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EXTRACTS FROM BOOKS READ
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SUBJECTS:
POLICY, COMMAND, STRATEGY, TACTICS
Arranged Alphabetically by Authors

VOLUME I
A — G

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VOLUME I

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Gentlemen:—I apprehend that, if we would essay to forecast the future, we must first turn to the past, and try to unravel the sequences of cause and effect which have created the present. Then assuming that the same forces continue in operation, we may draw our inferences concerning coming events, always with the reservation that our conclusions must be more or less inaccurate, since with finite minds and limited knowledge we undertake to deal with the infinite. (P. 828) 829 ✓

...the chief motor of human action is the instinct of self-preservation, and that in the struggle for life, men follow the lines of least resistance. ...Since few communities have ever been self-sufficing, men from the onset have been constrained to supply their necessities from without, either by purchase or by force, and that, to trade or rob, they have been obliged to travel. In travelling animals follow the easiest paths, which we call roads, and where roads have converged men have met and markets have grown up. 829 ✓

...As energy gathers volume, highways stretch across continents, and the states which they traverse acquire a common interest in defending the traffic which feeds their markets and supports their population. Thus, economic systems are generated comprising several states and when two or more such systems connect the same termini, war is apt to follow for war is the sharpest form of economic competition. (P. 830) ✓

Nothing is accidental, and the advance of any nation is the resultant of forces. p. 832 ✓

"The motives which predominate most in human affairs, are self-love and self-interest". ✓ p. 833 ✓

"There is nothing which binds one country or one State to another but interest". p. 833 ✓

Moralists may theorize as they will, but the displacement of energy and wealth which attends the migration of the world's central market, or, in other words, the seat of empire, involves the life and property of millions of human beings, and men have never yet learned to surrender these possessions by appeals to abstract principles. (Pages 832-837) ✓

Washington: "My policy has been, and will continue to be, while I have the honor to remain in the administration, to maintain friendly terms with, but be independent of, all the nations of the earth; to share in the broils of none; to fulfill our own engagements; to supply the wants and be carriers for the all; being thoroughly convinced, that it is our policy and interest to do so". Clearly Washington was right. If America could stand between France and England she could not fail to achieve fortune by collecting the debris scattered broadcast in the struggle. You can appreciate Washington's foresight, for you know how the U. S. has profited and still profits by the jealousy of European powers. (P. 841) ✓

Men fight to defend what they conceive to be their interests, but, generally, the only interests which stir them are those which are obvious. It is this tendency to ignore the future which has always been the greatest peril of America, and it is this tendency which Washington deplored. "It is to be regretted, I confess, that Democratical States must always feel before they can see; it is this that makes their governments slow". (P. 842) ✓

Gentlemen, that is the Monroe Doctrine. We oppose the establishment of a base of operations against us, by either of the two competing European systems, upon this continent; *and the principle should be extended even more emphatically to China, for he who possesses the richest beds of mineral in the world, and will almost infallibly, sooner or later, gain control of the canal which will cross the Isthmus of Panama.* That canal will be not only a route to the European market, but the cheapest highway from the mineral region of the East to the unoccupied domain of the valley of the Amazon which is now awaiting development. Thus England holds Egypt. ...We are safe as long as we divide our antagonists, but the danger will come hereafter. (P. 846) ✓

Instead, therefore, of being longer a nucleus lying at the extremity of two economic systems and serving them both as a terminus, the U. S. had herself become the seat of empire, and the point where both European and Asiatic trade-routes promised to converge. (P. 853) ✓

He (Chamberlin) contemplates an empire without a sovereign, or an organism which cannot coerce its members. Such empires are, in reality, leagues like our Confederation, and have seldom proved more than a shadow in the face of opposition. ✓

I wish to emphasize the fact that England failed in our Revolutionary War chiefly because of the imperfect training of her military and official class. They had not studied in advance the problems to be solved, and were neither prepared to overcome resistance, nor to compromise. They acted from instinct, obeying from day to day the pressure which impelled them along the path of least resistance, the greatest resistance being always offered by their own incapacity to master the relations of cause and effect with which they had to deal. The superiority of such administrators as Alexander and Caesar lay in the possession of this quality. I apprehend that our chief danger in the future may be an inheritance of this characteristic. We are naturally a race of gamblers, who

trust to chance; and it is this gambling tendency which makes preparation for war unpopular. War is costly and painful to contemplate; therefore the temptation is to ignore the teachings of the past, and erect the theory that mankind will eventually learn to live in peace into a moral dogma. Meanwhile the experience of many thousands years proves that under certain conditions war is inevitable. Those conditions consist in a certain intensity of economic competition. (P. 856) ✓

Had she (England) conquered the colonists who inhabited the belt between the ocean and the Ohio valley, she would have held her base in Asia, she would have possessed an unrivaled industrial plant at home, and she would have opened a practically exhaustless vent for her manufactures and a storehouse of raw material in America. p. 857 ✓

Viewed thus it is apparent that the stake for which England played in 1775 was little less than universal empire; and this brings us to the consideration of what England was at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War; what the so-called "Industrial Revolution" meant. p. 857 ✓

The sequence of cause and effect seems complete. The competition between England and France for the eastern trade generated the Seven Years War; by 1760 the Seven Years War had given India and Canada to England, and with India the treasure of Bengal. p. 860

England had consolidated rapidly after the Cromwellian Wars, because during those wars the superiority of the attack over the defense had been established. Thereafter no local power remained which could defy the central energy. In France in 1770, feudalism still lingered. Feudalism was the legal name for decentralization, because feudal law expressed the fact that the defense in war predominated over the attack. A country is decentralized when the provinces are independent or quasi-independent; and a province is independent which cannot be coerced. (P. 861) ✓

The crisis came when, by the consolidation of her society, Great Britain succeeded in throwing the masses of manufactured material on the international market, at prices with which the French could not cope. The effect was precisely similar to the establishment of a modern department store among old-fashioned retail tradesmen. It was bankruptcy. Movement in France nearly ceased, and actual starvation set in, because the people could neither sell their agricultural products nor their manufactures. p. 862 ✓

England undersold the continent because England could deal more rapidly with larger masses, and England succeeded in so doing, because by the help of her conquests and her minerals she reached a higher degree of consolidation sooner than any continental nation; for in decentralization Germany surpassed France. The effect was a convulsion, both internal and external. (Pp. 862-863). ✓

If I am right in my theory that the energy developed in social consolidation is proportionate to the mass to be consolidated, then the energy now being generated in America should be in the ratio of about four or five to one, as compared with the energy of England. (P. 864). ✓

We are in good times producing pig iron at the rate of roughly about 20,000,000 tons annually, and, supposing the country to continue its growth, we shall be producing between 40 and 50 million tons within 20 years; nor does the demand appear to be limited by anything but the the money available to be converted from quick into fixed capital. No one can foretell how long our mines will endure such consumption before the price of ore rises; and a rising price is tantamount to exhaustion in the face of a cheap foreign supply. I apprehend, however, that Europe has not the steel available, at the requisite price. Yet if we succeed, Europe cannot stand still. To do so is to succumb. We appear, therefore to be confronted by an alternative. Either within the next generation America herself will be driven to seek supplies of ore beyond her borders, or if not, her very success in production will constrain competing nations to do so. p. 865 ✓

At present, so far as we know, Northern China offers the most abundant and the cheapest supply of minerals, combined with the most advantageous labor, and accordingly Northern China promises to be the terminus of modern trade-routes, in that imperative sense which implies that without its resources modern competition cannot be sustained. p. 865 ✓

I beg you to reflect on how this contingency which is already upon us, must affect the U. S. Admitting that Northern China should be developed by some energetic and administrative race, the product of China would undersell the American product in the Pacific. (P. 865) 866 ✓

Leaving aside, however, for the moment, questions referring to particular competitors, and recurring to general principles, I affirm that no lesson is more enforced by history than that which teaches us that, he who holds the terminus and the market will one day also hold the connecting road. I need not go back to the middle ages; I will take a modern instance. The French built the Suez Canal, but the English soon acquired control thereof. Apply this precedent to ourselves; and it is the more forcible, since we have to face a sharper competition, and we are inferior at sea to any probable coalition which might be made against us. We lie between two adversaries,

England and the Continent, both of whom we menace, and either of whom would gladly destroy us, were the nearer enemy eliminated. (P. 866). ✓

Judging from the past the men who, in the end, will prevail in South America, will be those who can control the cheapest steel, and the power who can do this may probably be the one which commands the minerals and the labor of China. (P. 868). ✓

England is pinched since she has to buy raw material and food, and cannot sell her manufactured product at a price high enough to balance the account, because of competition, and hostile tariffs. ✓ 869

Mr. Chamberlain bases his proposed policy upon the postulate that the British empire must dissolve unless greater cohesion can be given to the parts. ✓ p. 869

Mr. Chamberlain recommends a discriminating tax on food. Chamberlain proposes ultimately to make the British economic system self-supporting, as it would have been had England prevailed in our Revolutionary War. I doubt not that the initial steps of this enterprise would be taken without hostile intent towards this country; but such a path leads far. . . . All I wish to point out is the danger for us of the distinct predominance of either one of the two competitors whose quarrels have been our safety for nearly two hundred years. (P. 869-870). ✓

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Mr. Chamberlain recommends a discriminating tax on food. He proposes ultimately to make the British Empire self-supporting, as it would have been had England prevailed in our Revolutionary War. I doubt not the initial steps of this enterprise would be taken without hostile intent towards this country; but such a path leads far. You cannot have a self-supporting empire without a base, a central market and a terminus. p. 869 ✓

The only adequate terminus for the sale of commodities which now presents itself to England is North and South America, and the only base whence adequate supply of minerals can be drawn, seems to be in China. p. 869 ✓

I apprehend that our government could take no wiser course than extend the principle enunciated by President Monroe over the mineral region of Northern China. Of this we may rest assured; while our competitors can be kept asunder we can rule; our hour of peril will come when by war or otherwise they consolidate and the consolidation turns on us. Then China will be organized and opened. It matters for us little by whom. (P. 871). ✓ p. 870-871 ✓

Foreign affairs are but the reflex of domestic conditions. The two are halves of a whole, they cannot be dissociated; and incapacity to appreciate our domestic phenomena and provide for their effect abroad may be fatal. It may be fatal, as the battle of Trafalgar was fatal to France. But if war is the fiercest form of economic competition, it is an effect of causes which may be recognized beforehand, as certainly as the approach of rate-cutting by railways. p. 873 ✓

If you will look back through history you will perceive the part played by the military mind in the adjustment of human society. The reason is that the military mind when not narrowed to a specialty, but broadened by a varied training, has proved the most powerful of administrative agents. p. 873 ✓

Alexander was a military genius, but he has something more. He was a great economist. Other Greeks might have captured Tyre, but Alexander's capital conception was not so much the attack on a stronghold, as the relation of eastern and western exchanges. He comprehended the value of the direct route to India. He founded Alexandria, threw Phoenicia and Babylon into eccentricity, and thereby changed the equilibrium of the world. p. 873 ✓

So with Caesar. Caesar did not establish the Roman Empire through the victory of Pharsalia, for no amount of victories would alone have created a stable equilibrium between the East and West. Caesar's power lay in his grasp of the fact that the civilization in which he lived could not consolidate until it had broadened its base by absorbing Gaul. Study the map and the history for yourselves, and the more you ponder on Caesar's voluntary exile for years before he made his final attack upon Rome, the more you will be penetrated with admiration for that far-reaching intellect which seized upon the correlation of the parts of the society which he was to regenerate, when his generalizations would have seemed insanity to his contemporaries. p. 873-874 ✓

Permit me a last example. No platitude is more popular than denunciation of the conqueror and the military despot, and none is flimsier. The soldier does not create a despotism; despotism is the fruit of a social condition. The soldier when he organizes a society upon a despotic basis conforms to the conditions before him; but if these are unfavorable to despotism, and he proposes to succeed, he establishes a republic or some other kind of government. Government is a means to an end, and that end is the preservation of property and order. (Pp. 873-874). ✓

Washington, like Alexander, or Caesar, or Cromwell, understood the society in which he lived and adapted himself thereto. That he could do this proved him to be no visionary but truly great, as his predecessors had been great before him. His sagacity contributed more than any other single factor to the adoption of the constitution, and thru the adoption of the constitution to the construction of the foundation of a great administrative system. ✓

That system we and our descendants must complete, and, unless I greatly err, in the process of construction the Naval Staff of the U. S. must face responsibilities more serious than any it has heretofore borne. Among these must stand in the front rank the adjustment of military force to the exigencies of economic competition. (P. 874). ✓

Our danger is in the character of our education which makes men too special. Civilians are apt to consider officers as men whose opinion is of value only within their own department, *largely because officers are prone to confine their attention somewhat exclusively to military affairs.* (Page 875). ✓

To me, as I have said, the preliminary step seems clear. Self-preservation would prompt me to defend the integrity of Korea and the Chinese Empire, if necessary, by arms, since by so doing we should be sure of allies, and should be certain to divide our competitors more radically than they are divided now. I do not apprehend, however, that we should be driven to war. The mere certainty that we should be ready to resist would work in China as it has worked nearer home. We, with our allies, would be too strong to be defied. p. 876 ✓

We have before us problems whose magnitude cannot be exaggerated, and whose complexion changes with bewildering rapidity. If the U. S. is to fulfill her apparent destiny and become the converging point of trade-routes and the seat of energy and empire, our successors must not only be able to handle masses by the side of which now oppress us will be small, but they must have means of reaching their decisions with rapidity and precision. To that end we must have men trained as specialists and yet capable of generalizing. (P. 876). ✓

You need scientific men in the navy, as well as practical seamen, but you also need economists and historians, for without these you will be weak in a vital point. You will lack a channel of communication with the public, and such a channel is essential both to you and to the nation. You must be able not only to formulate your conclusions, but to state the steps by which you reach them, in order that you may be able to demonstrate the necessity of the armaments you advise. (P. 877). ✓

The tendency is for men to enter the diplomatic service young, grow old amid narrow circles in foreign capitals, and lose connection with the great currents of competition which agitate the world of practical affairs. p. 877 ✓

Officers of our navy travel throughout the world, they are stationed abroad to observe other civilizations, they return home at regular intervals and there they are apt to be thrown into active relations with many of the great industries of the country, above all they are always under the responsibility of being answerable with their lives for inaccuracies in their work. Add to this that they are a self-perpetuating corporation, and not only practically choose their successors, but educate them from boyhood. p. 877 ✓

Such a corps of men, with such advantages, who would give a portion of their energy to a study of the economic side of war, on the principle that war is a form of competition in the struggle for the survival among nations, could hardly fail in time to gain the confidence of the public. They would do so because they would be competent, and because their judgment would be impartial and not warped from year to year by impending elections. Their doctrines would finally be crystallized and become the common property of each successive administration and congress, very much as the Monroe Doctrine would be supported as loyally by a Democratic as by a Republican cabinet. (P. 877-8.) p. 878 ✓

In my judgment, national efficiency rests on national intelligence, and my conviction is that the American people will never act intelligently in the matter of self-defense until they have trained their naval staff to be their guide in regard to the probabilities of war, and then have learned to trust them. p. 878 ✓

If war be one phase of economic competition, then economic conditions become to you important as the basis of campaigns, and trade routes are factors in strategy. Other things being equal, that force will prevail which is best equipped, and your equipment must depend on the supplies granted you by a commercial community. You have a double reason therefore, for addressing yourselves to these problems; the first is to obtain for yourselves the most accurate ideas of the probable character of the wars in which you may engage; the second is to demonstrate to the public their stake in the conflict. p. 879 ✓

I make no apology for these suggestions, for, as a citizen, I feel that the efficiency of the Navy touches my personal safety. My country may at any hour be involved in war against serious odds, and her chance of victory will then be proportionate to her preparation, and her preparation to the intelligence with which she has been taught to estimate the possibilities of the future. In my judgment, national efficiency rests on national intelligence, and my conviction is that the American people will never act intelligently in the matter of self-defense until they have trained their naval staff to be their guide in regard to the probabilities of war, and then have learned to trust them. (P. 878). ✓

The question then arises, what are those means, and I believe, in this matter that you must be the judge; but to be recognized as the judge you must be able to convince your contemporaries by reasoning which appeals to them. p. 878-879 ✓

So it should be with you. If war be one phase of economic competition, then economic conditions become to you important as the basis of campaigns, and trade-routes are factors in strategy. p. 879 ✓

Unless I am wholly in error, safety lies in being able to concentrate superior force at the point where rival trade-routes converge. Had the English comprehended this axiom they would not have suffered Braddock's defeat, not lost the thirteen colonies. p. 879 ✓

As between America and those whose interest clash with hers, one side must yield, and the only argument to which men have yet submitted when the great prizes of life were at stake, is the argument of force. He who is unarmed is the slave and the victim of the soldier; while he who is armed shares in the fruit of victory. Once admit these premises and the conclusions are irresistible. Safety lies in strength. When nations have thus learned to appreciate human limitations, the position of the military services is impregnable. (Pp. 879-80). p. 880 ✓

Safety lies in being able to concentrate superior force at the point where rival trade routes converge. p. 879 ✓

Common sense indicates that if you convince the public that you understand their economic interests and that you only ask to insure their lives and their property, you will be granted what appropriations you may need. (P. 878). p. 879 ✓

Look where you will, the field which opens before the American navy is vast and demands alike the highest powers of the mind, and the intensest effort. I firmly believe no century has ever unfolded more superb possibilities than the twentieth century will unfold to you; but, conversely your responsibilities are at least commensurate with your opportunity. Your task is to carry your country through the dangers which will beset her as she climbs the path to economic supremacy; a path in which errors such as those committed by England in 1774 may be fatal. ✓

As Washington said a century and a quarter ago: "It is to be regretted that Democratical States must always feel before they see," for "it is this which makes their government slow." In my judgment this failing constitutes our chief danger, for modern life is fast. Modern warfare requires not only a highly scientific body of trained men to act as officers, but modern fleets take many years to build. On the other hand, when the blow falls, it falls suddenly. In a few days a decisive battle may be fought, as the French found in the campaign of 1870. Safety therefore lies in patient preparation and in rapid action. Such being my opinion I cannot too strongly urge upon you, as one of your weightiest duties, your responsibility toward your country in this behalf. A portion of your task should be to foresee and explain the action of those competing currents of trade which, when brought into conflict, must, as a condition of survival, make it necessary to take and hold certain dominant positions. That means war unless one party is too strong to be attacked. To perform this function you must, in a degree, become popular teachers, for on you, more than on any other class of the community, devolves the task of eradicating prejudices, and of diffusing intelligent ideas on this great class of subjects with which you, of all men, are most competent to deal. (Pp. 880-81). ✓

As between America and those whose interests clash with hers, one side must yield, and the only argument to which men have yet submitted when the great prizes of life were at stake, is the argument of force. He who is unarmed is the slave and the victim of the soldier; while he who is armed share in the fruit of victory. Once admit these premises and the conclusions are irresistible. Safety lies in strength. When nations have thus learned to appreciate human limitations, the position of the military services is impregnable. (P. 880) ✓

Aston—Amphibious Wars.

'Let us suppose a small state which is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that each year its position will become worse; should it not, if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is farthest from the worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantage—it will rather increase the disparity of forces—but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives, or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account'. He goes on: 'If again we suppose a small state engaged in war with a greater, and that the future has no influence on their decisions, still, if the small state is politically the assailant, we demand of it also that it should go forward with its object'. 222: 221

With several places of embarkation and disembarkation available, we see that the application of sea transport could enable the Japanese to transfer their troops to the mainland with considerable rapidity, always supposing they could get enough transports, and that there was no interference from Russian war vessels. 224. ✓

Before doing so we can note that at the beginning of February there were about 126,000 field, fortress, and railroad troops in the districts threatened. The means of communication available for despatching reinforcements from European Russia consisted of a single line of railway, with a break at Lake Baikal; this lake was frozen over, and the ice-breaking vessels were unable to work after the 27th of January. The section of line eastward of Lake Baikal was short of rolling stock, and the distance apart of the places where trains could pass each other, the governing factor in calculating the maximum number of trains which can pass along a single line, was as much as twenty-one to twenty-five miles, which was reduced to 7 and a half miles before the end of the war. At first only 3 trains could be run each way every 24 hours, and only 2 of these could be military trains, on account of the number required for railway material and so forth. Each train, according to the German General Staff, would take about 500 men and a rest day was required every 3 or 4 days. Other estimates give from 250 to 1000 men, and I think that if you take 500 as an average you will not be far from the mark.... 225. ✓

The fact that I want to bring out is that Japan, in carrying her 'limited object', need not expect to face the whole Russian army, altho the territory in which the operations must take place was continental, and adjoining the home territory of her enemy. At the beginning of 1904 the Russians had no less than 4,540,000 more or less trained men, and I do not know how many more untrained men who were liable to service, while the number of Japanese more or less trained, and liable to military service, did not exceed 850,000.... 228: 233

.....
... We have received no information about the Russian plan for the employment of their naval forces immediately upon the outbreak of war with Japan; and, judging from results, it is doubtful whether any such plan was in existence. Had the Russian fleet been in a state of readiness, there was no apparent reason why offensive action should not have been undertaken against the Japanese fleet and transports from the first, but in that even Japan seized the initiative both by sea and by land; the Russians never regained it during the whole course of the struggle, and were obliged to conform to the plans of their enemy. It would be difficult to find a more striking example of the disasters which attend the fleets and armies of a country, in which an aggressive foreign policy has been allowed to proceed unchecked, altho far ahead of the strategical preparations for its continuity after the failure of diplomatic measures. 239. ✓

Remembering Mahan's remark that the command of a maritime region is ensured primarily by a navy, and secondly by positions suitably chosen upon which the navy rests, and from which it can exert its strength, we note that Japan had naval bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Maizura, Sasebo, and Takeshiki, in addition to her private dockyards at Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Kobe, where repairs could be executed. Russia had naval bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, but the latter place was not an ice-free port, and a channel could only be cleared by means of special ice-breaking vessels. The resources of Port Arthur for the execution of repairs could not be compared with those at the disposal of the Japanese. 241-242. ✓

We have studied the reasons why, in the circumstances, it was necessary for Japan to assume the offensive at once if she wished to attain her object, which was the effective occupation of Korea, and the freedom of Manchuria from Russian influence. We must take care not to generalise too much from this war, or to assume that the only way to obtain a limited object in a certain territorial area is to conduct all one's operations in that area. To illustrate this by a personal reference, if one's object were to take a man's boots it might take a long time to obtain it by treading on his toes, while on the other hand one might knock him on the head quickly, and then remove his boots at one's leisure. The object of the Japanese Government, in continuation of the national policy, was to force their will upon the Russian Government, and check the progress of Russian expansion in Manchuria and Korea.

A blow at the main Russian army, and at the Russian centre of organization and commercial activity, was out of the question, and the only course open was to operate in the territory under dispute. 246-247. ✓

Here again we can compare the defending side in amphibious warfare to 'a man in the dark at a loss which way to go to guard against the stroke of an invisible hand'. The only chance of bringing about a better situation on land would be to obtain a victory over the Japanese fleet, and for this purpose it was essential that their own fleet should be concentrated and not divided. We have no information why the main fleet, and the large Vladivostok cruisers and other outlying craft at Chemulpo and elsewhere, were not so concentrated. The harbor of Vladivostok, it is true, is icebound during long periods every winter, but ice-breakers for many years had kept the channel clear for the vessels of the Russian volunteer fleet, when they ran regular trips to this destination. Possibly the Russians may have considered that the concentration of their fleet would have precipitated hostilities, to the same extent as the reinforcement of their armies, but it seems highly probable that they were taken completely by surprise by the Japanese policy; not only was the main fleet at Port Arthur weaker than it need have been, but it was anchored in the outside harbor exposed to torpedo attack. 250-251. ✓

The time factor was all-important to the Japanese. To apply the military advantages afforded by the configuration of the coastline, it was necessary, in the first place, to ensure that the Russian fleet did not interfere with the movements of transports by sea, or with the disembarkation of armies. In the second place, it was necessary to land troops quickly enough to strike at the advanced portions of the Russian army, and to follow up successes promptly. If allowed sufficient time the Russians would be able to reinforce their field army, and the farther north, in the direction of Harbin, the decisive battles on the land took place, the more would Japan's amphibious advantage disappear. The longer the decisive conflict could be delayed, the smaller would be the prospect of success. You will remember that passage in Von der Golt's *Conduct of War*, where he writes that the time for landing expeditionary forces is at the very commencement of hostilities, when their effect is most felt, because all the hostile field troops are on their way to the frontier. He also points out that bodies of troops which have been landed are ill adapted for a rapid and distant advance from the coast, because their proportion of mounted troops, and especially of transports, must usually be small. 252-253. ✓

Since Togo, in spite of all endeavors, was unable to gain decisive results in his attempts to destroy the Russian war vessels, he was obliged to do the best he could to prevent their coming out of harbor because, had they done so and evaded him, the military forces moving by sea would have been in great peril. Accordingly, he tried on several occasions to run old merchant vessels filled with stones or explosives into the entrance channel, and to sink them there. The first attempt was made on the night of 23-24 February, when five such steamers were employed, escorted by 5 torpedo boats. On the night of 26-27 of March another attempt was made by 4 merchant ships, escorted by 11 destroyers and 6 torpedo boats. On the night of 2-3 of May a final attempt was made by 12 merchant vessels. None of these operations appear to have been completely successful, tho it is said that the effect of the last one was to block the channel completely for a short period.

By this constant activity Admiral Togo gained the object desired, because he prevented the Russian fleet from interfering with the free movement of the Japanese troops and storeships by sea. 285-286. ✓

Ballard—Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan.

Reference has been made on several previous pages to the strategical and political importance to Japan of maintaining the Korean peninsula free from annexation or domination by a strong naval power. 125. ✓

But it has always been the tragedy of Korea to be strategically important to China as well as to Japan. 126. ✓

Herein lay for centuries a perpetual source of irritation and jealousy between the statesmen of Peking and Kioto. Neither could perhaps be accused of actively aggressive intentions toward Korea—with the notorious exception of Hideyoshi—but neither wished to see the other there. 127. ✓

On this part lay the fine natural harbor of Vladivostok, the headquarters and supply of the Russian Pacific fleet. But, as already observed, this was not an ice-free port, and the Russian authorities constantly kept their eyes turned towards the Yellow Sea farther to the south, especially on its eastern arm extending between Korea and the Liao-tung peninsula. To establish a footing on its shore, they began in 1898 by obtaining from Peking, under practical compulsion, a "lease" of part of the Liao-tung peninsula itself, which included Port Arthur. Neither France nor Germany raised any protest against a spoliation of that kind by a powerful European neighbor, although ready enough to denounce such action when carried out by a small and far-distant country from which they had nothing to fear. This acquisition was well situated for Russian requirements, but suffered under the serious drawback of being cut off from the main Russian territory to the northward by the great easternmost block of the Chinese Empire known as Manchuria. To annex this area or at least to obtain a military right of way across it, became in consequence the problem for which they ardently sought a solution. Their first step towards that end was the construction of a branch line joining Port Arthur through Manchuria with their main railway across Siberia to Vladivostok, a section of which itself ran, by permission extorted from the Chinese Government, through Northern Manchuria to avoid a long detour in difficult Siberian country. 187, 188. ✓

But Japan was deeply concerned in the strategic and political aspects of the matter as well as the economic. A Russian Manchuria would mean the permanent establishment of a first-class naval and military State in an excellent situation for the exercise of sea power in the North-West Pacific, by joining up the invaluable naval base at Port Arthur in direct land communication with the Russian metropolis and main centres of production. Until that was accomplished Port Arthur remained a disconnected though highly essential part of the whole scheme. A Russian Manchuria would also extinguish the last hope of the Japanese towards attaining a position of influence in Far Eastern affairs, and place a potential enemy of vast strength in a most favorable position to attack Japan should trouble ever arise. Above all, it would hem in Korea entirely on the land side, and inevitably lead to its ultimate annexation, if Russian methods of the past three centuries were any guide. 189, 190. ✓

The Japanese were resolved, therefore, to forego no effort to prevent it, and as the Russians were obstinately resolved to proceed with this scheme, a deadlock was reached towards the end of 1903, after much diplomatic controversy, by which time the Russians had already been established for more than two years in the disputed region, and done much to consolidate their hold. In their endeavors to settle the matter peaceably by compromise, the Japanese went so far as to propose a convention whereby they would pledge themselves to recognize Manchuria as being outside their legitimate sphere of influence, if the Russians would meet them half-way by agreeing to recognize Korea as outside that of Russia. Five successive revisions of the original draft of this proposal were made in St. Petersburg to gain time while more of the Tsar's ships were being despatched eastward and in the final form in which alone the Russian Foreign Office declared it would be acceptable if Japan was to have no word in Manchurian affairs, but Russia was to be subject to no pledges or restrictions as regards Korea. 190. ✓

The distance of St. Petersburg from the region in dispute was not an unmixed advantage, but it did at least produce a situation in which by going to war Russia would risk no more than an out-lying extremity of her dominions, whereas the Japanese would risk the very heart of their Empire. Thus, not only would the latter be venturing their all by war, but success on both elements would be necessary for the achievement of their special object of forcing the Russians out of Manchuria. The Russians, on the other hand, would be risking nothing absolutely vital, while success on either element, it did not much matter which—would enable them to remain rooted in Chinese territory. 192. ✓

But, as already observed, there was one point of great importance in Japan's favour. The Japanese producing centres for war-supplies lay within close and easy reach by sea of the prospective theatre of operations, whereas the Russians were very far distant by a slow land route quite useless for the transport of heavy articles such as naval guns of 50 tons weight. The Russian bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok were merely dumping depots, and not manufacturing arsenals except in a very small way. The Japanese bases, on the other hand, were at, or immediately adjacent to, the spots where munitions and articles of maritime equipment of all kinds were actually turned out. 192. ✓

As already observed, all chance of success depended for the Japanese in the first place on *victory at sea*, and yet they knew that they had none of the means of making good losses to their fleet such as their opponents would enjoy. At that period the Japanese dockyards had not been sufficiently developed to build even one "capital ship", and every vessel of modern design in their navy, large or small, had been launched from a foreign shipway. When once hostilities were started, no more could be obtained from abroad, and every vessel lost represented a permanent weakening of their position at sea. 193. ✓

On February 6, 1904, their Minister in St. Petersburg was instructed to break off diplomatic negotiations and announce his immediate recall. On the same day Togo received orders to proceed to attack the Russian fleet. Information of its exposed position had reached the Japanese, who meant to profit thereby if possible, although it may be doubted whether they expected to find them still outside after the recall of the Japanese Minister. 204. ✓

The immediate results of the Tsushima victory were most far-reaching. In Russia the news caused the deepest depression, and all hopes of ultimately winning the war vanished. On land the situation had arrived at something in the nature of a deadlock, promising no decisive outcome either way in spite of the Russian reverse at Mukden, for the Japanese had reached the limit of their capacity in men and money, and could not hope to drive the enemy back any farther. The Russians, on the other hand, although far from the end of their resources in troops, were unable to send any more to the war, because their one line of railway could only with the utmost difficulty feed those already at the front. Thus although strong enough to hold their ground they were unable to advance. As neither side could take the offensive on land, nothing but a decisive defeat of the Japanese on the sea could alter the situation, and this the Russians had signally failed to achieve. The conditions after Tsushima, therefore, were singularly favorable for foreign mediation, and President Roosevelt took the opportunity to offer his services. 284. ✓

By the terms of peace Russia expressly recognized that Japanese interests were permanent in Korea from the military, political, and economic standpoints, which had been the special contention of the victors from the first. The lease of the Liao-tung peninsula with Port Arthur obtained by Russia from the Chinese was also transferred to Japan; together with the southern half of the island of Saghalin which the Japanese had occupied in July. No indemnity was paid, but the Russian ships lying half submerged in Port Arthur were raised and added to the Japanese fleet. Some were returned to Russia in 1915 when Russians and Japanese were both fighting against Germany. Lastly, the Russian evacuation of Manchuria, forced by defeat in the field, was rendered permanent. Japan had therefore attained all the objects for which she entered the war. 284-285. ✓

Baudry—Naval Battle.

If we accept the principles of naval battle the sought and purposed naval battle we cannot logically stop there, but must go on to the principle of victory-sought, purposed, prepared, and decisive.

To fight the enemy is nothing—we must beat him. We must mean to win.

And victory itself is little. What we must achieve is the "big victory", the heaviest blow in the shortest time. What we must seek, purpose, and achieve is the decisive victory. (P. 17-18).

The inevitable conclusion therefrom is that all the wheels of a war-fleet turn for, all its coiled, tense springs wait for, is this, "Big battle"; that its chief subject of study is the tactical procedure which admits of the concentrated employment of all its means, and that its practical training is battle training; that operations accessory to external to the battle—blockades, coast-defense, etc., without, indeed, being ignored, must be relegated to the second place in the preoccupations of the executive and the finance departments alike; that building policy regards every vessel that is not one of destruction (before or during the general battle) as an auxiliary, and therefore as a harmful parasite which sucks men, money, and material into itself at the expense of the victory-winning element.

If information of concentration are formations taken up by the vessels of a fleet with respect to each other, positions of concentration are those taken up by one fleet with respect to the opposing fleet; supposing these fleets to be arrayed in straight lines, positions of concentration necessarily imply that the opposed straight lines are not parallel. (P. 134).

And the overmastering, offensive will, the determination to stifle the base instinct of retreat and "see it through", must be forged in advance by training of the will and by incessant night exercises.

First and foremost of the points to be insisted on is the capital importance of numerical superiority.

If we have this superiority at the very outset—which is the surest way of having it at all—let us strive to multiply it by fire and maneuvers of concentration.

If we are only equal or inferior in numbers at the start, let us strive, by maneuvers, to gain a relative superiority. Let us make numbers. Speed will assist enormously here.

We insist, too, upon the importance of being able to keep up continuous fire of maximum effectiveness. But let us carefully distinguish the school-of-gunnery maxima from those obtainable in battle-firing, when the target shoots back.

We insist, further, on the importance of priority of effective fire, and on that of deranging the enemy's fire-control while maintaining our own intact. (Pp. 138-139).

One assertion, lastly, seems to be not unsafe. In modern conditions of gunnery, the "useful defeat", the defeat in which one sacrifices one's self in order to inflict an equivalent injury on the enemy, is a quasi-impossibility. We must, therefore, make the utmost use of our weapons and our means, cannonade and maneuver, to win the victory.

When victory slips out of our hands in the course of the fire-fight, she means to take wing and fly from us. There are ways and means of obtaining your "useful defeat" and perhaps a victory—a victory of a different kind—but guns and fire-control are not amongst them. If these be your objects, demand them of close-quarters fighting, hand-to-hand fighting, and face the consequence resolutely. And for that, do not delay until it is too late; do not wait until your men feel that they are...doomed. (P. 140).

But the first condition of his success is that he should have his hands free, that no tactical FORMULA should be lied upon him.

Relative superiority—the key of all decisive battles, whether by land or by sea.

The collective effort will have its full effect in the battle when the orders given, communicated, and received evoke the instinctive and unanimous approval that comes of thought within a single religion, an "I believe" of tactics.

Here is the first restriction on free-will? By no means, but rather the formation of the free-will.

This doctrine, if it is to be understood and assimilated, must take many things into account, and in particular the national characteristic of our people, our crews. It seems as if the offensive has always been more suited to us, brought out our quality better, than a long, wearing fight. (Pp. 147-152-153).

"To win at the point to be reached, it is necessary to concentrate both in time and in space; the ends are

surprise and violence, the mean strength and fire-power. The ideal to be aimed at is the greatest possible effect in the shortest possible time over the smallest possible area.

"Strike only those of the enemy who are dangerous, but strike all these. Strike upon the head and at close range—let your blows be both incessant and well concerted—three ships against one.

"A cannonade ill-begun can only be made good at close quarters.

"The naval battle is a collective act, from which all individualist ideas and actions must be banished. When one instrument has the solo, the others must subordinate everything to loyally playing the accompaniment; men, weapons, vessels, squadrons, are a single group of comrade forces. The fire of one must protect the evolution of another.

"Singleness is powerlessness. No 'solitary horseman'.

"To detach is easier than to concentrate. Let concentration be our starting-point always". (Pp. 155-156-157).

...It gives something higher than passive obedience: it gives the voluntary obedience that we call the "spirit of discipline". A disciplined man is not a slave. He marches with good humor, good heart, and good will along the path opened to him by the orders which he receives and the regulations to which he conforms.

