

SERIAL No.....

(250 copies printed)

EXTRACTS FROM BOOKS READ  
IN CONNECTION WITH  
WAR COLLEGE READING COURSES

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SUBJECTS:

POLICY, COMMAND, STRATEGY, TACTICS

*Arranged Alphabetically by Authors*

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VOLUME II

H — Z

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Prepared by

COMMANDER H. R. STARK, U. S. N.

Naval War College

Class of 1923



## VOLUME II

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Roosevelt.

I want Uncle Sam to be peaceful; I want Uncle Sam to show scrupulous regard for the rights of others; but I want to see Uncle Sam owe his safety to two facts; in the first place, that he will do nothing but good to men; and, in the second place, that he will submit to wrong from no man.

Remember friends, that foreign judgment of us depends not in the least upon what we say we can do, but upon what we can do. I hate to see an American boast in the presence of a foreigner; it exposes him and his country to laughter. It does no good to boast that we are the greatest nation on the face of the earth; but it does help us when we do a great deed that no other nation has done. (Pp. 19-20).

Unjust war is to be abhorred; but woe to the nation that does not make ready to hold its own in time of need against all who would harm it; and woe thrice over to the nation in which the average man loses the fighting edge, loses the power to serve as a soldier if the day of need should arise.

Peace, like freedom, is not a gift that carries long in the hands of cowards, or of those too feeble or too short-sighted to deserve it; and we ask to be given the means to insure that honorable peace which alone is worth having. (P. 22).

The prime and all-important lesson to learn is that while preparedness will not guarantee a nation against war, unpreparedness eventually insures not merely war, but utter disaster. (P. 23).

The blood-and-iron statesman of one nation finds in the milk-and-water statesman of another nation the man predestined through the ages to be his ally and his tool.

The navy of the United States is the right arm of the United States and is emphatically the peacemaker. Woe to our country if we permit that right arm to become palsied or even to become flabby and inefficient! (P. 24).

\*\*\*\*It is of little matter whether any one man fails or succeeds; but the cause shall not fail, for it is the cause of mankind. \*\*\*

No nation can achieve real greatness if its people are not essentially moral and essentially manly; both sets of qualities are necessary. (Pp. 26-27).

No organization can last long enough even to make a beginning in doing practical good to the people unless it is practical; and unless it actually functions instead of confining itself to manifestos and advice. Great is the persuasive power of concrete action! (P. 30).

According to our ability we intend to safeguard the rights of the mighty; but we intend no less jealously to safeguard the rights of the lowly. Our ideal is equal justice for all; justice alike for the rich man and the poor man who do right; and the same stern justice for the rich man and the poor man who do wrong. (P. 32).

The test of a man's worth to the community is the service he renders to it, and we cannot afford to make this test by material considerations alone.

The only value of words uttered or listened to comes when they are transmitted into deeds. (P. 31).

There never yet was a service worth rendering that did not entail sacrifice; and no man renders the highest service if he thinks over much of the sacrifice. (P. 35).

Bring your children up not so that they will shirk difficulties, but so that they will overcome them; not so that they will try to have a soft time of selfish ease, but so that they will have the greatest joy that comes to mankind—the satisfaction of knowing whenever the end may come, that they have led worthy lives. (Pp. 35-36).

Peace treaties and arbitration treaties unbacked by force are not merely useless but mischievous in any serious crisis.

Mere treaties, mere bits of papers, with names signed to them and with no force back of them, have proved utterly worthless for the protection of nations, and where they are the only alternatives it is not only right but necessary that each nation should arm itself so as to be able to cope with any possible foe.

The effective workers for the peace of righteousness were men like Stein, Cavour, and Lincoln; that is, men who dreamed great dreams, but who were also preeminently men of action, who stood for the right, and who knew that the right would fail unless might was put behind it. (P. 37).

#### —THE ROOSEVELT CREED—

I believe in honesty, sincerity and the square deal; in making up one's mind what to do—and doing it.



I believe in fearing God and taking one's own part.

I believe in hitting the line hard when you are right.

I believe in speaking softly and carrying a big stick.

I believe in hard work and honest sport.

I believe in a sane mind and a sane body.

I believe we have room for but one soul loyalty, and that is loyalty to the American people. (P. 42).

The surest way to prevent your boys from being food for cannon is to have them so trained, so prepared, that it will not be safe for any foreign to attack us. Preparedness no more invites war than fire insurance invites fire. (P. 23).

The policeman must be put back of the judge in international law just as he is put back of the judge in municipal law. The effective power of civilization must be put back of civilization's collective purpose to secure reasonable justice between nation and nation. (P. 25).

The only permanently effective type of defensive is the offensive. (P. 23).

Courage, hard work, self mastery, and intelligent effort are all essential to successful life. (P. 35).

If I must choose between righteousness and peace I choose righteousness. (P. 37).

To give up the power to exercise force, and if need be, to exercise it quickly, is to give up every right and every principle that may be challenged.



The main lessons which Henderson sought to teach in this most instructive work were the absolute necessity for initiative, and the ready acceptance of responsibility by even the most subordinate officers, the discipline of self-reliance and the fact that self-reliance could only be gained by the most careful education and training. p. xxi ✓

This was no new theory—General Gneisenau, one of the greatest of Prussian leaders, had recognized its truth as early as 1814. 'What he enjoined', Henderson tells us, 'was that when a subordinate commander had an opportunity of furthering the general plan of attack, and when, were time to be lost in waiting or sending for orders, the opportunity might escape, he was to act without delay. Such too were the orders of Wellington. But when the rifle and breech-loader came to be employed, it was not at first understood that a deeper zone of fire and wider front had so increased the difficulties of command, and occasioned so much delay in transmitting orders, that the same latitude which had hitherto been allowed to the leaders of advanced guards and other detachments, must now be granted to the leaders of the fighting line. p. xxi ✓

'A strong spirit of initiative, correct and deep-rooted instinct and unity of action are the qualities which are essential for the successful leading of the fighting line; and these are created by sound general principles "being engrafted into the flesh and blood", thereby securing intelligent decision; by a careful training of the capacity for independent action; by the uniform tactical education of the officers, and by the constant practice of battle exercises.' (Memoir—Pp. 22-23). xxii, xxiii ✓

'At no single point did the Prussians show themselves superior in courage or hardihood to their opponents. But they did not, like their opponents, rely on natural attributes or martial spirit alone. Officers and men had received the highest training, both of mind and body, that was possible in peace. It was their training which turned the scale'. p. xxiii ✓

Is not the very same lesson being now repeated in Manchuria? The Russians, who considered themselves invincible, trusting to their numbers and their prestige, have been beaten in every instance by the carefully trained Japanese. p. xxiii ✓

Surely these two examples of the futility of numbers and courage without training should be a warning sufficiently clear to rouse the British public to the advisability of taking a real practical interest in their army, and should prevent their waiting until some terrible crisis opens their eyes to the fact that the most disastrous consequences must result to us, as to other nations, from the fatal policy of delaying to prepare for war until war is about to be declared. (Memoir Pp. 23-24). xxiv ✓

War is first and foremost a matter of movement. ✓

In the second place war is a matter of supply. ✓

In the third place war is a matter of destruction. ✓

Fourthly, war is not merely a blind struggle between mobs of individuals, without guidance or coherence, but a conflict of well-organized masses, moving with a view to intelligent co-operation, acting under the impulse of a single will, and directed against a definite object. (P. 1). ✓

These masses, however, are seldom so closely concentrated that the impulse which sets them in motion can be promptly and easily communicated to each, nor can the right objective be selected without some knowledge of the enemy's strength and dispositions. Means of inter-communication, therefore, as well as methods of observation, are of great importance. (P. 1). 2. ✓

In former times, when war was a much slower process, and armies were less highly trained, mistakes at the outset were not necessarily fatal. Under modern conditions the inexperienced commander will not be granted time in which to correct his deficiencies and give himself and his troops the needful practice. The idea of forging generals and soldiers under the hammer of war disappeared with the advent of 'the nation in arms'. It is not too much to say that every state in Europe, except Great Britain, can employ the whole of its resources, physical, material, and intellectual, at the outset. (P. 2). ✓

In all ages the power of intellect has asserted itself in war. It was not courage and experience only that made Hannibal, Alexander and Caesar the greatest names of antiquity, Napoleon, Wellington, and the Archduke Charles were certainly the best educated soldiers of their time; while Lee, Jackson, and Sherman probably knew more of war before they made it than anyone else in the United States. (P. 3). ✓

It was understood, therefore, in the Prussian armies of 1866 and 1870, that no order was to be blindly obeyed unless the superior who issued it was actually present, and therefore cognizant of the situation at the time it was received. If this was not the case, the recipient was to use his own judgment, and act as he believed his



superior would have directed him to do had he been aware how matters stood. Again, officers not in direct communication with Headquarters were expected not only to watch for and to utilize, on their own initiative, all opportunities for furthering the plan of campaign or battle, but, without waiting for instructions, to march to the thunder of the cannon and render prompt assistance wherever it might be required. It was long before the system was cordially accepted, even in Germany itself, and it has been fiercely criticized. (P. 5). ✓

The first step was to make a clear distinction between 'orders' and 'instructions'. An order was to be obeyed, instantly and to the letter. Instructions were an expression of the commander's wishes not to be carried out unless they were manifestly practicable. But orders, in the technical sense, were not to be issued except by an officer actually present with the body of troops concerned, and fully aware of the situation; otherwise 'instructions' only would be sent. The second step was to train all officers to arrive at correct decisions, and so to make certain, so far as possible, that subordinates, when left to themselves, would act as their superiors would wish them to do. The third step was to discourage to the utmost the spirit of rash and selfish enterprise. (P. 6). ✓

\*\*\*\*The second means is a systematic encouragement, from the first moment an officer joins his regiment, of the spirit of initiative, of independent judgment, and self-reliance. Each has his definite responsibilities, and superiors are forbidden, in the most stringent terms, to entrench upon the prerogatives of their subordinates. The third means is the enforcement of the strictest discipline, and the development of camaraderie in the highest sense. Despite the latitude that is accorded him, absolute and punctual obedience to the most trifling 'order' is exacted from the German officer; while devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice, exalted to the same level as personal honour, and inculcated as the loftiest sentiment by which the soldier can be inspired, are trusted to counteract the tendencies of personal ambition. (P. 7). ✓

It may be remarked that Napoleon at St. Helena, in his criticisms of his marshals, frequently made use of the significant expression that so-and-so failed 'because he did not understand my system'. It is possible that Moltke, the real founder of the German system, took those words to heart. Be this as it may he knew not only how to command an army, but how to teach an army; how to form skilled leaders, strategists and tacticians, men who could plan, execute, and instruct; and in this respect he was far superior to Napoleon, or indeed to any general of modern times. In 1866 the system was not quite perfected; but in 1870 there were few German officers who were not thoroughly penetrated with the ideas of the chief of the staff; few who did not thoroughly understand how to interpret and how to issue 'orders' and 'instructions'. (P. 7). ✓

\*\*\*\*No well-organized army can afford to dispense with the initiative of the subordinate leaders for it is the determining factor in modern war, and up to the present it has been monopolized by Germany'. (P. 9). ✓

\*\*\*\*Yet the skill with which they planned the preliminaries was the foundation of the victories. Had not the general scheme of operations been thoroughly sound, the judgment and initiative of the subordinate leaders would assuredly have gone astray. But Moltke committed no mistake. Long before war had been declared every possible preparation had been made. And these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the establishment of magazines. The enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. (P. 11). ✓

\*\*\*\*War is something more than a mere outgrowth of politics. It is a political act, initiated and controlled by the Government, and it is an act of which the issues are far more momentous than any other. And yet no branch of political science is less studied among the Anglo-Saxon communities. That obstacles to a mastery of the subject are very numerous it is idle to deny. A youthful Hohenzollern can be taught by a Moltke; to train the sovereign people to a proper understanding of things military is a different matter. Moreover, it is not easy to find instructors. (P. 12). ✓

\*\*\*\*But if war were more generally and more thoroughly studied, the importance of organization, of training, of education, and of readiness would be more generally appreciated; abuses would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance, efficiency would be something more than a political catchword, and soldiers would be given ample opportunities of becoming masters of every detail of their profession. Nor is this all. A nation that understood something about war would hardly suffer the fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the best-meaning statesmen. And statesmen themselves would realize that when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless; that preparation for defence, whether by the multiplication of roads, the construction of railways, of arsenals, dockyards, fortresses, is not the smallest of their duties; and, lastly, that so far as is possible diplomacy and strategy should keep step. Each one of these points is of far greater importance now than in the past. (P. 13). ✓

Decey's brilliant victory at Manila lost the greater part of its effect because the United States Government was unable to follow up the blow by landing a sufficient force. (P. 16). ✓



\*\*\*It is to be recognized that the amount of preparation must vary with the extent of the frontier and the character of the foe beyond. p. 16 ✓

\*\*\*It is essential, then, that when hostilities across the sea are to be apprehended, the most careful precautions should be taken to ward off the chance of an initial disaster. p. 17 ✓

\*\*\*It will certainly be necessary to construct strong places to secure the lines of communication, to establish ample magazines, to organize local forces, to assemble a fleet of transports, and to keep a large body of troops ready to embark at a moment's notice. But there is no reason, except that of expense, why all this should not be done directly; it becomes clear that war is probable, and why it should not be done without attracting public attention. In this war strategy may easily keep pace with diplomacy, and all that is wanted is the exercise of ordinary foresight, a careful study of the theatre of war, a knowledge of the enemy's resources, and a resolute determination, despite some temporary inconvenience and the outcry of a thoughtless public, to give the enemy no chance of claiming first blood. (P. 16-17) ✓

The action of the French, improbable as it was deemed, had already been provided against; and, in accordance with time-tables drawn up long beforehand, the German army was detained on the Rhine instead of on the Saar. Ninety miles of German territory were thus laid open to the enemy; but the temporary surrender of the border provinces, in the opinion of the great strategist, was a very minor evil compared with the disasters, military and political, that would result from an attempt to hold them. (P. 18). ✓

\*\*\*If, however, the soldier and the statesman are supported by an enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realize that patience is to be preferred to precipitation; that retreat, though inglorious, is not necessarily humiliating, their task is very considerably lightened. (P. 21). ✓

\*\*\*There is no bringing up men again and again to the attack, as in the days of Napoleon; and unless discipline and national spirit are of superior quality, unless even the private soldier is animated by something higher than the mere habit of mechanical obedience, panic, shirking, and wholesale surrender will be the ordinary features of a campaign. (P. 24). ✓

The importance, nay the necessity, that the people, as a governing body, should keep as watchful an eye on its armed forces and the national defences as on diplomacy or legislation is fully realized, naturally enough, only by those nations whose instincts of self-preservation, by reason of the configuration of their frontiers or their political situation, are strongly developed. So remote is the prospect that either British or American soldiers may suddenly be called upon to confront the trained hosts of Continental Europe, that the efficiency of the army has comparatively little interest for the nation at large. (P. 25). ✓

\*\*\*How seldom do we hear a knowledge of strategy referred to as an indispensable acquirement in those who aspire to command? How often is it repeated, although in so doing the speakers betray their own shortcomings, that strategy is a mere matter of common sense? Yet the plain truth is that strategy is not only the determining factor in civilized warfare, but that, in order to apply its principles, the soundest common sense must be most carefully trained. (Memoir—P. 337. XXX 111 ✓

But their idea of a diversion was a series of isolated efforts, made at far distant points; and even so late as 1813 they were oblivious of the self-evident facts that for a diversion to be really effective it must be made with such strength as to constitute a serious threat, and that it should be directed against some vital point. p. 32 -

Whether the improvement in communications, as well as the increase in the size of armies, has not greatly weakened the value of diversions on the mainland, it is difficult to say. (P. 337. 32 ✓

The relative values of the different kinds of communication have a most important bearing on the art of war. A great waterway, such as the Nile, the Mississippi, the Danube, or the Ganges, is safer and surer than a railway. But railways are far more numerous than navigable rivers, and a series of parallel lines is thus a better means of supplying a large army. But neither railways nor waterways as lines of supply or of operation are to be compared with the sea. (P. 34). ✓

But if the enemy's army, supported by a powerful fleet, were to advance across the blue water, the case would be very different. Its movements would be veiled in the most complete secrecy. It would be impossible to do more than guess at its objective. It might strike at any point along hundreds of miles of coast, or it might shift from one point to another, perhaps far distant, in absolute security; it could bewilder the enemy with feints, and cause him to disperse his forces over the whole seaboard. Surprise and freedom of movements are pre-eminently the weapons of Power that commands the sea. (Pp. 34-35). ✓

The power of striking like a 'bolt from the blue' is of the very greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of almost all the grand strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come. The first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary, and to strike where he is least expected. And the measures he adopts to accomplish his purpose are not easily ~~divined~~. p. 35 ✓



To what Federal soldier did it occur, on the morning of Chancellorsville, that Lee, confronted by 90,000 men, would detach the half of his own small force of 50,000 to attack his enemy in flank and rear? The course which appeared to ordinarily minds so beset by difficulties and dangers as to be outside the pale of practical strategy has, over and over again been that which led to decisive victory, and if there is one lesson more valuable than another as regards national defense, it is that preparation cannot be too careful, or precautions overdone. (Pp. 35-36). ✓

Overwhelming numbers, adequately trained, commanded, and equipped, are the only means of ensuring absolute security. But a numerical preponderance, either by land or sea, over all possible hostile combinations, is unattainable, and in default the only sound policy is to take timely and ample precautions against all enterprises which are even remotely possible. There is nothing more to be dreaded in war than the combined labours of a thoroughly well-trained general staff, except the intellect and audacity of a great strategist. The ordinary mind, even if it does not shrink from great danger, sees no way of surmounting great difficulties; and any operation which involves both vast dangers and vast difficulties it scoffs at as chimerical. The heaven-born strategist, on the other hand, 'takes no counsel of his fears'. Knowing that success is seldom to be won without incurring risks, he is always greatly daring; and by the skill with which he overcomes all obstacles, and even uses them, as Hannibal and Napoleon did the Alps, and as some great captain of the future may use the sea, to further his purpose, and surprise his adversary, he shows his superiority to the common herd. (P. 36). ✓

Strategy, according to the official text book of the British infantry, is the art of bringing the enemy to battle, while tactics are the methods by which a commander seeks to overwhelm him when battle is joined. It will thus be seen that strategy leads up to the actual fighting—that is, to the tactical decision; but while the two armies are seeking to destroy each other it remains in abeyance, to spring once more into operation as soon as the issue is decided. It will also be observed that the end of strategy is the pitched battle; and it is hardly necessary to point out that the encounter at which the strategist aims is one in which every possible advantage of numbers, ground, supplies, and morale shall be secured to himself, and which shall end in his enemy's annihilation. p. 39 ✓

The means by which this desirable consummation is attained are many, but the guiding principle is generally the same, and may be summed up in Napoleon's dictum, the secret of war lies in the communications. The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. (P. 39). 39 ✓

There are certain principles, however, which serve as guides; and it will be seen that they are all accessory to a rule of strategy which is intimately connected with that which bids us strike at the enemy's communications, viz., the concentration of superior strength, physical and moral, on the field of battle. (P. 40). ✓

\*\*\*\*(a) If the superior army is not yet concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot readily support each other, it may be defeated in detail. (b) If the superior army is concentrated, its commander, by one means or another, may be induced to make detachments and thus be weak everywhere. p. 41 ✓

To accomplish (a) the means are:—1. More rapid mobilization. 2. Surprises, effected by hard marching, secrecy, feints, and the adoption of an unexpected line of operations. p. 41 ✓

To accomplish (b); 1. The skilful use of detached forces, threatening points which the enemy is bound to protect, such as his immediate base of operations, or his line of supply. 2. Concealment, begetting uncertainty and apprehension. 3. Drawing the enemy forward to 'a zone of maneuver' where topographical obstacles, the difficulties of supply, or judicious feints will compel him to split up his army. (P. 41). ✓

The moral equilibrium of the commander is often of even greater importance than the spirit of his troops. If that equilibrium can be upset, or his imagination so played upon that he gives way to recklessness, over-confidence, or despair, victory should be very near. The methods which may be employed are numerous:

1. Drawing the enemy into a trap by an apparent dispersion of the forces against him.
2. Feigned retreat, inducing the enemy to pursue needlessly, and so commit mistakes.
3. Spreading false information.
4. Changing the base, and adopting a new and unexpected line of operations. This is one of the most effective weapons in the armoury of the strategist, who thereby not only secures great freedom of maneuver, but may completely baffle his adversary's penetration.

Lastly, there are two great principles which are the foundation and the crown of all strategical methods, and which strike heavily and directly at the moral both of the hostile commander and of the troops he commands. They have been defined for us by Stonewall Jackson. pp. 41-42 ✓



1. Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy. P. 42 ✓

2. Never give up the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow, for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can be defeated by half their numbers. To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war. (P. 42). ✓

It will be noted that some of these principles are to a certain extent conflicting. The concentration of the whole army in one body is undoubtedly a rule which is not to be infringed with impunity, and yet the use of detached forces is continually recommended as the surest means of making the enemy disperse his troops or commit other mistakes. The fact is, however, that strategical principles are neither to be rigidly applied nor over-scrupulously respected. They are to be obeyed rather in the spirit than in the letter; and the strategist, to be successful must know exactly how far he can go in disregarding or in modifying them, and be ingenious enough to bring those into adjustment which are apparently irreconcilable. For instance, a superior army may derive the greatest advantage from a breach of the rule of concentration. If it divides at the outset into two wings, each approaching the enemy on a different line, and possibly supplied from a different base, it may not only cause the enemy the very greatest embarrassment, but eventually crush him between them. (Pp. 42-43). ✓

The soldier, on the other hand, is aware that full knowledge on any one point connected with the enemy is seldom forthcoming; that the data of the problems to be solved are never clear; that the condition of affairs has always to be more or less inferred; and that almost every operation is so involved in uncertainty, from beginning to end, that success is invariably a matter of doubt. 'I have fought', said Wellington, 'a sufficient number of battles to know that the result is never certain, even with the best arrangements'; and it is within the experience of all those who have had to do with strategy in the field that the density of the 'fog of war' is almost appalling. (P. 44). ✓

War is assuredly no mechanical art. Broadly speaking, it is a war between the brains and the grit of the two commanders, in which each strives to outwit and outlast the other; a conflict in which accident plays so prominent a part that mistakes, in one form or another, are absolutely unavoidable. It is thus preeminently the art of the man who dares take the risk; of the man who thinks deeply and thinks clearly; of the man who, when accident intervenes, is not thereby cast down, but changes his plans and his dispositions with the readiness of a resolute and reflective mind, which, so far as is possible, has foreseen and provided against mischance. Particularly is this the case with strategy. The tactical errors of a commander have often been redeemed by the skill and courage of his troops, but it is seldom indeed, against a vigilant enemy, that a strategical blunder does not carry its own punishment. Defeat, indeed is far more often due to bad strategy than to bad tactics. An army may even be almost uniformly victorious in battle, yet, ultimately be compelled to yield. (P. 45). ✓

We have not far to go to find the whole case put before us in a nutshell. 'The only right way of learning the science of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains'. Such is the opinion of Napoleon; and he is a bold man who dares set himself in opposition to the great Corsican, who, if not the finest soldier that ever lived, was at least one of the most sagacious of men. What could be more beneficial to the soldier than that the atmosphere he breathes from the first hour he determines on the profession of arms should be purely military; that the traditions of the army should be constantly before him, the campaigns of great generals, the groundwork of his daily study, and famous marches or maneuvers the commonplaces of his ordinary knowledge? (P. 48). pp 47-48 ✓

\*\*\*\*A cavalry without the true cavalry spirit, lacking all spark of chivalry, and jibbing at the prospect of self-sacrifice, would be of small value in shock-tactics; yet, if this spirit is not to disappear, it must be sedulously fostered. The cavalry soldier must be taught to consider himself as, first and foremost, the soldier of the charge and of the melee. It is this that he must be led to look upon as the consummation of his training, the justification of his existence, as well as the finest, the most manful act of war. Now, if the cavalry soldier is called a mounted rifleman; if he is told that it is more useful to be a good shot than a good swordsman; if he is continually dismounted in preference to risking something by advancing; if he is not sometimes allowed to lose himself in the exhilaration of a charge, his dash invariably deteriorates. So, while it is absolutely essential that the trooper should be a good skirmisher and a good marksman, it is undoubtedly good policy to relieve him, as far as possible of the necessity of fighting on foot. (Pp. 61-62). ✓

Combinations in war too often 'gang a'ry' from the neglect of some trifling precaution, some vagueness or omission in orders; and in the excitement of battle, or of approaching battle, when arrangements have to be made, possibly on the spur of the moment, for the co-operation of large bodies, unless he has been so trained that the measures necessary to ensure simultaneous and harmonious action occur to him instinctively, it is an exceedingly easy matter even for an able and experienced soldier, to make the most deplorable mistakes. The practice of the staff in peace should not be less constant, to say the very least, than that of the units whose co-operation, as the only road to victory, it is the business of the staff to ensure. (P. 69). ✓



Strategy is the art of bringing the enemy to battle. Combined, or, to use the phraseology of the Napoleonic era, 'grand' tactics are the methods employed for his destruction by a force composed of all arms—that is, of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Each of these possesses a power peculiar to itself, yet is dependent, for the full development of its power, to a greater or less degree upon the aid and co-operation of the rest. Infantry and artillery, unaccompanied by cavalry, if opposed by a force complete in all arms, are practically helpless, always liable to surprise, and whether attacking or defending, hampered by ignorance of the enemy's movements and bewildered by uncertainty. (P. 70). ✓

Of all the errors in the conduct of war, none is more pernicious than the attempt to fight battles according to a sealed pattern. Even the formations in which troops approach the enemy or occupy a position must vary with the circumstances. In like manner, it is impossible to dictate a normal procedure for the combination of the three arms. Certain principles demand respect, for to infringe them generally spells disaster. But even this rule is not absolute. Great victories have been won not merely in spite of great principles being disregarded, but because they have been disregarded; and those are the greatest generals who have known when and where to discard the accepted maxims of war. p. 71 ✓

And herein is the key to successful combinations on the battlefield; the habit of using the wits, of subordinating the rules of theory to the needs of the moment, and if necessary discarding them in toto; the habit of improvising strategems, of inventing on the spot new methods of attack and defense. p. 72 ✓

As we have already implied, the first principles of grand tactics is cooperation, i. e., the full development of the force inherent in each arm at the right place and the right time. (Pp. 71-72). ✓

And yet, today, who remembers his (Wellington's) critics, the leader-writers who vilified him, the general who knew so much better than he did what ought to be done, and how to do it; the enemies who despised him, the regimental officers who abused him? or, if they are remembered, how mean and ridiculous do they appear? P. 88) (88) ✓

\*\*\*\*The aim of every general is to concentrate superior force on the field of battle; thus only can he hope for decisive results. And to concentrate superior numbers strategy must be vigorous. If the enemy divides his forces each separate portion must be crushed before they can concentrate. If he keeps his forces in hand he must be compelled, by skillful maneuvering, to separate them. If, however, he remain concentrated, the inferior force has nothing for it but to fall back to a strongly entrenched position, as Wellington did to Torres Vedras, or to a zone of maneuver, as Napoleon did in 1814, and await its opportunity. Such, broadly and briefly stated, is the whole secret of strategy, and it is evident that in dealing with an enemy in detail a defensive attitude cannot be adopted. The grand object is to prevent the enemy from concentrating, from receiving reinforcements, and from gaining time, and attack is, consequently, the only possible course of action for the superior numbers, except under most unusual conditions. (Pp. 99-100). ✓

\*\*\*\*There he will learn how to outwit, to out-maneuver, to deceive, in one word, to surprise his enemy, and, as has well been said, 'Surprise is the deadliest of all foes', a more terrible instrument of war than even the Lee-Metford rifle or the Maxim gun. (P. 102). ✓

But he (Wellington) left to his country a rich inheritance—the increase of a reputation abroad, which sprang from his achievements and his policy, and the gain at home which a people derives from a noble example and a great name'. p. 106 ✓

Loyalty to his superiors, whether statesmen or soldiers, was the first rule of his life. Whether he approved their action or not, he invariably supported them, and he never permitted himself to criticize. p. 107 ✓

That a soldier should criticize his superiors, either in public or in private, did not square with his ideal of an officer and a gentleman. p. 107 ✓

Men seem to have forgotten that loyalty is not only due to the Crown, but to the State, and to those that represent the State. (Pp. 106-107). ✓

\*\*\*\*It should never be forgotten that success depends far more on the skill of the General than on the efficiency of the troops.....

\*\*\*\*The truth of Napoleon's saying that in war 'it is the man who is wanted and not men' is incontestable; and his own magnificent campaigns of 1796 and 1814 are sufficient in themselves to prove that an able general, although with far inferior numbers, need never despair of success. Let the converse—that superior numbers, if indifferently commanded, may be utterly defeated and demoralized—be taken to heart, and the supreme importance of good leading, and of thorough training in the art of leading, becomes at once apparent. (P. 109). (109) ✓



\*\*\*\*Yet it is to Grand Tactics (the Art of Command) that Napoleon referred when he said, 'Read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains'. (P. 170). ✓

He (Napoleon) found in those campaigns a complete study of human nature under the conditions that exist in war; human nature affected by discipline, by fear, by the need of food, by want of confidence, by over-confidence, by the weight of responsibility, by political interests, by patriotism, by distrust, and by many other things. The lessons he learned from the campaigns he studied so carefully were not mechanical movements and stereotyped combinations. He was not merely an imitator. Not one of his campaigns has its exact prototype in history—but he learned from history the immense value of the moral element in war; to utilize it to the utmost became instinctive, and he played upon the hearts of his enemies and of his own men with a skill which has never been surpassed. (P. 174). ✓

The explanation of the brilliant successes that the great generals gained in spite of rules and against enormous risks is to be found in the fact that they looked not only on the physical side—on the numbers and armament of the enemy—but that they saw his weaknesses; they played upon his susceptibilities and apprehensions; every movement that they made was calculated to destroy the morale and confidence of both general and soldiers; if they made movements which set at definite the rules of war, it was because they were aware that the moral influence of such movements made them absolutely safe; and if in appearance great risks were run, it was with the full knowledge that the enemy's character or his apprehensions would prevent him from taking those simple precautions by which the critics point out that the whole enterprise might easily have been ruined. 'They had penetrated', to use a phrase of the late Colonel Charles Brackenbury, 'their adversary's brain'. (P. 175). ✓

The ordinary general, on the other hand, even if he takes into account the peculiar characteristics of the enemy, does not, like the great generals, take into account the character of the hostile commander; and he runs none of those apparent risks which bring about decisive victories, because he neither understands his opponents' weaknesses, nor the art of turning them to his own advantage. He does not set mind against mind; and yet war is more of a struggle between two human intelligences than between two masses of armed men. p. 176 ✓

When his luggage was captured during the retreat from Moscow, Sir Robert Wilson, the English Commissioner with the Russians, relates that there were found amongst his private papers biographies of all the Russian generals opposed to him. p. 177 ✓

The greatest of all was Lee, and his military secretary writes as follows: 'He studied his adversary, knew his peculiarities, and adapted himself to them. His own methods no one could foresee; he varied them with every change in the commanders opposed to him. p. 177 ✓

But for a knowledge of his own resources, of the field, and of the adversary, some of his movements might have been rash. As it was, they were wisely bold'. (Pp. 177-178). ✓

Look at Lee, in the great campaign of 1864, where he allowed an army, double his numbers, to turn his flank, enticing his adversary into the jungle which is called the "Wilderness of Virginia"—a jungle of which his men knew every path, and of which the Federals knew nothing—in order that he might overwhelm their unweildly masses. (P. 180). ✓

'If', he said, 'I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I have to do in circumstances unexpected by other people; it is reflection, it is meditation.' p. 183

'It is not pretended', says M'Dougall, 'that study will make a dull man brilliant, nor confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature; but the quick, the resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon the practice.' (Pp. 183-185). ✓

'A certain amount of reading, and a certain amount of study is absolutely necessary for anyone who ever wishes to command troops in the field. So far as I know of the study of war, the great thing is to read a little and think a great deal and think of it over and over again'. Lord Wolseley (P. 182). ✓

'If I were to put my finger on the most important lesson that may be drawn from the past I should reply that history teaches us that courage, numbers, armament, and entrenchments are of no avail if the troops are badly led, and that the honor and safety of the empire depends on the skill and knowledge of British officers. (P. 184). ✓

The great fault of the American soldier in the early part of the war was that the obedience he rendered was based on intelligence rather than on habit. He did not resist authority when he considered its demands were reasonable, but when he thought those demands vexatious or unnecessary he remembered his birthright as the citizen of a free state, and refused compliance. (P. 211). ✓



\*\*\*\*Without absolute obedience to the spirit as well as to the letter of the law; without a determination on the part of all to render loyal service and cordial support to every authority, however distasteful such a course may be; without the resolution to forego and to check criticism of the acts of superiors, skill and courage are of no avail. (Pp. 212-213). ✓

Relying on the discipline no less than on the courage of his lieutenants and his soldiery, Grant was able to carry out his policy of wearing out his opponent by incessant attack. The army of the Potomac was employed as if it was a battering-ram, without consciousness and without feeling. It was a machine, perhaps unskillfully used, but challenging admiration by the manner in which it answered every touch of the manipulator. The lesson had taken long to learn but it was thoroughly mastered. Brigadiers and colonels forebore to obtrude their advice upon the general commanding. Divisional leaders no longer asked audience of the President to expose the errors of their superior. No leader of an army corps criticised adversely the plan of battle in the hearing of his troops, as Hooker had done before Fredericksburg. The necessity of cooperation and ready support had become apparent; and the truth was at last recognized that even indifferent tactics have a better chance of success, where those who carry them out are in accord, than more skilful strokes if cordial acquiescence in their expedience is wanting. (Pp. 213-214). ✓

A daring general, like Grant, if he is not tightly bound to one line of supply, will remember Napoleon's maxim 'shun the position in which the enemy wishes you to attack him, especially that which he was fortified'. Of course it may be said that Lee, in allowing Grant to pass round his flank, and then attacking him in the wilderness, showed us the best way to deal with such maneuvers. But this was altogether an exceptional case. Lee relied on the difficulty of the battlefield, on the topography with which he was familiar, and of which his opponents knew next to nothing, and could find out nothing. Pp. 331-332). ✓



## Hocking—Morale and its Enemies.

\*\*\*\*For war summons skill against skill, head against head, staying-power against staying-power, as well as numbers and machines against machines and numbers. When an engine "exerts itself" it spends more power, eats more fuel, but uses no nerve; when a man exerts himself he must bend his will to it. The extremity of the physical effort, the greater the strain on the inner or moral powers. Hence the paradox of war; just because it calls for the maximum material performance, it calls out a maximum of moral resource. As long as guns and bayonets have men behind them, the quality of the men, the quality of their minds and wills, must be counted with the power of the weapons.

And as long as men fight in nations and armies, that subtle but mighty influence that passes from man to man, the temper and spirit of the group, must be counted with the quality of the individual citizen and soldier. Every racial group, every army corps, every regiment, has its own distinctive mentality with which it endows its members, and for which it becomes reputed. And every commander accordingly seeks to know not alone what numbers are against him, but who they are. (Pp. 3-4).

In no war, I judge, has the human quality counted for so much;—the endurance, the initiative, the power of sacrifice, the loyalty, the ability to subordinate personal interest and pride, the power of taking the measure of the event, of discounting the unfavorable turn, of responding to frightfulness with redoubled resolution rather than with fear, of appreciating the real emergency and rising instantly to meet it. It is these qualities of mind and character which in the ensemble go by the name of "morale"; and it is these qualities that hold the balance of power in war.

For war, completely seen, is no mere collision of physical forces; it is a collision of will against will. It is, after all, the mind and will of a nation—a thing intangible and invisible—that assembles the materials of war, the fighting forces, the ordnance, the whole physical array. It is this invisible thing that wages war; it is this same invisible thing that on one side or other must admit the finish and so end it. As things are now, it is the element of "morale" that controls the outcome. (P. 8).

