information needed by the subordinate commanders, be complete in itself. Much detailed intelligence data received in the form of an Intelligence Annex may be passed on to subordinates in the same form.

(b) The Commander's General Plan

This consists merely of a statement of such plan, which is obtained directly from the commander's decision and from his assigned, or adopted, task.

41. The third sub-head under the Synthesis of the Operation Plan is:

(c) The Assembly of Measures or Plans
to Ensure Freedom of Action

In this section the commander reviews his preceding discussion and solution of complementary Freedom of Action problems (Section 3 of the Second Step). Any measures previously decided upon should be stated; any plans, such as technical training, intelligence, communications, or logistics to be used should be referred to by a designating number or letter.

Any measures or plans which must be executed in advance of the initiation of the operation, such as technical training plans, intelligence plans or plans to improve the existing logistics situation, should be listed as Preparatory Measures and Plans.

There also should be listed all measures or plans relating to Freedom of Action which have any bearing on the apportionment of forces, or which are to constitute an essential part of the commander's plan, even though they are to be issued as Annexes. Measures should be stated; plans may be referred to by designating number or letter. This list must be complete in order to ensure that in the formulation of the directive, no measure or plan essential to Freedom of Action is overlooked.

42. The fourth sub-head of Section 4 is:

(d) The Assembly of Complementary Military Plans,
the Task Organization and Apportionment of the Command

Because of the difference in the form of an operation plan for an O.T.C. problem and a task problem, sub-head (d) is discussed separately for each type of complementary military problems.

Complementary Military Plans, Task Organization
and Apportionment of the Command for an
O.T.C. Problem.

43. For an O.T.C. problem the requirements of sub-head

(d) are:

(A) For a preliminary phase:

- (I) The plan of movement,
- (II) Sortie Plan (if required),
- (III) Cruising Dispositions, and
- (IV) Task organization and apportionment of the command.

(B) For a final phase:

- (I) Methods of Deployment (if required), and
- (II) Battle Plans.

44. The plan of movement must indicate:

- (a) the time of departure,
- (b) the planned time of arrival at destination,
- (c) the average speed to be made good, and
- (d) the contemplated route (usually a tracing from the Operation Situation Chart).

45. The plan of movement is not incorporated in the commander's directive; it is subject to many changes as the operation progresses. It should be given to the next senior commander, the second in command, for his information. The above indicated data should be recorded here, the route being described in general terms or by reference to a tracing (over-lay).

46. A sortie plan formulated by the commander will be required only when he is officer-in-tactical command of a force proceeding to sea simultaneously. The sortie plan is issued as a separate directive. Its principal features are the sequence in which units pass a given point in the channel and the time measured from H hour at which each unit is to pass such point, which is generally indicated by time intervals between ships and larger subdivisions.

47. Cruising Dispositions will have been formulated in the process of solving the complementary military problem. In such formulation it is best to consider units in relation to type characteristics, that is, as to numbers available of each type. Conditions developed in the discussion of battle plan, and of matters pertaining to Freedom of Action, may affect the assignment of units.

48. Now, having reached the point where a definite task organization and apportionment of the command is to be made, the previously prepared Cruising Dispositions must be completed by the assignment of units to definite stations.

49. Task organization in a cruising disposition is based primarily upon the stations to be occupied by such units in the approach or battle disposition. The normal organization, therefore, comprises the battle line, the carrier group, cruisers on the right flank, on the left flank; and (at times) in the center, destroyers on the right flank, on the left flank, and (at times) in the center.

50. Each of these subdivisions is listed in the Task Organization of the commander's directive and its composition stated, but in the directive no definite task is assigned, it being understood that each subdivision by its name will be informed of the duties and actions required of it, in accordance with doctrine and standard practice. An exception to this practice is sometimes made by assigning all or a portion of destroyers in the center as an anti-submarine sound screen. By the addition of this designation the subdivision so designated is informed as to its additional routine procedure.

51. Because the duties of the various subdivisions are covered by doctrine, instructions for each subdivision in the body of the directive are unnecessary and are omitted. Paragraph 3 has only one subparagraph, (x), which contains instructions applicable to all subdivisions.

52. With the requirements of the cruising disposition, approach disposition, and deployment in mind, and giving consideration to the requirements of Freedom of Action, especially in respect to communications requirements, logistics situation, and to technical training, speed and reliability of units, the commander organizes his subdivisions and apportions units to each, writing his conclusions in the form of a Task Organization for his proposed directive. Permanence of organization is an important factor in mutual understanding; therefore, whenever possible, administrative organization subdivisions should be maintained intact.

53. For a final phase there are, in addition,
- (I) Methods of deployment (if required), and
 - (II) Battle plans.

Methods of deployment are procedures to pass from the cruising or approach dispositions to a battle disposition, Such methods of procedure are more or less standardized for conventional cruising dispositions. Defense against air attack has introduced some innovations in cruising dispositions and the commander must ensure that methods of deployment on various relative courses are provided. These are generally issued in the form of a tactical bulletin which may accompany the directive as an Annex.

Battle plans, using various assumptions, should be prepared as a result of the solution of the complementary military problem. These may be issued as separate directives, or as Annexes to the Operation Plan. They need be recorded here only by designating number or letter with a statement as to the proposed method of issue.

Complementary Military Plans, Task Organization
and Apportionment of the Command for a
Task Problem

54. For a task problem the requirements of sub-head (d) are:
- (I) The statement of tasks, and
 - (II) Task organization and Apportionment of the command.

The statement of the tasks to be performed is obtained directly from the previous solution of the complementary military problem. It is repeated here because it is the basic of Paragraph 3 of the commander's directive and also the basis of his organization and the apportionment of his command.

