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NAVAL MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING



**U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND**

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NAVAL MANUAL
OF
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
1948

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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1. "Naval Manual of Operational Planning" issued herewith is effective on receipt and supersedes "Cominch P-1, Naval Directives and the Order Form".

2. The matter contained in this Manual is prescribed as standard for use in the formulation of Naval directives.

/s/ LOUIS DENFELD
LOUIS DENFELD

Chief of Naval Operations.

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FOREWORD

Following the adoption of standard planning forms for use in Joint Schools and in all agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the President of the Naval War College to prepare a manual containing these standard forms and such amplifying instructions as necessary in order to adopt these forms as standard throughout the Navy.

The Navy Manual of Operational Planning has attempted to combine in the clearest and simplest terms, the various existing instructions in effect for planning Naval Operations.

Additional detailed study of planning can be obtained from the Naval War College publications "Sound Military Decision (1942)", and "Operational Functions of Command (1945)".

The solution of a military problem requires:

1. An estimate of the situation.

Here the mission (what the commander has been told to do and the reason for it) is set forth, necessary information relating to it is assembled and examined, and a decision is made as to what must be done and, in general, how it is to be done.

2. The development of the plan.

With the decision as a basis, the plan for implementing this decision is developed.

3. The directive.

The directive (the communication which starts or governs action) is prepared.

4. The supervision of the operation.

Any changes or adjustments to the plan are made to suit the actual conditions which develop during the execution of the plan.

In many ways the solution of a military problem is similar to the solution of the problems of everyday life. When one is faced with a problem, he studies the situation from all angles and decides what must be done. He then determines how it should be done - and proceeds to act, governing his actions according to the development of the situation. Hundreds of such problems are solved by everyone. The great majority of them are not committed to writing, nor are they consciously

solved in phases. They are solved by the natural, logical thought process normally pursued by the human mind.

In military problems the situation is much more complex, and the stakes are much higher. In order to insure a logical thought process, to guard against the oversight of important details, and to form a readily available record, military problems are usually solved in written form.

It is the purpose of this Manual to aid in the development of sound reasoning. There is no substitute for good sound reasoning in military planning. No check-off list nor diagram can be the key to a sound solution. With the exception of the Operation Plan and Operation Order Forms, this Manual does not attempt to prescribe a standard form for solving military problems. It merely outlines a logical procedure for arriving at a sound decision that can be translated into successful action. The emphasis is placed on sound reasoning - on the logical approach to military problems.

Throughout the entire planning phase and during the execution phase, a military situation remains fluid - never static. Open-mindedness on the part of military planners is therefore indispensable. Changing conditions will often require reversal or revision of previous decisions. Instead of striving to justify questionable decisions, the successful commander must be quick to recognize and correct their weaknesses.

In war there is no second prize; there is seldom a second chance.

THE ARMED FORCES ESTIMATE FORM

This chapter sets forth the Standard Armed Forces Form for the Estimate of the Situation. It is quoted verbatim from the Joint Chiefs of Staff document which prescribes standard planning forms. This form is now used by all of our armed forces.

STANDARD FORM

1. MISSION. A statement of the task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. If there are intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission, such tasks should be listed in this paragraph.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

(a) Considerations affecting the possible courses of action:

Determine and analyze those factors of the situation which will influence your choice of a course of action as well as those which affect the capabilities of the enemy to act adversely. Consider such of the following and other factors as are involved:

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations, including terrain, hydrography, weather, communications, as well as political, economic, and psychological factors.

(2) Relative combat power, including enemy and friendly strength, composition, disposition, status of supply, reinforcements.

(b) Enemy Capabilities: Note all the possible courses of action within the capabilities of the enemy which can affect the accomplishment of your mission.

(c) Own Courses of Action: Note all practicable courses of action open to you which if successful will accomplish your mission.

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3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of your own courses of action.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of your courses of action and decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing your mission.

5. DECISION. Translate the course of action selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and so much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. GENERAL. Every military operation should have a definite aim. All missions assigned incident to an operation are contributory to this end. A commander's Mission as conveyed in orders or instructions from higher authority should require the adoption of a positive course of action which will meet the situation confronting his command. The course of action adopted should be the result of a sound decision. A sound decision results from a timely and proper estimate of the situation.

B. PURPOSE. The purpose of the estimate is to ensure that the commander gives due consideration to all factors in the situation, including enemy capabilities (courses of action open to the enemy which may interfere with the accomplishment of the commander's mission), to the end that he may adopt a course of action which:

(a) If successful, permits the accomplishment of his mission.

(b) Offers the best prospects of success.

If more than one course of action meets these requirements equally, that one should be adopted which most favors future action.

C. ELEMENTS OF THE ESTIMATE. The following discusses the paragraphs of the commander's Estimate of the Situation:

(a) Paragraph 1 (Mission). A commander's mission is derived in one of two ways.

(1) Set forth in the orders or instructions received from higher authority, or

(2) Deduced by him from his instructions and his knowledge of the situation.

^{HT}In the case of (1) above, the commander must give careful consideration to the wording of the orders or instructions which he has received to be certain that he clearly understands the intent of his superior. In (2), he must be certain that the mission he deduces will contribute to the accomplishment of the mission of his superior. The mission is the actuating factor of the estimate. It is a statement of the task and its purpose.

(b) Paragraph 2 (The Situation and Courses of Action).

(1) The purpose of this paragraph is to determine:

(a) The physical capabilities of the enemy to interfere with the accomplishment of the mission, and

(b) All of the reasonable and practicable courses of action open to the commander which, if successful, will permit the accomplishment of the mission. Enemy capabilities and a commander's own possible courses of action are arrived at by considering the possible effects of the factors of the situation which might favor or hinder his or the enemy's course of action.

(2) Factors are usually considered in the order of their importance in the given situation. The consideration of each factor divides itself naturally into:

(a) A statement of the existing situation as regards the factor, and

(b) A deduction as to the probable consequences. The deductions indicate the influence of the facts on the commander's choice of a course of action and on the physical capabilities of the enemy to act adversely. In practice, it will generally be found that not more than two or three "own courses of action" will require a complete analysis.

(3) Following a consideration of all pertinent factors in the situation, those enemy capabilities which deductions have indicated may interfere with the accomplishment of the mission are enumerated for further analysis in connection with the commander's own course of action. When warranted, the relative order of probability of adoption of the indicated enemy capabilities is noted.

(4) The final step in this paragraph is the enumeration of such of the commander's own courses of action as are to be carried forward for analysis and comparison in the light of enemy capabilities. Only those courses of action are retained for further consideration which, if successful, will accomplish, or facilitate the accomplishment of the mission.

(5) Check-lists of items to be considered under this paragraph and compiled for the appropriate planning echelons and services are often desirable.

(c) Paragraph 3 (Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action).

In this paragraph each of the "own courses of action" remaining for consideration after the conclusions reached in paragraph 2 is separately weighed in turn against each capability of the enemy which may interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. The results to be expected in each case are visualized. The advantages and disadvantages of each course of action with respect to the enemy's ability to oppose it are thus determined.

(d) Paragraph 4 (Comparison of Own Courses of Action).

In this paragraph the advantages and disadvantages noted as a result of the analysis made in paragraphs 2 and 3 for each "own course of action" are summarized, and the various courses of action are compared and weighed. That course of action which appears to offer the greatest prospect of success is selected. If several courses of action offer equal prospects of success, that one is chosen which most favors future action. The commander formulates his decision accordingly.

(e) Paragraph 5 (Decision). The decision reached as a result of the estimate is expressed in the form of a brief statement clearly setting forth the course of action adopted. This decision is then the basis for plans.

D. THE ESTIMATE A CONTINUOUS PROCESS. The formulation of an estimate of the situation is a continuous process for the commander. With each change in the situation, he must review his estimate and decide either to continue the course of action upon which he is proceeding or to make and announce a new decision. For example, when hostile contact is expected, the initial decision may be merely to continue an advance

already begun. As information of the enemy is accumulated, the commander may then be able to decide that he will attack. The tactical method of attack may have to be determined later as the situation further develops. On the other hand, when action is urgent a commander may have to make his complete decision and issue orders in compliance with his mission, regardless of scanty information or a rapidly changing situation.