\*\*\*\*Humor is a symptom of margin; a man who has it can do more than fight when he is fighting,—he can look about and find a trick to spring, with the result that we have sergeants who with a handful of men bring in a battalion of prisoners. Or he can make the passing misery dwindle in magnitude for an entire company, as with the Irish corporal in the Philippines, who, as General Shanks narrates, after a hot day's marching and a loss of trail, was sent to the top of a ridge to reconnoitre. When a comrade called up, "I say, Shorty, is this the last hill?" he shouted back, "Yes, the last hill it is; the next one is a mountain." (P. 11).

Perhaps the simplest way of explaining the meaning of morale is to say that what "condition" is to the athlete's body, morale is to the mind. Morale is condition; good morale is good condition of the inner man; it is the state of will in which you can get most from the machinery, deliver blows with the greatest effect, take blows with the least depression, and hold out for the longest time. It is both fighting power and staying power and strength to resist the mental infections which fear, discouragement, and fatigue bring with them, such as eagerness for any kind of peace if only it gives momentary relief, or the irritability that sees large the defects in one's own side until they seem more important than the need of defeating the enemy. And it is the perpetual ability to come back. (P. 14).

\*\*\*\*Perhaps the most important dividing line—one that has already shown itself at various critical points—is that between the willingness to defend and the willingness to attack, between the defensive and the aggressive mentality. (P. 16).

\*\*\*\*Morale is seen in the spirit which is put into obedience, the evident free will with which one adds the touch of briskness and grace to what is required of him. (P. 20).

When we see the high command of Germany referring to a Marne retreat as the taking of "new positions", we can read under the ambiguous accuracy of the phrase a fear of their own public morale. Statesmen of other lands have been known to modify what they felt to be a bitter dose; and usually it has been the morale of the statesman rather than that of the public which has been at fault. Prudent statesmen and censors might learn much from the fact that when the news of the disaster to the British fifth army on the days succeeding March 21st (1918) began to roll in, recruiting both in England and in Canada took a sudden upward leap. The human mind, always apprehensive and trying to decipher the future, doubly so in time of great contingency such as war brings, is chiefly fearful of being protected from the truth.

For the tempering of the truth is the first sign of an attempt to manipulate morale from the exterior; and whatever is recognized as having this aim immediately, and by that fact, becomes suspect. Any agency pro-



fessing to assist morale, any occasion gotten up for the sake of rallying a shaken or sleepy morale, will partially (I do not say wholly) defeat its own purpose. It establishes at once a state of guard and scrutiny on the part of its intended beneficiaries. For as a state of the will of free men, morale can only be evolved by the man himself, his own reaction to his own data. It has been the fundamental error of Germany to suppose that the soul can be controlled by scientific management. (Pp. 21-22).

Morale, for all the greater purposes of war, is a state of faith; and its logic will be the superb and elusive logic of human faith. It is for this reason that morale, while not identical with the righteousness of the cause, can never reach its height unless the aim of the war can be held intact in the undissembled moral sense of the people. This is one of the provisions in the deeper order of things for the slow predominance of the better brands of justice. (P. 23).

\*\*\*\*Soldierly ambition, in fact, is an almost perfect anesthetic for the minor trials incident to life in camp and field; and those officers who are skilled in securing a strong morale are those that take a high personal pride in the technique of their calling, and communicate it, in encouraging fashion, to their command. (P. 108).

\*\*\*\*The foreground of his life is apparently hard-headed, realistic, sordid; the feelings and sentiments that were in evidence during the recruiting campaign have retired to the background. He finds himself summoned to "pack up his troubles in the old kit bag," and if he is wise he does so; but the philosophy of "smile" hardly meets all his requirements; he recognizes it for what it is, less a philosophy than a life-preserver. He is likely to get the impression that his ideals, and the people that talked of them, have somehow gone back on him. (P. 109).

It has sometimes aided me to put things into the right perspective to think of the soldier as the man who lives always at the frontier. \*\*\*\*The foundations of the social order are not laid once for all in a remote past; as long as there are spots of disorder and chaos in the world; there are beginnings to be made. And here the soldier is always found.

In times of peace, he is there, where great canals are being dug, or where forest-reserves are being warded, or where mountain roads are being built, or irrigation projects carried out, or where law and order have broken down. His task is to face original chaos and to create the beginnings of social life. And in times of war, he is still the same thing; the soldier is the perpetual pioneer. (Pp. 109-110).

Perhaps the finest things in the temper of the soldier are these later qualities that only come with experience, steadiness, absence of pretense, and the firm undemonstrative readiness for whatever may happen next. I know of no single name for these qualities, unless it is the word "reality".

\*\*\*\*A training detachment seldom fails to take on the character of its commanding officer to a greater or less degree. (Pp. 144-145).

Perhaps there is here a general principle of training, namely, no hardship for hardship's sake. Morale, which includes a good-will to endure whatever the undertaking calls for, cannot be made without hardship; but for training purposes a line should be drawn at the point where the difficulty in question ceases to be a genuine preparation, and becomes a mere stunt. Thus, for example, night guard duty is a normal part of training. This may involve, later on, standing in ice-water during winter nights; and that is one of the things men will do without a murmur when it is necessary. But it is also one of the things which nobody is better fitted for by practicing it; and to require it as a part of training would be an excess of zeal.

The elimination of friction does not mean molly-coddling the army nor softening the work of training; it means the recognition of waste motion, the removal of useless puzzles, and the diminution of hardship which is without disciplinary value. (Pp. 146-147).

Morale is at bottom a state of will or purpose; and the first factor in any mature human purpose is knowledge, i. e., knowledge of the thing to be gained by the purpose,—the good to be reached or the evil to be averted, or both. Hence, in any development of military morale the supreme worth of the aims of the war must be made the object of particular care.

(Footnote) It is better to take this motive for granted than to tamper with it and belabor it ineffectively, argumentatively, or oratorically. The inspiring speech always has its function; but for the longer thoughts of the soldier in training, nothing but sober truth in the form of information, and reflection will give him the grist he needs. Nothing could be more powerful as a morale-making agency than the action of a nation which should, as it were, lay its cards on the table, before its soldiers in training, and say, "These are the data upon which our decision is based; this is the history of the case; these are the principles involved. Judge for yourself." (Pp. 150-151).

.....Whatever suggests doing things to the army will aid the turning of bodily preparations down the



pugnacity-channel rather than the fear-channel. Fear can better be met by substitution of alternative interests than by directly rebuking it and so recognizing and consolidating it, producing a division within the mind. It is here that "suggestion" has its place; ideas of action and of success can be suggested, ideas of the game side of the operation, rivalry with other units, etc.

In it, the psychology of the soldier joins with that of the man everywhere who has learned to worship the god of things as they are. He has made his mental detour, passed through the stage of special character and contrast to the civilian mind, and has returned to his natural self. It is perhaps only a few who complete the circuit; but those who are genuinely "first in war" are ready without another reversal of character to become the "first in peace". War has been their path to wholeness.

In describing "the soul of the soldier", Lieutenant Morize of the first French Military Mission to this country, said, "To my thinking, that means for you two things,—the spirit of sacrifice and the spirit of discipline". The "spirit of sacrifice" may be taken as another name for the qualities we have been discussing. The "spirit of discipline" is a chapter by itself. (Pp. 116-117).

\*\*\*\*Discipline means subjection; but not subjection to officers. It means subjection of the body to the mind; it means the superiority of the human spirit to the last efforts of wind and weather, and the demons of fear, pain and fatigue. It is the element of Stoicism without which no man can do his living well. (P. 120).

For instance, a solicitor for some charity comes into my office, and asks for a subscription. If I make a subscription, what habit am I forming? Nobody can answer unless he knows why I do it. If I do it because I see everybody else is doing it and I don't want to be out of line, I am forming the habit of social imitation, not of charity. If I do it because I want to impress somebody who happens to be in the office at the time, I am forming the habit of pretense. If I do it to get rid of the solicitor, the habit of evasion. The habit-forming power of any act is determined from inside, not from outside. (P. 125).

If men are at odds with the general spirit or management of things; if they chafe under their rules or hate their rulers—whether the fault is in the rules or in the commanders or in themselves, the regime may bring out the worst in them rather than the best. External discipline, held in place by a vista of punishment, develops chiefly the powers of deception and evasion; makes adepts at beating the rules, and turns the times of freedom and furlough into times of kicking over the traces. And this will be to some extent the tendency of every system which pretends to a greater measure of infallibility than it actually possesses, or which assumes a "military" finality of form which it cannot make good in substance.

But in a democratic army these dangers are at a minimum; the absolute theory of command, is everywhere subordinated to the human equation; authority has learned that it must be built on confidence and good will, that the obedience of the spirit is something which commanders have to earn. (P. 127).

The beginner will at times be too severe for fear of being too lenient, and at others too lenient for fear of being too severe. It is in human nature I will not say to stand, but to prefer, being held to rigorous standards—but only on one condition; that beneath the iron will there is known to be a complete knowledge and consideration of the limits of the human organism. As long as obedience is an act of confidence which commits vital interests into the hands of officers, command must be an act of thorough responsibility; and a large, though unscheduled, part of the life of an army consists in the gradual education of the officers by the privates, through their spontaneous reactions. Hence there is not, and there ought not to be, prestige apart from experience, none like that of the man who has been tested and has made good, who knows his instrument, and is fortified against miscalculation. (Pp. 138-139).

First he spoke to us of our mission, of the utility of training the men in view of the coming fatigues:

Train their arms, train their legs, train their muscles, train their backs. You possess fine qualities: draw on them, for the soles of your feet if necessary but get them into your heads. I have no use for people who are said to be animated by good intentions. Good intentions are not enough. I want people who are determined to get there, and who do.' (P. 139).

'If you want to overturn that wall, don't blunt your bayonet point on it; what is necessary is to break it, shatter it, over turn it, stamp on it, and walk over the ruins, for we are going to walk over ruins. If we have not done so already—(and here he suddenly lowered his voice, and gave it an intonation almost mysterious) it is because we were not ready. We had no explosives, bombs, grenades, minnewerfers, which we now have. And we are going to strike; for we have a stock such as you cannot even have an idea of. We are going to swamp the enemy, strike him everywhere at once,—in his defenses, in his morale,—harass him, madden him, crush him. We will march over nothing but ruins.' (P. 140).

\*\*\*\*The primary enemy of morale is not pessimism, it is plain apathy or indifference; and the conditions



of camp life, especially with an abundance of athletics in the form of vigorous and aggressive games, boxing, etc., are such that indifference, feebleness of spirit, self-centeredness, without much attention, die a natural death.

But fear will never be met by minimizing the occasion; this only drives it to deeper, more private and dangerous recesses. What men have the greatest right to, under the circumstances of battle, is the fullest knowledge of their general situation that can be given them. . . . (P. 165).

It is not incompatible with the suggestion of success to prepare the men with the greatest candor for all contingencies, forestalling in this way the possibility of surprise, the greatest breeder of panic. An officer who has once concealed the worst facts of the situation from his command, can hardly hope for their full confidence,—an indispensable element in any power he may have over their fears. (P. 166).

Above all, the soldier has borne the brunt, and he knows it. What will be the effect of that? What argument is it building up in him today? "Now, civilians, our share is done; we rest on our laurels; give us our leisure, and our reward"? Or is it this: "We have learned to choose the harder part, and to do more than our share; give us your heaviest burdens, and we will show you how men can carry them"?

There is no prophet who ought to venture an answer to these questions, unless he can see with what hidden approvals, rebellions, provisos, the alleged 'habits' are being accepted. It is a man's idea, his philosophy, that fixes the angle of impact of all experiences upon him, and so decides what 'effect' that experience will have. But by the same sign it can be said with some certainty that if the ideas with which a man is carrying on his service are right at the core, its total effect on him—whatever its character or duration—will be for the better; he will come out of it broadened, liberated, ennobled by the daily companionship with duty, wise with the wisdom of one who has explored the extremes of the human lot. (P. 199).



In Professor Bain's chapter 'The Morale Habits' there are some admirable practical remarks laid down. Two great maxims emerge from his treatment. The first is that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, we must take care to launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible. Accumulate all the possible circumstances which shall reinforce the right motives; put yourself assiduously in conditions that encourage the new way; make engagements incompatible with the old; take a public pledge, if the case allows; in short, envelop your resolution with every aid you know. This will give your new beginning such a momentum that the temptation to break down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day during which a breakdown is postponed adds to the chances of its not occurring at all. (P. 145).✓

The second maxim is: Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life. Each lapse is like the letting fall of a ball of string which one is carefully winding up; a single slip undoes more than a great many turns will wind again. Continuity of training is the great means of making the nervous system act infallibly right. As Professor Bain says, "The peculiarity of the moral habits, contradistinguishing them from the intellectual acquisitions, is the presence of two hostile powers, one to be gradually raised into the ascendant over the other. It is necessary above all things, in such a situation, never to lose a battle. Every gain on the wrong side undoes the effect of many conquests on the right. The essential precaution, therefore, is so to regulate the two opposing powers that the one may have a series of uninterrupted successes, until repetition has fortified it to such a degree as to enable it to cope with the opposition, under any circumstances. This is the theoretically best career of mental progress." (Pp. 145-146).✓

A third maxim may be added to the preceding pair: Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain. It is not in the moment of their forming, but in the moment of their producing motor effects, that resolves and aspirations communicate the new 'set' to the brain. As the author last quoted (Bain) remarks: "The actual presence of the practical opportunity alone furnishes the fulcrum upon which the lever can rest, by means of which the moral will may multiply its strength, and raise itself aloft. He who has no solid ground to press against will never get beyond the stage of empty gesture-making". (P. 147). ✓

No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one's sentiments may be, if one have not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act, one's character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions, hell is proverbially paved. And this is an obvious consequence of the principles we have laid down. A character, as J. S. Mill says, 'is a completely fashioned will'; and a will, in the sense in which he means it, is an aggregate of tendencies to act in a firm and prompt and definite way upon all the principal emergencies of life. A tendency to act only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur and the brain 'grows' to their use. When a resolve or a fine glow of feeling is allowed to evaporate without bearing fruit it is worse than a chance lost: it works so as positively to hinder future resolutions and emotions from taking the normal path of discharge. (Pp. 147-148).✓

The weeping of the Russian Lady over the fictitious personage in the play, while her coachman is freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort of thing that everywhere happens on a less glaring scale. (P. 148).✓

Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every day. That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do every day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance which a man pays on his house and goods. The tax does him no good at the time, and possibly may never bring him a return. But if the fire does come, his having paid it will be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has daily insured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when his softer-fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the blast. (P. 146). ✓

The physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most powerful ally of hortatory ethics. The hell to be endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar. The drunken Rip Van Kinkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, 'I won't count this time!' Well! he may not count it and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the less. Down among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in



strict scientific literalness, wiped out. Of course this has its good side as well as its bad one. As we become permanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we become saints in the moral, and authorities and experts in the practical and scientific spheres, by so many separate acts and hours of work. Let no youth have any anxiety about the upshot of his education, whatever the line of it may be. If he keeps faithfully busy each hour of the working day, he may safely leave the final result to itself. He can with perfect certainty count on waking up some fine morning, to find himself one of the competent ones of his generation in whatever pursuit he may have singled out. Silently, between all the details of his business, the power of judging in all that class of matter will have built itself up within him as a possession that will never pass away. Young people should know this truth in advance. The ignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement and faint-heartedness in youths embarking on arduous careers than all other causes put together. (Pp. 149-150), ✓



Knapp—Limitation of Armament.

The Navy is the country's first line of defense, and its personnel deeply feels the responsibility entailed. Its motto for the country is "Safety First"; its duty is far-sighted preparedness—such preparedness as the action of other agencies of the Government may make possible. In advice or action, naval officers have a life-long responsibility for the security of the nation, in which respect they, in common with their brothers of the Army, are in quite a different position from that of any other persons in the Government. Questions of immediate expediency do not have much weight with them, and they are not perhaps so inclined to take chances with national security as those having a shorter tenure of office. Upon them is bound to fall the brunt of an underestimate of the necessity for defensive measures. That they are conservative is the natural consequence. Their conservatism did not, however, go so far as to lead them into opposition to the principle of limitation of armaments. (P. 57) p. 771 ✓

"The U. S., the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder." (P. 57) p. 772 ✓

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified, that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions above specified. (P. 57) p. 772 ✓

The U. S. has in Guam a location for a naval base that is wonderfully situated strategically. To state that its fortifications and equipment are desirable now is to disclose no secret. This is no fault of the Navy which for years has sought in vain for the appropriations to make Guam a secure base. In the Philippines there is another great site for a naval base in the Manila region. The entrance to Manila Bay is fortified, but the fortifications need modernizing and the naval facilities are far from being what would be necessary to support the operations of a fleet in war. To meet a menace to the territories under our flag in the Western Pacific, we need a secure naval base in the Philippines and another intermediate between them and the Hawaiian Islands. While neither Guam nor Manila is in efficient condition to support a fleet in war, up to Feb. sixth last the U. S. possessed the sovereign right to make them so. p. 773 ✓

Naval opinion, is accepting the 5-3 ratio of floating strength between the U. S. and Japan did so on the basis of the status quo of sovereign right—not the status quo of insular fortifications, naval bases and naval facilities. It had no idea that the latter, if proposed, would be entertained nor the former be yielded. . . . For the defense of our Pacific Islands, and with no idea of aggression whatever, secure and well-provided naval bases are necessary. To surrender the right to go beyond the status quo is to make the defense of our western possessions—their retention—well-nigh hopeless in case of need. Should they fall, their recapture would only be possible at the cost of great treasure and of very tedious and lengthy operations. Regarded from the viewpoint of position-comparative distances—Art. XIX is glaringly inequitable to U. S. . . . At practically no cost to themselves they have secured all that they (Japan) have secured all that they were actually straining, and were prepared still further to strain, their financial resources to obtain by their ambitious building program now no longer necessary. p. 774-775 ✓

Art. XIX fatally impairs for the U. S. the 5-3 ratio of floating strength with Japan insofar as the Western Pacific is concerned. The U. S. has yielded the possibility of naval equality in that region; control she has never sought. It is beside the mark to say that we are as well off as we were before the treaty. That is a half truth—true only in the material sense; in the sense of sovereignty we have given up the right to better our situation, and that without adequate return—certainly without return in kind. (P. 8) p. 775 ✓



## Knox—On Morale.

Without one to give direction to the combined efforts there cannot be *unity of action* by the body, nor mutual support between the various parts, and in consequence energy will be neutralized, wasted, and dissipated. By means of a leader the collective effort may be given continuity, and individual or group effort coordinated and thus utilized to the best advantage in the interest of the common purpose——As a corollary to leadership there must also exist discipline. The principal leader, as well as the subordinate leaders, must have control or authority over each of their juniors, to which all subscribe. Adequate authority for the leaders is therefore necessary as a basis for command.....A further essential to efficient collective effort is *organization*.....It is obvious that the collection of men must be equipped with the *physical means* necessary to the accomplishment of their purpose.....The final requisite is good *morale*, which may be defined as sustained confidence, combined with an ardent and enduring determination to do the utmost. Much can be accomplished with such a spirit pervading an organization that is otherwise wholly impossible.....Except where contentment is based on slackness or indiscipline, "happy" ships and fleets are efficient—not that happiness in itself will surely create efficiency directly, but that a carefully nurtured morale unavoidably engenders both contentment and efficiency. (Pp. 1-3).

If Napoleon's estimate of the worth of morale is accepted, which has been done by all the great writers and students of war, and which is substantiated by the experience of all great leaders and testified to by most of them, then it must be admitted that efficiency in strategy and tactics, gunnery and engineering, seamanship and navigation, radio and signals, cleanliness and uniforms, and in fact in all matters to which intense attention is now directed, are after all of only secondary consequence.....

No one will dispute the advantages in war of adequate and efficient materiel, nor of expertness of personnel in its use. These are indeed contributory factors of morale on account of the feeling of confidence which they bring. If, however, morale is neglected for the sake of obtaining such subsidiary advantages, or worse, if the latter are acquired by methods which undermine morale, then we are deceiving ourselves, and such efficiency as has been acquired is without firm basis. In any event the first concern should be the development of morale in a systematic, serious and well digested manner. (P. 4).

Experience has indicated that inherently the fighting efficiency of all the great races of mankind is about equal. The success of one race over another has usually been due to such factors as superior organization, training, leadership and armament. Except under the guidance of a great leader a decided difference in morale between opponents has, as a rule, not existed. Armies and navies have striven to excel their possible opponents in the excellence of their materiel or in the superiority of the training of personnel in its use. Rarely has a systematic or intelligent effort been made to excel through superior morale. This is all the more strange because of the importance of morale and of its relatively undeveloped nature. It would seem logical to suppose that the best chance for superior preparation over any possible enemy lies in the heretofore almost untouched field of morale. (P. 4-5).

The desire to live is basic, and is independent of all intelligence. Fear is the defensive form of the instinct of self-preservation. It takes precedence over all other emotions, and is the most difficult to control..... Our interest in fear, one of the greatest of all obstacles to military success, lies chiefly in understanding it, that we may induce it in the enemy and provide against it in our own forces. In addition to being caused by the instinct of self-preservation, fear is induced by weakness and fatigue.....the effects of surprise are closely akin to those of fear.....While fear is the *defensive* form of the instinct of self-preservation, the *offensive* form of the same instinct is manifested in the emotion known as anger. It is a strange fact that, while both fear and anger have their origin in the same instinct, their effects upon the brain and body are the antithesis of each other. In anger the functioning of the higher brain centers is stimulated and the nerve-control increased. Circulatory vessels are dilated and muscular activity is induced in all parts of the body. In consequence aggression, strength, pride, and feelings of superiority are awakened. It is clear, therefore, that to incite anger is fundamentally one of the best methods for quelling fear. The enemy will furnish a convenient object of anger. (P. 9-11).

A third form of the instinct of self-preservation is found in the emotion of ego, or "self-feeling". A feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's self gives rise to a consciousness of strength or weakness, and a resulting desire for appropriate action. It follows that a well developed ego is a military asset, and will assist in the subordination of fear. (P. 11).

A strong will is the keynote of military character. It is the great bulwark against the detrimental effects of emotion. No great leader has been without one, and the amount of determination permeating the personnel of an army or a fleet is one principal measure of their capacity for sustained confidence, and consequently one of the greatest factors in morale and victory. We are prone to regard strength of will as an inherent quality, acquired only through heredity and incapable of material change by training. In so far as the effect of training is concerned, quite the contrary is the case. (P. 11).



The power of concentration is a quality which can be readily developed by repeated exercise in concentration; and by so doing will power is directly strengthened.

It is difficult to concentrate the mind, no matter how great the desire to do so, unless the subject is a matter which excites interest. Consequently, whatever means may be employed to develop concentration and will, they should be made as interesting as possible. Interest is invariably increased by responsibility; hence the latter is one instrument of will building.

The will is also dependent upon past experience.

We can directly will an act only when we have before done that act, and so have experienced the nature of it. (Royce). (P. 12).

From the preceding it follows that great will power may be acquired by developing a strong power of inhibition, i. e., the ability to concentrate exclusive attention upon a selected objective. Also, that no matter how great the will power, it is impossible to will an act with which one is not familiar. The military application of these principles is obvious. We must familiarize ourselves and our men with the duties that will be required of us in war, and in all drills and exercises the greatest possible interest should be stimulated, and the strictest attention must be insisted upon. (P. 12).

The principal reason why surprise, the great ally of strategy and tactics, is such an effective moral factor, is because it diverts the attention of its victims; thus undermining their will and opening the gates to a flood of emotion, which latter directly prevents efficient mental operation. (P. 13).

In any effort to combat the disorganizing effects of emotion, the will may be greatly aided by sentiments. In such sentiments as pride, self-confidence, confidence in one's companions or leader, self-respect, valor, a sense of duty or of honor, conviction of the utility of discipline, patriotism, a spirit of devotion or of sacrifice, and loyalty to a cause, the physical responses are similar to those induced by anger; that is, the wits are sharpened thru a stimulation given to the activities of the higher brain centers, muscular nerve control is increased, and circulatory vessels are dilated and muscular activity induced.

To reach a high state of development in many of these sentiments, it is essential that the foundation be laid by moral training begun at an early age; while the individual is under the paternal roof, and while he is at school. (P. 13).

No other part of an officer's duty, in peace or war, afloat or ashore, in whatever circumstances he may be placed, is so important as the creation of high morale within his command. (P. 14).

.....The London Times of March 25, 1915, published the following as being an extract from a German brigade order:

"We must do everything possible to prevent the men becoming dull and lethargic. I recommend that the men in rest billets should be given stirring history lessons and, in particular, accounts of the present campaign. All officers must take an active interest in cheering up their men and in drawing together the various classes. Encouragement of every sort prepares the way to victory".

In an article written several years ago, Lieutenant Dewar of the British Navy says:

"The cultivation of morale is not merely commendable, it is a necessity, and it cannot be done by lectures and blackboards alone. It requires a close association between men and the right kind of officers.....The real solution is to choose good petty officers and officers and give them a free hand.... This question of ideals is just as important as questions of rate of pay, for if you have no ideals, expressed or sub-conscious, more pay simply spells more beer". (P. 16).

In the Japanese service great attention is given to the elevation of morale. To indicate their methods of inculcating military sentiments, the following extracts are made from their "Regulations for the Instruction of the Personnel in the Japanese Navy", published several years ago:

"They (officers) should fortify themselves in the sentiments of honor.

The basis of the instruction of the petty officers and men is to make them acquire the disposition and the indispensable talent for battle, so that they may completely fulfill their mission and duties.

At the same time with the moral instruction will be given them the habit and familiarity of the weapons of war.

The moral instruction of the personnel should seek to develop the sentiment of military honor and obedience to the will of the Emperor.



The principal parts of the moral instruction refer to the following topics:

1. The reading and explanation of the imperial decrees delivered to the military, and to men of arms generally.
2. Conferences on the constitution and the history of the empire, to cultivate in the seamen sentiments of fidelity to the person of the Emperor, and to form in them just conceptions of patriotism" ..... "To speak always to the men with the idea of stimulating their sense of valor."
- ..... "V. Conferences on discipline, and special instruction upon the obligation of obedience in military men, habits and customs which they should observe to distinguish them from the rest"..... The obligations of courtesy inherent in all Japanese and the observance of good conduct".

"The naval and military men should ever have a firm resolution and should have besides an esprit de corps, for without it the moral instruction will have no result". (Pp. 16-17).

The methods of training for loyalty may be summarized as follows:

1. By the influence of personal leaders. These should be eager, earnest, and enthusiastic, and if possible convinced—or at least capable of conveying the impression of being convinced. They should be persistent and fittingly aggressive.
2. By idealizing the cause. This is most important.
3. By subjecting the loyalized persons to "great strains, labors, and sacrifices in the service of the cause". In this way loyalty is perfected. (Pp. 19-20).

Another potent sentimental factor is tradition; which is very valuable in itself to stimulate morale directly, and is also useful to the same end indirectly through feelings of loyalty which are fostered by it. Merely because they are not generally well known to the service, the very fine traditions of the American Navy are almost valueless to the present day personnel. There is every reason why this important moral asset should be utilized to the limit of its possibilities. (P. 20).

We officers must prepare ourselves for the work of leaders. We must formulate the cause or causes, idealize them, cultivate high traditions; and then labor continuously and faithfully at the task of creating and fostering a spirit of true loyalty in the service, to the end that, in peace or war, contentment may prevail, proper initiative be permitted, effective unity be obtained, and a high morale dominate the naval service. (P. 20).

The famous reply of John Paul Jones to a demand for the surrender of his vessel, "We haven't yet begun to fight", was an inspiring suggestion to his own crew, and a discouraging one to that of his opponents, which, according to the principles of crowd psychology, doubtless contributed in no small measure to ultimate victory for him. Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes; go ahead!" was no less an inspiring suggestion than an order; as was also, to the ships which were following, the action of his flagship in steaming boldly through the mine fields. (P. 24).

If the object be to impregnate the crowd mind more slowly with ideas, doctrines, or beliefs, other means should be employed. In the first place, simple affirmation, free from reasoning, is a very effectual method. The affirmation should be repeated at intervals; if other impressions intervene between the repeated affirmations, the effect is three times as powerful as if the repetitions were not relieved of monotony by varied impressions. The effect of the last impression given is very great; it is said to be three times as powerful as the combined influence of repeated affirmations with intervening impressions. (P. 24).

.....The tendency of discipline is to inhibit emotion, but rarely can it wholly do so. Under the tenseness of battle, emotion may become so great as to completely surpress the emotional centers of the crowd's mind, and hence cause conduct to be governed wholly by the lower centers; that is, by habit. (P. 26).

.....Above all, to effectively sway a crowd, earnestness must be exhibited. Especially in time of danger and other emotional conditions do men instinctively look to their officers or other leaders for guidance, and readily accept whatever suggestion emanates from the latter. Evidence of *self-possession*, confidence, courage, resolution and decision in the leaders are reflected psychologically among the men. So are the converse undesirable qualities reflected. Vigor of utterance and action are very potent in their influence. (P. 27).

"Prestige is the mainspring of all authority". It is "a sort of domination exercised on our minds" for reasons of sentiment which cannot be explained. Merely by virtue of the fact that a person holds high office, is influential has a wide reputation, is rich, or possesses a title, he is invested with prestige, irrespective of actual personal merit. A judge's robes, an officer's uniform, a policeman's or a conductor's uniform, and a secret ser-



vice man's badge, are alone sufficient to endow them with a certain degree of prestige. (P. 27).

Prestige also springs from other sources of more meritorious basis. For example, cleanliness and neatness of personal appearance, good manners, savoir-faire, self-possession and poise are instruments of prestige.

Still another form of prestige emanates from personal magnetism as an inherent quality. It is difficult to acquire through cultivation alone, but like most human qualities may be improved through effort. (P. 27).

A prime requisite in an officer is will power. He can never possess too strong a will and therefore should cultivate it assiduously. The means available for developing strength of will thru interest and repeated mental concentration have already been explained. Like all other qualities, will power cannot be brought to a high state of development unless exercises in it be carried out frequently; the practice of habitual self-control in daily life offers a ready and inexhaustible means for the exercise of it. (P. 29).

..... Will power makes possible the pursuit of a purpose, whether it be great or small, with firmness and tenacity, as well as the maintenance of a conviction of ultimate success in spite of adverse events. Bulow says: "One is never whipped so long as he refuses to believe that he is." (P. 30).

By profession, we naval officers are committed to purposely sacrifice our lives, if necessary, for the benefit of the nation. Should the day of final reckoning find us unprepared? It will so find us unless we are then possessed of great strength of will. (P. 31).

Hand in hand with the development of will power should go the cultivation of those attributes which increase the force of the example set by officers. Every officer should cherish his prestige as second only to his honor; and promote it accordingly. Prestige is established by reputation, successful accomplishment, and personal attainments; and is fostered by self-confidence. (P. 31).

The value of poise, as an aid to prestige and to the influence of example, is so great that it should be studiously cultivated. Other personal attainments of much importance to an officer are self-confidence, a vivid imagination, an agreeable manner, a *cheerful disposition*, a sense of humor, and bodily vigor. Last, but not least, the inspirations and ideals must be kept very high. (P. 32).

The officer must have a deep emotional interest in his profession and in the Navy. It is not sufficient that his interest be based upon such motives as earning a living and promoting his career and position.

"But motives on a much higher level, motives which do not refer to the individual as such, but to ideal aims and purposes must be intimately associated with the personal ones. He must feel joy in the service as such, he must have interest in the details of the work and in the problems which it offers, he must be determined by a consciousness of duty which gives him perfect satisfaction when he is loyal to his task, whatever sacrifices it may demand". (Munsterberg). (P. 32).

..... While he may entertain a desire for world peace, it is essential that he become convinced of the impracticability of such a millenium during the present stage of the world's development, while such great varieties of races, customs, religions and languages obtain and while populations and wealth are so unequally distributed. It will be still better if he can reach an inward settled belief in the divine utilitarian purpose of war; a conviction that war is but one of many so-called evils, but in reality blessings in disguise, which the Almighty in His wisdom gives to us. It is not an illogical theory that pain, suffering, privation, poverty, sorrow, and the like, are woven into our lives for the purpose of exercising, and thus developing, our character; nor that war has a similar mission. Remembering the fundamental Christian doctrines of love and self-sacrifice in connection with the unqualified words of Christ, "Greater love hath no man than this: that a man lay down his life for his friends", who can say but that participation in a just war is practicing a high form of Christianity.

"He (the officer) must grasp the fundamental role of war in history as the great vehicle of progress, as the great eradicator of egotism, and as a great educator to a spirit of sacrifice and duty". (Munsterberg). (P. 33).

A navy so permeated cannot fail during peace to persist in the face of every difficulty to prepare itself for war, physically, mentally, and morally. When war breaks out it will embark upon the campaign, not merely with enthusiastic patriotic fervor, which our own history has shown time and time again will cool rapidly under the test of real hardship, but with an inflamed spirit which will be sustained in spite of whatever danger, privation and suffering may be encountered. Our officers and men will then go into battle with irresistible fanaticism, yet with nerves and muscles under such control as to ensure precision of thinking, loading, pointing, sight-setting, range-finding, spotting, plotting, position keeping, and all other operations essential to efficient fighting. Determination to win will endure, in spite of ghastly casualties, until victory is attained. (P. 34).

..... In common with many other elements, efficient and adequate material is necessary; no one will dispute the fact; but physical means can never rise superior to "the guiding hand and the directing brain". (P. 35).



## Knox—Great Lessons from Nelson for Today.

In one essential quality Nelson did far outshine the other Admirals. He had the gift of a contagious personality capable of inspiring great personal loyalty. While this was an asset of high value, it was not, as the writer reads history, the one conspicuous difference between Nelson and the others, which mainly contributed to his unprecedented success. (P. 298).

Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the eleventh to escape, when it had been possible to have got her, I could never have called it well done. (P. 298).

The incidents cited lead also to the belief that his ideas had taken definite form on such questions as (1) the undesirability of the commander-in-chief directing in action the detailed movements of all his forces; (2) the necessity for mutual and more or less automatic support, as occasion required, between ships of the same side in action; (3) the advisability of entrusting proper initiative to subordinates. (P. 300).

Nelson's own mind was, by constant pre-occupation, familiar beforehand with the bearings of the different conditions of any situation likely to occur, and with the probable inferences to be drawn; his opinions were, so to say, in a constant state of formation and development, ready for instantaneous application to any emergency as it arose. But he had, besides, exercised the same habit in the captains of the ships, by the practice of summoning them on board the flagship, singly or in groups; the slow movement of sailing vessels, particularly in the light summer weather of the Mediterranean, permitting such intercourse without materially affecting the progress of the fleet. (P. 301).

"Nelson, in addition, throughout the whole of that memorable cruise turned the quarterdeck of the Vanguard into what can only be described as a perpetual 'school for captains.' Whenever the weather permitted, he summoned the captains on board the flagship, where, says Berry (Nelson's flag captain), 'he would fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of attack and such plans as he proposed to execute upon falling in with the enemy. Whatever their position or situation might be by night or day'! 'There was no possible position in which they could be found that he did not take into his calculations, and for the most advantageous attack of which he had not digested and arranged the best possible plans. With the masterly ideas of their admiral, therefore, on the subject of naval tactics, every one of his captains was most thoroughly acquainted'! 'This explains why', continued Fitchett, 'when the moment of attack came—and suddenly—signals were so little needed. . . . Nelson in a word was so charging the minds of his captains with his plans, that when the moment for action came. . . . there was no need to spell out clumsily by signal what their admiral wanted them to do. They were already saturated with that knowledge'. (P. 301-302).

Under the conditions of sea fights, having in mind particularly the restricted view of the commander-in-chief, the difficulties of communication between ships, and more especially the time factor, such education and indoctrination were then, and still are, absolutely essential to unity of action in battle. (P. 302).

He appreciated that the opportunity for naval genius to accomplish its work is during the months or years before the day of encounter; that the work of the commander-in-chief is primarily one of preparation. The eve of battle is too late to shape its destiny; no amount of detailed orders or instructions promulgated then can materially influence the issue for good, but may on the other hand by creating confusion, work untold harm.

The fate of the day had been moulded beyond change during the preceding months, so Nelson held his counsel and refrained from supplementing his general signals. (P. 303-304).