Military discipline aboard-ship or in the ranks, in peace or in battle, means the subordination of all wills to those impersonal wills expressed in Regulations, and to intermediate and visible holders of the authority consecrated by Regulations. Each has duties in regard to the others, whether they be his superiors, his equals, or his subordinates. (P. 157).

The less the change that has to be made between the last day of peace and the first of war, the readier and the stronger is a military organism for battle. If, then, certain factors of victory can be thoroughly absorbed in advance, we ought thoroughly to absorb them in advance,—viz. in peacetime; and amongst these is the organic and moral factor of victory—discipline. (Pp. 157-158).

If our crew is to be morally healthy on the day of battle, we must prepare it well in advance. We must exalt the courage of all, and must in no wise restrict the battle-education of peacetime to certain categories. At sea, every single man on board is as much a combatant as every other. Let him know it and be proud of it.

...What battle-enthusiasm can be expected of non-specialists, ordinary seamen, stokers, and so forth, if in peace they have all their lives been looked upon as "poor devils"? (P. 162).

...Naval discipline requires not fear but mutual confidence as its foundation. It is confidence, from below up and from above down, that elevates the moral of a body of troops. If tightening up discipline strengthens the organic bond, making discipline more and more "reciprocal" raises the moral level, and the two are in no wise incompatible. (P. 165).

...It is the duty of the officer constantly to repeat to those under his orders that a navy exists in order to fight, perhaps tomorrow, and not for peace and regattas and harbour and fair-weather service. War—battle—we ought always to be thinking of these things, but in any case let us talk of them often, so as to be sure of thinking of them sometimes. Let us not be afraid of being regarded as bores harping on one string to the annoyance of their fellows. It is only by thinking of war that we can train ourselves for war—which is our duty—and only by speaking of it that we can train others—which is again our duty. (Pp. 169-170).

As the officers are, so will the men be. On the day—I have known such a day—when the spark of faith, hope, or enthusiasm informs the voice, the gesture, and the eye of a fighting leader, whatever be his rank, the spirit of the whole group under his command instantly flames up in response.

But to light that fire we must have a torch. Let us not let our torch go out before the battle. (P. 177).

As the arms at our disposal evolve; as the command in every grade is unfortunately always changing hands; as the Main Fleet ought always to be ready to put forth its whole power, and therefore to be trained to saturation-point; as the training should be similar for all groups and all units of the same degree—it is necessary that there should be a certain number of permanent and fundamental principles, well known to all, and immune from the glosses and interpretations of "initiative".

Some of these principles deal with the organization and grouping of squadrons, ships, men, and weapons; the constitution of material and masses, the grading of personnel. Others are concerned with the methods whereby material and personnel can best be employed on the field of battle. Lastly, the methods of battle-training should be identical for groups and units of the same degree.

Does this imply fresh restrictions on the free-will of the commander-in-chief? By no means. It means that he is put in possession of a number of methods which have been judged best, and given a free hand in applying them.

in handling them in any way that he thinks conformable to to the common doctrine.

These links and means should be defined by Regulations—Constituent Regulations, Regulations for Armaments, Training Regulations, and Maneuver Regulations.

Look at Tsushima! Not the least of the causes of that victory was the fact that Togo had been at the head of the Japanese Fleet—or, at any rate, the higher command had been forming itself—for ten years before the war (Semenov) In default of permanence in the men, let us at least have permanence in the functions, the flag commands. Let the framework for material be structurally so far permanent that the transition from peace to war in no way strains it. (Pp. 177-180).

Under the present system all alike command, the good and the mediocre. An officer of the former category leaves his ship, just as he has really begun to understand what he can do with it, or his squadron or division just as he has really begun to understand what he can do with it, or his squadron or division just as he has acquired the art of handling it in line or in mass; in short, just when personal assimilation is complete. An officer of the second category will never learn in any case. And when war surprises us, the twelve battleships that constitute our whole force will be commanded, more or less as chance dictates, by admirals, captains, specialist officers, who may have had little training for their work and no chance of proving their capacity, and may possibly be nobodies into the bargain. (P. 181.)

A human body that is solid, self-contained, well proportioned, neither fat nor emaciated, is fit to fence. But before it becomes a champion fencer, it must be taught first what lunges and parades are and then how to deliver them. It is trained by the methodical daily practice of appropriate exercises. Similarly a naval force, constituted structurally and organically in the best possible way for winning, must, if it is to be fit to win, train itself for battle maneuvers, for maneuvers in front of an opposed free will. FIGHTING REGULATIONS deal with (a) The formations, evolutions, and transformations of the field of battle. (b) Gunnery. (c) Signals in action. (d) Scouting, and work of light vessels outside the battle.

Lastly, the regulation formations must be such as will facilitate (a) the collective employment of our weapons and the development of our fire-power, and (b) the making and taking of signals—the first imperative, the second more or less subjunctive.

But above all, formation must never, under any diagrammatic or geometrical pretexts whatsoever, take precedence of action. It must be and remain supple and articulated. It must be a "rallying-point" as Nelson called it in the Trafalgar Memorandum. We can no more demand the parade precision of peace-time in our battle formations than we can expect school-of-gunnery percentages of hits when the target hits back. The whole secret of victory does not reside in geometrically accurate firing-lines—far from it. The signal of formation will be (like those of Nelson and Collingwood) above all else an indication of the type of combat that the commander-in-chief intends to fight. (Pp. 185-189-190-191).

REGULATIONS FOR BATTLE SIGNALS.

Here again, as always, let us aim at simplicity. At Tsushima it was not long before the Suvarov's last signal halliards were shot away. Let us avoid complicating the signalling system in peacetime, and let us not count on it to work in battle. What is important is not that a signal should be made, but that the idea of the commander, in tune with the ideas of all under him, should hover over the battle with a meaning for each executant.

Let us have a simple alphabetical code, and one letter, or two at most, for battle signals, to be repeated all down the firing-line by bunting on every intact halliard, by wireless, by squealing sirens, by microphones, all at once. Let every vessel cry aloud the will of the chief, and so it will reach the rear of the ship by one way or by the other. (Pp. 194-96.)

It is training, training to the idea of battle, training to the act of battle, that we won, first in order to eliminate our own natural toxins of physical feebleness, over-individualism, tendency to spend ourselves and our money on parasites, discouragement, fear; and secondly, to develop our fighting organs for the struggle with the enemy who watches and waits. Let us train ourselves until we are a sound organism, an organism that is so far master of itself as to be free to win.

Regimental officers know well enough that the only things that are properly done in battle are instinctive things.

It is necessary that one should have been accustomed all one's life to keeping one's post and doing one's duty, if one is to be sure of doing it well, by acquired instinct, before the enemy.

But for that it is necessary, too, that each man's battle-duty should be simple, and should call for neither reflection nor calculation. The instinct of striking, of giving blow for blow—that is all. (P. 198).

Guided by the common doctrine, bound to apply the regulations with which all the elements under his command are familiar to the point of instinct (which is in no sense of fresh restriction upon his free will) the com-

mander-in-chief is under yet another obligation towards his subordinates, viz: that of informing them of his intentions, in order that each may co-operate with all his energy and all his intelligence.

He must also discount in advance the effect of surprise upon us, prevent the effect of an unexpected blow being doubled by an unexpected order. He must explain to us before the battle how he proposes—D. V.—to adapt regulations to reality according to the circumstances of the battle. (P. 199-200).

Now, all maneuver implies, at least in theory, a counter maneuver (whether parade or riposte). This fact is used as an argument for the theory that "naval battles can only be conflicts of artillery. It is useless and therefore dangerous to try to maneuver". We are to regard maneuver as dead and buried—to deny the Nile, Trafalgar, Lissa, and Tsushima. At the same time it must be acknowledged that, at sea, if a maneuver is to count at all towards victory, it must catch the enemy unprepared. This unpreparedness may consist in (a) not knowing how to parry, (b) not daring to do so, (c) having actually no time to do so (d) having morally no time (reflection—execution) to do so. Villeneuve, Persano, Rozhestvensky, even Brucey had actually time enough to parry. But they did not. This is "surprise", and the factor of surprise is to be found in all decisive battles—

Is surprise—I mean surprise by big ships or a fleet—possible at sea?

On land, cover from view is the principle factor of surprise. But at sea we have only:

- (a) Power of doing the unexpected.
- (b) Rapid and adroit choice of plan.
- (c) Suddenness in execution.
- (d) Proximity of position.

(Pp. 203-204).

The maneuver, if it is unexpected, will surprise. Minutes of indecision—seconds of reflection on the appropriate counter-maneuver—minutes of transmission of orders—... dead time, retardation of our parade.

The maneuver will surprise when it is executed suddenly—that goes without saying. All waste time is lost time, to be deducted from that on which we have calculated, and put to the credit of the adversary's parade. The main thing here is not so much the special quality in the leader as the tactical procedure and degree of training in the units and groups.

Surprise, lastly, is the more effective in proportion as the lunge is delivered closer to the enemy. For in effect, the object of every objective maneuver is to bring about a change in the relative positions of my mass and the enemy's, to modify our respective distances from the point of convergence of our lines.

The countermarch (change of course in succession) gains in simplicity and orderliness, what the method of changing course together would have gained in time. It is an insurance premium. Let us not be too pedantic and blame Togo because he "let well alone". (Pp. 204-205-206-208).

For the brevity of the sea battle, the necessity of striking one and only one maximum blow, and that as quickly as possible, precludes any application of the reservoir principle.

In the Napoleonic battle the reserves have a great part. Upon them centres the crowning act (evenement). Not so the Nelsonian battle; one cannot regard the "windward column" at Trafalgar as a reserve. It is simply a mass of maneuver.

Again, in view of the short time available for useful action in the battle, it is essential that these reserves should throw themselves into it with all the numbers and intensity they possess, at the precise moment of the "first forced attack", thereafter to act incessantly to the end. (Pp. 210-211).

"Maximum effect at the earliest moment, in the shortest time, and over the smallest area"—let us stick to our principle. If the reserves figure in the plan of action, let them be handled on these lines. (P. 211).

Land battles, on the contrary, tend to become longer and longer. In Manchuria they lasted for many days, and victory could hover in the balance. It was possible for a stroke of genius to retrieve an initial error. At sea, the balance tips up the moment that it inclines.

In truth—and this is the great lesson of these decisive battles of the Nile, Trafalgar, Lissa, and Tsushima alike—practically everything depends at sea upon the "engage", the collision, the first destructive, demoralizing, and disorganizing effects. When once we have carried out the maneuver that is to bring us into the thick of the "first forced attack", there is little room before us and little time at our disposal for a variety of subsequent maneuvers. (P. 213.)

Thus, whether he be the larger or the smaller force, whether he has the advantage of being to windward or the disadvantages of being to leeward, Nelson never for a moment entertains the idea of fighting in an inert mass or line, or of waiting to be rushed instead of rushing in to close quarters. He means to strike himself, to strike first, to strike how and where and when he chooses, to make the battle dance to his tune. And this brings

us to recall General Camon's appreciation of the Napoleonic battle as a whole.

"Whether connected or not to a fixed point, Napoleon... never had recourse to a defensive battle; it is by mobility, by the speed he imparts to his troops, and also by utilizing obstacles of ground to divide his opponents, that he succeeds in beating them. Victory is still and always the triumph of the larger number over the smaller". (Pp. 233-234).

But there is nothing new under the sun. The man is the pivot of the battle. He is still man, with man's instincts, weaknesses, and enthusiasms. He is still "capable only of a given quantity of terror". Fear, discipline, the crowd-soul, are what they were in Nelson's day. The field of battle is the sea, and the sea, with its chances, its tempests and fogs, is eternal. The day is neither longer nor shorter than it was. The duration of a fleet's resistance is the same for Tsushima as for Trafalgar. (P. 256).

The information available in peace-time should have afforded sufficient indication of the enemy's tactics and intentions. A navy that has failed to divine, and to familiarize itself with, the tactical tendencies and principles of the probable enemy is ripe for thorough defeat. Are not these things of very much more considerable importance than this or that detail of material or dockyard practice? (P. 262).

We repeat, what we have said before, that only these formations should be employed in peace-time sailing which will be employed on the day of battle, for maneuvers and for combat. A fortiori, the same rule applies to war-time sailing.

But why not, in that case, make the fighting order the sailing order outright? Amongst other reasons, because we are working on the principle that we shall "maneuver", in the presence of the enemy—meet him in "tactical duel". And we have to maneuver rapidly.

Now, maneuver is one thing and cannonade another. In the latter case, what is wanted is the deployed line of ships and groups, whereas in the former the essential is masses well in hand; i. e., closed up and with minimum intervals. (Pp. 265-266.)

To sum up: The approach is the phase of final dispositions. Each side will gather up his forces, moral, material, and organic. And—a most important point—the crews will have a meal. It is their last chance, for even during the indecisive phase of the battle it would not be safe to reckon on an opportunity for doing so, and how many human failures are due to empty stomachs! It is the hour, too, for the Nelsonian battle signal, the England expects, ... etc. It is the moment at which the captains and their officers go around the fighting quarters for the last time, exhort the men, and screw up enthusiasm to the highest pitch, see that everything is working smoothly, courage high and transmitters in good order. (Pp. 267-268).

"A" lunges at me. I shall not be able to define his lunge until after an appreciable fraction of waste time; I shall not begin to parry until still later (perception—understanding—reflection—orders—movement).

If I leave "A" all initiative, then, and content myself with parrying, he will pay into his account, one after another, all my forfeited moments, and by maneuver upon maneuver will gain the advantage of position.

Let us then ourselves take all initiative, and if it befall that we have to submit to hostile initiative in a particular case, let us look to it that parade and riposte are but a single act. (P. 275).

... War, with its hazards, represents a part of the initial outlay essential to every enterprise. It may become rarer in future in proportion as it becomes more and more costly, and the risk more frequently outweighs the possible gain. Neither a Government nor a nation will consent to risk thousands of millions of money and hundreds of thousands of lives for the sake of the profits accruing from the economic exploitation of a country. Take Morocco. Did not Bismarck say that it was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier!? (P. 333).

There is only one way of ensuring supremacy at sea: it is to defeat the hostile squadrons and force their remnants to take refuge in port. There is equally one way only of defeating the hostile squadrons; it is to take the offensive and the initiative in the attack. (Pp. 342-343).

(Maillard):

"Within the battle, the combat is the normal for units and for armies.

"The requirements of battle are: the will to fight and the means of doing so, an object, a plan, and the desire to win.

"The battle comprises two parts—a general fight along the whole front, and a decisive attack at one point, for the issue of a combat depends on superiority of force at one point.

"There are two ways of ensuring this superiority of forces—envelopment and mass.

"Surprise, mass, energy, and speed are the elements of a decisive attack.

"In every action it is essential (1) to insure against the action of the enemy, (2) to act up to the end in view, (3) to deal with unforeseen emergencies". (Pp. 348-349).

It must be insisted upon, iterated, and reiterated, that those who most keenly desire battle, and, as a logical consequence, prepare themselves most resolutely for it, will win it. This is the probability on which we must base all our efforts. If we hold any contrary opinion, if we encourage any philosophy which tends to lull men's minds and breeds plausible theories of a pacific, defensive, or similar nature, to hide from them this formidable reckoning, then are we acting criminally towards our country and courting for it servitude and defeat? (P. 351).

Bellaires—Battle of Jutland.

We make many mistakes, and it is our business to-day to see that the lessons have been taken to heart, and that we shall not again be found in such a state that we may have to face the greatest crisis in history with improvised methods, working from hand to mouth. It may be said that the result was good enough with such methods; but was it? We have surely no right to continue to rely on improvisation. We in the Navy know well defects and it is our business to face them, to leave no stone unturned to avoid a repetition of the mistakes from which we have suffered in the past. The work of reconstruction has to be taken in hand with a full knowledge of our requirements, learnt by bitter experience in the past 4 ½ years. It must be our endeavor to profit by that experience. The Navy is today what it has been for the past 200 years, the same sure shield of Britain and the British Empire. The mere reputation of this very true and well-known phrase will not ensure that we remain so. The sure shield must be kept sure. Clear thinking and concentrated effort on scientific lines in the necessary struggle for retrenchment and such economies as certainly will be required must be applied with wisdom and a proper understanding of the problems before us in the light of the knowledge gained during the war. Only so shall we avoid impairing the essential efficiency of the Navy.

If vitally false principles of war are held by the Navy, nothing can prevent its defeat by a materially inferior foe animated by a true doctrine of war. Our object now must be to place the traditions and methods of the Navy on right lines. This course becomes the more necessary as we economize. It has been one of the chief sources of trouble in dealing with the Admiralty that they have been unable to indicate when their expenditure was vital and when it was merely useful. It is the doctrine of war which, when shaped on sound lines and put into practice by an efficient War Staff, enables us to bring about the only real combination of economy with efficiency. (P. X.)

Certainly the thing has outlived the explanations, and the consequences are with the world today.

Though we cannot help the consequences of the Battle of Jutland, we can at least draw conclusions which may be fruitful in thought and action in future years. (P. Xii).

The audacious cruise of the Goeben and Breslau, in face of an overwhelming British force, proved in the first days of war to what lengths success can be pushed in face of a navy which is not prepared by a true doctrine of war. (P. 4.)

At the beginning of February, 1915, a former Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, Grand Admiral von Koester, who was also president of the Navy League lectured at Kiel and said that to accept battle was to stake all on death or victory. It is worth while to make a very full quotation from the Times, February 11, 1915, of these remarks:—

"Our confidence in our Navy is as firm as a rock. But we know that the naval battle means death or victory, and that, once a fleet has been destroyed, it can never be renewed during the course of the same war, even if the campaign goes on for years. (Pp. 6-7).

Professor Holland Rose has pointed out that Guibert was Napoleon's favorite author, and in his marked copy Napoleon had heavily lined the paragraph concerning the Governments of Europe in 1770:—"They direct affairs at haphazard and in accordance with established routine". (P. 9).

The proud record of the British Navy is a wonderful one of magnificent fighting, and this war is no exception; it is that of a bad starter, though a good stayer and a sure winner. But is it necessary for us to start badly to gain our knowledge by experiencing the hard knocks of war, and to go through the agony of its prolongation if it can be shown that there is a better way by which we can train ourselves into a condition to strike hard and to strike quickly? (P. 9).

Our victories in the past are no criterion as to the future, though a renowned Navy has the advantage of handing down high standards and traditions. Success is apt, however, to blind men to the need of adaptation to changed conditions, and to cause the command at the Admiralty, and in the fleets, to rely on experience rather than on well-directed studies. The latter are generally more important for, as Frederick the Great pointed out, he had a couple of mules which had been through twenty campaigns and were mules still. In the British Navy the experience was peace experience prior to the war, and, since there was only the one great Battle of Jutland, experience qua experience could contribute little to replace well-directed studies. Success, again, is seldom followed by inquiry, though the latter is both useful and necessary. There is reason for great anxiety in this respect, for we have never had less inquiry than in the present war. Take the court-martial system, which from time to time has saved the Navy from disaster. So sure were our ancestors of its value that for all the centuries of the Navy's existence, up to the break of the case of the destroyer Ariel in 1907, whenever a ship was lost there was a court-martial to inquire into the circumstances. (Pp. 11-12).

Later on, Sir Edward Carson in the House of Commons, and Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, revealed that the Navy had fought over two years of war without blockade or sea mines. The position taken up by the

German delegates to the Hague Conference and the open German advocacy of mine-fields on the high seas, left no doubt as to their intentions. It was our business not merely to get in the first blow, but to foil the enemy. As a matter of fact, the German mine-fields were laid with a loss of only one mine-layer, for the simple reason that the problem had not been considered by us nor the necessary provision made to meet it. (P. 14).

It is obvious that provision was not made against these things because they were not thought out and only discovered after war had revealed them. Lord Jellicoe's explanation is that the "people" were to blame! As reported in the Morning Post, February 21, 1918, he said:—"Our shortage of destroyers was due partly to the fact that before the war the nation thought in 'Dreadnaughts'. 'Dreadnaughts' had caught on, and if you wanted money, you were pretty sure, with a certain amount of pressure, to get it for 'Dreadnaughts'. But in the shout for 'Dreadnaughts' people forgot that there were other classes of craft that were quite as necessary for other purposes. If money was asked for these craft there was not quite the same response. The result was that at the commencement of the war we were short of destroyers". It is impossible not to feel contempt for such a plea. Even if we toy with the idea for a moment, who but the Admiralty taught the public to think in 'Dreadnaughts'? Investigation will, however, show that the lack of material preparation was due to ignorance of the principles of war. (Pp. 15-16).

Lord Jellicoe sometimes blames the politicians and sometimes the public, and certainly in his successive posts as Director of Naval Ordnance, Third Sea Lord and Second Sea Lord, he was in a position to know. His charges should be investigated and if his advice were ignored it should be ascertained why he did not resign rather than allow the public to believe that he was satisfied. We want to know who are these politicians? They are certainly not the members of the House of Commons, of whom I have personal experience. There is nothing that the House of Commons will not do for the Navy. (P. 17).

Men who enter a profession with the obligation of sacrificing their lives for their country should certainly resign rather than be the instrument of their country's downfall, or the disgrace of the noblest profession in the world. They would have had the backing of all the forces of public opinion had they so acted, and the public always assumes that, in a matter so vital as the Navy, the Government acts on the advice of the Sea Lords. There is, however, much reason to believe that many of the shortcomings were the direct result of ignorance of the principles and conduct of war through failure to study its problems with an executive War Staff. All the material shortcomings, to which Lord Jellicoe refers in his book, were the outcome of decisions in which his own responsibility as a member of the Board of Admiralty was very prominent. (P. 18).

Take, for instance, the absence of boom defences to the northern ports. The idea of booms is as old as the ancient Greeks, and a recent example is the one commended by Admiral Lord Collingwood which the Turks laid across the Dardanelles in 1808. So little had matters been thought out, that efficient merchant ships were used to block the channels at Scapa, and owing to many of these ships being put down empty, unballasted, the tide drifted them out of position and they failed in their object. The unfortunate politician, whom Lord Jellicoe blames for the state of affairs which resulted in his going elsewhere and losing a new 'Dreadnaught' costing over two millions sterling, the Audacious, on the north coast of Ireland, surely cannot be blamed for the ignorance and lack of preparation which made the British Navy practically wage a war on its own against the British merchant marine. Scapa was decided on as the base early in 1910. A committee, of which Lord Jellicoe was the most prominent member, did consider boom defences and decided against them. The fact, then, that Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth were without booms, and therefore open to destroyer and submarine attack, was a circumstance for which Lord Jellicoe was himself responsible. (Pp. 18-19).

We do not propose to deal further with evidence of this lack of thought beyond saying that it extended from the primaries to the secondaries, and the Navy, lacking reserves had to enter on a mad race with the Army to obtain contracts in which the Navy naturally obtained priority. (P. 23).

In its fundamental characteristics, war is the same by land and sea, and we learn from the fall that overtook the Prussian Army at Jena, in spite of its former power under Frederick the Great, and the French Army in 1870, in spite of all it achieved under Napoleon, how nothing but unrelenting care is the mother of safety. In Marlborough's phrase, "the English are famous for negligence", and such a nation requires continuous criticism of its vital shortcomings, for as a rule it takes a crisis to shake us out of our complacency, and then it is too late to reform except at a great price. (P. 23).

The nature of a people can only be changed through the educational system which gradually works with cumulative effect on the propaganda P's, Press, Parliament, Platform and Pulpit. (P. 24).

It is only under an autocracy that an army or navy can be nursed into something dwelling apart from the main currents of the national life so that it does not reproduce the characteristic national habits and faults. (P. 24).

Unfortunately, in England, the Navy and Army, except in the days of the Commonwealth, while reproducing the characteristic qualities of our people, both in their strength and weakness, yet dwelt apart from the people

though dependent on them for all that constitutes preparation and efficiency. Reproducing the faults of the people, the study of history in the two Services was the work of a mere roomful of officers. Gifted with no historical sense, the people could not be interested in war problems during peace. This accentuated the gulf. The fighting men who felt bitterly—and those who have seen the needless sacrifices in the opening stages of every war and the subsequent sacrifices through their prolongation, had every reason to feel bitterly—yet failed to see that the real remedy lies in the resolute finding of the historical sense in the people by creating a love of the history of the country. (P. 25).

Many years ago, when, in 1895, Lord Salisbury, as Prime Minister, plaintively exclaimed that naval experts could be found to support almost any view as to what should be done, I wrote attributing the fact to the absence of any kind of historical teaching and study in the Navy. (P. 25).

Does it never occur to the succession of admirals who have controlled naval policy for years that every great leader has been a student of history and has never ceased to be one? (P. 27).

So in the actions of great commanders, whether by sea or by land, we find the same underlying principles whether we are dealing with Caesar, Nelson, Napoleon or Foch. (P. 27).

Men who have never given a thought to history, whose whole life has become a habit, and that habit the mere handling of ships and the administration of their internal economy, colour-blind in regard to strategy and grand tactics. They are judged thoroughly efficient officers by their technical work afloat, and their promotion depends on these things and mere examinations. They pass to the control of so-called War Staffs or onto the Board of Admiralty without knowledge, and the result is failure. Successive Cabinets find them convenient in peace time, for, lacking knowledge, they do not press demands for they cannot argue their case. (P. 29).

It interprets golden rules to guide us somewhat as follows, but each student must frame his own:

- (1) The more provident care in peace the less improvident scare in war.
- (2) Do not bring your peace mind to bear on war problems. It is as unsuitable as your silk hat.
- (3) Do not conjure up pictures to suit either your fears or your wishes. The enemy will act according to his psychology and the probabilities of the situation.
- (4) Trust the man on the spot. If you do not trust him change him.
- (5) Co-ordination, Co-operation, Consolidation, Comradeship, and Concentration are the winning C's of war.
- (6) Concentrate for victory.
- (7) The spirit of war is the offensive and the surprise, of Napoleon's "Frappez vite et frappez fort". (P. 31).

Publicity is the watch-dog of democracy, and secrecy takes the dog off his beat. As a matter of fact, when attention was drawn to these dangers, they were officially denied by the Admiralty, and the public believed the denials because they did not imagine that sailors could be found who would acquiesce in endangering the country. (P. 32).

History tells us pretty plainly, that when the death-dealing results of a weapon are very terrible, an altogether disproportionate value is attached, to its use, and but little regard is paid to those limitations which prevent it from being used. It was so in the past with the fireship. It has been so in our day with the ram, the torpedo-boat, the Brénnan torpedo, lyddite and the dynamite gun.... So much fuss was made over the destroyer that even the Admiral Colomb was induced to prophesy in a series of articles that the battleship was doomed. (P. 33).

In any case, nothing could be worse for the morale of the fleet than the knowledge that the admiral fears to face his work because of the torpedo craft. (P. 33).

The confidence of France in her army administration, in 1870, could not be shaken by defeat, and France inquired after the defeat instead of inquiring before into the warnings given by her military attache in Berlin. Leboeuf boasted that the French army was ready to the last gaiter button, and Mr. Churchill used similar language about the Navy. Leboeuf may have spoken truly in a general sense in regard to material, but the French army was distinctly unready in its mental preparation, and the result was a surprise to Parliament and People, because it had been kept secret from them. (P. 37).

It is difficult to see how the public is ever to find out what is wrong when those in high places are determined to defeat them in their zest for knowledge. (P. 38).

The truth is bureaucratic government has established an unexampled secrecy in regard to the war which cannot be broken down except by half-pay and retired officers whom the regulations cannot touch when once the restrictions of Dora are removed. A free community is supposed to control its own defences, and it cannot do so if the channels of discussion are dammed, for its control will be without knowledge. A community which is not to inquire into its own Government's conduct of war when that war is concluded is in no sense a free community. When to this knowledge is added the fact that it required a lawless revelation in almost every case to achieve

lasting good, the effect on the public mind is likely to lead to evil results if the Government does not reverse its policy. (P. 39 and 40).

Yet we still act without realization of the great truth that democracy and secrecy will not run in double harness. (P. 40).

Our mine-layers were very slow converted cruisers, inadequate in number, equipment, and sea-going qualities for this work; our mines were entirely unsatisfactory; the elevation of our guns was inadequate; our shell and fuses were bad; our battle-cruisers' magazines were insufficiently protected, for the flash of a shellfire could go down by the ammunition hoist right into the magazine, and hence we lost the Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible at the Battle of Jutland; our ships were built to fit the docks, and not the docks to fit the ships, and consequently alterations of design both in battleships and battle-cruisers in order to obtain more protection after Jutland resulted in a loss of speed; rangefinders had to be fitted for the main armament of many battleships, while those already fitted were too small; and it was found necessary to transfer 6-inch guns in certain ships to the upper deck because they could not be fought on the main deck except in a flat calm, while in our latest battleships 6-inch guns were removed, from the after section of the ships because they had been given areas of training which were quite useless in battle. Other instances have been revealed in the House of Commons, such as the utterly unseaworthy and slow motor boats ordered early in the war. It is a characteristic sneer of the material school to say that criticism is wisdom after the event. All these things could have been guarded against by clear thinking in terms of war and not of mere technique. Tactics were made subordinate to gunnery by the materialist, if indeed they were not kept separate since he does not understand co-ordination. More attention was devoted to obtaining records in hits than to firing under conditions which were likely to obtain in war, and Lord Jellicoe's influence had been powerful in maintaining this system when he occupied the position of Director of Ordnance. (P. 43).

On the outbreak of war there was no technical authority to deal with mine developments which had to be even begun. The work was carried out under the official discouragement of a school which did not understand war. As a consequence 2 ½ years after the outbreak of war the British Navy was without the weapon which did so much to break the morals of the German Fleet in 1918. (P. 44).

The main function of all the satellites of a Fleet whether they are mobile like aircraft, torpedo craft, cruisers or battle-cruisers, or associated with immobile weapons like mines and booms, is to enable the battle-fleet to do its work while hampering and injuring the enemy battle-fleet to the best of their ability. (P. 47).

The truth is we owe our troubles to the mentality of the naval officer and the educational system on which it is based. First, as we saw in the earlier chapters is the influence of national characteristics. Next comes the narrow environment of ship life. As far as the Navy is concerned, these are more or less fixed. There remains the educational system which, unfortunately, by syllabus and examinations, did everything to foster a mechanical outlook in which the conduct of war was relegated to the background. Not only have we failed to learn the lesson, but the system is being intensified, and there is marked hostility to the direct entry of public school boys, a system which had very good results although worked under most hampering conditions. It is not a little significant that the three officers, Sir David Beatty, Sir Roger Keyes and Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt who were the survival of the fittest, in the sense that they ultimately had the complete charge of our home forces, passed indifferent examinations. Out of a possible fifteen first-class certificates they mustered only one between them, and among their certificates were a great many third-class. (P. 47-48).

Sir David Beatty not only escaped this, but by his early promotion for land service was prevented from being unduly cramped by absorption in the details of administrative work, which, important as it is, leaves little or no time and opportunity for higher studies. (P. 48).

As yet, owing to their inability to think clearly and follow Dr. Johnson's dictum to survey the whole before considering the parts, the materialist, who had full charge of the Admiralty, failed in foresight at almost every point. Naval war, for instance, consists in movement and interference with movements. They failed to anticipate the German withdrawing tactics and the uses of zigzagging. In interference with movements they failed to anticipate smoke tactics and the uses of mines and submarines. All movement involves rest and replenishment in secure harbors with docks. They failed to provide any on the East Coast. (Pp. 48-49).

The Americans laid in the northern minefield no less than 5,000 mines in four hours, showing the rapidity with which we might have acted on the outbreak of war. The reason why the Germans so often chose the right material equipment while we did not was because they went to work in a scientific way. They studied war and its probabilities and exalted it far above mere mechanical knowledge. (P. 49).

They gave their guns the requisite elevation of 30 degrees. Our own elevation, as Admiral Sir Percy Scott relates was 13 ½ degrees; in 1907 we increased it 15 degrees; in 1911 to 20 degrees; and in a year after the war we decided to increase to 30 degrees. In commenting on this fact, Sir Percy Scott says he drew the attention

of the Admiralty, in 1905, after his visit to Kiel, to the fact that the Germans were giving 30 degrees elevation to their guns. (P. 49).

All great leaders have studied the history of war and learned its principles, and the most hateful heresy and cause of offence to them was to subordinate the man to the machine. (P. 55).

Yet the principles of war as unchanging as the laws of motion, and it is only their application that varies with the development of the material. That was why Napoleon advised soldiers to study the campaigns of the greatest of Greek, Roman and Carthaginian generals who fought before gunpowder was invented.

In the practice of a profession such as the Navy, a man needs to be a student all his days if he is to get out of the ordered grooves of that profession. (Pp. 55-56).

So let us lay it down as an axiom that the essence of tactics is offensive action. Everything is concentrated and consecrated to the purpose of victory.

Thus in our wars with France, in the days of the sailing ships, we chose the weather gage while the French as deliberately chose the lee gage. It enabled us to force an action while the French argued that the lee gave defensive advantages through the damage inflicted while the attacking ships were unable to fire their broadsides as they bore down. The writer pointed out in 1913 that the Germans might be expected to take similar advantage with their torpedoes in that a fleet evading action can fire torpedoes at a much higher range than one chasing; for in the first case the target has to be overtaken and in the other the target goes to meet the torpedo. Just as Rodney found the remedy for the French withdrawing tactics of the day by concentrating on a portion of the enemy's line, so the writer ventured to indicate that there was a tactical remedy available through the use of aeroplanes carrying torpedoes, and by their high speed of four or five times that of the enemy's ships, getting into position in advance of the enemy, swooping down to the water, firing their torpedoes into the fleet. (Pp. 56-57).

At the beginning of 1913, in an article based on the fact that the Germans were likely to practice withdrawing tactics, the writer advocated the use on a large scale of air craft carrying torpedoes to fire from a position on the bow of a retreating enemy. (P. 61).

Von Scheer, of course, accepts the doctrine, which has the support not merely of students but also of Beatty, that the submarine menace depended absolutely on the High Seas Fleet. It is true that the High Seas Fleet depended for its security on the fortifications and the mine fields, but the former could have been rendered of no avail, and the latter swept away, but for the existence of the Fleet. The Elbe Channel itself is a narrow channel, liable to be blocked by concrete ships out of effective reach of the fortifications, and the submarine could have been hemmed in by protected mine fields if no High Seas Fleet existed. As Von Scheer says, "The Fleet was essential to protect the base for our submarine warfare". He might have added that it enabled many soldiers to be relieved from the defence of the coasts. (P. 61-62).

The upshot of our reduction policy is that we have exposed our armored ships needlessly to torpedo attack. Our cruiser position is worse than the destroyer position.... You may lay it down as a golden rule that the absence of small craft involves the loss of big ones.... the destroyers attack your fleets and probably sink some of your ships; but if you had sufficient force of destroyers backed by cruisers this would not occur." (P. 68).

Offensive tactics, when taught, have the merit of instilling confidence. (P. 70).

They were not being continually impressed with the sound truth that safety lies in boldness, and that at all costs they must sink the enemy. (P. 70).

A second example of the same spirit was the refusal to allow the Harwich coastal motor-boat flotilla to attack the German fleet at anchor with the skimming motor boats or "scooters". The officers had worked for this object and thought of nothing else for a couple of years.

The answer they were given was that the German Fleet was doing no harm at anchor! At the time the proposal was made their attack would have come upon the Germans as an immense surprise. To men accustomed to think in terms of the offensive there was no question of their ability to win success and only a few lives would have been risked. Their proof lies in what has since occurred at Cronstadt, when a number of armored ships have been sunk by the operations of these little craft, whose existence was revealed several years ago when a German destroyer was sunk off the Belgian coast. (Pp. 72-73).

It was the fault, not of the officers in command, but of a system which did not keep war singly in its eye. For one word about war in the destroyer manual there were about one hundred about peace. (P. 74).

War was no where taught to the young officer. He picked up his knowledge at a haphazard or not at all. He had no centre of discussion to make him think, for lectures and papers at the Royal United Service Institution under the deep discouragement of the Admiralty, had become a dead letter. Some of the younger officers handed

themselves together to found a confidential review for the discussion of war among themselves. (P. 75).

Training in the writing of reports or drafting of intelligence formed no part of any naval officer's education, except for the small number who happened to go to the War College. (P. 76).

Lord Jellicoe had twenty months in which to train his force. If his information was defective, there is no escape from the inference that his dispositions or his system of training were at fault. (P. 76).

Nothing was done because the life training of our admirals had not included any study of war, nor the history of war, but relied wholly on detail knowledge of material, experience and the tradition of precedents. (P. 77).

FIRST PLAN, THEN DARE.

The Navy suffered from no Unseen Hand, but from an Unseen Brain. (P. 79).