E. EXTENT OF THE ESTIMATE.

(a) General. The estimate should be as thorough as the time available will permit. It may thus vary from a short, almost instantaneous, mental estimate, to a carefully written document requiring hours of preparation and the collaboration of various staff officers. For example, in a large command with ample time, Intelligence may be called upon to estimate the hostile situation; Operations may be called upon to estimate the friendly situation; Logistics may be called upon to submit a logistics estimate, expressing the influence of the logistics factors on the contemplated course of action; and other staff officers may be called upon for estimates relating to their functions. Portions of these estimates, if approved, may be incorporated in the proper places in the commander's estimate. The estimate should be sufficiently complete to include a determination of the enemy capabilities, the course of action open to the commander, and a consideration of the effect of the enemy capabilities on each of these courses of action, before arriving at a decision.

(b) Use of the form for the commander's estimate.

The form for the commander's estimate establishes a sequence in which

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the elements of a situation should be considered. When time is not pressing, the form may be physically referred to and a complete written estimate may be made by the commander. When time is pressing, the form may be used as a mental check-list to ensure that the commander considers all elements of the situation in arriving at his decision.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTIMATE

Warfare is filled with intangibles too numerous and variable to permit solution of a military problem by formula. The Estimate of the Situation is a logical procedure by which these many factors may be considered. In addition to helping the commander reach a sound decision the Estimate also bares facts which provide a foundation for later development of plans. By keeping these two purposes in mind the material to be considered can be limited.

The Armed Forces Estimate Form has been shown to consist of the following five major sections:

1. MISSION
2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
5. DECISION

These five sections establish a logical sequence for recording data and ideas.

There are several methods of developing these sections in detail. One method, and it is shown only as a guide, is outlined below.

1. MISSION.

The Mission consists of two parts:

- (a) The Task (i.e. what is to be accomplished)
- (b) The Purpose (i.e. why the Task is to be accomplished)

Before proceeding further with the Estimate the mission should be analyzed. This analysis should accomplish two things. First, it should ensure that the Task is thoroughly understood; and second, it should ensure an understanding of why the Task is to be accomplished. If the

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Purpose has not been supplied by the superior it must be derived by the subordinate. It is only by knowing why a Task is to be accomplished that the most intelligent action will follow. The Purpose will normally be to assist the superior in some manner in carrying out his own general plan. The superior therefore should make his general plan known to his subordinates. If he does not do so specifically, those subordinates must derive the Purpose from their own knowledge of the existing situation. Frequently there will be several subordinate commanders, each assigned a different task but a common purpose, i.e., to contribute to the success of the superior's general plan. For example, the superior's general plan may be the capture of an island objective. Among his forces he may have land based air, a naval striking force, and expeditionary troops. The land based air might be assigned the task of neutralizing certain enemy air fields; the naval striking force the task of isolating the objective; and the expeditionary troops the task of executing ground operations. Each one of these forces is thus assigned a separate specific task with the same purpose, i.e., to assist in the capture of the objective.

In most cases a commander's mission is assigned by higher authority. Sometimes the commander does not have these specific instructions and must deduce his entire mission from his knowledge of the general and special situations and his superior's general plan. A mission so derived must be designed to render the greatest possible support to the superior's plan.

The extent of the analysis of the Mission cannot be specified in advance but is determined by the clarity of the Mission and the subordinate's knowledge of the existing situation. A clear understanding

of the Task and its Purpose is the only criterion. If this can be gained at a glance no further analysis is necessary.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

This section may be broken down into three sub-sections as follows:

(a) Considerations affecting the possible courses of action.

(1) The situation.

(2) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(3) Relative combat power.

(4) Strength and weakness factors.

(b) Enemy capabilities.

(c) Own courses of action.

A further development of these three sub-sections is necessary.

(a) Considerations affecting the possible courses of action.

(1) The Situation.

The general situation should be analyzed for its effects upon the enemy as well as upon own forces. This analysis need be no more extensive than necessary to provide a clear point of departure for the remainder of the Estimate. Items so obvious as to be matters of common knowledge need not be recorded. The situation may be one actually confronting the commander, or it may be a situation assumed for purposes of planning.

(2) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.

The items discussed under the characteristics of the area of operations will be determined largely by the nature of the problem. In a broad strategic problem political, economic

and psychological factors; terrain, hydrography, weather, facilities and fixed defenses, daylight and dark periods, and communications, represent a partial list. Other pertinent items may be added or unnecessary ones deleted. For instance, the political and economic factors would have little bearing upon purely tactical problems. Factors should be analyzed in relation to their effect upon the enemy as well as upon our own forces. In determining the extent of this subject the best guide is to restrict the material included to that which is directly connected with the problem at hand. This is a matter of judgment.

One recommended system is the recording of conclusions drawn from the data considered. These conclusions form a connecting link between the facts and the problem at hand. They are estimates of how the factors discussed will affect own and enemy forces and operations. Material which will form no basis for a conclusion or no basis for a plan should not be included.

(3) Relative Combat Power.

The discussion of relative combat power is something more than a mere tabulation of opposing combat units. It includes a discussion of other factors which determine the combat potential and efficiency of the opposing forces. Such additional items include personnel training and efficiency, logistic support, reinforcements, special weapons, and quality of equipment. The time and space factor in its relation to disposition of forces

and their possible movement should also be included under this heading, because of the importance of position in its relation to the striking power of opposing forces. The time and space factor is more than a table of distances. It is only by most careful analysis of this factor that an estimate can be made of when the enemy or our own forces can be placed in the most effective positions.

From the discussion of factors under relative combat power conclusions should be drawn as to their effect upon the operation.

(4) Strength and Weakness Factors.

Strength and weakness factors of both belligerents must be determined so that we can exploit our own strength and take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses. These factors should have been disclosed by the analysis of the situation, characteristics of the area of operations, and by the consideration of relative combat power.

Normally a weakness factor for one side is a strength factor for the other and vice versa. Hence if this is obvious and recorded in proper terms there is no need to put the same information down twice. For example, if the fact is recorded that one power is overwhelming in surface strength it would be superfluous to add that the opposing power is greatly inferior in surface strength. In some cases a specific condition will be a strength factor or a weakness for each belligerent, and if so it should be thus recorded.

(b) Enemy Capabilities.

Enemy capabilities are partial or complete courses of action which the enemy is capable of executing in interfering with the accomplishment of our mission. They should be stated broadly and in terms of accomplishment. (e.g. "to seize" instead of "to attack"; "to neutralize" instead of "to strike"). The individual actions which the enemy can take to exploit these capabilities are considered later under ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION.

Examples of possible enemy capabilities in a situation where our task is to seize an overseas objective might be,

- (1) Reinforce the objective prior to arrival of our forces.
- (2) Destroy our forces engaged in the capture of the objective.

Study must not be limited to those enemy actions which appear most probable; all his physical capabilities to interfere with the accomplishment of our mission must be considered. Reliable intelligence or particular knowledge of the enemy's characteristics may justify basing the primary plan upon enemy intentions or probable actions. Even in this case, however, his remaining capabilities must not be disregarded. Enemy intentions are subject to change without our knowledge; the enemy may be using deceptive measures.

Planners cannot simply fashion plans to meet the most probable event in a world in which the improbable frequently occurs. They must be prepared to act on the most probable basis, but alternate plans and courses of action must be prepared in case their calculations prove erroneous. Plans must be based on multiple

contingencies. Perfect forecasting is impossible, and basing plans solely on a best estimate is a hazardous risk. Plans should be made which will afford adequate timely action for the most probable contingency and at the same time be usable if less probable contingencies occur.

(c) Own Courses of Actions.

A course of action is a tentative solution to the military problem under consideration. It consists of two parts: (1) The objective (what is to be done) and (2) the action to be taken for the attainment of the objective (how, in general terms, it is to be done).

A course of action is expressed in terms of accomplishment - that is, the objective, as defined above, expresses a result desired.

Example:

If the mission is to secure control of the sea lanes passing through area Mike, which is dominated by enemy forces operating from Xray Island, possible courses of action might be:

- (a) Capture Xray Island by an amphibious landing.
- (b) Neutralize Xray Island by naval gunfire and aerial bombardment.

Note that each of these examples contains an objective and the action to be taken to attain that objective.

In most cases a short study of a proposed course of action will reveal whether or not, if carried out, it will accomplish the mission. A proposed course of action which will not accomplish the mission need not be considered further for in such case it is not in fact a course of action because it is not a solution to the problem.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION.

In this section each retained "Own Course of Action" is tested against each "Enemy Capability". Thus the number of comparisons required is the product of the retained number of "Own Courses of Action" and "Enemy Capabilities".

In a written Estimate it is advisable to write down the opposing courses being analyzed.

Example:

Own Course of Action No. 1 - "Capture Xray Island by amphibious assault".

