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HINTS ON THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS

Many students in recent War College classes have suggested that the Department of Tactics issue to the class an outline to follow in estimating tactical situations similar to the outline given by the Department of Strategy for estimating strategical situations.

While the assistance such an outline gives cannot be denied, nevertheless to devise one suitable for all tactical situations is more difficult than devising one applicable in general to strategical situations. Whereas strategical estimates are generally made under conditions that permit spending a reasonable amount of time on them and the decisions reached generally have to do with a plan for a long, protracted effort, tactical estimates vary greatly as to the time for making them, while the decisions reached range from the general plan for a major engagement with a possible enemy to those reached on the battle-field that cover only the situation of the moment and require constant revision.

A detailed outline for estimating one tactical situation would frequently not do at all for estimating the next situation that confronts one because, what one bases his decisions on at one time are not at the things they are based on at another. For instance, tactical estimates are made even in times of peace to determine the general plan our fleet should use to meet the RED or ORANGE fleet in a general engagement while later, after war comes and the opposing fleets approach to engage, another estimate must be made taking into consideration certain actual conditions found on the field of battle in order to reach decisions as to what courses of action are necessary to best enable us to carry out our fundamental general plan.

Thus, there seems to be two very distinct phases to a complete estimate of tactical situations of which the first phase is to determine what the general plan of combat for the force will be upon meeting the enemy. For a "Battle Fleet" such an estimate is

made not only long before contact is made with the enemy but usually must be made a sufficient time before leaving port to engage as to permit the entire force being indoctrinated with the plan and trained to carry it out. In fact, such estimates for a regularly organized "Battle Fleet" should be made long before war comes and kept continuously up to date and they are so made by all "Battle Fleet" commanders who wish to train and prepare their fleets to fight. For other forces than are provided by the permanent fleet organization, that is, for forces organized for special tasks after war comes, the first phase of the estimate cannot be started so long ahead, - cannot be started in fact until the force is organized. However, it should be made as soon as the force is organized, kept continuously up to date and the force indoctrinated in its decisions and trained to carry them out.

Forces indoctrinated with the plan of battle and trained to carry it out are ready to go out for battle but, however complete a general plan may have been deduced in the first estimate, a second estimate must be made on the field to determine the courses of action to take to give the fleet the advantages that arise from the conditions existing there, such as wind, sea, spray, light, roll, pitch, location of forces as to their respective bases, etc. Having gotten a general plan by the first estimate, the second determines for us how to make it most effective under the existing local conditions; and, though made separately, both estimates are vital to success.

#### FORM.

No matter which phase of the estimate is under consideration, the form and order of procedure as laid down in the pamphlet on the "Estimate of the Situation" should be adhered to. Although, each year, a few students suggest changes in form of the estimate or in the order of steps on it, it invariably happens that an overwhelming majority of every class is for the form and order of steps,

exactly as laid down. This being so, the general form for estimating situations will continue to be used by the service at large just as it stands; so, even though a few officers may feel that it is not the one best way for them to reach decisions, all of us should follow what the great majority accepts as best. Strictly followed, it not only leads to the deduction of logical decisions, but it places the reasoning in such form that it can be easily followed and clearly understood by others, especially by a senior who has to pass on the estimates of members of his staff.

### MISSION

The first step in any solution is a clear enunciation of one's Mission. In Tactics, the Mission is often so clearly indicated as to not require any special derivation, and because of that fact, students do not always take steps to bring their Tactical Mission clearly before them. This frequently leads to a false start with resulting difficulties. Always be sure of your Mission, by deriving it if necessary. The process of deriving one's Mission gives one a clearer conception of what part his task plays in the general plan.

With the Mission clearly enunciated, the solver is ready to proceed with the estimate proper. Since a tactical estimate has two phases which may, in one instance, be far separated as to time in making and, in another, may merge together, each phase will be taken up separately and the major points to consider in each indicated. Having indicated the major points of each phase, it will be left to the student to combine these points in one estimate on those occasions when the phases merge.

FIRST PHASEThe Estimate to Determine the General Battle Plan.Enemy Forces: Their Strength, Disposition and Probable Intentions.