All the arguments based on mere preservation of forces in 1793-1802 were with Lord Howe's views, in favor of keeping the ships in harbors in the best condition. The one demand of war inexorably asking for contact with the enemy when he put to sea, was "impossible". The storms, the lee shore, the loss of ships refitting, and countless other arguments were and could be urged against St. Vincent, and yet because his was the supreme demand which victory made his policy won against the defeatist policy of Lord Howe. (P. 80).

Examine Lord Jellicoe's actions as Commander-in-Chief and First Sea Lord, and it is easy to identify the school to which he belongs. Granted that high-skilled forces must fight by daylight, then the time that remained to him at the Battle of Jutland, from 6.16 p. m. to 9.00 p. m., was all-important; but considerations of the preservation of his force made him turn away from and lose the enemy, made him dispose of his fleet so that he never regained contact the next morning, though his subordinate's masterly maneuvers had given him the vantage position between the High Seas Fleet and their base. Lord Jellicoe in his book searches for material details by which to weight the scales against his own force, and paints in heavy colors the risks of offensive actions.

A man indeed of tearful yesterdays and fearful tomorrows! A man who never gets to grips with the broad salient fact that both on May 31 and June 1 he had at his disposal as targets a demoralized enemy utterly inferior in fighting power.

This overwhelming advantage, when great superiority is combined with the offensive, is known by the brief spells when the Grand Fleet was ventured within offensive range of the enemy, and inflicted punishment on that enemy. Lord Jellicoe. (P. 81).

"Both at this period, and earlier in the action, the ships of the First Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities for effective fire than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and the fullest use was made of the opportunities. The immunity of the ships of the squadron from the enemy's fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels very severe punishment, bears eloquent testimony to the offensive powers of the squadron". (P. 81).

One would have thought that if this immunity was obtained by the excellence of the gunnery of a portion of the British Fleet in the First Battle Squadron then on the principle that "The more you hurt the enemy the less he will hurt you", instead of allowing 11 destroyers to, drive the whole line of 27 battleships out of action the whole 27 would have been pressed into service to complete the "severe punishment" which was being inflicted by the First Battle Squadron. This would be done the more resolutely for the destroyer attack had but one obvious object, a sort of forlorn hope that, combined with smoke tactics it would enable the heavy ships to escape from the guns of the British Fleet.

All the British ships were immune because not only was the visibility in our favor, but, what is far more important, the enemy were still laboring under the panic of the Grand Fleet's unexpected entrance into battle. It is not necessary to argue that point now, for we have the evidence of German officers, since it has been no longer necessary for them to gasconade in order to make propaganda. For instance "A member of the Inter-Allied Commission" in Germany contributed an article to the Times, January 14, 1919, in which he quoted a Zeppelin officer who was gunnery lieutenant of the Deutschland as saying to him: "They (the men) are not fools about the things they can see, and the way we were utterly crushed from the moment your battle fleet came into action took the heart out of them. (P. 82).

As for the destroyers' attack which drove Lord Jellicoe's 27 battleships out of action, the German gunnery officer said:—"Torpedo attack in the daylight was almost hopeless, because the English destroyers averaged faster than ours, and I do not need to tell you that their guns were very much heavier". Yet such is the psychological possibility of an offensive action, on a mind predisposed to defensive measures, that the forlorn hope was successful in relieving the German battle-line. (P. 82).

What the weather gave was to the sailing Navy the advantage of speed is to the steam Navy. To the

weak it is an opportunity to escape, and to the strong to force the battle. At Jutland, owing to the presence of the German pre-dreadnaughts, Lord Jellicoe had a 3 knots advantage in speed over his enemy and an even greater advantage if he had availed himself preponderance of strength in order to shed some of his slower battleships. (Pp. 82-83).

His conduct now as in all his measures on the afternoon and night of May 31 to the final loss of the enemy on the morning of June 1 was governed by defensive considerations. He deployed his fleet away from the enemy when he formed his line, partly because of the torpedoes and partly because of a supposed gunnery disadvantages. He thereby enabled the enemy to get over the first shock of surprise at his arrival. He then, at later stages, twice allowed his whole fleet, with the exception of Sir David Beatty's inferior battle-cruisers to abandon the action, because of destroyer attacks. From first to last he fought a defensive battle. (P. 83).

His force was overwhelmingly superior in gun-power. The alleged inferiority in destroyers has not been substantiated. (P. 83).

The true spirit of the offensive was shown in the little action of the Broke and the Swift with six enemy destroyers at another stage of the war. They rushed into close quarters and made the action two against two, for the four other destroyers could not risk firing at their own side. They accounted for their two opponents, and the remainder fled. That was a practical fulfilment of Cicero's demand for a three-fold audacity: "Audacity, audacity, and always audacity", which centuries after was repeated by our own poet Spencer and by the French revolutionary Danton, to whom with Napoleon it is generally attributed. It is impossible to discover any principle on which Lord Jellicoe acted except that of avoiding losses, one which leads to nothing but the evasion of action. (P. 84).

"Defensive battle", says Marshal Foch in his "Principles of War", "never brings about the destruction of enemy forces". And again: "The will to conquer: such is victory's first condition, and therefore every soldier's first duty: but it also amounts to a supreme resolve which the commander must, if needs be, impart to the soldier's soul. Elsewhere Foch goes so far as to say that the commander who is thinking of what will happen if he is defeated is already overthrown. (P. 85).

If one sits down to record all that the offensive does in the hands of a great leader, one would put it down succinctly somewhat as follows:

- (1) It is the only winning policy.
- (2) The only method enhancing the moral.
- (3) The only way to start with the surprise.
- (4) The only way to gain the initiative.
- (5) The only way to save a long drain on one's resources by a wasting defence.
- (6) The only way to get concentration of effort. (P. 85).
- (7) The only way to enhance the prestige of one's country and one's profession.

The whole spirit of war is the offensive, for the more you hurt the enemy the less he will be able to hurt you. Experience may indeed be the best of schoolmasters, but the fees may be beyond our capacity to bear, and it is useless to go to school too late. (P. 85).

"A victory is very essential for England at this moment". And so he fought and beat twenty-seven Spanish line of battleships with his fifteen. His example lives on. And so we turn on this theory of the materialist school, and say that in navigation we avoid danger while in battle we plunge into it, only seeking to make it very much more dangerous for the enemy than for ourselves. In fact, our will is to make him see the situation at its worst, if need be by camouflage, but in any case make him see at its worst while our own chief acts on probabilities and seizes opportunities. (P. 87).

Instead of considering the situation at its worst, a great chief takes the probabilities and the opportunities and acts swiftly. Drake's drum plays him into victory, for the great chief is never punished like the Israelites who wandered away to material gods. (P. 87).

If a more exact analysis of Lord Jellicoe's services is made, it will be found that during 12 ½ years before the war he was 7 years and 10 months in purely administrative posts. If we assume him to have been regarded as a great leader in war, we were taking the very course to ruin him as such by keeping him to administrative posts. His appointment to the Grand Fleet indicates the belief of Mr. Churchill that Lord Jellicoe was a man fit to take the mantle of Nelson. As a matter of fact that was never the view of the writer, but those who held that view showed almost criminal carelessness in not preparing Lord Jellicoe for his great task by placing him in positions where he would always be studying the problems of war rather than the routine and details of administration. (P. 91).

Sir David Beatty, owing to two early promotions for land service, became a flag officer at 38 years of age. By passing bad examinations he escaped the fate of clever officers who became specialists in gunnery and torpedo work, and whose minds are so directed for years as to be absorbed in details and the workmanship of mere material. He also escaped almost the worst period of a naval officer's career, when he learns nothing about the business of fighting, but as executive officer of ship is engrossed in a soul-destroying routine work connected with the internal economy and discipline of a ship. (P.93).

If the character of a fighter were at its best in compromise; if knowledge of war were familiarity with mechanical details of weapons and their use; if courage were merely physical; if skill were the product exclusively of drill and parade movements, it is possible that Lord Jellicoe was the superior of his successor. History and biography show that this is not so. The command in war requires immense energy, concentration and determination, directed towards the one object of swift and decisive victory. It requires untiring patience both in forcing and tempting the enemy to afford an opportunity. The last thing in the world it needs is that character of compromise which fears loss, which by its formal methods of approach loses all the advantage of surprise, and which conforms to the enemy's initiative and therefore to his wishes. (P. 94).

Moral courage is more necessary than physical, but it is a far more rare quality. Beatty exulted in responsibility and would strain all to the limit to ensure it, and the men under him were exalted by the strain. Lord Jellicoe's end was not victory, but the preservation of our communications and their denial to the enemy which he believed could be attained without a decisive victory. With the one the smashing of the enemy's force was the supreme demand which gave us the command of the sea, and with the other the preservation of our own force sufficed. Hence things were achieved with the one which under the easier rule of compromise were held to be impossible. Lord Jellicoe knew far more of gunnery, and yet under Beatty's inspiration the "impossible" in regard to fire control was accomplished. (P. 94).

Under Lord Jellicoe it was held to be impossible to coordinate completely the movements of separated squadrons or divisions. Under Beatty it was worked out because it was essential to victory. Lacking the technical knowledge, he yet had the instinct of the born leader, who demands what victory requires, and spurs on an enthusiastic staff to help him in his difficulties. "Nelson was no seaman", said Codrington. "His ship was always in bad order", said St. Vincent. The answer is that he was the greatest leader the sea has ever produced, and he stands on a pinnacle today for those qualities of leadership which Beatty has made manifest again. The French admiral and historian, Jurien de la Graviere pointed out how the circumspection of the British admirals and formal tactics in the war of the French Revolution favored the continued existence of the French naval threat, and that this state of affairs was only broken when Nelson was given his first independent command and fought the Battle of the Nile. The Germans were well aware that the strongest refitted fleet they could send out after August, 1916, would never be able to return successfully from an encounter with the Grand Fleet under Beatty, so they gave him no opportunity. (P. 95).

It is among the disadvantages of working in a room in an administrative capacity, dealing with sea affairs from a town environment, that insensibly one thrusts psychology more and more into the background. If one's work absorbs the mind in the material side of the Navy then the process is much accelerated. (P. 95).

Nothing struck me more, in reading Lord Jellicoe's book, than this absence of any consideration for the psychological factor, as though there were no soul in war. Because Nelson gave first place to psychology he had one plan for attacking a Fleet and another for a Russian. (P. 95-96).

The seven years and ten months which Lord Jellicoe spent over administrative details at Whitehall which had nothing to do with the conduct of war were as ruinous to his mental outlook as were the years Lord Raglan spent at the War Office before he went to the Crimea. If both are bad, it matters little whether the system produced the type of man or the men produce the system. It is equally important to criticise the men in order to end the system, and to show up the system in order to mend the men. (P. 97).

It should be remembered that in regard to any weapon, it is not so much the actual defect that matters as the dry rot that brought it about, and this is what we have endeavored to emphasize throughout. At Jutland we had overwhelmingly material superiority. It was in the use of that superiority that we failed. The causes are to be sought in the slothfulness of thought and action which accompanies a long period of peace, and in the exaltation of the administrative side at the Admiralty with its routine and formalities which are so utterly unfavorable, to imagination, and to the study of anything but rules and regulations. (P. 100).

We dine to celebrate events, but we do not study them. Without study, there is no profit from the past except the mere properties it hands down. If we do not think of the past, we are hardly likely to think clearly of the future, and we find, indeed, that a dislike to face the future is a national characteristic. (P. 101).

Abstract reasoning is distasteful, particularly to the class of person who call themselves "practical men".

War demands continuous study and abstract thought. (P.101).

One has only to read Foch's "Principles of War" to see that all his War Staff training aimed at promoting independence of judgment by discussion, for it is only by constant examination and straight challenging that truth is set upon her throne. The study of history had tended to promote this independence of judgment among the young naval officers to whom we have referred. (P. 103-103).

Instancing this and other wars in our history, I wrote in 1904 that "assertion holds good in every case that if a fraction of the increase made in war had been incurred during peace, in all cases the war would have been avoided or considerably shortened, always predicating that the expenditure is in the right direction, for otherwise the money were far better left to fructify in the banks of the nation". Again, in 1906 I said that, "one vessel in the hunt at the beginning of a war is worth two at the end. . . . The problem of commerce protection can only be satisfactorily met by relatively prepondering forces enabling us to envelop the raiders at the outset". (P. 104).

The truth is that the weakness of the Sea Lords lay not merely in lack of moral courage, but in what contributed to that weakness, the inability to argue the case. In other words, they lacked that which a War Staff is meant to do. (P. 105).

One cannot imagine Anson and Ligonier, who were the naval and military advisers of Lord Chatham, putting forward such a plea. The first thing Chatham had to do was to make the sailors and soldiers work together or, in other words, poll their ideas. The expression of ideas is what staff training ought to achieve. (P. 105).

We are in this difficulty in the Navy. There is a very highest standard in regard to courage. There is a high standard in regard to seamanship. There is really no standard at all, enforceable by court-martial, in regard to skill in strategy, staff work, and tactics, especially in regard to the two former. There is no conception such as General Sir Charles Napier, who saved the situation in India by going against the advice of his officers, gave voice to when he said that the officer who does not make himself master of his profession is a murderer. We have to find some means of attaining the same high standard in regard to staff work strategy as in regard to seamanship, so that if the enemy escape, or our own ships are endangered through faulty staff work, the inefficient may be made an example of. (P. 108-109).

The British fleet of battleships and battle-cruisers had an immense gunnery advantage in which the weight of projection from a single discharge of heavy gunfire was 420,000 lb., compared with 226,074 lb. for the High Seas Fleet. (P.113).

For reasons which are not known, the two British forces were not ordered to rendezvous or establish visual contact until the afternoon of the next day, a fact of some importance as will be seen later. Before that could happen the Rosyth force under Beatty sighted the enemy, and in pursuance of the general policy steered to cut him off from his channel through the mine field to the Heligoland Bight known as the Horn Reef Channel. The enemy proved to be the five German battle cruisers with accompanying small craft. (P. 113-114).

The outcome of Lord Jellicoe's decision as to deployment was to leave the battle cruisers only in action, except for a few shots fired from the rear of the line, and to lose all the advantages of the surprise, which might have very speedily decided the issue. He claims that there was both a gunnery and a torpedo disadvantage in following the battle cruisers by a deployment to starboard towards the enemy. On the other hand, psychological factors such as the surprise, the time limit imposed by the approaching darkness, and the all-important gunnery advantage of the light have to be considered. On this point Beatty's despatch states:—"It is interesting to note that after 6 p. m. although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favorable to us than the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the reports of other ships and my own observations it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships". The diagram which Lord Jellicoe submits is subjected to criticism in a succeeding chapter, but diagrams however clever, cannot explain away the state of affairs to which Beatty's despatch points. (P.117).

"Hesitation and half-measures are nowhere so fatal as in war. True wisdom for the general lies in an energetic determination". Napoleon. P. 121).

Normally, in any sweep in the North Sea, the advanced equadron constituted a very powerful scouting force, capable of pressing home an attack or a reconnaissance. Whenever it has been detached so as to be out of sight of the Battle Fleet the accuracy of its information depends on it having been kept in visual contact by a chain of ships with the Battle Fleet until there was a definite purpose for the fast force to achieve by increasing speed. This precaution becomes necessary because of the fact that it is quite possible for two ships which may have been at sea for many hours to arrive at estimates of their positions which do not correspond. The error will then vitiate all reports of an enemy subsequently encountered by the one, and transmitted to the other. Lord Jellicoe records that an error of twelve miles too far to the eastward in regard to the position of the enemy was thus

made, but regarding it as inevitable he fails to see his own responsibility. Its importance will be seen later, for it resulted in the Grand Fleet arriving late in action when every minute of daylight was of the utmost value. (P. 123).

In other words, a vital junction was deferred to about twenty hours after the Grand Fleet had gone to sea. When it was 2 p. m. the Grand Fleet was eighteen miles from its ordered position and 75 miles from the Rosyth force, partly owing to Lord Jellicoe's anxiety to spare destroyers examining vessels met en route from burning too much fuel in regaining their positions with the fleet.

At 2 p. m. the Rosyth force had placed itself nearer the Grand Fleet's rendezvous than had been ordered, as it was in Lat. 53 degrees 46' N., long. 4 degrees 40' E., and was steering to the northward with the view of getting into visual touch with the Grand Fleet. Twenty minutes later the enemy was sighted and all idea of getting into visual touch had to be abandoned. There was one more chance arising from the accidental fact that the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, capable of six knots greater speed than the Battle Fleet, was with Lord Jellicoe and stationed twenty miles ahead. If this squadron had been pushed forward at once, a reckoning based on that of Lord Jellicoe's flag-ship would have been in possession of the Rosyth force. Instead, however, of following the safe rule of concentration, a fanciful picture of ships escaping to the Baltic was conjured up by the Commander-in-Chief. The three Invincibles were ordered to steer to intercept the enemy in case they did try to so escape at a time when it was not even known whether the enemy were battleships or cruisers, for the first ship sighted may always be mere outlying vessels. This message was not cancelled in favor of one directing them to reinforce Beatty at once until one and a half hours later at 4 o'clock, and the outcome of the false move was that Hood's Squadron did not enter the battle until 6:15 p. m., when without a second of delay, they gave a splendid display of what a powerful reinforcement they constituted. Pp. 125-126).

The cruising formation to be adopted by a fleet of 100 to 150 vessels when it may meet an enemy at sea depends upon visibility. While small craft are of the greatest importance in obtaining information, and in action must be placed in a position from which they can attack the enemy with torpedoes, or overwhelm enemy vessels of their own type, they must not impede by their proximity or their smoke, the gunnery of the battleships and battle-cruisers. Altogether insufficient attention was devoted on May 31 to these matters. (P. 146).

It is difficult to understand the situation when the Defence (which was sunk at 6.16 just after crossing the bow of the Lion) and the Warrior circled across the path of the battle-cruisers in the endeavor to take up their westward station on the Grand Fleet. They thus came between our battle-cruisers and the enemy and blanketed the fire from Beatty's ships while sacrificing themselves. (P. 146).

When, as in this war, the enemy, by his weakness, is forced to avoid battle, it becomes of the greatest importance to organize the fast ships apart from the slowest. It was possible in the Grand Fleet not merely to organize the fleet in two fast divisions of battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron of Barhams, but to create a 22 knot division as well. (P. 147).

Points such as these derive their chief importance because of the effect they have in swaying the conduct of men who bow down before material considerations, and who do not press the advantages they possess because they are morbidly anxious about the risks they encounter. (P. 147-148).

To effect, on entry into action, the most effectual surprise with the means at his disposal, an admiral has to bear in mind, first, the approach, and then the deployment. The enemy's position changes rapidly, and as the reports are received the course and line of bearing of leaders of divisions have to be adjusted so as to secure the most favorable approach with the least loss of time. The formation, on drawing near to the enemy, must lend itself to rapid deployment so as to have the greatest number of guns to bear with the least possible delay against a section of the enemy. (P. 148).

The advantage of the heavy projectile at the long ranges is very great, but all such considerations on May 31 were discounted by the fact that the conditions of light did not permit the guns to be used at such distances. Hence the next point to be appreciated was that the range-finder revealed that the advantage of light was with a force to the northward and eastward, and the advantage of light means the multiplication of whatever gunnery advantage you possess. Unfortunately, the very reverse was the thought in the mind of Lord Jellicoe. (P. 149).

The important thing then is to maneuver so as to get the line A. B. at right angles to the bearing of the enemy instead of being at right angles to the course of the fleet. The result is given in the 2nd diagram. (P. 149).

But on May 31 the conditions were entirely uncertain, and Lord Jellicoe states there was insufficient information to justify the lateration in direction of the line AB as explained above. The cruising order adopted was consequently not satisfactory for the particular conditions when the enemy would probably be sighted from an unexpected direction. It might have been atoned for if Lord Jellicoe had made better use of his cruiser and destroyers for the purpose of obtaining information. P. 150-149).

From the foregoing it will be seen that the cruising order of the Battle Fleet was not suitable for the conditions of low visibility when the enemy might be encountered suddenly from an unexpected quarter. Lord Jellicoe says nothing on this point, and it can only be inferred that despite the misty conditions which constantly prevail in the North Sea, the important question of bringing the Battle Fleet into action in the shortest possible time in such circumstances had received insufficient attention. Tactical investigation had apparently been lacking. (P. 150).

Up to the last moment Lord Jellicoe remained uncertain as to the position of the enemy. He states: "The first definite information received on board the fleet flagship of the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet did not therefore come in until 6.14 p. m., and the position given placed it 30 degrees before the beam of Iron Duke or 59 degrees before the starboard beam of Marlborough".

Is not this an extraordinary confession of failure from an admiral possessed of the great superiority of 36 cruisers to 11 for the enemy, since the main function of cruisers is to act as the eyes of the Fleet? (P. 151).

Lord Jellicoe himself states that his first and natural impulse was to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the fleet into action at the earliest possible moment. But he goes on to say that he deliberately sacrificed this tremendous advantage in view of the risks, which he considered too great to be run. (P. 151).

Considerations of caution, therefore, urged deployment on the port column away from the enemy, but considerations of early action with the enemy urged deployment on the starboard column. Caution won the day. (P. 152).

But the far larger moral question of joining action early in view of the falling visibility and few hours of daylight is left unconsidered. No account is taken of the factor of surprise and its effect on the German command. Material considerations alone weighted with Lord Jellicoe but in the final issue history shows that it is the moral forces to which a commander must pay the most heed, for these exercise the decisive influence in battle. In the will to conquer, to take risks, to make sacrifices for the supreme end of victory, he was deficient. His own apology is his strongest condemnation. He thought like Byng, of what would happen if he were beaten, and the preservation of his force was his chief end and aim. (P. 152).

One can imagine how he would reason from his profound knowledge of military history that in all the best tactics will be found simplicity and flexibility. They are the servants of the great fighter, who never allows the system to be his master. The system gives the opportunity of victory, but not the victory itself. (P. 152).

No great naval leader ever said that the single line at every moment must bring all its gunfire to bear. All he would say is that a concentration of gunfire at a vital portion of a battle justifies its loss at another time, such as the approach to breaking the line in the old days and in the deployment today especially when the enemy is taken by surprise and is already engaged by a detached force. (P. 153).

A further consideration which suggests itself is a criticism both of the position in which Lord Jellicoe placed his flagship, and the formation in which he chose to approach. As regards the centre position it is only possible in practice if the subordinates have:

- (1) A complete knowledge of the Chief's intentions.
- (2) Freedom to act.

In Lord Jellicoe's arrangements the all-important provision for initiative was lacking. They suggest a too-rigid adherence to the line of battle with provisions by which the leading ships could reduce speed to correct distances. It cannot be too plainly stated that a firm adherence to the single line is a denial of free action to the subordinate commanders whether of squadron or divisions. It is a defensive conception. To attack one needs the power to seize opportunities which may be invisible to the Chief, and whereas a line of 27 ships cannot be moved quickly enough for this purpose the whole line can avail itself of the situation which a subordinate has created by a rapid stroke. (P. 155).

It is the mass formation of wild ducks flying. Deployment would thus bring fourteen ships at once into action with the flagship leading whichever way was turned. The importance of the flagship leading lies in the fact that she ought to see the situation of her own engaged ships first and set an example of keeping contact with the enemy. It is the golden rule in tactics that whatever else lets go the van should hold, and as the enemy turns, turn with him. The Barhams, being capable of 24 knots, should, for the same reason, have remained in the van, and at a later stage we shall find that Jerram's division in the van altogether lost sight of the battle-cruiser squadron as well as the enemy. (P. 156).

With the speediest ships in the van this would have been less likely to happen, and when it did happen, it would have been easier to rectify. (P. 156).

Whatever system one adopts, a long line of ships is bound, however, to be barren of decisive victory if that line is rendered rigid through subservience to the signals and motions of the flagship. Briefly, we may say that history is dead against such a conception of the line and most of all in the presence of a fleeing enemy. The sailor's

adherence to the line against the Dutch lost us the chance of victories, and it was the military men, Monk and Rupert, who freed the fastest ships to act independently and to concentrate on the enemy in the best manner known. (P. 156).

The maximum of flexibility was introduced by Nelson who broke out as a subordinate at St. Vincent; and at the Nile and Trafalgar gave out his general idea, conceding complete responsibility to each in execution. For instance, at Trafalgar, the battle order stated that "The second in command will, after my instructions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line". If such had been Herram's instructions, surely he would have leapt to Beatty's assistance on receiving the famous signal about 7.15, begging him to follow the battle-cruiser and cut off the enemy. (P. 156).

The italicised parts show the condition of the enemy fleet which Lord Jellicoe surprised by his arrival at 6.15. The four Barhams and seven battle-cruisers were already engaged with the head of the enemy's line as Beatty has just related, so the head of the enemy's line was fully occupied and "crumpled up". Why, then, did not Lord Jellicoe deploy to starboard, to use his own words, "in order to bring the Fellet into action at the earliest possible moment"? His answer is that it involved both a torpedo and a gunnery disadvantage, "I assumed that the German destroyers were ahead of their Battle Fleet", and "it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers during such a deployment". (P. 105).

All this dispersion from, instead of concentration on, the enemy, would have been avoided by the course which Lord Jellicoe describes as suicidal. (P. 166).

The real points, however, are the psychological one that surprise means so much in obtaining decisive victory, and that every minute of daylight was precious in view of the pre-determined veto against fighting at night. As Nelson remarked to Keats his intention was to "surprise and confound" the enemy, and he also gave the caution that a day cannot be lost in maneuvering. Lord Jellicoe threw away both time and surprise for purely reflexive and theoretical reasons. (P. 167).

To come into action rapidly with as many guns bearing as possible in comparison with the enemy, astern of that squadron, is what a Commander-in-Chief should bend all his energy to attain. The whole proceeding would have been simplified for every captain in the fleet if this had been understood. Hood, in the *Invincible*, came in ahead of Beatty. He showed both coup d'oeil and energy when he instantly turned his ships at 6.21 so as to prolong the line ahead, for that was the quickest way of getting into action. (P. 171).

The sound of heavy gun-fire was also heard from the South. The natural expectation was that he would at once detach his fastest cruisers to acquire the fullest information in the shortest time so as to guide him as to the best disposition to make of his Fleet; and this for the reasons which we have endeavored to make plain in the Chapter on the "Theory of Deployment". Lord Jellicoe on hearing guns ordered cruisers and destroyers to take station for action, instead of seeking further information. (P. 173).

The result of Lord Jellicoe not using his great cruiser preponderance to investigate was that the armoured cruisers on his right made contact at 5.50, not with Beatty, but with the enemy cruisers, and the resulting fight served to confuse Lord Jellicoe, for to the rear, as to the position of the enemy's main force, for he now saw gun flashes ahead as well as on the starboard bow. Apparently, the first knowledge he had of the position of Beatty's force was at 5.50, when he sighted them on the starboard bow, bearing S. S. W., and steering E. S. E. The presumption in such a case is that the staff work is entirely at fault in the most important work of training and using cruisers. (P. 174).

We had then exactly 200 guns of over 12 inch calibre superior to anything the Germans possessed. As at the Battle of the Bight, Comonel, the Falkland Island and the Dogger Bank it was the gun which won the victory, so now at Jutland it was the gun which destroyed the *Indefatigable*, *Queen Mary*, and *Invincible*, in fact all the British ships which were sunk, except the destroyer *Shark*. While the torpedo may have lowered the speed of the *Lutzow* and *Seydlitz*, there is reason to believe that the gun drove them out of the battle. Never in war had its crippling power been so great as at Jutland. (P. 178).

Suppose we put the British advantage at 3 to 1 in any given broadside from the ships in action and take no account of the concentration that an advantage of speed gives. If the broadsides were delivered every minute, then in ten minutes the proportion would be 30 to 10, that is, a surplus of 20 as compared with 2 for a single range of salvos. In addition there comes the psychological factor in the concentrated horror and confusion to which the inferior fleet is subjected and which resulted in the earlier battle-cruiser action, in the falling-off of the enemy's accuracy of fire, to which Beatty called attention. At no stage after the arrival of the Grand Fleet did the German gunnery inflict any injury on battleships or battle-cruisers in the line. This did not arise from the overwhelming superiority of the British gunfire, for, unfortunately it was not brought to bear except in the case of the enemy's battle-cruisers which had been subjected to very drastic punishment; but it arose from the fear of its use. If the mere anticipation could bring about such results, what the actuality might have been it is not difficult to visualize. (P. 179).

The enemy at the same time turned away under smoke clouds, and contact, so far as the battleships were concerned, was never really regained. It is impossible to imagine a more definite break from the whole spirit of naval tradition, or from the practice, suited to modern invention, of the golden rule that once an enemy is sighted must be cut off, closely engaged and annihilated. (P. 187).

This evidence was at his disposal in spite of his failure to probe into the enemy's position. Each piece was powerful in itself, but taken together they presented a convincing picture that the German formation and fighting spirit were broken.

- (1) The enemy continued to fire but had ceased to hit.
- (2) The enemy was on the run.
- (3) The enemy was using smoke screens to escape.

Two of his battle cruisers had drifted down the line but this information was not passed to Iron Duke.

In other words the appearance of the Grand Fleet alone had established a moral ascendancy in spite of all that had happened. (P. 194).

There were about sixty cases throughout the whole of the battle on May 31 of torpedoes being reported, and only one battleship (The Marlborough) and one destroyer (the Shark) was hit. We can leave out the destroyer fights, and such attacks as were not made on a line of ships. This reduces the number to about fifty torpedoes fired on May 31, of which eight in ten were at a line which did not turn away from its enemy. Only one hit, on the Marlborough, was secured, or a result of a little over two per cent. (P. 202).

The Germans made seven attacks on our ships, all of which were during daylight. The following is a brief summary:

Two were on the Battle-cruisers Squadron at 3.45 and on, and at 5.45 and on.

One on the rear of Battle Fleet 6.45, but it is uncertain where the torpedoes were fired from.

One on the rear of the battle line by a destroyer flotilla at 7.21 when the British line turned away.

Two were on our cruisers at the head of the line at 6.40 and 7.30, apparently from enemy line.

One on our cruisers and destroyers at 8.22 by destroyers, when the British battle line again turned away though it was obvious the enemy was divided, for Beatty was fighting battleships many miles ahead. (P. 204).

In addition it should not be lost sight of that to attack the German battle line with destroyers was a course calculated to force the Germans to use their own destroyers with inferior armaments, in defence, instead of attack.

We, on the other hand, made only four destroyer attacks by day, and all from the Battle-cruiser Fleet.

They were as follows:—

One on the German battle-cruisers before they turned north.

One on their battle-cruisers after they turned north.

One on their Battle Fleet when advancing north (this was an overflow by two destroyers from the first mentioned attack).

One by a few destroyers on the head of the German line as the Invincibles came into action. (P. 205).

At night our attacks were as follows:—

May 31, p. m., 9.50 to 10.50 Destroyers attacked cruiser 10-21. The Southampton fired at vessel using searchlight 11.10 to 11.45. Fourth Flotilla fired eleven torpedoes at vessels believed to be light cruisers, but accompanying battleships.

There were three torpedo explosions.

The battleship Malaya was able to watch this and the next attack. The first one was abaft her starboard beam. By the light of the explosion the leading enemy ship was distinctly seen as apparently one of the Westfalen class.

11.30 to 12.30 five torpedoes were fired at battleships. Attack was some way astern of Malaya but explosions could be seen from her.

June 1 a. m., 2.00 to 2.30. Seventeen torpedoes were fired at a group of battleships or battle-cruisers, and eight hits were claimed.

2.37. The Moresby attacked four Deutschland class and claimed a hit on third ship of line.

All the attacks by night were made at under 4,000 yards range, and the majority were under 1,500 yards. (P.p. 205-206).

Any discussion on the torpedo at the Battle of Jutland will start from a fundamental error if it assumes that the question is one of battleships versus torpedo craft instead of fleets versus fleets. Fleets derive their inherent strength from the qualities of the chief command and the training of the personnel; and we must bear in mind that they consist of various bodies, even as an army consists of infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks, air forces, etc. It is necessary to emphasize the qualities of the chief command; for the fleet which forces the fighting dictates the moves. (P. 206).

To argue, as the late Admiral Colomb did, that the battleship is degraded from its proud supremacy because it leans on other craft, like cruisers and destroyers, is to misconceive war, and one might as well argue that man yielded his supremacy when, instead of depending on his hands, feet and teeth, he took to using tools and weapons. The different classes of fighting craft are complementary to each other and the small fry sally out on the offensive with the more assurance because they look to the battleships as a great protecting base on which they can always retreat if necessary to do so. The disabled, whether surface craft or hydroplanes, know that the sea is theirs if they belong to the stronger fleet, while those of the retreating force know no other protection but fortifications and mined waters. (P. 207).

The argument takes on itself the character attributable to dwelling too much on conjectured results rather than on probabilities, or what Napoleon condemned as "making pictures", so that
"Imagination frames events unknown,
In wild fantastic shapes of hideous ruin;
And what it fears, creates. (P. 208).

We have now seen that the failure to destroy the enemy was due neither to lack of information nor to any other cause such as low visibility or mist, but to the deliberate steps taken by Lord Jellicoe, all of which had as their one controlling thought the preservation of his own ships. (P. 223).

	British	German
Officers killed, drowned or missing	343	172
Officers wounded	51	41
Men killed, drowned or missing	6,104	2,414
Men wounded	513	449

(P. 231).

The greatest suffering we incurred through the Jutland failure was one which nearly lost us the war. As Sir David Beatty said at Liverpool on March 29, 1919;—"The German High Seas Fleet was the bulwark behind which the submarine menace grew. Assailed by wasps we could not take their nests. German strategy, science and brain-power evolved a system of land defences, and the High Seas Fleet supplemented them, and the menace went further afield. If the Grand Fleet could have maintained a position close to the nests, we could have throttled the submarines and the menace would have ceased to exist. That was not possible. Had the High Seas Fleet been destroyed the menace would have disappeared.

"Our opportunities of destroying the High Seas Fleet are known to everybody. One opportunity was given of short duration". (P. 238).

British	German
Queen Mary, Defence	Lutzow
Indefatigable, Black Prince	Pommern
Invincible, Warrior	Wiesbaden
Tipperary	Frauenlob
Ardent, Nestor	Elbing
Fortune, Nomad	Rostock
Shark, Turbulent	5 destroyers
Sparrowhawk	

(P. 240).

It was not the Navy, but one man, who failed; but the battle had this clear gain, that it revealed the great merit of the admiral who a few months later succeeded to the command of the Grand Fleet. As Admiral Mathew's failure at Toulon brought out Hawke, so Lord Jellicoe's failure at Jutland brought out Beatty. (P. 241).

To inflict losses nowadays is even more imperative than when Boscawen gave us a classic example. The pursuit is everything, for dockyards work miracles. If a vessel once reaches sanctuary she lives to fight another day. In this battle there was no pursuit. With the door at our command, we left it flung wide open. (P. 214).

Yet one must insist again that decentralization is only possible when admirals and captains are inspired by a common doctrine of war in which victory is the predetermined goal. Thus, the signalling, a fruitful source

of hesitation, delay and confusion, is reduced to a minimum, and judgment, initiative and courage are given their fullest scope. (P. 248).

There was a great deal of technical study of material, but there was no doctrine of war. The whole tendency he brought with him was towards defensive tactics, the accentuation of material workshop and a marked leaning towards the administrative side. (P. 249).

The system thus described is one which can produce Captains of the Fleet who deal with the administrative side, but it is not capable of giving to the Fleets the efficient Staffs they require. (P. 249).

During his command of the Grand Fleet he made no serious attempt to separate operations from administration. (P. 249).

There is only one solution to the whole question and that is the appointment of a First Sea Lord who understands and believes in the necessity of staff training and staff organization, and who has the strength of character and determination to enforce them against the opposition of many senior officers. (P. 251).

Until a real War Staff has been at work for some time, and a mass of officers passed through it and into the various fleets, the importance of decentralization in command will not be generally recognized; for then, and then only, will the personnel of the Navy be possessed of a common doctrine of war which enables the subordinate to anticipate the wishes of his chief. (P. 253).

The truth is that the Navy has always been in constant danger of mistaking mere seamanship and technical knowledge as complete equipment for war. (P. 254).

Similarly, Foch, Petain and Joffre were what the material school would describe as "paper men", capable as they were of expressing their ideas on paper and having taught in the war colleges. If the Admiralty will give the public the document issued by the practical men at the Board in the Battle orders to the Mediterranean under which the Goeben escaped, the Press might well, as a bitter lesson, publish it side by side with Joffre's famous order of the day at the battle of the Marne: "You must be prepared to die rather than yield ground". (P. 254).