Versus

Enemy Capability No. 2 - "Destroy Blue expeditionary and supporting forces threatening Xray Island".

This procedure aids in focusing attention on, and limiting the discussion to, the courses being analyzed.

In this analysis "Own Courses of Action" and "Enemy Capabilities" are broken down into specific operations necessary for their execution. For example, in discussing an enemy capability which has been broadly stated, as the destruction of our forces enroute to an objective, those actions which the enemy can take to effect that destruction are analyzed. His surface forces, submarines, aircraft and other means at his disposal are considered. In this analysis the means for meeting each weapon the enemy is able to employ in exploiting his capabilities should be investigated. A basis is established in this manner for a conclusion as to whether the enemy can oppose effectively "Own Courses of Action". A basis is also established for an estimate of probable losses in carrying out "Own Courses of Action" in the face of enemy capabilities.

A course of action is not necessarily discarded merely because it would fail if the enemy exploited his capabilities to their theoretical maximum. Special intelligence, or knowledge of the enemy's character, should be considered as well as his capabilities based purely upon material strength.

The analysis of opposing courses should disclose data which will assist in the development of any plan based upon the Estimate. For instance, a study of enemy capabilities will reveal tasks which must be assigned own forces in order to meet those capabilities.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION.

The purpose of this section is to determine the relative merits of "Own Courses of Action" which have been considered. This can sometimes be accomplished by listing the advantages and disadvantages of each course.

Before a course of action is adopted it must be examined for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. A course of action is suitable if, either alone or in combination with others, it will accomplish the mission within the required time limits; it is feasible if it can be carried out with the forces available and in the face of enemy capabilities; it is acceptable if the results to be obtained from its execution are worth the estimated cost.

If the Estimate up to this point has been sound no course of action which is not suitable has been carried forward. The analysis and comparison have provided a basis for determining whether the courses of action are feasible and acceptable. The decision is reached by professional judgment rather than by formula. A course of action may appear perfectly feasible to a daring and aggressive commander but infeasible to a more conservative one.

In deciding what losses are acceptable the primary criterion is the result expected from a successfully executed course of action. The results expected from some operations will justify very few losses whereas others, such as those designed to repel a major threat to the nation, or to create a situation where the enemy will be annihilated later, may justify the loss of the entire force engaged. The British in the autumn of 1940 and the Soviets in their defense of Stalingrad exhibited the willingness to accept whatever losses were necessary to repel the invader.

In some instances it is possible that a commander may fail to accomplish his immediate mission but may so damage or delay the enemy that the losses sustained in the attempt are acceptable. Such long range results may or may not be apparent to the commander at the time. The more accurately they can be estimated the easier it becomes for the commander to decide what losses are acceptable.

If no course of action appears suitable, feasible and acceptable the commander concerned should present his conclusions and supporting facts to his superior. It may be that the detailed analysis has revealed probable losses far beyond those estimated by the superior when he assigned the mission. On the other hand he may be willing to pay the price for success of the mission, even to the expenditure of the entire force involved.

5. THE DECISION.

The decision expresses a general plan of action for accomplishment of the task of the mission. It is the basis for a commander's plan of action for his entire force. The decision states:

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(a) What the force as a whole is going to do.

(b) Why this is to be done.

How, in general terms, the operation will be carried out may also be specified if appropriate. This may also include when and where if necessary.

The first of the above two components is taken from the preferred course of action, or from a combination of two or more courses of action. The second component shows the purpose of the chosen course of action, and is thus usually stated as "in order to" accomplish the task assigned in the commander's mission.

While the wording of the decision is not bound by rigid form, use of the same statement here as will be later used in paragraph 2 of the directive will be helpful.

Example:

Assuming the task of the assigned mission is, "Secure control of the sea lanes passing through Area Mike", that area being dominated by enemy forces operating from Xray Island, a decision might be:

"To neutralize Xray Island by surface and aerial bombardment, in order to secure control of the sea lanes passing through Area Mike".

Time available will not always permit the Estimate of the Situation to be produced as a written document. If time is available and the projected operation is of a complicated nature it is desirable to make a formal written Estimate for two primary reasons. First, such a method permits the recording of the thoughts of the writer or the combined thoughts of the staff making the research. This record is then available for reference and helps to prevent the oversight of pertinent factors.

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Secondly, the written record is available for study by other levels of command as well as by the commander for whom it is made.

Regardless of whether or not the Estimate of the Situation is written, it must not be permitted to become a purely theoretical procedure which will not stand up under the realities of war. The Estimate is a flexible means for the orderly and practical consideration of the factors involved in the solution of a military problem.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

A military plan is a proposed procedure for future action. It outlines the measures required to translate the Decision into effective action. There is a distinction between a plan and a directive. A plan may exist as a rough outline, a series of recommendations, or it may exist only in the mind. A plan may be placed in the Armed Forces Operation Plan Form. In this latter case it may specify the time or conditions under which it becomes effective, thereby becoming a directive at that time.

A plan, even though written, is not necessarily distributed. In some cases it is retained by the commander as the basis for a later directive. In other cases it is distributed to appropriate subordinate echelons to expedite and facilitate their planning prior to receipt of the actual directive.

This chapter is concerned with the development of the plan as an entity separate and distinct from the directive. The transposition of the plan into a directive in the Armed Forces Operation Order or Operation Plan Form is covered in Chapter V.

The development of the plan is outlined herein as a separate step in the solution of a military problem. In many instances it is not necessary to prepare the plan as a separate document. In comparatively minor operations, or when time is pressing, the plan may be no more than rough notes, calculations, chart work, or mere mental processes. In this case the plan and directive are developed concurrently, but only one document, the directive, is actually produced.

If the decision from which the plan is developed is intended to be carried out only under certain circumstances, the assumptions describing those circumstances, that is, the assumptions upon which the decision is based, should be kept clearly in mind during the preparation of the plan. (Assumptions are discussed in detail, later in this chapter)

The development of a plan may be undertaken in the following manner:

(a) Analyze the decision.

The purpose of this analysis is to break down the decision into the component operations necessary for its execution. The analysis may take the form of a broad, rough outline of the whole operation. This analysis is, in effect, the commander's tentative concept of the operation. Some or all of the component operations may have been disclosed in the development of the Estimate. If so, this work is not repeated.

(b) List the component, or complementary, operations determined by the analysis of the decision. The following list is typical of the component operations involved in most military operations:

(1) Obtain intelligence.

Adequate intelligence must be obtained during the planning and execution phases of an operation. This intelligence may be obtained by searches, preliminary raids, information from other commands, etc.

(2) Movement or deployment.

Assemble and move forces to the objective area or deploy them to meet a threatened attack.

(3) Protect own forces.

This involves the protection of own units from attack by the enemy during movements, protection of own bases, protection of own troops, etc.

(4) Isolate the objective.

Prevent the enemy from bringing additional forces or supplies into the objective area.

(5) Gain the objective.

In an amphibious operation this would involve the actual seizure of the territory, the physical objective of the entire operation. If the operation involved the defense of a convoy the physical objective would probably be the enemy weapons aimed at the destruction of the convoy. All other component operations support the operation that is directly concerned with gaining the objective.

(6) Provide logistic support.

Make provision for delivery of fuel, ammunition, provisions, replacement personnel, etc., to the operating forces. Salvage, evacuation of wounded, handling of prisoners, etc., should also be considered under this heading.

(7) Provide for security and deception.

Conceal information of own forces and plans from the enemy.

(c) Determine how each component (complementary) operation is to be carried out.

This can be done by determining under each operation what has to be done, that is, the tasks involved, and what weapons (or

forces) are available to perform each task. It must be remembered however, that the procedure followed in preparing a plan need not result in a formal document. The component (complementary) problems must, in any event, be recognized and solved in some manner.

The following illustration, in diagrammatic form, indicates the thought process pursued in the development of the plan. The decision used as an example in this diagram is "To Capture and Occupy Zebra Island, in order to obtain an Advanced Base". It should be noted that the "Decision" column, the "Component Operations" column, and the "Tasks" column each result in accomplishing the purpose of the decision - "To obtain an advanced base". Only the "Obtain Intelligence" and "Protect Own Forces" operations are worked out in this illustration.