55. The tasks should be listed in order of importance when the tasks are to be performed simultaneously in relation to different physical objectives, and in chronological order when they are to be performed successively in relation to the same physical objective.

56. Following the listing of these tasks the commander should review Section 3 relating to Complementary Freedom of Action problems, and note any requirements which have a bearing on the organization or apportionment of his command. For instance, the communication plan may require that there be assigned as a command, or headquarters ship, one with more extensive communications facilities than exist in the ship normally assigned. Also, when possible, each task force should have one ship at least with radio facilities adequate to communicate with the task force commander's immediate superior.

57. Relative fuel consumption rate is frequently a determining factor in which ships of the same class will be assigned to various task forces. When these factors are different in ships of the same type, the state of discipline, morale, physical exhaustion, technical training, and previous war experience may be determining factors.

58. Another feature which has an important bearing upon the organization and apportionment of his command is the relative rank and relative efficiency of the commander's subordinates. Unless a junior is specifically designated by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, the senior officer attached to a task force shall be its commander. It does not follow, however, that the commander of a task force may not be junior to subordinate commanders in some other task force. The selection by the commander of his task force commanders and the apportionment of units of the command have a mutual interrelation which cannot be omitted from consideration.

59. As the first act in the organization and apportionment of his command, the commander must decide upon the commanders he will designate to command the respective task forces. He may retain for himself the immediate command of one such task force, though if he be located in a Headquarters on shore this may not be practicable. His decision as to the other task force commanders will be influenced by their relative rank, their respective ability and experience, the administrative organization units which they command, and other factors influencing the desirability of apportioning such units to definite task forces.

60. Having in mind all factors which may influence efficiency of operation, the commander reviews his visualization of the operations which will be involved in the performance of each task, the probable nature of the enemy opposition, and the rela-

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61

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tive importance of the task, and then proceeds with the organization and apportionment of his command, writing his conclusion in the form of a Task Organization for his proposed directive.

SECTION 3

HOW THE PLAN IS EXECUTED

1. The Operational Functions of command in relation to execution are:

The Third Step -- The Inauguration of the Planned Action by the Formulation and Issue of Directives; and

The Fourth Step -- The Supervision of the Planned Action.

The Third Step

2. Having completed the synthesis of his plan and having decided to prepare to execute such plan, the commander will prepare a directive. The guide for the preparation of directives is the pamphlet issued by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, short title "COMINCH P-1".

3. When such directive has been received by all of the commander's immediate subordinates and each of them has prepared and issued any required directives, the commander puts his plan into effect and with such act the Fourth Step begins.

The Fourth Step

4. In making a plan, one cannot anticipate and provide for all possibilities. Notwithstanding every effort to foresee all eventualities during the conduct of a military operation, unanticipated changes in the military situation may force a modification, or even a complete change. This fact necessitates effective supervision of the planned action.

5. After a Commander has closely supervised the planning itself, as well as the issuance of the directive, his responsibility continues throughout two distinct phases. The first is the preparatory period, which extends from the hour at which his own complete directive is issued until the hour at which it becomes effective.

6. Due to the non-static nature of military situations, the Commander must be prepared, during any period, to adjust his plan and his directive to meet changes that will occur. He may receive a modification of his orders from his superior, he may receive new information of the enemy's movements, intentions, or position, and he may find that the availability and composition of his forces has changed.

7. He is, therefore, faced with the following responsibilities during this Preparatory Period:

- (a) To correct errors or deficiencies in his own plan,
- (b) To review directives of immediate subordinates and coordinate commanders,
- (c) To direct immediate subordinates, and to request coordinate commanders to modify their directives in such manner as he may consider necessary,
- (d) To keep enemy information up to date,
- (e) Within the limits of his discretion, to modify his own plan to meet situations developed by new information of the enemy received.

8. The length of his preparatory period will vary with the number of echelons below the Commander, which will have to make plans and issue directives, before he himself can make his effective, and the nature and complexity of the contemplated

operation. It goes without saying that the preparatory period should be as short as possible, since old plans require many modifications, and the information of the enemy contained in them is often defective.

Responsibility of the Commander during the Operating Period

9. The second distinct phase through which the Commander's responsibility continues is the Operating Period. This extends from the hour at which his own complete directive is made effective until his Mission is accomplished.

10. In operations extending over large sea areas, days may pass between the inauguration of the planned action and the receipt of the first contact with enemy forces. More frequently, however, the Commander will receive many reports of contacts with enemy forces. Some will be important, others unimportant. From these the Commander strives to picture the current situation and its potentialities.

11. He is, therefore, faced with the following responsibilities during this Operating Period:

- (a) To take prompt action to accord with any new directive received from his superior,
- (b) To perceive any situation which threatens the accomplishment of his Mission, and to notify promptly his superior where possible. If not possible, to take prompt action on his own initiative,
- (c) To take prompt action to modify or change his own plan to meet an unanticipated situation,
- (d) To disseminate promptly to immediate superiors and coordinate commanders, any information received by him that is of an essential nature,

- (e) To keep his subordinates informed of information that will concern them.

12. In order that the Commander may be able to carry on effectively the many duties comprised in the supervision of the planned action, he must make adequate preparation for a systematic procedure to cope with the following:

- (a) Recording and evaluating enemy information received,
- (b) Disseminating essential elements of information,
- (c) Maintaining a grasp of the progress of the current operation,
- (d) Recognizing the potentialities of the situation as it develops,
- (e) Re-estimating the situation in the event of change in the superior's plan, or in the event that an Assumption turns out to be false,
- (f) Determining and inaugurating the most effective action which under the existing conditions can be taken by his command.

13. Effective supervision of the planned action to carry out these responsibilities listed above, calls for the following:

- (a) An adequate, properly organized, and well-trained staff,
- (b) An efficient staff procedure,
- (c) A thorough basic Estimate of the Situation,
- (d) A well-considered plan,
- (e) An effective Running Estimate.