The Navy, the Army and the Air Force are parts of a machine fashioned for the purpose of waging war, and the supreme function of those at the head is to conduct war. This is no more an administrative task than it is in the case of a great general in the field. The working of the material supplies and the administrative occupation, involving a special kind of brain with a genius for details. Its importance and its special prominence in peace time should not be allowed to blind us to the fact that it must be subordinate to the instructions received from the men who conduct war. (P. 255).

This arose partly from the mixing of the conduct of war with administration, which the standard work of the German army characterises as a "terrible mistake for the reason given, that it would be impossible that a man would be found who... was equally master of the art of military administration and of handling armies". (P. 259).

It may be laid down, almost like a law of motion, that the moment a First Sea Lord meddles with administration, he will muddle his strategy. Under Lord Fisher, the evil grew to huge dimensions. He was chairman of a committee on personnel, of the Estimates Committee, of the Designs Committee, and of the Dockyards Committee, and there were no War Plans. (P. 259).

Beatty's War Staff
Chief of Staff
GENERAL DIRECTION.

			Flag Captain	Captain of Fleet
War Staff	Signal	Armament	Maintenance	
Section	Section	Section	Supply-Personnel	

Do not admirals say to themselves "How would Nelson act?" "Much as I approve of strict obedience to orders wrote Nelson to his First Lord, in 1798, "even to a court-martial to inquire whether the object justified the measure—yet to say that an officer is never for any object to alter his orders is what I cannot comprehend. The great object of this war is 'Down, down with the French! To accomplish this every nerve and by both services ought to be strained". Again he writes of the destruction of French naval power as the Great Order, "and if it can be proved that a breach of the lesser order is a more strict compliance with the former then there can be no doubt of the duty of the breach of the lesser orders". (P. 263).

We remained in command of the sea, with communications still safe. Therefore we had won a victory! In less than twelve months the communications were tottering to the onslaught of the submarine, showing that the preservation of one's ships is not a substitute for the destruction of the enemy. (P. 263).

It is the spirit and not the letter which matters. The spirit of the command under Lord Jellicoe was a narrow conformity to formal defensive tactics which could never achieve victory and which failed to do so at Jutland. (P. 268).

That our preparations for war were defective because they were not thoroughly thought out owing to the absence of a properly constituted War Staff. The Admiralty had no doctrine of war. (P. 270).

The Admiralty failed to develop a high standard and doctrine of war by their determination to hold no courts-martial on superior officers.

Lord Jellicoe failed through his own arrangements to establish visual touch with the Rosyth force under Beatty, so that the information sent by that force as to the enemy's position was not based on the reckoning as to latitude and longitude of the Iron Duke. (P. 271).

The visibility conditions necessitated closer action and this was not sought owing to fear of torpedoes. The British destroyer flotillas attached to the Battle Fleet made no attack upon the enemy by daylight because they had not been trained to attack by day. (P. 271).

The turning away on two occasions of the whole fleet of 27 battleships from the enemy, because of a destroyer flotilla attack, was a grave error of judgment. On both occasions it took the Grand Fleet out of action altogether when it had the enemy fleet, or a portion of the enemy fleet, at its mercy, and it left only the battle-cruisers and small craft to continue the action. Beatty asked for support by a signal taken in by the whole fleet as the Grand Fleet was turning away at 7.21, but it is evident that decentralization was not effective, for none was given him. (P. 271).

The arrangements for information as to the whereabouts of the German Fleet were again so ineffective during the night.

We did not seek the enemy after dawn at the spot where we could certainly intercept him, off the Horn Reef light-vessel, because Lord Jellicoe claims that it would have been dangerous on account of torpedo craft, his own destroyers not having been assembled after the night action. (P. 272).

The Admiralty, with full knowledge of the naval battle in progress, failed to send out the Harwich force, but ordered it to remain in harbor, until after the German Fleet had successfully escaped.

The consequences of Lord Jellicoe's failure to achieve a victory when the work of the battle-cruisers had cut the enemy off from their base, and when he had an advantage of 3 to 8 knots speed and an immense preponderance of force, were world-wide, and profoundly affected Russia. (P. 273).

This is the general indictment. It is the arrangement of a system and not of a man, for the man is the victim of the system which produced him. At this very moment the mechanical side of naval training is being accentuated. (P. 274).

It would have been the greatest thing that could ever have happened if Beatty, with the Sixth Battle Squadron of American ships under Admiral Rodman, could have fought a last great sea fight against the High Seas Fleet as the culmination of that splendid and harmonious co-operation which had gone on for 18 months. (P. 275).

The Sixth Battle Squadron went back from the old home to the new home, or the new home to the old home, put it which way you will, carrying with it the thousands who could proudly recall they had stood in the place of Franklin, as ambassadors of America. (P. 275).

Their hopes were our hopes, and our dreams were their dreams, of things which will be accomplished, which were born in the Sea of Mists, tempered in the furnace of war, and which are the expression of the prophetic soul of the great world dreaming on things to come. (P. 276).

These are the hopes, and these are the dreams which are stronger than navies and armies.

There was room for a tragic misunderstanding in the days when not a single Member of Parliament had ever visited America, and only one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence had been in England, days when the ocean closed up like a wall behind those who went forth on Great Britain's ventures to found new Britains beyond the seas. The Sixth Battle Squadron, the Australia, the New Zealand and the Malaya crossed the oceans and were, in the truest sense of the words hand-clasps across the sea, pledges that whatever may happen between the Mother of Parliaments and her families in other capitals, the old and the young navies of the British Empire and America will never fight except against a common foe. Then let us serve together now in peace in the Atlantic and the Pacific, inspired by a common doctrine of war which will never be satisfied with results if more can be achieved. (P. 276).

Clausewitz—On War—Vol. 1. Bk. III.

An Army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch, which, proud in the feeling of its victories, never loses its sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat; an Army with all its physical powers, inured to privations and fatigue by exercise, like the muscles of an athlete; an Army which looks upon all its toils as the means to victory, not as a curse which hovers over its standards, and which is always reminded of its duties and virtues by the short catechism of one idea, namely, the honor of its arms;—Such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit. (P. 182). ✓

The more a General is in the habit of demanding from his troops, the surer he will be that his demands will be answered. The soldier is as proud of overcoming toil, as he is of surmounting danger. (P. 184). ✓

But this noble impulse (boldness) with which the human soul raises itself above the most formidable dangers is to be regarded as an active principle peculiarly belonging to war. (P. 186). ✓

The reader will readily agree with us that, supposing an equal degree of discernment to be forthcoming in a certain number of cases, a thousand times as many of them will end in disaster through over-anxiety as through boldness.

The higher the rank the more necessary it is that *boldness* should be accompanied by a reflective mind, that it may not be a mere blind outburst of passion to no purpose; for with increase of rank it becomes always less a matter of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others, and the good of the whole. Where regulations of the service, as a kind of second nature, prescribe for the masses, reflection must be the guide of the general, and in his case individual boldness in action may easily become a fault. Still, at the same time, it is a fine failing, and must not be looked at in the same light as any other. Happy the Army in which an untimely boldness frequently manifests itself; it is an exuberant growth which shows a rich soil. Even foolhardiness, that is boldness without an object, is not to be despised; in point of fact it is the same energy of feeling, only exercised as a kind of passion without any co-operation of the intelligent faculties. It is only when it strikes at the root of obedience, when it treats with contempt the orders of superior authority, that it must be repressed as a dangerous evil, not on its own account, but on account of the act of disobedience, for there is nothing in War which is of greater importance than obedience. (P. 187). ✓

The higher we rise in a position of command, the more of the mind, understanding, and penetration predominate in activity, the more therefore is boldness, which is a property of the feelings, kept in subjection, and for that reason we find it so rarely in the highest positions, but then, so much the more should it be admired. Boldness, directed by an overruling intelligence, is the stamp of the hero; this boldness does not consist of venturing directly against the nature of things, in a downright contempt of the laws of probability, but, if a choice is once made, in the rigorous adherence to that higher calculation which genius, the tact of judgment, has gone over with the speed of lightning. The more boldness lends wings to the mind and the discernment, so much the farther they will reach in their flight, so much the more comprehensive will be the view, the more exact the result, but certainly always only in the sense that with greater objects greater dangers are connected. (P. 189-190). ✓

Meanwhile, however, with every year that elapses the forces at present in equilibrium are changing in magnitude—the pressure of populations which have to be fed is rising, and an explosion along the line of least resistance is, sooner or later, inevitable. Intro.—vi. Vol. 1. ✓

The ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell. The only way to avert them is to ensure victory; and, again following out the principles of Clausewitz, victory can only be insured by the creation in peace of an organization which will bring every available man, horse, and gun (or ship and gun, if the war be on the sea) in the shortest possible time, and with the utmost possible momentum, upon the decisive field of action—which in turn leads to the final doctrine formulated by Von der Goltz in excuse for the action of the late President Kruger in 1899; "The Statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready, and seeing War inevitable, hesitates to strike first is guilty of a crime against his country".—vii, Intro. Vol. 1. ✓

...and the Statesman who failed to take into account the force of the "resultant thought wave" of a crowd of some seven million men, all trained to respond to their ruler's call, would be guilty of treachery as grave as one who failed to strike when he knew the Army to be ready for immediate action. Intro.—ix—Vol. 1. ✓

Yet there are politicians in England so grossly ignorant of the German reading of the Napoleonic lessons that they expect that Nation to sacrifice the enormous advantage they have prepared by a whole century of self-sacrifice and practical patriotism by an appeal to a Court of Arbitration, and the further delays which must arise by going through the mediaeval formalities of recalling Ambassadors and exchanging ultimatums.

Most of our present-day politicians have made their money in business—a "form of human competition greatly resembling war", to paraphrase Clausewitz. Did they, when in the throes of such competition, send formal notice to their rivals of their plans to get the better of them in commerce? Did Mr. Carnegie, the archpriest of Peace at any price, when he built up the Steel Trust, notify his competitors when and how he proposed to strike the

blows which successively made him master of millions?—Intro. x—Vol. 1. ✓

In the end, and with every improvement in science, the result depends more and more on the character of the Leader and his power of resisting "the sensuous impressions of the battlefield".—Intro. xii. Vol. 1. ✓

...that great results carry the little ones with them—...that victory consists not merely in the conquest on the field of battle, but in the destruction of armed forces, physically and morally, which can in general only be affected by a morally, which can in general only be affected by a pursuit after the battle is gained ...that every attack becomes weaker as it progresses. Notice—xxvii—Vol. 1. ✓

We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations—therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole; because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts their relation to the whole should be kept constantly in view. p 1—Vol. 1. ✓

...for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. p 2—Vol. 1. ✓

Two motives lead men to War: instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of War, we have chosen as its characteristic the later of these elements, because it is the most general..... In short, even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other. p 3—Vol. 1. ✓

We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme. p 4—Vol. 1. ✓

War does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment; each of the two opponents can, therefore, form an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do. p 7—8—Vol. 1.

Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, etc.,—in short, not the whole country, unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the war....

That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously affected by the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter. p 9—Vol. 1.

...owing to the repugnance in the human mind to making excessive efforts; and therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used. p 10—Vol. 1. ✓

Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether. p 11

It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political motive for War may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in fact, a perfect explosion.—p 12—Vol. 1.

If two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it; as long now as they continue armed, that is, do not come to terms of peace, this feeling must exist; and it can only be brought to a standstill by either side by one single motive alone, which is, *that he waits for a more favorable moment for action.* p 14—Vol. 1. ✓

The greater the tension of feeling from which the War springs, the greater therefore the energy with which it is carried on, so much the shorter will be the periods of inaction; on the other hand, the weaker the principle of warlike activity, the longer will be these periods; for powerful motives increase the force of the will, and this, as we know, is always a factor in the product of force.

But the slower the action proceeds in War, the more frequent and longer the periods of inaction, so much the more easily can an error be repaired; therefore, so much the bolder a General will be in his calculations, so much the more readily will he keep them below the line of the absolute, and build everything upon probabilities and conjecture. p 18—Vol. 1. ✓

But together with chance, the accidental, and along with it good luck, occupy a great place in War. p 19—20.

We see, therefore, how, from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, nowhere

finds any sure basis in the calculations in the Art of War; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the course and fine threads of its web, and makes War of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game. p.20-Vol. 1. ✓

Courage and self-reliance are, therefore, principles quite essential to War; consequently, theory must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues. In daring there may still be wisdom. p.21-Vol. 1. ✓

The War of a community—of whole Nations, and particularly of civilized Nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is, therefore, a political act. p.22-Vol. 1. ✓

Still, the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means. . . . Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit. p.23-Vol. 1. ✓

We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. p. 25

War is. . . as a whole. . . . a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the General and his Army; the third, more the Government. p.26-Vol. 1. ✓

We see, therefore, that if the successful defence may change imperceptibly into the offensive; so on the other hand an attack may, in like manner, change into a defence. These gradations must be kept in view, in order to avoid making a wrong application of what we have to say of the attack in general. p.7-Vol. III. ✓

. . . These means are generally estimated at more than they are worth—they have seldom the value of a battle; besides which it is always to be feared that the disadvantageous position to which they lead will be overlooked; they are seductive through the low price which they cost. p.11-Vol. III. ✓

Every special calling in life requires peculiar qualifications. War being a province of danger—courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior. vi. p.47

War is the province of uncertainty—of chance—hence necessity for a penetrating mind. vi pp48-9

Two qualities indispensable—intellect—resolution. vi, p.50 The whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on the will of the Commander. His spirit must always rise above to lead.

By the term strength of character, or simply character, is denoted tenacity of conviction. Discernment clear and deep. p.62

A well balanced mind is essential to strength of character. vi p.62

Searching rather than inventive minds, comprehensive minds rather than those with a special bent, cool rather than fiery heads, are those to which we prefer to trust the safety of the Fatherland in time of war. p.70-71

That the true nature of a war should be realized by contemporaries as clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is seldom to be expected. At close range accidental factors will force themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call executive ability. (P. 3).

If, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in this way—if, that is, it be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience, but as a means of fertilizing both, it can do no man harm. Individual thought and common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to grow bewildering. Theory will warn us the moment we begin to leave the beaten track, and enable us to decide with open eyes whether the divergence is necessary or justifiable. Above all, when men assemble in Council it will hold discussion to the essential lines, and help to keep side issues in their place. (P. 7).

The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it.

The problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible of widely varying solutions. It may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy's fleets. (P. 12).

Take, now, the ordinary case of naval or military Staff being asked to prepare a war plan against a certain state and to advise what means it will require. To any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply must be another question—What will the war be about?

Before they take any sure step further they must know many things. They must know whether they are expected to take something from the enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other State. If from some other state, the measures to be taken will depend on its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. Even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be likely to fight to the death or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight resistance? If the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely overthrowing his powers of resistance. If the latter, it will suffice as it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and better within our means. All these are questions which lie in the hands of Ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the Staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by Ministers.

In short, the Staff must ask of them what is the policy which your diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you expect it to break down and force you to take up arms? The Staff has to carry on in fact when diplomacy has failed to achieve the object in view, and the method they will use will depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes. (Pp. 13-14).

"War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will."... Consequently, the first desideratum of a war plan is that the means adopted must conflict as little as possible with the political conditions from which the war springs. In practice, of course, as in all human relations, there will be a compromise between the means and the end, between the political and the military exigencies. But Clausewitz held that policy must always be the master. The officer charged with the conduct of the war may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with the military means which are placed at his disposal; but however strongly this demand may react on policy, in particular cases, military action must still be regarded only as a manifestation of policy. It must never supercede policy. The policy is always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object, and the means must always keep the end in view. (P. 21).

Hence, says Clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most critical decision upon which the Statesman and the General have to exercise their judgment is to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do not mistake it for something nor seek to make of it something which from its inherent conditions it can never be. "This", he declares, "is the first and the most far-reaching of all strategical questions".

Let it suffice for the present to mark that it gives us a conception of war as an exertion of violence to secure a political end which we desire to attain, and that from this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the intensity of our desire to attain it. (P. 23).

If it be positive—that is, if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy—then our war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, our aim be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting some advantage to our detriment, then the war in its general direction will be defensive.

The only real difference is this—that if our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at least open with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be negative our general plan will be preventive, and we may bide our time for our counter-attack. To this extent our action must always tend to the offensive. *For counter-attack is the soul of defence.* Defence is not a passive attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, it is an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment when the enemy shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far cripple him as to render us relatively strong enough to pass to the offensive ourselves. (P. 24-25).

For the classification "offensive and defensive" implies that offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive ideas, whereas the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that they are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must be both offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our positive aim nor how high our offensive spirit, we cannot develop an aggressive line of strategy to the full without the support of the defensive on all but the main lines of operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced devotee of attack admits the spade as well as the rifle.

It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside the designation "offensive and defensive" altogether and substitute the terms "positive and negative". But here again we are confronted with a difficulty. (P. 24)

Again, in the late Russo-Japanese war the main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being absorbed by Russia. That aim was preventive and negative. But the only effective way of securing her aim was to take Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice positive.

On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the majority of wars the side with the positive object has acted generally on the offensive and the other generally on the defensive. A clear apprehension of their relative possibilities is the corner stone of strategical study. It is only the offensive that can produce positive results, while the strength and energy which are born of the moral stimulation of attack are of a practical value that outweighs almost every other consideration. (P. 26-27).

The side which takes the initiative has usually the better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has usually the better chance of securing the advantage by dexterity or stealth. But it is not always so. If either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We are hidden on familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. We can lay traps and prepare surprises by counter-attack, when he is most dangerously exposed. Hence the paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound and well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack.

It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they depend on the *preservation of the offensive spirit.* Its essence is the counter-attack—waiting deliberately for a chance to strike—not cowering in inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained activity—not a mere condition of rest. Its real weakness is that if unduly prolonged it tends to deaden the spirit of offence. This is a truth so vital that some authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the misleading maxim "That attack is the best defence". (Pp. 28-29).

Again such a Power an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by passing to a bold and quick offensive, thus acquiring a momentum both moral and physical which more than compensates his lack of weight. (P. 29).

A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements of strength entirely disappear, unless it is such that the enemy must break it down by force before he can reach his ultimate objective. Even more often has it failed when the belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available progress, attempts to guard every possible line of attack. The result is of course that by attenuating his force he only accentuates his inferiority. (P. 30).

Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine has increased their possibilities. In the latest developments of naval warfare we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot Islands preparing a real defensive position to cover the landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung Peninsula— A strategical defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land and our own gravest problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when our enemy assumed it.

Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages that may be derived in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be found in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the final crisis of the naval struggle the Japanese Fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive attitude in its own waters which the Russian Baltic Fleet would have to break down to attain its end, and the result was the *most decisive* naval victory ever recorded.

To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly evil. For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible. But if prolonged, it will sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of effective aggression. (Pp. 30-31).

So soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power of attack it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended activity and anything that is not activity is not war. (P. 32).

A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent Russo-Japanese War was fought for a limited object—the assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent. Hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations and not by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent her interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth. (P. 36).

In the case of a limited object, however, the complete destruction of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was necessary. Clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength inherent in the defensive could set up such a situation that it would cost the enemy more to turn you out than the object was worth to him.

In the case of an unlimited war your main strategical offensive must be directed against the armed forces of the enemy; in the case of a limited war, even where its object was positive, it need not be. If conditions were favorable it would suffice to make the object itself the objective of your main strategical offensive." (P. 37).

It is under the first category of his first main classification "Of offensive wars to assert rights", that he deals with what Clausewitz would call "Limited Wars". (P. 38).

"First, those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether it be we aim at his political destruction or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and secondly, those in which our object is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as a matter of exchange in settling terms of peace".

War was a form of policy, and that being so it might be Limited or Unlimited. (Pp. 40-41).

... That, as all strategic attack tends to leave points of your own uncovered, it always involves greater or less provision for their defense. It is obvious, therefore, that if we are aiming at a limited territorial object the proportion of defense required will tend to be much greater than if we are directing our attack on the main forces of the enemy. In unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend everything elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate against our attack. Whether the limited form is justifiable or not therefore depends, as Clausewitz points out, on the geographical position of the object.

To satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions is essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, but of really limited political importance; and secondly, it must be so situated as to be strategically isolated or to be capable of being reduced to practical isolation by strategical operations. Unless this condition exists, it is in the power of either belligerent, as Clausewitz himself saw, to pass to unlimited war if he so desires, and, ignoring the territorial objective, to strike at the heart of his enemy and force him to desist. (P. 46).

If then, we only regard war between contiguous continental states, in which the object is the conquest of territory on either of their frontiers, we get no real generic difference between limited and unlimited war.

Possessions which lie overseas or at the extremities of vast areas of imperfectly settled territory are in an entirely different category from those limited objects which Clausewitz contemplated. History shows that they can never have the political importance of objects which are organically part of the European system, and it shows further that they can be isolated by naval action sufficiently to set up the conditions of true limited war. (P. 46).

Of the paramount value of the fleet's isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint.

Even when he deals with overseas expeditions, as he does at some length, his grip of the point, is no closer.

... He, like Clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest of Canada; and yet it is the leading case of a weak military Power succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its will upon a strong one, and succeeding because it was able by naval action to secure its home defense and isolate the territorial object. (P. 47).

It is that limited war permits the use of the defensive without its usual drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in unlimited war. These drawbacks are chiefly that it tends to surrender the initiative to the enemy and that it deprives us of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. But in limited war, as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without making these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the defensive our position becomes

exceedingly strong. (P. 61).

The form which economically makes for the highest development of strength in a given force—is strategic offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in effect the conditions which limited war should give—that is, if the theatre and method be rightly chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or mobility or by being more conveniently situated to establish our selves in the territorial object before our opponent can gather strength to prevent us. This done, we have the initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to attack us at home, must conform to our opening by endeavoring to turn us out. We are in a position to meet his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his distant and therefore exhausting offensive movements are likely to offer....

That is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor strategy is defensive. (P. 62-63).

The one which present them in their clearest and simplest form is without doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. Here we have a particularly striking example of a small power having forced her will upon a much greater power without "overthrowing" her—that is, without having crushed her power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of Japan. So manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the Continent, where the overthrow of your enemy was regarded as the only admissible form of war, the action of the Japanese in resorting to hostilities was regarded as madness.... Only in England, with her tradition and instinct for what an island Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to have any reasonable chance of success. (P. 66).

The political and geographical conditions were such that she was able to reduce the intangible object of asserting her prestige to the purely concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into the Russian Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own position and future development. Her power to maintain Korea integrity would be the outward and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her abstract quarrel with Russia could therefore be crystalized into a concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the Western Powers with Russia in 1854 crystalized into the concrete objective of Sebastopol. (P. 67).

In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well adapted, for the use of limited war. Owing to the geographical position of Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz attached the greatest importance—that is to say, the seizure of the particular object so far from weakening the home defense of Japan would have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. Though offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing her heart, it served to cover it almost impregably. The reason is plain. Owing to the wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, with a defile controlled Japan interposed, the Russian naval position was very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. (P. 67-8).

Approaching in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to develop on the same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study. It presents the normal three phrases—the initial offensive movement to seize the territorial object, the secondary phrase, which forces an attenuated offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of pressure, in which there is a return to the offensive "according", as Jomini puts it "to circumstances and your relative force in order to obtain the cession desired". (P. 71).

It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the idea of making a piece of territory your object is liable to be confused with the older method of conducting war, in which armies were content to maneuver for strategical positions, and a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of bad generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. Its conduct differs only from that on unlimited war in that instead of having to destroy our enemy's whole power or resistance, we need only overthrow so much of his active force as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order to prevent or terminate our occupation of the territorial object.

The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is to endeavor to determine what that force will amount to. It will depend, firstly, on the importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled with the nature and extent of his pre-occupations elsewhere, and, secondly, it will depend upon the natural difficulties of his lines of communication and the extent to which we can increase those difficulties by our conduct of the initial operations. In favorable circumstances therefore (and here lies the great value of the limited form) we are able to control the amount of force we shall have to encounter. The most favorable circumstances and the only circumstances by which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the more or less complete isolation of the object of naval action, and such isolation can never be established until we have entirely overthrown the enemy's naval forces. (Pp. 73-74).

The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.

The paramount questions of strategy both at sea and on land turn on the relative possibilities of offensive and defensive, and upon the relative proportions in which each should enter into our plan of war.

The object of naval warfare is the control of communications and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental.

By occupying her maritime communications and closing the points of distribution in which they terminate we destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent on the other. Thus we see that so long as we retain the power and right to stop maritime communications, the analogy between command of the sea and the conquest of territory is in this respect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost practical importance for on it turns the most burning question of maritime war, which it will be well to deal with this place. (P. 78, 80, 81).

The current term "Commerce destruction" is not in fact a logical expression of the strategical idea. To make the position clear we should say "Commerce prevention". (P. 81).

A riper and sounder view of war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial blockade—that is, the blockade of ports—could be extended to and supplemented by a strategical blockade of the great trade routes. In moral principle there is no difference between the two. Admit the principle of tactical or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot condemn the principles of strategical or distant blockade. Except in their effect upon neutrals, there is no juridical difference between the two. (P. 82-83).

In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea is humanitarian, and in so far as it rests on a belief that it would strengthen our position as a commercial maritime State, let it be honorably dealt with. But so far as its advocates have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to be based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by depriving yourself of the power of offense and resting of defense alone, and the other, the idea that war consists entirely of battles between armies or fleets. It ignores the fundamental fact that battles are only the means of enabling you to do that which really brings wars to an end—that is, to exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. "After shattering the hostile main army", says Von der Goltz, "we still have the forcing of a peace as a separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult task... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight that the desire for peace will prevail. This is the point in which Napoleon failed... It may be necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in other words, all important property necessary to the existence of the people and army". (P. 83-84).

It is commerce and finance which now more than ever control or check the foreign policy of nations. If commerce and finance stand to lose by war, their influence for a peaceful solution will be great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea exists they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately and inevitably whatever the ultimate result may be.

Humanity then, will surely beware how in a too hastily pursuit of peaceful ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the evil which it has as yet no power to kill. (P. 85).

Wars are not decided exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely less important. When other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. It has even many times redressed an unfavorable balance of armed force and given victory to the physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end against a maritime State is to deny him the resources of sea-borne trade. (P. 88).

If the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is obvious it may exist in various degrees.

Obvious as the point is, it needs emphasizing, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is all one". Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail of error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our control of any special sea area.

That his vital feature of naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, but when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, that you cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely overthrown your enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would be as wise to hold that in war you must never risk anything. (P. 89).

The Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck a naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually within the theatre of operations, they started their essential military movement oversea, content that though they might not be able to secure the control of the line of passage they were in a position to deny effective control to the enemy. (P. 90).

The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. It may also be said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. (P. 93).

In the case of Anson's threefold organization, the relation is not far to seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the command of the sea depends upon battleships", and the other that "cruisers are the eyes of the fleet". (P. 98).

Judged by his record, no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his battle fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical view. Had the French been ready to risk settling the question of the control in a fleet action, it would have been different. He would then have been right to sacrifice the exercise of control for the time in order to make sure that the action should take place and end decisively in his favour. But he knew they were not ready to take such a risk, and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on the part of the enemy to delude him from the special function with which he had been charged. (P. 99-100).

If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of actual practice. In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their specialization has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We should still require cruisers specialized for the work and in sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the converse is not true. We could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet to interfere with them. (P. 100).

If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our theory; it would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. That is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial steps must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea depends on the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include all the other facts on which it hangs. The true function of the battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work. The best means of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of interference. The doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed forces as the paramount object here reasserts itself, and reasserts itself so strongly as to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalization that the command depends upon the battle-fleet. (P. 100-1).

We arrive, then, at this general conclusion. The object of naval warfare is to control maritime communications. In order to exercise that control effectively we must have a numerous class of vessels specially adapted for pursuit. But their power of exercising control is in proportion to our degree of command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations being interfered with by the enemy. Their own power of resistance is in inverse proportion to their power of exercising control; that is to say, the more numerous and better adapted they are for preying on commerce and transports, the weaker will be their individual fighting power. (P. 103).

But as soon as the flotilla acquired battle power the whole situation was changed, and the old principles of cruiser design and distribution were torn to shreds. The battle-fleet became a more imperfect organism than ever. Formerly it was only its offensive power that required supplementing. The new condition meant that unaided it could no longer ensure its own defense. It now required screening not only from observation, but also from flotilla attack. (P. 108).

As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With every increase in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo craft, the problem of the screen grew more exacting. To keep the hostile flotilla out of night range the screen must be flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. And not only this. The screen must not only be far flung, but it must be made as far as possible impenetrable. In other words its own power of resistance must be increased all along the line. Whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be attached to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of the screen. The crying need for this type of ship set up a rapid movement for increasing their fighting power, and with it fell with equal rapidity the economic possibility of giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of numbers. (P. 109).

So insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has overridden the old order of things, and the primary function of the cruising ship inclines to be no longer the exercise of control under cover of the battle-fleet. The battle-fleet now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity.

The present system differs from them all. On the one hand, we have the fact that the latest developments of cruiser power have finally obliterated all logical distinction between cruisers and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with the fleet constitution of the old Dutch wars. (Pp. 109, 110).

To concentrate, therefore, the idea of division is as essential as the idea of connection. It is this view of the process which, at least for naval warfare, a weighty critical authority has most strongly emphasized. "Such" he says, "is concentration reasonably understood—not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will". Vessels in a state of concentration he compares to a fan that opens and shuts. In this view concentration connotes not a homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a common centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a wide field without sacrificing the mutual support of its parts. (P. 117).

Concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the expression of a war plan which, while solidly based on an ultimate central mass, still preserves the faculty of delivering or meeting minor attacks in any direction. It will permit us to exercise control of the sea while we wait and work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently secure control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our ability of bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment for the decision arrives. Concentration, in fact, implies a continual conflict between cohesion and reach, and for practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two tensions—ever shifting in force—which constitutes the greater part of practical strategy. (P. 118).

The idea of massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in war. (P. 120).

If we risk nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. The great leader is the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment he can stretch his concentration. This power of bold and sure adjustment between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test of that judgment which in the conduct of war takes the place of strategical theory. (P. 120).

For a comparatively weak belligerent sporadic action was better than nothing, and the only other alternative was for him to play into our hands by hazarding the decision which it was our paramount interest to obtain. Sporadic action alone could never give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury and embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so much loosen our concentration as to give him a fair chance of obtaining a series of successful minor decisions. (P. 124).

But at sea this is not so. In naval warfare we have a far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. It is simply this—that it is possible for your enemy to remove his fleet from the board altogether. He may withdraw it into a defended port, where it is absolutely out of your reach without the assistance of an army. This was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. (P. 140-141).

The second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare which relates to the communication idea is not so well marked, but it is scarcely less important. It will be recalled that this characteristic is concerned with lines of communication in so far as they tend to determine lines of operation. It is a simple question of roads and obstacles. In land warfare we can determine with some precision the limits and direction of our enemy's possible movements. We know that they must be determined mainly by roads and obstacles. But afloat neither roads nor obstacles exist.

Our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration of effort, and the third characteristic of naval warfare which clashes with it is that over and above the duty of winning battles, fleets are charged with the duty of protecting commerce. . . . It is idle for purists to tell us that the deflection of commerce protection should not be permitted to turn us from our main purpose. We have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of public opinion, no one has ever found it possible to ignore the deflection entirely. So vital indeed is financial vigour in war, that more often than not the maintenance of the flow of trade has been felt as a paramount consideration. (Pp. 142-144).

Nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way to protect your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. As an enunciation of a principle it is a truism—no one would dispute it. As a canon of practical strategy it is untrue; for here out first deflection again asserts itself. What are you to do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his fleets? You cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser raids while you wait your opportunity, and the more you concentrate your force and efforts to secure the desired decision, the more you will expose your trade to sporadic attack. (P. 144).

In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to relate to two broad classes of object. The one is to obtain or dispute the command of the sea, and the other to exercise such control of communications as we have, whether the complete command has been secured or not. (P. 145).

Take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we mean putting it out of the enemy's power to use effectually the common communications or materially to interfere with our use of them. We find the means employed were two; decision by battle, and blockade. Of the two, the first was the less frequently attainable, but

it was the one the British service always preferred. It was only natural that it should be so, seeing that our normal position was one of preponderance over our enemy, and so long as the policy of preponderance is maintained, the chances are the preference will also be maintained. (P. 146-147).

But further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the oldest traditions of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the conviction of the sea service that war is primarily a question of battles, and that battles once joined on anything like equal terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has had nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. (P. 147).

For clearness we may summarize the whole in tabulated analysis, thus:—

1. Methods of securing command:
 - (a) By obtaining a decision.
 - (b) By blockade.
2. Methods of disputing command:
 - (a) Principle of "the fleet in being".
 - (b) Minor counter-attacks.
3. Methods of exercising command:
 - (a) Defence against invasion.
 - (b) Attack and defence of commerce.
 - (c) Attack, defence, and support of military expeditions. (P. 149).

Still less in the later stage, when everything depended on the destruction of the Baltic Fleet, did Admiral Togo "seek it out". He was content, as the Americans should have been content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy must come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the war. So he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come to him, and thereby he rendered it, as certain as war can be, that when the moment for the tactical offensive came his blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming strength of concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent. (P. 153).

The principles, then, which we distill from this, the original case of "seeking out" are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative, and secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilization is complete. (P. 156).

Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. What the maxim really means is that we should endeavor from the first to secure contact in the best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favor, and as soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in the Japanese and American cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be subordinated to the movement of the offensive. If, however, the military offensive cannot be ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move must be to secure naval contact. (P. 162).

"When you know the enemy's designs", he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavor to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be formed sufficient to face the enemy's at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere". (Pp. 198-199).

Finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and especially for the actual determination of the force and distribution it requires, there is a dominant limitation to be kept in mind. By no conceivable means it is possible to give trade absolute protection. We cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. We cannot make war without losing ships. To aim at a standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution which would make our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march to economic ruin. It is to cripple our power of sustaining war to a successful issue, and to seek a position of maritime despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set every man's hand against us. All these evils would be upon us, and our goal would still be in the far distance. (P. 254-255).

To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our plans on an assumption that war may be waged without loss, that it is, in short, something that it never has been and never can be. Such peace-bred dreams must be rigorously abjured. Our standard must be the means of economic strength—the line which on the one hand will permit us to furnish our financial resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our financial vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our trade. (P. 255).

If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what fleet support the landing operations may re-

quire, it should never be given in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval action. (P. 269).

This is a special difficulty when in the case of large operations the landing army arrives in echelon like the Second Japanese army. In that instance the naval feint was used strategically, and apparently with conspicuous effect. The Russians were always apprehensive that the Japanese would strike for Newchuang at the head of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and for this reason General Stakeberg, who had command of the troops in the peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate for effective action in its southern part, where the Japanese had fixed their landing place. Admiral Togo, in spite of the strain on his fleet in effecting and securing the disembarkation of the army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in the Gulf. The precise effect of this feint upon the Russians Staff cannot be measured with certainty. All we know is that Stakeberg was held back from his concentration so long that he was unable to strike the Japanese army before it was complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering counterstroke. (P. 277).

Should a flotilla of such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast and make a show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral impossibility to ignore the demonstration.

Against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of covering and protecting an oversea expedition will not more work today than they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war. (P. 278).

Cordonnier—The Japanese in Manchuria.

To study a war without in the first place finding out the guiding idea of it is to beat the air. ^{r.1} p.3 ✓

Here, then, is the starting-point of our strategical study. 8-Intro. ✓

War, therefore, from the commercial point of view, was as necessary as ever. The economic probability became a moral certainty when the national self-esteem was wounded by a scramble amongst the European Powers for the Chinese benefits that Japan herself coveted. 8-Intro. ✓

When Japanese policy found itself for the second time obliged to prepare a war, it set before itself a definite object. This object was:—

To install Japan in a dominant position in the Liao-Tung.

To gain a free hand in Korea.

To expel the Russians from Manchuria.

Policy had next to ascertain whether the game was worth the candle, in view of the sacrifices war would involve, and to this end Strategy—that is, the general staff—was called in to advise.

The general staff studied the situation, and calculated (how, we shall presently see) the effectives in ships and divisions that would be required to make the venture with chances of success, and also the probable duration of the war.