Of course, for military purposes, personal loyalty alone is inadequate to the end desired, namely, concerted action before, during, and after battle. The kind of loyalty to the general plan promulgated by the superior. This is the type of military loyalty essential to the accomplishment of great results. But, while perhaps possible in some cases, the separation of "personal" from "plan" loyalty is normally difficult; human nature does not lend itself to it, and it is almost an axiom that the latter loyalty flows directly from the former. It is certainly true that the enthusiastic support given to Nelson's plans, even making due allowance for their excellence, was unusually great, and was no doubt colored by loyalty to his person. (P. 307).

His confidential secretary during this period wrote "Even for debating the most important naval business, he preferred a turn on the quarterdeck with his captains, whom he led by his own frankness to express themselves freely, to all the stiffness and formality of a council of war". Another officer serving on the Victory at about the same time makes the comment that "when the weather and the service permitted, he very often had several of the admirals and captains to dine with him; who were mostly invited by signal, the rotation of seniority being commonly observed by his Lordship in these invitations". (P. 308).

To indicate Nelson's own conception of the limited function of the commander-in-chief during the approach



to, as well as during the progress of battle, the following incident is related: As contact between the two fleets became imminent, and after all signals but that for close action had been made and acknowledged, he said to Blackwood: "Now I can do no more. We must trust to the Great Disposer of all events and to the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty". (P. 310).

Education.—At all events no way of teaching is more effective than that which draws out the pupil to formulate his own ideas after due reflection, and to give expression to them. No learning is acquired well which is not the product of one's own effort. It may well be imagined that, following Nelson's "talks", his subordinates spent many a quiet hour in the seclusion of their own cabins, pondering and reflecting over what he, and they themselves, had said. Study and reflection are logical, if not indispensable, preludes to decision and action. This truism is sound today as it was in the year 1798. It is not to be supposed that these methods failed to be of value to the master himself. While his conceptions and development were much in advance of those of the pupils, the system of instruction nevertheless must have contributed in great measure to the advancement of Nelson himself—genius that he was. An application of this system at the present time would surely be beneficial to any set of captains and to any commander-in-chief. (P. 312).

TRAINING—Which in Nelson's time was obtained almost wholly through battle itself. Modern development and conditions have not only made other forms of tactical training possible, but also indeed have rendered them imperatively necessary. Wars come these days with little warning, are accompanied by the employment of a maximum concentrated force almost immediately after their outbreak, and may be frequently decided by one big naval engagement. The navy, then, which postpones its tactical training until the day of battle will most likely cease on that day to be a navy.

Education without training is inadequate to produce satisfactory results. Practical work is necessary to ripen the fruit of academic work. But it is also true that training alone, without education, cannot produce the desired degree of excellence. The two are complementary, and both in balanced combination, are necessary to the end of tactical efficiency, and to success in battle. (P. 22-23).

Indoctrination.—Which consisted in the imparting of Nelson's own ideas and beliefs, as they developed, to his subordinates in such manner as to carry conviction of their correctness. The process of education was, in effect, itself one of indoctrination both of Nelson and of his subordinates, because indoctrination consists essentially in learning to think alike, that is, to have similar convictions about fundamentals.

The value of doctrine based on universal conviction is, in a military organization, very great. It inspires all with mutual confidence, thus furnishing a moral force of great power; it promotes concentration of purpose and effort and by these means permits unity of action; it is one of the essential requirements preliminary to the proper and effective use of initiative by subordinates; it inspires loyalty to plan; it permits the maximum advantage to be taken of the "time factor"; and it reduces enormously the number and complexity of orders and of signals necessary to carry a plan into execution. (P. 313).

The "method" which he (Nelson) evolved was unique, and, when in proper working order, gave to the fleet the functions of an automatic machine, wherein, the broad plan alone being specified, there followed that type of co-ordinated effort which multiplied many fold the strength of the fleet as compared to what was possible to effect through the detailed consecutive direction of the commander-in-chief alone. (P. 27).

\*\*\*Now, as in 1805, the die is cast when action is joined. It is too late then for specific detailed directions. (P. 28).

The Inspiration of Loyalty—As has been pointed out Nelson was fortunate in possessing a magnetic personality sufficient to inspire the great personal loyalty which formed the basis of the very essential "plan" loyalty exhibited by his subordinates on all occasions. Yet he fortified this divine gift in many humble ways. He was invariably loyal to those who served him. He kept them always informed, as far as could properly be done, of news which he had received, of his opinions, general intentions and plans. A subordinate always likes to know, as a matter of human interest if nothing more, what has happened, what is likely to happen, and the reasons therefor; and his personal loyalty is increased by being taken into the confidence of his chief. There are of course many other means available for stimulating personal loyalty. Without rigid loyalty to the spirit of the general plan the granting of initiative becomes a grave danger, and united action an impossibility. (Pp. 313-314).

(Mahan) \*\* "I have an exceedingly good ship's company; not a man or officer in her I would wish to change.....I am perfectly satisfied with both officers and ship's company". In 1805, while in London consulting with the First Lord of the Admiralty concerning dispositions to be made before his assuming command of the fleet for the last time, he was asked to express his preferences for ship commanders. His reply was "Choose yourself, my Lord: the same spirit actuates the whole profession; you cannot choose wrong". Now making all due allowance for a generous, charitable and impulsive nature, it can scarcely be fairly maintained that he was



oblivious to the military value of stimulating the personal loyalty of his subordinates, not that to some degree he did not do so studiously and deliberately. As is well known personal loyalty to a superior is to a great extent engendered by due loyalty of the latter to his subordinates. That is, "loyalty down" is an essential element in "loyalty up". (P. 15).

Here is seen, at its best, the combination of "personal" and "plan" loyalty, closely interwoven. He would be bold indeed who would dispute that this combination contributed very largely to the great results which followed closely afterwards. (P. 16).

The giving of Initiative.—But little reflection is required to comprehend the very great danger inherent in the exercise of initiative by subordinate commanders unless they know what they are about.

For many obvious reasons the use of some measure of initiative in action is of great value. But the writer is not content to rest the case here. He maintains that it is imperatively necessary to any great success. This is true because of the very vital, ever present and always pressing time factor.

Under these circumstances, to expect a subordinate commander to postpone an obviously desirable movement until he receives orders to do so, or until he has acquainted the commander-in-chief with the situation and obtained in reply permission to do so, would seem to be the height of folly and the forerunner of defeat. Such a course would be criminally wasteful of opportunities; every movement would be too late.

At the risk of tedious repetition, let me say again for the sake of greater emphasis, that the proper use of initiative is vitally necessary; and that initiative not only cannot be used properly but will be attended by grave risks, unless the men entrusted with it have been previously educated, trained, indoctrinated and loyalized. (P. 314).

\*\* Initiative unrestrained by due loyalty leads to fatal dispersion of effort, because of the danger that some subordinate commanders may be tempted too far by the glamor of personal distinction or by the belief that some particular course of action is better than the one prescribed. (P. 14).

MAHAN \*\* "Upon his own subordinates Nelson laid a distinct charge, that he should expect them to use their judgment and act upon it with independence, sure of his generous construction and support of their action; .....he was emphatic in his expression of commendation for action rightly taken; a bare, cold approval was not reward for deeds which he expected to reproduce his own spirit and temper, vivifying the whole of his command, and making his presence virtually co-extensive with its utmost limits. ....To deny an officer discretion was as scathing an expression of dissatisfaction as Nelson could utter; and as he sowed, so he reaped, in a devotion and vigor of service few have elicited equally". (P. 18).

The Formulation and Dissemination of Plan—The foregoing closely related elements being accepted, each in its own sphere, as essential parts of the "method", it will become apparent that still another was an integral part thereof. A focus of the effort of the separated units of the fleet was necessary and was supplied by the formulation of a general plan of action and by thoroughly acquainting all with its substance. Nelson's plans, particularly that for Trafalgar, were models for completeness, without unduly specifying details. The "system" took all the care of the details that was necessary, after the subordinate commanders had been acquainted with the general wishes and intentions of the commander-in-chief.

The plan once promulgated, and fortified by the preceding elements, the commander-in-chief of a large fleet, besides stimulating morale, can do little more to shape the action. (Pp. 315-316).

7. The Stimulation of Morale.—The accomplishment of each of the above six elements, is in itself a means for elevating the moral force of the personnel. When all of them in combination have been affected, universal confidence and combative ardor have been assured. No one knew this better than Nelson, yet he took pains on more than one occasion to raise the "fighting edge" to the highest pitch, the famous signal during the approach at Trafalgar being the best example, and the "method" cannot be considered as complete without a due recognition of this final element. (P. 316).

Little more need be said. The unchanging principle of concentrating the whole against a part, in time, was irresistible. It was the band of trained, mutually understanding, loyal "brothers" which had done it, after the broad general outline of the manner in which the chief wished the concentration to be done had been made known to them, by the original plan supplemented by a few—a very few—simple signals. (P. 20).

Few will dispute that tactical genius shone in most of his deeds on the field of battle, nor that even greater tactical genius was displayed in his plans for battle, but the writer hopes that enough has been said to show that Nelson's greatest claim to fame lay in his ability to prepare a fleet for battle, rather than in his skill in its conduct during battle or in formulating tactical plans therefor. (Pp. 316-317).



"The business of an English commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's fleet to battle, on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that of laying his ship close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible), and secondly to continue them there without separating, until the business is decided; I am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honor to command will, knowing my precise object, that of close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals; which may, if extended beyond these objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for, very probably, from various causes, be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make; therefore, it will only requisite for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object. (Pp. 317-218).



Most of us are approaching a point in command where we may cease to be the *followers of leaders* to become *leaders of followers*, which change is very great and, which we must be ready for when it comes. P 2043-

It is not difficult to order, control, and dispose of when one has the power to compel obedience, but to do those things in the way to get the best results is an altogether different matter. (P. 2043). ✓

From the above it would appear that there are three fundamentals for success in high command:—First, knowledge of exactly what is to be accomplished; Second, ability to lay out the certain way to accomplish it with the forces at one's disposal; and Third, skill in directing and leading the forces commanded so they will do the thing to be accomplished in the way decided on to do it. If he who holds a position of high command develops these three fundamentals, *knowledge, planning, execution*, his success is certain. Therefore let us see what he must do to develop them. (P. 2045). ✓

..... Knowledge of war and ability to plan war operations will not by themselves gain decisions in war and this must never be forgotten. Sound plans based on even full knowledge of war bring favorable decisions only when they are properly executed. This being so it behooves us to go deeply into the matter of execution. P 2046

What must a high commander do to insure that the forces he commands will carry out his plans successfully? Operating on a sound plan, forces organized and indoctrinated for their task, well disciplined through proper training in team work, loyal and of high morale will always win the decision if it is humanly possible to do so in the existing situation. Therefore the answer to our question as to what the commander must do to make his forces succeed seems to lie in (1) Organization, (2) Indoctrination, (3) Discipline, (4) Training, (5) Team work, (6) Morale, and (7) Loyalty. Let us discuss each of these until we clearly see not only its relation to the execution of plans but also how we may develop it in the forces we command. (Pp. 2046-2047). ✓

The first step in developing a war machine is to organize it properly to do the work it will be expected to do in war. Such organization is much less difficult to bring about than is generally supposed provided that efficiency for the task is made the criterion. Unfortunately, and all too often, those in high command sometimes let other things than fighting efficiency dictate the organization of their forces, and as a result they frequently wind up with commands that can do almost anything but the one thing they are wanted for, fighting. We have had this situation even in our own Navy and will continue to have it whenever organization is based on anything but the fighting factor. Therefore on coming to a position of high command, the first thing an officer has to do is to make estimates of the situation, ascertain who the probable enemy or enemies are, determine the fighting his command may be called on to do in case of war with them, and then decide on how he will carry on the fight and on his task organization to fight that way. This task organization for war, derived from those estimates, is the organization a commander should use for his forces, not just during war but during peace as well. (Pp. 2047-2048). ✓

When he has done that, it then becomes his duty to arrange the whole Navy, including the Department, into such task groups as are called for by the plans he adopts. It takes no law to enable him to do it; it takes merely a strong man who knows what he wants to do and has the force to do it. (P. 2048). ✓

..... Without indoctrination a huge Navy even when properly organized, is very like an "All American" football team, in which each position is filled by naming an exceptionally strong and able player, but which has never been assembled as a team and taught a way to play together. If the eleven men named as the "All American" football team this year were suddenly brought together and started in a game of football against a reasonably stronger team, no matter how excellent and how strong the individual players are it would still have but little chance of winning. It would be exactly the same way with a war team. Unless the parts filling the various positions on the war team know exactly what is expected of them in every situation, and know exactly how to do it, they cannot win. Teaching them what to do and how to do it is known as "indoctrination". (P. 2050). ✓

..... Therefore the commander must cause his ideas to be absorbed by his subordinates until they actually think and act as he would or as he would want them to. ... Doing these things with those immediately under him, he requires them in turn to indoctrinate their subordinates, and so on down the line through the whole chain of command until the whole force works as a unit, united in thought, united in action. (P. 2052). ✓

And so after he has indoctrinated his forces a commander must lay out a schedule of practical exercises, by which each and every part of his force gets actual practice at sea in everything it has to do in carrying out the



plans for fighting as deduced by the commander. (P. 2054). ✓

.....Discipline is never punishment. On the contrary it is a state or condition brought about not by punishment but by careful painstaking teaching and training on the part of the commander, by which a force becomes able to act in accordance with rules which are the commander's wishes as enunciated and taught by himself. p. 2053 ✓

.....When constant punishment has to be resorted to it is *prima facie* evidence that the command has not been trained to act properly, and the fault lies not with the subordinates but with the commander himself. Not until the commander has taught and instructed his command in his ways, and has trained them to act in accordance with them, can he possibly have a well disciplined command. (P. 2053). ✓

Training, not punishment, makes a disciplined force, and if the officer reaching high command will but bear this in mind, and carry out what it implies he will have not only a force that will act in accordance with his wishes but one that will do so under any condition however impossible that condition may seem. (P. 2054). ✓

In the treatment of our subject up to this point little has been said of the team work required in a great fighting force, although in a way team work must be considered in every step the high commander takes. His plans for fighting must be based on it, his organization laid out to enable him to put it into effect, his indoctrination such as to make the theory of it known to his forces, and his training work practice his forces in it. In all that an efficient high commander does, *team work* exercises a dominating influence, and yet strange to say the principle of team work seems to have been lost sight of in recent years by many high naval commanders. (P. 2055). ✓

.....Organization, indoctrination, and training, essential though they are, will not by themselves make a force always victorious. Back of those things there must be a greater quality, a *will to win*, and that quality must be so developed that the force will refuse to accept anything but victory. The quality in a force that gives it such a will to win that nothing less than victory will be accepted is known as *morale*, and it is so vital that unless a command has it to a superlative degree it not only may be defeated but probably will be. p. 2056 ✓

.....In spite of this self-evident truth the training of forces is frequently focussed on giving them the ability to fight while the will to fight, which is the far more important element, has been left to look out for itself, and this in face of experience which shows that even with less actual effort the moral factor can be developed just as surely and just as highly as can the physical. (P. 2056). ✓

Morale, for all purposes of war, is a state of faith; it is belief in an ability to see anything through to a successful conclusion; it is a measure of men's confidence in their cause, in their leaders, and in themselves. If this be true, we begin to have something definite to work on, for to develop morale it is only necessary to develop that confidence until it is absolute. p. 2057 ✓

.....Always his own example must show his confidence; always he must energize the system with the fire of his own faith and always he must lead. While through his own efforts and those of his morale organization his forces may develop great confidence in their cause and in themselves, he must never forget that these are but two legs of the tripod that makes morale. The third leg of the tripod is the troops' confidence in their leader, and the structure will fall just as surely from the failure of this leg as from the failure of any other. PP 2057-58 ✓

.....However, even though by his work he clearly impresses both his ability and devotion on his subordinates, a commander who is lacking in justice to them can hardly hope to exact their loyal support when facing trying conditions. Only justice begets loyalty and unless held by the extreme of loyalty men cannot and will not make the supreme effort or the supreme sacrifice called for in war. (Pp. 2057-2058). ✓

.....While in the sense ordinarily used loyalty is devotion to a superior and therefore works upward from the bottom, in the military sense it works both ways and to have its maximum effect there must be loyalty down as well as up. ....In fighting forces one-sided loyalty spells failure, for certainly no commander can expect from his subordinates anything more than he himself gives to them. The commander who fails to support his subordinates when they are faithfully trying to carry out his wishes cannot long count on their maximum support. The commander who in order to avoid punishment for his sins of omission or commission, throws blame on his subordinates, has no right to expect, much less demand, devotion to himself. ....How different it is for the commander who has the moral courage to stand by and with his subordinates in their hour of need! When his own hour comes they will stand by him to a man and no effort or sacrifice will be too great for them to make when he asks it. Therefore in our preparation for high command and when we come to high command let us not forget that the loyalty of our subordinates to us and all we do will be measured in kind and amount by our own loyalty to them. (Pp. 2058-2059). ✓



When a subordinate knows his commander depends on him to carry through successfully his part in the general plan, in the way that seems best to him as the man on the spot, he will spare neither energy nor resources in doing so as long as there is life in him. This is exactly the spirit and will to win that the commander wants and must cultivate; but it never comes to a force whose commander tries to do anyone's work but his own. For this reason, if for no other, high commanders must leave all details of execution to their subordinates. p2059 ✓

Whenever a high commander usurps the province of a subordinate he does more than kill initiative and destroy morale, he puts himself in a position in which he cannot but neglect his own great task. It is evident that in attending to his own important duties a high commander has quite all the work any man can do and that if he undertakes the work of another he can do so only at the expense of the time he needs for his own. Furthermore, in doing it he sacrifices the whole force to a part, and even the part becomes worse off than it otherwise would be because it is trained solely to operate alone. (Pp. 2059-2060). ✓

In the same way that a C-in-C often fails through usurping the work that belongs to subordinates so will any other high commander fail who does likewise. Yet over and over we find high commanders doing that very thing. They swamp themselves in details belonging to subordinates, and because they overwork themselves in doing so they imagine they are making progress even though they never give a thought to their own great task. Success in high command is never measured by the quantity of work done by the commander but only by the work he does on his own particular task, and high commanders should not delude themselves on that point. To do so is absolute proof of incompetency and unfitness for the task. . . . In these two statements we have the very foundations of all success in high command. . . . knowing one's own business and attending to it. When the high commander does that he does all, but the trouble is that many high commanders do not do it. (Pp. 2060-2061). ✓

Truly the principles of high command are embodied in the trinity. . . . self preparation, planning, and execution. . . . each of which follows the other in turn and none of which is of value without the others. Of these the first concern themselves only with the high commander, but the last concerns itself with the entire command and is the measure of all that command does. No matter how well the commander may prepare himself, no matter how expert he may become in planning, those things go for naught unless he organizes his command to carry out his plan, indoctrinates it with the plan and method of carrying it out, trains it so it will act in co-ordinated effort in accordance with the indoctrination, and finally develops in it the "fighting spirit" and the "will to win". These are the things the high commander can do and must do. And they are the things he will do if he too has the fighting spirit and the "will to win". (P. 2062). ✓



## Le Bon—World in Revolt.

An army is a crowd—a homogeneous crowd, it is true, but retaining, despite its organization, some of the general characteristics of crowds; intense emotionality, suggestibility, obedience to leaders, etc. ✓

In an army the leaders are the officers. Observation shows that the soldier is worth just what his commander is worth. It is the commander's part to create that potent element of success; confidence. It is the best of stimulants. But while the commander can create confidence, he can maintain it only so long as success justifies it. (P. 97). ✓

One of the most reliable elements of valour, or, if you prefer it, of indifference to danger, is the blunting of the sensibilities described as familiarity. It has been said with reason that at the beginning of the campaign no soldier would have held out under the infernal bombardments, the poison-gas and the liquid fire that failed to check our troops at a later date. p. 97

It is precisely because surprise destroys familiarity that it is so formidable. An undefined danger, however slight, seems much more menacing than a known danger, however great it is believed to be. Surprise is the unknown, and courage in face of the unknown is usually deficient. p. 98

Every new weapon—gas, flame-throwers, tanks, etc..... is, as I have already remarked, a source of surprise. However great its material effects, its moral effects are even more important. But owing to the mechanism of familiarity they soon lose their effect, and the adversary must then seek others. (Pp. 98-99). ✓

These factors must be handled by the commanders. A body of soldiers, as I cannot too often repeat, is worth only what its leaders are worth. The latter must constantly consider the soldier's needs, and keep his mind absorbed by drills and exercises, interrupted by amusements so that he is not unduly isolated and confronted by depressing thoughts. The Queen of Belgium gave proof of a sound knowledge of psychology when she established on the Belgian front four great theatres in which ten thousand soldiers daily could see plays, hear music, or enjoy a cinema show. (P. 99). ✓

Fortune often rewards the daring, but the line of demarcation between daring and temerity being difficult to trace daring men are rare. p. 99 ✓

The first figures in a recent volume of Lord Fisher's. p. 100 ✓

There he tells how Nelson's daring won the victory of Aboukir. Nelson was walking to and fro upon his quarterdeck at sunset when the French Fleet was signalled as being at anchor in Aboukir Bay. Immediately he gave the orders to the whole of his fleet to clap on sail and attack the enemy ships. His officers reminded him that to attack by night, without charts and by way of a passage full of reefs might be extremely dangerous. Nelson confirmed his orders, declaring that those ships that might be cast away would serve to guide the rest. p. 100 ✓

Boldness is profitable only when supported by reliable judgment. Now, judgment implies the art of observation. (P. 100). ✓

Moral factors have, of course, no influence if, as is often the case at the beginning of a campaign, they are opposed by material elements which are too strong for them. p. 101 ✓

These moral factors act principally on troops weakened by fatigue or depressed by failure. At such times there comes a moment when their power of resistance is non-existent. p. 101 ✓

The defeat of the Germans is an example of this. It justifies yet again Napoleon's saying: "From triumph to downfall is only a step; I have observed in the greatest emergencies that a mere nothing has nevertheless determined some of the most important events". p. 101 ✓

The mere nothing is the trifling weight which, thrown into a balance with equally loaded scales, will make it dip on the side of this trivial weight. Such a phenomenon occurs at the decisive moment when equal forces have produced an equality of lassitude and success depends on the final effort. (P. 101). ✓

The only form of optimism possible today is that which avoids exaggerating the misfortunes that befall us, while perceiving their advantageous aspects, however small these may be, and seeking to create for itself a better future. p. 102 ✓

The intelligent optimist is an optimist by determination as much as by temperament. Thanks to a strong will he struggles against events instead of allowing himself to be their plaything, and does not allow himself to be unduly affected by his fate..... (P. 102). ✓

The optimist always believes in the success of his undertakings. Capable of running risks and fearless



of danger, he often sees his efforts crowded with success. Chance, is not, as the ancients used to say of Fortune, a blind goddess. She willingly grants the optimist favours which she denies the pessimist. p. 103 ✓

Yet to be really valuable, optimism should be associated with a reliable judgment. Otherwise it causes lack of foresight, due to the idea that things will of themselves fall out as we desire. Those were optimists, although of a very short-sighted type, who prevented others from preparing for war by repeating that war was impossible. Optimism, therefore, is not always without danger, but pessimism is far more perilous. (P. 103) ✓

The lot of the pessimist is generally wretched enough. He sees only the dismal side of things, and to him the future often appears catastrophic. The misfortunes which he foresees surround him with so close a web that no least ray of joy can penetrate it. Certainly he is not lacking in foresight, but foresight dispersed over the infinite variety of possibilities is useless to him. Not venturing to undertake anything he lives in a state of indecision. In short, his life is a burden to himself and to others. In the army pessimists have always been extremely dangerous. p. 103 ✓

In military as in industrial conflict, optimism and pessimism represent two frequently antagonistic forces. The first creates endurance, energy and confidence—that is, the elements of success. But behind the pessimists the knell of defeat is heard ere long. (P. 103). ✓

One of the chief psychological elements of success in warfare, whether military or industrial, is unity of action. p. 104 ✓

It constituted one of Germany's elements of strength in all her undertakings, political, military or economic. p. 104 ✓

Thanks to constant effort, the Allies eventually equalled the Germans in the matter of armaments; but in the matter of initiative and unity of action they commonly proved to be greatly inferior to their adversaries. (P. 104). ✓

And here I must refer to certain fundamental principles of the psychology of crowds, as expounded in one of my books. There I showed that from the point of view of intelligence, and above all decisiveness, a collectivity is always greatly inferior to each of the individuals that compose it. p. 106 ✓

Continually verified, even in industrial undertakings, this law also manifests its validity in military matters. This can easily be explained without insisting on purely psychological data. p. 106 ✓

Let us remember, to begin with, that all the councils of war of which history has kept a record have proved to be very well adapted to criticism and very ill adapted to action. p. 106 ✓

However, it took the German's march on Paris, after their victories of the early part of 1918, finally to secure the realization of the single command. (Pp. 106-107). ✓

The simplicity of the leading conceptions is verified by the mere statement of the guiding principles of the British naval strategy and the German strategy on land in the recent war. p. 111 ✓

The concept governing the British policy of naval construction was, according to Lord Fisher, to possess a speed superior to the enemy's and guns of longer range. (P. 111). ✓

The principle of military strategy which guided the German staff at the beginning of the hostilities presented the same characteristics: simplicity of statement, difficulty of achievement. It consisted of the method formerly applied by Hannibal at the battle of Cannae; of holding the adversary on the front and enveloping him by attacking him on the two wings. (P. 112). ✓

The victim of <sup>routine</sup> ~~routing~~ is inspired by ideas which undergo no change once he has adopted them, usually, for that matter without discussion. For him ideas do not arise from the reasoned knowledge of things, but only from a belief accepted by suggestion or contagion. Hostile to all initiative, routine quickly gives rise to a dread of risk and responsibility. p. 113 ✓

..... There always comes a moment when, as society has failed to adapt itself progressively to changes of environment, necessity forces it to do so suddenly and violently. It is the sum of such violence that constitutes a revolution. Nations addicted to routine, being incapable of evolution, are subject to revolutions. p. 113-114 ✓

The guiding idea of our General Staff was so immovable that when the Germans were actually massing their great armies on the north of France, the Generalissimo, in his correspondence, was laughing at General Lanrezac, "who warned him of the imminence of the danger, and whose grief, when confronted with such blindness,



was poignant". p. 114 ✓

The result of this blindness, due to the tenacity of a fixed idea in minds that were in the grip of the spirit of routine, was, in the words of the above-mentioned writer, that "nothing happened as our Staff had foreseen, and nothing happened of that which it had foreseen. It was a case of surprise, disorder and muddle all along the line". p. 114-115 ✓

The war has furnished many examples revealing the danger of the spirit of routine created by fixed ideas. (P. 114-115). ✓

The soldier's morale is evidently stimulated by the offensive and depressed by the defensive. But he is still more depressed by an unsuccessful offensive. p. 127 ✓

The offensive represents, in reality, a moral force which must be supported by material forces, and these must be sufficient and skillfully directed. If the preparations are inadequate or faulty, the losses will be high in proportion as the offensive spirit of the troops is more energetic. Of this we had many unhappy experiences during the war. p. 127 ✓

To sum up: superiority of fire and of tactics seem to be the conditions of a successful offensive. (P. 127). ✓



## Mahan—Strategy.

Based as Naval Strategy is upon fundamental truths, which, when correctly formulated, are rightly called principles, these truths, when ascertained, are in themselves unchangeable; but it by no means follows that in elucidation and restatement, or by experience in war, new light may not be shed upon the principles, and new methods introduced into their application. (P. 2).

On the other hand, the submarine and the greater range of the torpedo will place a far greater strain on blockaders, and compel them to keep at a much greater distance. These consequences will not change the principles of strategy, but they will affect the application of it. An illustration of this has been afforded by the Japanese battleships taking position sixty miles from Port Arthur, which they were watching, at the Elliott Islands, and by the elaborate provision made against torpedo attack even there; while other measures insured their probably reaching the scene betimes, if the enemy undertook to come out. As to the effect of wireless, Togo could await Rozhdestvensky where he did, at anchor, because wireless assured him of the shorter line in order to reach the point of interception. Could he have known of the enemy's approach only through a scouting system which, though itself equally good, was dependent upon flags or lights for transmitting information, he might have had to keep nearer the line of the enemy's route, at the probable disadvantage of remaining at sea. This does not affect the well-recognized, ancient strategic principle of the value of interior lines; but it does seriously modify its application, and appears to me a new confirmation of Jomini's dictum that changes in weapons affect practice, but not principles. (P. 3-4).

There was plenty of naval strategy before; for in war the common sense of some, and the genius of others, sees and properly applies means to ends; and naval strategy, like naval tactics, when boiled down, is simply the proper use of means to attain ends;.....and if it had produced no other result than the profound realization by naval officers of the folly of dividing the battle fleet, in peace or in war, it would by that alone have justified its existence and paid its existence and paid its expenses.

Like the A, B of the Greeks, which gave its name to the whole of their alphabet and ours, concentration sums up in itself all the other factors, the entire alphabet, of military efficiency in war. "Exclusiveness of purpose means concentration of the will upon one object to the exclusion of others. There is thus a concentration of mental and moral outlook, of resolution, as real as the physical concentration of disposable forces; and when the moral prepossession exists in a military man the physical concentration will follow, as surely as any effect follows upon its cause". (Pp. 5-6).

Nelson said, "This I freely venture, that, when they shall have beaten Calder, they will give England no further trouble this year". What he meant was, that the enemy as well as Calder would be removed from the board, and that Great Britain's reserve forces would still dominate the situation.

The principle from which the same conclusion flowed at these three successive epochs is that of keeping a superior force at the decisive point; expressed in the homely phrase of getting there first with the most men. This again is concentration, timely concentration; the A, B, C, of strategy, moving on to the D, E, F. The value of a reserve constituted the decisive factor in the three estimates quoted. A reserve, if correctly constituted in numbers and in position, enables you at a critical moment to be first on hand with the largest force; to concentrate, at the decisive period of a battle or of a campaign. It is one method among many to insure superiority of numbers, each method adapted to its particular conjunction. (Pp. 7-8).

If the Russians in the late war with Japan had properly mastered and applied the function of a reserve, if their national method of naval reasoning had not been utterly vitiated by their prevalent theories of a fortress-fleet, they at Port Arthur would have reasoned as did Nelson in 1805; when Togo shall have wiped out the Port Arthur division he will be in no condition to do further harm for some time, and Rozhdestvensky can proceed safely. The clear duty of the Port Arthur division was an engagement so desperate as to leave the field clear for the reserves. Japan had none; Russia had. If ever a nation took its fortune in both hands and threw it overboard, Russia did so in the late war with Japan. (P. 8).

On the field of battle the happiest inspiration—again *coup d'oeil*—is often only a recollection. This is a testimony to the value of historical illustration, which is simply recorded experience; for whether the recollection be of what some other men did, or whether it be of some incident one's self had seen and recalls, it draws upon the past; and that, too, not in a general way, but by specific application to an instant emergency, comprehended at a glance just because it is familiar.

There is such a thing as seeing another come to grief, yes, even to destruction, without being one whit



wiser yourself, because you do not understand how it happened; and you do not understand, either because you do not see the principle he has violated, or because you miss the application of it in his case, and consequently to your own. (Pp. 9-11).

Darrius says correctly:

"Every naval project which takes account neither of the foreign relations of a great nation, nor of the material limit fixed by its resources, rests upon a weak and unstable base. Foreign policy and strategy are bound together by an indestructible link."

In this connection he quotes the German, Von der Goltz:

"Whoever writes on strategy and tactics ought not in his theories to neglect the point of view of his own people. He should give us a national strategy, a national tactics." (P. 20).

**Interior lines.** The characteristic of interior lines is that of the central position prolonged in one or more directions, thus favoring sustained interposition between separate bodies of an enemy; with the consequent power to concentrate against either, while holding the other in check with a force possibly distinctly inferior. An interior line may be conceived as the extension of a central position, or as a series of central positions connected with one another, as a geometrical line is a continuous series of geometrical points. The expression "Interior Lines" conveys the meaning that from a central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two opposite fronts than the enemy can, and therefore can utilize force more effectively. (Pp. 31-32).

"Communications" is a general term, designating the lines of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living connection with the national power.

This being the leading characteristic of communications, they may be considered essentially lines of defensive action; while interior lines are rather offensive in character, enabling the belligerent favored by them to attack in force one part of the hostile line sooner than the enemy can reinforce it, because the assailant is nearer than the friend.

This is an illustration of the force of Napoleon's saying, that "*War is a business of positions*", (P. 35-36).

In the recent war between Japan and Russia, the Port Arthur fleet similarly threatened the Japanese line of communications from Japan to Manchuria, and so affected the whole conduct of the war. It was central, as regards Japan and Liao-Yang, or Mukden. Study of such conditions reinforces knowledge, by affording numerous illustrations of the effect of position under very differing circumstances.

This instance illustrates, however, as Port Arthur conspicuously did, that the value of a position is not in the bare position, but in the use you make of it. This, it is pertinent to note, is just the value of anything a man possesses, his brains or his fortune—the use he makes of either.

At Port Arthur, the inefficiency of the Russian Navy permitted this course to the Japanese. They watched the place by navy and army, and went on with their march in Manchuria. Even so, the threat inherent in the position compelled an immense detachment of troops necessary for the siege, and so greatly weakened the main army in its action. (P. 37-38).

"If you meet two enemies, do not each attack one. Combining both on one of the enemy; you will make sure of that one, and you may also get the other afterwards; but, whether the second escape or not, your country will have won a victory, and gained a ship. (Pp. 43-44).

In the Battle of the Japan Sea the attack again was on a flank, and that the van. Whether this was due to previous purpose of the Japanese, or merely arose from the conditions as they presented themselves, I do not know; but its tendency certainly would be to cause confusion. I do not wish, however, to argue here a question of tactics. My subject is strategy, and I am using tactics simply to illustrate the predominance, everywhere, under all conditions and from the nature of things, of the one great principle of concentration; and that, too, in the specific method of so distributing your own forces as to be superior to the enemy in one quarter, while in the other you hold him in check long enough to permit your main attack to reach its full result. That necessary time may be half an hour on a field of battle; in a campaign it may be days, weeks, perhaps more. (P. 49).

Before passing on, note the striking resemblance between the Florida peninsula and that of Korea. Togo, at Masampo, was to Rezhestvensky and the Russians at Vladivostok just as a hostile fleet in the Straits of Florida would be to American divisions in the Gulf and at Hampton Roads. In like manner at an earlier period Togo and Kamimura, working apart but on interior lines, separated the three fine fighting ships in Vladivostok from the



Port Arthur division. (P. 52).

The interior position will enable you to get there sooner, but with that its advantage ends. It does not give also the "most men" needed to complete the familiar aphorism. The position in itself gives no large numbers; and when left it serves only the defensive purpose of a refuge, a base of supplies, a line of communication. It cannot be carried to the field of battle, as a reinforcement, but if you have an enemy in the Atlantic, and also one in the Pacific, and are superior to each singly, though not to both combined, central position may give an opportunity of dealing with one or the other singly and decisively; of preventing their junction in a force which you cannot meet. So, through the Russian mismanagement, Togo dealt in succession with the divisions of Port Arthur, of Vladivostok, and of the Baltic. (P. 55).

It is, I think, a distinct gain for a man to realize that the military principle of concentration applies to the designing of a ship, to the composition of a fleet, or to the peace distribution of a navy, as effectually as it does to the planning of a campaign or to an order of battle. (P. 62).

To control a commercial route necessitates two strategic factors: (1) a mobile navy, and (2) local ports near the route, upon which the navy can rest as bases of operations. In seas where the State has no national possessions, the navy first comes and depends upon friendly harbors, as Dewey in 1898 depended on Hong Kong until war was declared; but the inconvenience and uncertainty of such dependence leads directly to acquisition of ports. (P. 68).