14. Staff Organization for the Supervision of the Planned Action

- (a) The Intelligence Section

The Intelligence Section is responsible for:

- (1) Collating all available information in relation to enemy forces, installations, bases, airfields, and sea areas,
- (2) Recording all enemy information received, and evaluating its credibility, accuracy, and significance,
- (3) Preparing conclusions as to relative fighting strengths and enemy capabilities,
- (4) Drafting of the Enemy Forces section of Paragraph One of all directives,
- (5) Preparing dispatches to disseminate appropriate enemy information received.

In order to facilitate the performance of these above-mentioned duties, the Intelligence Section maintains:

- (1) Separate files of incoming and outgoing dispatches,
- (2) An Intelligence Journal,
- (3) An Intelligence Situation Chart, or Charts,
- (4) Intelligence Work Sheets, which constitute the Intelligence portion of the Running Estimate,
- (5) A file of Intelligence reports made by this section.

The Intelligence Situation Charts show graphically all of the available and verified information of enemy mobile forces; on separate charts there will be shown possible future positions of such forces as determined by an estimate of enemy capabilities.

Whenever possible after the receipt of a complete directive from a superior, recent enemy information must be promptly compared with the latest recorded information to see if, and wherein, it differs. During the operation, enemy information may be received frequently, and full advantage can

be taken of it only if it is promptly recorded, compared, evaluated, and its effect on the Commander's operations speedily estimated. In order to assist in this process, each item of information is recorded in the Intelligence Journal, and is then recorded upon appropriate Intelligence Work Sheets. There should be a separate Work Sheet for each of the following classes of information:

- (1) General Situation,
- (2) Enemy Forces and Operations,
- (3) Combat Efficiency of enemy personnel and material,
- (4) Weather (as it effects enemy operations),
- (5) Enemy facilities and fixed defenses, transportation, supply, and communications.

Naturally this information can be further sub-divided as the needs of the situation dictate, but in any case the conclusions from them, insofar as a change in the basic estimate is concerned, should always be readily available.

(b) The Operations Section

The Operations Section is responsible for maintaining in readily accessible form all data pertaining to own forces, installations, bases, airfields, and sea areas. In order to facilitate the execution of these duties, it maintains:

- (1) A State of the Command Board,
- (2) A file of current directives, received and issued; separate files of incoming and outgoing dispatches; and a file of Estimates of the Situation made or received,
- (3) An Operations Journal,

- (4) An Operations Situation Chart,
- (5) A Running Estimate.

The Operations Situation Chart is used to maintain a graphic picture of own forces, and the location of such enemy forces as may effect our own movement and disposition. By this procedure the situation as it is known at the moment is presented in full.

If the Chart is kept up to date, and compared frequently with the Chart of Enemy Forces as prepared by Intelligence, the Commander will have a ready and available picture of the entire operation and its potentialities, better than any number of words can convey.

The Running Estimate

15. It frequently occurs that in the process of carrying out a planned operation, information is received that indicates an existing situation which is different from that which had been anticipated. In such case the commander must first consider its strategical aspects, i.e., what effect this new situation will have on the accomplishment of his current plan - the attainment of his present objective.

16. The Running Estimate, together with the Intelligence and the Operations Situation Charts, constitutes the means by which the Commander:

- (a) Maintains a grasp of the progress of the current situation and operation,
- (b) Recognizes potentialities of situations as they develop,

- (c) Determines what, under the existing conditions is the action that can be taken by him in order to accomplish his assigned task or, failing that, to provide the maximum assistance toward the accomplishment of the superior's General Plan.

17. There must be the closest coordination between Intelligence and Operations in the process of making this continuous estimate. Information received is not Intelligence until it has been evaluated, and the staff as a whole must bear that in mind when working together.

18. The Operations Section is charged with the responsibility for maintaining the Running Estimate. This involves a continuous process of revising the basic Estimate, and of solving the Complementary Military Problems. Much of the Material of this basic Estimate will remain unchanged. The primary object of the Running Estimate, therefore, is to set forth changes in the basis for the solution of the problem, and then to determine the effect of such changes on own courses of action, and on enemy capabilities, with the resultant change in decision and detailed plans. The Running Estimate is, therefore, the process by which the Commander reviews his Decision. Such Decision, as in the case of the basic Estimate of the Situation, is a strategical decision.

19. The Running Estimate is thus a short-cut which, by comparison between the present and the basic situation, tends to obtain the maximum advantage of the material prepared and the studies made during all planning phases. The more complete the basic Estimate has been, the better prepared the Commander will be to recognize the potentialities of a changed situation.

20. Just as the Intelligence Work Sheets were subdivided in context, so must the sheets of the Running Estimate be subdivided. The Running Estimate will contain a Summary of the Situation, with one or more sheets for each of the following:

- (a) General Situation,
- (b) Enemy Forces,
- (c) Own Forces (including those of own command),
- (d) Assumptions,
- (e) Relative Fighting Strength,
- (f) Enemy Objective,
- (g) Mission.

It will also contain a section for reaching the Decision, with a sheet for each of the following:

- (a) Determination of Own Courses of Action,
- (b) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities,
- (c) Comparison of Own Courses of Action with Enemy Capabilities, resulting in the Decision.

Finally, there should also be a section for the Solution of Complementary Military Problems. The extent to which this section will follow the usual form will depend upon the time available, the complexity of the problem, and the degree of experience and judgment possessed by the Commander.