The next step was for Policy to work out a balance sheet of profit and loss, and to decide whether or not it was worth while to continue the pursuit of the object proposed. (P. 9). ✓

Imperatively necessary is harmony of policy, and strategy, in peace time. When this harmony does not exist, when Policy wishes to impose its will on foreign nations without consenting to the sacrifice entailed by the provisions of means sufficient to insure the triumph of that will—then policy is leading the nation to ruin. ^{p.10} Up to July 1903 army and navy were in process of organization. Up to this point policy diplomizes. When the means of action are ready, Policy raises its voice. It has recourse to threats, its tone becomes arrogant, its demands open and clear; and when it thinks the moment come, it does not even wait for the fulfilment of promises. Negotiations are broken off, and the word is given for the guns to speak. (Pp. 14-15).

Policy is the mistress, War the servant. ^{p.15}

The determination of the theatre of war is therefore a problem of the very first importance, in which a wrong solution may involve failure or even disaster. ^{p. 28}

As a general rule, the way to obtain the object desired is to strike at the heart. ^{p. 17}

In special cases—such as those of the Crimea and Manchuria—this is not necessary. It would have been to go beyond the object of war, and it would have been a blunder.

The general staff of the Japanese Army, then, selected, as the theatre of war, the Far East. (Pp. 28-29). ✓

The determination of the theatre of war is therefore a problem of the very first importance, in which a wrong solution may involve failure or even disaster. (P. 28). ✓

All that is necessary is to lay down 95 miles of new railway. This will give us five through lines of transport, an advantage for which millions would not compensate in case of war. (P. 35). ✓

To make war three things are necessary, (1) money (2) money (3) money. ^{p. 57}

Today the state of "armed peace" impoverishes the states which maintain it, while the others run the risk of being ruined and of disappearing altogether. ^{p. 58}

There is thus an intimate relation between the financial and the military situations. ^{p. 61}

Careful observations of the fluctuations of foreign nation's finance is nowadays of the highest importance. This is one of the characteristics of modern warfare. (Pp. 31-57-58). ^{p. 64}

Duration of the War.—As Russia was not to be attacked in a vital part, she would *ipso facto* be in a very favorable position for prolonging the contest. (P. 29). ✓

The Japanese Staff was therefore unable to determine beforehand how long the war would last. It could only study possible means of reducing its duration.

The Russia-Japanese war in its very conception was an economic war. Logically, therefore, the war ought to come to an end as soon as, viewed from the commercial standpoint, the losses exceeded the profits. ^{p. 30}

But it is not a commercial balance-sheet which brings about the signature of a treaty of peace, even

in an economic war. National self-respect quickly comes into play on both sides; and as soon as self-esteem takes the predominant part, all figures are obliterated. p. 31 ✓

The Japanese Staff had therefore to reckon with factors of national pride as much as, if not more than, with those of the economic kind. (P. 30-31). ✓

As long as Russian national pride had no cause to consider defeat as irremediable, so long the war might continue. ✓

The main thing, then, was to make Russia understand that she could never have the chance of carrying the war on to Japanese soil. ✓

To that end the first essential was to destroy the Russian Far Eastern squadron; this, added to other factors with which we shall presently deal, accounts for the persistence and fury of the Japanese attacks upon Port Arthur. (P. 31). ✓

Forces.—The Japanese staff, having determined the theatre of their war, studied the means of shortening it, and made a reasonable estimate of its probable duration, had next to work out the potential strength of the forces they would have to deal with. ✓

These were (a) the Russian troops of the existing Far Eastern army, (b) the reinforcements that might be brought to the theatre of war before, and (c) those that could be brought up after, the outbreak of hostilities. (P. 34). ✓

Restricting to its minimum the effort to be demanded of the nation, the Japanese staff prepared means which it considered necessary to defeat, by sea or by land, the forces that Russia could bring into the field or assemble in Manchuria between February and September 1904. (P. 38). ✓

Policy has fixed the object of the war. Strategy has settled upon the theatre of the war, and created and organized the means. It now remains to ascertain how these means are to be employed in the determined theatre and for the given object. (P. 39). ✓

On the night of February 8-9, 1904, Admiral Togo's fleet attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron without declaration of war. From that day forth, so long as anything of this squadron remained in existence, Togo stood on guard, ready to pounce upon any Russian ship that attempted to emerge from its refuge. (P. 40). ✓

The positive initial superiority of the Japanese navy lay in the fact that it was concentrated as a whole at Sasebo, whereas the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was short of the three big armoured cruisers and of the torpedo craft that were at Vladivostok. At sea, therefore, the Japanese could work on interior lines, and, using their whole force at will against either of the ports and the portion of the Russian fleet therein, fight with the advantage of superior strength. (P. 42). ✓

The goal of Japan's policy was the acquisition of territories on the Asiatic mainland. ✓

But the Policy required strategy first and foremost to assure the inviolability of the home country, i. e., put it out of the enemy's power, once and for all, to disembark on the islands of Japan. ✓

This necessity of assuming the position of "on guard" at the outset gave predominance for the time being to the naval side of operations. The command of the sea was indispensable in that it secured Japan against risks which would have very considerably outweighed the prospects of profit. (P. 43). ✓

The transference of the war to the mainland necessitated the transference of the army thither, and for this the transport vessels must be able to ply to and fro unharmed. (P. 44). ✓

Modern armies, because of their requirements in ammunition, cannot do without an established line of communication with the base—i. e., the home country. It was therefore essential for the Japanese to have the command of the sea, not merely temporarily, but permanently. (P. 44). ✓

It was, moreover, within the bounds of possibility that a Russian fleet would come on the scene from Europe. A squadron under Admiral Virenius was in the Red Sea, and other vessels might one day join the Far Eastern Squadron. On that day Admiral Togo would find himself in inferior strength, and faced with the prospect of being beaten, perhaps destroyed. p. 44 ✓

What, then, would become of the Japanese armies on the mainland, even if they were victorious, when the Russian Fleet controlled the Sea of Japan? Sooner or later, when they had fired away the projectiles that they had no means of replacing, they would have to capitulate. p. 44-45.

The mastery of the sea, therefore, was a vital matter, not only at the outset, but throughout the campaign. If it were lost, even temporarily, the very gravest consequences might ensue. p. 45 ✓

It was *essential*, then, that the Russian Far Eastern Red Sea, and Baltic squadrons, already separated in space, should be separated in time as well. The Far Eastern squadron must be destroyed to the last vessel before the others could reach Japanese waters.

Lastly, it was fair to suppose that Russia would agree to terms of peace as soon as it became absolutely impossible for her to pay off her scores with Japan on Japanese soil (Pp. 44-45). ✓

Land and sea strategy were then in opposition. The interest of one was to delay until the break-up of the ice, that of the other was to begin at once. Of the two, the strategy which aims at the more important objective should have precedence. p. 46 ✓

Togo, therefore, sailed from Sasebo on Feb. 6, 1904; and his guns were to be the first intimation that war had commenced. p. 46 ✓

It is very rare, in war, to find all interests pointing the same way; practically no solution of a problem is free from serious defects. Victory falls to that party which can disentangle the principal from the secondary, which can discern its objective and march straight upon it, regardless of side issues. (Pp. 48-49). ✓

The first phase of the operations is direct action against the Russian squadron by Togo's fleet. The second is indirect action against the same objective by Kuroki's army. p. 52 ✓

The Russians had two forces in Manchuria, the army and the squadron. It was the more urgent matter of the two to destroy the squadron, and it was against the squadron that the 2nd Army was directed. p. 52 ✓

The third phase of the operations, therefore, is a resumption of direct action against the Russian squadron. On May 5, the 2nd Army began to disembark at Pi-tzu-wo and Yentai. pp 52-53 ✓

On May 26 Oku's three divisions carried by main force after a sanguinary struggle, the isthmus of Nanshan.

From this day forth the Port Arthur peninsula (Kuan-Tung) was severed from the rest of the theatre of war.

A glance at the map shows that the Kuan-Tung peninsula is connected to the mainland only by an isthmus 4000 yards wide. The mastery of this isthmus, Nanshan, which can be defended by one division against greatly superior numbers, is tantamount to the investment of Port Arthur.

Port Arthur stands at the extremity of the theatre of war, far from the scene of the intended decision. The fortress barred none of the routes which the armies were to follow in their advance. Never perhaps was there a fortress which could so easily have been avoided or masked. (P. 53). ✓

For it was a matter of urgent necessity to destroy or capture the squadron which was sheltered in the place. It was necessary, too, to release the Japanese fleet in order that it might be rested and refitted in time to meet that other danger which began to loom large—the Russian Baltic fleet. (P. 54). ✓

It was not a fortress, then, that the Japanese assailed, but seagoing forces that it was a matter of the very first urgency to destroy. Hence the organization of a 3d Army (Nogi), strong at the outset and reinforced with a lavish hand. This army was meant to destroy, in concert with Togo's fleet, the last vestiges of the enemy's Far Eastern squadron.

Port Arthur falls on January 2, 1905. In May Admiral Rozhdestvenski's fleet arrives in Japanese waters. But Togo has now no other adversary on his hands. He has had time, moreover, thoroughly to rent his ships for battle, and his victory is decisive, for it deprives Russia of the whole of her means of action afloat. p. 55 ✓

When security was assured, or practically assured—i. e., when the Port Arthur Squadron was besieged by land and sea by the 3rd Army and Togo's fleet—Strategy was free to act against Russia's means of action on the mainland, and so to achieve the object of the war as fixed by Policy. (Pp. 55-56). ✓

The success of the plan of campaign depended upon the destruction of Russia's two means of action in the Far East, her fleet and her army. The fleet was destroyed, but not so the army; and having still a means of prolonging the argument, Russia still argued. Thus in the end peace was accepted by Russia, but not imposed upon her.

To make three things are necessary, as Montecucoculi, even in his generation, could say, (1) money, (2) money, (3) money.

This is truer than ever today. In the war in Manchuria finance fought as many battles as the soldiers. The money of Portsmouth, though it did not satisfy the Japanese, was accepted by them because their finances, not their battalions, were exhausted. (Pp. 56-57). ✓

When the treaty of Shimonoseki had been revised by the European Powers, Japan had to forego the conquests she had just made on the continent, and to content herself with Formosa and L37,700,000. A violent blow was

thereby dealt to Japanese self-esteem; and as it was only submitted to because the warlike means then at Japan's disposal could not compete with those of Europe, she began to augment her war power without waiting for the payment of the indemnity by China. She obtained money by raising a loan on the security of this indemnity.

What was the meaning of it all? It was not for a defensive war that Japan was subjecting herself to such sacrifices, for no one was threatening her. It was therefore in order to attack. To attack whom? Had Russia asked herself the question she could have seen that she herself the enemy aimed at. (Pp. 61-62).✓

War is the wrestle of two nations, which throw into the contest their blood, their treasure, their moral force, their hopes, and their liberty.

The battle of soldiers is only an episode of the war. It may be, and in fact generally is, the decisive episode; but it is not an isolated and self contained act. (P. 70).

Antagonism, between the aims of Policy, the financial conditions, the armed forces, can only be productive of disaster. Defective co-operation between them inevitably results in deadlock. There must be combination of all these forces; so alone may the country, sure of her future march confidently in the way of progress and liberty. (P. 70).✓

In studying the *Japanese plan of operations*, we have seen that the attainment of the object laid down by Japanese policy required:

- (a) The destruction of the Russian Far Eastern squadron with the least possible delay.
- (b) The destruction of the Russian army in Manchuria. (P. 72).✓

(Kuropatkin) He said so explicitly. "No operations will be undertaken without an assured numerical superiority. Nothing must take place before August".

It would therefore be necessary to wait some months before being able to accept or to compel a battle. It was March, and nothing was to happen till August—five months to be gained.

The enemy would not give these five months gratis, for he would know perfectly well what the Russians stood to gain by delay. It would be necessary to impose this delay.

Now, as we have seen, the weakness of the field army suggested that its concentration point should be put back, while the weakness of Port Arthur compelled the army to go no further away than Liao-Yang. The small available space in these conditions, did not ensure the necessary time for the concentration of the forces that Strategy desired to use. (P. 93-94).✓

(Jomini) For him likewise, the offensive is in its general principle advantageous. It exercises a preponderant influence on the morale of armies; it is beneficial furthermore from the advantage which the pursuit of a well determined object gives. If this writer, nevertheless, seems to attribute to the defensive method a partial superiority because it gives the choice of the place of operations, it is on the express condition that it be active, for he explicitly condemns every passive form of the defensive. But what then is the active defensive, that is to say, the defensive which contemplates attacking at a favorable moment, if not a particular form of the offensive?

He likewise says: "let us recognize that a state does better to invade its neighbors than to let itself be attacked". (P. 225).

Analyzing Napoleon's system of war, the definition of which can be summed up in three words--speed, battle, rest--Jomini thinks that this system will never be abandoned. (P. 227).

(Jomini) "Correct theories, founded upon true principles and justified by facts are, in our opinion, when taken in conjunction with the lessons of history, the veritable school of generals. If these means do not make a great man, since great men are always self-made when circumstances favor them, they will at least form generals skillful enough to be perfectly fitted for the second rank under the orders of great generals". (P. 228).

The sole efficient means of war is battle; that is the essential thing, what I have already several times called the principal objective. "Battle", says he (Clausewitz) "constitutes the whole action of war. In battle the destruction of the opposing forces is the means of attaining the object, even though the battle does not actually take place and the threat of it suffices to bring about a settlement; for in that case the enemy manifestly retires only on the supposition that, if he accepted the struggle, he would inevitably be destroyed. In war, then, the destruction of the armed force of the adversary is the corner stone of all combinations. In speaking of the armed force of the adversary, we ought expressly to observe that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical force; but rather moral force also, for the reason that these two forces are constantly mingled even in the smallest details of the act of war, and consequently are inseparable".

(Clausewitz): "Outside of the destruction itself of the armed forces of the adversary, the different objects that it can be proposed to attain in war are positive objects, and, consequently, the offensive alone is capable of pursuing them". (Pp. 228-229).

Clausewitz adds further: "The essential characteristics of offensive warfare are rapidity, decision and continuity of action", and also "The greatest promptitude should be used in operations. Every loss of time, every useless detour brings about a waste of forces and is consequently a strategic error."

Thus once more is the high strategic value of speed proclaimed. "In tactics as in strategy, the one which most generally gives victory". "The greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point. Such is the first principle of strategy".

We have already seen the prime importance which Clausewitz attributed to battle; he defined it: "Strategy's instrument for attaining the object of the war". (P. 231).

Clausewitz): "The general-in-chief, says he, "does not acquire this varied knowledge from formulae and from scientific processes; it requires on his part special aptitude, supported by the judicious observation of things and a judgment trained by the events of life". He says again: "Study the meditation can produce an Euler and a Newton, but experience of life and its great teachings are necessary to form calculators such as Conde and Frederick". (P. 232).

In the first place (Rustow) "armies are the principal instrument and the principal objective of strategy, the true representatives of force in war. To develop as much as possible the activity of his own army and to restrain the activity of that of the enemy, to maintain his army and to destroy the enemy's, such are the dominating ideas that should direct the general-in-chief. Battle is the culminating act of war. It commands and determines all other operations of war". (P. 233).

(Rustow): "Victory is assured by superior forces; by the choice of the favorable moment, that is to say of the moment when one is strongest and the enemy weakest; by the choice of the suitable place, that is to say of the place where one is strongest and the enemy weakest. Success is further assured by a clear and precise conception of the result to be attained; by the intelligence which directs towards a single object all one's material, forces and which advances straight towards it without deviating; finally by an energetic will which never loses sight of this object and never abandons it without necessity. (P. 233).

(Rustow:) "With equal forces, an army will be so much the more formidable as there is harmony between unity of command and independence of parts, in such a way that these fractions have as much independent life as is possible without weakening the power of the commander-in-chief. The best method of arriving at this re-

sult is a proper subdivision of the army so that these fractions are neither too numerous, nor too strong, nor too weak..." (P. 235).

Rustow: "He who has a positive object in view can with the greater facility bring superior forces to bear upon the decisive point. He who waits, on the contrary, for the enemy to take the initiative, makes this problem the more difficult for himself. In fact, beside the principal and positive object that we choose, all others are secondary, and the forces which are devoted to them will be in the same proportion. But if we allow the adversary to choose, then several, contingencies will seem to us to have the same value, and we will divide our forces equally to oppose these equally important contingencies. This it is which above all makes the offensive superior to the defensive".

"For the defensive to be as strong as possible, all the preparations must be directed by an offensive idea". (Pp. 236-237).

Rustow: "Victory is completed by pursuit. After his defeat the enemy needs rest to reassemble and repair his forces. This rest is forbidden him if he is forced to fight or to march rapidly in order to avoid fighting, perhaps under the most disadvantageous conditions. Thence follows the rule that the conqueror should pursue the conquered without delay, with the greatest possible speed and energy. (Pp. 237-238).

"In any operation it should never be forgotten that the shortest road to reach the enemy has a marked advantage over the longest". This is the affirmation of the value of speed. (P. 238).

Rustow: "The plan and preparation of an enterprise, whatever it may be, are never the act itself; and it is to the act alone that are due success and diminution of the enemy's success. The plan of every enterprise ought to be made in advance. This is an indispensable condition of arriving at a predetermined end; but, beyond this end to be attained, a plan ought to take account of the nature of the means and of the existing circumstances. The first requisite of a plan of war is the greatest simplicity; for a simple plan is easier to conceive and to execute than a complicated plan. The second requisite of a good plan of operations is to limit the number and scope of those operations, to lay them down according to the known data, with room for the action of unknown quantities, and allowing sufficient freedom to the direction of the operations to enable the plan to be modified in the course of its execution, if circumstances require it. (P. 238).

Rustow: "Simplicity and independence of plan (independence relative to the plans attributed to the enemy) are principles of the military art". (P. 239).

Von der Goltz: "The first of the conditions of success in war is POLICY". (P. 239).

"Without a good policy, it is not probable that war will turn out fortunate".

"It is essential that the commander-in-chief, as well as the troops, have the FIRM WILL TO CONQUER".

"The first object, and the principal one, towards which the movements of armies are directed is the hostile army".

"He who has on his side superiority of numbers has a great chance to triumph over the adversary".

"The first and main principle of modern tactics is THE GREATEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF MEN MUST BE BROUGHT TO THE PLACE WHERE THE DECISIVE BLOW IS TO BE STRUCK".

"To make the fullest use of all the means at one's disposal is the principle of war at the present time".

"Whoever can sustain a war for a long time possesses an important guarantee of final success". (Pp. 239-242).

"Though wealth greatly augments strength, it only becomes fruitful if, AT THE PROPER TIME, every sacrifice is made".

"The offensive requires a greater activity than the defensive; that alone is a great gain, for of two adversaries otherwise equal, the one who is the most active will conquer". (Pp. 242-243).

Von der Goltz: "The possession of money, it is true, is not alone to be taken into account, but also the greater or less facility for making use of it. States which, in case of war, keep open their sea communications have ways of using their credit quite other than have those whose ports will be immediately blockaded. The former will moreover be able to have recourse to foreign industries for the armament and equipment of new armies. Without this last resource, the government of the National Defense would never have been able, in the late war, to constitute the formidable armies which astonished the whole world. It, in 1816, Napoleon had had this resource, affairs in the American War of Secession, succumbed in spite of their military superiority, because their communications with the sea had been cut. The control of the sea therefore contributes indirectly to strengthen a state, even if its fleets are not able to give direct aid to its army". (P. 242).

Mahan: "This does not mean only a squadron whose individual ships have superior speed, but also one which has the greatest uniformity of action through the homogeneousness of its units". (P. 244).

"The power to assume the offensive or to refuse battle..." (P. 245).

I wish no better proof than the following words, taken from an essay of 1898 by Commander Ballard, crowned by the Royal U. S. Institution, on the protection of English commerce in time of war: "Those who have thought on the matter at all will probably agree that the necessary basis of any protection whatever must be a sufficient superiority in battle-ships on our part to destroy, capture or blockade in their own ports the main squadrons of the enemy as in former wars, which in itself would constitute the chief source of safety to our shipping, and without which it would be idle to talk of commerce existing at all,.... unless (the destruction or blockade of the enemy's squadrons be) successfully effected, it would be useless to attempt anything else.

"It obviously follows, however, that the more thoroughly their duty of watching the enemy is performed, the greater this protection will be; indeed, the opinion is apparently held in some quarters that this is all that is required. (Pp. 248-249).

...It is this that General Bonnal wishes to express when he says: "Initiative, that quality of character which nothing can replace, can act usefully only to the extent that it is directed by community of thought; in other words by a doctrine common to all the members of the army". In his "The Nation Armed" Von der Goltz also writes: "The principles of Napoleon form even to this day the basis of our doctrine".

Bonnal: "Confused in the beginning, ideas have little formed themselves into groups about a few great principles of experience that have formed the basis of a doctrine aiming at discipline of the mind, today in full period of development, in which the War College has taken a large part.

"A doctrine of war does not impose itself; it is born of the unanimous concurrence of understandings under the empire of convictions PROGRESSIVELY acquired". (P. 253).

"The idea could not be better expressed, especially to show the needfulness of time for accomplishing a lasting work in any military institution. (P. 253).

The object of command is to unite and concentrate all the scattered forces that are represented in each individuality, and to bind them together. It manifests itself by the subordination of all wills to a single will.

Command is not the logical product of our military regulations; it is a social necessity. When it does not exist, it creates itself and imposes itself.

The great majority of men have need of being governed, and a small minority have received special gifts for directing the masses. Under the ordinary circumstances of life, this need does not make itself felt, and the instinct of independence incites us to free ourselves from all tutelage; but when danger appears, the crowd abdicates in favor of the most worthy and command shows itself then in its true light, very much more a protection than a trammel. Each one of us has been able to note it in those situations, so frequently in cruising, that are, if not dangerous, at least difficult. The whole crew looks towards the commander, calling upon him to get the ship out of the tight place in which it finds itself; at this critical moment the strongest willed scarcely think of contesting the leader's authority. (P. 531).

...At the same time they draw upon the human machine to its utmost, and make use, as from a veritable reserve, of the property that the strong man possesses, by the concentration of all of his facilities, of doubling and tripling his strength at a given instant...

The method of great leaders has this other peculiarity; that they have never sought to be sparing of their forces, and that the greatness of the result concerns them much more than the losses they may suffer.

Let us say, finally, that the simplicity of the plans of genius proves that the difficulty consists less in defining what is needful to do than in having the energy necessary to carry out successfully what has been decided upon. (P. 532).

Let us now view command in its relation toward subordinates. The medium of centralization, it can be exerted in two different manners. The first tends to bring all the machinery under the direct control, of a single person who acts in stead and place of the rest; the second blends all wills in a single one by impressing upon them a uniform conduct, while leaving to each the free disposal of his means in his proper sphere. (P. 533).

Nevertheless, there is not wanting people who think that the initiative takes away from command a part of its authority and prerogatives. That is a narrow view to take of things. Command is, above all, a moral affair, because it is exercised over men who think and act; it does not consist in the substitution of the action of one for that of all; it subjugates the wills that engender acts and not the acts themselves, in such a way that each acts as the leader would have acted. Command gives the impulse, it determines unity of action; but it neither thinks nor acts for everybody. (P. 534).

... But the need of reaching a decision one way or another, and of deciding immediately without waiting for the morrow, is not debatable. (P. 535).

Leaders who stifle the initiative of their captains should never complain of having been abandoned on the battlefield.

The duty of command is, therefore, above all, to instruct each one in advance what he will have to do in order to start the battle in the right way; thoroughly to instill into all the subordinate admirals the principle that they must never regard the situation from their individual points of view, but that they ought solely to concern themselves with the effects that their personal actions will have upon the result of the battle. Whatever may happen afterwards the impulse given will not cease to act. Who would dare to assert that while Nelson was dying in the hold of the Victory his squadron was no longer commanded? (P. 536).

The work of times of peace is to train the personnel and to teach each one what he will have to do, in such a manner that during battle the officers of the various grades can devote themselves to the occupations that are born with war and only appear on the battlefield. The subordinate officers especially will have a role of general supervision to keep everyone at his post, to strengthen courage and to meet unexpected needs. As for the commander-in-chief and the captains, all their attention will be concentrated upon the enemy, whose movements they will follow in order to profit by the least sign of weakness. In war, it is the opportunity that makes the thief; to profit by it, it is necessary to have a free mind and not to be absorbed in details; it is also necessary for the machinery to be in such good condition that, once set going, it will keep on working. (P. 537).

... The best indication is still furnished us by the great seamen; of all chiefs of squadron, they are the ones who left the most initiative to their lieutenants, and it may be admitted that, since they acted so, they thought that they could not do otherwise. (P. 538).

Though the methods of war are reacted upon by a material that is undergoing permanent changes, man, who puts in operation all this complicated apparatus, does not change. Today, just as a hundred years ago, he keeps his susceptibility, passing from confidence to discouragement according to the influence exercised upon him by events and by his surroundings.

It is impossible to understand anything of military affairs if we do not bring into account the moral factor that destroys all combinations solely based on superiority of numbers or of strength. (P. 539).

Self-confidence is only a consequence of the confidence that command inspires; for troops take very good account of the fact that there must be someone to lead them to victory. A leader who has the confidence of his soldiers can ask everything of them; his orders are accepted as infallible dogmas, and, no matter how perilous their execution may appear, each one marches with pleasure, confident of success and saying to himself: he has his idea. Under the influence of this confidence, man accomplishes acts of which he would be thought incapable. The efficiency of the human machine is, in fact, essentially variable; not only is it not the same in two different nations or in the different armies of any one nation, but it varies from day to day, from one hour to another, in one and the same force, according to the course of events. (P. 539-540).

The same reason that deprives those on one side of all strength, multiplies tenfold the strength of the others because the situation appears in a directly opposite light to the two sides. A vessel that sinks in the midst of the battlefield compromises the battle, and the first one that hauls down the flag gives the signal for defection. Thus an affair badly begun is always difficult to retrieve. Nevertheless, the character of man is so mobile that very little is necessary to change the direction of his thoughts and to revive his hopes. "The battle is lost", said Napoleon at Marengo, "but we still have time to win another".

What a powerful lever moral force can be in hands that know how to exploit it may be understood. The great captains, one of whose qualities is knowledge of the human heart, have made constant use of it. Nelson knew what he was doing when he signaled to his squadron "England expects every man to do his duty".

The prestige of the victor resides much less in his actual strength than in that which is attributed to him. Whoever has been fortunate in the beginnings of a war possesses a double strength; that which comes from the self-confidence given by first success; and that ascribed to him by the enemy, which has the effect of rendering the latter cautious. (P. 540).

The moral factor dominates the field of battle. It exercises a greater influence than numbers, altho numerical superiority contributes to strengthening morals and the whole art of war consists in knowing how to make skillful use of it.

The influence of events is felt by the command, moreover, just as it is by the men. History shows us Suffren hurling himself upon the enemy and laying himself open in consequence of his captains' lack of energy; yet Hughes never thought of drawing advantage from the disorder of the French Squadron, because he submitted to the moral ascendancy of his adversary. Far from seeking to take the offensive, he thought himself fortunate to

have been able to escape without disaster from a bad situation. We note with astonishment that the English admiral saw concentrations of forces in what was only the consequence of badly executed maneuvers. (P. 541).

... At the battle of Santiago, the Americans kept the men below decks informed of the incidents of the contest. That has been thought silly by some; but its effect, none the less, was to keep one at his station and to strengthen courage.

Discipline, self-esteem (especially among the French), the habit of winning, develop moral strength; but it is an inconstant that attaches itself to fortune and takes flight with her. (P. 542).

... Fatigue comes over the combatants; each feels his strength waning and the need of making an end is felt; each has enough of it.

At this critical moment, victory no longer depends upon deadly weapons; it is in the hands of an invisible weapon that will decide in favor of the one who knows how to keep it on his side; it is the will to conquer.

Battle, from its nature, exacts of man a superhuman effort that strains all the fibers of his organism; and this abnormal tension can only be produced and maintained by the hope of victory. As soon as that disappears, the reaction at once sets in, and the worn-out man gives up. If he had waited a minute more, his adversary would himself have reached the limit of his strength, for he is only sustained by the feeling that one last effort will secure for him the superiority.

And thus, most frequently, victory will rest with the one who forgets his own fatigues to think only of the adversary. "You are worn out with fatigue" said to us our professor of the military art at the Ecole Superieure; "the enemy is just as much so, and perhaps more". We sailors can say to ourselves; the ammunition is almost all gone; the ship is riddled with shot; but the enemy is no better off. (P. 542).

Battle is, above all, a reciprocal action, and however bad the situation may appear we have the right to think that it does not show itself to the adversary in any better light. The aspect of affairs would very often change if, instead of dwelling on our own evil condition, we sought to discover the ills from which the enemy was suffering. It is observed that the vanquished always attribute to the victor superhuman means, transcendent plans, while in reality he has no other superiority than that he exhibits more moral force. A battle is only definitely won from the moment when one of the adversaries manifests the intention of no longer continuing the struggle. Too frequently this resolution has been taken without giving enough weight to the state of exhaustion of the enemy, who thus finds himself victorious at the moment when he feared being beaten.

He who engages in battle with the fixed determination not to be the first to yield is already half victor.

... Therefore let us instill into our men the principle that they must hold fast, continue to hold, and never let go. Just as one nervous man (and not a coward) is enough, to make a whole company turn tail, so one cool man in a turret or at a torpedo tube will keep the rest at their stations. Even in the most serious situations, the man's self-respect always endures, provided there is some one to awaken it. (P. 543).

Beneath the inscription in letters of gold that adorns the fronts of our bridges, Honor and Country, there should be written in letters of bronze, It is the most stubborn who wins. (P. 543).

Victory is not taught, any more than genius is acquired by study. (P. 9).

Clausewitz defined strategy as the use of battle in war; tactics as the use of troops in battle.

For Jomini, strategy includes all that goes on in the theatre of war, while tactics is the art of fighting on a field of battle.

According to Moltke, strategy shows the best way leading to battle; it tells where and when one ought to fight. Tactics teaches how to use the different arms in fighting; it tells how one ought to fight.

General Bonnal summed up these different views in the following excellent definitions: Strategy is the art of conceiving; tactics is the science of executing.

Hanson: art of skillfully combining and co-ordinating the effects towards victory by battle, of all the forces, ... surface, subsurface, and air... which go to make up a modern battle fleet.

Adopting from now on language as concise and exact as possible, and remembering that in the main the etymology of the words expresses their sense, the word strategy henceforth will convey the idea of preparation for fighting. The word tactics that of the execution of the fighting. (P. 10-11).

Stratagema Dictionary:—grand or combined—includes the combined use of 3 arms, infantry, cavalry, artillery, to destroy the enemy, and constitute the whole courses of the high commander on the day of battle.

Use of weapons in combat:

Navy regulations apply to all naval movements and operations made after contact with the enemy forces. The term "contact" is here employed in a broad sense, meaning such proximity to the enemy as affects fleet formations and renders a battle imminent.

Have you been furnished with a list of requirements which must be satisfied? And going further: "Have you demanded it of the sole directing office, qualified to furnish it? If this has not been done, then the solution of the problem is bad, whatever may be the skill and ingenuity of your work as a specialist. (Pp. 16-17).

It is scarcely possible in the whole course of a campaign to repair errors made at its beginning, when the armies are being concentrated". (P. 22).

An important condition says Von der Goltz again, "is that the morale of the army be good", and also: "It is essential that the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the troops, shall have the firm will to conquer". (P. 25).

"He himself recognized that he owed success to his activity. When he was asked by what means he had been enabled to conquer Greece he replied—"By losing no time".

"Promptitude has a thousand advantages which pass over to our enemy if we waste time in sluggishness. The first impression is a great point in affairs of this kind, and that is always in favor of the one who attacks.... The strongest, in the common view, is he who makes war, not he who awaits it".

Nor was Alexander the only one convinced of the high military value of the offensive. The Persian general Memnon, deeming that it a truth which no one doubts that it is better to wage war in a foreign country than in one's own, had proposed to invade Macedonia. The plan was rejected, with what result one knows. (Pp. 27-28).

On the other hand, he knew too well the importance of a careful preparation of the soldiers to have sacrificed this indispensable gage of victory; the proof of this is found in the Commentaries, apropos of a battle with the Nervii. "In this difficult position there were two resources: the first was the experience and skill of the soldier who, instructed by previous engagements, knew as well what to do himself as if orders were given him,... Each lieutenant, without asking for orders from the general, himself took the best practical dispositions". (Pp. 35-36).

The aim of every war is to bring one's adversary to his knees completely and as quickly as possible: there is no more certain way of reaching this end than by destroying his principal forces. (P. 36).

One of the translators of Caesar's Commentaries has well defined his many remarkable qualities: "He had moreover all the qualities which go to make a good general: prudence, coolness, activity, boldness, a mind fertile in resources, a sure and clear sight which covered the general features of the vastest project and comprehended all its details, a wise restlessness which made him feel that he had done nothing so long as there remained anything to do, a courage to surmount all obstacles, great understanding of men, the art of making himself loved and respected by his soldiers.

It is opportune to here recall a word of Napoleon's of striking truth: "No great continuous actions" said he, "are the results of chance and fortune. Rarely are great men seen to fail in their enterprises.... Look at Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal... they always succeeded. Is it because, great men, they knew how to master fortune. When we study the causes of their success, we are astonished to find that they did everything to obtain it". (Pp. 36-37).

The great Emperor's method he himself described when he summarized it in the phrase, "To march ten hours a day, to fight and then to rest".

This brief formula really contains a whole system of strategy. In the first place it postulates the immutable principle of rapidity, accepted by all great leaders as an article of faith of the military gospel throughout all ages, and so well known as such that it is astonishing to see it again brought into discussion in our own times. In the second place, it sets forth with precision the idea that fighting is of primary importance and the principal objective.

He also might have said, as Alexander the Great did, that he won his battles by not losing time.

Though his armies were almost always inferior in number to those of his adversaries, still he constantly beat them by securing a numerical superiority at one point at a given moment. No one better than he has known how to show the exact meaning of superiority of military force. (P. 40).

Another of the great elements of strength in Napoleon's military power was his constant and judicious economy in the use of forces. The word economy must not be here taken in the sense of parsimony, for, quite to the contrary, he himself laid it down as an axiom "that the very last man ought to be expended, if needful, on the day of battle, because on the day after a complete success there are no more obstacles to surmount and public opinion by itself alone assures new victories to the conqueror". Economizing here signifies holding in reserve ready to make the decisive effort at the selected time and place.

"Have no lines at all, but keep all your troops united and grouped together around Genora, with your depots in Savona" he wrote to Massena at the beginning of the campaign of 1800, and he added: "Such are the true military principles; by acting thus you will beat fifty thousand men with thirty thousand and will cover yourself with an immortal glory". (P. 41).

"The force of an army", wrote he in his Memoirs, "like momentum in mechanics is the mass multiplied by the velocity". How unmistakably suggestive it is to observe the unanimity of great warriors in taking speed to be one of the essential means of action. (P. 42).

"Every war conducted according to the rules of the art is a systematic war, because every war ought to be conducted in conformity with the principles and rules of the art and to have an objective; it ought to be carried on with forces proportioned to the obstacles which are foreseen" said Napoleon; and again: "Alexander, scarcely more than a boy, with a handful of men conquers a large part of the world, but was this a mere onslaught on his part, a sort of rush? No, all is profoundly calculated, boldly executed, wisely conducted.

"Caesar conquered the Gauls and overthrew the laws of his native land; but were his great deeds of war the result of chance and mere luck?

"Will it be believed that Hannibal wove his career and so many great actions only to be the caprices of hazard, to the favor of fortune?

"All these great captains of ancient times, and those who later on have worthily followed in their steps, only did great things by conforming to the rules and natural principles of the art; that is to say, by the correctness of their combinations and the logical relation of means to ends, of efforts to obstacle; they only succeeded by obeying correct principles, whatever may have been the audacity of their enterprises and the extent of their successes. They never failed to treat war as a true science. It is in virtue of this alone that they are great models, and it is only by imitating them that we can hope to rival them". (P. 43-44).

Clausewitz has defined Napoleon's method of war in the terms "To begin by striking hard, to take advantage of the successes to strike again, to always and unceasingly stake all he has on a single card till the bank breaks; such was Bonaparte's way and it is precisely to this correct conception of war that he owes his incredible triumphs. (P. 44).

A navy cannot be improvised; the mere habituation to the abnormal medium in which it moves, the struggle against the fierce elements, which singularly complicates that against men themselves, demand a special and lengthy education of those who compose it. And this is still more true now when more complicated ships, filled with machinery, have pressing need of a trained personnel. (P. 52).