Like every sound principle, *concentration* must be held and applied in the spirit, not in the letter only; exercised with understanding, not merely literally. The essential underlying idea is that of mutual support; that the entire force, however distributed at the moment, is acting in such wise that each part is relieved by the others of a part of its own burden; that it also does the same for them; while the disposition in the allotted stations facilitates also timely concentration in mass. A very considerable separation in space may be consistent with such mutual support. The Japanese Admirals, Togo and Kamimura, before the fall of Port Arthur were separated, and for necessary reasons; yet each supported the other by positions which were between the two principal enemies' divisions—i. e., central. Consequently each supported its colleague by the control each exercised over its immediate opponent. The central position, too, facilitated junction or reinforcement. — transfer of force, should such become advisable; as in the engagement of August 10, 1904, when Kamimura moved across the mouth of the Yellow Sea for a cooperation which in the result was not needed, because of the return of the Russian Fleet to Port Arthur.

The one on which I wish to lay the most stress, is the inevitableness with which the appearance of a navy on a scene of operations distant from its home country leads to the acquirement of permanent positions in such a region, and the necessity of such positions to the effectiveness of naval action. (Pp. 74-76).

Thus, in the latest war, Port Arthur stands for a Japanese victory; few are impressed with the fact that, till it fell, it detained from the main armies in Manchuria many more Japanese than it did Russians, and obtained abundant time for the Baltic Fleet to arrive. That this did not arrive within that time was not attributable to Port Arthur. (P. 79).

Popular clamor exerts an immense disturbing force upon rational military dispositions. Panic has much in common with insanity. (P. 95).

The truth is, Germany, by traditions of two centuries, inherits now a system of state control, not only highly developed but with a people accustomed to it,—a great element of force; and this at the time when control of the individual by the community—that is, by the state—is increasingly the note of the times. Germany has in this matter a large start. Japan has much the same. (P. 110).

The new great navies of the world since 1887 are the German, the Japanese, and the American. Every state in Europe is now awake to the fact that the immediate coming interests of the world which are therefore its own national interest, must be in the other continents. (P. 111).

When I was a midshipman, a very accomplished officer, the late Admiral Goldsborough, told me of his bewilderment in listening to the arguments of eminent lawyers in a difficult suit. Later in the day, meeting the judge who presided, he said to him, "Upon my word, I don't understand how you can see your way through such a maze of plausibilities as were presented by the two sides". The judge replied, "There are in such contentions a very few, perhaps only one or two, really decisive considerations of fact or principle. Keeping these firmly in mind, much of the argument sheds off, as irrelevant, or immaterial, and judgment is therefore easy".



This is the advantage of the habit of mind bred by study, when principles are understood. Such decisive considerations correspond essentially to the leading feature, or features, which constitute "the key" of a military situation. (P. 120).

"*Naval Strategy* has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country".

The diplomatist, as a rule, only affixes the seal of treaty to the work done by the successful soldier. It is not so with a large proportion of strategic points upon the sea. The above positions have all been acquired in peace, and without hostilities. The same is true of the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands by the U. S., accomplished long after the writing of these lectures. Such possessions are obtained so often without actual war, because the first owners on account of weakness are not able to make the resistance which constitutes war, or, for the same reason of weakness, feel the need of political connection with a powerful naval state. (P. 124).

A properly disposed fleet is capable of movement to a required strategic position with a rapidity to which nothing on land compares.

At sea for navies, the process also is simple; which again means that it can be rapid.

I knew long ago, and quoted in these lectures, Jomini's assertion that it is possible to hold too many strategic points; but it is only by subsequent reading that I have come to appreciate how common is the opinion that the holding of each additional port adds to naval strength. Naval strength involves, unquestionably, the possession of strategic points, but its greatest constituent is the mobile navy. If having many ports tempts you to scatter your force among them, they are worse than useless. To this is to be added another remark, also due to Jomini, that if you cannot hope to control the whole field, it is an advantage to hold such points as give you control of the greater part of it. The farther toward an enemy you advance your tenable position by the acquisition of strategic points, or by the positions occupied in force by army or navy, the better; provided, in so doing, you do not so lengthen your lines of communication as to endanger your forces in the advanced positions. (Pp. 126-127).

The strategic value of any place depends upon three principal conditions:

1. Its position, or more exactly its situation. A place may have great strength, but be so situated with regard to the strategic lines as not to be worth occupying.
2. Its military strength, offensive and defensive. A place may be well situated and have large resources and yet possess little strategic value, because weak. It may, on the other hand, while not naturally strong be given artificial strength for defense. The word "fortify" means simply to make strong.
3. The resources of the place itself and of the surrounding country. It is needless to explain the advantages of copious resource or the disadvantages of the reverse. A conspicuous example of a place strong both for offense and defense, and admirably situated, yet without natural resources, is Gibraltar. (P. 132).

(Rodney) "Porto Rico, in the hands of Great Britain, will be of infinite consequence, and of more value than all the Caribbean Islands united--will be easily defended, and with less expense than those islands; the defense of which divides the forces, and renders them an easier conquest to an active enemy; but this island will be such a check to both France and Spain, as will make their island of St. Domingo be in perpetual danger, and, in the hands of Great Britain, enable her to cut off all supplies from Europe bound to St. Domingo, Mexico, Cuba, or the Spanish Main; and, if peopled with British subjects afford a speedy succor to Jamaica; and when cultivated, employ more ships and seamen than all the Windward Islands united".

In this you have an example of the material which, as I have said before, naval history furnishes in abundance to the student of the art of war. All the advantages of a strategic point are here noted though not quite in the orderly, systematic manner at which a treatise on the art of war would aim; Situation, relatively to Jamaica, Santo Domingo and other Spanish possessions; defensive strength, due to concentration, as compared with the dispersion of Lesser Antilles; offensive strength as against the communications of Spain with her colonies; and resources of numerous British subjects with their occupations, as well as of British ships and seamen. (Pp. 133-134).

Of the three principal conditions, the first, situation, is the most indispensable; because strength and resources can be artificially supplied or increased, but it passes the power of man to change the situation of a port which lies outside the limits of strategic effect.

Generally, value of situation depends upon nearness to a sea route; to those lines of trade which, when drawn upon the ocean common, are as imaginary as the parallels of the chart, yet as really and usefully exist. If the position be on two routes at the same time, that is, near the crossing, the value is enhanced. A cross-roads



is essentially a central position, facilitating action in as many directions as there are roads. (P. 134).

In general, however, it will be found that by sea, as by land, useful strategic points will be where highways pass, and especially where they cross or converge; above all, where obstacles force parallel roads to converge and use a single defile, such as a bridge. (P. 139).

The recent siege of Port Arthur has illustrated the propositions just advanced. Port Arthur was defended against naval attack and against land attack, in front and in rear, and attack was made from both quarters. The siege illustrated also another proposition, made in the original draft of these lectures, that the defense of ports, in the narrow sense of the word "defense", belongs chiefly to the army. The Russian navy contributed little to the defense.

In a properly coordinated system of coast defense this counter-action, molestation, the offensive-defensive, belongs to the navy.

Sound decision in the selection of naval stations at the home and abroad is for combined military and naval consultation. Indeed, every question and every preparation touching seacoast operations present this feature of combination between army and navy working to a common end.

In all such cooperations there will be found conflicting conditions. War in all its aspects offers a continual choice of difficulties and advantages.

The one most demoralizing attitude is that which demands exemption from risks, or is daunted unduly by them.

The siege of Port Arthur illustrated another truth, which will be found of general application; namely, that coast fortresses are in greater danger of capture by land attacks than by those from the sea.

But any scheme of naval activity rests upon bases, as do all military operations. Bases are the indispensable foundations upon which the superstructure of offense is raised. Important naval stations, therefore, should be secured against attack by land as well as by sea. ((Pp. 141-144).

Thus Jomini says, "When a state finds itself reduced to throw the greater part of its force into its strong places, it is near touching its ruin". This received illustration in the war between Japan and Russia. Russia was reduced to shutting up her fleet in Port Arthur and Vladivostok; and persistence in this course, whether by choice or by necessity prognosticated the ruin which overtook the naval predominance which at the beginning of the war she actually possessed over Japan.

In war, the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely. In sea warfare, the offensive is assigned to the navy; and if the latter assumes to itself the defensive, it simply locks up a part of its trained men in garrisons, which could be filled as well by forces that have not their peculiar skill. But a popular outcry will drown the voice of military experience. (Pp. 149-150).

This line of thought requires development. Panic, unreasonable apprehension, when war begins, will be found in the same persons who in peace resist reasonable preparation. Unless my information at the time was incorrect, a senator of the U. S., who has earned much approval in some quarters by persistent opposition to naval development, was among the most clamorous for the assignment of naval forces to the local defense of his own State, which was in no possible danger. In both cases the effect is the result of unreason. "It is better", said a British Admiral of long ago, "to be frightened now, while we have time to prepare, than next summer, when the French Fleet enters the Channel. The phrase is much more worthy of perpetuation than his other often-quoted "fleet in being". (P. 151).

That in giving up the offensive the navy gives up its proper sphere, which is also the most effective.

II. Offensive strength; the offensive strength of a seaport, considered independently of its strategic situation and of its natural and acquired resources, consists in its capacity: 1. To assemble and hold a large military force of both ships of war and transports. 2. To launch such force safely and easily into the deep. 3. To follow it with a continued support until the campaign is ended. In such support are always to be reckoned facilities for docking, as the most important of all supports.

Tactical facilities and disabilities are elements of strength or weakness, and as such a general consideration of them falls under the lawful scope of strategy. (P.p. 153-158).

Obviously, in any particular port, this capacity to support active operations will depend upon the scene and character of the operations. In the war between Japan and Russia, the Japanese dockyards were the scene both of the equipment and refreshment, restoration and repair, of the ships. They thus followed them continuously;



stood at their back. The Russian home ports despatched the vessels, but had nothing to do in sustaining them on the theatre of war. A fleet equipped at San Francisco for operations in the Far East would require support nearer than the harbor.

All this is simply to reaffirm that for seaports position—situation—is the first in importance of the elements of strategic value. This illustrates again Napoleon's saying, "War is a business of positions".

To follow a fleet with support means principally two things: (1) To maintain a stream of supplies out, and (2) to afford swift restoration to vessels sent back for that purpose. (Pp. 159-160).

Other things being equal, the most favorable condition is that where great natural resources, joined to a good position for trade, have drawn men to settle and develop the neighboring country.

The mutual dependence of commerce and the navy is nowhere more clearly seen than in the naval resources of a nation, the greatness of which depends upon peaceful trade and shipping. Compared with a merely military navy, it is the difference between a natural and a forced growth.

Drydocks represent in condensed form the three requirements of a strategic seaport. In position they should be as near the scene of war as possible. Strength is represented by numbers; the more numerous the docks, the greater the offensive strength of the port. For resources, the illustration is obvious; docks are immense resources. In contemplating the selection of a navy yard site, it is evident that facility for excavating docks is a natural resource, while the subsequent construction is artificial. Evidently, also, a commercial port will supplement these resources in an emergency by the docks it may maintain for commerce, thus exemplifying what has been said as to the wide basis offered by resources developed by man in his peaceful occupation of a country. (Pp. 162-163).

The strategic points on a given theatre of war are not to be looked upon merely separately and as disconnected. After determining their individual values by the test of position, military strength, and resources, it will remain to consider their mutual relations of bearing, distance, and the best routes from one to the other.

Illustration is afforded by the very recent case of Rozhdestvensky's fleet when leaving French Cochinchina, or, yet more critically, the Saddle Islands, for its final push towards Vladivostok.

The position occupied by Admiral Togo was judiciously chosen to facilitate intercepting in either case. The very strength of his conviction that they must come that way would be an element favoring the Russians, had Rozhdestvensky decided for the other. There are temperaments which cannot readily abandon a conviction, as there are others which cannot bear suspense. (Pp. 164-165).

The most important of strategic lines are those which concern the *communications*. Communications dominate war.

These are, first, fuel; second, ammunition; last of all, food. These necessities, owing to the facility of water transportation as compared with land, can accompany the movements of a fleet in a way impossible to the train of an army.

Nevertheless, all military organizations, land or sea, are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of the national power; and the line of communications is doubly of value, because it usually represents also the line of retreat.

It is difficult to imagine a more embarrassing position than that of a fleet, after a decisive defeat, hampered with crippled ships, having but a single port to which to return. (Pp. 166-169).

As soon as a nation in arms crosses its land frontier it finds itself in the territory of a neutral or of the enemy. If a neutral, it cannot go on without the neutral's consent; if an enemy, advance must be gradual and measured, unless favored by overwhelming force or great immediate success. If the final objective is very distant, there will be one or more intermediate objectives, which must be taken and held as successive steps, to the end in view; and such intermediate objectives will commonly represent just so many obstacles which will be seriously disputed by the defendant.

The key of the whole is held, is within the hulls of the ships. (Pp. 175-177).

Napoleon once said that the art of war consists in getting the most of the chances in your own favor. The superior fleet holds the strongest suit, but the strongest suit does not always win. The character and the skill of the player against you are important factors. For such reasons, the study of the chances, both in general elements of war and in the concrete cases of specific regions, is necessary; in order to fit an officer to con-



sider broadly and to determine rapidly in particular contingencies which may arise. (Pp. 177-178).

The great advantage of nearness to the latter is apparent in itself and from these instances. (Speaking of the home country). This was the greatest advantage of Japan over Russia in their recent war, and is the advantage which Japan still possesses over all other nations for action in the western Pacific. The center of her national power is close by the scene of possible international contentions in that which we know as the Far East. (P. 189).

All consideration goes to show that the supreme essential condition to the assertion and maintenance of naval power in external maritime regions is the possession of a fleet superior to that of any probable opponent. This simply reaffirms the principle of land warfare, that the armies in the field, not the garrisons, are the effective instruments of decisive war.

We may safely coin for ourselves the strategic aphorism, that in naval war the fleet itself is the key position of the whole. Pertinent to this it may be noted that the Japanese in the recent war began by landing much of the supplies of the fleet at their protected permanent base in the Elliott Islands, but later, as an administrative expedient, found it better to keep a large part afloat. That which is afloat can be kept in vessels capable of accompanying the fleet, which thus carries its base with it, and so can occupy a convenient harbor, though unfortified, its own strength affording for the moment the necessary protection. (Pp. 190-191).

Finally, the maintenance of any stem of maritime fortified stations depends ultimately upon superiority upon the sea—upon the navy. The fall of a wholly isolated strong post may be long postponed, but it is sure to come at last. The most conspicuous instance is the celebrated three years' siege of Gibraltar, from 1779 to 1782.

An immediate corollary to this last proposition is that in war the proper main objective of the navy is the enemy's navy. As the latter is essential to maintain the connection between scattered strategic points, it follows that a blow at it is the surest blow at them. There is something pitiful in seeing the efforts of a great naval force, with the enemy's fleet within its reach, directed towards unimportant land stations. (Pp. 198-199).

Notwithstanding the difficulty of maintaining distant and separated dependencies, a nation which wishes to assure a share of control on any theatre of maritime importance cannot afford to be without a footing on some of the strategic points to be found there. Such points, suitably chosen for their relative positions, form a base; secondary as regards the home country, primary as regards the immediate theatre.

It must be remembered that secure communications at sea mean naval preponderance, especially if the distance between the home and the advanced bases be great. Such secondary bases should be constituted on the same principles as those of the home frontier; that is, it is expedient that there be two fortified ports, of which one only need be of the first order.

If the Russians in the years preceding the late war had sent their entire fleet to the Far East they would have outnumbered the Japanese and rested upon Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The Japanese, on the other hand, would have had the advantage of the Inland Sea and its several exits for combining unexpected movements. (Pp. 200-201).

From all these considerations, it follows that when a government recognizes that the national interests in a particular region may become of such character as to demand military action, it should be made the business of some competent body of men to study the ground carefully, after collecting the necessary information, and to decide what points have strategic value and which among them are most advantageous for occupation. When such positions are already occupied, the tenure of the present possessor has generally to be respected, and the conditions under which it becomes right to disregard it are not within the decision of the military man, but of the statesman. It will be granted, however, that occasions may arise in which a state may exercise its rights of war in order to protect interests which it thinks vital; and that the control of a maritime region may become a necessity of the war, if not its prime motive. When this is the case, what are technically called "operations of war" follow. The state may aim either at acquiring control, or at extending the control it already has; or on the other hand, may seek only to defend that which is in present possession, by checking advances threatening to it. (Pp. 202-203).

If the aim be to acquire control not already held, the war becomes offensive in its motive and, necessarily, in its operations also. The military operations, however, may not be directed immediately against the object the acquisition of which is sought. It may be that the enemy is more assailable in some other point which at the same time he values more; and that by moving against this, the true object may be more surely reached than by a direct attack.



The conquests of a war are frequently valuable only as a means of barter in the treaty that ends it. The correspondence of the first Napoleon teems with instructions to this purport.

It may thus happen that the object of the war may not be the objective of the military plan. The object of the war, indeed, may not be the gain of territory at all, but of privileges or rights denied before; or to put an end to wrongs done to the declarant. Even so, an attack upon some of the enemy's possessions will probably form part of the plan of operations. (Pp. 203-204).

The case before us is limited by our subject to the control of a maritime region,—a control to be either partial or total according to circumstances. To embark upon such a war with any prospect of success, a nation must have two conditions: first, frontiers reasonably secure from vital injury; and secondly, a navy capable of disputing the control of the sea with its enemy under his present conditions. The frontier or coast, in its broadest sense, is the base of the whole war, the defensive upon which it rests, answering to the narrower base of operations from which a single operation of war starts. The navy is the chief arm by which the offensive is to be carried on; for, while in the defense the navy plays a secondary role, in offensive naval war it takes a leading place. (P. 204).

Having the two fundamentals requisites already stated, a reasonably secure home frontier and a navy adequate to dispute control of the sea with the enemy, the next thing is to determine the particular plan of operations best suited to obtain your purpose. This involves the choice of a base, of an objective, and of a line of operations,—three things inherent in every operation of war.

Putting aside, as involving too wide a scope, the question of attacking the enemy elsewhere than upon the maritime region which you wish to control, the ultimate objective there should be that position, line, or district which in its influence upon the general situation may be considered the most important; to use a common expression, the key or keystone. (P. 205).

Paramount among these is the strength of the navy as compared with that of the enemy,—a strength dependent not only upon aggregate tonnage or weight of metal, but also upon the manner in which those aggregates have been distributed among the various classes of vessels and upon the characteristics of each class in point of armament, armor, speed, and coal endurance. All these qualities are elements in strategic efficiency, sometimes mutually contradictory; and the adjustments of them among themselves may seriously affect strategic calculations. This illustrates that the composition of a national fleet is really a strategic question. (P. 207).

A fleet operating some distance from home should not depend upon a single line of supplies. It may be said, generally, that while concentration is the proper disposition for the fighting force, or for preparation for battle, the system of supplies should not be concentrated upon a single line, when avoidable. This statement is, in effect, an application of one of Napoleon's brief, pithy sayings, quoted by Thiers: "The art of war", he said, "consists in the skill to disperse in order to subsist, yet in such manner that you may quickly concentrate in order to fight".

Without ammunition a ship may run away, human life may be supported on half rations, but without coal a ship can neither fight nor run. (P. 212).

Admiral Togo's signal to his fleet off Tsushima "The fate of the Empire depends upon this day's work", though primarily an appeal to patriotism, was ultimately and simply a particular application of the general military truth here enunciated. Japan by readiness, skill, and promptitude had projected the national power across sea, forestalling the action of Russia, as Bonaparte that of Great Britain. She had conquered a secure foothold in Korea and Manchuria, and had seized Port Arthur, as the French had Egypt and Malta. The positional keys of the situation were in her hands; but the defeat of Togo's fleet would have annulled all previous successes, as that of Brueys by Nelson did the achievements of Bonaparte. Conversely, Russia also at the same moment had projected Rozhdestvensky's fleet, in like manner, close to the position she coveted to attain, accompanying it with convoy and coal destined to further future operations; but within easy range of her point of arrival she had first to fight a battle, in which fleet, coal, and convoy went down to a common destruction. (P. 214).

As a rule, a major operation of war across sea should not be attempted unless naval superiority for an adequate period is probable. The reason is that already given, that the main movement of a war should be closely knit by steps linked one with another, which cannot be if the navy cannot command the sea. (P. 218).

Napier estimates the presence of Napoleon on a battle field as equal to thirty thousand men; and it is no exaggeration to say that Nelson, for thorough dealing with an enemy's fleet, was equal to a reinforcement of



three ships-of-the-line. (P. 240).

Seacoast fortresses should not be thought, as they usually are, to be primarily defensive in function. Seacoast works, the office of which is limited to keeping hostile ships at a distance, but which are open on the land side, may be defensive merely; but a properly fortified port, capable of giving security to a navy, is defensive only as is a fortress, like Metz or Mayence, which contains an army able to take the field, and thereby compels the enemy to maintain before the place a detachment sufficiently strong to arrest any offensive action possible to the garrison.

The sustained exertion of such action depends upon ports capable of protecting the fleet. Otherwise it is destroyed, as at Port Arthur; or driven out, as at Santiago. (Pp. 249-250).

The position of the enemy's fleet and his naval base indicate the direction of operations; as Port Arthur determined the direction of the Japanese naval war, as well as much of the Japanese effort on land, and Santiago that of the American fleet and army in 1898. The consequent movements of the Japanese and the Americans were a direct compulsion upon the Russians in the one instance and the Spaniards in the other to fight, which each avoided only by accepting fleet suicide. (P. 254).

Communications, in the full meaning of the term, dominate war. As an element of strategy they devour all other elements.

Having reference to the defense of the Canal, which is the crucial strategic feature of the whole Caribbean, it may be remarked that to attack an enemy's base, such as Martinique or Santa Lucia, is a more effective measure for protection and control of the Isthmus than a direct defense of the Isthmus itself would be; whether such defense be passive only, by fortification, or active, by a fleet resting upon the fortified Canal. For, if one of the islands—supposed an enemy's base—is attacked by a combined expedition, such attack, so long as sustained in adequate force, detains the scene of war at a distance from the Canal, and protects all communications west of the operation. It constitutes an advanced front of operations, combined with the moral power of the initiative and of the offensive. If it ultimately fails, it nevertheless will have produced this result for the time it lasts; while if successful, the enemy is deprived of a necessary base, the recovery of which involves operations that will exert the same protective influence as those which effected the capture.

Strenuous, unrelaxing pursuit is therefore as imperative after a battle as is courage during it. Great political results often flow from correct military action; a fact which no military commander is at liberty to ignore. (Pp. 264-267).

The relations between the fleets of Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Togo prior to their meeting off Tsushima bore no slight resemblance to those between a pursued and a pursuing fleet. (P. 268).

The guiding principle in all these cases is that your force must not be divided, unless large enough to be nowhere inferior to the enemy, and that your aim should be to reduce his base to a single point, out of which he can then be driven by regular operations, or by exhaustion; or, at least, to reach which with supplies, or for refuge, his fleet must accept battle.

Port Arthur was taken by force. If Rozhdestvensky had reached Vladivostok without a battle, the war would have continued; but the Japanese under the conditions would probably have contented themselves with blockading that port, relying upon the presence of their fleet assuring all the sea behind, which would secure the communications of the army in Manchuria. (Pp. 273-276).

The fleet, it cannot be too often repeated, is the chief element of strength in naval warfare; but the fleet with strong points to support it, is stronger than the fleet alone. (P. 276).

"Defense is a stronger form of war than Offense is". I do not like the expression, for it seems to me misleading as to the determinative characteristics of a defensive attitude; but it may pass, if properly qualified. (P. 277).

In so far, the form taken by the defense is stronger than the form assumed for the moment by the offense. (P. 278).

If you will think clearly, you will recognize that at Tsushima the Japanese were on the defensive, for their object was to stop, to thwart, the Russian attempt. Essentially, whatever the tactical method they adopted, they were to spread their broadsides across the road to Vladivostok, and await. The Russians were on the offensive, little as we are accustomed so to regard them; they had to get through to Vladivostok—if they could. They had to hold their course to the place, and to break through the Japanese,—if they could. In short they were on



the offensive, and the form of their approach had to be in column, bows on,—a weaker form,—which they had to abandon, tactically, as soon as they came under fire. (P. 278).

In choosing its local base of action, its point of concentration for the general defensive, of which it itself is a principal factor, the defendant fleet should consider seriously, among other things, which port is most likely to be the object of the enemy's shore operations; because, if that be ascertained, some other position will probably be better for itself. Thus, there were several reasons for presuming that the Japanese would prefer to land in the neighborhood of Port Arthur, and would attack that place. Consequently, the Russian fleet, if intending to postpone battle, or to decline it, would be better in Vladivostok; because, by taking position in Port Arthur it enabled, and even induced, the enemy to concentrate both fleet and army at one point, which thus became strategically, though not geometrically, a central position, occasioning the Japanese no temptation to eccentric movements. The Russian battle fleet at Vladivostok would draw thither necessarily the main Japanese fleet, and so would open larger possibilities to the Russian cruising divisions for action against the communications of the Japanese army. That Vladivostok has two entrances is an additional reason.

It can scarcely be repeated too often that when a country is thrown on the defensive, as regards its shore line, the effectual function of the fleet is to take the offensive. (Pp. 291-293).

It is in converting inequality or inferiority into superiority at a given point that the science, or rather the art, of war consists. The principles upon which this art is based, we are assured by the best authorities, are few and simple; and they are summed up in one great principle, that of being superior to the enemy at the decisive point, whatever the relative strength of the two parties on the whole. Thus the Russian navy in the aggregate was much superior to the Japanese, but, being divided, was inferior to the enemy upon the immediate scene of war; and this inferiority at the decisive point was increased by the sudden action of the Japanese in opening hostilities. (Pp. 296-297).

But, beyond and above this, it is by that diligent study which Napoleon enjoins that the officer who so lives with those men absorbs not merely the dry practice, but the spirit and understanding which filled and guided them. There is such a thing as becoming imbued with the spirit of a great teacher, as well as acquainted with his maxims. There must indeed be in the pupil something akin to the nature of the master thus to catch the inspiration,—an aptitude to learn; but the aptitude, except in the rare cases of great original genius, must be brought into contact with the living fire that it may be itself kindled. (P. 298).

The objects to be controlled in the Caribbean Sea are threefold: 1st—The entrance into the sea by the various passages. 2d—The chief commercial centers, points of destination, within the Caribbean, of which the most conspicuous is the Isthmus, centering now at Colon. 3d—The communicating lines between the entrances and the points of destination. (Pp. 347-348).

That is to say, military and naval men, from their habit of mind and their acquirements, should be the most competent advisers to the statesmen of a country, to indicate to them what positions are most profitable to obtain by the conduct of diplomacy, as in the case of Heligoland, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Hawaii, Kiao Chau, and others; or as the result of a successful war, as in the instances of Malta, Gibraltar, Guantanamo, Culebra, and the Philippines. (P. 375).

In these two well-known expressions, "Fortress Fleet" and "Fleet in Being", both current, and comparatively recent, we find ourselves therefore confronting the two old divisions of warfare,—defensive and offensive. We may expect these old friends to exhibit their well-known qualities and limitations in action; but having recognized them under their new garb, we will also consider them under it, speaking not directly of offensive and defensive, but of Fortress Fleet and Fleet in Being, and endeavoring, first, to trace their influence in the Russian conduct.

As in other cases, motive must be here inferred from facts; and the Russian acts, as well in assembling the fleet as in stationing it, and in using it, all go to indicate absence of purpose to use it offensively, and presence of purpose to devote it to the support of a fortress. For it was meant to be employed offensively, if that motive was clearly formulated and distinctly dominant, it would have dictated the assembling of a force decidedly superior to that of the Japanese; which Russia was able to do, for she had the ships.

If the primary purpose had been to fight the enemy's fleet, the need of superior force could not have been overlooked; and, when taken in connection with the subsequent naval conduct throughout, the absence of offensive intention, with the fleet can justly be inferred. (Pp. 393-394).

"If the necessity has been foreseen of concentrating the permanent forces in case of war, such concentration should be effected while peace still lasts." This corresponds to the old strategic maxim that concentration, that is, the stationing the several bodies in such positions as to make mutual support certain, should take place



beyond the enemy's power to strike any one of them separately. In other words, what we call the distribution of a navy, in peace, should conform to the most probable needs, if war should arise.....Hence arose the subsequent requirement to unite the two, resulting in the twin disasters of August 10 and 14; in face of which there are those who would divide the US fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific. This helps to reinforce the conclusion, from the universal experience of mankind, that principles are of decisive consequence upon conduct; the results appearing in places least expected, and where it requires some attention to trace them back to their origin in faulty principles. Incorrect principles, or disregard of correct principles, in this war, caused the stronger nation to be defeated by the weaker. The inefficient conduct of the war proceeded from defective grasp of principles. (Pp. 394-395).

Why then was the fleet stationed in Port Arthur? Because, expecting the Japanese attack to fall upon Port Arthur, the purpose of the Russian authorities was not to use the fleet offensively against the enemy's navy, but defensively as a fortress fleet; defending the fortress by defensive action, awaiting attack, not making it. That is, the function of the fortress was conceived as defensive chiefly, and not as offensive.

And again, "The torpedo boats were never sent out with the aim of attacking Japanese ships, or transports. If out, and attacked, they fought, but they did not go out for the purpose of attacking, although they would to cover an army flank".

The Japanese expressed surprise that no attempt by scouting was made to ascertain their naval base, which was also the landing place of their army; and, although the sinking of the two battleships on May 15 was seen from Port Arthur, no effort was made to improve such a moment of success, and of demoralization to the enemy, although there were twenty-one destroyers at Port Arthur; sixteen of which were under steam and outside. So, at the very last moment, the fleet held on to its defensive role; going out only when already damaged by enemy's shells, and then not to fight but to fly. (Pp. 395-397).

The hapless Rozhdestvensky gave voice to this fact in an expression which I have found attributed to him before the fatal battle at Tsushima; that, if twenty only of the numbers under his command reached Vladivostok, the Japanese communications would be seriously endangered. This is clear "Fleet in Being" theory, and quite undiluted; for it expresses the extreme view that the presence of a strong force, even though inferior, near the scene of operations, will produce a momentous effect upon the enemy's action. The extreme school has gone so far as to argue that it will stop an expedition; or should do so, if the enemy be wise. I have for years contended against this view as unsound; as shown to be so historically. (P. 398).

These two simultaneous operations, the transport of troops despite the fleet in being, and the persevering effort at the same time to destroy it—or neutralize it—illustrate what I have called adjustment between opposite considerations. The danger from the fleet in being is recognized, but so also is the danger in delaying the initiation of the land campaign. The Fleet in Being School would condemn the transportation, so long as the Port Arthur fleet existed. It actually did so condemn it. (P. 399).

From the first they were exceedingly careful of their battleships, knowing that on them depended the communications of their army. The fact was noted early in the war by observers on the spot. This shows that they recognized the full menace of all the conditions of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, also of the one in the Baltic, and of the danger to their communications. Nevertheless, though realizing these various dangers from the hostile "fleets in being", they ventured. (P. 400).

.....and it was right to embrace even the barest chance of getting to Vladivostok with the main body uninjured, and after the junction to deliver battle. That a junction was intended is evident, from the fact that the Vladivostok vessels were ordered to move to the Straits of Korea. Whether this subordinate movement was judicious or not, considering that the Japanese division of four armored cruisers was known to be in the straits, is matter of fair difference of opinion.....As it was, we after the event know there was very little chance, and that actually both divisions had to fight, separately, and very far apart. (Pp. 404-405).

"If we get close alongside, by the time they have beaten our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm this year". Translated into Russian, this means, "By the time the Japanese have beaten the Port Arthur fleet, they will be in no condition for six months to injure Rozhdestvensky". The second of Nelson's sayings, more familiar, was, "In case signals cannot be understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy".

If it can be joined before fighting, good; if not, the fighting must be characterized by the same desperation as if the junction had been effected.....It would be no adjustment but a bare compromise, so to fight as to escape with part; because the part thus save is unequal to contend with the enemy, and the way for the Baltic fleet has not been cleared. (Pp. 406-407).



The instructions of the Russian admiral should have set forth these considerations so clearly, and prescribed action so positively, as to have made impossible what actually occurred, through the sole, though serious, accident of the coincident disabling of the flagship and the death of the commander-in-chief. If the second in command and the captains had received, as they should, clear instructions, that, failing escape without battle, the fate of the war—to quote Togo before Tsushima—depended upon this action, it is to me inconceivable that they could have slunk back to their fortress as they did. . . . The spirit of a clearheaded resolute commander-in-chief does not expire at the instant that his body dies. If the Russian fleet, to a ship, had gone down in such an attempt, Manchuria, might have been lost; but it would have been well lost with such a priceless gain in morals to the Russian navy, and, what was more immediately to the point, the Japanese fleet could not have suffered to the extent of at least temporary disability. As a matter of probable calculation, I think all goes to show that Vladivostok was the point for uniting; and this coincides with the time-honored maxim that it is not advisable for two separated bodies to seek their point of concentration inside the enemy lines. (Pp. 407-408).

The same considerations hold as to a surrender. No extreme, short of absolute incapacity to resist, justifies surrender, unless it is evident that no other interest is compromised; and that practically is never the case, Rozhdestvensky was defeated on August 10, before Port Arthur, by the inefficient action of the Port Arthur division, as really, though not as finally, as off Tsushima nine months later. (P. 413).

There could be no question therefore that Rozhdestvensky's first object should be to reach Vladivostok without fighting, in order that afterward he might fight with the most chances in his favor. Besides, he would there join the two remaining armored cruisers; no despicable reinforcement to his rather scratch lot of vessels.

In characteristic features therefore Rozhdestvensky's problem was precisely the same as that of the Port Arthur division on 10 August, nine months earlier; and he had before him its experience, a factor additional for judging what his course should be. To escape, if he could, for the moment; to fight at once, if he must; but in no case by double-mindedness, to fall between these two stools. There were no reserves now; the whole fortune of Russia was in his hands. (Pp. 413-414).

When the conditions of war are such that a solution cannot be reached without battle, this imposes as the strategic aim to force battle at the time, and under the conditions, most favorable, tactically, to yourself. In face of this perfectly clear truth, having only a bare thousand miles to go, the Admiral proceeded to load his ships down with coal; carried, it is said, even in the admiral's cabin. . . . in the vain hope to satisfy both considerations—the result and the economy. If the object is not worth the expenditure, spend nothing. If it is worth while, and yet can be equally attained by a less expenditure, economize; but do not economize any amount, however great and desirable, necessary to put the attainment of the object beyond all possibility of failure, or even of completest success. Rozhdestvensky's management of the preparation for meeting the enemy appears to me as a whole so blundering, that I am forced to the conclusion he had never clearly thought out his strategic problem and settled down in consequence to a single-minded decision. . . . He had become so obsessed with the question of supplies, and of reaching Vladivostok, that neither escape nor battle clearly dominated in his mind. Rather, the two contended throughout for mastery, making him essentially a double minded man, even at the moment when every hope of escape had disappeared. (Pp. 414-415).

Now I say, that, while all this was bad management in the face of the enemy, and in so far bad tactics, the bad tactics issued from an error of strategy; and the error in strategy was due to the lack of unity of conception, of that exclusiveness of purpose, which is the essence of strategy, and which subordinates, adjusts, all other factors and considerations to the one exclusive aim. (P. 417).

A fleet is half beaten already when it goes into battle with one eye upon something else than fighting. (P. 418).

They illustrate, too, how misleading is the disposition to compromise, to concede something all around; to straddle the two horse, escape and battle.

At the saddles, the same fitness required the dismissal from influence upon conduct of all thought of Vladivostok, and of supplies there, so far as such thought might modify the preparation for probable battle. His mind and morale had got a twist, a permanent set, from which they could not recover. (P. 420).

Briefly, you will perceive that there is a concentration of purpose, for conduct, as well as a concentration of numbers for action. (P. 421).

Taken as a whole, the naval strategy of the Japanese during this war was marked by that accuracy of diagnosis, concentration of purpose, and steadiness of conduct, which were so strikingly wanting in their opponents. (P. 421).

"How the Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses flesh, and not spirit".



"The Japanese are terribly influenced by the necessity of preserving their battleships". This was nearly two months before the Hatsuse and Yashima were sunk by mines, on the same day. Consider then what the load of anxiety must have been after the loss of those two ships, which it was impossible to replace in kind, and for which the two armored cruisers bought in Italy were but partial substitutes. (Pp. 421-422).