This part of the estimate is the foundation on which any estimate is built and the soundness of the complete structure will be found to vary exactly with the thoroughness with which this part of the estimate is covered. In spite of this fact, many student officers show a tendency to give the enemy scant attention and devote most of their thought to "own forces", often evolving a plan that scarcely takes the enemy into consideration.

Plans, so evolved, usually break down quickly since, having overlooked what the enemy can and may do, anything he does do comes as a surprise to disrupt the plan. Hence, before going into one's own plans, one must discuss thoroughly those of the enemy and get clearly in his mind every course the enemy can or might take.

Since one always knows his own strength and weakness better than does the enemy, one is generally able to ascertain, better than can the enemy, the strongest course of action the enemy can possibly take. Having ascertained what that course is but having at the same time ascertained the courses the enemy may take, one is ready to draw up for one's self a plan that will not only meet the enemy's strongest effort, but will also be ready to meet any other weaker effort he may adopt.

To accomplish this, the ENEMY FORCES are discussed under the three sub-heads, Strength, Disposition and Probable Intentions.

STRENGTH: The first step in a study of enemy strength is to measure his material strength in terms on one's own strength and to do that, comparative lists of the opposing forces must be made by classes or types of ships. In these lists are shown speed, fighting equipment (guns, torpedoes, mines, depth charges, etc.)

armor, air equipment, etc.

Having made these lists, many students feel that they have made a sufficient study of enemy strength. However, comparative lists of material are in no sense a study of enemy strength but only the basis for such study.

Having the lists one is ready to analyze the opposing forces to ascertain in what lies the relative strength or relative weakness of the enemy. This analysis must be very thorough for only by having clearly in one's mind the stronger and weaker elements in the enemy's forces can one proceed to the general courses of action those forces may take. One of the features of this analysis is a calculation of the "fighting strengths" of (1) the various enemy combinations and (2) of the combinations one can bring against them, having which, one can compare the enemy's material fighting strength with one's own. Not until one has a thorough knowledge of the enemy's material fighting strength as compared with his own can one even guess how that strength can be best used by the enemy, hence the necessity for a full and complete analysis of it.

The study of enemy strength in this phase of a tactical estimate should cover all factors that affect that strength in battle except those peculiar to the field of battle such as wind, sea, roll, pitch, yaw, smoke, gas etc., which factors can be taken up only in the second phase. The study investigates strength as it may be affected by material, moral and human elements, and as it may be affected by general conditions known to exist in the war area.

Having completed that study one next takes up the enemy's  
DISPOSITION:

Since the courses of action open to the enemy are directly influenced by the "disposition" or "location" of his forces, it is necessary to have the disposition of the enemy forces fixed in one's mind as well as is possible. Will all the forces

listed be present when battle is imminent and, if not, which forces will be present? If present, how will they be disposed with reference with each other? These and similar studies must be made, for until they are made any clear deduction as to what the enemy can and may do is difficult.

With the enemy's strength and disposition clear in one's mind one can then take up his,

PROBABLE INTENTIONS:

The enemy's "probable intentions" as deduced by one who knows his own weaknesses and is thoroughly versed in what strength the enemy can bring against him is very likely to be the strongest course of action an enemy can possibly take. But before deciding what is the enemy's strongest and therefore probable course of action, one must examine each course open to him and note its strong points and weak points. Only by so doing can the various courses be thoroughly weighed, each against the other, and the really strongest course determined; and only by being ready to meet the enemy's strongest course can we hope to decide on the sure way to beat him. However, a thorough examination of all courses open to the enemy does more than merely enable us to determine his strongest course. It enables us to draw up a plan that will not only meet his strongest course but will also meet any other course he may elect to take.

Even if one could see at a glance what the enemy's strongest action might be, it is not sufficient to base one's plans on that action alone, for should the enemy elect to take some weaker action it might come as a surprise to us and find us so unready to meet it as to cause our defeat. Therefore no reasonable course of action can be left out of consideration. By studying everything the enemy can do one prepares a plan to meet anything he may do, and that is the kind of plan, and the only kind, one wants.