End of Part 1

PART II

TABULAR FORM OF
THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
including
SOUND MILITARY DECISION

- PLANNING -

THE FIRST STEP - THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
REACHING THE DECISION

THE SECOND STEP - THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN

- EXECUTION -

THE THIRD STEP - THE INAUGURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTION BY
THE FORMULATION AND ISSUE OF THE
DIRECTIVES

THE FOURTH STEP - THE SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNED ACTION

PLANNING

THE FIRST STEP

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

SECTION 1

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

- A. The Summary of the Situation.
- (a) General Situation.
 - (b) Enemy Forces.
 - (c) Own Forces, other than those listed in Task Organization of the Superior's Directive.
 - (d) Assumptions used by the Superior as a Basis for his Plan.
- B. The Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective, and the Determination of the Objective of the Opposed Enemy Force.
- (a) The Preliminary Appreciation of Own Objective:
 - (1) A Recognition of the Incentive to Action.
 - (2) Derivation of Own Mission.
 - (a) General Plan of Superior.
 - (b) Own Assigned Task.
 - (c) Additional Information.
 - (d) Preliminary Statement of Own Mission.
 - (b) The Determination of the Objective of the Opposed Enemy Force.
 - (1) Survey of the Enemy's Situation.
 - (2) Analysis and Statement of the Effect Desired by the Enemy; his Objective.
- C. The Consideration of the Relative Positions of Own and Opposed Enemy Forces in relation to each other, and to any Indicated Physical Objective of other Character.
- D. Survey of, and Conclusions as to, Relative Fighting Strength.
- (a) Survey of the means available and opposed.
 - (1) General Factors. (These factors are seldom considered in problems of commanders of Intermediate and Lower echelons).
 - (a) Political Factors.
 - (1) Internal Conditions.
 - (2) External Relations.
 - (3) Alliances.
 - (b) Economic Factors.
 - (c) National Psychological Factors.
 - (d) Means other than Military, pertaining to Information and Counter-Information.

(2) Military Factors.

- (a) Sea Forces.
 - (b) Air Forces (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps).
 - (c) Land Forces (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps).
 - (d) Combat efficiency of personnel; sufficiency; training; racial characteristics; morale; discipline; the offensive spirit; skill, and physical stamina.
 - (e) Combat efficiency of material; armament, life, and mobility; which latter is compounded of the elements of speed, radius and ability to operate under those conditions of weather and visibility, that will probably exist in the theater of operations.
 - (f) Effectiveness of the Logistics support in relation to bases, facilities, supplies, and lines of transportation.
- (b) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.
- (1) Hydrography.
 - (2) Topography.
 - (3) Climate and Weather.
 - (4) Daylight and Dark Periods.
 - (5) Relative Location of and Distance between involved geographical positions or areas.
 - (6) Lines of Transportation and Supply.
 - (7) Facilities and Fixed Defenses.
 - (8) Communications.
- (c) Summary and Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.

- E. The Examination of the Preliminary Statement of Own Mission as to Suitability, Feasibility and Acceptability, and Final Statement of Own Mission.
- F. The Determination as to which Force, Own Command, or Opposed Enemy Force, Possesses the Strategic Initiative.

SECTION 2

THE DETERMINATION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION; REACHING THE DECISION

NOTE: (Subsection B to precede Subsection A when the opposed enemy force possesses the strategic initiative.)

- A. Formulation of Tentative Courses of Action and Test as to their Relative Suitability.
- (1) Repeat own mission from Sub-section I-E.
 - (2) Analyze own mission in order to determine wherein, and to what extent, discretion as to choice of a course of action is limited by the statement of the mission.
 - (3) State any assumptions or requirements of the directive by which the superior has restricted the choice of a course of action.
 - (4) Select suitable physical objectives for the command as a whole, and respectively the actions which might be taken in relation to them, thus formulating tentative contributory or complete courses of action for further consideration.
 - (5) List the formulated tentative courses of action and test each in detail as to suitability, assuming for the moment that each will later be found to be feasible and acceptable.
 - (6) Compare the above listed tentative courses of action as to suitability, and relist them in order of relative suitability.
- B. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. (See Note above)
- (1) Repeat enemy objective from Sub-section I-B.
 - (2) State any assumptions contained in the directive which restrict the enemy capabilities which need be considered by the commander.
 - (3) List and analyze enemy capabilities within the above limitations.
 - (4) Test enemy capabilities as to suitability from the enemy point of view.
 - (5) Relist enemy capabilities in order of relative suitability, and note that capability which according to present information appears to be most probable.
- C. Test and Comparison of Own Courses of Action Resulting in the Decision.
- (1) Test each tentative course of action of Sub-section 2-A(6) for facility of execution and extent of utilization of own strength and exploitation of enemy weakness. Eliminate any course of action which fails to meet this test.
 - (2) Test each retained course of action in relation to each enemy capability, as to prospects of success and acceptability as to costs.
 - (3) Compare retained courses of action in relation to each other in regard to effectiveness.
 - (4) Decide upon the best course of action and state it as the decision, coupling it with its purpose, the commander's assigned, or adopted, task.

Variations in the Process of
The Estimate of the Situation

THE FIRST STEP

Variation 1

When the task of the mission is within the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation and so restrictive as to constitute a predetermined course of action.

- A. Do not complete Subsection 2-A of Estimate.
- B. Complete Subsection 2-B in full.
- C. Of Subsection 2-C complete only that portion in which the predetermined course of action will be tested as to prospects of success and to acceptability.

Variation 2

When the decision of the Basic Estimate is of such great scope as to be beyond the capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation; or when the decision necessitates the determination of a tactical general plan, a supplementary Estimate of the Situation is required, the Mission for which problem is the decision of the preceding basic Estimate.

Use same form as that for the basic Estimate, but restrict the information and data used to those which have a bearing upon the desired more limited course of action.