When Japan began hostilities, she had to recognize that in material force the total navy of Russia was much superior to her own. Yet, to carry out her objects, she must make an invasion over sea, an offensive movement on a large scale, depending upon the control of the sea, not only for the first success, but for the maintenance throughout of her operations. In this offensive purpose she was not hampered by any pre-possessions in favor of a Fortress Fleet, as were the Russian. I find no trace of any such conceptions. On the contrary, Japan appears fully to have grasped, and to have acted upon, the principle that the one object of a navy is to control the sea; the direct corollary from which is that its objective is the enemy's navy—his organized force afloat. This they recognized in two ways. First—they allowed the Russians to assemble their vessels to the Far East, until their navy as a whole was fairly divided in two. Next, they made the leading feature in their campaign to be attack, upon the half of the enemy's fleet exposed to them. . . . All these efforts were dictated by one principle; the destroying or neutralizing the enemy's fleet. (Pp. 422-423).

When all these means—bombardment, mines, and channel blocking—proved ineffectual, the same conception of the end in view, and recognition of what was "imposed by the course of things", as Ranke has it, dictated the next action of the Japanese. The main fleet was withdrawn from the neighborhood of the port to a position remote from torpedo attack; to the Elliott Islands, some sixty miles from Port Arthur. There its security was further provided for by an elaborate system of booms, which not only covered the approaches to the islands but were carried from them to the mainland. By this means were protected both the anchorage of the transports, and the landing place on the peninsula of the troops destined for the operations against the fortress. This may be styled the defensive basis of the naval operations before Port Arthur; the furthering control of the sea by preserving your own vessels and supplies intact. This artificially protected area of sea about the Elliott Islands became the advance base of both land and naval operations, the concentration of which at one point, when feasible, as in this case it was, possesses evident advantages. It may be compared advantageously with the position of the British under Wellington at Lisbon, which served as both naval and military base during the Peninsula War. (P. 424).

Offensively, not merely was the Russian fleet to be deprived of its refuge, forced out into the open, to fight, by the siege operations, which when sufficiently advanced would render the position untenable; but in the meantime it was effectively held in check, made unable to escape without fighting, by an elaborate set of dispositions covering the surrounding waters, and based upon the Elliott Islands.

The whole action illustrates the unity of the underlying strategic conception, which the Russians never mastered, or, if they did, never carried out; the conception, namely, that the one thing necessary was to paralyze the movement of the enemy's fleet, or to destroy it. (Pp. 424-425).

The result of August 10, in the return of the Russians to Port Arthur, was therefore rightly claimed by the Japanese as a strategic success. Thus, a Japanese officer, in a position to know the opinions of the leaders, wrote to a Japanese paper:

"If the Russians had succeeded in breaking the blockade on August 10, and several of their battleships and cruisers had reached Vladivostok, which could not have been invested for a long time, the Japanese navy and nation would have been placed in a most embarrassing position as regards the strategy of the second period of the fighting, namely, the period after the Baltic fleet's coming". (P. 456)

Napoleon's sound dictum that "War cannot be made without running risks". This is the correlative of his other saying just quoted, that war, accurately conceived, consists in getting the most of the chances in your favor.

Nelson: "Something must be left to chance. Our only consideration. Is the honor and benefit to our country worth the risk? If so, in God's name, let us get to work". "You may depend", he wrote on another occasion, "If I find the French convoy in any place where there is a probability of attacking them, they shall be either taken or destroyed at the risk of my squadron, which is built to be risked on proper occasions." (Pp. 430-431).

When war exists between two nations separated by the sea, it is evident that the one which invades territory occupied by the other takes the offensive, and that the instrument of offense is the arm which carries on the invasion, that is, the army. The navy preserves, and assures, the communication of the army. That the navy alone makes the invasion possible, does not make it the invading force. That it alone makes the offensive possible, does not make it the offensive arm. That its own mode of action is offensive does not necessarily constitute it the



offensive factor in a combined operation. In the joint action it takes the defensive. That, in pursuit of this defensive role, it takes continual offensive action whenever opportunity offers to destroy an enemy's ship, does not alter the essential character of its operations. It defends by offensive action, wherever its gun reach; but it defends. This certainly was the function of the Japanese navy in the late war. (Pp. 432-433).

Men begin: Coast fortresses serve only for defense. They continue: The navy defends better than any fortress can. They conclude: Therefore money spent on fortresses is wasted, and should be spent on the fleet. This is, briefly, the syllogism of the Blue Water School. Granting the premise, the conclusion follows; but the premise is erroneous. Strategically, coast fortresses are not for defense but for offense, by sheltering and sustaining that force which against an invader is the offensive arm; that is, the navy. It follows that they must be developed on the land side as well as on the sea side, in order to preserve them against reduction, either by *coup de main* or by prolonged siege, as at Port Arthur. Having regard to all the circumstances, Santiago may be said to have fallen by *coup de main*, as Port Arthur by siege. (P. 435).

In short, and in conclusion, there has been nothing in the whole course of the war between Japan and Russia so illuminative as the part played by *Port Arthur*.

The Russian fleet there (Vladivostok) would have imposed upon the Japanese divergent points of interest, tending to divide their efforts. The absence of the Baltic division gave the Japanese the day of opportunity which they admirably improved. The Russians helped them further by putting together the two objects, Port Arthur and their fleet, close by the points where the intended invasion of Korea and Manchuria must begin. Being for the moment inferior, and on the defensive, instead of provoking their enemy to divide his forces, they compelled him, by their own dispositions, to concentrate at the point most dangerous to themselves. In this they circumscribed the area in which the energies of Japan must be exerted, and enabled her entirely to disregard Vladivostok, which gave no support in the conflict, because eliminated by Russia herself. That the Russians so acted was due, almost certainly to their wish to preserve Port Arthur, and to their vicious theory of a fortress fleet; a fleet subservient to the fleet. (Pp. 440-441).

The intelligence officer of one of our ships stationed at Newchwang, at the beginning of the War, reported that the common talk among the Russian officers there was, that they could not hold the Liao-Tung peninsula, on which Port Arthur is, nor yet Lower Manchuria; that they would garrison Port Arthur for a siege, and that the army in the field would fall back successively on Liao-Yang and Mukden, to Harbin, disputing the defensible positions, but falling back. Harbin reached, they would make a stand, reinforced by the troops and material already accumulated there during the retreat, and to be yet farther increased, as far as necessary, while they continued to hold the place. Then, when all was ready, they would assume the aggressive in numbers sufficient to bear down all opposition. Harbin, in its turn, would thus have illustrated the usefulness of fortresses.

Kuropatkin's plan was essentially correct, and in his retreat he had got no further than Mukden, when Japan indicated her willingness to treat. (P. 444).

Of the Russian scheme, *Port Arthur* was an essential feature. It provoked the Japanese to detach from their main advance a body of, from first to last, over one hundred thousand men. They were compelled to do this by no point of national susceptibility because of the wrong done them by Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, —though that may have counted,—but by the necessity of smashing the naval division within before the Baltic Fleet arrived out. As we have seen, the margin of time was not too great; and we know, too, that the commander of the fortress was condemned to death for premature surrender. The Russian retention of Port Arthur was therefore no compromise with national pride or military hesitancy. It was a correct adjustment, of that feature of the Russian conditions, to the campaign as a whole subordinate to the main plan, but conducive to its success. The numbers of the Russian main army were reduced by the amount of the garrison; but in order to overcome the garrison, the enemy had to reduce his force by from double to treble the same amount. (P. 444).



The world of newspaper readers is hypnotized by the stupendous possibilities which the dreadnaughts of our day have created. . . . ✓

But in the midst of this unquestioning enthusiasm for the material development and the physical progress of the battleship, you stand for the conviction that it is after all the man, man's thought and man's emotion and man's will which is of decisive importance. You do not submit to the popular prejudice which expects success only from the marvels of steel and powder and electricity. (P. 1). ✓

Commanding a ship or fulfilling the orders of the commander, shaping the plans of a battle or pointing the gun, directing a submarine or aiming a torpedo, sending the wireless message or even feeding the engines in the hold of the ship while the cannons are thundering is an activity of the mind. (P. 3). ✓

. . . . . But the ultimate proof of the man comes when the unexpected happens and no time is left for the slow decision. A quick decision must be made or destruction of ship or life will follow. . . . . Only the man who can live up to this demand of an emergency is the born leader of a ship, as far as mere navigation is concerned. Experience for which mankind has dearly paid has shown that there are two types of men who utterly fail. One type becomes paralyzed under the pressure of the sudden responsibility. . . . . The other type instantly opens the channels of motor discharge but the flood of impulses rushes into any chance course and a haphazard result, a foolish decision or an unconsidered hasty action is the outcome. The right man is of the third type which under the pressure of danger without loss of time instinctively grasps the whole complex situation, is not carried away by any chance impression, does not overlook what is significant in the unexpected event, sees the important things great and the insignificant small. Coolly he chooses in immediate response the attitude which he would take if he had time for careful deliberation. (P. 6-7).

What are the mental characteristics of the many to whom the few have to give their orders? One psychological fact ought to stand in the foreground and ought never to be forgotten. The many are not simply a large number of single minds; they are not only many, but they are at the same time one. They are held together—more, they are forged together into one compact mental mass in which no single mind which entered has remained unchanged in its structure or in its energies. (P. 8). p. 8

This psychophysical increase of suggestibility transforms the individuals now into a crowd, now into a rushing mob, now into an enthusiastic army, and whoever deals with such a group of men in which everyone knows himself as a part of the cooperating whole must be fully aware of the advantages and of the dangers which are created by this reinforcement of suggestibility. (P. 10). 9

This suggestibility of the social group which composes the crews stands in an especially significant relation to the mental function which after all is the backbone of military service, obedience. Where the spirit of discipline is lacking, the military cause is lost. There never has been a victorious navy without obedience. To a certain degree the necessity of a dogged submission to the order has in the most modern ship become still more necessary than ever before because the individual man is more isolated in his duties than in the former times. (P. 14).

Whether the man will carry out the movement which the maneuver has taught when the cannons not only are thundering but the balls really are splintering the ship depends upon the one decisive question of whether an obedient submission to the order of the superior has become an instinct for his mind. And here begins that complex relation to the suggestibility of the crew, inasmuch as the spirit of obedience itself is reinforced by the unified social consciousness of the mass, while on the other hand the obedient carrying out of the order disturbs the social consciousness. (P. 14). 13 ✓

But on the other hand the order goes from the commander to the man as individual, and he has to fulfill his share without reference to what the other members of the crew have to do. To demand obedience to the order which is given to him individually may mean to force on his resistance to the suggestions of the social consciousness. Indeed it is no real obedience unless it is strong enough to break up the unified will of the crowd. In this sense their education towards obedience demands a relentless suppression of the general suggestibility. The man must be trained by real discipline to have control of themselves against all suggestions of their mates and to inhibit in their minds all merely imitative and yielding impulses. (P. 14). 14

Discipline is the product of habit and habit cannot become deep-rooted where any exceptions are admitted. Habits result from the physiological law that the uninterrupted repetition of actions transforms the nervous path into a path of less and less resistance. The submission to the order given and the faithful performance of the duty in spite of all counter stimulations must be secured by such habituation of the brain paths



.....The routine effect of a strong discipline can be reached only if this submission has become so habitual that it works as a matter of course without any need of excessive effort. The service must have made the man an exact machine which works automatically whenever the order reaches his consciousness. (P. 20). 15

Yet the true meaning of military discipline would be entirely missed if automatic obedience were considered as the only important demand and if another postulate were neglected which stands in every respect coordinate, the demand for a spirit of initiative. Without this spirit the fighter would become a slave and no nation can rely on its normal slaves. Initiative does not stand in a psychological contradiction to obedience. On the contrary even the training in obedience demands a background of initiative as the overcoming of the resistance will be successful only if every single act of submission is supported by a feeling of confidence and reliance in the leader and this reliance however much it may result from the imitative crowd consciousness remains ultimately an act of personality and initiative. (Pp. 12-17). 15-16

Every man in the crew must be able and must be conscious of his ability to step into a position of responsibility. His intelligence and power of decision accordingly demand as much stimulation as his habit of submission. It is this which enabled the modern navy and gives to it values far beyond those of a mere mechanical fighting machine. (P. 17). 16

.....Initiative and obedience ought to belong together in the psychology of the naval man the world over. (P. 18). 16

He has to overcome the resistance by sport and training, by social comradeship with his equals, by joy in the service as such, by intellectual interest in his duties and by passionate love for his task, but above all by a systematic training of his will power. p. 18

This emphasis on the will traits of the leader stands in nearest relation to the demand which seems paramount in a war college, the training of abilities. (P. 19). 18

The minister cannot be a true preacher if pure religion is not the center of his soul. Such a belief, such an inspiration, such a religion, must penetrate and fill the mind of the officer. With every fibre of his personality he must feel that it is sacred work to which he is called, that the mission of the navy is an ideal one and that the honor of the country is not too dearly paid for by his death. (P. 25). p. 23

The steam-yachtsman loves the ship and its handling, enjoys the life on the water, is deeply interested in all naval movements; and yet the whole setting of his mind is fundamentally wrong for the officer who has to prepare himself and his men for the heroic work in the crisis. It is a spirit of ease and comfort, of charming hospitality and delightful companionship, of self-satisfaction and good natured sportsmanship. (P. 26). p. 24

But the social psychologist cannot overlook a still more dangerous rock which is threatening under the surface. The whole civilized world is today filled not only with the old vague wish for peace, but with a more modern conviction that means can be found to secure peace and to make war superfluous. The American Nation is among the leaders in this international movement and no educated man has a right to close his eyes to this tremendous problem of civilization. But just because it is appealing to an ideal demand and carries with it the promises of highest humanity, it is much more dangerous to the inner unity of the officer's mind than a mere appeal to comfort and selfishness. (P. 26). 25

The mind of the warrior is thrown into a conflict between the demands of his lifework and the siren voices of the eternal peace advocates. How can the enthusiastic belief in the preparedness for war and in the relentlessness of the fight prevail in a mind which is touched by the doubt whether war among civilized nations is not brutal and immoral and criminal? It is one of the most important conditions for the success of the navy that such inner wavering be absolutely excluded from the officer's mind. ....All that is needed is for him to see them in the right perspective. He will not deny the harm and the losses which war brings with it. But at the same time he will be deeply impressed by the tremendous moral power of a national self-defense which concentrates the energies of the whole nation in loyalty to its historical mission. He must grasp the fundamental role of war in the history of mankind as the great vehicle of progress, as the great eradicator of egotism, as the great educator to a spirit of sacrifice and duty. (P. 27). 25-6

The ideals of the artist and of the scholar and of the preacher, of the peace reformer and of the warrior are all true ideals, are each worthy to give meaning and significance and this meaning ultimately lies in the devotion and the deepest value is therefore lost if the faithful belief in any of these ideals is choked by rival ideals. There is no fitness to win without unity of mind and fixity of purpose. (P. 28). 26



Murray—Reality of War.

Mr. Bernard Shaw:—"There is one point", he said; "on which I cannot follow Mr. Wilkinson; he suggests that the military instructors of the nation should be its professional officers. Against professional officers I have the complaint to make that they never know their business. In spite of their many other excellent qualities, they have invariably shown themselves incompetent in the matter of war". (Note V). ✓

.....When war comes the officers work with the ideas which have been thus supplied to them; the natural intelligence which they had as boys having long ago been replaced by the authorized code of thoughts. If the enemy is led by men who still do their thinking for themselves, he naturally has a tremendous advantage. p. VI ✓

The success of the Prussian Army in 1866 was in large part due to its having had a good proportion of officers accustomed to do their own brain work, and it is an interesting question how it came to pass that the Prussians had a certain number of officers in this unusual condition. One reason, no doubt, was that in the Prussian army every officer was expected to mind his own business. When I first knew the British army, about 35 years ago, every one always did somebody else's work rather than his own. (Note VI). ✓

Today the book of Clausewitz, "On War", easily holds the first place. It is the least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to analyze and put into words. (Note VII). p. VIII + IX ✓

For the general nature of war is the same, and the great leading principles of strategy are common both to war on the sea and on land. (Preface XIV). ✓

He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation", and finally to let loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and compel submission to its will by force. p. 8+9 ✓

To talk to such a man of "the evils of war", or of "the burden of armaments;" or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of armed forces", and so forth can only appear to him as the result of "imperfect knowledge". He will not say so, but he will think so, and act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall". (Pp. 8-9). ✓

"All war supposes human weakness, and against that it is directed". p. 12 ✓

Of all military virtues Energy in the conduct of Operations has always conducted most to glory and success of arms. p. 12 ✓

"In war all things are simple, but the simple are difficult". p. 12 ✓

.....for to overcome those simple yet great difficulties he regards as the art of war..... p. 12 ✓

"Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war". And we can all reflect, without reading too many books. Also he (Clausewitz) says: "Much reading of history is not required for the above subject. The knowledge of a few separate battles, in their details, is more useful than a general knowledge of several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed narratives and journals than regular works of history". (P. 12). 12-13 ✓

As he pictures war, "the struggle between the spiritual and moral forces on both sides is the center of all",.....He has freed us once for all from all formalism. The formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war—these are the practical fruits of his teaching. (P. 13). ✓

"In real action most men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or less accurately. ....This is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly lay their greatness.....But when it is a question not of acting one's self, but of convincing others in consultation, then all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really without any value. Clear ideas on these matters are not, therefore, wholly useless". (P. 17). ✓



"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what Clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if from a machine". p. 18 ✓

"Pity the warrior", says Clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about in this beggarmdom of rules". "Pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the mind"..... "It is an analytical investigation of the subject which leads to exact knowledge". (Pp. 18-19). ✓

Like every other habit, the habit of military reflection gradually grows with use; till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually becomes Power. p. 21 ✓

It is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference with, the military interests of the State. (P. 21). ✓

The cabinets therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase, without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in this improvement. (P. 24). ✓

But every one will agree with us that, at least, whenever great interests are in dispute, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our time". ✓

Consequently, European war, as Clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people". (Pp. 28-29). ✓

"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale. Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their germs". (P. 31). ✓

These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other"..... It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in fact, a perfect explosion"..... To submit without a struggle to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile people..... For no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that it regards as absolutely vital. (Pp. 31-32-33). ✓

For in the warfare of the present and future the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally important to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack, weaken, and gain over that of the enemy..... But good thoughts are no better than good dreams unless they be put into action. (P. 36). ✓

As Clausewitz says: "Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. This, therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical questions". (P. 42). ✓

"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes, into such as are only preparations for war, and into the war itself". p. 44 ✓

We may nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten before the war breaks out. p. 45 ✓

It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace time, are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier and require study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part of the latter. (Pp. 44-45). ✓

"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated plans, we must always rather endeavor to be beforehand with him by the simplest and shortest". (P. 49). ✓

In his chapter on "The Geometrical Element", he says, "We therefore do not hesitate to regard it as an established truth that in strategy more depends upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on form of the great lines by which they are connected". Of course he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. (P. 50). ✓



Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul". "Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction", (P. 50-51). ✓

"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war and make it a resistant medium for every activity, we have designated danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction". He never loses sight of this; it pervades everything he writes. (P. 52). ✓

Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral is to the physical as three to one". (P. 52). ✓

As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next. p. 53 ✓

"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither party (for the moment) wills anything positive there is rest, and for the moment equilibrium. . . . As soon as ever one of the parties proposes to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps toward it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy opposes this, there is tension of the powers; this lasts until the decision takes place. . . . This decision, the foundation of which lies always in the battle—combinations which are made on each side, . . . is followed by a movement in one or other direction". (Pp. 53-54). ✓

"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the chains of human weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one". ✓

. . . . "In that war, and especially in the campaign of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then it is necessary". (P. 54). ✓

Murray says: Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length of time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as long as the interests of both contracting parties remain the same. Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or as Austria has just torn up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn up treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste paper basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste paper basket is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only in ourselves can we trust. (P. 55). ✓

It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted upon, that the success or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind it depends the greater or lesser amount of resistance, or friction, which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength. The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have been prevented if its prestige, or armed force had been greater. On the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is the more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace. (P. 56). ✓

Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the surprise by actual hostilities taking place before the actual declaration of war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the fighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the surprise by superior preparation silently carried out till all is ready for a decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defense, and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly ready as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870. (P. 57). ✓

"The British constitution is a bad fighting machine", and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all that appertains to war. . . . If our rival makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that war the whole of its national force, material, moral, and physical, while we only prepare to bring to bear a small portion therefore, then there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. (Pp. 58-59). ✓

We may safely lay down that State policy is the defense and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength, or weakness, of success or failure in the policy of a State. p. 60 ✓

"In one word, the art of war, in its highest point of view is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes". . . . All the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet—that is, by a political, not a military functionary". (P. 60-61). ✓



"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from one standpoint; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency". "We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community". (Pp. 62).

It is a well-known fact that the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a continuation of State policy by other means".

....."None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations;....."

Clausewitz defines strategy as "the use of the battle to gain the object of the war". War is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another". The great thing in strategy is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. "The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; secondly, at the decisive point".

"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counter-poise to all the other cooperating circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point....." (P. 69).

Bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon, Waterloo, he was beaten.....The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal of strategy. "The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before all and as far as possible". If Strategy has done this, then it has done its utmost duty. (Pp. 70-71).

Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is, THERE is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL OUR FORCES.

"There are", said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they see too many things at one time. As for me, I see only one thing, the enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it". (P. 72).

"The rule", says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavoring to set forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be simultaneously applied to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more everything is compressed into one act and one moment". This he calls "The law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in strategy". "In strategy we can never employ too many forces".....As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in 1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might, if present at Jene, have turned defeat into victory, but they were useless afterwards. A fault so often made may be made again. (Pp. 72-73).

"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than to keep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity. On this maxim we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon.

"The concentration of the whole force (i. e. within supporting distance) should be the rule, and every separation or division is an exception which must be justified.

"It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of the action. (P. 74).

"At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the first battle,.....because the first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself".

....."A great victory thus won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow us to carry out our own....."

"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, the victory at the decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor points over the whole theatre of war". (Pp. 75-76).



Murray—On Clausewitz.

The first and most important maxim we can get before ourselves is to employ ALL the forces which we can make available with the UTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it is extremely unwise not to make it perfectly certain. p. 77 ✓

The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible at the point where the decisive blow is to be struck. The success at that point will compensate for all defects at secondary points. p. 77 ✓

The third point is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are the most powerful elements of victory. p. 77 ✓

Lastly, the fourth principle is to follow up the success we gain with the UTMOST CERTAINTY. The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the only means of gathering up the fruits of victory. (Pp 77-78) ✓

The first of these principles is the foundation of all others. If we have followed up the first principle, we can venture any length with regard to the three others without risking our all. p. 78 ✓

It gives the means of creating new forces behind us and with the new forces every disaster may be repaired. In this and not in going forward with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise. p. 78 ✓

Therefore I am convinced that whosoever calls forth all his powers to appear incessantly with new masses, whoever adopts every imaginable means of preparation, whoever concentrates his force at the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with resolution and energy has done all that can be done, in a general way, and will undoubtedly be victorious, in the same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and energy. (P. 78). ✓

It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about, to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. (P. 79). ✓

In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals to win..... How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers. How are we going to give our generals that? How? Or are we going to make NO adequate preparations for these three eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the impossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political object and safeguard the interests of the nation. (Pp. 80-81). ✓

These principles also gives us a theoretically correct ground for anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare accordingly. p. 80 ✓

These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war which is probable or possible and make every imaginable preparation to carry out these principles therein. (P. 80). ✓

"War", he says, "is the province of uncertainty. Three fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty. p. 83 ✓

"Now, if he is to get safely through this perpetual conflict with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable; in the first place an understanding which, even in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light, which lead to the truth, and then the courage to follow this faint light. The first is expressed by the French phrase *coup d'oeil*; the second is resolution". "Resolution is an act of courage in face of responsibility". (Pp. 83-84). ✓

The vital importance of *firmness* and *resolution*, so strongly urged by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation in war. p. 84 ✓

Also there is required "the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense excitement, in the storm of the most violent passions". p. 84 ✓

"Here nothing else can help us but an imperative maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it; that maxim is, in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to give it up till a clear conviction



forces us to do so". (P. 84).✓

Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have an eye upon that of the enemy". "This is a great natural law of the combat", "and so becomes the pivot upon which ALL strategical and tactical maneuvers turn". (P. 91).✓

Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit must predominate. "The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as respects the whole". (P. 94). ✓

The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war". "The defense is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the attack is the weaker form with a positive object". p. 96 ✓

Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through his works. For instance—"It is a FIRST maxim NEVER to remain perfectly passive, but to fall upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making an attack upon us". And again—"A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point in the defensive. (Pp. 96-97).✓

General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of War": "The best military organization is that which renders available ALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of war. A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake". (P. 112). ✓

But though these changed conditions must, of course, modify Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical philosopher on the actual nature of war, as the chief exponent of the moral and spiritual forces in war, will ever remain invaluable in the study of war. (P. 114). ✓

The fervor and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution, which drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at the beginning; the ambition, military glory; plunder and greed, which animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion, and stern endurance which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance, and selfish callousness which were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany, which gave to the Prussian recruits, and Landwhers, the same driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French; the passing therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater driving force, from the French to the Allies. Hence Clausewitz—Supreme importance of the moral and spiritual factors in war. p. 115 ✓

It is therefore imperative that we should feel confidence in our statesmen; confidence that, in addition to their excellent administrative capacity, they understand the nature of modern war; confidence that they will make all preparation demanded by the theory of modern war for our national self preservation. p. 117 ✓

Unfortunately—most unfortunately—our long immunity from foreign invasion has bred in our people a sort of feeling—a most dangerous feeling under modern conditions—that war does not concern them, either in theory or in practice. Every European country has learned, by sad experience of foreign invasion and conquest, to respect the realities of war, to guard with the utmost effort of its manhood against its destructive effects. But with us it's different. We have had as yet, practically no such experience, and have, therefore, hitherto, refused to regard war, or the preparations for or against war, as a part of our national life and policy. p. 117 ✓



Navigation, Bureau of—Talks on Leadership, etc.

For a naval force to be efficient it must be so organized and disciplined that it can be handled by its commander exactly as he desires, in conformity with the general plan of the campaign. This means that each individual must respond instantaneously to orders. Such a response can only be obtained where men instantly and willingly surrender their personal inclinations for the welfare of the organization to which they belong—the Navy and the Government. This is the fundamental form of discipline. (P. 1).✓

While men may work regularly and often with fair efficiency under general rules and regulations, it is only by personal appeals and under the stimulation of close personal interest that they really become enthusiastically aroused. (P. 1).✓

To do the very best team work one must become closely identified with the team, as for instance, in football, and must get to feel personally affected by its successes and its failures. The leader or commander who fails to get such interest on the part of his men and who therefore gets something short of their very best effort, will do well to lay the blame on himself and make it a special problem to find what is the matter with his methods or in what particulars he is not succeeding in arousing the interest of his men. (P. 2).✓

It is a well known fact that an individual will usually live up to what is expected of him; if he is regarded as being worthless he finds it very hard to be otherwise, while if great things are expected of him he is naturally aroused by the confidence and encouragement of others. (Pp. 3-4).✓

Years ago there was a tendency among a great many people to consider the time spent at play and recreation as time lost but now it is generally recognized that play is one of the means of human growth and development, both physical and mental. p. 4✓

That play goes hand in hand with strenuous work is illustrated by observing the life of ex-President Roosevelt. His memoirs show that the more strenuous his work at Washington was the more he felt the need of tennis playing, and this form of play fitted into each day's program. (P. 4).✓

Closely related to competition and play, both of which are agencies of developing it, is team work. Every one knows some thing of what team work is and has at some time or other participated in the team work of some group or organization, but many individuals do not fully realize the great importance of team work in all forms of group activity. (P. 4).✓

Team work means something more than the concentration of effort. It leads to a fine spirit of friendliness among the men, to cementing together the bonds of good fellowship, and in the Navy to fighting spirit popularly known as "esprit de corps". (P. 5).✓

It not infrequently happens that to get the most out of a temporary opportunity leaders "play unfair", slightly misrepresent, make promises which they cannot fulfill, and so on. p. 5✓

If such an attitude occasionally seems to bring good immediate results and thus to justify itself, this is only too short vision; for the temporary successes collapse in discontentment, jealousies, criticisms, conflict and final failure. The largest business corporations know this; they have learned by costly experiences that a far-sighted and straight-forward policy inevitably brings the best results in the end. (P. 6).5✓

Each officer and man must be thoroughly and genuinely interested in his division and ship and be anxious to guard its reputation, as a man works for the welfare of his own family. In games, as has been pointed out, the group interest and success comes out so strongly that each player becomes vitally interested in what every other player does, in how well he does his own part in the game. It is only when one's division or ship is regarded as superior by one's self and by others that one is stimulated to the utmost effort to keep up its good reputation. (P. 5).✓

Definite rules for team work cannot be prescribed. Individuals show ability in organization and in the successful application of principles favoring team work will find themselves in demand, just as good coaches are sought for football and located by their results when competition is keen. p. 6✓

Mere formal drills in which all do the same thing at the same time without evident co-operation for the attainment of some practical end do not in themselves develop team work or give a good idea of it. (P. 6).✓

The team captain or leader is the man who is responsible for the building up of an efficient gun's crew, division or ship. To kindle the fires of loyalty, team play and enthusiasm within a ship the spark must come from the top. p. 6✓

The Government has clothed the officer with a mantle of authority, which if properly exercised will result



in the forming and molding of real man-of-war's men from the men placed under his command. The very thoughts of an officer will color those of his men, his actions will be guide posts for theirs. He is to his division or ship what a father is to his family; he must teach them, discipline them, console them, sympathize with them, share their hardships and judge their actions. p. 6 ✓

The success of a navy more than of any other organization is built upon the foundation of leadership. p. 6 ✓

.....One can just imagine the force and influence that John Paul Jones must have had with his men. (P. 6).

In time of peace we see the importance of leadership on every hand. In commerce, business, politics and athletics one sees thousands of examples where individuals have accomplished extraordinary deeds by means of their leadership. p. 6 ✓

Men like E. H. Harriman, James J. Hill, Wannamaker, Carney and Schwab have built up great business enterprises by influencing the thoughts and securing the allegiance of thousands of men. In politics we know that each community has its leader, the man who welds together the individual thoughts of the people and brings about organized effort. In athletics also we find that success comes most often to that team which has the most skillful, aggressive and enthusiastic leader. (P. 6). ✓

The naval leader is not merely well trained and impressive in his physical appearance, he must know the whole business of going to sea in ships—the more of it the better. Continued leadership is impossible without thorough knowledge of the matters in which the leader directs. p. 7 ✓

There should be a definiteness about a leader which makes us feel that he will not leave us drifting, but will set a course, will substitute action for doubt, and give our energies an outlet. Again, his aggressive confidence is transmitted by suggestion, and acts directly upon our minds as a sanction of his leadership. If he adds to this the tact to awaken no opposition, to make us feel that he is of our sort, that his suggestions are quite in our line, in a word that we are safe in his hands; he can hardly be resisted. (P. 7). ✓

It must ever be borne in mind that the influence we exert over others is a result of the many things that we say and do, and that are reported of us by others, and not simply of our physical presence and the tone of voice at the time of giving directions. (Pp. 7-8). ✓

All special favors must be on the basis of service and efficiency. A strict holding to this principle will mean much to the young officer in securing good discipline and influence over his men. This principle should be practiced in one's behavior and in no sense ostentatiously; not a word need be said about it. (P. 8). ✓

There is no royal road to leadership, for it demands not only superior ability, but hard work, sincere living, and a high regard for justice and individuality. There can be no question that careful attention to these matters and persistent attempts to embody such characteristics in one's own life and work will greatly improve one's leadership and influence. p. 8 ✓

It is proper that an officer should aspire to popularity, to be beloved by his men, to be one of those leaders of whom it is boasted that their men would follow them anywhere. p. 8 ✓

Popularity, however, is something that will come itself if it is merited, and while it is essential to the success of the leader that he be popular with his men, yet in his actions and words he is not to convey the impression that he is courting popularity. p. 8 ✓

Real popularity is not attained by showing favoritism or by over-looking mistakes. Popularity gained by such methods is not lasting and will not stand the acid test of experience. The only solid, enduring popularity is that gained by exhibiting the qualities of justice and fairness in one's dealings with men. p. 8 ✓

Another thing which will aid materially in winning influence among the men is to study their point of view, mentally to "place one's self in their shoes" and thus to avoid the mistakes of misunderstanding the men. (P. 8). ✓

One of the most important factors in the make-up of a successful leader is his ability to make decisions quickly and to carry them out in a commanding manner. A leader is helpless before his men if he shows any hesitancy about what to do under any circumstances that call for a quick decision. p. 9 ✓

An officer to become a leader of his men in the full sense of the word must not only give them commands, direct their efforts and teach them their duties, but he should also look after their material needs; he should watch their men and should see that they are well outfitted. In a word he must be something of a father to his men. (P. 9). ✓

Some military leaders contend that discipline is cold and mechanical, a condition to be found only in



seasoned veterans, an automatic habit of obeying commands. This view of discipline is believed to be incorrect. The consensus of opinion of the most successful military leaders appears to be that discipline is instantaneous, willing obedience. p 10 ✓

It should be kept in mind that the enlisted man's spirit depends partly on himself and partly on his environment and the circumstances surrounding him on board ship. Some officers can develop the right kind of discipline and fighting spirit in any division or ship's company, and it is quite evident that the discipline of every ship is entirely dependant on its officers. Competition, play, team work, and leadership all enter into the development of the ideal kind of discipline. (P. 10). ✓

The U. S. Navy does not desire the German type of discipline based on servility, fear, and blind allegiance, but by means of intelligent instruction we should develop an attitude in the enlisted men which will manifest itself in an intense desire to do his best and to cooperate with his fellows for the common cause. p 10 ✓

Team work depends on discipline. A well disciplined ship's company is one that can do its work efficiently and does not become seriously disorganized by fear and other emotional disturbances, or by such hardships and privation as men are liable to experience. It is one that performs its duty with as little confusion and waste of effort as possible. Well disciplined men respond instantaneously and whole-heartedly to the commands of the leader. (P. 10). ✓

Loyalty is nothing short of intelligent, whole-hearted devotion to a common cause or a common interest, such as one's division, guns' crew or ship. We are loyal to that into which we can throw ourselves without hesitancy or reservation. (P. 11). ✓



Parker—Leadership.

First, the many excellent books and articles that have been written on the very subject; second, the lives and precepts of the really great leaders of all ages; and third, but not least, a clear recollection of those men under whom we have ourselves served who by their methods and character succeeded in drawing from us the very best we have to give in loyalty, obedience and efficiency. p. 324.