From the above it should be evident that the soundness of one's final decision will be almost in direct proportion to the care and thought one expends on his study of "Enemy Forces"; yet that fact is frequently overlooked by students, the consideration of "Enemy Forces" being given little attention as compared to "Own Forces". Nothing could be further from the fact for, in reality, it is the consideration of the enemy that paves the way for taking up the use of one's own forces, and the more fully one understands the enemy the easier becomes the task of determining what is best to do to defeat him. It is highly improbable that one can deduce for one's self any general plan that will prove sound in battle unless that plan is drawn up to meet not only the enemy's strongest plan but also to meet any of his other possible plans.

Having reasoned out the enemy's strongest course of action and, therefore, his Probable Intentions and having studied every practicable course of action open to the enemy, the results of the study should be summarized at the end of the heading "Enemy Forces" in much the same way that one's Decisions are summarized at the end of the Estimate.

That having been done, we are ready to take up,

OUR OWN FORCES: Their Strength, Disposition and Courses of Action  
Open to Us.

Strength: Since at this stage of the estimate the solver has reached a clear conception of what the enemy will probable do, he now takes up a further and more detailed study of his own strength to meet the enemy's effort. This study will do much to indicate the courses of action open to him, but, before they can be taken up, one must also investigate his own.

Disposition: This includes (1) a study of the present disposition of his forces, (2) of the ability to concentrate the forces taking time and space into consideration, (3) of the dispositions necessary to meet the enemy's effort, and, (4) as to employment of forces in carrying out the mission.

Being fully cognizant of the strength and weakness of his forces to meet the enemy's strongest and possible efforts and of the disposition of those forces, the solver can then take up the, Courses of Action Open to Us: to meet anything the enemy may do and to beat him when he does it.

Under this heading we examine every one of the general courses open to us in exactly the same manner that we examined the courses open to the enemy and, having noted the strong points and weak points of each for meeting what the enemy does and for defeating him we finally select the courses that by our reasoning seem most sure to bring success.

In investigating the courses of action open to the enemy or to our own forces, many solvers state each course in turn, discuss it and then say "rejected" or "Accepted" for this or that reason without actually weighing the various courses against each other. No course of action should be either "accepted" or "rejected" for the enemy or for one's self until all the courses have been investigated and weighed, each against the other, for not until that has been done can the really best course be selected. In fact it often happens that a course one wants to reject for this or that reason still proves to be the strongest course open to him. Not until all courses have been examined and compared can one decide that any one course is not the best or the worst.

Having determined the best course of action open to him this course is then enunciated in the,

DECISION:

Whether tactical or strategical, sound decisions have the same general characteristics. Enunciated in the "Outline for Estimating Strategic Situations" the sound characteristics for tactical decisions are,



Decision: It must be sound as to substance and properly expressed.

To be sound in substance the Decision must,

- (a) Support the Mission.
- (b) Express a purpose.
- (c) Outline the general plan.
- (d) Show whole-hearted resolution, and
- (e) Be free from minor considerations.

To be properly expressed the Decision must be

- (f) Clear, definite and forcible, and
- (g) Concise as is consistent with full purport.

Tactical Decisions should

- (a) Result from previous reasoning.
- (b) Support the Decision.
- (c) State:- What to do, - To what, -Where or when, -and  
With What.
- (d) Not invade the province of the subordinate.
- (e) Not include what properly belongs to the War In-  
structions or is covered by doctrine.
- (f) Be definite, clear and concise, and
- (g) Provide adequate forces for the assigned tasks.

THE SECOND PHASE

The second phase of a tactical estimate is that part of the estimate occasioned by contact with the enemy. As previously stated, the two phases often merge into one, but when the phases are distinct, the second calls for a "contact estimate". However, whether distinct or not, the second phase has elements in it that are not in the first phase.

In the second phase the Commander already should have fixed in his mind,

- (1) His mission.
- (2) The material strength and moral comparisons.
- (3) His general plan for overcoming the enemy's probable and possible general procedure.

Making contact with the enemy, he must then make an estimate to decide as to how he can best put his new plan into execution, and this estimate takes the same form and sequence of steps as the other. Let us consider each step in the regular order.

ENEMY FORCES:- Their Strength, Disposition, and Probable Intentions.