Normally, the decision of this supplementary Estimate will be a complete course of action compounded from two or more contributory courses of action, each of which is within the

capacity of the command to accomplish in one major operation.

Each of such contributory courses of action will be the objective of, and will constitute the basis for a separate plan. Frequently, however, only one plan, that to accomplish the first contributory course of action need be prepared immediately.

OUTLINE FORM OF
The Second Step in Planning
THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN

Section 1 - An analysis of the decision in order to determine the complementary military problems involved in its accomplishment.

Section 2 - The solution of the complementary military problems.

Section 3 - The determination of the complementary Freedom of Action problems involved in the execution of the required military operations, and the solution of such problems.

Section 4 - The synthesis of the operation plan, which comprises:

(a) The assembly of information and intelligence data to be incorporated in the Information Paragraph of the commander's directive,

(b) The statement of the commander's general plan,

(c) The assembly of measures or plans to ensure Freedom of Action,

(d) The assembly of complementary military plans, the Task Organization and Apportionment of the Command:

(1) For an O.T.C. problem.

(A) For a preliminary phase.

- (I) The plan of movement,
- (II) Sortie Plan (if required),
- (III) Cruising dispositions,
- (IV) Task organization and apportionment of the command.

(B) For a final phase.

- (I) Methods of deployment (if required),
- (II) Battle Plans.

(2) For a Task Problem, either preliminary, or final phase.

- (I) The statement of tasks,
- (II) Task organization and apportionment of the command.

PLANNING (continued)

THE SECOND STEP

THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN

SECTION 1

AN ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC DECISION

- (a) Number of phases required for the accomplishment of the basic decision.
- (b) Type of complementary military problem presented by each phase.
- (c) Mission for each preliminary phase problem. (The mission of a final phase problem is the same as the basic decision being analyzed, coupled with its purpose.)

SECTION 2

THE SOLUTION OF THE COMPLEMENTARY MILITARY PROBLEMS

A. Solution of OTC Problems.

(a) Offensive OTC Problems.

- 1. State the Mission of this problem as derived from the Decision, and the Assumptions under which it is to be solved.
- 2. Consider the Summary of the Situation pertaining to the enemy objectives and to relative positions of forces.
- 3. Consider Sub-section 1-D(c) of the Estimate, entitled Summary and Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.
- 4. Consider that portion of Section 2-C of the Estimate in which that course of action adopted as the Decision was tested against enemy capabilities as to prospects of success.

(In sections 5, 6, 7, and 8, which follow, list tasks resulting from your study of those sections; and tentatively assign units to accomplish those tasks, paying particular attention to the following four factors:

- (1) Physical Objectives,
- (2) Relative Positions,
- (3) Apportionment of Fighting Strength,
- (4) Freedom of Action.)

- 5. Consider the possibility of, and relative danger from, enemy submarine, air and surface ship attack previous to the major

- action, as a basis for the preparation of cruising dispositions.
6. Consider strength and weakness factors in relation to air forces immediately preceding and during battle, and determine best use of own aircraft.
 7. Consider strength and weakness factors in relation to destroyers and cruisers and determine whether conditions favor a night destroyer attack, and the most advantageous use of these types in day and night fleet action.
 8. Consider strength and weakness factors in relation to battleships, including relative speed and relatively favorable range bands, and relative advantages of day and night action.
 9. From the above data and considerations develop cruising dispositions and battle plans.
- (b) Defensive O.T.C. Problems.
1. State own mission as derived from the Decision, and Assumptions under which the problem is to be solved.
 2. Consider the section of the Summary of the Situation pertaining to enemy objective.
 3. State any requirements or conditions which limit the commander's discretion, such as time of departure, time of arrival at destination, maximum cruising speed, and logistics situation.
 4. Determine within the limitations of time, and speed made good (allowing for reduction for zigzagging, etc.) possible routes from point of departure to destination (the use of a chart is essential).
 5. Examine weather conditions on various routes as such may affect enemy scouting operations, and own possibility of defense.
 6. Consider the section of the Summary in relation to relative positions of forces and consider for the direct route and for routes using the maximum detour, the probability of being contacted by the enemy scouting forces and the character and strength of the enemy forces which may intercept.
 7. Compare various routes as to prospects of success, and decide upon the most advantageous route.

(The remainder of the procedure pertains to the defense against such enemy forces as may make contact.)

8. Consider Summary and Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.
9. Consider the character (types) of enemy forces which may attack, and the relative probability of and danger from such attacks.
10. (List tasks resulting from the study of section 9 above, and tentatively assign units to accomplish the tasks, paying particular attention to the following four factors:
 - (1) Physical Objectives.
 - (2) Relative Positions.
 - (3) Apportionment of Fighting Strength.
 - (4) Freedom of Action.)

B. Solution of Task Problems.

(a) Requiring Simultaneous Action in relation to Two or More Physical Objectives.

1. The basis for the solution comprises:

(a) The mission of the problem, obtained directly from the analysis of the preceding decision.

(b) A review of that portion of the preceding Estimate pertaining to the course of action adopted as the decision devoting especial attention to that portion in which such course of action is tested in relation to enemy capabilities.

(c) Note for this problem, which force possesses the strategical initiative.

2. Consideration of the tasks (physical objectives and actions in relation to each) of the force which possesses the strategical initiative, and estimate of the approximate composition of each task force.

3. Consideration of the tasks of the force which does not possess the strategical initiative, and estimate of the approximate composition of each task force.

4. List suitable tasks for subdivisions of own command (from subsection 2 or 3) stating them in order of relative importance, and test each as to feasibility and acceptability.

5. List retained tasks in order of importance indicating for each the approximate fighting strength required, with special note as to requirements as to types.

(b) Requiring Successive Actions by Different Subdivisions in Relation to the Same Physical Objective.