MEANS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM TASK

TASKS

COMPONENT OPERATIONS

DECISION

Submarines, Aircraft, Info. from other Commands
Aircraft
Info. from other Commands, Submarines
Aircraft, Surface-Ships, Submarines
Aircraft, Submarines

Obtain Intelligence of Beaches
Obtain Photographs of ZEBRA IS.
Observe Air and Ship Movements
Search Sea Area around ZEBRA
Observe Enemy Air Bases within Range of ZEBRA

Task (1)
Task (2)
Task (3)

SEIZE ZEBRA ISLAND
(Gain the Objective)

Task (1)
Task (2)
Task (3)

MOVE FORCES TO ZEBRA IS.

Aircraft
Aircraft, Anti-Aircraft Ships
Surface-Ships, Aircraft, Submarines
Submarines, Aircraft

Neutralize Enemy Air Bases
Protect against Air Attack
Protect against Naval Attack
Destroy Enemy Ships leaving their Bases

PROTECT OWN FORCES

Escort Ships, Aircraft
Aircraft, Surface-Ships, Submarines

Protect against Submarine Attack
Early warning of approaching enemy forces

Task (1)
Task (2)
Task (3)
Task (4)

ISOLATE ZEBRA ISLAND

Task (1)
Task (2)
Task (3)

PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Task (1)
Task (2)

PROVIDE SECURITY AND DECEPTION

OBTAIN ADVANCED BASE
(PURPOSE OF DECISION)

OBTAIN ADVANCED BASE
(PURPOSE OF DECISION)

CAPTURE AND OCCUPY ZEBRA ISLAND

IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ADVANCED BASE
(PURPOSE OF DECISION)

- (d) Organize the forces available into a Task Organization to perform the tasks worked out from the component operations.
- (e) Assign tasks to appropriate elements in the Task Organization. Considerable adjustment may be necessary between organization and tasks before all tasks are assigned. There may, for instance, be too many tasks tentatively assigned to aircraft for the size of the force available. In that case reassignment of some of the tasks to other weapons will be necessary.

Tasks of a similar nature may be grouped together into subsidiary plans and later included as annexes to the basic directive. A Search Plan, Movement Plan, Intelligence Plan, etc., may be prepared in this manner.

A Commander's knowledge of the ability and experience of his subordinate commanders and of the capabilities, limitations, experience, and state of readiness of the units under his command is helpful in developing an effective organization and in assigning tasks.

- (f) Solve command problems.

In order to permit the Task Organization to function properly during an operation, solutions to the following problems are necessary:

- (1) Communications.

The Communication Plan usually takes the form of an annex to the basic directive.

(2) Coordinating measures.

In order to prevent misunderstanding during an operation, the divisions of responsibility among the various subordinate commanders must be clearly defined.

(3) Location of the Officer in Tactical Command and the Second in Command, together with other important features of the chain of command.

(4) Time and date, or conditions under which the plan will become effective.

(g) Compile the information required by subordinates to permit them to carry out intelligently their assigned tasks. This information is normally prepared under the following general headings:

(1) General Situation.

(a) Enemy Forces.

(b) Friendly Forces.

In the following table sections of the Order Form are listed in the order that they would be considered if the procedure outlined in this chapter for the development of a plan is followed.

| <u>Development of the Plan</u> | <u>Corresponding place in the Order Form</u> |
|---|---|
| 1. State the decision. | Decision becomes the General Plan, paragraph 2, of the directive. |
| 2. State assumptions, if used as basis for decision. | Assumptions included in paragraph 1 of Operation Plan. |
| 3. Determine the component (complementary) operations necessary to carry out the decision. | ----- |
| 4. Determine <u>how</u> each component (complementary) operation will be carried out by preparing an itemized list of what has to be done (tasks) for each operation. | ----- |
| 5. Organize forces to perform these tasks. | Task Organization. |
| 6. Assign tasks to appropriate elements of Task Organization. | Paragraphs 3 and 4 (task and logistics paragraphs). If task assignments are too voluminous, some of them are placed in Annexes. |
| 7. Solve Command Problems. | Sub-paragraph 3(x) or paragraph 5 (command paragraph), as appropriate. |
| 8. Compile information necessary to permit subordinates to perform tasks intelligently. | Paragraph 1, General Situation Paragraph. If information is too voluminous some of it is placed in an Annex. |

ASSUMPTIONS

An assumption, when used as a basis for planning, denotes a condition or situation that is taken for granted. In order to plan future operations or to be prepared for future emergencies, it is necessary to visualize a situation that is likely to develop. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff might pose the question, "Suppose war develops between the United States and the Zebra Empire, what action should we take?" They then determine what action to take to meet that visualized, or assumed, situation. The decision resulting from the estimate of a visualized situation is thus based on the assumptions that describe the situation used as the basis for the planning. These assumptions are accepted as fact during the entire course of the planning.

If the situation that actually develops differs from that outlined in the assumptions the decision must be revised to meet the new situation. To provide for this contingency it is usually prudent to determine what action to take, and to prepare appropriate plans, to meet more than one likely situation. The situation that actually develops, however, may differ slightly from that foreseen in any of the prepared plans. In this event slight modification of the most appropriate plan may be sufficient to adapt it to the actual situation.

The ability to recognize and frame correct assumptions requires the best in professional knowledge and judgment. Assumptions limit the field to be considered by the planner. They define the situation that the plan is designed to meet; they are restrictions on that plan. If adopted, they should be few in number and worded so that they describe accurately the conditions under which the plan is intended to be used.

In an Operation Plan that has been placed in effect assumptions have no significance to subordinates other than as information. Assumptions in an Operation Plan inform subordinates of the commander's proposed action in a situation such as that described by the assumptions. They should not be inserted in an Operation Plan merely to alert subordinates. They are tools used by the commander in preparing his plan. They are not conjectures, guesses, or probabilities.

Assumptions may be used as a basis for preparing subsidiary, or supporting plans, as well as basic plans. Thus a number of search plans, battle plans, fueling plans, etc., may be prepared to cover different situations that might be encountered. For example, one battle plan might be based on the assumption that the enemy will be encountered at night; another might be based on the assumption that he will be brought to action during daylight. One fueling plan could be based on the assumption that the weather will be favorable for normal fueling-at-sea operations; an alternate plan would be based on the assumption that the weather would be unfavorable for normal fueling-at-sea operations.

Assumptions used as the basis for planning are listed in the General Situation Paragraph of the Armed Forces Operation Plan Form.

A SUMMARIZED GUIDE FOR PLANNING

A. THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

1. Mission

- (a) Derive Mission, if not assigned by higher authority.
- (b) Analyze Mission.

2. The Situation and Courses of Action.

- (a) Considerations affecting the possible courses of action.
 - (1) The situation.
 - (2) Characteristics of the area of operations.
 - (a) Political, economic, and psychological factors.
 - (b) Weather.
 - (c) Hydrography.
 - (d) Terrain.
 - (e) Communications (including transportation facilities).
 - (f) Daylight and dark periods.
 - (g) Facilities and fortifications.
 - (3) Relative combat power.
 - (a) Numerical strength of opposing forces.
 - (b) Effect of time and space upon own and enemy forces.
 - (c) Efficiency of personnel.
 - (d) Quality of equipment.
 - (e) Special weapons.
 - (f) Logistic support and reinforcements.
 - (4) Strength and weakness factors.
 - (a) Tabulate own and enemy strength and weakness factors.

(b) Enemy capabilities.

- (1) List and consider broad measures enemy is capable of taking to interfere with accomplishment of the Mission.

(c) Own courses of action.

- (1) List and consider own courses of action which are suitable.

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action.

- (a) Test each "Own Course of Action" against each "Enemy Capability".

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action.

- (a) List and consider advantages and disadvantages of each.
- (b) Determine relative merit.
- (c) Select best course of action for execution.

5. The Decision.

- (a) Translate selected course of action into a decision.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

1. State the decision.
2. State assumptions, if any, upon which decision is based.
3. Determine component (complementary) operations necessary to carry out decision.
4. Determine how each component operation is to be carried out.
List tasks under each operation.
5. Organize forces into Task Organization to perform above tasks.
6. Assign tasks to appropriate elements of Task Organization.
7. Solve command problems.
8. Compile information necessary to permit subordinates to perform assigned tasks intelligently.

THE DIRECTIVE

A naval directive is any communication which initiates or governs action. It is the means by which the commander's will is made known. A directive may be oral or written and may be transmitted by any means of communication.

The naval directives in common use are: Letter of Instructions, Operation Plan (when implemented), and Operation Order.

A Letter of Instructions is suitable for use as a directive to a single subordinate commander when only limited coordination with other commands is involved. It will normally state the mission, assign the forces, and set forth any other details deemed necessary.

Operation Plans and Orders are suitable as general directives to any military or naval force.