Strength: While by his previous estimate a Commander has in his mind a good idea of the relative material and moral strength in which the opposing forces could arrive on the field of battle, those forces might not be in exactly that strength when they do arrive. Exact, detailed information as regards the enemy is hard to get, and under ordinary circumstances there will probably not be sufficient new information to permit a change in the original plan. However, the variants of the battle field, wind, sea light, etc., have a considerable effect on strength as it can be exerted there and these factors must be considered and a correct estimate of their effect on the enemy's strength must be deduced. Hence, at this stage of the estimate one must again analyze the enemy's strength as it will be with the variants of the battle field applied to it and get a correct idea of what it actually is at that moment.

Disposition: Having obtained from this study a new and possibly somewhat modified view of the enemy's strength as it can actually be exerted, one next proceeds to a study of the enemy's dispositions as indicated from the information obtained concerning him.

These dispositions and their location relative to Own Forces should be plotted, and taking them into consideration together with enemy strength as indicated by above analysis, one is ready to study various possible detailed course of action open to the enemy and, by doing so, to determine in more detail what may be his immediate probable intentions.

Probable Intentions:

As was indicated for the first phase of a tactical estimate, so in the second phase must one consider all the courses of action open to the enemy and from those considerations not only get a clear idea of everything the enemy can do but also ascertain what the strongest and therefore his most probable course of action will be.

Knowing all about one's own forces one here places himself in the enemy's position and taking into consideration

- (1) the force and direction of the wind and its probable shifts
- (2) the state of the sea and what it will do as regards roll, pitch and yaw,
- (3) light, and
- (4) the geographical situation as regards bases or places of refuge;

looks into everything the enemy can and may do and from them selects his strongest and most probable course of action.

Assuming that the enemy will fight and not run away, the principal things to be determined about him are

- (1) his probable deployment course if he engages at once, and
- (2) what his maneuvers will be if he decides to delay engaging to obtain a more favorable situation as regards wind, sea, light, etc.

While the second of these two must be given careful consideration, that consideration is not nearly so urgent as is the one involving his immediate deployment and engagement. It therefore need not be treated in the early part of this phase of an estimate but may be deferred until one has decided on what he will do if the enemy decides to engage at once.

Having decided as to that, one can if necessary, make a third estimate to determine what to do to best meet the enemy in case he maneuvers for position. Since that phase is all its own and follows after the second phase in order of consideration it will not be taken up in this paper. Following the order suggested in the order form, and realizing what the enemy is trying to do, there will be nothing difficult about an estimate of that situation. Let us return, then, to that more urgent and important matter, - the determination of the enemy's deployment course should he elect to engage at once.

One of the surest ways to arrive at the enemy's most probable intention as to the direction of deployment is to examine in succession the several general directions in which it is possible for him to deploy and engage. Select any one of them as the one the enemy will take for his deployment course and study what the effect will be if he takes it; ascertain (1) what advantages and (2) what disadvantages accrue to the enemy on that deployment course from the existing conditions of wind, sea, spray, light, gas, roll, pitch, yaw and geographical location, but go no further at this time. Having examined the one deployment course as just suggested, proceed to each of the others in turn and do likewise.

What deployment courses one should examine quickly suggest themselves to the solver. After all have been examined it is usually rather easy to select the one that is really strongest for

the enemy. Many solvers start off in the above described way but as soon as a course has been discussed, "reject" or "accept" it for this or that reason. One should not "reject" or "accept" any course as the "probable intention" until all have been examined, for not until that time can one decide which course is really best. Generally speaking, the best deployment course for the enemy is the one we ourselves would least like to see him adopt.

Having determined the enemy's strongest deployment course as above suggested, one at least has certain definite facts before him. He knows the weather and what effect it will have on the enemy's deployment, not only as regards his most probable course, but as regards any other course he may take. He will thus have his mind perfectly oriented to proceed to the consideration of what his own forces can and should do to win.

OUR OWN FORCES:- Their Strength, Disposition and Courses of Action Open to Us.