I think this last is perhaps greatest of all, being nothing more than a practical application of the Golden Rule—to deal wisely with others by imitating those who dealt wisely with us. (Pp. 1-2) p. 324 ✓

If I should advance the proposition that peace-time demands a higher quality of Leadership than war-time, it would probably be ridiculed as contrary to all established ideas. Yet, within certain limits, it is absolutely true. p. 324 ✓

Yet, the exercise of all our finer qualities in time of war is not enough. History is replete with instances where nations as well as individuals gave all that they possessed of leadership, patriotism, heroism and industry toward the prosecution of war, and yet went down to defeat simply because they had reserved them for war and not applied them to the fullest extent in time of peace. . . . Leadership should not await the call of some vague tomorrow, but is needed now, today, more desperately against the forces tending to lower our morale than against any enemy we are liable to encounter. (Pp. 5-6) p. 325 ✓

And the problem is no simple one. For the ordinary American boy, on first enlisting, has not the faintest conception of discipline or military duty nor of the respect and obedience due to his superior in rank. p. 326 ✓

How should he have, who never before heard of rank? Does he learn it at home? In the public-schools? It is something we have a right to expect of him like common honesty and morality? Most certainly not. The obvious fact is that this initial ignorance of his relationship to his officers is a perfectly normal condition and one which should never be allowed to cause a rise in blood-pressure on our part. And the work of establishing the relationship is as clearly part of an officer's routine duty as standing watch or caring for his battery. p. 326 ✓

Let us pause a moment, then, and look from the viewpoint of the recruit in the rear rank, seeing his division officers for the first time. p. 326 ✓

What impression do you make in his eyes, Mr. Junior Officer? Does he see you loitering and indifferent? Careless or "non-reg" in your dress? Diffident and apparently afraid of your own voice? Blustering and brow-beating? Giving orders in a "won't you please" manner? Excitable and inclined to throw fits over trifles? (Pp. 7-8) p. 326 ✓

Or does he see you a proper figure of a man, self-confident, firm, courteous, military; and conveying the impression of being in command, not so much by the stripes on the sleeve of your uniform as by virtue of the Man inside of it? p. 326 ✓

Do you so throw yourself into all branches of work that you kindle a like enthusiasm in him? When the sun is hottest, or the rain has turned the coal dust to mud, are you there in the middle of it, encouraging? Do you correct his mistakes consistently and thoroughly, or apparently just when the mood strikes you? When he transgresses the law do you deal with him in such fashion that he realizes why he was wrong and should henceforth do better, or do you merely give the impression of having worked off a bit of temper? If in trouble or needing help or advice, are you the first man he would turn to, or the last? pp. 326-327 ✓

Are you a true Leader in the sense that your influence and example make men give freely of their best efforts, or are you a sort of human lemon-squeezer that by dint of much pressure extracts a little sour obedience? All these questions it were well to ask yourself before looking in the mirror with too much satisfaction and asking permission to go ashore! Have faith in your men! (Pp. 7-9) p. 327 ✓

Too often nowadays one finds a young officer sitting in the Wardroom and growling about the shortcomings of the enlisted personnel he has to deal with. Are they lazy? Be you industrious. Are they dirty and unmilitary? See to it that you are above reproach yourself. Is their morale low? Then for shame's sake, stop whining, get up there and show them what a man should be. p. 327 ✓

Study them, work with them, guide them; report whom you must and command whom you can, but whatever you do, never lose faith, for when that happens, it is not they who are hopeless but you who are beaten. (Pp. 9-10) p. 327 ✓

If you are well born and brought up, with a background of family, and your government has spent four years educating you, and gives you rank and position in the world, what is it all for, if not that you may have something to give in character to those whose start in life was less fortunate? And rest assured that teaching even



one hopeless specimen to hold up his head and take a Man's pride in himself, is the grandest work an officer can do—better than writing fifty articles on "Leadership" or on "The Higher Ethics of the Fire and Bilge Pump". p 322-58

The man is the thing, not the machine or the idea or the Regulation. We are too prone to work for results alone without considering that the real problem is the man on whom we should depend to get those results. (Pp. 11-13). 328 ✓

Suppose our First Sailing Launch, under care of Bill Jones, Coxswain, has continually fallen below the required standard of cleanliness. Now, our primary mission and objective should be, not the sailing launch, but Bill Jones himself. (P. 18). 328 ✓

By heckling and driving we may finally get the boat fixed up for inspection—and thereby have accomplished a little. p 328 ✓

But if we are able to get Bill Jones himself fixed up, to get him to take a pride and intelligent interest in his boat, then we have accomplished as much and a great deal more. For not only is the boat now clean, but Bill Jones has become an asset instead of a liability, and the seed thus sown tends to multiply itself. (P. 14). 328 ✓

Farther back than this, the same principle holds good. p 328 ✓

You yourself bear much the same relationship to Bill Jones that he does to the boat. Get yourself fixed up; get yourself in the proper relationship to your men; make yourself a true Leader; and all the Bill Joneses and sub-Bill Joneses and their boats will in due course fall into line, and the whole lump be leavened. p 328 ✓

If something is wrong, set it to rights by all means, but do not stop there. Why was it wrong? Did some human element of the system fail? Then repair him. Reprimand him or encourage him; teach him or court-martial him; retain him or get rid of him; handle him in whatever best way heaven gives you wisdom to do, but don't leave him to muddle along unrepaid. And when you are through with him, then go back one step further and ask yourself "What was wrong with me, that he should have been wrong?" (Pp. 14-15). 328 ✓

#### *Ability*

The young officer, at least, should be able to do everything that he requires others to do, and do it better, no matter how small the detail or humble the task. When the men find that you are right even in small things they will have faith in you for the bigger things. p 329 ✓

#### *Loyalty*

There is loyalty "down" as well as loyalty "up", and one cannot exist without the other. As you feel toward your men, so will they feel toward you. Give, and unto you it shall be given. (P. 16). 329 ✓

#### *Justice*

It is not enough to think yourself that you are just and fair; make your men think so too. You do not demean yourself by explaining the why and wherefore of an order or decision. A sense of injustice will kill spirit and morale quicker than any other agency. p 329 ✓

#### *Courage*

We know you have it; but take heed that never by the slightest accident or error your men get the idea that there is any danger you would not undergo or hardship you would not share with them. If ever you lose your nerve before them, pack your trunk and get transferred quickly. p 329 ✓

#### *Truth*

Tell them what you can, when you can. Neither conceal nor exaggerate nor minimize. Keep your word whether it be to give a promotion or a court-martial. (Pp. 18-19). 329-330 ✓

#### *Firmness and Consistency*

Be firm as a rock when right, but never obstinate. If wrong, admit it, and you will gain rather than lose in prestige. Finish what you start. Never give up. Never blow hot and cold according to circumstances, but invariably live up to the same principles. p. 330 ✓

The foregoing are a few, a very few, of the points which no officer can neglect. Ceaseless study and constant effort are none too much. For in the final analysis, he who has mastered the Art of Leadership has mastered everything, since through others all other arts are subject to him! (P. 20). 330 ✓



## Reinsch—World Politics.

The reputation of a statesman, as well as his permanent influence on human affairs, depends on his power to understand and aid the historical evolution; from out the medieval chaos, of strong national states. . . . Even Napoleon was unsuccessful whenever his policy opposed the innate strength of nationalism. (P. 3). ✓

Meanwhile international law holds a balance between the states by preventing any of the stronger members from unjustly oppressing the smaller civilized nations. ✓ p. 4

. . . . .no political union, but the active co-operation of all nations in the common work of mankind. (P. 6). ✓

. . . . .Within the latter half of the nineteenth century, nationalism has been thus exaggerated; going beyond a healthy desire to express the true native characteristics of a people, it has come, in some quarters, to mean the decrying, as barbarous or decadent, of everything originating outside of the national boundry. (P. 6). ✓

In international politics the motives of foreign nations are being constantly misunderstood. Each nation looks upon itself as the bearer of the only true civilization. (P. 7). ✓

. . . . .This age of reason, of which Kant, Jefferson, the Humboldts, and Rousseau are the most prominent and distinctive exponents, was followed by what may be called the age of force. (P. 8). pp 7-8 ✓

The nations, having passed through their historical evolution, stand now, with fully developed individualities, face to face. Their competition in all the fields of human activity has taken on tremendous dimensions. On the same overwhelming scale as that of their armaments for war do they now exert their energies in all directions. It is true that in this way they develop greater vitality and ability than could ever be brought about in a condition of world peace; but their rivalry may become suicidal. (Pp. 8-9). ✓

. . . . .nor, on the other hand, can any crime exceed in enormity the act of hauling down the flag where it has once been raised. (P. 11). ✓

Napoleon, indeed, strove to revive the Roman form of imperialism, but the rising spirit of nationalism was too strong for him; against the forces of historical development his genius was of no avail. p. 14 ✓

The older ideas of the solidarity of humanity, of universal brotherhood, have largely lost their force, and have been replaced by a narrow national patriotism. (P. 20). ✓

At present, civilization has the benefit of the constant mutual criticisms among nations, by which an intelligent and real *public opinion* of the world is created; in this manner the individual bent of a particular nation is restrained from becoming exaggerated into a vice or engendering a danger to the general welfare. (P. 25). ✓

Thus, through the expansion of Russian influence in Asia is undoubtedly a serious matter, and may entail very grave consequence on western civilization, that gross misrepresentation of every act, motive, and impulse of the northern empire and its government, with which we are constantly meeting, tends to obscure the clear vision of actual political facts, and at the same time is likely to engender deep resentment among the Russian people. It is in the interest of civilization that nations should watch each other carefully, and that they should not permit any one power to obtain undue advantages over others; it is equally important that this be done in a spirit of mutual understanding and amity, without sowing the seed of hatred and unending dissensions. (P. 26). ✓

. . . . .an empire that does not maintain a navy will be shorn of its dependencies, as was Spain by the United States. (P. 27). ✓

However, nations of the first class are no longer confined to the mainland of a single continent, and hence the importance of navies has been increased, while the number of their functions has diminished. (P. 28). ✓

The social organization favored by a strong army is thoroughly opposed to democracy. (P. 30). ✓

The navy does not come into such direct contact with the life of the people as to influence social organization in accordance with its own system of official aristocracy and popular subordination. Moreover, the life on board a man-of-war, among officers and men, is more democratic, has more of *camaraderie* than is the case in a land army. (Pp. 30-31). ✓

Modern imperialism is more vitally interested in commercial expansion than in territorial acquisition; the great nations are becoming more and more dependent on transoceanic markets. To obtain these and to secure their future accessibility and development, the trade routes leading to them must be protected; and, to this end, navies as well as coaling stations and trade entrepôts, are indispensable. (P. 31). ✓

The recent developments of American expansion obtain their chief significance from the fact that Cuba,



Hawaii, and Manila are important stations on great oceanic trade routes,—that of the Nicaraguan Canal, and that leading to China and India from our western coast. (P. 32). ✓

Banking.....and merchant marine:—Geographically and politically the United States would seem to have a decided advantage in the competition for this trade, but there are no direct banking relations and very few direct sea communications between North and South America. (P. 35). ✓

The men who, as civilization pushes forward its outposts, come in contact with the savages, usually have no ability or desire to understand them. Cruel methods of conquest and subjection are pursued, and most of these races would be happier if they had never seen their civilizers. It is well, then, to look the facts clearly in the face and to recognize that it is a serious and sad duty which the white race is performing in making way for its own future expansion. The white man has burden enough of his own to carry, and too often his interference makes the existence of the inferior races yet more toilsome and weary. (P. 43). ✓

To sum up the general position of the great powers at present, it may be stated that all are straining every nerve to gain as large a share as possible of the unappropriated portions of the earth's surface. Wherever sharp methods of competition are necessary to accomplish this object, they will be employed. p. 66 ✓

In this contest, Asia is the principal object, because with its marvellous resources and its great laboring population it is bound to become the industrial centre of the future. (P. 66). ✓

On account of her meditating position between the Orient and the West, the character and policy of Russia are at present of the greatest importance to the world. Her civilizing capacity, her true aims and ideals, her attitude toward Oriental and Western civilization, the scope of the means at her disposal, are matters of supreme importance to every thoughtful man. (Pp 67-66-67) ✓

On the other hand, even from the Anglo-Saxon side, we often encounter a belief that the world would be better off if forced to adopt Anglo-Saxon methods of thought and government. The existence, side by side, of a group of virile and powerful nations happily renders impossible, for the present at least, the consummation of such schemes of despotic imperialism with all the dead monotony and uniform decadence which it would entail. (P. 69). ✓

The fact must also be emphasized that in the struggle for national greatness the existence of one-man power in a government gives a great advantage to a state. The two countries in which one-man power is most predominant—Russia and Germany—are at present executing the most systematic plans of national expansion. (P. 74). ✓

A nation which engages in the perilous business of competing for transoceanic possessions must have a leader in whose judgment and discretion it can repose absolute confidence,—a leader in whom power and responsibility may safely be concentrated. (P. 74). ✓

The cabinet system of England supplies the concentration, if not the continuity, of absolute authority, in selecting as leaders men whose character and abilities have been subjected for years to a strenuous test; statesmen who are familiar with all the ins and outs of legislation and administration at home and abroad; who have proved their mastery in dealing with public affairs, not only on the floor of Parliament, but in the offices of the administration, and are finally by an informal but effective selection designated for supreme leadership. As both parties aim to give continuity to the foreign policy of the country, and as the same men often remain for decades leaders of the parties, the English government, with all its advantages of freedom and popular representation, has also, to some extent, those characteristics of continuity and permanence which are essential to success. (P. 75). ✓

Political fatalism is very common at present; it is in fact the mental attitude created in many by the study of historic evolution. The manner in which the U. S. was drawn into Oriental politics and incurred far-reaching duties, without any clear recognition among the public, or even among statesmen, of a national purpose or policy, strengthens this feeling. Conscious purpose and reasoned action seems indeed to have been but a small factor in these workings of "destiny". (P. 79). ✓

The suddenness with which the entire perspective of the political world has been changed by recent developments in China is unprecedented. That country, without question, has become the focal point of international politics. (P. 85). ✓

The present weakness of the Chinese empire is due not to the degeneracy of individuals, but to a disorganized political system and to false political ideals. (P. 87). ✓

In the quiet years between 1870 and 1890, some of us may have felt at times that a little of that excitement



which Caesar and Napoleon gave the world might prove a not unwelcome diversion. These later years have shown that the stage on which those actors played their part was after all but a small affair, compared with that on which the twentieth century drama is to be presented. (P. 89). ✓

The repeated conquests of China by foreign invaders have left little or no impression on her ancient morality and polity the conquerors having fallen instead into Chinese ways and forms. Thus, the last conquerors—the Manchus—have become even ultraconservative of Chinese traditions, while the true Celestials themselves are recruiting the reform parties. *p. 89-90 ✓*

The chief characteristic of Chinese society and the essence of Chinese morality is reverence for the past. Noting the fact that the present state forms have existed practically for twenty-five hundred years, and that within this time and under these forms untold millions have been enabled to lead a civilized and peaceful life, we shall cease, perhaps, to wonder at the canonization and worship of the originators of the system. (P. 90). ✓

Any reform along Western lines would render worthless the knowledge that gives prestige to the members of the present official class. Even the introduction of an alphabet would at one blow take away the *raison d'être* of the prominence of thousands of them. *p. 94 ✓*

But the whole system of Chinese education rests on memory and a radical change must therefore be effected in this system before reform can become general. No one has recognized this more fully than have the emperor and his chief reforming minister, Kang Yeu Wei. (P. 95). ✓

.....Usually only about one-tenth of the taxes levied ever reach the imperial (Chinese) treasury. (P. 96). ✓

A whole province does honor to a successful graduate, and the humblest family knows that the day may come when one of its members will stand high in governmental power. It is this that makes it possible for such a system to exist without causing great popular dissatisfaction. It is accepted calmly and as a matter of fact that those in office should provide for themselves and their relatives, while every group of relatives hopes in turn to be made happy by the preferment of one or more of its members. (P. 97). ✓

Whatever laxity Chinese morality may permit in official relations, from the working-man, the tradesman, and the servant it exacts most scrupulous honesty. (Pp. 97-98). ✓

Their whole view of life is favorable to a soldierly character; for, like all Orientals, they hold individual existence cheap, and are impassive under physical pains that to a Westerner would be unendurable. Chinamen have been known to continue eating calmly, while the most horrible tortures were being inflicted upon them. *p. 99 ✓*

Should the Chinese be disturbed in their long cherished habits and prejudices by an invasion of foreign enterprise or political control, they would become fierce defenders of their local civilization. (P. 99). ✓

They have come to look upon the northern empire as the irresistible power, and all officialdom bows before the emissaries of the Czar. A strong, consistent, unwavering policy is necessary to impress the minds of these Orientals. (P. 109). ✓

According to all who have investigated the matter, it may be predicted with absolute certainty that the coal and general mineral wealth of China, taken in connection with the vast and highly trained, frugal, and capable population, will, during the coming century, make China the industrial centre of the world, and the Pacific the chief theatre of commerce. (P. 111). ✓

The technical meaning of the term *sphere of interest* is an area or territory within which a nation claims the primary right of exploitation of commercial and natural resources. (P. 113). ✓

The Chinese never omit the educational view of an undertaking. (P. 142). ✓

It is certain that China offers the most promising, the most marvellously remunerative field for industrial exploitation, but whether the conditions are such that European capital can safely risk investment without the strong and interested backing of a home government remains doubtful. (P. 144). ✓

Lack of security is the chief impediment to the development of the foreign trade in China. The British China Association, in a memorandum drawn up in response to a suggestion of Lord Charles Beresford, attributes the slow progress in the development of foreign trade with China to three principal causes: first, the entire absence of good faith on the part of China in the matter of treaty obligations; secondly, the absence of security for the investment of foreign capital in China anywhere outside of the treaty ports; thirdly, the general want of knowledge regarding Chinese affairs. (P. 154). ✓

.....but that at the present time political influence is essential for obtaining commercial advantages in



China. The Chinese are willing to follow the lead of the strongest. They are willing to reform their institutions and methods, if a strong nation will aid them in meeting the consequences. (P. 156). ✓

The Chinese are an active, energetic race. For ages there has been with them a survival of the hardiest. Trained from youth to subsist on the most meagre diet, to get along with little sleep, and to work patiently for twelve or fourteen hours a day, these men scoff at difficulties and exertions which would within a year weary a European to death. There is no overstrained sensibility. Human life is held so cheap that people often commit suicide simply to cause inconvenience to others. With an intense veneration for the past and an unusual reverence for their ancestors, these people naturally combine a tenacious conservatism in matters of every-day life and intercourse. (P. 194). *p. 193-194* ✓

The mineral and lumber wealth of Manchuria is practically untouched. (P. 208). ✓

(Russian policy of expansion):

The Development is largely, due to the feeling that the available portions of the earth's surface are becoming few, and that, when a vast prize like China is at stake, nations cannot wait for the natural forces of trade and colonization to expand the political influence, but must anticipate the operation of these forces by reserving territories in which they may later assert themselves. (P. 210). ✓

The developments in China have been one cause of the recent *reapproachment* between Great Britain and the U. S. Both have the same interests in the Chinese Empire. Both have, so far as Chinese politics are concerned, the same opponents. Therefore, though in other matters these two nations are most eager rivals, they may well act in common when the question of the destiny of China is at stake. (P. 225). ✓

Though these two civilizations (orient and occident) have in some degree reacted upon each other, they still maintain a distinct character, with little real mutual understanding. *p. 237* ✓

The great question that now agitates thinking minds is as to the future predominance of either tendency in the life of the world. Is the Western spirit to conquer or to be conquered or is there to be a peaceful union of the two ancient civilizations, combined into a higher harmony? (P. 237). ✓

The Orient has the pessimism of completed knowledge and disillusionment: it is quiet and serene, because it sees nothing worth striving for: individual existence is unimportant. The West, on the other hand, is intensely individualistic, and filled with an optimistic energy which leads it to believe in an evolution of higher forms and in progress to a higher civilization: not always clear as to the final aim, it yet believes above all in upward struggle, and takes for granted that humanity can progress. (P. 238). ✓

What the West is striving for and struggling over, their Oriental mind has solved long ages ago. *p. 239* ✓

In China, the relations of the races will be different. First of all it must be remembered that China is in a more temperate zone, and will therefore permit and even invite settlement by Europeans. Consequently, more direct and more far-reaching relations will be established between China and the Western nations than was the case in India. (P. 239-240) ✓

Buddhism, introduced into China from India, is the true religion of the Orient. Its pessimistic view of life, its weariness of existence, and its search after Nirvana, the quiet of the soul, are the fruit of long ages of suffering. It is averse to all fretting energy. Its ideal is a quiet life of contemplation and the extirpation of all violent passions and desires. (P. 240). ✓

At this juncture, the East with its swarming hordes living a listless life from century to century; the West with its energetic, individualistic impulses, but without any consistent philosophy of civilization, meet face to face. That this threatens to accentuate the reactionary forces, to strengthen autocracy and brute force, and to weaken everything that bases itself on reason, reflection, and individual right, is natural and evident. . . . It is paradoxical that, with all its individualism, the West is, nevertheless, more sympathetic than the East. This sympathy is largely a result of the Christian religion; for before the growth of Christianity, the Roman world was dominated by the Stoic spirit, to which pity for the sufferings of fellow-beings was entirely foreign. Throughout the Orient, man is singularly apathetic and untouched by the woes of his fellows. (Pp. 243-244). ✓

Some favorable influences that may be exercised by the meeting of the older and younger civilizations are the gaining by the latter of a deeper insight into the mystic elements of life, more serenity, and greater quiet and self-possession. Our civilization is too materialistic, and lays too much emphasis on mere machinery. The Oriental may well ask, why do you hurry, and struggle, and make inventions, and reduce life to an endless scramble, when you have not time left to think about the deepest questions of the human soul? (P. 245). *244-245* ✓

No one who sees the seriousness of the present situation will rashly cry for war and headlong national ag-



grandizement. (P. 245). ✓

With the growing importance of China in the world of industry, the Pacific is becoming a most important highway of commerce, promising to outstrip the Atlantic as a centre of maritime interests within the not distant future. The countries that immediately border upon the Pacific contain a population of about 550 millions of inhabitants, well-nigh one-half of the total population of the globe. (P. 252). ✓

Thus, the Imperial Japanese line is, next to the two great German lines, the largest, richest, and best equipped in the world. This whole development, with all that it involves, emphasizes the importance of navies. Any nation that desires to have its voice heard in the counsels of the East must be able to support its demands with a strong and efficient navy. (P. 253). ✓

Thus, all nations may cooperate as long as they expand naturally. What must be prevented at all hazards is the ruthless preemption of territories not yet demanded by the interest of national expansion. Even if the nations grow normally, the day may come when they must clash and prove their right to survive. But that day is distant indeed. Until then, it is only necessary to repress the tendencies that would anticipate natural development. . . . To oppose the natural growth of a strong power is unwise and futile; to resist the artificial preemption of regions not yet necessary for national life is the part of statesmanship. (P. 257). ✓

*upon the representative occasion*  
Re-delegation of delegating Prince Henry to command the Oriental fleet; the emperor took occasion to express himself thus:

" . . . . . We simply wish equal rights for German commerce under the imperial banner. Imperial power is sea power. The two are mutually dependent; One cannot exist without the other. Our citizens abroad may rest absolutely assured that the protection of the empire will everywhere be given them through the imperial navy. Should any one infringe our rights, then use the mailed fist and earn your laurel wreath". (P. 265). 264-265 ✓

Their commercial interests (German) are rapidly expanding and no efforts are spared to study the characteristic demands of the market, and to adapt the nature of manufactures and of the credit arrangements to local conditions. (P. 277). 276-277 ✓

The foregoing considerations have given us a vantage-ground from which to view Germany's new imperial policy as a whole. It is based on Bismarck's idea of commercial expansion, its purpose is to create a commercial and industrial empire, resting on a strong nationalistic basis,—one founded for the purpose of giving an outlet to the superabundant energies at home. (P. 287). ✓

In the method of manufactures, as we have already stated, the Germans study the markets carefully and adapt their products as closely as possible to the needs and requirements of their customers. They are not satisfied with sending catalogues, but send agents and samples, and prepare exhibitions. They are free from that somewhat supercilious disdain of foreign eccentricities which marks the Englishmen. If men wish to wear nonsensical and peculiar looking clothing, it is their own affair; and the Germans are glad to manufacture and sell to them whatever they may desire. (P. 296). ✓

While there is nothing but distrust, contempt, and calumny, a real party commonwealth exist. (P. 303). ✓

Among all the interesting developments of the last decade there is perhaps none more significant than the change in the traditional foreign policy of the United States. (P. 309). ✓

In all such great popular movements, there is a powerful element of passionate, unreasoning enthusiasm, which associates itself with symbols, ideas, and words, such as "patriotism" and "the flag"; . . . . . At such times it is difficult to make the voice of reason heard. . . . . A nation that trains itself in sober reasoning,—clear, logical analysis of the facts,—can well afford an occasional outburst of patriotic feeling, without the fear of being driven utterly out of its course by the storms of popular emotion. . . . . The time has now come for a cool analysis of our position and interests, and a careful selection of modes of policy and action. It will not do—it will not be possible—to live forever on the capital of enthusiasm and patriotism. (Pp. 310-311) ✓

Mere territorial expansion appeals to the unthinking; there is a certain fascination in knowing that new territories are brought beneath the sway of our national power. There is, therefore, always a strong tendency to hoist the flag wherever an opportunity offers itself, and as it is considered the height of unpatriotic feeling to haul down the flag under any circumstances, the nation is often forced into undertakings, the scope and bearing of which are only dimly perceived by even its best-informed members. (P. 312). ✓

—When we consider the present situation and the probable future of the Chinese Empire, it seems only just to conclude that the share of the United States in the development of the resources of that country will be at least as large as that of any of the European powers. Commercially the U. S. is the nearest neighbor of the Chinese



Empire; for even when the Siberian railway is completed, it will not materially affect the freight traffic between China and Europe. (P. 313). ✓

The absence of American shipping is noticed by all writers on the Orient, and the Chinese themselves are reported as asking when consuls try to impress them with the importance of American industries, "Where, then, are your ships?" p. 314 ✓

.....In addition to this absence of American shipping, there is a great lack of American banking and trading facilities. Most of the American goods imported into China are handled by British firms. (Pp. 314-315). ✓

.....If free trade opportunities are maintained in China, we shall soon absorb our full share in the commerce of that magnificent market. (P. 318). ✓

It is this that constitutes the chief importance of the possession and control of the Philippines. Indeed, the people of the U. S. would perhaps, all things considered, derive more benefit from the possession of Manila than from the permanent ownership and control of all the rest of the territory in the islands. (P. 320). ✓

When the situation is regarded as a whole, it seems that the importance of these islands lies not so much in their own resources, present or prospective, as in their favorable situation on the great trade route between China and America, and between China and the European colonies in the Orient. At this point therefore, we meet the question of the importance of the direct control of territory in the development of national trade and industry. (P. 323). ✓

We are most favorably situated for developing a great and flourishing trade with the entire Pacific coast of Asia. It would, therefore, be the height of folly for the U. S. to join in a rush for territorial acquisition, which could only lead to such a breakdown of the friendly commercial relations of the civilized powers, as would entail upon all of them a disastrous loss. p. 325 ✓

It appears from the above considerations that the fundamental principles of American policy ought to be the fostering of commercial relations and the strengthening of industries at home, rather than the acquisition of vast reaches of territory. (Pp. 325-326). ✓

Questions of international relations of measures undertaken against foreign nations or in concert with them, cannot effectively be made the subject of party controversies. When the national honor is apparently at stake, when the statesmen at the helm have once taken a position, withdrawal from which might be interpreted as national weakness, divisions of opinion on questions of abstract justice will be of little weight in the balance against the powerful passion of patriotism, which will, in such cases, support the party of advance and aggression. (P. 328). ✓

Party government deals most effectively with matters of domestic concern. As soon as the foreign interests of the nation are at stake, divergencies of opinion have to be reconciled, and a common front presented to the foreign rival. (P. 329). ✓

In the U. S., questions of domestic policy have been the predominant ones until very recently. (P. 332). ✓

It is generally believed that war can be brought about only in answer to a strong demand for it by popular opinion, but even in the most recent events we have examples that show how easily the current affairs may be turned by the action of the executive. This, a diplomatic note by the government of Mr. Cleveland brought us to the verge of war with Great Britain; and through the initiative of Mr. McKinley, the nation has been placed in the position which it now occupies in the Philippines, without any initial impulse on the part of popular opinion. (P. 334). ✓

The nation is still to us the ultimate impersonation of political justice. When its existence or interests are at stake, or when, by its authorized representatives, they are judged so to be, effectual opposition to the course of the government by any party is usually out of the question. Inner discords must be suppressed; nations must present to one another an undivided front.—such seems to be the law of our present stage of political development. (P. 335). ✓

America has of late enjoyed a freedom from care which has made the American statesman rather an object of envy to the rulers of Europe. The politics of the old world were vastly more complex and difficult. Surrounded by rivals who are eagerly watching every opportunity to gain diplomatic or commercial advantages, their resources so limited that national life has to be carefully fostered in order to support the vast expenditures for national defence; these countries are so dangerously circumstanced within and without that any miscalculation of means is likely to bring about immediately disastrous results. (Pp. 338-339) ✓

Our wealth, it is true, still seems boundless, but for what we possess of youthful vigor, the other great na-



tions make up by long experience and astuteness in diplomacy. p. 339 ✓

We may be able to buy, and by brute force to conquer, a good many things; but if we wish to compete successfully with other nations, we must begin to calculate the cost, and not count on the apparently inexhaustible extent of our resources. The time when our statesmen could rely merely on our material strength is forever past. (P. 339). ✓

Our method of selection is most unscientific, and is open to manifold abuses. A crowded popular convention summoned for a few days, cannot develop any organic unity and feeling of responsibility; it will, therefore, be led either by political machinations or by merely fortuitous enthusiasms. . . . Another unfavorable element in our government is the fixity of tenure of the presidency. No matter how great a statesman, or how utterly inefficient the president may be, he knows that his term is limited, not by his success as a statesman, but by the passage of time. Continuity in American political careers is also hindered by the general custom which prescribes that a congressman cannot be elected to represent another district than that within which he resides. The statesman is, therefore, constantly dependent upon the whim of a narrow constituency, who are often unable to judge of his real services, and are guided in their opinion by post-office appointments and harbor bill appropriations affecting their neighborhood. (Pp. 340-341). ✓

Continuity of political life is secured by the fact that law and custom permit a statesman to stand for election in any district of the kingdom, so that no narrow, local jealousies can defeat the reelection of a prominent man. It is by virtue of this fact that the leaders of both parties are constantly present in the House of Commons. Young representatives of marked promise are first admitted into the administration as undersecretaries, and are thus given an opportunity to study both sides of the government,—the administrative and the legislative. The laws which they assist in making, they are bound also to administer. Within Parliament there is constantly going on the most vigorous kind of natural selection, by which promising men are gradually advanced to greater and greater power in governmental affairs. Cabinet statesmen are here subjected to a fiery test; they have to meet the open criticism of their opponents and the silent scrutiny of their friends day after day, as they present measures or engage in parliamentary discussion. Responsibility is so concentrated that the nation really knows whom to praise or to blame for the effects of any particular measure. The men who have passed through this training become so well known to the nation, that they are virtually embodied policies, and it is hardly necessary for them to stand on any platform; their character and political record is ordinarily a better assurance of their true purposes and principles than any verbal declarations could be. ✓

It is evident that this system is admirably adapted to the management of the imperial side of politics. (Pp. 341-342). ✓

Some germs of a system of organic selection can be observed in the history of the last two decades. Thus the governorship of great states, the chairmanship of important, congressional committees, and prominence in the Senate, have come to be considered stepping-stones to the presidential office. Again, there has been a tendency to grant second terms, and thus to secure a continuous career to efficient congressmen and senators. And, finally, the former disorganization of the H. of R. is remedied, to some extent, by the growth of the Committee on Rules, which unifies and digests the legislative business, and acts as a responsible body representative of the party in power. (P. 345). ✓

It is well known that the marvellous English system is entirely an unpremeditated growth. Its essential elements are the representation of the crown by the prime minister; the solidarity of the cabinet; the responsibility of the latter to Parliament; the power to dissolve the legislative and to create new peers the fact that the ministers are members of Parliament; and, finally, that a representative may stand for any electoral district in the realm; all these elements are indispensable to the successful working of cabinet government. (P. 345). ✓

Unless a nation trains itself in political character and method by the efficient administration of its home affairs, it cannot hope to be successful in imperial politics, or to escape the detrimental influence which expansion is likely to produce. (P. 352). ✓

It should be the aim of our nation to counteract everywhere at home and abroad, the ambitions of universal imperialism, by fostering a spirit of confidence and friendship among the nations. Commerce and industry should be developed by establishing trade depots and means of communication, and by upholding the policy of equal opportunity throughout the colonial world, rather than by territorial acquisitions. Our policy with regard to the Philippine Islands should be guided by the broader consideration of Orinetal politics. (P. 361). ✓



## Royce—Loyalty.

Loyalty shall mean, according to this preliminary definition: The willing and practical and throughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. A man is loyal when first, he has some cause to which he is loyal; when secondly, he willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when thirdly, he expresses his devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting steadily in the service of his cause. (Pp. 16-17). ✓

Such cases of loyalty are typical. They involve, I have said, the willingness of the loyal man to do his service. The loyal man's cause is his cause by virtue of the assent of his own will. His devotion is his own. He chooses it, or, at all events, approves it. Moreover, his devotion is a practical one. He does something.

Loyalty without self-control is impossible. The loyal man serves. That is, he does not merely follow his own impulses. (Pp. 17-18). ✓

.....In any case, when the loyal man serves his cause, he is not seeking his own private advantage. (P. 19). ✓ Moreover, the cause to which a loyal man is devoted is never something wholly impersonal. It concerns other men. Loyalty is social. (P. 20). ✓

Whether a man is loyal to a good cause or to a bad cause, his own personal attitude, when he is loyal, has a certain general quality. Whoever is loyal, whatever be his cause, is devoted, is active, surrenders his private self-will; controls himself, is in love with his cause, and believes in it. The loyal man is thus in a certain state of mind which has its own value for himself. To live a loyal life, whatever be one's cause, is to live in a way which is certainly free from many well-known sources of inner dissatisfaction. Thus hesitancy is often corrected by loyalty; for the cause plainly tells the loyal man what to do. Loyalty, again, tends to unify life, to give it centre, fixity, stability. (P. 22). ✓

.....In one form or another this fact, that the ultimate moral authority for each of us is determined by our own rational will, is admitted even by apparently extreme partisans of authority. Socrates long ago announced the principle in question when he taught that no man is willingly base. Plato and Aristotle employed it in developing their ethical doctrines. When St. Augustine, in a familiar passage in his Confessions, regards God's will as that in which, and in which alone, our wills can find rest and peace, he indeed makes God's will the rule of life; but he also shows that the reason why each of us, if enlightened, recognizes the Divine will as right, is that, in Augustine's opinion, God has so made us for himself that our own wills are by nature inwardly restless until they rest in harmony with God's will. Our restlessness, then, so long as we are out of this harmony, gives us the reason why we find it right, if we are enlightened, to surrender our self-will.