1. The basis for the solution comprises:
 - (a) The mission of the problem obtained directly from the analysis of the preceding decision.
 - (b) A review of that portion of the preceding Estimate pertaining to the course of action adopted as the decision, devoting especial attention to that portion in which such a course of action is tested in relation to enemy capabilities.
2. Solve as well as can be done with the information available, the defensive O.T.C. problem confronting the commander of the objective enemy force, in order to determine the routes available to it, and the probable character and fighting strength which it possesses. Possible enemy routes should be listed in order of probability of use.
3. (a) Decide upon the portion of own force that can be made available for scouting and from its position, determine the areas in which search operations will be most effective. Whether the commander shall prescribe the method of search and position of origin depends largely upon the facility of communications and the necessity for coordination. As the distance between the objective force and own attack group decreases; the importance of coordination increases.
 - (b) Decide upon any required support for the scouting group and instructions for its coordination with the scouting group.
 - (c) Decide upon the movement of the attack group to maintain it in a position to interpose between the objective force and any probable destination.
4. List suitable tasks for subdivisions of own command (from subsections 3(a), (b), (c)), stating them in order of relative importance, and test each as to feasibility and acceptability.
5. List retained tasks in order of importance, or in chronological order, indicating for each the approximate fighting strength required, with special note as to requirements as to types.

SECTION 3

THE DETERMINATION OF THE COMPLEMENTARY FREEDOM OF ACTION
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE EXECUTION OF THE REQUIRED
MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND THE SOLUTION OF
SUCH PROBLEMS

Consider problems arising from following Freedom of Action factors, such as:

- (a) Efficient provisions for the exercise of command such as:
 - (1) Effective command organization,
 - (2) Efficient communications.
- (b) Efficient personnel, requiring
 - (1) The offensive spirit,
 - (2) A state of high and stable morale founded on
 - (3) Sound discipline
 - (4) Effective technical training
- (c) Adequate logistic support,
- (d) Adequate intelligence,
- (e) Security, involving
 - (1) Counter-intelligence
 - (2) Radar
 - (3) Maintenance of Secrecy and exercise of vigilance
 - (4) Precautions against surprise attacks,
- (f) The initiative with the possibility that the enemy may be surprised.

LOGISTICS ESTIMATE

I-A. Summary of the pertinent features of the existing strategical and tactical situation, and of contemplated strategical and tactical operations, and a statement of the existing logistics situation.
The Mission will be:

Task To make provision for adequate logistics support

in order

Purpose To contribute to freedom of action in (the contemplated operations, indicated by the preceding decision.)

I-B. Review the logistics factors discussed under Characteristics of the Theater of Operations, and the present state of the command in relation to fuel, ammunition, personnel, etc.

- II. Discuss the various possible procedures for affording appropriate logistics support of various categories.
- III. Discuss enemy actions to hamper or prevent adequate logistics support.
- IV. Compare various possible logistics procedures.
- V. State the decision as to the logistics support to be provided in adequate detail to meet the requirements of allocation and the needs of the commander's directive. When the logistics plan decided upon is complex or requires detailed instructions to ensure coordination, the logistics plan should accompany the directive as an Annex.

Intelligence Estimate.

- I-A. Summarize the pertinent features of the present situation and of the contemplated strategical and tactical operations. The Mission will be:

Task To make provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and of the theater of operations

in order

Purpose To contribute to freedom of action in (the operations contemplated, indicated by the preceding decision.)

- I-B. Take account of the factors as to intelligence noted in the basic Estimate, and note all deficiencies of major importance.
- II. Consider the possible procedures for obtaining the desired information, that is, for its collection and for the receipt of reports from the collection agencies.
- III. Consider the capabilities of the enemy as to counter-intelligence measures.
- IV. Compare the various procedures open for the collection of information and for reports thereof.
- V. State the decision as to the essential elements of information which it is considered feasible to obtain, and the method or methods for obtaining each element.

SECTION 4

THE SYNTHESIS OF THE OPERATION PLAN

- (a) The assembly of information and intelligence data to be incorporated in the Information Paragraph of the commander's directive.
- (b) The Commander's General Plan.
- (c) The Assembly of Measures or Plans to ensure Freedom of Action.
- (d) The Assembly of Complementary Military Plans, the Task Organization and Apportionment of the Command.
 - (1) For an O.T.C. problem.
 - (A) For a preliminary phase -
 - (I) The plan of movement:
 - (a) Time of departure,
 - (b) Planned time of arrival at destination,
 - (c) Average speed to be made good, and
 - (d) Contemplated route (usually a tracing from the operation chart.)
 - (II) Sortie Plan (if required),
 - (III) Cruising dispositions,
 - (IV) Task organization and apportionment of the command.
 - (B) For a final phase -
 - (I) Methods of deployment (if required),
 - (II) Battle Plans.
 - (2) For a Task Problem, either preliminary or final phase.
 - (I) The statement of tasks:
 - (a) If to be performed simultaneously in relation to different physical objectives; list in order of importance,
 - (b) If to be performed successively in relation to the same physical objective, list in chronological order.
 - (II) Task organization and apportionment of the command.

EXECUTION

THE THIRD STEP

THE INAUGURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTION

BY THE

FORMULATION AND ISSUE OF THE DIRECTIVES

1. Carefully check material of the Synthesis of the Operation Plan, Section 4 of the Second Step.
2. Restate the Decision, amplifying its provisions or modifying its scope as desired, for use in the Directive.

Note: An Outline Form of an Operation Plan, and examples of an Operation Plan and of an Operation Order are given in U.S. Fleet Publication "COMINCH P-1." An Outline of the Despatch Order Form and examples of its use for both an Operation Plan and an Operation Order follow herewith.

40.