Strength:

Just as was done with the enemy forces in this phase of the estimate, we must now ascertain what effect the conditions of the battlefield will have on our own strength. Having done that and noted carefully the disposition of our own forces as they actually are at the instant both as regards each other and as regards the location of the enemy, one is then ready to take up the courses of action open to him. If one's general plan has been properly conceived, it provides for courses of action to cover a meeting at any time, day or night. The three tactical rules that follow give the principles that govern on contact;

(a) "A major engagement will not be attempted during fog or darkness unless a delay in bringing on the engagement might permit the enemy to escape, or, in case of marked inferiority, such conditions offer an opportunity for engagement under conditions which prevent the enemy making full use of his superiority."

(b) "The attack will be delivered from such direction as to gain advantages of favorable wind, sea, and light conditions, if such can be obtained without sacrificing an advantageous strategical situation or causing an undue delay in the engagement."

(c) "If it happens that the enemy is attempting to escape, the advantages of wind, sea, and light conditions may have to be sacrificed, the movements of the fleet being governed by conditions favorable to cutting off the enemy's retreat and bringing him to action."

Contact with the enemy, then, calls for immediate consideration of three important conditions, namely,

1. Time:- (a) Does the time of contact permit carrying out plan for day action or does it necessitate using plan for night contact?  
  
(b) Do the necessities of the situation require one to engage in spite of approach of darkness?
2. Place:- (a) Is the area suitable for carrying out the plan?  
Does the geographical situation favor the enemy or one's self?  
  
(b) Do the necessities of the situation require one to engage in spite of unfavorable area?
3. Weather:- (a) Do visibility conditions, wind and sea favor plan of action or do they re-act in favor of the enemy?  
  
(b) If in favor of the enemy, do the necessities of the situation require one to accept the handicap?

A consideration of these points brings one to a decision either to engage or not to engage until the situation is more favorable. A decision not to engage defers the completion of the estimate until a more suitable time for engaging and determines what to do in the meantime. We will therefore not go further with such a situation but will proceed to the conclusion of the estimate when it has been decided to engage. Our question then becomes one of when to engage. Should we do so immediately or maneuver into a more favorable position?

The decision to engage calls upon one

1. To seize all advantages of the situation for one's self that one possibly can,
2. To minimize the disadvantages as much as possible, and
3. To deny, as far as possible, any advantages to the enemy.

The necessities of a special situation may force a deviation from this very natural course, but, even so, such a deviation should retain for ourselves the possible remaining advantages.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of a situation?

They are,

- I Navigational:- Can the enemy be forced into restricted waters while we are free to maneuver? Or may the enemy reverse the situation? Will such a situation force us to lose visibility, wind and sea benefits which we might otherwise have, and, if so, which is the more valuable?
2. Visibility:- (a) Is the visibility such as to favor the enemy or ourselves, or can we gain a position which will give us greater visibility than the enemy? If so, will it offset navigational and weather disadvantages which would result therefrom?  
  
(b) Should we attempt to gain the sun-gauge? Or are the light conditions such that we are apt to be silhouetted to the enemy? Do the advantages of either of these situations outweigh the advantages of wind or navigational situations if they are lost thereby?
3. Weather:- (a) Is the weather gauge necessary or desirable for our plan? How will it affect our own and the enemy's smoke, smoke tactics and speed? Does gaining the weather gauge run us into navigational or visibility disadvantages? If so, which is more valuable?  
  
(b) What effect will the sea have upon our own gun-fire as to spray, roll, pitch and yaw? Can we reduce the effect of these by our choice of course?  
  
(c) What course will be most favorable for our air-craft? Will such a course handicap our force as a whole, considering the advantages and disadvantages above? Which is more important to success?

These conditions, their advantages and ~~dis~~-advantages, different on each field of battle and, in fact, changing even during battle, must be carefully weighed. Only when they have been weighed will the Commander be able to determine whether to engage at once or to maneuver for a position which insures for himself the maximum of benefit from the local situation, and such weighing thus becomes the next step in a tactical estimate. Having completed it, he will have decided to engage at once or to maneuver to put himself into position to engage.

If he has decided on the latter course of action his decision for the moment has been reached and should be enunciated and carried out until the time to engage.