If you want to find out, then, what is right and what is good for you, bring your own will to self-consciousness. Your duty is what you yourself will to do in so far as you clearly discover who you are, and what your place in the world is. This is, indeed, a first principle of all ethical inquiry. Kant called it the Principle of the Autonomy or self-direction of the rational will of each moral being. (Pp. 26-27). ✓

.....By merely consulting convention, on the one hand, and his disposition to be somebody, on the other hand, this man can never find any one final and consistent plan of life, nor reach any one definition of his duty. p. 39 ✓

But now suppose that there appears in this man's life some one of the greater social passions, such as patriotism well exemplifies. Let his country be in danger. Let his elemental passion for conflict hereupon fuse with his brotherly love for his own country men into that fascinating and blood-thirsty form of humane but furious ecstasy, which is called the war-spirit. The mood in question may or may not be justified by the passing circumstances. For that I now care not. At its best the war-spirit is no very clear or rational state of anybody's mind. But one reason why men may love this spirit is that when it comes, it seems at once to define a plan of life,—a plan which solves the conflicts of self-will and conformity. This plan has two features;—1—It is through and through a social plan, obedient to the general will of one's country, submissive;—2—It is through and through an exaltation of the self, of the inner man, who now feels glorified through his sacrifice, dignified in his self-surrender, glad to be his country's servant and martyr, yet sure that through this very readiness for self-destruction he wins the rank of hero. p. 39-40 ✓

Well, if the man whose case we are supposing gets possessed by some such passion as this, he wins for the moment the consciousness of what I call loyalty. This loyalty no longer knows anything about the old circular conflicts of self-will and of conformity. The self, at such moments, looks indeed outwards for its plan of life. "The country needs me", it says. It looks meanwhile inwards for the inspiring justification of this plan. "Honor, the hero's crown, the soldier's death, the patriot's devotion—these", it says, "are my will. I am not giving up this will of mine. It is my pride, my glory, my self-assertion, to be ready at my country's call". And now there is no conflict of outer and inner. p. 39-40 ✓



What I point out is that this war-spirit, for the time at least, makes self-sacrifice seem to be self-expression, makes obedience to the country's call seem to be the proudest sort of display of one's own powers. Honor now means submission, and to obey means to have one's way. Power and service are at one. Conformity is no longer opposed to having one's own will. One has no will but that of the country. (Pp. 39-41). ✓

Loyalty, then, fixes our attention upon some one cause, bids us look without ourselves to see what this unified cause is, shows us thus some one plan of action, and then says to us, "In this cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfillment". p. 42 ✓

Thus loyalty, viewed merely as a personal attitude, solves the paradox of our ordinary existence, by showing us outside of ourselves the cause which is to be served, and inside of ourselves the will which delights to do this service, and which is not thwarted but enriched and expressed in such service. (P. 42). ✓

.....The essence of it, whatever forms it may take, is, as I conceive the matter, this: Since no man can find a plan of life by merely looking within his own chaotic nature, he has to look without, to the world of social conventions, deeds, and causes. Now, a loyal man is one who has found, and who sees, neither mere individual fellow-men to be loved or hated, nor mere conventions, nor customs, nor laws to be obeyed, but some social cause, or some system of causes, so rich, so well knit, and, to him, so fascinating, and withal so kindly in its appeal to his natural self-will, that he says to his cause: "Thy will is mine and mine is thine. In thee I do not lose but find myself, living intensely in proportion as I live for thee". If one could find such a cause, and hold it for his lifetime before his mind, clearly observing it, passionately loving it, and yet calmly understanding it, and steadily and practically serving it, he would have one plan of life, and this plan of life would be his own plan, his own will set before him, expressing all that his self-will has ever sought. Yet this plan would also be a plan of obedience, because it would mean living for the cause. p. 43-44 ✓

Now, in all ages of civilized life there have been people who have won in some form a consciousness of loyalty, and who have held to such a consciousness through life. Such people may or may not have been right in their choice of a cause. But at least they have exemplified through their loyalty one feature of a rational moral life. They have known what it was to have unity of purpose. (Pp. 43-44). ✓

And again, the loyal have known what it was to be free from moral doubts and scruples. Their cause has been their conscience. It has told them what to do. They have listened and obeyed, not because of what they took to be blind convention, not because of a fear of external authority, not even because of what seemed to themselves any purely private and personal intuition, but because, when they have looked first outwards at their cause, and then inwards at themselves, they have found themselves worthless in their own eyes, except when viewed as active, as confidently devoted, as willing instruments of their cause. Their cause has forbidden them to doubt; it has said: "You are mine, you cannot do otherwise". And they have said to the cause: "I am, even of my own will, thine. I have no will except thy will. Take me, use me, control me, and even thereby fulfill me and exalt me". That is again the speech of the devoted patriots, soldiers, mothers, and martyrs of our race. They have had the grace of this willing, this active loyalty. (Pp. 44-45). ✓

.....What form of loyalty is the right one, we are hereafter to see. But unless you can find some sort of loyalty you cannot find unity and peace in your active living. You must find, then, a cause that is really worthy of the sort of devotion that the soldiers, rushing cheerfully to certain death, have felt for their clan or for their country, and that the martyrs have shown on behalf of their faith. This cause must be indeed rational, worthy, and no object of a false devotion. But once found, it must become your conscience, must tell you the truth about your duty, and must unify, as from without and from above, your motives, your special ideals, and your plans. You ought, I say, to find such a cause, if indeed there be any ought at all. And this is my first hint of our moral code. (Pp. 46-47). ✓

.....Loyalty so far means for us, in these lectures, the willing, the thoroughgoing, and the practical devotion of a self to a cause. And a cause means, in these lectures, something that is conceived by its loyal servant as unifying the lives of various human beings into one life. p. 252 ✓

.....Loyalty, as we have already seen, and as we have yet further to see, is an idealizing of human life, a communion with invisible aspects of our social existence. p. 260-61 ✓

.....If our philosophy of loyalty has any truth, the history of human loyalty concerns whatever is most important in the annals of mankind. And the whole history of loyalty is the history of the inseparable union of the personal influence of leaders with the tendency to idealize causes. (Pp. 252-260-276). ✓

.....Before true loyalty can appear in any but rather crude and fragmentary forms in the life of a growing human being, a long discipline of the whole mind must have preceded. One must have become capable of conceiving what a social cause is. One must have learned decisiveness and fidelity through an elaborate general pre-



paration of the will. Therefore, while the beginnings of loyalty extend far back into the life of childhood its full development must belong to mature years. Affection, obedience, a gradually increasing persistence in wholesome activities, a growing patience and self-control, all these, in the nature growth of a human being, are preliminaries to the more elaborate forms of loyalty. (Pp. 258-259).✓

.....The resulting dangers show that loyalty ought not to be a prematurely forced plan. It should grow, in its various forms, in its due time. Hence those in charge of our secondary schools should not be misled by their knowledge of the preciousness of loyalty into encouraging an overhasty development of secret fraternities and of fully formed athletic organizations amongst those who are not old enough to reap the fruits of such forms of loyalty. The coming of true loyalty may be seriously hindered by the too early organization of the perfectly nature gang of boys into some too elaborate social structure. Harm has been done of late years by too much aping of athletic and fraternity life in connection with the lower grades of schools. (Pp. 264-265).✓

.....It is the extravagant publicity of our intercollegiate sports which is responsible for their principal evils. Leave wholesome youth to their natural life, not irritated and not aroused to unwise emotions by the exaggerated comments of the press, and our athletic organizations would serve their proper function of training the muscles as well as the souls of our youth to loyalty. As for the fraternities,—the false social prominence which their graduate members sometimes force upon them is a distinct hindrance to the work that they can do in training youth for a loyal life. (Pp. 266-267).✓

Fair play in sport is a peculiarly good instance of loyalty. And in insisting upon the spirit of fair play, the elders who lead and who organize our youthful sports can do a great work for the nation. The coach, or the other leader in college sports, to whom fair play is not a first concern, is simply a traitor to our youth and to our nation. If the doctrine of these lectures is right, we can see with what stupendous human interests he is trifling. (P. 267).✓

European nations glorify the army as a practical teacher of loyalty to the youth. The loyalty thus won is mingled with the war-spirit, and is therefore dearly bought. But we unquestionably need substitutes for military service as a means of training for a loyal life. It belongs to the task of our social leaders to invent and to popularize such substitutes. Herein lies one of the great undertakings of the future. (P. 268).✓

The main lessons that these guides teach us, as I think, are three: First, our loyalty is trained and kept alive by the influence of personal leaders. Secondly, the higher forms of training for loyalty involve a momentous process which I shall call the Idealizing of the Cause. Thirdly, loyalty is especially perfected through great strains, labors, and sacrifices in the service of the cause. p. 269 ✓

Of the three factors here mentioned, the first and second are inseparable and universal. If we are to be made loyal, we want personal leaders, and highly idealized causes. In exceptional cases a man may seem to be his own sole leader in loyalty..... Always to be sure, a loyal man uses his own leadership, since, as we saw in our fourth lecture, his conscience is his leader. But usually he needs the aid of other personal leaders besides himself. As for the idealizing of the cause,—I have called it a momentous process. How momentous we shall soon see. For it is by this process that we are introduced into the true spiritual world. (P. 269).✓

And thus we have before us two of the methods where by individual loyalty is trained. The deliberate fixing of our attention upon the doings of loyal people, the deliberate use of those methods of human nature which tend to idealize our cause, these are means for training in loyalty. p. 296 ✓

Yet one method remains,—it is the most common place, yet often the hardest of all. Loyalty means giving the Self to the Cause. And the art of giving is learned by giving. (P. 296).✓



## Scheer—Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War.

By creating a fleet we strengthened our claim to seapower; without which the Empire must wither away; we remained a thorn in the side of the British, and their ill-will was the constant accompaniment of our growth. The freedom of the seas, which we strove for in line with our evolution, England was never willing to grant, even if it had to come to a world-war on the point. (Preface V). ✓

The origin of the world-war lies in the opposition between Anglo-Saxon and the German conceptions of the world. On the former side is the claim to the position of unrestricted primacy in seapower, to the dominion of the seas, to the prerogative of ocean trade and to a levy on the treasures of all the earth "We are the first nation of the world" is the dogma of every Englishman, and he cannot conceive how others can doubt it. (Introduction IX). ✓

The conduct of a Great Power which left its sea-interests without protection would have been as unworthy and contemptible as dishonourable cowardice in an individual; but it would have been most highly impolitic also, because it would have made it dependent on States more powerful at sea. The best army we could create would lose in value in Germany remained with the Achilles-heel of an unprotected foreign trade amounting to thousands of millions. (Introduction XII). ✓

If it comes to the point that one must decide antagonisms by arms, the foremost consideration is no longer "how can I defend myself?" but "how can I hit the enemy most severely?" Attack, not defense, leads most quickly to the goal. (Introduction XIV). ✓

The method adopted by us of creating an efficient battle-fleet, an engagement with which involved a risk for England, offered not only the greatest prospect of preventing war, but also, if war could not be avoided, the best possibility of striking the enemy effectively. Of the issue of a fleet action it could with certainty be stated that the resultant damage to the English supremacy at sea would be great and correspond proportionately with our losses. Whilst we at need could get over such a sacrifice, it must exercise an intolerable effect on England, which relied on its sea power alone. How far these considerations, on which the construction of our Fleet was based, were recognized as correct on the English side, can be judged from the tactics of England's Fleet in the world war, which throughout the struggle were based on the most anxious efforts to avoid suffering any real injury. (Introduction XIV). ✓

As our Fleet increased, it had become necessary to distribute the various squadrons between the two main bases, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, both with a view to using simultaneously the available docking facilities and also to keeping the ships companies in touch with their nucleus crews on land. The families too, resided at the headquarters of these nucleus crews, to which the long service men, especially the warrant and petty officers, returned on receiving a special order and there awaited fresh employment. The ships spent the unfortunately all too short periods which the annual training permitted, at their bases. (P. 4). ✓

The practical application of theoretical tactics to the circumstances arising out of battle is inexhaustible and provides fresh material from year to year. (P. 6). ✓

The new squadron required training in that respect. In war games, indeed, very useful preliminary work can be done in this department, but that tactical insight which knows how to exploit a favorable situation is itself first trained on the open sea and in the last resort it is the sum of the impressions received which first enables the commander to come to the right decision in the time available, which is often only a matter of seconds. For such decisions there are no rules, however valuable certain tactical principles may be, which have been sanctified by experience. (P. 7). ✓

In the War Orders which were issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet the task before him was framed as follows: The objective of the operations must be to damage the English Fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight, as well as by mine-laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had been realized as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been got ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our Fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy. Of course, if a favourable occasion for battle presented itself before, it must be exploited. Further, operations against enemy merchant ships were to be conducted in accordance with Prize Court regulations and the ships appointed to carry out such operations in foreign waters were to be sent out as soon as possible. (P. 25). ✓

The order underlying this plan of campaign was this: The Fleet must strike when the circumstances are favourable; it must therefore seek battle with the English Fleet only when a state of equality has been achieved by the methods of guerilla warfare. p 25 ✓

It thus left the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet freedom of action to exploit any favourable opportunity and put no obstacles in his way, but it required of him that he should not risk the whole Fleet in battle



until there was a probability of victory. (P. 25). ✓

The first proof of the ability of the submarine to remain at sea for a long time had been given, and progress was made along the lines I have mentioned, thanks to the greatest perseverance, so that the submarine, from being merely a coastal-defense machine, as was originally planned, became the most effective long range weapon. (P. 36). ✓

The other splendid quality of the submarine is its independence, by which I mean that it is not dependent on the support and cooperation of ships or craft of other types. Whilst a force of surface ships comprises various classes, according to the presumed strength of the enemy, the submarine needs no help to attack, and in defense is not so dependent on speed as the surface ships, as it has a sure protection in its ability to dive. This again increases its radius of action, for whereas a surface ship, meeting a superior enemy, has no other resource but to make use of its speed—and that means a large consumption of fuel—diving means a very great economy in engine-power. In the submarine there is no question of driving the engines too hard in such a situation, as the boat can escape from the enemy by diving. The engines need not therefore be constructed to stand perpetual changes of speed. (Pp. 36-37). ✓

The advantages of the submarine service first became of practical value through the fact that human strength of will brought men voluntarily to display such endurance as was shown in our boats. Patriotism was the motive-power of the ships companies. (P. 37). ✓

The English High Command, however, must have had a much higher estimate of the damage our destroyers and U-boats could do than was actually the case. It appears also that their confidence in the achievements of their own submarines, which were the foundation for the execution of any such plan, was not very great. At the outset, therefore, considerations prevailed on both sides which led the Commands to hold back their fleets from battle. The overestimate of the submarine danger played a most important role. (P. 39). ✓

There could be no question of the former alternative on account of the danger from submarines, defence against which was the work of the destroyers, and also because the destroyers were indispensable for battle. The Fleet was therefore dependent upon the radius of action of the destroyers. The appearance of the submarine as a defensive weapon has made it a necessity in modern times to screen the approach of a fleet with destroyers. (P. 64). ✓

Strategical reasons had made it necessary to keep our Fleet back, and this looked like a want of confidence and affected the morale of the men, and gradually lowered their belief in their own efficiency to a regrettable degree. An impressive recital of these facts with the request that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet should be allowed greater latitude was met with a decided rebuff. The grounds of this refusal, as communicated by the Naval Staff, ran somewhat as follows: (P. 67). ✓

Experience showed that it was necessary to test every torpedo that had lain unused for more than five months to make sure that it would act when needed. (P. 74). ✓

The restrictions enforced by the previous Command, not to expose the Fleet to serious losses in the gaining of a prescribed objective, had meanwhile been swept away. The Fleet Command had merely been notified that the necessary caution, by means or reconnaissance, must be observed in all enterprises, and that action should be broken off if unfavourable conditions arose. (P. 90). ✓

The then prevailing conditions of strength kept us from seeking a decisive battle with the enemy. Our conduct of the naval war was rather aimed at preventing a decisive battle being forced on us by the enemy. This might perhaps occur if our tactics began to be so troublesome to him that he would try at all costs to get rid of the German Fleet. It might, for instance become necessary, if the U-boat war succeeded again in seriously threatening English economic life. Should the English thus maneuver for a decisive battle, they could fix the time so as to allow the full use of their vast superiority, whereas some of our ships would be either under repair or otherwise unfit for service, or absent in the Baltic for exercises, of which the enemy would be well informed. (Pp. 97-98). ✓

The first and most important task was the safety of the German Bight. Fresh rules were laid down dealing with the action of the Fleet when in the Bight, and instructions issued concerning protection and outpost. Arrangements were also made as to action under an enemy attack which would save waiting for lengthy orders in an urgent emergency, and would render it possible for all subordinate officers to play the part expected of them in such an event. (Pp. 98-99). ✓

The art of leadership consists in securing an approximately correct picture from the impression of the moment, and then acting in accordance with it. (P. 135). ✓



The swing around was carried out in excellent style. At our peace maneuvers great importance was always attached to this being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to ensure the working of the signals. The trouble spent was now well repaid; the cruisers were liberated from their cramped position and enabled to steam away south and appeared, as soon as the two lines were separated, in view of the flagship. The torpedo boats, too on the leeward side of the fire had room to move to the attack and advanced..... (P. 153). ✓

It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us our action in retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving to him to decide when he would elect to meet us the next morning. (P. 155). ✓

There was but one way of averting this—to force the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to attack. The success of the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The maneuver would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my resolve to make an effort to render assistance to her and at least save her crew. (P. 155). ✓

"The success achieved is due to the eagerness in attack, the efficient, leadership through the subordinates, and the admirable deeds of the crews full of an eminently warlike spirit. It was only possible owing to the excellence of our ships and arms, the systematic peace time training of the units and the conscientious development on each individual ship. The rich experience gained will be carefully applied." (P. 168). ✓

The battle has proved that in the enlargement of our fleet and the development of the different types of ships we have been guided by the right strategical and tactical ideas, and that we must continue to follow the same system. All arms can claim a share in the success. But directly or indirectly the far reaching heavy artillery of the great battleships was the deciding factor, and caused the greater part of the enemy's losses that are so far known, as also it brought the torpedo boat flotillas to their successful attack on the Main Fleet. (P. 169). ✓

The big ship, battleship and battle cruiser is therefore, and will be, the main strength of naval power. It must be further developed by increasing the gun calibre, by raising the speed, and by perfecting the armour and the protection below the water line. (P. 169). ✓

The German idea incorporated in the founding of the Fleet had to hold its own in battle in order not to perish. The readiness to face a battle rests on the fundamental idea and even the numerically inferior must not shirk an attack if the will to conquer is supported by a devoted staff, confidence in material, and a firm conviction of perfect training. (P. 176): 177 ✓

The clever attempts made by the English to surround and cut us off from home by their Main Fleet were turned into a defeat, as we twice succeeded in pushing into the enemy formation with all our strength, and in withdrawing from the intended encircling movement. In spite of various attacks during the night we forced a way for ourselves to Horns Reef, and thus secured an important strategical point for the following morning. (P. 177) ✓

"The enemy suffered twice as much material loss and three times as many losses in personnel as we did. English superiority was thus wrecked, for the Fleet was unable to keep in touch with us at the close of the day battle and its own formation was broken. (P. 177). ✓



Schofield—Lecture—"Training For War Command".

The aim of training will be better understood if we can get at the very root of the matter, if we can uncover a true ideal towards the attainment of which we should direct our efforts. (P. 1). ✓

The intellectual acts of states as of the individual fall under three general heads: (1) Conception, (2) Reasoned Decision, (3) Intelligent Control of Effort. The conceptions of the state are the products of many intelligences in conflict. From among these intelligences certain stronger ones emerge as the leaders or exponents of the dominant conceptions. From these dominant conceptions and from the conditions surrounding the state its Reasoned Decisions flow. These decisions express policies. They may be quite permanent, or they may be evanescent depending upon how naturally they flow from the deepest convictions of the people, how effective the measures in their support, and how nearly the realization of the conceptions corresponds with expectations. But the fact that is here of most interest to us is that the conceptions and decisions of the state in her final form emanate from closely associated individuals, men who as a rule deal together without the barriers of time and space. pp. 1-2 ✓

If the conceptions of the people were sound and durable, if the leaders were brilliant and honest, the reasoned decisions, the policies of the state would be efficiently determined. (P. 2). ✓

When a state determines on a policy which requires the consent of other States it uses diplomacy to further the policy. If diplomacy fails and there has been no preparation for the use of force the policy will fail. This naturally suggests the necessity for policy and the preparation of force to be thoroughly coordinated. If Policy and the Preparation of Force have been coordinated we come quite naturally to Force. Force is the Army and Navy, in their correct perspective a single living instrument of the State in peace the potential argument of diplomacy, in war the dynamic power of the State for the realization of its policies. (Pp. 3-4). 5 ✓

All training in method is systematically aimed at coordination of effort. This judgment results from training according to method. But the Captain's judgment requires more training and a higher order of intelligence back of it because of the greater variety of conditions that influence its action. It is a curious fact that where judgment and understanding have most to do with efficiency, the systematic effort of our organization towards their development is weakest. The training of subordinates is good. It receives the attention and criticism of skill wherever found in the organization. The same is not true of higher training. Rank is removed from criticism. Peace is apt to foster apathy towards the requirements of war. The training of the subordinates to the efficient performance of his duties is of great importance, the training of rank to the efficient performance of the high duties of the great command is of the greatest importance. The one is provided for, the other neglected. Both are essential to intelligent cooperation. Both are essential to the employment of the navy as a whole, as a single instrument. (Pp. 5-6). ✓

In searching for some guide that would focus ideas on the essentials of military conduct, none has been found surer or more useful than the conception of unity in all the forces, of unity in their aims and measures, and of unity in the scheme of war. (P. 6). ✓

Because, "It is not enough that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in well adjusted action. (P. 6). ✓

Every case must be judged on its merits, but without normal to work from we cannot form any real judgment at all; we can only guess. "Theory (knowledge of the past) will warn us the moment we begin to leave the beaten track, and enable us to decide with open eyes whether the divergence is necessary or justifiable". (P. 8) pp. 7-8 ✓

The one picture is of the great man undertaking inconspicuous work, hard, long continued work, in order that he might be the more fully prepared for what the future had in store. The other picture is of the same man exhibiting a dazzling poise, born, perhaps in part, of natural greatness; but strengthened by the sleepless nights of hard and inconspicuous labor by which he had endeavored to perfect his natural endowments. He realized the value of knowledge. He was willing to give his reward in the greatest military careers. Foch—smoking my pipe. (P. 9). P. 9 ✓

The intellectual acts of command in war may, then, be stated as follows:—(a) A clear comprehension of instructions; (b) A reasoned examination of conditions; (c) The determination of intention—decision; (d) The communicating of intention in the shape of orders to others. P. 9 ✓ P. 9 ✓

These are the acts that we should do to train for command. It was not the fault of doctrine but the fault of men who did not comprehend the doctrine and who, in consequence, could not fully understand the orders of their chief. (Pp. 10-12). ✓ P. 10 ✓

The earlier campaigns of Napoleon justified the existence of doctrine in war. To be ready in war he



trained his commanders in peace. He thoroughly instructed them in his *doctrine*. This doctrine is indicated in the following paragraph from his "Instructions for the Superior Leaders of troops". p.10

"Incomparably more favorable will things shape themselves if on the day of battle all the force can be concentrated from different points towards the field of battle itself—in other words, if the operations have been conducted in such a manner that a final short march from different points leads all available forces simultaneously upon the front and flanks of the adversary. In that case strategy has done the best it can ever hope to attain, and great results must be the consequence". (P. 10-11) ✓

The doctrine of no doctrine does not promote coordination of effort, unity of action—our mission. (P. 11) ✓

From this examination of doctrine, it can be seen that no subordinate in a military organization can efficiently and surely perform the intellectual acts of command in harmony with his chief unless his education and beliefs are in harmony with the educations and beliefs of his chief. To clearly understand his instructions, he must be able to read between the lines their full meaning. (P. 11) 12 ✓



Sims—Military Character.

Almost all the writers have confined their studies to the traits of character found in great leaders, but the literature concerning the character of the great body of subordinates is very scant. I will confine my remarks principally to the latter, because the character of the great body of officers and men is of more importance to us than the character of the rarely attained ideal—a great leader of men. p. 438 ✓

We all know, in a general way, that a man upon whom is placed a great responsibility in a great war, a Joffre or a Jellicoe, should not only be a model of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination, but that he should have a thorough knowledge of his profession, and the self-confidence which this renders possible. Also a strong will, great decision of character, resolution, energy, loyalty to his government, his cause, and his subordinates, willingness to accept and ability to bear responsibility, fortitude in adversity, boldness in conception, caution in execution, imperturbability in council, thoroughness in preparation, besides personal courage, physical vigor, and many other secondary though essential qualities. (Pp. 438-439). p. 439 ✓

Military character involves the two wholly essential twin qualities of loyalty and initiative, and all those qualities that are necessary to inspire and develop them, as well as all those that flow from their combination. Loyalty in itself is always indispensable, but initiative without loyalty is dangerous. It is their intelligent and trained co-operation which is the vital characteristic of modern armies. (Pp. 439-440). p. 440 ✓

(Henderson) "The study of war had done far more for Prussia than educating its soldiers and producing a sound system of command, and this system proved a marvelous instrument in the hands of a great leader. It was based on the recognition of three facts; First, that any army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; Second, that the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; and, Third, that intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience". (Pp. 441-442). p. 441 ✓

In the German Army of today the means employed to insure so far as possible correct decisions are, first, a uniform training in handling troops. p. 442 ✓

The second means is a systematic encouragement from the first moment an officer joins his regiment of the spirit of initiative, of independent judgment, and self-reliance. Each has his definite responsibilities, and superiors are forbidden in the most stringent terms to entrench upon the prerogatives of their subordinates. The third means is the enforcement of the strictest discipline and the development of camaraderie in the highest sense. (Pp. 442-443). p. 442 ✓

It is the initiative of the subordinate leaders. This quality, which multiplies the strength of an army, the Germans have succeeded in bringing to something near perfection. It is owing to this quality that, in the midst of varying events, the supreme command pursued its uninterrupted career of victory and succeeded in controlling, almost without a check, the intricate machinery of the most powerful army that the nineteenth century produced. p. 442 ✓

.....the French had nothing to oppose in the grand as in the minor operations but a deliberate inactivity, always awaiting an impulse from above. (Pp. 443-444). p. 443 ✓

The ability to reach a correct decision without delay is not an inherited characteristic as many suppose. It is a habit of mind that is the result of systematic self-training in decisions applied to all situations, both great and small, as they arise in our daily occupations. A correct decision necessarily involves a logical consideration of all available information and experience. But many men who have both this knowledge and experience are comparatively unable to decide their line of action, simply because they have not trained their minds to do so. This training is essential to the development of this faculty. It is of great importance in all walks of life, but it is wholly essential in military life. p. 444 ✓

There is this difference, however, between decisions made in civil life and those required in military life. The civilian has usually a reasonable time in which to arrive at a conclusion whereas a military decision must often be made at once to be of any use. The enemy will not wait for you to make up your mind. Similarly, the power to exercise prompt initiative in large affairs can be acquired only by the habitual exercise of initiative in small ones. (Pp. 444-445). p. 444 ✓

Shortly after I reported on my first ship I learned that if I made out an official application for leave and the captain approved it I would be free to do as I pleased until my leave expired. So, having prepared the document in due form, I requested the marine orderly at the cabin door to hand it to the captain. This orderly was an old man who had had extensive experience with the temperamental idiosyncracies of commanding officers. He glanced at the paper and at once handed it back to me with the following wise admonition: "If you'd be a



takin' of my advice, now, Mr. Sims, you'd hand this here request in after the old man's had his lunch; he's in a h-l of a humor this morning". I followed this advice and my leave was granted and since that time I have seldom if ever made any request of a superior officer until after he had his lunch. I have related this incident to you gentlemen because I believe that a systematic avoidance of contact with the empty stomach will be found as advantageous in civil as in military life. (P. 8). 450 ✓

In contrast with such cases is the happy and successful ship—for the happy ship is almost invariably successful. Both officers and men brag about "their ship". They will not allow her to be beaten in anything if they can help it. Every man loyally does his best to help along, and is encouraged to exercise his initiative in so doing. Such a ship is a practical school in the development of the two primary essentials of military character; that is, loyalty and initiative. (P. 9). p. 452 ✓

We believe it is the duty of every officer to study his own character that he may improve it, and to study the characters of his associates that he may act more efficiently in his relation with them. p. 454 ✓

Above all things, let us not regard loyalty as a personal matter. It is due to our organization and our country under all circumstances and under all possible conditions. No faults on the part of superiors can excuse any failure in loyalty upon our part. This is easy to say but sometimes very difficult to live up to. As it is of the utmost importance, let me illustrate it by an example. (P. 11). p. 455 ✓

The point is that all those who exercise authority should remember that, in their daily contact, with their subordinates, every order, as well as the manner, bearing, and attitude of mind with which it is given, has its influence in promoting or retarding the mission of the whole organization; that is, its maximum efficiency in preparation for war. p. 456 ✓

The responsibility rests of course with him who is in chief command. He has the power to eliminate all detrimental subordinates, and if thorough kindness of heart or personal consideration he fails to do so, he must take the consequences. He is also responsible for the amount of initiative and loyalty displayed by his subordinates, it being one of his most important duties to see that they are trained in these invaluable qualities. (P. 12). 456 ✓



Stoddart—Lecture on Race Conflict.

The keynote of 20th century world policies is the relation between races of mankind. The biological interpretation of history; the pendulum of race.

Increasing racial self-consciousness everywhere and increasing appreciation of what race implies.

Distinction between RACE and NATIONALITY. Nationality is, in the last analysis, a psychological concept or state of mind, a sense of belonging together, as a Nation. Race is a physiological fact, determined by tests, like skull measurement, hair form, and color of eyes and skin. In other words, is what people anthropologically really are; Nationality is what people politically think they are.

The late war was not a race war but an internecine struggle between closely knit blood relatives; since Europe inhabited almost exclusively by three related racial stocks:—Nordic, Alpine, Mediterranean. Almost all European nations are composed of at least two and generally all three. *Pseudo*—"race" phrases—"Pan".

Reasons for past and present predominance of the National over the Racial idea. However, the racial idea is a waxing factor, which will be dominant as the world grows smaller and the primary races are brought ever more in contact.

Distribution of Primary races:—whites 550,000,000—yellow 500,000,000; brown 450,000,000; black 150,000,000; red 40,000,000; total 1,700,000,000.

White world supremacy. Background (1492-1904). Categories of white world supremacy: (a) settlement; (b) political control; (c) mixed population. This very white world supremacy tends to coalesce the other races versus the whites, despite their own interecine differences. This particularly true of mixed areas—example, Kenya Colony. Also:—South Africa, French North Africa, Latin America, and our "black belt".

Difference between such conflicts and those of white political control. India, etc. Here no race issue immediately involved (no white anything); so the problem can be viewed mainly from political, strategical, and economic viewpoint, free from the more vital consideration of race.

Another class of race conflicts: *migration*, especially of non-white races into areas of white settlement. VERY serious. A problem of life and death. No compromise here possible. Also no compromise on question of migration of Asiatics into Latin America or abandonment of Africa to brown control. In both Latin America and Africa the whites must stand fast. (reasons).

Approaching crisis in world race—relations. Necessity of a sound racial viewpoint, based on scientific biological knowledge, "the new biological relation", inspired by the modern spirit of science our best hope for future.



Upton—Military Policy.

Shortly after the disastrous battle of Camden, Washington wrote to the President of Congress "What we need is a good army not a large one". Unfortunately for the country, the object sought by this assertion, so thoroughly in harmony with our cherished institutions, has only been partially attained in time of peace. ✓

....."The National Defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesmen". (Intro-P. VII). ✓

With the greater mass of people, who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the requirements of military science, no error is more common than to mistake military resources for military strength, and particularly is this the case with ourselves. p. VII

Already we are forgetting these costly sacrifices, and unless we now frame and bequeath to the succeeding generation a military system suggested by our past experience and commended by the example of other enlightened nations, our rulers and legislators in the next war will fall into the same errors and involve the country in the same sacrifices as in the past. ✓ III

It has been truly remarked by one of our philosophers "We follow success and not skill". No one can study the subject without acknowledging that our military policy is weak and that it invites and inevitably produces long wars, and that in the race for military laurels the professional soldier usually distances all competitors. p. VII

In the War of 1812 the discipline and victories of the Navy alone saved the country from dishonor. On the land the historian of the Army was glad to slur over needless disasters, to dwell on the heroism in the open field displayed by the Regulars at Chippewa and Lundys Lane.—(Intro. P. ~~211~~). p. XI

The statesman, on the contrary, should study peace and the causes which tend to preserve or destroy it. History will teach him that peace ends in war and war again ends in peace. If the causes which terminate peace and produce war cannot be removed, and if the legislators does not recognize and know how to create a powerful army, he ceases to be a statesman. p. XI

.....There is ample reason for such a conviction. Ultimate success in all our wars, has steeped the people in the delusion that our policy is correct and that any departure from it would be no less difficult than dangerous. —(Intro. P. ~~211~~). p. XI ✓

Unable to suppress in two years an insurrection which culminated in a great rebellion, the representatives of the people were forced to adopt conscription and to concentrate in the hands of the President all the war powers granted by the Constitution, whereupon weakness gave place to strength, but at the expense of a *needless sacrifice of life and property*. p. XV ✓

Twenty thousand regular troops at Bull Run would have routed the insurgents, settled the question of military resistance, and relieved us from the pain and suspense of four years of war.—(Intro. P. ~~211~~). p. XV ✓

The lesson to be learned from this remarkable conflict (Bunker Hill) is the value of trained officers in command of raw troops, a lesson which neither our statesmen nor our historians have ever been able to appreciate. p. 2 ✓

.....Being urged to quicken the step of his men, when they came under artillery fire on their way to the breastworks, the experience of Stark prompted the reply, "one fresh man in action is worth ten fatigued ones". (P. 2). ✓

Men who have been free and subject to no control can not be reduced to order in an instant, and the privileges and exemptions which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others, and the aid derived from them is nearly counter-balanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion they occasion. (P. 14). ✓

From the ill-judged economy (war of revolution) which contributed so largely during the whole war to deprive our commanders of adequate armies, we may turn with pleasure to the generosity which our Government has ever displayed toward those who have risked their lives in the national defense. The liberality of the Government in the matter of pensions has not been confined to the brave men who have been maimed in battle, or whose health has been ruined by disease, it has been justly extended to the widows and orphans of soldiers, who, from whatever cause, have perished that their country might live. p. 65 ✓

The statesman therefore who would relieve us from the burdens of taxation, as well as the philanthropist who would save the health, the lives, and the limbs of our people, must turn from the list of deserving pensioners to the cause, and seek by judicious and humane legislation to set on foot a military system which by lessening the demand for men, will, with equal certainty, economize both life and treasure. (P. 65). ✓

Sixth. No matter what reasons may be given for the adoption of an unwise military policy, that these are powerless to diminish or modify the disastrous effects which inevitably follow. p. 67 ✓



Seventh. That when a nation attempts to combat disciplined troops with raw levies, it must maintain an army of at least twice the size of that of the enemy, and even then have no guarantee of success. ✓ p. 67

Eighth. That neither voluntary enlistments based on patriotism, nor the bounty, can be relied upon to supply men for the army during a prolonged war. p. 67 ✓

Ninth. That the draft, connected or not connected with voluntary enlistments and bounties, is the only sure reliance of a government in time of war. p. 67 ✓

Twelfth. That regular troops, engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view the best and most economical. p. 67 ✓

Fourteenth. That troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training, and cannot be attained without the existence of a good corps of officers. p. 67 ✓

Fifteenth. That the insufficiency of numbers to counter-balance a lack of discipline should convince us that our true policy, both in peace and war, as Washington puts it, "Ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one". (Pp. 65-67). ✓

Apropos of this rebellion, (Shay in Mass.) which found strong sympathizers throughout all of the New England States, John Adams, second President of the Republic, expressed himself as follows:

"National defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman. On this head I recollect nothing with which to reproach myself. The subject has always been near my heart. The delightful imaginations of universal and perpetual peace have often amused, but have never been credited by me". (P. 71). ✓

So long as Congress, in time of peace, shall neglect to provide for national defense, great confusion must ensue at the beginning of our wars, and no better evidence of this is needed than a recapitulation of the military legislation of this period. (1808 and preceding). p. 92 ✓

At the date of the declaration of war against G. B., June 18, 1812, the enemy's regular troops in Canada did not number 4,500 effectives, while our whole standing army was only 6,744 strong, notwithstanding that Congress six months before had increased, on paper, the regular establishment to 35,000 men. Powerless, therefore, to take advantage of the enemy's weakness, military legislation had to take the place of military action. p. 95 ✓

Had Congress, on the 11th of January, declared that all men owed their country military service, and decided to raise the Army immediately, by volunteering or by draft, to 35,000 men, to be held for the term of five years or during the war, (1812) it scarcely admits of a doubt that after six months' training and discipline this force could have occupied Canada and ended the war in a single campaign. (Pp. 95-6). ✓

While the nation had reason to exult over so signal a victory (New Orleans), the battle in no sense vindicated a dependence on raw troops. It only proved, as at Bunker Hill, that with trained officers to command them, with an effective artillery and regular troops to support and encourage them—above all, when protected by works so formidable that nothing but a regular siege should have dislodged them—advantages of position may compensate for an utter lack of instructions and discipline.

Agreeable as it might be to give the entire credit of this battle to raw troops, their heroic commander knew so well the uncertainty of their conduct in the open field that he was obliged to accept the advantages of a more passive defense. (Pp. 135-136). ✓

The same day the remainder of the army, launched against the enemy in position at Bull Run was totally defeated. In the panic that ensued, discipline again gave proof of its value. The Battalion of regulars which covered the retreat and was the last to leave the field, checked the enemy's pursuit and retired in perfect order. ✓

It is well known that the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link, and with slight modification the same principle applies to an army—that complicated mechanism upon which has often depended the fate of republic and empress. The army which went forth to Bull Run, freighted with the hope of a loyal people, was simply a chain of weak links. (P. 245). ✓

A comparison of these figures shows that while in the War of 1812 the combined force of regulars and volunteers of twelve or more months' service was but 12 per cent of the total number of troops employed, the same force in the Mexican War was no less than 88 per cent. The contrast does not stop here. (P. 222). ✓

In the other (1812), less than 5,000 men, for the period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory, and successfully withstood the misapplied power of 7,000,000 of people. (P. 142). ✓



Von der Goltz—Nation in Arms.