OUTLINE OF DESPATCH ORDER FORM

The Despatch Order Form follows the standard Order Form except that only the body of the directive is transmitted, with the TASK ORGANIZATION omitted. The title, the name of the commander, and the composition of each Task Force (group or unit) are set down at the beginning of the sub-paragraph which contains the tasks and instructions of that force. If the current organization for any force remains unchanged, the name of the commander and its composition may be omitted.

The main paragraphs of the standard Order Form are indicated by their names, as INFORMATION, GENERAL PLAN, TASK, XRAY, LOGISTICS and COMMAND. Each paragraph, after the first, may be separated by the insertion of the word "PARAGRAPH" before its name, if necessary for clarity. The names of the main paragraphs which have been left blank may be omitted when not required for clarity.

When the Despatch Order is sent by radio, or other means, it will be entirely recast by designated personnel in conformity with the requirements of security. Therefore, it is important that the issuing officer familiarize himself with the requirements of security in order that he ensure the most acceptable compromise demanded by the conflicting interests of clarity and of security of transmission of encrypted despatches. It is necessary that the plain language copy be clear, concise, and complete.

FROM: OFFICER ISSUING DESPATCH ORDER
TO : ACTION ADDRESSEES
INFO: INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

- INFORMATION
- PARAGRAPH GENERAL PLAN
- PARAGRAPH TASK
- PARAGRAPH XRAY
- PARAGRAPH LOGISTICS
- PARAGRAPH COMMAND

(Administrative Short Title of Issuing Officer) OPERATION PLAN
or ORDER
(Identifying Serial Number)

41.

EXAMPLE OF A DESPATCH ORDER

(Operation Plan)

FROM: CINC ORANGE COMBFLT
TO : ACTION ADEES
INFO: INFO ADEES

INFO CRITICAL SITUATION CONTINUES IMPERATIVE DELAY BLUE WESTWARD MOVEMENT INDICATIONS BLUE ASSEMBLING TROOPS MATERIAL PURPOSE STRENGTHENING EXISTING BASES OR ESTABLISHMENT NEW BASE ALUTS X

BLUE MAIN BODY SORTIED PEARL NIGHT THIRTYONE MAY REPORTED MIDWAY EARLY THREE JUNE X BLUE FORCE THREE BATTLESHIPS LARGE CARRIER SIX TO TEN CRUISERS ABOUT TWENTY DESTROYERS PASSED NOEASTWARD ALENUIHANA CHANNEL LATE THIRTYONE MAY X BLUE CONVOY ABOUT TWELVE COMBAT LOADED TRANSPORTS TWELVE AUXILIARIES PORT TOWNSEND ESTIMATED DEPARTURE EIGHTEEN HUNDRED UNIT FIVE JUNE MAXIMUM SPD TWELVE X BLUE AIRCRAFT PATROLS INCREASED INTENSITY X

NO ORANGE NAVAL FORCES THIS AREA NOT LISTED TASK ORGANIZATION X

ASSUMPTIONS BLUE ATTEMPT STRENGTHEN BASES OR ESTABLISH NEW BASE ALUTS X COVERING SUPPORTING DIVERSIONARY OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY FORCES LEAVING HAWAIIAN AREA

PARA GENPLAN THIS FORCE WILL PREVENT STRENGTHENING EXISTING OR ESTABLISHMENT NEW BLUE BASES SOWEST ALASKA OR ALUTS IN ORDER DELAY BLUE EXTENSION NAVAL BASES WESTWARD OF HAWAII

PARA TASK MAIN BODY CONDUCT DIVERSIONARY OPERATIONS DIRECTION MIDWAY COVER FLANK RETIREMENT NORTHERN RAIDING FORCE X NORTHERN RAIDING FORCE VADM OB BATDIV THREE CV ELEVEN CRUDIVS FOUR FIVE SIXTEEN CL EIGHTEEN DESDIVS FIVE TWENTYTWO TWENTYNINE THIRTY THIRTYFOUR AO TWO TO SEVEN AD ONE TWO AF ONE TWO PREVENT PORT TOWNSEND CONVOY ARRIVING SOWEST ALASKA OR ALUTS

PARA XRAY PLAN EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT

PARA LOGISTICS PLAN THREE COMBFLT LOGPLAN A

PARA COMMAND COMBFLT COMPLAN SIX X ZONE TIME LOVE EXCEPT NORTHERN RAIDING FORCE ZONE TIME XRAY X RENDEZVOUS LIST TWELVE X CINC COMBFLT IN BB ELEVEN MAIN BODY X

ORANGE CINCOMBINED OPPLAN THIRTEEN FORTYTHREE

4764-4264
31/May/44c1

87

42.

EXAMPLE OF A DESPATCH ORDER

(Operation Order)

FROM: COMTF 51
TO : ACTION ADEES
INFO: INFO ADEES

INFO ORANGE HOLDS MARSHALLS LESS KWAJALEIN X RABAU KAVIENG
NEUTRALIZED X LOW VISIBILITY PREVENTED ACCURATE OBSERVATIONS
ENEMY MOVEMENT DISPOSITIONS CAROLINES SINCE ONE AUGUST NORMAL
VISIBILITY EAST OF PONAPE UNTIL FIFTEEN AUGUST X

HEAVY CONCENTRATION ORANGE COMBFLT UNITS ONE AUGUST CAROLINES
TRUK WESTWARD X ORANGE LIGHT FORCES ONE AUGUST WAKE PONAPE
KAPINGAMARANGI X PONAPE FIELDS BELIEVED IN USE X