When the time to engage actually comes, be it at this period in the estimate or later on after maneuvering for position, the most important decision one has to make is in regard to the deployment course. Having previously gotten in mind what the enemy can and may do, the selection of the best course becomes simplified provided one proceeds in the same systematic manner to analyze the courses open to himself as he did in analyzing those open to the enemy. He lists the several general directions his deployment course can take and then, under each, studies not only the effects of wind, sea, light etc., on that course as was done with the enemy forces, but also the effect on that course of the strongest action and the possible actions the enemy may take.

Having by such study ascertained the advantages and disadvantages accruing to each course, and having thereby prepared his mind for every eventuality the existing conditions or the enemy can impose, it becomes fairly simple to come to a decision as to the best deployment course and to come to the sound tactical minor decisions necessary to carry that decision out.

#### DECISIONS-

The above decisions, when written, complete the estimate.



THE BATTLE ORDER:-

Every tactical estimate that covers the second phase must lead to decisions on two outstanding points. These are

First:- Whether to engage or to not engage immediately, and

Second:- The course to be taken (1) for engaging, (2) in maneuvering to gain a position for engaging, or (3) in retiring.

Having come to a decision on these two points, the solver, by enunciating these new decisions in paragraph 2 of the battle order gives his force the final details that changes his general plan into a detailed battle plan. Through paragraph two an indoctrinated command immediately understands the detailed manner in which the general plan is to be carried out. Subordinates will know the fleet is to do one of the following:-

- (1) Close and engage immediately following the previously announced general plan,
- (2) Gain a desired position or disposition (as, for instance, the weather gauge) or a concentration of light forces) and then close and engage,
- (3) Retire and not fight,

and the course to be taken whichever of the three it has been decided to do.

Just what is to be done and the course to take to do it are the first and most important things the entire command must know and are given in paragraph 2 of the battle order.

Paragraph 2 of a battle order may or may not be preceded by a <sup>1</sup> paragraph containing information. Usually paragraph 1 may be omitted from the battle order because the new information having come in by broadcasted radio messages may be presumed to have been intercepted by the entire command. However, if the Commander has any doubts as to this having been done and feels that any or all of the new information must be known to his subordinates to enable them to carry out his plan, he must repeat that information in paragraph 1.

In order to facilitate the transmission of battle orders in code, in writing out paragraph 2 (which contains the decision) and paragraph 3 (which contains the tactical decisions) care should be taken to express the ideas in the phrases of our Signal Books and Codes. To facilitate doing so, the same phraseology should also be followed in writing out the decisions at the end of the estimate. Unfortunately the Signal Books and Codes do not now cover all possible contingencies though revision to this end is now in progress, which, it is hoped, will provide first for the basic signals and second make possible the adding of the course to carry out the basic idea. What is desired but what is not now provided for in every contingency, is indicated by the following signals:-

<u>Basic Signal.</u>	<u>Course Signal.</u>
Will engage immediately	(battle course)
Will seek weather gauge and then engage	(course to gain weather gauge)
Will delay action until light forces concentrate and then engage on	(battle course)
Will retire on course	(retirement course)

Even though the Signal Books do not provide for every contingency, we should still always write paragraph 2 along the lines indicated by the above examples, and should always couch paragraph 3 in the language of the Signal and Code Books. The battle order can then be coded and transmitted quickly by any of the usual means of communication.

Outling for Estimating Situations - Tactical Problems.

Attached hereto is an outline for estimating Tactical situations. The student will find this outline useful as a "check off" list. It is believed that understanding the "Hints on Solutions" and by generally following the "Outline" the student will arrive at logical and sound solutions.

OUTLINE FOR ESTIMATING SITUATIONS -- TACTICAL PROBLEMS

CLASS of 1924.

BLUE

Tactical Problem \_\_\_\_\_ No. \_\_\_\_\_

DERIVATION OF MISSION:

- (a) Is the MISSION derived from orders or from a situation? If from a situation,
- (1) Is the realization of the situation written down or omitted?
  - (2) Is it a useful review or merely a rehash?
  - (3) Is it confined to the situation as it exists or does it run ahead into details of the solution?
- (b) Is the desired new situation clearly set forth?
- (c) Are the various dynamic means to resist the desired change and to bring it about considered?
- (d) Is the appropriate means selected from the foregoing logically, on broad considerations, not mixing in those of minor degree?

MISSION:

Substance: Embracing purpose and means to effect it or work towards it?