"I really do not know what sort of precaution England can take to shelter herself from the terrible risk she is in. A nation is very foolish when she has no fortifications and no army, to expose herself to the chance of having an army of one hundred thousand picked men and veterans descend upon her. That is what the flotilla is really for; it costs money, but it is only necessary to be master of the sea for six hours that England may cease to live". (P. 53).

As Tourville himself said: "I beg you to believe that none wishes more than I to accomplish something, but my professional knowledge has compelled me to take precautions, and I have always noticed that officers who in Paris arranged the finest enterprises in the world became of quite a different opinion when here".

The restrictions placed upon the military operations of great leaders by too strict instructions, most often formulated without knowledge of technical, or fortuitous necessities, have never led so far as I know, to fortunate results. The history of the wars of all times and all countries furnishes, on the contrary, numerous examples of the unhappy part played in final failure by the untimely interference of the controlling powers in the operations in the field. (P. 63).

It must not be forgotten, in fact, that this same man had taught, better than anyone else, to a conquered world, that the best of all defences for a nation was the vigorous attack of victorious armies.

Later, on the rock of Saint Helena, reviewing his whole life and pondering the lessons of experience, he had had on the contrary the clear vision of the great primary role which freedom of the seas plays in naval operations; he had thus understood that on the sea, as well as on land, the protection of acting forces is the best of all, and that on this point there is real unity of military concept.

It was not during a few hours that it would have been necessary to be master of the sea, nor even during a few weeks; it was necessary to conquer this command of the sea definitely by the energetic action of a powerful fleet, superior in moral and material force to that of England. This result accomplished would have made any landing in England useless, for the government of that country would have humbly sued for peace.

It is altogether interesting to observe, in ending, that Napoleon, great admirer of Hannibal, imbued with

the military ideas of the Carthaginian general, was like him to succumb from lack of naval forces, and to lose the empire of the world because he had lost that of the sea.

Waterloo was by the coup de grace; Trafalgar was really the mortal wound. (P. 54).

Thus, from the very beginning of his career as a military commander, his conception of war appears clearly and can be summed up in a brief formula: to consider the fleets of the enemy as the principal force which must be destroyed and reduced to impotence in order the more surely to accomplish the object of the war.

It is true then that Suffren had the making of an incomparable tactician, because he felt the necessity of revolutionizing maneuvers which were too much regulated, too confined, but it is also exact to say that he was not complete as a tactician, whereas he will always be a model, without blemish, in the matter of strategy. He did not take enough care to make them understand his plans before battle. That alone explains the persistence with which those captains held back from full cooperation with him in all his battles, without exception, and thus compromised his success. (Pp. 66-68).

Activity was also Nelson's chief characteristic: "Time is our best ally, and I hope we shall not soon give her up, as all our allies have given us up. Time is everything, five minutes makes the difference between victory and defeat".

In the strict blockade of Toulon and the coast of Provence, maintained through stress of weather, he already points out to us a lesson by which we can profit even now. Men and officers inured to hardships, ready for all the trials of the most difficult seafaring, must be trained at sea, in conflict with its thousand changing phases, and nowhere else. Villeneuve's men, relaxed by too long a stay in the harbor of Toulon, were no match for Nelson.

Note this well, for in the game of war no cards are negligible.

The French fleet, having effected a first sortie, is obliged to return to port, partially disabled and much tried by a violent storm which Nelson had sustained in the excellent state which the sea habit alone can give. (P.72).

The first plan is a veritable discourse on tactics, for it would be difficult to express more fundamental ideas in fewer phrases. Everything is to be found there; in the war of theory, conviction of the necessity of forcing the enemy to fight, full and entire confidence in his subordinates, admirals and captains, based upon their complete understanding of the chief's plans, worthlessness of signals during battle, exposition of the principle of simplicity of methods in war. In what concerns execution, endeavor to crush a part of the enemy's line by passing through it; finally putting the finishing touch to victory by chasing the routed ships.

This enumeration would be incomplete, were it not added that Nelson declared, once more, that war cannot be made without running risks, nor battle engaged without expectation of injuries, and that he reminded all of the profit to be derived from a strict mutual dependence, all having a common aim. Having taken care to develop these sentiments in his subordinates, he could afford to announce that signals were useless. Not one of his principles has become obsolete; they are eternal as the changeless truth. (P. 76).

The second plan of combat is better known than the first and has become famous under the name of Nelson's Memorandum; it is the one which was devised before Trafalgar; much may be learned from it: "Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into a line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command) that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail, on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct.

"The second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed".

"If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advance squadron can fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I should therefore probably make the second in command's signal to lead through about their twelfth ship from their rear (or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my line would lead through about their center, and the advance squadron to cut two or three or four ships ahead of their center, so as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture.

The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two or three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the center, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be untouched it must be some time before they could perform a maneuver to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships, which indeed would be impossible without mixing with the ships engaged. The enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of forty-six sail of the line. British fleet

of forty. If either is less, only proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off; British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off.

"Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others. Shot will carry away the mast and yards of friends as well as foes, but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succeed their rear, and then that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line or to pursue them should they endeavor to make off.

"If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wears, the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled British ships and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

"The second in command will in all possible things direct the movements of his line by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point. But, in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.

"Of the intended attack from to windward, the enemy, in line of battle ready to receive an attack:

"The divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be made for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line, and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the enemy's rear. Some ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends, and if any are thrown around the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.

"Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large still the twelve ships composing, in the first position, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed from the commander-in-chief which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of lee ships, after the intentions of the commander-in-chief (are) signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line.

*The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavor to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as is possible". (Pp. 77-78).

The worth of this document justifies its exceptional celebrity. The order of sailing will be the order of battle; it is with this admirable statement of principle that this incomparable seaman begins his instructions. It shows in the fewest possible words that it would be the most dangerous of illusions to believe it practicable to perform on the very field of battle, face to face with the enemy, this or that complicated maneuver. From the moment that there appears any chance of an impending encounter, a naval force ought to take formation ready at any instant to open fire. In commenting on this exposition of principles, we cannot help thinking of the latest fact in universal naval history, of the battle of Tsushima, where the Russians were overwhelmed, principally because they were surprised in a cruising formation which bore no resemblance to a judicious battle formation.

The memorandum specifies, still more than the first plan, a tactics based upon the attack of a portion of the hostile fleet by the whole weight of the naval force. Thus it sets forth with remarkable clearness the principle of the superiority of forces, and of relative superiority, at one or several points of the field of battle. (Pp. 78-79).

The Memorandum further accentuates the principals of mutual confidence and self trust in battle, without which there could not be any decisive action; that which he accorded to his second in command, Collingwood, honors the latter as much as the chief himself. It was the very sign of Nelson's sagacity; a commander-in-chief cannot have confidence in his subordinates when he has not confidence in himself. Another truth of all times and of all countries. There is the same conviction of the uselessness of signals once the action has begun. If a captain is under fire, he is at his station. This is worth remembering and meditating upon. (Pp. 79-80).

At the beginning of this war the belligerents appeared in very unlike war conditions. The superiority in material, ships and guns, as well as in numbers, undoubtedly belonged to Italy, which had spared no sacrifice to prepare a strong navy; but she too, like so many others, had forgotten that strength resides not in excellence of weapons alone but in the training and quality of the personnel called upon to use them; in short that military power is not made wholly of physical force, but equally includes a moral force; perhaps the more important of the two, since it alone can overcome the inertia of the first and inspire it.

And it is quite thus that Tegethoff, the Austrian admiral, understood the matter when he pronounced those famous words: "If you have no cannon, still give me ships, I will do the best I can with them." Like good workmen, he would not blame his tools. (Pp. 88-89).

With equal preparation on both sides, and above all equal morale, she must succumb to the superiority of material force, and as battle cannot be indefinitely escaped or refused, the day will come when, forced to fight, she will finally perish.

To conquer nations, as with individuals, the heart must be struck at. (Pp. 95-98).

In a striking contrast to this is what will happen ten years later in the same theater. We shall not find then, at the head of the Japanese fleets, admirals of such exceptional worth as to deserve immortality, but on the other hand we shall see a staff already conscious of the impossibility of military improvisation, knowing what it wishes and with a firm will to attain to it, having prepared a plan of operations in conformity with sane principles and carrying it out to the end without weakness. We had "the man" but we neglected preparations for war, as well as war itself; in the contest between China and Japan, the conquerers did not have "the man" but they knew how to prepare methodically for war and to carry on war.

This was an experimental proof that the system to which Von der Moltke owed his successes in 1870 is as excellent on the sea as on shore.

A General-in-chief is not relieved of responsibility by an order from a minister or a prince far from the field of operations and knowing badly or not knowing at all the last state of affairs: (1) Every general-in-chief who undertakes to execute a plan which he thinks bad or injurious is criminal; he ought to make representations, to insist upon a change, finally to resign rather than be the instrument of the ruin of his own people; (2) Every general-in-chief who, in consequence of orders from a superior, delivers battle with a certainty of losing it, is equally criminal; (3) A general-in-chief is the first officer of the military hierarchy. The minister, the prince gives directions to which he must conform in his soul and conscience; but those directions are never military orders and do not exact a blind obedience. (4) Even a military order is to be blindly obeyed only when it is given by a superior who, being on the spot at the moment of giving it, knows the state of affairs. (Pp. 101-102).

"Give me good statesmanship, and I will give you sound finance" said Baron Louis. It would be equally true to say: "Give me good statesmanship, and I will give you adequate military forces". The bond between the one and the other is indissoluble; the example of Spain is the proof to be pondered by many other nations. (P. 113).

That unhappy admiral knew not Bulow's fine saying: "One is never whipped so long as he refuses to believe that he is". (P. 114).

"Exclusiveness of purpose is the secret of great successes and of great operations". (P. 131).

To found colonies, and to sow in them with liberal hand the riches which enhance their value, without developing at the same time the means of protecting them for the covetous, is to play the part of dupe and to work for others. (P. 143).

While invasion of England by French forces has been an exceptional event in the course of naval history the deccents of the English upon the soil of France have been extremely numerous. In one case, as in the other, these operations of invasion have always been carried on by that one of the two nations whose fleets were in command of the sea. (P. 144).

In our own days, if Great Britian can continue to regard as a useless luxury the organization of an army whose function it would be to safeguard her territory, it is because she has full consciousness that her formidable fleet constitutes for her the most invulnerable of protections. Quite recently indeed, the prime minister, replying to a question in the House of Commons, rejected as a quite impossible hypothesis the invasion of England, so long as the English naval forces dominated the sea. (P. 145).

If to govern is to foresee, it is therefore quite exact to say that the Empire of the Tsars was badly governed, since it did not comprehend that the constitution of a powerful fleet, which, in the ten years respite at its disposal, it could easily have formed of eighteen fighting units of the first class would have been a great economy. This imposing and homogeneous force would have sufficed to calm all the belligerent ardor of Japan, and would thus have prevented the mad squandering of money and of human lives which the war entailed.

Nothing can be improvised in war, today less than ever, and proper preparation for it takes a long time.

"No colonies without a navy" said Napoleon on the occasion of the cession of Louisiana. (Pp. 146-148).

These torpedo boats, it is said, visibly scattered over the surface of the sea buoys, kegs and other things which could from a distance be taken for mines. The morale of the Russians evidently could not stand against this terrifying appearance. (P. 170).

When you wish to fight a battle assemble all your forces, do not neglect any, one battalion sometimes decided the fate of a day. (P. 177).

It certainly cannot be a mere coincidence that we always find identical principles underlying the ways of acting of all the great captains; for that reason alone we already have the right to believe that their successes have been due precisely to their agreement in the application of these principles. (P. 196).

We have seen, in the course of the preceding chapters, what idea Duquesne, Tourville, Suffen and Nelson, to speak only of the most famous, had of war. Their conceptions in this regard can be condensed in the classic for-

mula, "To seek the enemy, to come up with him and to beat him with superior forces" and this sums up very well, in fact, the true conception of war. (P. 197).

When we speak of force, we mean relative force; that is to say, the superiority of military power at a fixed point or under certain favorable conditions. (P. 198).

The aim of strategy is to obtain this superiority at a point of the theater of war, that of tactics to have it at a point of the field of battle.

And why is his superiority of forces so much sought after? Solely because at all epochs it has furnished the most certain, as well as the most rapid, solution of all wars by the destruction of the weaker military power. (P. 199).

It goes without saying, in fact, that a nation which has no armed force left at its disposal is a nation at the mercy of the conqueror, since it no longer has any means of holding him in check. (P. 200).

D'Estaing, de Grasse, Grueys, and Villeneuve were beaten because they fought only when forced to; Rodjes vensky tasted defeat because he had to be dragged to battle. The sortie of August 10 from Port Arthur was a pitiable failure likewise because, even before they set out the staff officers of the Russian ships were resolved not to fight.

Suffren, Nelson and Togo were victorious because, on the contrary, they wished, sought for and prepared for battle. The same causes have produced the same effects. (P. 202).

In his *Esprit des Loix*, Montesquieu says "The nature of defensive warfare is discouraging, it gives to the enemy the advantage of the courage and energy of the attack; it would be better to risk something by an offensive war than to depress minds by keeping them in suspense".

"Fortunate the soldier" says Von der Goltz, "to whom destiny assigns the role of assailant". And he adds: "To make war is to attack". (P. 203).

The offensive method demands before all else one primary quality-activity; that which Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, Napoleon, Suffren and Nelson possessed to the highest degree. It demands great force of character on the part of the chief, with a tenacious will controlled by a great intelligence. (P. 205).

In a fine flight of eloquence in advocacy of speed, this orator reminded his hearers very justly that the French nation owed its most beautiful memories of military glory to speed; but he forgot to limit his argument to the fact that when, in the immortal campaign of Italy for example, Napoleon made such a wonderful use of it, it was to surprise the enemy and attack him, and that wherever speed has assured success it is only by conducting to battle. (P. 207).

After centuries, this time again, the same causes produce the same effects. When the German Emperor pronounced that celebrated phrase: "The future is upon the sea" he showed that he had a clear conception of the principles of war, and that a nation could not pretend to secure a world-wide economic empire if it was not prepared, with the industrial and peaceful mastery of commercial fleets, to impose by force the mastery of military fleets. (P. 209).

In this connection, the words of Admiral Jurien de la Graviere cannot be too much pondered: "If the names of some of our admirals are today so sadly associated with the memory of our disasters, the fault, let us be sure, is not at all wholly theirs. Rather must the character of the operations in which they were engaged be accused, and that system of defensive warfare which Pitt declared, in Parliament, to be precursor of inevitable ruin. This system, when we wished to renounce it, had already become habitual to us; it had weakened our arms and paralyzed our confidence. Too often our squadron left our ports with a special mission to fulfill and the intention of avoiding the enemy; to meet him was already, on adverse stroke. It was thus that our ships presented themselves to battle; they underwent it instead of imposing it.

"For a long time this restricted and timid warfare, this defensive warfare, could be kept thanks to the circumspection of the English admirals and the traditions of the old tactics. It was with these traditions that Aboukir broke; the time of decisive battles had come". (Pp. 218-19).

To maintain formidable forces, to discern the vulnerable point of the adversary, to carry there rapidly the maximum possible effort to obtain at that point superiority, such is the role of strategy and, consequently, of the General Staff.

To watch closely the opposing forces of the adversary, to compel him to battle, to discover the weak points in his formation, and to bring the whole of one's own forces to bear upon that point, that is the rule of the tactician, that is to say, of the commander-in-chief. (P. 222).

A single object ought to guide them—battle; and it is for that reason also that during the period of search

for the enemy everything ought to be planned as if that battle might take place at any instant. This implies that "in order of cruising is to be the order of battle".

Finally, as a consequence of the requirements above set forth, once battle is engaged, signals become useless: "Honor to whomsoever does the best".

"The Admiral-in-Chief ought as much as possible", says Admiral Bouet-Villaumez, "foresee before the battle the maneuvers to be made; and once fire is opened, the captains ought to be so, much under the influence of their admiral's methods of attack and his intentions that signals cease then to be necessary for their guidance".

"Who risks not, gains not" says an old proverb.

On September 14, 1804 Napoleon wrote: "All the over-sea expeditions which have been undertaken since I am at the head of the government have failed, because the admirals saw double and found, I know not where, that war can be made without running any risks".

Suffren and Nelson, in their correspondence, have also made known to us their ideas on this subject; they are worth meditating upon. That is why I do not think I can better conclude all that precedes than by recalling one of Nelson's professions of faith which I have already quoted: "I should very soon either do much, or be ruined. My disposition cannot bear tame and slow measures" wrote the most illustrious of English admirals, after the battle of March 14, 1795, against Admiral Martin's fleet. These words contain a whole program. (P. 223).

I wish no better proof than the following words, taken from an essay of 1898 by Commander Ballard, crowned by the Royal United Service Institution, on the protection of English commerce in time of war: "Those who have thought on the matter at all will probably agree that the necessary basis of any protection whatever must be a sufficient superiority in battleships on our part to destroy, capture or blockade in their own ports the main squadron's of the enemy as in former wars, which in itself would constitute the chief source of safety to our shipping, and without which it would be idle to talk of commerce existing at all... unless (the destruction or blockade of the enemy's squadrons be) successfully effected, it would be useless to attempt anything else.

"It obviously follows, however, that the more thoroughly their duty of watching the enemy is performed, the greater this protection will be; indeed, the opinion is apparently held in some quarters that this is all that is required". (Pp. 248-249).

Another thought is worthy of our consideration; if so many illustrious warriors, if so many famous military writers, for a century past and still in our time, have felt obliged to continue to express certain ideas under forms scarcely different one from the other, it cannot be for the vain satisfaction of reproducing them. If they have not feared to keep on repeating them it is because they had the profound conviction that these truths demand more than a passing and as it were complaisant acceptance, and that they ought definitely to establish themselves in minds with the irresistible force of dogmas. (P. 250).

"A nation must have the fleet which corresponds to its policy". (P. 255).

The attentive study of that past is in fact singularly suggestive, and marvelously illumines the motives of British policy. Finding there the evidence of many other ententes cordiales, we are naturally led to accord to one of 1905 the exact value which it ought to have, that of an accidental agreement which will last, like the preceding ones, as long as the economic development of France does not give offense to her powerful neighbor. (P.257).

The first phase of England's long struggle for the conquest of maritime empire had for objective the destruction of the till then uncontested naval supremacy of Spain. That nation, then the first in Europe, assumed to forbid English commerce to take its share of the incalculable riches with which she herself loaded her galleons. The rights which she invoked to support her claim to the monopoly were weak indeed, unless supported by the most powerful of all; that which might gives. What truly could a solemn Bull of the Pope count in the eyes of a bold and enterprising people, having the blood of the Normans, and already conscious of its vocation as well as of its strength? It was necessary, as in the time of the Punic wars, that one of the two maritime powers should make way for the other, since the world was not vast enough to satisfy them both. (P. 258).

We already have clear grasp on the idea of the primary importance of preparation for war. The intoxication of riches acquired without reckoning, the indolence which comes from their too long enjoyment, the careless peace of mind derived from a monopoly so long uncontested, had made Spain forget that a formidable force alone is capable of restraining dangerous desires. (P. 259).

Raleigh expresses himself on this subject with perfect clearness:

"If the late queen would have believed her man of war, as she did her scribes, we had in her time beaten that great empire in pieces and made their kings kings of figs and oranges, as in old times". (P. 259).

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the following year they came to blows; but it is particularly curious

to note that, hardly a few months before the promulgation of the "Navigation Act", the two naval powers had drawn up a plan of union which came to nothing, but which suffices to show that agreements between nations are very precarious, if they are not based upon great social interests. In reality, this manifestation of hostility only emphasized the smothered rivalry existing from the beginning of the century between England and Holland. (P. 261).

A coalition of identical general interests rather than a national unity, the government of the Low Countries could with difficulty understand that the preparation of a powerful war fleet was not an unnecessary expenditure abstracted from commercial wealth. They haggled over the expenses of arming and getting ready ships of war, and deserved Reuter's threat to take the sea no more if the number as well as the strength of ships was not increased.

Such doings are common to all periods, and that is why they should be remembered. Very few people even in our times are capable of assimilating this fundamental idea, that only the powerful are respected and can enjoy their possessions in peace; that consequently, it is indispensable to be strong. But, to be strong, it is necessary to know how to expand properly the premium of insurance against the risks of war, and that premium is nothing else but good preparation; it is a wise economy. Very small would have been the expense of construction and maintenance, for Spain first, then for Holland, of fleets of sufficient strength to intimidate England and cut off at their roots her aggressive inclinations, when compared with the immense losses sustained by those two nations in their loss of maritime supremacy. (P. 262).

The 16th century, then the 17th, were two successive stages in the continuous enhancement of the maritime power of England, characterized, the first by the weakening of Spain, the second by the defeat of Holland. With the end of the 17th century and the 18th century, the turn of another nation, France, was to come. (Pp. 262-263).

Under the reign of Charles II, so obstinately favorable to the maintenance of good relations with Louis XIV, the dawning development of the French navy began to excite the English suspicions; that monarch himself expressed them in a letter to the King of France, quoted by Mahan: "There are two impediments to a perfect understanding. The first is the great effort that France is now making to create a commerce and become a powerful maritime empire. This is so greatly suspicious to us, who are only important through our commerce and our naval forces, that every step that France takes in that direction will perpetuate the jealousy between the two nations". (P. 264).

This memorable war definitely opens a period of almost continual conflicts between the two nations a period which covers the 18th century and only ends in 1815, with the final crushing of France's pretensions to maritime supremacy. All these conflicts were really the effects of a single cause: the opposition of Great Britain to the economic, commercial and colonial development of her rival. (P. 266).

In proportion as this dominion takes on greater proportions and extends its immense net over all the seas of the world its security will require points of reinforcement where the meshes of this net will find themselves strengthened; and it is thus that little by little the English policy will sow over the whole face of the earth the bases of operations and advanced bases which, at least as much as her squadrons, and because without them those squadrons would have but a precarious strength, will be the principal elements of the British power. (P. 266).

We find this statement in the celebrated Memoires of Saint-Simon: "There is no counterweight to the naval power of England, whose ships cover every sea. Holland, while inwardly lamenting it, dares not show her feelings. Spain will not be able for a long time to recover from the fatal assistance that we have lent to England in ruining her navy and crippling her commerce and her establishments in the Indies; and France would need thirty years of peace, and of the wisest government, to bring her navy back to the point where Colbert and Seignelay left it". (P. 267).

And it is Pitt who, faithful guardian of the tradition bequeathed by the statesmen of the British Empire, condemned in the following terms a new truce granted to France in that merciless strife. "France is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us above all through the injury to her which results from it. You leave to France the possibility of reviving her navy". (P. 268).

On October 21, 1805, Nelson consummated the defeat of the French fleet and closed, to the profit of his country, the third chapter of the magnificent work of building up the English power began under Elizabeth. (P. 269).

Much might still be said about the period which comprises the greater part of the 19th century, altho it furnishes us with no example of great naval wars comparable to those of the preceding centuries. It affords on the contrary the spectacle of a great apparent cordiality of relations between France and England, which leads them to seal the two ententes cordiales of 1843 and 1856, and even to fight as allies for the same cause against Russia in 1854; it also reminds us that before 1870 the trend of opinion at the Imperial court was openly towards the entente cordiale. (P. 269).

It is easy to conceive that the disproportion existing between the possession of a fever-stricken waste of land and a war as formidable as that with which we were threatened does not permit regarding the former as the cause of the latter. The premonitions of this crisis could have their source only in a deep-seated organic trouble. To explain it, all the symptoms of an uneasy feeling between the two nations must be brought together and considered as a whole. (P. 271).

The national prosperity of that people is built upon an indefinite extension of commerce, free markets and naval supremacy, the third of which is the guarantee of the first two.

By destroying the French fleet, the most powerful after her own, she would make sure of her domination over other navies for many years. By taking from France her colonial empire, and notably Burmah and Siam, she would give new and immense outlets to her commerce. Finally, and above all, she would yield to her economic destiny, which inexorably compels her to crush her rivals, in order not to be absorbed by them.

Less than seven years after a storm so violent that one of the most authoritative organs of the English press declared that "conflict between the two great powers was inevitable sooner or later", Lamourette, kisses are being exchanged, and there is no longer question of anything but peace and concord. These who, in this "entente cordiale," see anything but a momentary expedient, intended to make head against head against more imminent dangers, have not studied the causes and the necessities of English power. (Pp. 273-274).

This peril is so much the more serious because the new adversaries do not seem likely to commit the same errors which formerly cost to Spain, to Holland and to France their finest colonies and their influence in the world. They know that to be lasting economic prosperity must of necessity be based on force, in order to impose respect, and they are working to obtain that result. (P. 275).

And better still to explain his thought, the same writer adds: "If Russia had in the Far East, two years ago, a few big battleships and a number of armored cruisers, she would still possess Port Arthur, Manchuria and Korea. Japan could not have thought of making war upon her. Nowhere have delays more effect, nowhere do they cost more dear than in what concerns the fleet. No longer like the Romans can we build a fleet in three months; we need for that a continuous effort during twenty years, without losing sight of the object, and that is exactly why we have no time to lose." (Pp. 275-276).

And in this England follows logically the unchangeable principle of her policy. In the stubborn onward march, with eyes constantly fixed upon her single aim, economic greatness, she takes inspiration from the watchword set by Shaftesbury: "Carthage must be destroyed," and for her Carthage has been successively Spain, Holland, France; to-day her name in Germany and perhaps to-morrow she will again be called France or very likely the United States or Japan. Necessarily pledged to violence to preserve the maritime power which is the nourishment indispensable to her life, she will see a new Carthage in every nation which seeks to acquire a portion of the empire of the seas.

This manner of looking at things is so little exaggerated that, on November 9, 1905, in an address delivered at the Lord Mayor's banquet, Mr. the Prime Minister, said in exact terms: "I believe that in future we shall not see war, unless we can conceive that either a nation or a ruler will arise who cannot carry out their scheme of national aggrandizement except by trampling on the rights of their neighbor." (P. 276).

Certain publicists, it is true, and not amongst the least, on account of the positions which they have occupied, have many times argued and even lately declared that, in the field of naval warfare, a contest with Great Britain was impossible. I will not discuss this incorrect statement, and moreover one insulting to a great nation, rich as is ours in a glorious past. No contest is impossible, except to nations who give up in despair, and such nations are ripe for slavery. (P. 277).

The tearing away of Alsace and Lorraine from the mother country by violence has dug so deep a pit between Germany and France that nothing will be able to fill it up. And, as though this operation in the living flesh was not enough, it was aggravated by the Draconian stipulations of the treaty of Frankfort extorted with knife to throat, and which place our country in a real condition of economic slavery. This rigor of the harsh law of the conqueror would by itself alone justify the revolt of a free people.

Therefore it is not, as beyond the Rhine they are too much pleased to say, because our hostility is ineradicable that it is our imperious duty to foresee war with Germany, nor is it because we were beaten but it is because our defeat was consummated with a useless refinement of cruelty of which the acute memory cannot be effaced by time. The wound is always open and cannot heal.

I say useless cruelty, because the higher objective fixed two centuries ago by the Elector of Brandenburg was attained without that. That Germany committed a grave error in exacting the ransom of a portion of French territory, I for my part am absolutely convinced, for it has rendered forever impossible a reconciliation between the two nations, and in spite of an apparent forgetfulness, this thoughtless keeps up in French hearts the small but never extinguished flame of hope. (Pp. 279-280).

The economic conditions of Germany have undergone profound transformations in the past thirty-five years. The trend of her people has changed; from agricultural it has become industrial and commercial. The modern Carthage, she has obeyed with extraordinary enthusiasm the watchword of her Emperor, who has said to her "The future is on the sea", and she lives, especially today, upon the ocean. But also for her, as of old for the daughter of Tyre, "danger is on the sea." The unprecedented impulse of her economic prosperity necessarily draws her towards the granite rock of the British power; she may well be dashed to pieces upon it. (P. 280).

It is for reasons of a general nature that that enterprising people should be watched, and that preparation for war against them should be seriously faced. They also, obeying the excitations of their leaders, cherish I know not what Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, imagining an empire of the yellow world under the domination of a "Great Japan." Everything urges them towards this dream of glory; pride in their extravagant success; their limitless ambition; their race hatred against Europeans; the desire to free from servitude their yellow brothers; their unlimited increase of population; the surpluse of which overflows their sea from insular character imposes upon them necessities similar to those of England, and also the same desires and the same vocation. (P. 286).

Finally, one single thing is not permissible, and that is the policy of bandaged eyes and ears, which perceives the storm only when it breaks and when it is too late. (P. 287).

I repeat it once more, because the subject is too serious not to permit reiteration—it is by a never ceasing collaboration of politics and of purely military strategy that one prepares himself for war. Is it not also the former which arranges the alliance whose conclusion has a direct effect on military strength? At each page, so to speak, of maritime history, we meet examples of these alliances, between England and France, between England and Holland, between France and Spain...; but these alliances, putting in play military forces whose relative displacement exercises an immense influence in the final balance, concern military strategy primarily. General strategy is made of their aggregate. (P. 287).

Whether we consider England, Germany, the United States or Japan, we see nations knowing admirably what they want and wanting that strongly. And to attain to it, they utilize the two most powerful factors of strategy, continuity of effort and national energy. (P. 288).

If we but glance at the past, many memories will come thronging upon us. Spain, Holland and France successively lost the empire of the seas because they had not prepared for war. England conquered France in 1805 through the genius of Nelson and the excellence of her fleets, but she also benefited largely by the naval improvidence of her adversary and the lack of training of his squadrons.

Italy was beaten at Lissa because she thought that an assemblage of materially powerful ships was enough to insure naval victory; she forgot that a fleet without a leader, without instructed and trained crews, is but a body without a soul.

Spain lost Cuba from having adopted the stupid policy of the ostrich, that hides its head under the pebbles so as not to see the danger; the lamentable Odyssey of Cervera is not of those that can be forgotten.

Finally, the overthrow of the power of Russia in the Far East was due to her not having for a moment anticipated that another nation which, for its part, had long been preparing, would one day stand up against her. (P. 289).

The Gun-Battle ought to be the objective of every war; but, to fight, weapons are necessary, and it follows that the study of the weapons best suited to the struggle which it is proposed to sustain is the most urgent of prerequisites. Among the various weapons that can be imagined, there is one to which the very human wish to crush one's adversary the soonest and the furthest possible has long ago assured the first place. (P. 292).

When a manufacturer, in fact, wishes to beat a competitor he does not limit himself to seeking an improvement which would put himself simply on an equality; he endeavors to study the methods of this colleague, and the trend of his ideas, in order to realize before him an undoubted betterment. In war the method is the same. (P. 293).

Look closely at the conditions under which those men work, each is exerting himself individually, but the fatal discord, of wills produces the disaccord of forces which mutually interfere, and the resultant is nil. Suddenly the boatswain's pipe sounds and the scene changes; its modulations as they rise and fall mark time for the elementary efforts, which become synchronous and multiply their actions. The boat is hoisted.

I ask nothing but this for preparation for war; it is necessary that everybody obey the pipe of the boatswain, who in this case is the directing body of the General Staff. To realize what is the devout wish of all, the "greatest navy", an outward discipline that is often a mere mask is not enough, there is needed above all the discipline of thought which is the ideal that the establishment of the Naval War College was precisely intended to bring about. (P. 305).

Squadrons can only be successfully trained by a methodical graduation of exercises, impossible to realize without the continuity of convictions that a central directing body alone possesses. This is so well understood in all the thriving navies that the program of squadron exercises is drawn up by the General Staff, or that the progression of the instruction, beginning with that of each ship, then continuing with that of the divisions forming the elementary grouping, next with the squadrons, and finally concluding with the annual grand maneuvers. It has been too often forgotten, in France, that the full benefit can only be derived from an assembly itself, its individual initiation. The assemblage of units can give only bad results, if the ships have not freedom to work alone as often as possible. (P. 305).

The preparation of plans of war is the master key of preparation for war; it is also its skeleton upon which all the matters precedingly enumerated are successively built up.

It is only reasonable to believe that a planned campaign will result better than one in which decisions are reached under the spur of events. We know, moreover, what military chiefs and writers thought of it, and will say with Napoleon; "Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well arranged plan". (P. 311).

On June 5, 1905, the English Admiral Lord Charles Beresford wrote the following lines which I submit to the meditations of all: "I hope that a plan will be arranged for the meeting at sea of the British and American Fleets with a view of joint maneuvers. Such an experience would be of immense interest for the two navies, no less than for the two nations, and possibly the world would pay great attention to such a phenomenon." (P. 314).

It is enough to observe, as evidenced by recent occurrences, the suddenness with which modern wars break out to feel with what care all the stages of this mobilization, as regards material as well as personnel, require to be settled during peace time, so that, at the first signal, the units in reserve may be armed without damage or shock, with the maximum of activity in the minimum of time. It is easily understood that the unexpected cannot play any part in this operation; and, in fact, naval mobilization is one of the most delicate tasks, if not the most delicate, of preparation for war. (P. 317).

Preparation for war has further in its province the study, in concert with the military authority, of combined operations. The transportation by sea of an expeditionary force and its disembarkation on a hostile shore, particularly if an important army is concerned, have always been very difficult undertakings which under no conditions lend themselves to improvisation. The navy play in them the important part, first through the preliminary task that it ought to fulfill of suppressing the adverse naval forces and assuring freedom of the sea, then through its responsibility of guaranteeing the expedition against dangers of the sea, of getting ready to land the troops with their material, and finally of maintaining the permanent connection of the army with the bases of operations beyond the sea. (P. 318).

The two General Staffs, army and navy, should in advance, and with calm reflection, examine and solve all the points of this immense problem; designation of the objectives, evaluation of the military forces necessary to secure at a given point the desired military effect, determination of the number and the size of transports, packets or freighters that are to serve to carry the expeditionary army, choice of the points of assembly of the troops for embarkation and of the port of concentration where the convoy is to form, discussion of the point or points favorable for disembarkation and choice between them, orders of sailing and of convoy, reconnaissance and clearing of the landing places by the naval forces, preparation of the special material for the disembarkation, orders for that disembarkation, etc., I could add more, and more important things. (Pp. 318-319).

This magnificent work, that I have necessarily had to present bit by bit, appears so much the vaster as its details are brought out, it cannot therefore be the work of a day; it requires the devotion of a man's whole life, and the efforts of all together are not too much to bring it to a good conclusion.

The task, already so heavy, is complicated by a financial problem conjoined with the technical problem. In short, war must always be prepared for with limited resources; strategy finds its true justification in the search for success with restricted means. (P. 319).

More exactly it has already begun, since it is not at the moment when the battle opens that the chief ought first to exhibit his personal influence. In the preparatory exercises of peace times he should have endeavored to instil into the very souls of all his subordinates the most active element, of moral force, confidence, by his personal action, by his professional ability, above all by his character and finally by his activity, he should have inspired the hearts of all with the certainty of victory. Finally he should have made his military plan known sufficiently for his subordinates, on the field of action, to be inspired by it, and to all act together to a common end. All this is still preparation for war. (P. 320).

That is not yet all. From the top to the bottom of the military hierarchy, among the officers as well as among the men, each in his own sphere ought to be fully conscious of the greatness of his responsibility. Of all moral forces the most effective in war comes from the turning of all individual wills towards a common ideal of national glory and beauty. (P. 320).

The Latin proverb is truer now than ever before! Only strong nations are assured of peace. (P. 322).

Daveluy—Genius Naval Warfare.

When the War of American Independence broke out, the two opposing navies had very nearly identical tactical methods; but the spirit that, in each of them, animated the officers was completely different. The English, emboldened by the successes of the Seven Years War, sought the offensive, the French, on the contrary, still under the influence of their disasters, limited their desires and used all their skill to defeat the attempts of an enterprising enemy.

After ten years of peace, the two navies found themselves again in conflict. In this short interval of time the situations had profoundly altered; on one side, a personnel eager for glory, formed in the school of war, hardened by long cruises; on the other, a material in mad condition, undisciplined crews, captains in whom a certificate of citizenship took the place of knowledge. The issue of the struggle could not be doubtful; the battles of the 13th Prairial and Cape Saint Vincent threw a last luster upon the traditional tactics. (Pp. 459-460).

Its starting point was false; for, when one fights, one ought to think of attacking before seeking to defend one's self; and one ought only to defend one's self to an extent that permits the defensive to second the offensive.

When the attack was awaited to leeward, the employment of the artillery was dependent upon the will of the enemy, who had come and put himself in the field of fire of the guns.

Indecisive battles are fruitless. Historians furnish us with the proof of this when they enter upon long discussions to determine which was the victor; they neglect this demonstration when they speak of Aboukir or Trafalgar.