CENTPACFOR DIRECTED CAPTURE JALUIT DOG DAY EIGHT AUGUST X
ASSAULTFOR ORDERED SEIZE JALUIT MAIN BODY RESPONSIBLE SUPPORT
ASSAULTFOR X MAIN BODY SOWESPACFOR NEAR KAPINGAMARANGI TO
CREATE DIVERSION X ROI AIRDET DAILY RECONNAISSANCE BOMBING TRUK
AS WEATHER PERMITS X SEVENTH AIRFOR BOMBERS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST

PARA GENPLAN THIS FORCE WILL COVER ASSAULTFOR AGAINST INTERFERENCE
FROM WESTWARD IN ORDER ASSIST CAPTURE JALUIT

PARA TASK TG FIFTYONE POINT ONE RADM BT CRUDIVS NINE TWELVE
THIRTEEN DESRON FOUR CARDIV ONE DETECT PASSAGE ENEMY MERIDIAN
KUSAIE BETWEEN EQUATOR AND TEN DEGREES NORTH X BEGIN SCOUT ZERO
FIVE HUNDRED LOVE EIGHT AUGUST X TG FIFTYONE POINT TWO RADM
BU BATDIV TEN CRUDIV TEN DESRONS ONE TWO CARDIV TWO SUPPORT TG
FIFTYONE POINT ONE RETIRE ON MAIN BODY CENTPACFOR IF SUPERIOR
ENEMY ENCOUNTERED

PARA XRAY OPOD EFFECTIVE EIGHTEEN HUNDRED LOVE SIX AUGUST

PARA LOGISTICS CENTPACFOR LOGPLAN FOUR

PARA COMLIAND CENTPACFOR COMPLAN SIX X ZONE TIME LOVE X
RENDEZVOUS LIST FOURTEEN X COMTF FIFTYONE IN BB FIFTYSIX TF
FIFTYONE POINT TWO X COMBATDIV TEN OPODER TWENTYTWO FORTYFOUR

EXECUTION (Continued)

THE FOURTH STEP

THE SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNED ACTION

- A. For the commander, the Supervision of the Planned Action
1. Commences in a preparatory sense with the issue of the complete directive.
 2. Commences in an active sense with the making effective of directive.
- B. For the subordinate:
1. The planning period extends from the hour of receipt of the complete directive from the superior until the hour of issue of own complete directive.
 2. The preparatory period extends from the hour at which own complete directive is issued until the hour at which it is made effective.
 3. The operating period extends from the hour at which own directive is made effective until mission is accomplished or until such directive is superseded by a later one.
- C. To carry on the many duties comprised in the Supervision of the Planned Action, the Commander must make adequate preparation and must follow a systematic procedure for:
- (a) Recording enemy information received, and when necessary, evaluating its credibility, accuracy and significance,
 - (b) Disseminating essential elements of information acquired or received,
 - (c) Maintaining a grasp of the progress of the current operations,
 - (d) Recognizing the potentialities of the situation as they develop,
 - (e) Re-estimating the situation in the event of changes in the superior's plans, and
 - (f) Determining and inaugurating, within the limits of his discretion, the most effective action which under the existing conditions can be taken by his command.
- D. Requisites for effective Supervision of the Planned Action:
- (a) An adequate, properly organized, and well-trained staff,
 - (b) An efficient staff procedure,
 - (c) A thorough basic Estimate of the Situation.
 - (d) A well-considered Plan, and
 - (e) An effective Running Estimate.
- E. Staff Organization for the Supervision of the Planned Action.
- Intelligence Section and Operations Section.
1. Intelligence Section is responsible for:
 - (a) Collating and presenting in a readily accessible form all available information in relation to enemy forces, and as to installations, bases, airfields, and defended or fortified areas in the theater of operations which are not under control of own force.

- (b) Recording all enemy information received and when necessary evaluating its credibility, accuracy, and significance.
- (c) Assisting in making conclusions as to relative fighting strength and in judging enemy capabilities.
- (d) Drafting of the Enemy Forces section of the Information Paragraph of all Directives, and
- (e) Preparing despatches to disseminate appropriately all essential elements of enemy information acquired or received.

Also maintains:

- (f) Separate files of incoming and outgoing despatches,
- (g) An Intelligence Journal,
- (h) An Intelligence Situation Chart, or Charts,
- (i) Intelligence Work Sheets, which constitute the Intelligence portion of the Running Estimate, and
- (j) A file of Intelligence Reports made by this Section.

2. The Operations Section is responsible for:

- (a) Maintaining in a readily accessible form all data pertaining to own forces, installations, bases and airfields,
- (b) Assisting the commander in making Estimates of the Situation, in formulating plans and directives, and
- (c) When the commander is acting as O.T.C., assisting in the exercise of tactical command,

Also maintains:

- (d) A State of the Command Board,
- (e) A file of current directives, both received and issued; separate files of incoming and outgoing dispatches; and a file of Estimates of the Situation made or received from others,
- (f) An Operations Journal,
- (g) An Operations Situation Chart, and
- (h) A Running Estimate, except the Intelligence portion.

F. The Running Estimate comprises:

Section 1 - The Summary of the Situation, consisting of one sheet for each of the following headings:

- (a) General Situation,
- (b) Enemy Forces,
- (c) Own Forces, (including own command),
- (d) Assumptions,
- (e) Relative Fighting Strength,
- (f) Enemy Objective, and
- (g) Own Mission.

Section 2 - Reaching the Decision, comprising:

- A* - Determination of Own Courses of Action,
- B* - Analysis of Enemy Capabilities, and
- C - Comparison of Own Courses of Action, resulting in the Decision.

*B precedes A when enemy obviously possesses the strategic initiative.

Section 3 - Solution of the Complementary Military Problems

(Follows usual form according to the time available, the complexity of the problem, and the degree of experience and judgment possessed by the commander.)

Thereafter, the strategical or tactical situation governs the procedure of formulating and promulgating the directives evolved from, or modified by, the Running Estimate.

END