Operation Plans are based on stated assumptions (see Chapt. IV for Assumptions) and are effective at the time, or under the conditions, specified therein.

Operation Orders deal with known situations and therefore contain no assumptions. Unless otherwise stated, they are effective upon receipt.

Experience has shown that Operation Plans and Orders produce best results when cast in a standard form familiar to both the originator and the recipient. Such a form has been adopted by the Armed Forces. Examples of the Operation Plan and Order Forms are included at the end of this chapter.

This operation order and plan form without annexes is entirely suitable for operations of simple concept or limited scope. The plans for operations of greater complexity or needing a higher order of

coordination normally are supplemented with annexes in order to present all necessary information.

Graphic and tabular forms may and should be used whenever clarity, brevity, and better understanding by the subordinate will ensue. The form, particularly the clerical form, of a plan or order is merely a means toward an end. The end desired is the successful transmission of the senior's will to his subordinates.

The remainder of this chapter deals with the standard Armed Forces Operation Plan and Order Forms, their Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs.

The following discussion is intended to amplify the Armed Forces Order Form and to adapt it to directives of the Naval Service.

Essentially the Order Form consists of three parts:

1. The Heading.
2. The Body (including Task Organization and five paragraphs).
3. The Ending.

The Heading contains:

In the upper right hand corner in the following sequence:

- (a) The title of the issuing officer's command and his administrative title preceded by such titles of higher echelons as will ensure proper identification;
- (b) The name of the flagship, or the name of the headquarters if on shore;
- (c) The place of issue, or the latitude and longitude if at sea.
- (d) The time of issue including day, month, year, hour and zone description.

The information contained in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) above is placed only on the first page of the Operation Plan or Order and their Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs.

RESTRICTED

In the upper left hand corner in the following sequence:

- (e) The file notations and the classification.
- (f) The type of directive.
- (g) The short administrative title of the originator, and the serial number of the directive.
- (h) Pertinent chart and map references.

The information contained in paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) above is repeated on each succeeding page of the basic directive, Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs.

The Body comprises the Task Organization and the five paragraphs. These paragraphs are identified by names as follows, each name signifying the class of matter contained therein:

Paragraph 1 - General Situation paragraph

Paragraph 2 - General Plan paragraph

Paragraph 3 - Task paragraph

Paragraph 4 - Logistics paragraph

Paragraph 5 - Command paragraph

The Task Organization is a list of the Task Subdivisions (forces, groups, or units) into which the command is organized for the operation. Task subdivisions assigned tasks in Paragraph 3 are listed in sequence and lettered (a), (b), (c), etc. Each Task Subdivision is given a designating number and a descriptive name. A description of the decimal system of numbering is contained in U.S. Fleet Publications. Opposite each Task Subdivision is listed the name and rank of its commander, and directly beneath is listed its composition.

The composition of a Task Subdivision is indicated whenever possible by the use of administrative short titles, otherwise by the name or number

of units concerned. Units absent from their administrative organization - or additional units present - are handled as follows:

Desron 6 less Desdiv 12

Batdiv 1 plus Wisconsin

It is desirable, in all cases, to indicate the total number of vessels comprising the administrative units listed under a task subdivision, thus:

Crudiys 8, 9

7 CA

VP-MS-8

15 PBM-5

The detail into which a commander should go in developing his task organization is a function of his echelon of command and his mission. In general, if a commander intends to assign specific tasks to a certain unit, that unit should appear as a task subdivision in his task organization. When the task organization is extensive it is advisable to list only the task subdivisions on the first page of the directive and include the complete task organization as an annex.

The five paragraphs of the body follow the task organization.

Paragraph 1 - General Situation. In this section the commander sets forth such information of the general situation as will permit a subordinate to understand the current situation.

Enemy Forces. This section contains all available information of enemy forces which may have a bearing on the operation. The information is written in subparagraphs (a), (b), etc., one for each enemy subdivision on which information is available. An additional subparagraph is included listing any changes in enemy bases, airfields, installations, etc., in the immediate theater of operations.

Friendly Forces. The information in this section pertains only to forces not listed in the Task Organization. Information on friendly forces should be restricted to that required for proper coordination with their operations. Information placed in this section is listed in the following sequence:

- (a) Operations of higher echelons.
- (b) Operations of equal or lower echelons.
- (c) Changes in characteristics of own forces, installations, bases, airfields, etc., within the immediate theater of operations.

When no information is to be recorded in a section of Paragraph 1, the expression "No further information" is entered in that section.

Assumptions. In an Operation Plan the commander lists in this section the assumptions upon which the plan is based (See Chapter IV for assumptions). This section is omitted entirely in Operation Orders.

In drafting Paragraph 1, the commander should analyze, screen, and supplement information contained in the corresponding paragraph of his superior's directive as necessary to provide pertinent information for his own subordinates. The practice of referring subordinates to the General Situation Paragraph of a senior's directive is undesirable unless it is known that they have a copy of such directive.

Information incorporated in the General Situation paragraph of any operation order or plan should include only that required for an intelligent comprehension of the directive by those subordinates who receive the plan.

In Paragraph 1, distinction is made between verified and unverified information. The latter should be followed by a notation concerning the reliability and credibility of its source.

When information available is too extensive for convenient handling in the body of the directive it may be included in an Intelligence Annex. In such cases reference is made to this Annex in Paragraph 1. Even when an Intelligence Annex is prepared, major features of information should be written in Paragraph 1. In case no information is included under subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Paragraph 1, the paragraph number is placed in its designated position and an appropriate notation made to that effect.

Paragraph 2 - The General Plan Paragraph states what is to be accomplished by the integrated efforts of the command as a whole, and why this it to be accomplished. In other words, it states the commander's overall objective and its purpose. It should be expressed in general terms and with only sufficient detail to permit a clear understanding by subordinates.

The General Plan paragraph in the Armed Forces Order Form is called the Mission paragraph. Mission as used in this sense is not to be confused with the Mission defined in the Estimate of the Situation. Paragraph 2 of the directive, whether called the General Plan paragraph or Mission paragraph, stems directly from the commander's decision in the Estimate.

It is customary to begin the paragraph with the words: "This force will", followed by the commander's decision. Security considerations may at times forbid the inclusion of the purpose. The word "force", as used above, refers to all task subdivisions listed in the Task Organization.

Paragraph 3 - The Task Paragraph assigns individual tasks to each Task Subdivision listed and designated by letter (a), (b), (c), etc.,

in the Task Organization. When assigning specific tasks the commander should allow his immediate subordinates the maximum discretion consistent with the required coordination. The commander's prerogative is to direct what, where, when and why; the subordinate's prerogative is to decide how. The commander should give instructions in relation to how a task is to be accomplished only to such extent as may be required to ensure complete understanding and effective coordination among his subordinates.

Paragraph 3 comprises sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), etc., one for each Task Subdivision listed (and similarly lettered) in the Task Organization. Each sub-paragraph commences with the designating letter in parentheses, followed by the name of the Task Subdivision, and a statement of the specific task assigned. In addition there should be included for each Task Subdivision any instructions which apply to it alone, such as instructions which may be required to ensure cooperation, or to avoid interference with another Task Subdivision.

When two or more of the Task Subdivisions into which the command has been divided have identical task assignments, such Task Subdivisions will be listed in sequence in the Task Organization and in Paragraph 3, and the statement of the task written after the title of the last of such Task Subdivisions.

Paragraph 3 also contains a sub-paragraph (x) in which, in order to avoid repetition in the statements of assigned tasks and instructions, are embodied task assignments common to all Task Subdivisions and general instructions pertaining to the conduct of the operations. When desired, there may also be included in this sub-paragraph instructions which apply to two or more Task Subdivisions, the repetition of which in the respective

Task Subdivision sub-paragraphs would be cumbersome. Paragraph 3 (x) contains instructions concerning cooperation, security, intelligence activities, and the time at, or conditions under which, the directive will become effective.

In Paragraph 3 assign tasks in terms of accomplishment; use the imperative, rather than future, tense for verbs ("Expeditionary Troops seize the objective", instead of "Expeditionary troops will seize the objective"). State task assignments in clear, brief, and positive language that cannot be misunderstood.

Paragraph 4 - The Logistics Paragraph sets forth the availability of services and supplies, and describes and gives effect to the general plan for the logistic support of the operation. If the information and instructions pertaining to logistics are long and detailed, they may be embodied in a separate logistics plan, which will be referred to in Paragraph 4 and attached to the directive as an Annex. Paragraph 4 is not used for assigning movement tasks. Should there be no instructions pertaining to logistics, the paragraph number is written followed by the word "none".