To determine in what way one ought to fight, it is necessary first to specify the object that is sought in fighting.

That object is the destruction of the enemy. (Pp. 460-467).

Annihilation of the enemy is one of the general laws of war; is derived from the very essence of war, from its definition. It is a necessity that is still more imperative on the sea than on land. On land, the ground plays a part, its possession directly influences operations. One fights to dislodge the enemy, and it may happen that the victor is more used up than the vanquished, because he is forced to expose himself more. On the sea, conditions are different; the field of battle is a common ground that has no value; the ocean is so vast that one cannot think of taking possession of it, and remains master of it only by suppressing whoever occupies it.

To spare material, to keep on the defensive! What do these two expressions mean? It is worth while to come to an understanding on this subject so as not to base a whole system of fighting upon meaningless formulae. The true protection of material is victory. (Pp. 468-469).

Armament. The perfection of armament is one of the most important factors of success. Against an adversary who through conservatism has neglected to keep himself abreast of the latest improvements, a superiority of armament is equivalent to numerical superiority.

That is to say, Togo deployed all his means while preventing the enemy from doing the same.

To destroy the enemy's cohesion, to demoralize him, to incite him to give up the struggle by abandoning the stakes: such is the aim.

To realize these different objectives there is needed an instrument of irresistible strength, certain in its action. It is mass or concentration of forces.

This is the arm of victory.

Materially, mass annihilates every defence at the place where it is brought to bear; morally, it takes from those who support its weight every chance of resisting; well, troops that fight without hope defend themselves badly. (Pp. 472-479-485).

In short, long-range battle is an equitable distribution between attack and defence; it gives to one what it takes from the other. Well, it is not so that war is made; one attacks or one defends himself. In the former case, one employs all his offensive means which leads to drawing near; in the latter case, one develops all his defensive means, which leads to fight. It is so at least that things happen at sea, where there are no natural obstacles, for as far as the artificial protection given by armor is concerned, that cannot be altered at one's will, it is what it is. A linear distance cannot advantageously be made to take the place of the vigor and dash of attack. (P. 495).

Like tactics in general, of which it is one of the elements, the formation should only be the instrument of a will; this will pursues an objective; the order of battle is for the purpose of realizing it.

The sole advantage of the order of battle is to furnish a solution to him who, not knowing what to do, falls back upon official prescriptions.

In short, the order is of less importance than the relative positions of the combatants; for the line array of a squadron does not constitute a force by itself.

We find a fighting position clearly characterized only in the cases of Suffren and Nelson, for whom the formation is merely a means, anterior to the battle, of holding their forces in hand so as to throw them subsequently upon the enemy in a determined position.

It is too often forgotten "that it is easier to let loose the tempest than to guide it"; so that the role of the chief of squadron will consist principally in distributing his forces; after which he will be obliged to let them act. Materially, the ships will seem to escape from his control insofar as beautiful general maneuvers are concerned; morally, his action will make itself felt much more powerfully than could the ready-made phrases of a signal, if he has known how to instil into each captain the line of conduct he ought to follow. "The leader's guiding thought hovers over the field of battle". (Pp. 497-499).

Moreover, the effects of chance will depend much upon the field that is given over to it. It is therefore, necessary to reduce to a minimum the time during which its action will make itself felt indifferently upon one or the other of the opposing forces; which leads to diminishing as much as possible the period of approach, during which one cannot impose one's will upon the adversary.

During the second phase, on the contrary, we shall no longer have the use of the compass; the signal halliards will have been cut; the steersmen will be under shelter. There will be no more thought of maneuvering. Were it wished to maneuver, it could not be done.

It is, therefore, absolutely useless to have in view a tactics without signals; for, so long as one is not interfered with by gunfire, there is nothing gained by depriving one's self of signals; and when it becomes impossible to make signals it will be equally impossible to maneuver. (Pp. 504-505-506).

Nevertheless, the search for a tactics without signals shows that a proper distinction is not made between the presentation to battle and the battle; and it seems as though we intended to twist and turn under the enemy's very nose without paying any attention to the tempest that will be let loose upon us.

The error might occasion us disagreeable surprises, and what can have given rise to it is not apparent. During the actions of the Russo-Japanese War the Russians never maneuvered; at the most they changed direction by counter-marching. The Japanese, on the other hand, whether on the 10th of August or at Tsushima, made simultaneous movements on several occasions; but it seems beyond doubt that these movements were always executed during suspensions of the gunfire, when, in consequence of incidents of the battle, the adversaries found themselves momentarily separated.

The advantages of rapidity of gunfire have been contested for a long time. Yet it seems evident that a greater rapidity of fire is equivalent to a proportionate increase in number of guns, and that the superiority will be accentuated in proportion as the effect of the fire makes itself felt. The opponents of rapid fire do not deny these advantages; but they fear a squandering of ammunition that would empty the magazines in a short time and leave the ship without defense. This apprehension is justified on condition that at the time when ammunition is found wanting the enemy still has guns to fire; otherwise the shell that remain in his magazines will be of no use to him. Rapidity of fire is an element of strength and also of danger. We should not deprive ourselves of the strength in order to avoid the danger, but should seek another solution that will allow keeping the strength and escaping the danger. (Pp. 505-512).

Tactics does not give victory, for it creates nothing (genius alone is creative); but it furnishes to those who make use of it the means of obtaining victory. On the other hand, it can avoid defeat by furnishing useful indications. In any case, it does not direct battle; otherwise it would be like those Barbary organs that always play the same tunes.

The characteristics of battle tactics are simplicity and rapidity. Simplicity, because the field of battle is not suited to such a disturbing element as complication; rapidity, because that is the only way of getting ahead of the enemy. These two conditions fix bounds that tactics can never exceed without departing from the right path. (Pp. 527-528).

Battle tactics can only be constituted on the field, under conditions approaching reality as closely as possible, that is, by the maneuvers of opposing forces. This is the sole manner of avoiding hopeless errors. It frequently happens, in fact, that creations of the mind are found to be impossible of realization when it is wished to embody them in act. In general, they are inspired by an attractive idea the application of which brings out obstacles that had not been foreseen. Well, what would happen if battle were based upon movements that had not received the confirmation of practice? Insurmountable difficulties would be encountered, and the battlefield would become a field of experiment. In war it is especially important not to have the right idea that comes too late; in war one must not have to say when all is over, that is what ought to have been done. (P. 528).

Double-action exercise have had but little development in our Navy.

But each time that these exercises have taken place, they have brought out points that were in obscurity. If it had been possible to do them over again at once, each side would have modified its method of action. They teach something therefore. In the case of the army, is not the enemy represented?

The mere fact of one force being opposed to another brings out new ideas; one finds himself faced by situations of which he had not thought; on both sides it is sought to derive advantage from it, and again the unexpected is created. Then each man does not use the same methods, and it is the aggregate of all preceding observations that constitutes the tactics. The latter is a book that is never finished.

Double-action maneuvers play in tactics a part similar to that which history plays in strategy. The study of wars, in fact, make us see events in their true light and in their varied aspect; it reveals to us all the combinations that the fertile minds of men have brought forth in the course of centuries. (Pp. 529-530).

All the products of modern science under the most various forms can be accumulated on board, and there will be needed none the less, to control the ship, a commander, endowed with that artistic feeling that is called the seaman's sense. Finally, to lead a squadron under fire, the chief must judge the situation at a single glance, determine the advantage to be derived from it and the chances it offers; all of which is art. (P. 548).

National policies therefore may be domestic or foreign, and situations tend to determine which of the two great fields must be stressed. *July 14, 1922 p. 3*

✓ If a state is environed by powerful rival states, and if the danger of war is always present, it must become militaristic and develop a vigorous foreign policy. If, however, it is weak, it must seek neutralization or protection through alliances and understandings with its least hostile neighbors. Under militaristic systems, as Herbert Spencer so clearly showed, domestic problems and institutions must be subordinated to the primal necessity of self-preservation, so that internal development and general welfare must be correspondingly slighted. If, on the other hand, a state has neighbors not dangerous to its national existence, it may devote itself fundamentally to domestic problems and seek to build up the economic, social, and cultural interests of the people. The one policy tends to centralization and the subordination of the individual; the other to decentralization and to the national cooperation with individuals in the furtherance of common policies beneficial to nation and individual alike. The United States, for example, situated far from Europe and having adjacent no dangerous rivals, has seldom had to engage in foreign wars and hence has tended to neglect foreign policies, but it has developed well defined domestic policies, such as the promotion of democracy and education, the development of national resources and the strengthening of agriculture commerce and manufactures. Its foreign policies have aimed chiefly at the preservation of peace and friendly relationship with other nations. *July 14, 1922 p. 3-4*

In general, therefore, it seems clear that every state from its very nature must have policies, that these are fundamentally concerned with the preservation of the life of the state, and hence that they are not creations of personal whim or caprice, but are based on conditions and situations that unitedly tend to determine the policies themselves. *p. 5*

England and Japan on the other hand are typical sea powers, driven to the sea of necessity and basing their activities on their ports, shipping and fisheries. Our own country is so definitely a land power, that aside from our coastal cities, it is hard to arouse interest in the United States in a merchant marine or in a navy. *p. 8*

But in the last twenty-five years the world has become relatively small. *p. 8*

The distance of three thousand (3000) miles across North America from ocean to ocean is far shorter than was one hundred (100) miles two centuries ago. The Americas unitedly form an elongated island near the shores of eastern Asia and western Europe and Africa. We have become a world island and of necessity must become the world's sea and air power in future years. Panama is at the cross roads of the world, the Caribbean is our British Channel and Mediterranean all in one, and in due time every intelligent American will think in international terms and realize how important it is that the nation have control on sea and in the air. *p. 8-9*

But class distinctions, which often have a racial basis, may destroy national unity through class antagonism. Nor is a feeling of nationality so readily developed among a conglomerate racial population like that in the United States. Each race has its own racial inheritance and traditions and these may prove to be stronger than one's attachment to an adopted country, as shown in the war and in the racial lines so frequently found in politics. Then again, there is the factor of racial antagonism. *p. 9*

This theory of racial antagonism has its extreme form in a Darwinian interpretation greatly favored on the continent. It assumes a continuous racial struggle for supremacy, for survival, with the gradual elimination of defeated or inferior nations or their subjection and exploitation by dominant nations. It is a racial or national struggle for survival, for supremacy, nation against nation, with spoils to the victors and woe to the vanquished. *p. 9*

According to this theory one gets the clearest insight into the significance of national action, for example, by studying economic situations and comprehending the economic motives that actuate men. Other factors come in at times, it is argued, to modify somewhat or to check, such factors as those of race, religion or ethics, but in general, it is asserted, a full understanding of the economic basis underlying any question will give the key to the interpretation of the resultant action or conduct. In modern interpretations economic determinism plays a very important part and certainly greatest light will be thrown on national policies by thorough study of the economic factors involved in any particular policy. *p. 11*

In illustration, however, it may be said that in a democracy like that of the United States, great stress must be placed on the psychic situation of the nation as a whole, as voiced by what is called public opinion. In a highly centralized, militaristic government the public opinion of the masses at least is relatively unimportant. Leadership and the opinion of the dominant class are the important factors in decisions. But in a democracy policies in the long run must meet with general approbation. *p. 12*

It may be contained in the national mind and voiced in public opinion, but to become a national policy it must be formulated by the government as a principle to determine national action. *p. 13*

We have but recall how our own pacifist nation, which in 1916 elected a President on the platform, "he

kept us out of war" within less than a year was heart and soul in the war, submitting to drafts and heavy taxation and cheerfully subscribing to liberty bonds at par, with the full consciousness that in the markets they would promptly lose some 10 per cent. of their value. The real public is profoundly interested in ideals, in world situations, and in action that ultimately works for democracy and human welfare. Racial hatreds, prejudices, narrow and partisan viewpoints are never popular. They appeal to the mob mind, but not to public opinion. The public opinion of democracy loves justice and hates oppression. p. 13

If we see to it that those in authority comprehend national policies, and if these are taught to citizens in school and in civic life, our statesmen can perform their duties without hesitation, knowing that in so doing they are voicing the national will and will be supported by the real opinion of the citizens. p. 13

The exploitation of the many ultimately means national decay, so that the nations that longest survive are those that tend to embody in their policies the interests of all, not of the privileged few. In other words the national policies of vigorous nations become democratic and hence must be voiced by democratic agencies. p. 14

Policies may be formulated that are based on personal whim or false premises, but sooner or later they will fail. To be permanently successful policies must be based on national situations, known in their completeness so far as that is humanly possible. More than that, however, the people as a whole must comprehend that such policies are fundamental to national welfare. p. 15

A policy rightly formulated, and supported by an intelligent public opinion in due time becomes part of the national fibre, so that when occasion demands, action and popular support are simultaneous. p. 16

✓ Jefferson in his inaugural address could rightly say that our foreign policy was that of "peace, commerce, honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none". p. 5-6 18 July 1922

✓ When the Louisiana lands were ceded to France by Spain Jefferson became seriously alarmed; he asserted that "the possession of New Orleans by France would make that power our natural enemy". If necessary to prevent this he would favor, he said, the building up of a navy, and an alliance with Great Britain so as to keep France from regaining its hold on this continent. In other words he realized that a new situation would necessitate a new policy.

Policy is effective only as it is backed by FORCE. 21 July 1922 p. 16

In the development of the Monroe Doctrine it became evident that there were two dominating motives underlying it all:

- (1) the desire for national safety against foreign aggression, and
- (2) the realization of our paramount in this hemisphere.

Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army—its personnel, organization, discipline and tactics, things which are connected like the fingers of a hand—without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat.

Man is flesh and blood; he is body and soul. And strong as the soul often is, it can not dominate the body to the point where there will not be a revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of destruction.
The human heart, to quote Marshal de Saxe, is then the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.

Centuries have not changed human nature. Passions, instincts, among them the most powerful one of self-preservation, may be manifested in various ways according to the time, the place, the character and temperament of the race. (Pp. 39-40).

Battle, of course, always furnishes surprises. But it furnishes less in proportion as good sense and the recognition of truth have had their effect on the training of the fighting man, and are disseminated in the ranks. Let us then study man in battle, for it is he who really fights. (P. 41).

Man taxes his ingenuity to be able to kill without running the risk of being killed. His bravery is born of his strength and it is not absolute. Before a stronger he flees without shame. The instinct of self-preservation is so powerful that he does not feel disgraced in obeying it, altho, thanks to the defensive power of arms and armor he can fight at close quarters. Can you expect him to act in any other way? Man must test himself before acknowledging a stronger. But once the stronger is recognized, no one will face him. (P. 46).

****The conquered always console themselves with their bravery and conquerors never contradict. Unfortunately, the figures are there. (P. 63).

****It may be said that to Hannibal victory was not sufficient. He must destroy. Consequently he always tried to cut off all retreat for the enemy. He knew that with Rome, destruction was the only way of finishing the struggle.

He did not believe in the courage of despair in the masses; he believed in terror and he knew the value of surprise in inspiring it. (P. 67).

Hannibal, in order to inspire his people with such confidence, had to explain to them before the combat his plan of action, in such a way that treachery could not injure him. He must have warned his troops that the center would be pierced, but that he was not worried about it, because it was a foreseen and prepared affair. His troops, indeed, did not seem to be worried about it. (P. 68).

Hannibal was the greatest general of antiquity by reason of his admirable comprehension of the morale of combat, of the morale of the soldier, whether his own or the enemy's. He shows his greatness in this respect in all the different incidents of war, of campaign, of action. His men were not better than the Roman soldiers. They were not as well armed, one-half less in number. Yet he was always the conqueror. He understood the value of morale. He had the absolute confidence of his people. In addition he had the art, in commanding an army, of always securing the advantage of morale. (P. 68).

Roman tactics were so excellent that a Roman general who was only half as good as his adversary was sure to be victorious. By surprise alone they could be conquered. Not Xanthippe,—Hannibal—the unexpected fighting methods of the Gauls, etc. (P.81).

Indeed Xenophon says somewhere "Be it agreeable or terrible, the less anything is foreseen, the more does it cause pleasure or dismay. This is nowhere better illustrated than in war where every surprise strikes terror even to those who are much the stronger." (P. 82).

The men of the maniple, of the Roman company, mutually gave their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a comrade (a Roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (Livy) (ft. note—P. 86).

Now, man has a horror of death. In the bravest, a great sense of duty, which they alone are capable of understanding and living up to, is paramount. But the mass always cowers at sight of the phantom, death. Discipline is for the purpose of dominating that horror by a still greater horror, that of punishment or disgrace. But there always comes an instant when natural horror gets an upper hand over discipline, and the fighter flees. "Stop, stop, hold out a few minutes, an instant more, and you are victor! You are not even wounded yet,—if you turn your back you are dead!" He does not hear, he cannot hear any more, he is full of fear. How many armies have sworn to conquer or perish? How many have kept their oaths? An oath of sheep to stand up against wolves. History shows, not armies, but firm souls who have fought unto death, and the devotion of Thermopyli is therefore justly immortal. (Pp. 94-95).

The mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and decision of command proceeding from

habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law, and society. (P. 95).

A wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time maneuvers shall be comrades in war. From living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from cooperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity. The duty of obedience, the right of imposing discipline and the impossibility of escaping from it, would naturally follow.*** And now confidence appears*** It is not that enthusiastic and thoughtless confidence of tumultuous or unprepared armies which goes up to the danger point and vanishes rapidly, giving way to a contrary sentiment, which sees treason everywhere. It is that intimate confidence, firm and conscious, which does not forget itself in the heat of action and which alone makes true combatants. (P. 96).

***A thought of mistrust leads to hesitation. A moment of it will kill the offensive spirit.

Unity and confidence cannot be improvised. They alone can create that mutual trust, that feeling of force which gives courage and daring. Courage, that is the temporary domination of will over instinct, brings about victory. (P. 97).

***Commanding officers always try to keep in hand as long as possible, some troops capable of marching, acting at any moment, in any direction. Today, like yesterday, like tomorrow, the decisive action is that of formed troops. Victory belongs to the commander who has known how to keep them in good order, to hold them, and to direct them. That is incontrovertible. But commanders can hold out decisive reserves only if the enemy has been forced to commit his. (P. 101).

I have heard philosophers reproached for studying too exclusively man in general and neglecting the race, the country, the era, so that their studies of him offer little of real social or political value.

***In the last analysis, successes in battle are a matter of morale. In all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline, and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. It is rarely taken into account; and often strange errors are the result. (P. 109).

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell.

***The determining factor, leaving aside generals of genius, and luck, is the quality of troops, that is, the organization that best assures their esprit, their reliability, their confidence, their unity. Troops, in this sense, means soldiers. (P. 110).

***What good is an army of 200,000 men of whom only one-half really fight? while the other one hundred thousand disappear in a hundred ways? Better to have one hundred thousand who can be counted upon. (P. 111).

The purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves. No army is worthy of the name without discipline.*** Discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based on the salient virtues and defects of the nation.**** Discipline cannot be secured or created in a day. It is an institution, a tradition. The commander must have absolute confidence in his right to command. He must be accustomed to command and proud to command. This is what strengthens discipline in armies commanded by an aristocracy in certain countries. (P. 111).

Napoleon said, "Two Mamelukes held three Frenchmen; but one hundred French cavalry did not fear the same number of Mamelukes; three hundred vanquished the same number; one thousand French beat fifteen hundred Mamelukes. Such was the influence of tactics, order and maneuver."****On reflection, this simple statement of Napoleon's seems to contain the whole of battle morale. Make the enemy believe that support is lacking; isolate; cut off, flank, turn, in a thousand ways make his men believe themselves isolated. Isolate in like manner his squadrons, battalions, brigades and divisions; and victory is yours. If, on account of bad organization, he does not anticipate mutual support there is no need of such maneuver; the attack is enough. (P. 121).

What makes the soldier capable of obedience and direction in action, is the sense of discipline. This includes: respect for and confidence in his chiefs; confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do without trembling more than they; in a word, the whole of esprit de corps. Organization only can produce these characteristics. Four men equal a lion.

Esprit de corps is secured in war. But war becomes shorter and shorter and more and more violent. Consequently, secure esprit de corps in advance.

Mental acquaintanceship is not enough to make a good organization. A good general esprit is needed. All must work for battle and not merely live, quietly going through the drills without understanding their application.

Once a man knows how to use his weapon and obey all commands there is needed only occasional drill to brush up those who have forgotten. Marches and battle maneuvers are what is needed. (P. 122).

The great superiority of Roman tactics lay in their constant endeavor to coordinate physical and moral effect. Moral effect passes; finally one sees that the enemy is not so terrible as he appeared to be. Physical effect does not. The Greeks tried to dominate. The Romans preferred to kill, and kill they did. They followed thereby the better method. Their moral effect was aided by their reliable and deadly swords.

What moral force is worth to a nation at war is shown by examples. (P. 126).

Invention is less needed than verification, demonstration and organization of proper methods. To verify; observe better. To demonstrate; try out and describe better. To organize, distribute better, bearing in mind that cohesion means discipline. I do not know who put things that way; but it is truer than ever in this day of invention. (P. 139).

"Ask much, in order to obtain a little", is a false saying, a source of errors, an attack on discipline. One ought to obtain what one asks. It is only necessary to be moderately reasonable and practical.

Officers of the general Staff learn to order, not to command. "Sir, I order," a popular phrase, applies to them.

The misfortune is not that there is a general staff, but that it has achieved command. For it always has commanded, in the name of its commanders it is true, and never obeyed, which is its duty. It commands in fact. So be it! But just the same it is not supposed to.

Is it the good quality of staffs or that of combatants that makes the strength of armies? If you want good fighting men, do everything to excite their ambition, to spare them, so that people of intelligence and with a future will not despise the line but will elect to serve in it. It is the line that gives you your high command, the line only, and very rarely the staff. The Staff, however, dies infrequently, which is something. Do they say military science can only be learned in the general staff schools? If you really want to learn to do your work, go to the line.

***But today when general staff officers rank the best of the line, the latter are discouraged and rather than submit to this situation, all who feel themselves fitted for advancement want to be on the general staff. So much the better? So much the worse. Selection is only warranted by battle. (Pp. 211-213).

(Napoleon) "The moral forces constitute the most powerful factors of success; they give life to all material efforts, and dominate a commander's decisions with regard to the troops' every act. Honor and patriotism inspire the utmost devotion; the spirit of sacrifice and the fixed determination to conquer ensure success; discipline and steadiness guarantee the necessary obedience and the cooperation of every effort."

"Tactical science, therefore, possesses two indispensable bases; the science of arms, and the science of human nature." "And these two should form the foundation of the instruction of all officers." (Pp. 5-6).

There are two elements that enter to make these astonishing things possible: First, physical condition; second, purely psychological conditions. The first, to some extent, tends to produce the second. All psychologists agree that physical condition has a powerful effect on psychological susceptibility. A crowd of men that are tired, hungry, sick, thirsty, or who have lost sleep, are much more susceptible to psychic suggestion than the same men when in normal health and comfort. With a crowd of men who are worn out, sick, exhausted, the slightest suggestion is liable to produce a quick and most profound effect. What the effect will be depends on the suggestion. This is the basis for Soult's statement: "The soldier before dinner, and the soldier after dinner, are two entirely different beings."

***When an officer commands on the firing line, he must realize that his men are just a crowd, and that they must be handled like a crowd, not like the calm, respectful, obedient soldier of the drill ground. (Pp. 7-8).

First, fix it in your mind that direct commands, such as military orders, are not obeyed by the subconscious mind, but that, as long as the subconscious is controlled by will and reason, so long are these commands obeyed by the will; there is no psychic phenomena about it. Remember also that suggestion acts, not on the will and reason, but on the subconscious. Then get it clearly understood that, in normal suggestibility, the subconscious mind will respond to indirect suggestions, but will be revolted by direct suggestion.

In normal suggestibility the strength of the suggestion is dependent on the following factors: 1. Last impression—that is, of several impressions, the last is most likely to be acted upon. 2. Frequency—that is, repetitions, not one after another, but at intervals separated by other impressions. 3. Repetition—this is distinguished from frequency by being repetitions one after the other without having other kinds of impressions put in between.

Repetition is one-third as powerful as "frequency," and one-fifth as powerful as "last impression."

4. The strongest suggestion is obtained by a combination of "frequency" and "last impression". (Pp. 16-17).

***The leader whose own ideas are not clearly defined and whose intention is vacillating will get only half-hearted action from his troops, while on the other hand, a determined man who has one clear idea will himself be surprised to see how the troops respond.

***Above all, the personality of the commander will imbue a force with the determination to advance."—Balck.

"A couple of months after the battle of Chancellorsville, when Hooker had crossed the Rappahannock with the Army of the Potomac in the campaign of Gettysburg, he was asked by General Doubleday: 'Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancellorsville? Some say you were injured by a shell, and others that you were drunk; now tell us what it was'. Hooker answered frankly and good naturedly: 'Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there is to it' ". "The Campaign of Chancellorsville," Bigelow, page 477—(Pp. 20-21).

***We all know that strong action comes from a single strong leader. As Napoleon said, "Councils of war never fight." (P. 24).

***The principal of them are three in number and clearly defined—affirmation, repetition, and contagion. Their action is somewhat slow, but their effects once produced are very lasting.

Affirmation, pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and all proof, is one of the surest means of making an idea enter the mind of crowds. The more concise an affirmation is, the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it carries.

***The thing affirmed comes by repetition to fix itself in the mind in such a way that it is accepted in the end as a demonstrated truth.

***It is by examples, not by arguments, that crowds are guided. (Pp. 32-33).

Great power is given to ideas propagated by affirmation, repetition, and contagion by the circumstances that they acquire in time that mysterious force known as prestige.

Whatever has been the ruling power in the world, whether it be ideas or man, has, in the main enforced its authority by means of that irresistible force known as "prestige". The term is one whose meaning is grasped by everybody, but the word is employed in ways too different for it to be easy to define it. Prestige may involve such sentiments as admiration or fear. Occasionally even these sentiments are its basis, but it can perfectly exist without them. The greatest measure of prestige is possessed by the dead—by Alexander, Caesar, Mahomet, and Buddha, for example. (P. 34).

Ill-treat men as you will, massacre them by the millions be the cause of invasion upon invasion, all is permitted you if you possess prestige in a sufficient degree and the talent necessary to uphold it. (P. 37).

****These small states combine with others till one is formed that, to its constituents, seems powerful enough to defy the world. Then, freed from menace from the outside, commercial pursuits become the sole enthusiasm of the individuals composing the state; luxury increases till men, voicing the cry, "I want what I want when I want it", lapse into effeminacy and selfishness and forget that the protection that the nation will be able to furnish them in their commercial pursuits is wholly dependent on a spirit among them of self-sacrifice for the mutual good.

"Selfish and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all desires of the individual undermines the foundations of higher moral philosophy and the belief in ideals....." (P. 38).

Accustomed to more luxury and less hardship than in years gone by, neither part will hold out to extremity as in former times. This is the reason that modern wars are expected to be short. A big reverse and both army and populace lose their nerve. Neither is willing to pay the price of success. (P. 40).

Edinburg Review, Jan. 1912,—Doctrine in War.

From the alternative meanings given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary we have selected the following:

"A principle is a fundamental truth as a basis of reasoning."

"Command is control, mastery, possession."

From these definitions it follows that "the principles of command" as regards the command in the field of an army, are "the fundamental truths which are the bases of reasoning about the control or mastery of an army in the field."

The principles of command resolve themselves into: (1) control by a commander; (2) an army controllable by a commander; (3) a commander who knows how he intends to use his army. (P. 2). ✓

****In the case of Frederick and of Napoleon, so far as the battlefield is concerned, the three principles of command are to be found present and in harmony, though each principle has altered in its application: (a) the commander controls sufficiently for his purpose; (b) the troops are trained and organized to respond adequately to the control exercised; (c) the commander knows how he means to fight his battle. (P. 4). ✓

****In this campaign it is clear that the three principles of command harmonized, inasmuch as Napoleon had a definite idea of how he meant to win; had sufficient mastery over his army to enable him to move his detachments in the directions he wished, and to bring up the main body at the right time and place; and, lastly, that he had at his disposal an instrument suited to his method of war in the detachments commanded by Lannes and by Davout, and the main body commanded by himself. (P. 6). ✓

****But the form of war he made depended for success, as in 1805 and 1806, on the skillful command of detachments, though the detachments had grown in 1813 from detached corps to detached armies. True, he himself, the commander still knew what he wanted to do, but since his detachment commanders no longer played their part intelligently his army can no longer be considered controllable for the purpose in view, and, as a consequence, his mastery over his army was no longer adequate. This meant that in Napoleon's army in the later campaigns the first and second principles of command no longer harmonized with the third principle of command. (P. 6). ✓

****From 1796 to 1815 the French army only enjoyed a brief spell of peace. It is not during the stress and strain of war, when every wheel of the military machine is working at high pressure to grind out concrete results in the shape of movements, operations, battles, that an army can be trained. An army is used in war: it can only be trained in peace; more especially is it only in times of peace that the minds of subordinate commanders can be tuned so as to ensure in war the unity of thought and of effort which are essential factors in harmonizing the principles of command. (P. 8). ✓

****Moltke was not only widely read in military history, but was a deep thinker on war. He had studied the best books that had been written up to his day on the campaigns of Napoleon, and had not omitted to note that one important element in the ultimate overthrow of the Emperor was the failure of the marshals: the failure to harmonize the principles of command owing to the neglect to provide for the army subordinate commanders capable of intelligent co-operation when removed from the immediate control of the commander-in-chief. It would seem that Moltke resolved that whether the army of Prussia succeeded or failed when tested in war, its failure should not be attributable to neglect of this particular lesson of history.* (P. 9). ✓

*The Science of War, (P. 7).

****Although the method of operation which he (Moltke) favored differed from that of Napoleon, it had this in common with later campaigns of the Emperor, that it required commanders of detachments, possessed not only of a high degree of technical skill but able to see eye to eye with their chief, with minds trained to work in unison with that of the higher command, even when separated from Royal Headquarters by a distance which made direct control impossible. (P. 10). ✓

Thus Moltke's method on war calls for boldness, self-reliance, insight into a situation, and clear understanding of the intentions of an immediate superior on the part of every leader who is a link in the chain which binds the soldier to the generalissimo. To ensure this intelligent co-operation he trained the minds of the senior officers by his criticisms at maneuvers, at staff rides and war games, to see war as he saw it. He encouraged the study of war by every means in his power. ****To ensure the needful energy in operations he imbued the training manuals of the army with a markedly offensive spirit, which produced that passion for attack characteristic of the army in 1866 and 1870. (P. 10). ✓

From our brief survey of the wars we have examined it seems reasonable to conclude that *doctrine* has a definite place in war and in the training of an army for war. Success in war appears to be dependent upon harmony in the principles of command. That necessary harmony the unrivalled genius of Napoleon failed to ensure because he and his subordinate leaders were not bound together by a common doctrine. That harmony Moltke

in great measure did ensure in 1866 and 1870, because he had permeated with such a doctrine the army he guided to almost unparalleled victories. (P. 12). ✓

The correct definition of 'doctrine' is 'what is taught' or 'general body of instruction'. This is the meaning which Colonel Foch attaches to his use of the word in his brilliant and illuminating book on war. A 'tendency', on the other hand, is a 'bent' 'leaning', or 'inclination'. p. 14 ✓

Now, is it true that in war doctrine is a bad thing? A doctrine is 'what is taught', or 'body of instruction'. A principle is 'a fundamental truth as a basis of reasoning'. The principles of the art of war are the bases of reasoning about that particular art. Those principles are therefore the basis of the teaching of war; they are the raw material with which the teacher weaves the fine fabric of instruction; they are, in fact, the essential ingredients of instruction, but they are no more a general body of instruction than a heap of bricks in a house. (P. 15). ✓

Those who maintain the proposition that a doctrine of war is desirable, as well as possible, deny that adherence to any particular doctrine leads of necessity to formalism in method. By 'doctrine', they understand a general body of teaching, leading those who hold it to see the concrete problems of war in the light of the general body of instruction which they hold in common. Hence, given that the same problem is presented to different commanders bound together by a common doctrine, that particular problem will appeal to each commander under the same aspect, and consequently whatever solution that problem calls for will be the one which commends itself alike to each of those commanders. It most emphatically does not imply that any attempt is to be made to fit one solution to two or more essentially different problems. (P. 15). ✓

Foch--Precepts and Judgments.

DIRECTION—The power to command had never meant the power to remain mysterious, but rather to communicate, at least to those who immediately execute our orders, the idea which animates our plan. (P. 147). ✓

****He (Napoleon) was convinced that one can get anything out of a force to which one speaks frankly, because such a force will understand what is asked of it and will then itself ask no better than to do what is required of it. (P. 148). ✓

DOCTRINE—From the same attitude towards things will first result a same way of seeing them, and from this common way of seeing, arises a common way of acting. (P. 155). ✓

The latter will soon become itself instinctive: another of the results aimed at. p. 156 ✓

A doctrine of war consists first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject; second, in a common way of handling it, by adapting without reserve the means to the goal aimed at, to the object. (P. 157). ✓

(Napoleon) "It is not some familiar spirit which suddenly and secretly discloses to me that I have to say or do in a base unexpected by others; it is reflexion, meditation." (P. 1).

The truth is, no study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has already to know a great deal and to know it well.

This principle explains the weakness in 1866, of the Austrians (whom the war of 1859 ought to have made wiser), as against the Prussians who had not fought since 1815. We shall see this in detail later on. The first made war without understanding it (as, by the way, did the French in 1870, though they also had recently gone to war). The second had understood war without making it, by means of careful study. (P. 6)

History is the base. "The more an army is deficient in the experience of warfare," writes General de Peucker, "the more it behooves it to resort to the history of war, as a means of instruction and as a base for that instruction. . . . Although the history of war cannot replace acquired experience, it can nevertheless prepare for it. In peace-time, it becomes the true means of learning war and of determining the fixed principles of the art of war." (P. 7).

These latter variables were the material factors which of course exert and influence upon the result: armament, supply, ground, numerical superiority, etc. . . . but which are far from being everything.

At the same time, while the moral factors were suppressed as causes, they were also suppressed as effects. Defeat thus came to appear in the eyes of this school as a product of material factors, though we shall see later on that it is in fact a purely moral result, that of a mood of discouragement, of terror, wrought in the soul of the conquered by the combined use of moral and material factors simultaneously resorted to by the victor.

The conclusion of the old theory, then, was: in order to conquer, you must have superior numbers, better rifles, better guns, more skillfully chosen positions. But the French Revolution, Napoleon above all, would have answered: "We are not more numerous, we are not better armed; but we will beat you all the same, because, thanks to our plans, we will manage to have superiority in number at the decisive point; because by our energy, our instruction, the use of our arms, fire and bayonet we will succeed in stimulating our own spirit to a maximum and in breaking yours.

These theories, which men had believed to be accurate because they had been entirely based on certain and mathematical data, had in fact the misfortune of being radically wrong; for they had left aside the most important factor of the problem, whether in command or execution, namely that factor which animates the subject, which gives it life; man, with his moral, mental, and physical faculties. . . . (P. 3).

(Dragomirow) "First of all, science and theory are two different things, for every art may and must be in possession of its own theory, but it would be preposterous to claim for it the name of a science. . . . Nobody will venture today to assert that there should be a science of war. It would be as absurd as a science of poetry, of painting, or of music. But it does not in the least follow that there should not be a theory of war. . . ."

"The theory of the art of war does not lay claim to forming Napoleons, but it supplies a knowledge of the properties of troops and ground. It draws attention to the models, to the masterpieces achieved in the domain of war, and it smoothes thereby the path for those whom nature has endowed with military ability. (P. 8).

(Napoleon) "The principles of war are those which have directed the great Commanders whose great deeds have been handed down to us by History".

(Marshal Bugeaud:) "There are few absolute principles", he said, "but still there are some. When you try to lay down a principle concerning war, at once a great number of officers, thinking they are solving the question, exclaim: 'Everything depends upon circumstances, you must sail according to the wind.' But if you do not know beforehand what arrangement of sail agrees with what wind and what course, how can you sail 'according to the wind?'"

(Jomini) "Sound theories founded on principles both true and justified by facts are, to our mind, in addition to history, the true training school of command. Of course they do not make a great man, for great men make themselves under circumstances favorable to their development; but they form leaders sufficiently skilful to play their part perfectly, under the direction of great generals."

We may conclude with reason: The art of war, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art. (P. 9).

(General de Peucker)****To grasp a scientific truth does not mean that one is able to find it again later on

by means of reasoning. There is a long distance between an intellectual conception and that priceless faculty which allows a man to make acquired military knowledge the basis for his decisions in the field.