Expression: (a) Definite, neither too broad nor too limited; but to the point?

(b) Not divided in expression but strong in conveying the central purpose?

(c) Simple, direct and unequivocal, free from complexity and superfluity?

ENEMY FORCES:

- Strength: 1. Consideration of forces that may be employed;
- (a) Numerical and type comparison? Speed? Radius? Armor? Guns? Torpedoes? Mines? Air-craft?
  - (b) Material condition?
  - (c) Fighting strength? Compared? Analyzed?
  - (d) Communications, bases, logistics?
  - (e) Moral factors?
2. Strength of position and other elements?
3. Weather, actual, possible or probable?

Disposition: Present?

Possible, as problem develops, taking into consideration time, space and other considerations?

- Intentions: 1.(a) Enemy mission, derived or stated?
- (b) Tactical attitude, stated or realized?
  - (c) Enemy's objectives to accomplish mission?
  - (d) Area and nature of operations, their effect on enemy tactics?
  - (e) (Very important) Courses of action open to enemy to gain objective? Does he discuss all? Does he reason to the strongest and, therefore, the most probable?
  - (f) Forces in enemy's respective operations, probable kinds and strength?
2. Conclusions reached logically on each point?
3. Summary of enemy's most probable intentions? Analagous to Decision and Tactical Decisions
4. Support enemy's assumed Mission?

OWN FORCES:

Strength: Reconsidered and re-compared in light of summed up enemy effort and measured as against own probable tasks?

- Disposition: (a) Present? Probable as problem develops?  
(b) As it affects concentration-time, space?  
(c) As regards meeting enemy probable effort?  
(d) As it affects employment in problem?

Courses of Action Open to Us:

1. Analysis of our task?  
Area, weather and visibility conditions?  
Tactical attitude reasoned out and stated?
2. Objectives to accomplish mission?
3. Possible courses of action for gaining each objective? Does he discuss all? Taking into consideration enemy probable and possible intentions, is each course open to us considered as to,
  - (a) Prospect of success?  
Cost of success? Cost of failure?  
Possible gain worth probable cost?
  - (b) Forces necessary and available?
4. Courses adopted;
  - (a) Decided upon logically?
  - (b) Do they outline clearly,
    1. Plan?
    2. Forces?
    3. Tasks?
    4. Areas?
    5. Support of forces?
  - (c) Meet enemy probable courses?  
Meet other enemy possible courses?
  - (d) Support Mission?
  - (e) Provide for pursuit of enemy?

DECISION:

Substance:

- (a) Support the Mission?
- (b) Expresses purpose?
- (c) Outline a general plan?
- (d) Shows whole-hearted resolution, and
- (e) Is free from minor considerations?
- (f) Is clear, definite, forcible, and
- (g) As concise as consistent with full purport?
- (h) Follows phraseology of code and signal books?

Tactical Decisions:

- (a) Result from previous reasoning?
- (b) Support decision?
- (c) State:- What to do? To what? Where?  
With what?
- (d) Invade province of subordinate?
- (e) Invade province of standing orders or  
doctrine?
- (f) Definite, clear and concise? Do they  
follow the phraseology of code and signal  
books?
- (g) Forces adequate for tasks assigned?

Orders:

- (a) Correct as to form?
- (b) Impart decisions clearly, concisely?
- (c) Tactical decisions used without material  
change of wording?

FORMATIONS: 1. Dispositions, stated or clear from orders?

2. Consideration given to,

- (a) Security and information?
- (b) Concentration to meet probable threat?
- (c) Regular organization and chain of command, are they reasonably preserved?
- (d) Co-ordination of command?
- (e) Communication?

GENERAL COMMENTS:

- (a) Soundness of reasoning,  
As to enemy forces?  
As to own forces?
- (b) Is reasoning clear?
- (c) Is it all written down?
- (d) Is reasoning carried to conclusion on each point throughout?
- (e) Definiteness of the conclusions?
- (f) Completeness of the considerations?
- (g) Influenced by considerations not written down?
- (h) Too early or too full consideration of detail?
- (i) Conformity with prescribed method of solution?
- (j) Miscellaneous Comment?

(Tactics Department)  
(25 July, 1923 HL/WD)