Paragraph 5 - The Command Paragraph contains instructions necessary for the exercise of command during the operations. The plan for communications, the zone times to be used, and the location of the commander and his second in command during the operation are subjects covered in this paragraph. Detailed instructions in relation to communications are usually placed in the form of a Communication Plan and included as an Annex.

The Ending.

The ending consists of,

- (a) The signature
- (b) The list of annexes
- (c) The distribution, and
- (d) The authentication

(a) The signature of the commander appears below Paragraph 5 on the right hand side of the page. Below his signature are listed his rank, his command title, and his administrative title; for example,

John Doe,
Captain,
Commander Task Group 52.2 and Comdesron 6

(b) The Annexes are listed serially (A,B,etc.) at the end of the directive in the lower left hand corner. General instructions for the preparation and use of annexes appear later in this chapter.

(c) The Distribution is indicated directly below the list of Annexes. It shows to whom the directive is to be transmitted and the medium of transmission (hand, mail, aircraft, radio, visual, etc.,). When more than one copy is to be delivered to an addressee the total number of copies transmitted is shown in parentheses. Both administrative and task subdivision titles are used in making up the distribution list. All mail should be addressed using administrative titles, no reference being made to the Task Organization.

Whenever the Distribution List becomes extensive, it may be contained in an Annex. Reference to this Annex is then made in the space normally allocated to the Distribution List.

(d) Authentication. The commander signs the original including all Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs. This normally becomes his file copy. All other copies including Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs, are authenticated by a duly authorized member of the commander's staff, usually the Flag Secretary.

Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs

The information covered in Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs is so varied that only general instructions for their preparation and use can be given.

As has been brought out previously in this chapter, any portion which becomes too extensive for inclusion in the directive itself may be included as an Annex. Any information which is not appropriate for inclusion in an annex may be included as an Appendix to that Annex. Likewise, information amplifying an appendix may be included as a Tab to that Appendix. Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs are given titles descriptive of their contents.

Annexes are given serial designations by capital letters A, B, etc.; Appendices are given serial designation by Roman numerals I, II, etc.; Tabs are given serial designations by capital letters A, B, etc.

When annexes are appended to a plan the basic operation plan should contain only those elements necessary to give the subordinate the overall assignment of forces, general directives and tasks assigned. Details should be included in suitable annexes and reference made to such annexes in the basic plan.

In large scale and complicated operations a Concept of the Operation should be included as an annex.

The Heading and Ending of Annexes, Appendices and Tabs are identical with those of the Plan or Order; no standard form is prescribed for the Body. The use of charts, diagrams, and tabulated forms is highly recommended when the subject matter can be adapted to such treatment. Where practicable, the Body may be developed along the lines of the Standard Order Form. Where neither of the above is appropriate any readily understood form of written manuscript is suitable. Planning Officers must be careful to eliminate needless duplication of material in both plan and annexes and useless inclusion of material already known to subordinates through orders and standard procedures of higher commanders.

Examples of Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs are included at the end of this chapter.

When the distribution of an Annex, Appendix, or Tab differs from that used for the Plan or Order, a distribution list should be indicated above the authentication.

The clerical details in preparing directives, i.e. spacing, margins, punctuation, etc., are most readily comprehended by referring to the examples at the end of this chapter.

RESTRICTED

ARMED FORCES
OPERATION PLAN FORM

PLATE I

Classification

Headquarters
Place
Date and time

Operation Plan
Serial No.

Chart or Map References:

Task Organization: (List here, when appropriate, the task subdivisions or tactical components which will comprise the command, together with the names and ranks of the commanders.)

1. General Situation: (Such information of the general overall situation as may be essential for subordinates to understand the current situation.)
 - a. Enemy Forces: (Composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, identifications, and capabilities.)
 - b. Friendly Forces: (Pertinent information of own forces other than those listed in the Task Organization which may have a bearing on the decision of a subordinate.)
 - c. Assumptions: (Assumptions used by the commander as a basis for this plan. Normally applicable only to higher planning echelons.)
2. Mission: (A statement of the task which is to be accomplished by the commander and its purpose.)
3. Tasks for Subordinate Units: (In separate lettered subparagraphs, give the specific tasks of each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical duties.)
 - x. (In subparagraph x, give instructions applicable to two or more units or elements or to the entire command which are necessary for coordination or the general conduct of the operation, the repetition of which in the other subparagraphs of paragraph 3 would be cumbersome. State here the time at, or conditions under, which this plan is to be placed in effect.)
4. Administrative and Logistical Matters: (Broad instructions concerning administration and logistics for the conduct of the operation. Frequently included in an annex or separate document, to which reference should be made.)
5. Command and Signal Matters: (Plan of communications -- may refer to a standard plan or be contained in an annex --, zone time to be used, rendezvous, location of commander and command posts, statement of command relationship, and axis of signal communications as appropriate.)

Commander

Annexes:

Distribution:

Authentication:

NOTE

It may become necessary to include in the commander's plan a Task Organization indicating the organization of subordinate Task Units, or administrative commands. Each descending echelon in such cases shall be separately indented. The commanders of all subdivisions shall be included in the organization, as follows:

Task Organization

- (a) 56 Scouting Force, Admiral BB
 - 56.1 Air Search Group, Captain CC
 - Cardiv 1 3 CV
 - 56.2 Surface search Group, Rear Admiral DD
 - Cruidivs 1, 2 6 CA

etc.

RESTRICTED

PLATE II

EXAMPLE OF AN OPERATION PLAN

234/48
SECRET

White Eighth Fleet
and ComCarPac,
Enterprise, Flagship,

Operation Plan
ComCarPac No. 11-48

Port Lloyd, Bonins,
3 June, 1948; 0900K.

Charts: HO 5941
2367

Task Organization

- (a) 81 Northern Striking Force, Vice Admiral WB
 - Batdivs 1,2 plus Washington 5 BB
 - Cardiv 7 plus Cabot 3 CV
 - 1 CVL
 - Cruidivs 4, 15 3 CA
 - 3 CL
 - Desrons 5, 7, 9 less Desdiv 52 25 DD
- (b) 82 Covering Force, Rear Admiral WF
 - Cardivs 4, 5 4 CV
 - 2 CVL
 - Batdiv 5 2 BB
 - Cruidivs 11, 12 plus Houston 3 CA
 - 4 CL
 - Desrons 6, 8 plus Desdiv 52 25 DD
- (c) 83 Mobile Support Force, Rear Admiral WG
 - AO-2,4,9,11,23,28 6 AO
 - AD-7,8,9,12 4 AD
 - AE-3,4 2 AE
 - Cardiv 32 less Bogue 3 CVE
 - Cortdivs 41,43,48,49 24 DE

1. General Situation. Blue military situation in the North Pacific has improved recently. Indications are that Blue plans to strengthen his position in the Aleutians.

Enemy Forces. (a) A Blue task force consisting of about ten heavy ships, including three carriers, surrounded by heavy screen was sighted in the vicinity of Midway early on 3 June.

(b) A large Blue convoy is assembling off Port Townsend.

(c) Blue submarine and air activity in the Northwest Pacific is increasing.

Friendly Forces. (a) Submarines are operating between Dutch Harbor and Blue Homeland.

Assumptions. (a) Blue is attempting to strengthen his position in the Aleutians.

2. This force will destroy shipping and shore installations in the Aleutians, in order to prevent Blue from strengthening his position in those islands.

RESTRICTED

PLATE II
(cont'd)

234/48
SECRET

Operation Plan
ComCarPac No. 11-48

3. (a) Northern Striking Force destroy shipping, harbor facilities, and air installations in the Aleutians west of Dutch Harbor.
(b) Covering Force prevent heavy enemy naval forces from interfering with operations of Northern Striking Force.
(c) Mobile Support Force replenish the Northern Striking Force and the Covering Force during this operation.
(x) (1) Commander Northern Striking Force coordinate replenishment schedule for all forces.
(2) This plan effective on signal.
4. Use Commander Eighth Fleet Basic Logistics Plan Two.
5. Communications in accordance with Annex A. Use operations time zone minus eleven (love). Commander Northern Striking Force in Alabama second in command. Commander Eighth Fleet in Enterprise.

WA
Admiral
Commander Eighth Fleet
and ComCarPac.