"Between those two terms, scientific conception and the art of commanding, there is a gulf which the method of teaching must bridge if it is to deserve the name of a practical method. . . ."

In order to do this we must have a practical teaching including application made to particular cases of fixed principles, drawn from history, in order (1) to prepare for experience, (2) to teach the art of commanding, (3) lastly, to impart the habit of acting correctly without having to reason. (P. 11).

Marshal von Moltke shall tell us in what the matter consists and also which is the best method of treating it. "What is necessary," he writes, "is, in the midst of particular cases, to discover the situation, such as it is, in spite of its being surrounded by the fog of the unknown; then to appreciate soundly what is seen, to guess what is not seen, to make a decision quickly, finally to act with vigor, without hesitation. (P. 17).

"Clearly enough, theoretical knowledge, does not suffice for this; what is required is a free, practical, artistic development of mind and will, based of course on a previous military culture and guided by experience—either by experience derived from the study of military history, or by experience acquired in the course of one's own existence."

In other words, Strategy is but a question of will and common sense; in order to keep that double faculty in the field, you must have fostered it by training, you must possess a complete military culture (humanities militaries), you must have examined and solved a number of concrete cases. (P. 18).

****You will be asked later on to be the brain of an army. I tell you to-day: *Learn to Think*. In presence of each question, considered freely and in itself, you must first ask yourselves: What is the Problem? There is the beginning of the state of mind we are looking for; there is the direction wanted, a purely objective one.

"It is not some familiar spirit which suddenly and secretly discloses to me what I have to say or do in a case unexpected by others, it is reflexion, meditation." (Napoleon). (P. 21).

(Napoleon) "I am little pleased. . . . You have received an order to proceed to Cairo, and you have done nothing of the sort. No event ought ever to prevent a soldier from obeying; skill in war consists in solving any difficulties that may make an operation difficult, not in allowing the operation to fail." . . . (P. 97).

Discipline is the strength of armies (Foch). Armed forces are organized and commanded above all in order that they should obey. (P. 98).

(Xenophon) "The art of war is the art of keeping one's own freedom of action." (P. 99).

To be disciplined does not mean that one does not commit any breach of discipline; that one does not commit some disorderly action; such a definition works for the rank and file, but not at all for a commander placed in any degree of the military hierarchy, least of all, therefore, for those who find themselves in the highest places.

To be disciplined does not mean, either, that one only carries out an order received to such a point as appears to be convenient, fair, rational or possible. It means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior in command, and that one uses all humanly practicable means in order to give him satisfaction.

Again, to be disciplined does not mean being silent, abstaining, or doing only what one thinks one may undertake without risk; it is not the art of eluding responsibility; it means acting in compliance with orders received, and therefore finding in one's own mind, by effort and reflection, the possibility to carry out such orders. It also means finding in one's own will the energy to face the risks involved in execution. In a high place, discipline implies mental activity and a display of will. Laziness of mind leads to indiscipline, just as does insubordination. In either case it is an error; a guilty act. Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all who seek it. (Pp. 102-103).

Battle, the tactical fact, having been missed, there was nothing but danger everywhere.

The men who had not been made to march for 20 miles in order to be led to victory, were now able and compelled to walk in a state of demoralization for nearly 60 miles (Abbatucci brigade, from Niederbronn to Saverne) within 36 hours.

Without having fired a single shot, the Fifth Army Corps, composed of gallant troops, of undentifiable value, had withdrawn from the struggle in a state of annihilation, of depression; the men had been deprived of their moral strength, they no longer trusted their own chiefs; they stood ready to be routed. In the army's judgment, and for a long time to come, that corps was to be held responsible for the defeat at Froeschwiller; rightly enough if the command and the rank and file are made jointly responsible; wrongly, however, if one perceives the truth, which is, that battles are lost or won by generals, not by the rank and file.

A number of wrong theories, the want of military spirit and of discipline (of the will and of the intelligence), complete ignorance of security, the organization of which is the outcome of these military virtues, equal ignorance of what freedom of action (which security alone makes possible) may mean; these were the causes of the disaster. (Pp. 108-109).

****The one necessary condition was that an appeal should be made: To mental activity, so that the plans of the high command should be understood and endorsed; To mental activity, so that physical means should be found in order to carry out those plans; To mental activity, so that those plans should be carried out in spite of the attempts made by the enemy with a view to keeping his own freedom of action; The condition, in one word, was that the course of action should fully comply with DISCIPLINE. (P. 115).

Foster—Organization.

****In other words, the primary object of War Organization is to facilitate Command—that is, to ensure that every man in the force acts promptly in response to the will of the Commander.

A secondary object of War Organization is to facilitate Administration, or the supply of each individual in the Force with all that he requires to make it possible for him not only to live, but to move and fight. . . . (P. 3). ✓

Both of these objects of Organization—Command and Administration—are, however, really inseparable. The channels through which they act are identical, and the Authority which commands is necessarily responsible for the Administration which enables his Orders to be carried out. Solicitude for the well-being of the soldier is one of the most certain means for obtaining influence over him, and may be called the main lever for exercising Command. Some further consideration of the psychological factors of Command, which are essentially germane to the study of Organization, will be found in Part V of this work.

The word Organization. . . has been more elaborately defined, by Herbert Spencer, as "the bringing of independent bodies into interdependent relation with each other, so as to form a single organic whole in which they all work together. (P. 4). ✓

It is obvious that a Commander of a Military Force can not deal personally and directly with all those under his command, but only with a limited number of subordinate commanders. Each of the latter in his turn conveys his will to his own subordinates, and this gradually broadening system, called the Chain of Command, is carried on, till every individual of the Force receives his orders. These Orders are founded on the original directions of the C-in-C, with modifications and details added by each lower authority in the chain, so as to suit the special circumstances of his own Command. (P. 5). ✓

Each category of formations forms a step in the pyramid of organization, in which the lowest layer is formed by the units, the top layer by the Subordinate Commands, and the apex by the Supreme Commander. The commanders of each Formation, from the largest to the smallest, form the successive links in the chain of Command. (P. 6). ✓

****Organization exists to facilitate fighting, and cannot be explained without some discussion of Tactics. (P. 7). ✓

On the other hand, the correct principles on which a Government should control its Commanders in war are exemplified in the highest degree in those of the elder Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatman. To his wisdom and judgment in conducting operations by sea and land over all the world must be credited much of the brilliant success of the Seven Years' War. p. 236

He himself defined the object of the operations, but left the method of attaining it to his Commanders, to whom he allowed a large measure of latitude and discretion. He never failed to make use of every incentive which could spur them to action and ensure success. He insisted on the initiative being taken and risks run, but he was always as generous in case of failure as he was appreciative of good work. He succeeded in inspiring the Admiralty and the War Office with his own spirit and energy, and seconded their efforts with all the resources of the country. The lesson which his practice may teach every Government engaged in war is, that while the Statesmen alone can direct all the Departments of State, and combine Navy, Army, Diplomacy, and Finance to the common end, those responsible for the actual operations must be unfettered in their decisions, and in their methods of carrying them out. (P. 236). ✓

Command has in the large armies of the present day become rather a Direction of Operations, differing essentially in character and execution from the actual Command of the Troops. Frederick, Napoleon, and Wellington commanded; Moltke and Oyama directed their armies; while it was mainly the Prussian and Japanese Division Commanders who commanded in the true sense in the wars of 1866, 1870, and 1904. Thus we seldom see Moltke and Oyama on the battlefield, where Napoleon, Wellington, and Lee were always to be found. 236-37

The subordinate commander, like the C-in-C of old times, differs from the Supreme Commander of today by the fact that his action on his Command is personal and direct. He is in close touch with his subordinate leaders, knows the condition and spirit of his men, is always among them in person to inspire and control their movements. Troops take their tone from their immediate Commander, and reflect his vigour or hesitation, his confidence or caution. An intuition of his mental attitude seems to pass through all ranks of the Command. On the other hand the Army Commanders, and still more the Commander-in-Chief, are but nebulous figures to the soldiers in a very large Army. (Pp. 236-237). ✓

All crowds, even those of animals, have an overwhelming craving to be led. A leader is needed to strike the spark to kindle the mass, give shape to its idea, and instigate its action. A crowd loves to adopt a leader to be its despot, and will be obedient and even servile to him who shows he can command. The leader influences the crowd by three means—assertion, repetition, and example. All these means are necessary to implant ideas in an unreason-

ing mass, and initiate unanimous action towards their realization. The assertion must be concise and simple, and should epitomize the ideas which form the "religion" of the crowd. Reputation is necessary to drive these ideas home. Reasoning is out of place, and has the worst effect, for crowds cannot reflect, and are as impatient of appeals to their reason as of opposition to their desires. The example of the leader exercises a potent influence. A crowd is easily impressed by his coolness, courage, self-confidence, determination and vigour in utterance and action, and even by his personal appearance. (P. ~~247~~). 247c

Why would Be

Gardiner—Japan—Mistress of Seas.

The record from which Mahan drew his deductions as to the influence of sea power upon history is the record of how weak and poor Elizabethan England, with but five million inhabitants, expanded into the present world wide English-speaking civilization in little more than three hundred years. From this he pointed out the sources of sea power and showed how Britain's rise to preeminence was due to her naval power. Because she won the naval command of the North Atlantic, she was able to defend her colonies here; and because Holland and France were unable to wring its command from her, they lost their colonies here and Britain took them over. To the naval preponderance of Britain in 1783 may be accredited the fact that the French did not dispute the claim on Australia that Britain set up in that year. Nelson's decisive victory at Trafalgar enabled Britain to carry on against Napoleon a strangling blockade and determining campaign of which Mahan wrote:

"The world has never seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of sea power upon history. Those far distant, storm beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world." (P. 3). ✓

The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power. . . . They (the English and Dutch) were by nature business men, traders, producers, negotiators. Therefore, both in their native country and abroad, whether settled in the ports of civilized nations or of barbarous eastern rulers, or in colonies of their own foundation, they everywhere strove to draw out all the resources of the land, to develop and increase them. . . . At home they became great as manufacturers; abroad, where they controlled, the land grew richer continually, products multiplied and the necessary exchange between home and the settlements called for more ships.

In short, Mahan's basic thesis is that broadspread national prosperity, derived from overseas trade, fostered with overseas possessions, is the foundation of naval power. (P. 4). pp 3-4. ✓

But the Japanese seem also to have taken note of a saying of Napoleon's, to the effect that an army is dependent on concentration for action (whether defensive or offensive), and upon dispersion for sustenance. p. 4 ✓

In consequence of this trade and navigation Japan has developed a powerful group in her body politic whose prosperity is dependent on overseas trade, which trade has brought to Japan money wherewith to build a great navy. The result is that Japan is now spending more than one-third of her national income on her navy, while Americans talk as though our spending less than one-tenth of our national income on our navy were an "intolerable burden" the abatement of which would go far to solve all our economic ailments. (P. 5). ✓

In this connection it should be recalled that Japan is less crowded than are Holland, Belgium, and England, Furthermore, all of these European countries normally raise a smaller percentage of their food supplies than the 80 per cent and more that the Japanese now raise for their home consumption. England, in fact raises much less than 40 per cent of the food her people consume, and yet supports over 700 inhabitants per square mile, thus showing that Japan could support far more than her present 373 inhabitants per square mile—if the Japanese would turn from militant imperialism to peaceful industrialism. And this is further emphasized by the fact that but one fortieth of the Japanese are industrialist workers, whereas one fourth of the inhabitants of England are industrialists.

In other words, given adequate raw materials, industrial facilities, and markets, ten times as many Japanese as now do so could support themselves by industry in Japan. p. 6 ✓

The conclusion seems unavoidable that the whole fabric of the alleged necessity of Japanese emigration because of over-population must be dismissed as untrue. The student who has considered colonization, not only as a social operation but also as a maritime and military operation, will recognize under these circumstances that Japan's attempts at colonization in America and Australasia are designed to be "plantations" similar to the colonial "plantation" of Jamestown that England made in Virginia in 1607. It was the superior weapons and fighting ability of the English colonists that drove the American Indian from his lands. It is the superior working ability of the Japanese colonists that is driving the Californian from his lands. In both instances of colonization the result is the same—preemption of the land and means of livelihood. (P. 6). ✓

In outline, the situation that confronts us is somewhat as follows: If Japan fails to abandon her imperialism voluntarily, the United States will be called on either to abandon the Open Door Doctrine, or to make it effective by pressure on Japan. In order to uphold our Open Door Doctrine to protect China and her markets, as we have solemnly declared we would, we must command the Pacific even unto the China Coasts. But in point of fact, and in spite of the present statistical superiority of our navy, not the United States but Japan commands the Pacific in those Far Eastern Waters which we must command if we are to support effectively our Open Door Doctrine. (P. 7). ✓

The measure of comparative naval power is not to be found in the schedule of each navy at its base, but in the effective strength of each at the probable scene of contact. ✓

Remoteness from an adequate base subjects the effective fighting power of a fleet to a proportionate dis-

count; and this because of fuel limitations, the risks and naval costs of maintaining a heavy supply train over a long line of communication, and the added dangers to which crippled ships are exposed if they have to limp thousands instead of only hundreds of miles back to their repair bases. On the other hand, the close proximity of adequate bases adds to the effective power of a fleet to a degree that can be realized perhaps only by those having intimate knowledge of the mechanical strains and transportation problems that arise in modern naval warfare. ✓

As the entire strategy of the Pacific depends upon the certain possession of impregnable bases in the most advantageous relation to the theatre of operations, if we are to command in Far Eastern Waters in order to make Japan respect our Open Door Doctrine, we must have an adequate and impregnable base in the Far East; and its lines of communication with the United States must be adequately protected. (P. 7). ✓

And furthermore, these Philippines, which we leave unprotected in the centre of the scene of present world stress, would be extremely valuable to Japan, because they would command South China, in both the naval and commercial sense, and their possession is essential to Japan if she is to carry out the plans she has developed for expansion to the southward.

As Mr. Bywater says in his "Sea Power in the Pacific", "within a fortnight after the beginning of hostilities, the United States would find herself bereft of her insular possessions in the Western Pacific, and consequently without a base (location) for naval operations in those waters. With Guam and the Philippines in enemy hands, the problem confronting the United States would become well-nigh insolvable." (Pp. 7-8). ✓

The fact must be plainly stated that an adequate fleet base in the Western Pacific, costing less than two battleships, would make our fleet all powerful there, would enable us to enforce our Open Door Doctrine, to stop the imperialism of Japan and her disruption of China, and would prevent war in the Pacific by making it suicidal for Japan to go to war against us. The single fact that we have not got such a base makes our great fleet impotent in the Far East. Our nation is deprived of any power to enforce its Open Door Doctrine for the protection of China, for the stopping of imperialistic conquest, and for the preservation of the peace of the world. And by leaving undefended our Far Eastern possessions, which are so valuable to Japan, we invite war. If war comes, it will be primarily because we have saved this base cost amounting to less than that of two battleships. If war comes, we will lose many times two battleships; we will spend many billion dollars, and we will lose many thousand lives—all because we have saved the cost of a base amounting to less than that of two battleships. (P. 8). ✓

With the possessions of both Britain and America very seriously menaced in the event of a Japanese-American War, it would seem inconceivable that both should not work as one at the Washington Conference to show Japan that her only safety is in abandoning her imperialism entirely. For, if she persists in her present course, she will bring on the war of the English-speaking peoples for the freedom of the Far East. And though in this, at first, Japan would gain her immediate objectives, Japan would not be at war against other Orientals or against semi-Oriental Russians, but against the race that commands most of the resources of the world and that never turns back. If Japan can be brought to read our open mind as clearly as we penetrate her Oriental adaptations or Prussian policies, she will see that not by imperialism but by peaceful industry is the true way, for her, to fellowship among the really great nations. (P. 8). ✓

Gardiner—Philippines and Sea Power.

It should be realized that a modern battlefleet has an effective operating radius of only about two thousand miles from its base through waters likely to be infested by submarines—this because of the necessity of maintaining the high speed essential as a protection against submarines which entails burning rapidly its very limited fuel supplies. (P. 168). ✓

Upon the outbreak of this war, Japan signed a Protocol with the Emperor of Korea which, among other things, said: Art. 3. The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. After Japan's victory over Russia and after a protectorate over Korea had led to the installation of a Japanese Resident-General there, the following so-called treaty was forced on the Emperor of Korea in 1910:—Art. 1. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea. Art. 2. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan. It had taken Japan but five years to pass from guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Korea to annexing Korea as a subject province of the Japanese Empire—a transition worthy of notice by sincere advocates of Philippine independence. (P. 167). ✓

Consequently, if Japan could control the Philippines, directly or indirectly, she could not only blanket the South Pacific coast of Asia as she does its North section, but she could assure the safety of her threefold greater southward trade. For in time of war, if another Power had an adequate naval base in the Philippines, it could cut off virtually half of the total foreign trade of Japan—a trade upon which she is becoming more and more dependent as her transformation from an agricultural to an industrial nation progresses. In fact it may not be too much to say that, by destroying both the southward and the American trade of Japan, she might be so reduced that she could not keep up a war. (P. 170). ✓

Time and again the evolutionary process of civilization has shown that the proper function of force is to protect moral ideals against mere physical strength, however intelligently directed, until such time as moral ideals shall have borne such fruit throughout the world that physical aggression no longer will be contemplated. Stated in more specific present day terms, the civilization of Western Europe, of which the United States is the greatest single outgrowth, is trying to give form and substance to a young and tender flower—the substitution of equity for force among nations. Until the morality of this shall have penetrated effectively throughout Continental Europe and Asia, the culture of this ideal must be defended by force lest it be trodden under foot and fail of effective purpose in the world for another cycle of centuries. In short, as far as one can see, the prospect is a struggle on the part of the civilization emanating from Western Europe to preserve and disseminate its idealism while all the time it protects this idealism, by force if need be, from being blighted by the backward materialism of Eastern Europe and Asia—and this, for whatever period may be necessary to attain the universal substitution of equity for force. (P. 171). ✓

It is rarely that the man on the street has sufficient knowledge of strategy to realize that the ultimate security of the United States depends on the security of Australasia and on the stability of the Far East and that these, in turn, depend on the security of the Philippines. ✓

But perhaps the most profound factor in the future of the Philippines is the test it may put upon the normal fibre of the American people. It is no sign of a strong sense of righteousness for a guardian to grant the demand of a wayward child that he permit it forthwith to have its own way in the world. A higher sense of duty is shown by willingness to make whatever efforts and sacrifices may be required to defend and develop a dependent, however wayward. And the cycle of civilization after civilization has shown that when a once great people become so selfish and ease-loving that they lose their sense of duty to defend and foster their dependents, that is a sure index of moral turpitude which ends in their being overthrown as a nation by others who have not lost their virility. The policy of the American people toward the Philippines may indeed be the determining index of the future of the Pacific and of our civilization. (Pp. 172-173). ✓

*Political and Naval Problems of the Pacific. Delivered to the
Canadian Club of Toronto 7 March 1921.*

Gardner's—Toronto Speech.

I find that I have referred to Canada and to Australia as nations. This needs no explanation to a Canadian audience. But were I addressing a non-British audience, I would tell them of the cheers with which a great New York gathering recently greeted the Honorable N. W. Rowell, a Canadian Delegate returning from the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, when he said: "The British Empire, I repeat, is a group of free, self-governing sovereign States of equal status, under a common sovereign****." (P. 2). ✓

It is the fact that over two-thirds of the white inhabitants of the United States were either born in the island of Great Britain or in Canada or they were born in the United States of parents of British birth or descent. And, may I add in passing that these were the people who led in overbearing a desire expressed in January 1917, for "Peace without Victory" and who, when permitted, showed they were not "too proud to fight". (P. 3). ✓

That, while having full regard for the British Commonwealth of Nations as a political entity, the United States should support with the utmost cordiality all those aims and common interests of the English-speaking nations on the Pacific for our common weal and in order that we may escape a common danger. (P. 5). ✓

Just as Pitt fought Napoleon under the slogan of "security" for the established order of things, so the late war was fought to maintain the security and peace of the world against a late comer who sought to win by aggressive force of arms the world place he had not had ability enough to win during the era when the world was in a state of flux. (Pp. 9-10). ✓

I must pass rapidly over the period of reorganization of feudal Japan that began in 1867. Seeing the modern world as it is, the Japanese showed their extraordinary adaptability in their rapid transformation of their government into a modern imperialism more like that of the German Empire than any other state. And this transformation was accompanied with a putting on of the appurtenances and thoughts of European civilization to such an extent as to threaten the power of the Japanese Military Bureaucrats. Then the Chino-Japanese war of 1894 was brought on. The enemy upon whom to practice their new and modern war machinery was chosen with care. The war was a national success. And it seated the Military Bureaucracy firmly in the saddle. The whole enterprise was truly Bismarckian.

Again the Russo-Japanese war, undertaken after a period of ten years of financial recuperation and of military and naval preparation, was a profitable enterprise and established a broad bridge-head for obtaining the hegemony of eastern continental Asia as it brought Korea and Manchuria virtually under Japanese domination. (Pp. 11-12). ✓

The harvests reaped in these first two of the decennial wars of Japan seem insignificant, however, when compared to the harvest that has come to Japan from the war in which she embarked in 1914. Defacto she dominates cific except those under our flags. And there is no voice Shantung and almost all of the islands of the North Pa-Sakhamn, Eastern Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia, Korea, in Peking that compares to that of Japan. In total the third of her decennial wars has brought her dominion over new land and sea areas greater than the combined area of the United States and Mexico and has nearly doubled the number of people who are the virtual subjects of the Mikado, making them in total about equal to the number of inhabitants of the United States. (P. 12). ✓

The imminent problem of the Pacific Islands: Shall it be an English-speaking Ocean as is the Atlantic, open and free for the peaceful uses of all, or shall the Pacific be a Japanese Ocean with its Asiatic shores closed to our trade and with Asiatic bridgeheads in our lands sustained by naval lines of communication we cannot command? (P. 16). ✓

Without detail we may say that our "Mission" is to assure security to the English-speaking nations of the Pacific and to extend the shield of English-speaking justice to those around that ocean who are too weak to obtain justice and freedom for themselves.

The principal external obstacle to our accomplishment of our mission is the political, economic, military and maritime imperialism of Japan, who is overrunning Asia and spreading her net across the Pacific with the patent intent ultimately to dominate its shores. The principal internal obstacle to our accomplishment of our mission is our lack of clear understanding of our problem and our tendency to what a Japanese once described as "benevolent credulity." (Pp. 17-18). ✓

Whether the white or the yellow predominates in ocean transport determines whether the ocean is a white rampart extending to the yellow shores, or a yellow rampart extending to our white shores. That is a basic law of sea power. (P. 19). ✓

When this century dawned there was accepted by the Powers of the world a new-born American doctrine designed to be defensive of Asia against imperialism, just as the Monroe Doctrine, now within three years of its centennial, was designed to defend our western hemisphere against imperialism. This new American doctrine over twenty years ago was christened the "Open Door". Broadly speaking it set up the policy that outside the

special spheres of influence as existing in China in 1899, there should be no more acquisitions of special or exclusive rights by any of the Powers subscribing to it, among which powers were Great Britain, Japan, Germany and Russia. Outside the ten existing spheres all were to remain on a parity. The door was to be open equally to all, and consequently it was hoped that the integrity of China would be preserved and there would be an end to imperialistic encroachments in that part of the world. (P. 20). ✓

A war between Britain and America would be a war to ruin both Britain and America and to make Japan mistress of the world. (P. 24). ✓

For then England will realize the truth of what Premier Hughes of Australia said in September, 1920; then England will realize that every battleship that the United States puts on the Pacific saves England from having to put one there for the defense of the Britannic nations of the Pacific; and realizing this, England will say with Premier Hughes: "We rejoice over the launching of each new American battleship; it is another brick in our citadel of safety."

There should be no question from our point of view as to whether the American navy may have to become bigger than the British navy or can remain smaller than the British navy. Our soul guide must bethat the American navy be adequate to perform the task it may have to perform in defending our white preponderance on the Pacific. For a navy to be inadequate is for it to be futile. The German High Seas Fleet vis-a-vis the British Grand Fleet is a recent proof of this. (Pp. 25-26). ✓

It is well recognized in land warfare that sometimes local areas of comparatively lesser strategic importance have to be sacrificed temporarily to the enemy in order to sustain areas of greater strategic importance. Temporary local casualties are always deplorable; but sometimes they have to be endured in order to avoid a permanent national calamity. This is as true in naval warfare and coast defense as it is in land warfare. (P. 28). pp 27-28 ✓

—THE SURE WAY TO AVOID WAR—Indeed there are certain considerations, the details of which I am not prepared to discuss, that lead conclusively to the conviction, first, that unless our Pacific naval force is adequate we invite war in the Pacific, and, second, that if at this juncture and in view of our resources relative to those of Japan now, we force an overwhelmingly preponderant naval power on the Pacific, we can win its command and restrict Japanese imperialism in Asia without firing a shot. The sure way to avoid war is to make it impossible for a potential enemy to think of war—except as a means of national suicide. (P. 29). ✓

Not two months ago I heard your distinguished Canadian delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, the Honorable N. W. Rowell, close a great address to a New York audience in the following language:

"I believe it is a cardinal principle of Canadian public policy that Canada, associated politically with Great Britain, and geographically with the United States, the daughter of one, the sister of the other, and bound to both by ties of race, of language, and of common ideals, should seek to interpret the one to the other and to promote that cordial understanding and whole-hearted cooperation so urgently needed in view of the critical world situation so that the men of our race, in whatever land they may dwell, under whichever flag they may live, may march together to further those ideals of peace, justice and ordered liberty for which humanity anxiously waits and upon the realization of which the future of our present civilization depends." (Pp. 30-31). ✓

Gardiner—Washington Conference.

It was natural for Japan to suppose that, having called the Conference, the United States would be prepared to pay a high price to make it a success and might, therefore, be induced to a commitment that would constitute a positive improvement of Japan's politico-naval situation. The problem was to determine on an objective of great naval advantage to Japan, such an objective as would render unnecessary further expansion of Japan's navy while protecting her political policy, and such an objective as might be attained by astute diplomacy at the conference. p. 523-4

From the course pursued by the Japanese from the moment of their arrival at Washington it was evident that they came with such a plan, prepared by the co-operation of statesman who understood naval strategy with naval strategists who understood statescraft. And, as will appear, they thereby gained an unprecedented naval victory, pregnant with political possibilities for which it would be difficult to find a parallel in history. (Chapter II). p. 524 ✓

**the Chinese expected that American idealism as to China would receive material support from the fact that when the Open Door Doctrine was inaugurated, in 1900, the exports of the United States to Asia had amounted to only about \$65 millions, which was only about 1.4 percent of the total of American exports for that year; whereas, these exports had increased to over \$770 millions for 1920 and constituted nearly 10 percent of the total exports of this country for the last-named year. But, in entertaining such hopes, the Chinese overlooked the fact that the Open Door Doctrine has been merely a talking matter to most Americans, whereas the control of the Open Door is a fighting matter to Japan. And they also overlooked the fact—well understood by the Japanese and other strategists—that the United States would be very seriously handicapped in supporting the Open Door Doctrine, or any other policy in the Far East, against material opposition, because of the naval strategy of the situation. (Chapter II). p. 524 ✓

Right here it should be realized that, if the present personnel of the American navy were to be assigned only to the ships built and to be retained under the limitation plan, and to their auxiliaries, the fleet could not be 50 percent manned. This and other economies now make for the fact that the actual ratio between the American, British, and Japanese fleets is not 5-5-3, but between 4-5-3 and 3-5-3. The truth of this will be appreciated by those who know the relative training in these three navies, and who realize that ships do not fight each other but that it takes trained men to fight ships. (Chapter III). p. 526 ✓

As the present effective force of capital fleets in themselves is not virtually reduced, as the expansion only of capital ships and of airplane carriers is limited and as the expansion in volume of cruiser, destroyer, submarine and any other naval forces is unlimited, it is difficult to see why some have acclaimed this agreement as a tremendous reduction of naval forces. (Chapter III). p. 527 ✓

Considerable as such a saving would be, it would be surprising if any were to weigh a possible saving two years hence of less than 4 per cent of the Federal expenses against the question of whether or not the naval limitations of all kinds, as agreed on, conduce to peace or court war. Nor is a possible future saving of less than 4 per cent of our Federal expenditures to be considered in the same category as is a question greater than that of peace or war—namely, whether the arrangements arrived at conduce to the spread of righteousness or tend to condone unrighteousness. For, above all, "it is righteousness and not peace which should bind the conscience of a nation as it should bind the conscience of an individual."

Such considerations lead us to the conclusion that the most important thing for us to attempt to estimate is whether or not the naval limitations agreed on will tend to spread righteousness in the Far East; and, subsidiary to that, whether or not they will tend to maintain peace in the Pacific. (Chapter III). p. 527 ✓

The first mission of all armed force, from the policeman to the navy, is to maintain law and order in consonance with the policies of peace; and this by being of such potency that a breach of the peace would not promise desirable results to anyone, whether an individual or a nation, whose ethics alone are inadequate to keep him from peacemaking. That is what Mahan meant, in part, in saying, "The function of force is to give moral ideas time to take foot." If armed force is unsuccessful in the maintenance of peace, then individual or international war supervenes, and it becomes the duty of the armed forces to stop the war by doing—if necessary—such violence to the peace-breaker that his will or power to continue his warfare will be broken. p. 529 ✓

The basic mission of a navy is to defend its country and those for whose defense its country is responsible. The defense of British overseas domains by the British navy and the defense of the Philippines by the American navy are instances wherein a Power, by assuming suzerainty, has incurred the concomitant and unavoidable moral responsibility for the defense of its dependents. Collateral to this primary mission of defense, there rests upon a navy the duty of supporting the external policies of its country. The Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Doctrine are instances of such policies. (Chapter IV). p. 528 ✓

In the main, the function of a navy in war is to secure freedom of movement by sea for the other armed forces and for the commerce of its nation, while reducing the capacity of the enemy to continue to fight by excluding him from the use of the sea as a channel for his combatant and commercial movements. This securing "the command

of sea communications" is accomplished by the use of two different but interdependent naval forces, one of which depends on "concentration" for its efficacy while the other acts by "dispersion". (Chapter IV). p. 528 ✓

In short, it may be said that the first mission of a battle-fleet is to destroy or confine the battle forces of the enemy so as to enable its own nation's cruiser forces to obtain and maintain dispersed command of all military and commercial movements by sea in the contested area. p. 529 ✓

***In such an event, the battle fleet may be called on to perform its ultimate mission of enabling the landing of an army of invasion, at an appropriate spot, under the protection of the guns of the battle fleet; and collaterally it might be called on to support the invading army in coastal operations. But all of this only after adequate command of sea communications in the critical area has been secured. p. 529 ✓

This whole series of interdependent operations rests on the ability of the battle fleet to take such position as to control the maritime situation in the contested or critical area, such a position being preferably some strategically commanding and adequate advance-operating base with which a reasonably safe line of communication and support can be maintained from the home base. (Chapter IV). p. 529 ✓

From the data from which the above statements were deducted the conclusion seems unavoidable that the limit of the effective return radius or range of the American battle fleet would be about 2,000 miles from its base, if it had to pass—as it would—through submarine-infested areas. p. 530 ✓

**This leads us to the conclusion that naval power is not merely a matter of fleet ratios, of which we have heard so much of late, but that it is also a matter of geography; that the locations of operating naval bases determine the areas in which battle fleets have power—and that beyond those areas their power does not extend. Chapter IV). p. 530 ✓

From this the inevitable conclusion is that the establishment of the status quo as to Far Eastern American defenses has in fact made the United States impotent in the Far East in the event of war—provided Japan keeps submarines enough to oblige the American battle fleet to steam at high speed and, consequently, to burn its fuel so rapidly that it cannot travel far. And the corollary to this impotence of the United States in the Far East is that, as the Japanese Fleet can have the Far Eastern waters to itself, it is really all-powerful there. (Chapter VII). p. 535 ✓

The conclusion seems unavoidable, therefore, that the naval effect of this whole arrangement is not the establishment of a 5-3 ratio of naval power between the United States and Japan with respect to the Far East. On the contrary, it means virtually complete disarmament by the United States in the Far East while Japan—though statistically less heavily armed at home than the United States is at home—is left overwhelmingly armed in the Far East. p. 536 ✓

So in the Far East we have a region in which virtually the equivalent of disarmament of all Powers, except Japan, is proposed—a region in which, therefore, the only reliance will be in the validity of such diplomatic agreements as those in which the advocates of complete disarmament repose so much confidence. Consequently, this region may be looked upon in the immediate future as a localized experiment in disarmament wherein, in spite of Japan's armaments, the world is trying the experiment of relying merely on agreements. (Chapter VII). p. 536 ✓

We have seen that, in effect, the naval treaty puts up a bar that excludes the United States from naval power in the Far East; and we have seen that, with an adequate American fleet at Hawaii, Japan cannot make an attack in force on the United States. This has led many hastily to the conclusion that neither the United States nor Japan can attack each other, while each can defend its own. As none of Japan's important interests, outposts, or moral obligations lie in American waters, and as the American fleet will be powerless to enter Asiatic waters, Japan is safe from American aggression. But the Philippines lie under the very shadow of Japan, and the United States is responsible for them and for their safety, at least until such time as they can maintain their independence. Furthermore, to Continental Asia, lying immediately back of Japan, the United States is under all the moral obligations implied by the Open Door Doctrine. In our dependents and in our moral obligations Japan can assault us vitally. So any statement that the naval agreement debars aggression in the Pacific would seem to be one-sided. (Chapter VII). p. 537 ✓

In the light of these treaties it would seem that the great accomplishment of the Washington Conference has been to reach something of "a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East"—in principle. The value of the entire accomplishment will depend on the spirit with which each and all concerned put these principles into practice. Only as, in the course of years, it becomes manifest that principle is or is not being put into practice, will it be possible to decide whether America and Britain have been wise in virtually withdrawing their great naval police power from the Far East and in giving to Japan an unchecked opportunity to choose her course. (Chapter VII). p. 537-538 ✓

But as year by year the real results of the Washington Conference becomes manifest, we should view them not in a contemporary light only—for our duty runs to our contemporaries only. Actually we who now control the United

States are the beneficiary legatees of all the accumulated product of all of the struggles and of all of the sacrifices of all of our forbears. Back through the first century of our national life, back through our colonial era, back through the rise of England and of the countries that have contributed to our minority population, goes the chain of those painfully accumulated legacies that in us have culminated, making us heirs to all that is implied by American citizenship. If we but pause for a moment to realize that upon us rests the responsibility of administering the accumulated product of the scores of generations that have labored successively to build up our civilization, we cannot fail to recognize our connection with the past and our debt to it; and we cannot but weigh with a new reverence our present decisions as to what we will do with this civilization we call our own. (Chapter VII). pp 537-538-

In the light of such considerations we should see ourselves, not as a generation unique in history, apart from the past and lords of the present. Rather are we but the very transient trustees of the heritage of all for which the past has lived, charged with the duty of administering it for a few years that are of comparatively little moment in themselves; but above all, surcharged with the responsibility of administering today our trust for the future of our successors and of the world in such a manner that they will not look back on us as false trustees, who took our present ease instead of performing our perhaps more painful duty as a sound link in the chain of generation—a link in no wise extraordinary in itself, but one on which rested unusual responsibilities for the foreordaining of the world conditions of life in the immediate and more remote future. (Chapter VII). p. 538-

Geography has ordained that the United States with young Canada on her right and younger Australasia on her left, should constitute the front rank of the whole civilization of Europe facing the newer civilization of awakening Asia. Americans should realize not only the prominence, but more particularly the responsibility, of their position. And Europeans, in spite of their present travels, should realize that the future of white civilization as a whole may require that America take not her eyes off the Pacific, however much she may desire to look helpfully across the Atlantic. And furthermore, Americans should realize the many, many times repeated lesson of history to the effect that, when the people of a civilization become so individualistic and so ease-loving that they care not if their remote dependents are subjugated by a more virile race, that selfish shirking of responsibility, and consequent recession of empire, invariably foretell the downfall of the civilization as a whole—unless an Aurelian and a Diocletian save it from disintegration and destruction as they saved Rome. (Chapter VII). pp 538-9-

Great as may seem the promise today from the agreements arrived at by the Washington Conference, the actual accomplishment of its underlying purpose will be in the hands of those responsible for the maintenance of our civilization as a whole, and by force if need be, until such time as moral ideals shall have taken root and borne adequate fruit throughout the world. (Chapter VII). p. 539.