Annex

A. Communication Plan

Distribution

By hand to:

| | |
|---|------|
| Commander Northern Striking Force (ComBatDiv 1) | (48) |
| Commander Covering Force (ComCarDiv 4) | (50) |
| Commander Mobile Support Force (ComServRon 3) | (45) |

By officer messenger to:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------|
| Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet | (7) |
|-----------------------------------|------|

BL
Commander
Flag Secretary

ARMED FORCES
OPERATION ORDER FORM

Classification

Headquarters

Type of order and Serial No.

Place

Date and time

Chart or Map References:

Task Organization: (List here, when appropriate, the task subdivisions or tactical components which will comprise the command, together with the names and ranks of the commanders.)

1. General Situation: (Give briefly the general picture so that subordinate commander will understand the current situation.)

a. Enemy Forces: (Composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, identifications, and capabilities.)

b. Friendly Forces: (Pertinent information of own force other than those listed in the Task Organization which may have a bearing on the decisions of a subordinate.)

2. Mission: (A statement of the task which is to be accomplished by the commander and its purpose.)

3. Tasks for Subordinate Units: (In separate lettered subparagraphs, assign specific tasks to each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical duties.)

x. (In subparagraph x, give instructions applicable to two or more units or elements or to the entire command which are necessary for coordination or the general conduct of the operation, the repetition of which in the other subparagraphs of paragraph 3 would be cumbersome. If the order is not effective upon receipt indicate effective time in this subparagraph.)

4. Administrative and Logistical Matters: (Instructions to tactical units concerning supply, availability of services, evacuation, and traffic details required for the operation as applicable. These details frequently are covered in an administrative order, a standing operating procedure, or an annex.)

5. Command and Signal Matters: (Plan of communications-- may refer to a standard plan or be contained in an annex-- , zone time to be used, rendezvous, location of commander and command posts, statement of command relationship, and axis of signal communications as appropriate.)

Commander

Annexes:

Distribution:

Authentication:

EXAMPLE OF AN OPERATION ORDER1234/48
SECRETSecond Task Fleet,
T.F. 21 Striking Force
and ComCardiv 2,
Essex Flagship,Operation Order
ComCardiv 2 No. 12-48At Sea, Lat. 32W; Long. 72-15N,
7 May, 1948; 1300R.Task Organization

| | |
|---|-------|
| (a) 21.1 Carrier Group, Rear Admiral BT | |
| Cardiv 2 | 3 CV |
| Crudiv 10 less Biloxi | 2 CL |
| Desron 3 | 9 DD |
| (b) 21.2 Bombardment Group, Rear Admiral BU | |
| Batdiv 3 | 3 BB |
| Crudiv 8 plus Biloxi | 3 CA |
| | 1 CL |
| Desrons 4,5 | 16 DD |

1. General Situation. Allied shipping is suffering heavy losses from enemy submarines and aircraft operating from Xray and Zebra Islands. Commander Atlantic Fleet has directed the capture of Zebra Island.

Enemy Forces. (a) Heavy concentrations of enemy bomber, torpedo and fighter aircraft are operating from Xray and Zebra Islands.

(b) An enemy naval force of battleships, carriers and destroyers was observed in Latitude 35N, Longitude 20W, on 1 May.

Friendly Forces. (a) The Joint Expeditionary Force will capture Zebra Island by amphibious assault beginning on D-Day.

(b) Land based air will conduct long range searches of the area of operations.

2. This force will, beginning on D minus Five Day, neutralize enemy air and naval bases on Xray Island by gun and aerial bombardment, in order to assist in the capture of Zebra Island.
3. (a) Carrier Group destroy enemy aircraft and air base facilities and neutralize airfields on Xray Island. Protect Bombardment Group from enemy aircraft.
(b) Bombardment Group destroy naval bases and coast defenses on Xray Island. Protect Carrier Group from enemy surface forces.
(x) (1) D-Day is the day of the main troop landing on Zebra Island and is tentatively set as 20 May, 1948.
(2) Destroy targets of opportunity at discretion.
(3) Provide gunfire and air support for Joint Expeditionary Force when directed by Commander Striking Force.

RESTRICTED

PLATE IV
(cont'd)

1234/48

SECRET

Operation Order
ComCardiv 2 No. 12-48

4. Refuel and replenish from Mobile Logistics Support Force in Area Hemlock.
5.
 - (a) Use Second Task Fleet Communication Plan Six.
 - (b) Use operations time zone plus two (oboe).
 - (c) Commander Bombardment Group in Iowa second in command.
 - (d) Commander Striking Force, Officer in Tactical Command, in Essex.

BT
Rear Admiral
C.T.F. 21, Striking Force
and ComCardiv 2.

Annexes
A. Air Strike Plan
B. Cruising Instructions

Distribution

By Guard Mail to:

| | |
|---|-------|
| All ships of T.F. 21 (5 each) | (185) |
| Commander Bombardment Group (Combatdiv 3) | (5) |
| ComCrudiv 10 | (3) |
| ComCrudiv 8 | (3) |
| Comdesrons 3,4,5 | |

By plane to:

| | |
|--|-----|
| Commander Second Task Fleet | (5) |
| Commander Joint Expeditionary Force (ComPhibsLant) | (5) |

By Mail to:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| Commander Second Task Fleet | (5) |
| Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet | (5) |
| President, Naval War College | (5) |

OS
Commander
Flag Secretary.

RESTRICTED

PLATE V
EXAMPLE OF AN OPERATION ORDER IN DISPATCH FORM

FROM: CTF 21

TO: TF 21

INFO: ComSec Task Flt, CinCLant, ComPhibsLant, CNO

071300 THIS IS COMCARDIV TWO OPORD TWELVE DASH FOUR EIGHT X GENSIT ALLIED SHIPPING SUFFERING HEAVY LOSSES FROM ENEMY SUBS AND AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM XRAY AND ZEBRA ISLANDS CINCLANT HAS DIRECTED THE CAPTURE OF ZEBRA ISLAND X HEAVY CONCENTRATION ENEMY BOMBERS FIGHTERS TORPEDO PLANES OBSERVED ON XRAY AND ZEBRA ISLANDS X ENEMY NAVAL FORCE BATTLESHIPS CARRIERS DESTROYERS OBSERVED ONE MAY LAT THREE FIVE DEGREES NORTH LONG TWENTY DEGREES WEST X BEGINNING DOG DAY JEF WILL CAPTURE ZEBRA ISLAND BY AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT X BLUE LAND BASED AIR WILL CONDUCT LONG RANGE SEARCH OF AREA OF OPERATIONS X PARA GENPLAN THIS FORCE WILL CMA BEGINNING DOG MINUS FIVE DAY CMA NEUTRALIZE ENEMY AIR AND NAVAL BASES ON XRAY ISLAND IN ORDER ASSIST CAPTURE OF ZEBRA ISLAND X PARA TASK TG TWO ONE DOT ONE CARRIER GROUP RADM BT CARDIV TWO DESRON THREE CRUDIV TEN LESS BILOXI DESTROY ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND AIR BASE FACILITIES AND NEUTRALIZE AIRFIELDS ON XRAY ISLAND X PROTECT BOMBARDMENT GROUP FROM ENEMY AIRCRAFT X TG TWO ONE DOT TWO BOMBARDMENT GROUP RADM BU BATDIV THREE DESRONS FOUR AND FIVE CRUDIV EIGHT PLUS BILOXI DESTROY NAVAL BASES AND COAST DEFENSES ON XRAY ISLAND X PROTECT CARRIER GROUP FROM ENEMY SURFACE FORCES X PARA XRAY DOG DAY IS DAY OF MAIN TROOP LANDING ON ZEBRA ISLAND TENTATIVELY SET AS TWENTY MAY X DESTROY TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY AT DISCRETION X PROVIDE GUNFIRE AND AIR SUPPORT FOR JEF WHEN DIRECTED BY CTF TWO ONE X PARA LOGISTICS REFUEL AND REPLENISH FROM MOBILE LOGISTICS SUPPORT FORCE IN AREA HEMLOCK X PARA COMMAND USE SECTASK FLT COMPLAN SIX AND OPERATIONS TIME ZONE PLUS TWO X COMMANDER BOMBARDMENT GROUP IN IOWA SECOND IN COMMAND X COMMANDER STRIKING FORCE CMA OTC CMA IN ESSEX X ANNEXES ABLE AIR STRIKE PLAN BAKER CRUINS FORWARDED LATER TO ACTION ADDRES BY GUARD MAIL

NOTE (1)

The Task Organization is omitted from the beginning of the Dispatch Plan; it is included in the Task Paragraph instead. It is only included, however, when the addressees of the message do not have the Task Organization information, or when there is a change in the organization. If the current organization has remained unchanged, the name of the commanders and their units may be omitted.

NOTE (2)

This example is not intended to restrict suitable paraphrasing for radio transmission.

RESTRICTED

PLATE VI

EXAMPLE OF AN ANNEX

1234/48
SECRET

Second Task Fleet,
Auburn, Flagship,

Operation Plan
ComSecTaskFlt No. 2-48

Norfolk, Virginia,
1 July, 1948; 1200R.

Annex B

Movement Plan

Task Organization

- (a) 21 Striking and Covering Force, Rear Admiral BB
- (b) 22 Joint Expeditionary Force, Rear Admiral BC
- (c) 23 Submarine Patrol Force, Rear Admiral BD
- (d) 24 Air Reconnaissance Force, Rear Admiral BE
- (e) 25 Logistics Support Force, Rear Admiral BF

1. As in basic plan.
2. This force will carry out movements prescribed herein in order to execute Commander Second Task Fleet Plan No. 2-48.
3. (a) Striking and Covering Force.
(b) Joint Expeditionary Force.
(c) Submarine Patrol Force.
(d) Air Reconnaissance Force.
(e) Logistics Support Force execute movements in accordance with Movement and Employment Schedule, Appendix I, and along tracks prescribed in Route Chart, Appendix II.
4. Fuel as required from ships of Logistics Support Force enroute to objective.
5. As in basic plan.

BA
Admiral
Commander Second Task Fleet.

Appendices

- I Movement and Employment Schedule
- II Route Chart

XYZ
Commander
Flag Secretary.

1234/48
SECRET

Operation Plan
ComSoctaskFlt No. 2-48

EXAMPLE OF AN APPENDIX

Second Task Fleet,
Auburn, Flagship,
Norfolk, Virginia,
1 July, 1948; 1200R.

Appendix I to Annex B

Movement and Employment Schedule

| T.F. NUMBER | NAME | INITIALLY DEPLOYED | D-20 | D-19 | D-18 | D-17 | D-16 | D-15 | D-14 | D-13 | D-12 | D-11 | D-10 | D-9 | D-8 | D-7 | D-6 | D-5 | D-4 | D-3 | D-2 | D-1 | D |
|-------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|------|------|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | Striking and Covering Force | Newport | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 22 | Joint Expeditionary Force | Norfolk | | | Rehearsal Chesapeake Bay | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23 | Submarine Patrol Force | New London | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 24 | Air Reconnaissance Force | Quonset Pt. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25 | Logistics Support Force | Norfolk | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

52

XYZ
Commander
Flag Secretary.

BA
Admiral
Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.

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PLATE VIII

EXAMPLE OF A TAB

123/48
SECRET

White Eighth Fleet
and ComCarPac,
Enterprise, Flagship,

Operation Plan
ComCarPac No. 11-48

Port Lloyd, Bonins,
3 June, 1948; 0900K.

Tab A to Appendix II to Annex B

Fueling Rendezvous List

- 1. -----) text of Tab
- 2. -----) etc.

WA
Admiral
Commander Eighth Fleet
and ComCarPac.

BL
Commander
Flag Secretary.

SUPERVISION OF THE OPERATION

While the operation is in progress the commander supervises the execution of his directive and modifies it as necessary to meet new developments in an ever-changing situation. He must not only recognize the necessity for a change in his plans; he must recognize it in time to take effective action.

Supervision by the commander during the operation may be necessary for one or more of the following reasons:

(a) Error or misunderstanding on the part of subordinates.

No matter how well prepared the plan may be human error invariably creeps into the execution. The commander must assure himself that subordinates are performing their tasks in a manner that contributes most effectively to the support of the General Plan. Even though no misunderstanding exists more supervision will be required in some cases than in others.

(b) Change in the enemy situation.

Losses, reinforcements, or a change in relative position on the part of the enemy may vary his capabilities sufficiently to warrant a change of plans. (An efficient intelligence organization is required to keep abreast of the enemy situation.)

(c) Change in own situation.

Unexpected losses, successes, or reinforcements may warrant a change in plans. (Provisions for adequate exchange of information within one's own command, with other commands, and with superior commands is necessary to keep abreast of own situation.)

(d) Change in own mission.

Superiors in the chain of command are supervising the larger operations of which one's own operation is a part. The changing military situation may result in a change in the directive from higher authority.

The exact technique of assembling information during the operation so that it will present a true picture of the current military situation will, of necessity, vary to meet the needs of the individual commander. Situation or status charts, concise chronological narratives, and pertinent extracts from reports, messages, orders, conferences, etc., are generally accepted devices for assisting in supervising operations.

THE NAVY WAR PLANNING SYSTEM

In the Navy Department there are three stages of war planning. Above the Navy Department there is the Joint War Planning performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the Joint Plans, and Joint Estimates of Situations, the Services derive their missions and general tasks. For the Navy, this Function is performed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the first stage of war planning in the Navy Department. Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations) is responsible for the general coordination of all phases of planning for war operations. There are two classes of Navy Plans, Navy Basic Plans and Navy Plans (Code) which are described below:

Navy Basic Plans consist of:

(a) Basic Naval Establishment Plan which provides for the naval establishment in peacetime.

(b) Navy Basic Mobilization Plan which provides the plan, under the same general headings of the Basic Naval Establishment Plan, for a phased expansion of the Basic Naval Establishment to the size necessary to prosecute total war.

(c) The Navy Basic Logistics Plan which is prepared in two parts to support respectively the previous two plans. Part I, Peacetime, supports the peacetime establishment set forth in the Basic Naval Establishment Plan. Part II, Mobilization, supports the Navy Basic Mobilization Plan.

Although Basic Planning is largely confined to the Navy Department, senior commanders afloat and ashore receive Navy Basic Plans for information and guidance.

Navy Plans (Code), consist of:

(a) Navy Strategic Plans (Code). These are plans based upon the assumption of war with a particular power or combination of powers or upon certain disorders or insurrections. They are given code names as was the custom during the war. These plans will normally be in support of missions derived from Joint Plans issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but may be in support of missions originated by the Chief of Naval Operations. These strategic plans form the basis for operation plans prepared by senior commanders afloat and ashore.

(b) Navy Logistics Plans (Code). Although it is expected that the Navy Basic Logistics Plan will provide an adequate basis upon which to estimate and provide the overall logistics requirements to support any Navy Strategic Plan (Code), there will undoubtedly be specific logistics requirements for each particular Code situation. Therefore, for each Navy Strategic Plan (Code) there will be a Navy Logistics Plan (Code) in support of which additional plans are prepared by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department.

Note: Supporting plans of an operational nature, based on the Navy Strategic Plans (Code), are prepared by certain agencies of the Naval Establishment.

Under the system described herein, war planning in the Navy Department proceeds from concept toward implementation by three stages, and the plans of each succeeding stage are based upon the plans of the prior one. Briefly these stages are:

(a) First Stage. In this stage the missions and general tasks of the Navy as a whole are derived from Joint Plans, Estimates, and Studies.

In this stage also may be originated Navy Estimates, and Navy Missions derived therefrom, by OpNav. Navy Strategic Plans (Code) are also prepared in the first stage of planning.

(b) Second Stage. The three Navy Basic Plans previously outlined are second stage plans supporting first stage plans; and in the case of the Basic Naval Establishment Plan, supporting the approved peacetime policy of the United States Navy. The Navy Logistics Plans (Code), which support corresponding first stage Navy Strategic Plans (Code), are also second stage plans, so too are operational annexes to Navy Strategic Plans (Code).

(c) Third Stage. In this stage are prepared the supporting plans or Annexes and the subsidiary plans, stemming respectively from the three Navy Basic Plans and from Navy Logistics Plans (Code). In connection with third stage plans it is important to bear in mind the distinction between Subsidiary and Supporting plans.

Note: Subsidiary Plans are those contributory plans of a logistical nature prepared by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department. Supporting Plans are those contributory plans and annexes of an operational nature prepared respectively by Field Agencies and by certain offices in the Navy Department.

It is the responsibility of all commanders to distribute their plans to subordinate commanders who have, or may have, tasks to perform in support of those plans. These plans should be complete in themselves, and in enough detail to permit subordinates charged with supporting the plan to function without reference to a higher echelon. Each commander will review the plans prepared by his immediate subordinate in

RESTRICTED

support of his plans as part of his supervision of the planned action.

In general, in the Navy Department, the plans prepared in each stage of planning will be reviewed by the interested planning agency in the prior stage of planning. Final review and coordination of all phases of war planning is the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).