Fundamental principles are immutable, therefore it never becomes more than a question of recognizing the original in somewhat altered form.

It was the only extreme significance of maritime strength in relation to world power which was exemplified in a striking manner by the UNITED STATES, who by one short and practically bloodless campaign, gained valuable colonial possessions after the destruction of two hostile fleets.

Among them may be mentioned first one which, as a rule, appeals but little to soldiers, that is *politics*.

War is the continuation of policy with weapons in hand; hence the influence of policy upon the conduct of war. If this influence be open to criticism, it were more correct to blame the policy itself. A bad policy will naturally have a pernicious effect upon war. (P. 137). ✓

.....Contentment is no unimportant factor in the internal efficiency of an army. p. 58 ✓

.....Pride of his cloth and whole-hearted devotion to the service can only be instilled into the soldier by due provision for his wants, and by fair treatment. p. 58 ✓

Non-commissioned officers and soldiers rapidly come and go in the army; its officers alone are the constant element by which tradition is handed down. Year by year fresh contingents of recruits pass through their hands, and the whole nation in arms is subjected to their influence. The work of great thinkers and of great eras in the army can only be passed on to future generations through the medium of the officers. As the officers, so the army. More true today than when it was spoken is Ruchel's saying, "the spirit animating the corps of officers is the spirit of the army". (Pp. 58-59). ✓

Great generals could, accordingly, only arise up independently of their surrounding circumstances, so long as the armies remained more or less free levies of the people, and primitive naturalism pervaded all their institutions. p. 62 ✓

The excellence of the troops now stands in a more intimate relation to the excellence of their generals than was the case in former days. p. 62 ✓

The legend of brave armies defeated because of the incompetence of their leaders will scarcely be repeated in our days. ....As a general rule, good armies and good generalship may, however, be regarded as inseparable. p. 62 ✓

Hence we must not merely examine what qualities a man needs in these days in order to achieve great things as a general, but also what general conditions must prevail in an army to render the rise of great soldiers possible. (Pp. 62-63). ✓

The causes of wars are of a political nature. We have already seen that wars are now only possible for the protection of great political interests. p. 140 ✓

.....In all such cases, however, the true fact is that the apparent motive is really only a pretext for the political antagonism which has arisen from protracted friction. (P. 140). ✓

The general undergoes his hardest trials in the days of disaster. He must possess the special gift of being able to bear disappointments and the buffetings of fate, of whatever sort they may be. p. 69 ✓

.....We characterize that quality which is especially successful in combating the depressing influence of misfortune, as "greatness of soul," and attribute this quality to our ideal of a general. p. 69 ✓

Thus it follows that a number of great qualities, purely human, are also identical with great military qualities. Among the other gifts indispensable to a general, it appears only necessary for us to bring into prominence those about which something special remains to be said. For, we must take it at the outset to be self-understood that he cannot exist without circumspection, courage, boldness, enterprise, foresight, discernment, perseverance, etc., since every good soldier must possess these qualities. (P. 69). ✓

.....The general must understand how to look into the hearts of his soldiers, in order to estimate rightly what may be required of them at a given moment. He must be a judge of human nature. (P. 70). ✓

.....It is knowing his people and his army that guides the general into the right path. p. 71 ✓

A less appreciated, but yet indispensable, quality in a commander is imagination, the step-child of our modern method of training. (P. 71). ✓

As a rule, the importance to a general of a good memory is under-estimated. (P. 73). ✓



Now, if will power, ambition, and a love of fame are combined with creative power, the result is an irresistible spirit of enterprise, and it is rightly asserted, that of two generals who are in other respects equal, the most energetic must gain the day. This love of action was the secret of the fame of Alexander, who has been aptly compared by a writer to a man travelling in arms, who was always full of impatience, fearing that he might be delayed. p. 74 ✓

The mention of this love of action leads us yet further. It makes great claims upon our energies, not only the intellectual, but also the physical. Good health and a robust constitution are invaluable to a general. (P. 74). ✓

We generally understand by discipline that regularity and order which is maintained by the prompt application of a strict law. (P. 161). ✓

....Constant exhortation to cleanliness, to love of order, to punctuality, to painstaking, to love of truth, and to absolute fidelity is the most powerful factor in the formation of discipline. (P. 163). ✓

.....Objectless hardships and losses have a particularly demoralizing effect. (P. 165). ✓

.....The armies of the French September Republic numbered many members of the highest aristocracy in the lower ranks, and there was certainly no lack of intelligence, wanting in uniform training; hence also an absence of unity of action. (P. 166). p. 168 ✓

.....Good leadership cannot exist without strict schooling, since thus only it is possible to ensure that given tasks are executed by all officers on similar principles, though the methods employed may vary. In the case of theoretical problems set in time of peace, the solutions supplied are most diversified. (P. 168). ✓

.....We must not try to force the fulfillment of our pet ideas, come what may. Tacticians and strategists having this tendency are very dangerous leaders, particularly when they go so far as to crystallize their scientific convictions into systems. In war there is no saving truth outside which there is no salvation; everything may be right, and everything may be wrong, according to circumstances. (P. 382). 383 ✓

But in the zeal to inflict injury upon the enemy, a resolution must not aim at the unattainable, though it should venture to go to the extreme limit of the permissible. In war, nothing rational must be considered impossible, as long as it has not been tested out; and we may dare everything we believe we can carry out. (P. 383). ✓

Very frequently the time will be wanting for a methodical interrogatory. Sometimes excitement prohibits it. A resolution then becomes a matter of instinct. p. 383 ✓

What is meritorious in all instinctive action is the moral courage to obey such impulses. And yet we have valid reason to place confidence in them, since they express the total sum of judgment, experience, knowledge, and strength of character, an unconscious combination of all intellectual and moral forces. The soldier's spirit within us asserts itself with sovereign freedom, and finds its way more surely than deliberation, which may be led by appearances to false conclusions. (P. 383). ✓

.....It is even a creation of the moment, in which the whole productive capacity of the man has found its fullest expression. Shakespeare speaks of the "native hue" of a resolution. He knew that it was not an assumed hue. (P. 384). ✓

"Great aims are the soul of war, and what would become of the whole theory of military science, were its great views and rules buried under a mountain of petty difficulties, laboriously dug out from the whole range of possibilities?" (Clausewitz). p. 387 ✓

.....Excellent men, though perfectly clear-headed and conscious of the purpose, may lack it. It is, even, a question of the innate gift of command. The contemplation of human nature may suggest a few useful hints. "In the face of the enemy, the soldier is not so machine-like as on parade, and this is as true of the highest commanders as of the private soldier. (Scharnhorst). Even feigned assurance may be advantageous, whilst a careless word of doubt or fear may easily do the gravest harm. In action, optimists regain the ground which their views have lost on the field of argument. (P. 387). ✓

The will to conquer is, in the case of the C-in-C, as also in that of his troops, of paramount importance. p. 45 ✓

.....Troops determined, like those of the Second Army at Vionville, on August 18, 1870, not to yield ground, are in the end regarded as victorious, even though the greater material losses are on their side. This obstinate will to remain victorious speaks most strongly of the spirit animating an army.....The pride and self-consciousness of the army, founded upon good traditions and successful generalship, secure success even under the most trying circumstances. (P. 145). ✓



..... Besides, initiative is already opposed by a sufficiency of powerful enemies. Such are, intellectual laziness, *laissez-faire*, the habit of acting by rote, the fear of responsibility, the habit of the majority of men to allow themselves to be carried by the flow of events, of waiting until these clearly impose upon them the duty of action, instead of acting on their own judgment. These negative forces paralyze, as it is, all power of action. p. 391 ✓

..... Initiative can easily be driven out of an army; but it is extremely difficult, perhaps utterly impossible, to rehabilitate it when once banished. There is a means of preventing possible ill consequences of initiative, that being a uniform training of the faculty of judgment. This means is quite sufficient, and will not prejudice independence. (P. 391). ✓

Dissimilar things can never be brought into arithmetical comparison; and no sensible man, on seeing three rams confronted by a lion, would speak of the superiority of the former. p. 146 ✓

"If ever we see double numbers of men place their weight in the scale against the talents of the best generals, we may not doubt that, in ordinary cases, both in great and small engagements, a considerable superiority, which need not, however, exceed the double, will be sufficient to ensure victory, no matter how disadvantageous other circumstances may be. We may, of course, have in mind a defile, where tenfold superiority would not avail; but in such a case we can no longer speak of a battle in the ordinary sense". (P. 147). ✓

So long as earthly nations strive after earthly goods, so long as they aim at securing for succeeding generations both room for expansion and peace, and respect among their neighbours, so long as, led on by great spirits, they strive to go beyond the narrow bounds of everyday needs towards the realization of political and civilizing ideals, so long will there be war. What use is it to dispute whether war has an ennobling or degrading effect upon mankind? p. 470 ✓

..... What is, however, absolutely certain, is that wars are the fate of mankind, the inevitable destiny of nations; and that eternal peace is not the lot of mortals in this world. (P. 470). ✓

(It's not the men, but the war.) Very true in the old days—now "The excellence of the troops now stands in more intimate relation to the excellence of their generals than was the case of former days". p. 62 ✓

Throw the details on other shoulders. .... p. 93 ✓

Harmony must exist between the Chief and his Staff. p. 88 ✓

"The souls of the Prussian army is in its officers". p. 50 ✓

..... So long as the educated, the leading, classes maintain their efficiency, the people also will be stout and capable. p. 50 ✓

..... The best possible troops under bad officers are at most but a very deficient body. p. 50 ✓

Influence over the soldiers must be gained in time of peace by a proper application of the superior qualities of intellect and character, in training and leading them. This, above everything, must also include care for the well-being of the soldier. p. 52 ✓

..... The worse the discipline in an army is, the more despotic a form it assumes. p. 52 ✓

Just in order to inspire his men, he must frequently expose himself more than the ends of battle would otherwise at the moment demand. By thus showing himself exceptionally fearless and self-sacrificing, he awakens noble impulses in the soldier's breast, for only by these can great deeds be done. (P. 52-52). ✓

..... The desire of attaining the position of an officer in the reserve should be prompted, less by considerations of personal honour, than by a sense of duty. (P. 57). ✓

We must guard against a conception of policy in the narrow sense of the term, thinking only of what we commonly call external politics; internal politics being equally material. We will accordingly, take the word "policy" in its widest meaning. p. 137 ✓

Upon policy the whole general condition, the temper, the constitution, the moral and physical vigour of a State depends; and upon these elements, again, the manner of making war. (P. 137-138). ✓

The first step of the Prussian State ought to have been to make similar national efforts. But for this purpose it was necessary that political wisdom should, a considerable time before the outbreak of war, have brought the nation into a condition of mind allowing of the employment of all its resources in war. (P. 139). ✓

..... A claim advanced with determination seldom meets with opposition; it inspires respect, and the great masses of mankind like to be impressed by their leaders. p. 63 ✓



It is impossible to conceive of a strong will apart from self-reliance. (P. 63). ✓

Courage and love of responsibility are necessary to a general, but are rare <sup>2775.</sup> Very many men dash thoughtlessly into the gravest perils while another is accountable, but are irresolute when they themselves have to bear the responsibility. (P. 64). ✓

The truest friend and promoter of strength of will is ambition. Healthy ambition is indispensable to a general. Men of very strong will and great qualities remain sometimes unknown because they lack the inner impulse to shine forth, to be the first, and to "outstrip others". (P. 68). ✓

Policy, furthermore, regulates the relations not merely between the States immediately concerned, but also with those indirectly interested in the final result. Their sympathy or ill-will may count for much, in either impeding or in promoting the action of a belligerent. Politics, again, as a rule, determine the moment for the outbreak of hostilities, upon the happy choice of which so much depends. They, in short, create the general situation, in which the State enters into the struggle, and this will be of material influence upon the determination of the commander-in-chief, and even upon the general spirit of the army. (P. 141). ✓

In view of the swift march of modern military operations, politics will retire more and more into the background after the first roar of the cannon. p. 141 ✓

Politics regain their influence only when it is felt that, in the case of one of the belligerents, the necessity of peace begins to slacken the ardour for a continuance of the struggle, and that all hope of the success of his arms is fading away. It will then be the business of the politician to prepare the basis of an understanding respecting the end of the struggle. The influence of third Powers, too, is occasionally invoked. They frequently determine how far the victor may proceed in his demands, and to what extent the vanquished must give way. p. 141-142

In the last stages of a war, when the decision by arms is no longer doubtful, the military element naturally recedes more and more before the political, and considerations of policy may even directly influence the decisions of the commanders-in-chief. (Pp. 141-142). ✓

War is always the servant of policy. War waged merely for the sake of extermination and destruction is now quite inconceivable. An object of permanent value to the State, be it only a question of ascendancy, must exist; and this can only arise from political consideration. p. 142 ✓

The object itself of war is of such importance and will so powerfully stimulate the exertions of nations for its attainment, that, almost on that account alone, we are tempted to place policy first among conditions of success. Now, as we have seen, there are many attendant motives, and thus we may unhesitatingly lay down the maxim that without a sound policy success in war is improbable. (P. 142). ✓

How closely politics and war ought to co-operate is manifest. This leads us back to the conviction already expressed that a state is most happily situated when commander-in-chief and statesman are combined in the person of a great king. p. 143 ✓

A writer upon strategy and tactics ought to treat his subjects as national strategy and tactics; for only such teaching can be of real service to his country. (P. 143). ✓

Our modern German fighting method aims at bringing on decisive results by a succession of vigorous blows in accordance with our conception of resolute offensive. p. 143 ✓

Though not always within the power of the C-in-C, he ought to make it his constant aim, wherever circumstances permit, to give the utmost possible effect to the national mode of fighting even if such action be bound up with some material disadvantages. (P. 144). ✓

The spirit of initiative urges to independent action, and makes armies strong. We rightly adhere to the principle that, in the case of an officer who has been guilty of neglect, the excuse that he had received no orders is of no avail. Passive obedience does not satisfy us, not even the mere fulfilment of what was ordered, where an opportunity occurred for doing more. Clausewitz declares it to be a sign of mediocrity to do always only exactly what one's office requires. We call it an incomplete sense of duty. Frederick the Great demanded that every officer should at least prepare himself for the next higher rank. Power of independent action and the spirit of initiative can be cultivated in no other way. (Pp. 389-390). ✓

A clever general will often manage to paralyze the whole force of the enemy with a smaller portion of his own troops, either deceiving him by audacity as to his strength, or by involving him in a very difficult task absorbing large numbers. Again, where the numbers on both sides are equal, local superiority at a decisive point may be established, which brings in good interest, whilst the enemy has invested his capital badly. Such incidents display a certain fight of economy; we speak, in fact, of a wise economy of forces as constituting another condition



of success, which may, partially at least, compensate for a deficiency of resources. (P. 146). ✓

The resolution is the author of action; Firmness its preserver; Initiative its nutriment; Independence its guard against interruptions; and where these qualities are found, Arbitrariness is unknown, for the former spring from a good, and the latter from an evil disposition. (P. 393). ✓

We thus arrive at the leading principle of modern war: to show oneself, at the decisive point, as strong as possible. To dispute the value of numbers is equivalent to denying this universally recognized principle. p 147 ✓

Armament also figures largely among conditions of success. The bravest soldiers with lances and swords could effect little against breech-loaders and rifled cannon.....But untimely parsimony, technical mistakes, or obstinacy and false pride, which will not allow a weapon, once declared good, to be discarded, may considering the rapid progress of our times, be productive of considerable inequalities. (P. 147). ✓

Our modern wars, with their principle of the unrestricted use of all available resources, are not conceivable apart from the modern method of raising money by loans. p. 148 ✓

.....On the other hand one may say, with a certain show of justice, that so long as a State possesses credit, its defeat is not decided. (P. 148). ✓

States which, in the event of war, hold command of the sea, have greater facilities of utilizing their credit than those whose harbours are immediately blockaded. The former are in a position to make use of foreign industry for arming and equipping new armies. p. 149 ✓

The Southern States, in the American War of Secession, succumbed in spite of their greater military skill and efficiency directly their over-sea communications were cut. The command of the sea is, therefore, immediately productive of an access of strength, even the fleets be not in a position to give direct support to the operations of the land forces. (P. 149). ✓

Granted that wealth gives great strength, it will, nevertheless, only bear fruit if the people be willing to make sacrifices betimes. That tardy sacrifices cannot retrieve what has been neglected at the proper time was taught to Carthage by the fate of Hannibal, and it paid for its error with the loss of its freedom. (P. 149) ✓



Von der Goltz—Conduct of War.

.....An absence of clear knowledge of the object aimed at engenders a weak method of conducting war, and contains the germ of future defeat. (P. 119).✓

It is well that Napoleon I. boasted that he never had a plan. Yet we see that all his operations were directed from the outset on some great and perfectly definite objective, which can be readily recognized, whether it be cutting the enemy's army from its communications, as in 1805, or threatening his capital, for the protection of which the army must at all costs interpose and accept battle, as in 1806. (Pp. 120-121).✓

.....Hence, a thorough knowledge of our own capacity is of the very first importance in deciding on the military objective for a scheme of operations. Often it is even necessary to reject a plan which is good in itself, because the man who would, under the existing circumstances, have the carrying of it out is not equal to it. If the commander makes out the plan himself, he should ask himself honestly and without trying to deceive himself, if he really thinks himself capable of performing the great things which he proposes. (Pp. 124-125). ✓

The way to make a valuable plan of operations consists, beyond everything, in keeping within wise limits. If we go too far into questions of time and space, or enter too deeply into details, which are entirely dependent on chance, the course of events will soon prove us wrong. (P. 129). ✓



Wilkinson--War and Policy.

When I was a boy my father, partly by precept but much more by example, taught me three lessons: to tell the truth, not to be afraid of saying what I thought, and to live for the public good. VII ✓

But after many years and a long circuit it brought me back, with a new point of view, to British public affairs, for it seemed that war is a form of political action, the only means by which a nation can assert against challenge its conception of right. VII ✓

British public life and English literature, under the influence of that Liberalism of which Bright was the exponent, were pervaded by a false and distorted view of war, and regarded the exertion of force in support or right, not as something that might be necessary and for which the nation ought to be prepared, but as something altogether wrong. VIII ✓

If war is a fact of human life which cannot be neglected, no theory of the State or of British affairs which does not take account of it can safely be trusted. VII ✓

I believe that the first and last object in any policy must be the right, that a State which knowingly departs from justice is preparing its own downfall, and that injustice due to ignorance is hardly less dangerous. But the right can too often be maintained only by force, and the great test of character for nations as for men arises when they are confronted by the dilemma which requires them either to risk their existence in a conflict for the support of what they believe to be right, or to commit moral suicide by acquiescence in what they know to be wrong. VIII - IX ✓

In the last section, which treats of the South African War—unsystematically, as in this matter the time for history has not yet come—are brought out the consequences of that neglect to think about war during peace which is, in my judgment, the cardinal sin of the British statesmen of our time. X ✓

The separation of military from political history corresponds to a convenient division of labour, for the accident of experience that qualifies the same writer to deal with both departments is not common. Yet this separation is attended with grave disadvantages. It divorces in thought things which in reality and by nature go together. War is political action. It arises from political conditions, it ends in political conditions. 103

Writers on strategy are, rightly enough, apt to discuss the operations of war as matters of pure reason. But we should never forget that war is fighting, and that fighting without passion is outside the range of human experience. p. 7 ✓

In Lincoln's mind the contest between North and South was shaping itself. "A house divided against itself", he said, "cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall, but I expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or the other". p. 26 ✓

Their own country was assailed, and in defending it they were at the same time asserting a good cause. Is not this the natural form by which in this world right is vindicated? The theory that righteousness asserts itself stands in no relation to the facts of life. The realization of what is right in the region known to human observation is accomplished by the exertions of men attempting to carry out what they believe to be right, just as, at any rate in the English-speaking world, the fabric of civil law is built up by the actions brought by those who think it worth while to defend in the law courts those rights with which their own interests are bound up. p. 56 ✓

When a nation feels its vital interests wrongfully assailed by another nation, its only means of protecting those interests and of maintaining its belief in the right is to exert force in self-defense, and he would be a bold man who would maintain, upon a broad review of the wars of the last hundred years, that in the majority of cases success has not inclined to the side which has, on the whole, represented the better cause. p. 56 ✓

If this be the case, we must reject the conception of peace as the great object of political action. It rather behooves the free citizens of every State to be resolved that the policy pursued by their nation shall have justice for its aim and righteousness for its foundation, so that there may be no chance of their being called upon to draw the sword in behalf of wrong; no probability that their sons shall have to bleed in a quarrel of which their sons' sons shall be compelled to say that, brave though their fathers were, they were brave in a lost cause. pp. 56-57 ✓

The sentimental school, of which peace is the great aim, has attempted to foist upon the world the idea that war might be avoided by arrangements for international arbitration. This theorem is probably based on the analogy of the civil actions by which private quarrels are settled in the law courts, but the analogy is false. A safer analogy is to be found in the administration of criminal law, in which the State makes war upon offenders, and uses force to secure their punishment. p. 57 ✓

Nations are the best and only judges of their own affairs, and no nation worth the name will ever submit, in any matter in which it believes that its vital interests are concerned, and that its cause is that of right, to any



dictation from outside, even though it take the form of a judicial utterance. If the whole world were a single State, the ideas of the advocates of arbitration would be realized; but is it certain that in that event there would not from time to time be revolts against the authority of the State, based upon the purest ideals of conscience and duty, and probably as well justified as the most righteous revolts known to history? p 57-58 ✓

The true responsibility of a nation is not for the preservation of peace, but for abstention from wrong, and the penalty of wrongdoing, whether it takes the shape of peace preserved by cowardice or of a war in an unjust cause, is for nations, as for individuals, their own corruption and degradation. p 58 ✓

War is a means to an end, and nothing more; it is a phrase of policy in action. p 59 ✓

War carried on for its own sake, or for the sake of winning battles, is a mere handicraft, the occupation of small minds. In noble war, the war of the great masters, the political purpose dominates everything. p 59 ✓

A favorite account of the essence of strategy is that it consists in dividing an army for the purposes of movement and supply and in uniting it for battle. In this matter Gustavus appears as a precursor of Napoleon. p 62 ✓

A third account of strategy regards it as the art of using battles so as to further the object of war. p 64 ✓

The campaign of Valmy showed how a splendid army and a talented commander could come to ruin from sheer lack of political purposes. p 83 ✓

This is the secret of nearly all failures in war. "You ought never", says the father of military criticisms, "to begin a war without knowing what you mean to get by it and in it". p 84 ✓

The consequence of this mixture of motives was half-hearted action. p 85 ✓

Yet Valmy ought to have opened the eyes of the Prussians. That it did not is a striking illustration of the extent to which a nation may become blind to the incompetence of its rulers, to the weakness of their policy, and to the dangers by which its future existence is threatened. p 85 ✓

(Frederic II)—He, too, grasped the fundamental law of the political world, that a State must rely upon its own efforts. p 88 ✓

Frederic William III—.....so afraid of deciding wrong that he never in his life decided anything. To such a disposition "a policy of neutrality" commended itself, for it was a phrase that veiled the fact that he had no policy. p 89 ✓

The rights or the interests of a State if challenged must be sustained by force, and to renounce the use of force is to abandon every right and every interest that is challenged. p 89 ✓

"In consequence of the excessive increase in armies, tactics have lost in value, and the strategical design of the operations (rather than the details of maneuver) has become the decisive factor in the issue of a campaign. The strategical design, as a rule, depends upon the decisions of Cabinets, and upon the resources placed at the disposal of the commander. Therefore either the leading statesmen should have correct views of the science of war, or should make up for their ignorance by giving their entire confidence to the man to whom the supreme command of the army is entrusted. Otherwise the germ of defeat and of national ruin may be contained in the first preparations for a war". (One of the Archduke's aphorisms). p 105 ✓

The gist of it is that failure in war brings with it immeasurable consequences to a nation, and that it can be avoided, if at all, only by full devotion to their duty of self-preparation on the part of all who may have to bear any responsibility in connection with it—officers, generals, commanders, and, above all, the statesmen whose duty it is to see that the national forces are duly prepared—that competent leaders have been found in plenty of time and have been given authority to train their subordinates.

These are the touches that show why it is that a leader of men or a master in war must be an artist in human nature. Thus he speaks of "that preparedness of mind, as well as of purpose, which at bottom was the greatest of Nelson's claims to credit."

The essence of Nelson, the root and foundation of the whole man, is zeal. His autobiographical sketch is pervaded by this idea. At fourteen "my ambition was to be a seaman; at fifteen 'I begged I might be coxswain; I exerted myself to have the command of a cutter; at nineteen his captain felt as easy when I was upon deck as any officer in a ship.' " Then then "a frigate was not sufficiently active for my mind". In this review of his own life the whole impression is of an uninterrupted effort to be the best man at his work, and in particular at command. It winds up with the moral: "Thus may be exemplified by my life, that perseverance in any profess-



ion will probably meet its reward.....and I may say to the reader, 'Go thou and do likewise'". pp 127-128 ✓

"December 13, 1786—Our country has the first demand for our services, and private convenience, or happiness, must ever give way to public good". ✓ p. 128 ✓

"May 6, 1788—I have invariably laid down, and followed close, a plan of what ought to be uppermost in the breast of an officer: that it is much better to serve an ungrateful country than to give up his own fame. Posterity will do him justice; a uniform conduct of honour and integrity seldom fails of bringing a man to the goal of fame at last". ✓ p. 128 ✓

"April 28, 1796—I have not a thought on any subject separated from the immediate object of my command, nor a wish to be employed on any other service". ✓ p. 129 ✓

"June 20, 1796—Opportunities have been frequently offered me, and I have never lost one, of distinguishing myself, not only as a gallant man, but as having a head; for, of the numerous plans I have laid, not one has failed, nor of opinions given, has one been in the event wrong". p. 129 ✓

Nelson threw his whole force into thinking how to do what he had to do, what he was resolved to do, what it was his duty to do. p. 130 ✓

This kind of study (academical) tends to overload the intellect at the expense of the will, and leads to just that astonishment at the perfect equipoise between the two which marks Captain Mahan's general summaries of Nelson's greatness. p. 130 ✓

"Their high state of discipline is well known to you, and with the judgment of the captains, together with their valour and that of the officers and men of every description, it was absolutely irresistible". (August 3, 1798). p. 131 ✓

"July 2, 1804—My mind is fixed not to fight them, unless with a westerly wind outside the Hieres, and with an easterly wind to the westward of Sicie. b. 133 ✓

"Do not imagine I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at an immense disadvantage without an adequate object. p. 133 ✓

.....We won't part without a battle. I think they will be glad to leave me alone if I will let them alone; which I will do either till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted". p. 133 ✓

Nelson writes to the Queen of Naples (July 10, 1804):.....Small measures produce only small results". p. 133 ✓

"I knew when I decided.....that perhaps my life, certainly my commission, was at stake, but being firmly of opinion that the honour of my kind and country was involved.....I determined at all risks to support the honour of my gracious sovereign and country, and not to shelter myself under the letter of the law". p. 134 ✓

My position from the beginning has been that there is no absolute bar to the transport of troops short of decisive naval victory, which is itself the proof that the winning force was superior, though of course not necessarily in numbers. p. 136 ✓

Would it not be truer to say that the modifications of war in all ages are a result of social and spiritual growth and are, therefore, always primarily "moral", and that in our own day the best industrial development of society has given unusual importance to the influence of weapons upon tactics and of means of communication upon strategy? It seems to me that war is essentially a conflict between two wills, and that a distorted view must be the consequence of putting mere machinery—the weapons—in the forefront. For this reason discipline—the training of the will—is always, and will always be, the foundation-stone of an army. p. 142 ✓

Its choice is governed, not by a theory of the military superiority of defense, but by necessity. But insofar as there is an abstract doctrine it is not quite accurately represented by Colonel Elsdale. The best of all writers on war—Clausewitz—considers that the defensive is the stronger form with a negative purpose, the offensive the weaker form with a positive purpose. According to him the advantage of the defensive is that time is on its side; every hour that the attacker lets slip, from ignorance, hesitation, or weakness, tells in favour of the defender. Moreover, "possession is nine points of the law", and in war, as in law, it is easier to keep what you have than to take what you have not. Accordingly, no general attacks unless he believes himself in some way the stronger. He dares to attack because he thinks he is more skillful than his enemy, or that he has more men, or that his troops are better trained or better armed. No doubt victorious generals have as a rule, though by no means always, been the attackers. But this only proves that they had in fact the superiority in which they trusted. A victory is put down to the credit of the commander who won it, and mankind are probably not far wrong in sup-



posing that the skill and character of the commander were more important than whether he happened to be the assailant or the assailed. pp 157-158v

Every commander tries to get the initiative. He wants to have the first move. The reason is that the enemy must reply to your move, and in order to reply must first find out what your move was, what you have done. To find that out is the chief difficulty in war. Wellington once said that he had spent his time for years trying to get to know what was going on on the other side of a hill. Sherman described a general's chief anxiety as caused by "what he can't see the enemy doing". The commander who has the initiative throws this difficulty on to his opponent, and in general the initiative is with the attacker. I say in general, because the attacker may lose this advantage by a false move; probably if neither side made any mistake—which is out of the question—the attacker would always have the initiative. Troops, it is generally believed, prefer to attack. The men are said to dislike the suspense of waiting for the enemy. p.158v

In war, is in chess, the best player generally wins. But while in chess the number of pieces and their power are fixed and equal for both sides, in war their numbers and their powers depend upon the qualities, the resources, and the strength of purpose of the nations engaged. If one side opens the game with a set of twenty queens, an opponent having nothing but sixteen pawns will have a very poor chance. p. 169v

In Napoleon's words, "A la guerre les hommes ne sont rien, c'est un homme qui est tout". p. 175v

Sometimes, but not often, a powerful mind is coupled with a very strong backbone. Such a man, when he has a chance does great things. p. 175v

He (Nelson) proclaimed first that war is always in all circumstances nothing but a chapter of national policy; its ends are those of the statesman, the only difference between that chapter and the one that precedes it being that when the page of war begins the instrument used is force; when force has done its work, the thread continued in the next chapter, is the same that ran through the blood-stained passages called war. His second discovery was that if war were logically conducted, each side would, from beginning to end, aim at the total destruction of the enemy's forces, by which is meant, not necessarily killing all his men, but making an end of all his armies. pp. 179-180v

The conclusion is to be drawn from these reflections is that war in our time is bound to be a struggle for national existence, in which everything is risked, and in preparation for which, therefore, no conceivable exertion must be spared. p. 181v

This tendency of modern war to extremes is the fact that gives such immeasurable importance to the right kind of preparation, and makes it above all things necessary that a Cabinet of civilians should have as its thoroughly informed and trusted advisers the best naval and best military strategist that the nation possesses. To have selected a Comdr-in-Chief is a good thing; to bring him into the closest relation with the Prime Minister would be better; and the best thing that the Government could possibly do would be to find him a naval colleague, his equal in reputation, experience, and ability, and endowed with an authority over the Navy co-ordinate with that which he ought to exercise over the army. p. 182v

Those who consult tables giving the grand total of persons upon whose military service in some capacity the Russian Government considers that in the last resort it can count, may feel awed by the four or six millions of armed men who will in this way be paraded before the imagination.....The real military force of a nation is represented by the armies that it can put into the field for specific purposes of attack or defense. p. 216v

The recent political changes have had for Englishmen one salutary consequence. They must have opened even blind eyes to the fact that between nation and nation there are no sentimental ties. p. 226v

The chief end of a Government in its relation with the outside world is the defense of the nation which it represents. National defense, indeed, implies something more than a resistance to territorial attack. p. 246v

In all those cases the greatness of the English leaders lies in their confidence in their cause, and in their indifference to the great forces ranged in the opposite camp. p. 249v

I think there is nothing impossible in the successful administration of an army under a civilian Minister of War, provided his one idea is to be ready for war. In that case he will in the end find out the best advisers and give them his unqualified support. But if the minister has his eyes fixed not on the wars for which it is his business to provide, but upon the vote of constituencies, necessarily unacquainted with the chessboard of international affairs, it matters little whether he be soldier or civilian, the services will not be efficient. p. 268v

"In war, no factor is so important as the choice of the supreme commander. And even the best commander is robbed of more than half his power unless he has that familiarity with and command over the fighting machine



which can only be obtained by the long-continued exercise of his authority. p270v

It reminds me of Lincoln's maxim, "Don't swap horses when you are crossing a stream". p271v

The Government, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman might have declared, had made the appointment in honour and conscience for the best interest of the public service. No more was needed, and no less was required. p277v

Estimates that will make us ready for any conflict that can be reasonably expected while we insist on what we believe are England's rights. p290v

The common-sense plan of managing the national policy and the preparation of the army and navy estimates has not been adopted. p291v

Because every politician before he has a chance of entering the Cabinet has been thoroughly cured of the habits that mark a man. He neither sees with his eyes nor judges with his common-sense, nor acts from his own will, and in very few instances does he care enough for England to sacrifice to her his own career. p292v

History, then, is on the side of common-sense, which tells us that if a right is among the possibilities of the future we ought to prepare for it in good time. The popular idea divides the parts of the statesman and of the general and supposes it natural that when the statesman has muddled his policy until it is an inextricable tangle he then calls upon some general to take the army as it happens to be, and to cut the Gordian-knot with the sword. p298v

A clear statement of the rights it is intended to maintain, and to defend, if need be, by force, would not only form a sound basis for the national policy and for the defense of the Empire, but its publication would diminish, if not remove, the mistrust of the other Powers in British policy. pp. 302-303v

A land frontier can be defended by an army collected at one point and ready to strike. But an army cannot defend a coast line against the descent of an army from the sea; it may attack the army when landed and may destroy it, but it cannot be counted upon to prevent the landing. For a fleet of transports can move faster at sea than an army by land; even the use of railways will not enable an army to move along a coast as fast as a fleet; wherever, therefore, there is long stretch of coast with a number of possible landing places, the force intending to land can anticipate the arrival of the force intending to oppose it. Moreover, the guns which ships carry are so much more powerful than any that can be quickly moved upon land that at a suitable point away from fortifications a fleet of warships can always cover landing against resistance from the shore. The only way, therefore, by which an enemy can be prevented from landing upon a coast is by resistance at sea. p316v

The proper defense of a coast line against attack from the sea consists in having in the sea area from which the coast can be approached a fleet which commands that area. p317v

The command of an area of sea thus involves the destruction or at least the *mise hors de combat* of the enemy's fighting fleet, and to attain this end is the first object of each side in any naval war. p318v

A nation, however, is not alone in the World. The very idea of one nation implies the existence of other nations, so that the political world offers the spectacle of a series of concurrent independencies. The question arises whether it is possible to mediate between two independent powers, between two free wills. We shall probably find ourselves obliged to answer that it is not possible. If that is the case the existence of nations implies the possibility of conflict; and experience shows that when the conflict turns upon vital matters, or matters considered vital by the parties concerned, the settlement can be effected only by force—each will attempt to overcome the other. The axiom, then, from which we set out, is that the existence of independent nations implies the perpetual possibility of conflict. p329v

In case of an attack upon person or property there is no question of arbitration. In a settled and civilized State the criminal laws comes into operation, and the offender is seized and punished, the trial being simply an investigation to ascertain the facts. The State, in short, keeps an army of policemen, and employs them in perpetual warfare against criminals. Where there is no constituted authority able to protect person and property, men carry deadly weapons and defend themselves. This is exactly what nations do. p329v

The Continent being occupied, not by one nation, but by many, the principle of national independence has prevented their ever acting all together. p339v

They found allies because the dangers which threatened them also threatened other nations who, equally reluctantly, were obliged to take up arms in a cause identical with theirs. pp 339 - 340v

If, during the next century, this nation is to fulfill her high calling she will require in larger measure than in days gone by the devotion and duty of her sons and daughters. Let us then try to be worthy of that calling,



and to live, as far as in us lies, not for our personal ends, not for pleasure, not for party, but for duty, and for the nation in which we live, and move, and have our being. p343v

No Government that knows its business and does its duty goes into war without first having obtained clear and convincing answers to the questions: What is the purpose of the war? How must the war be carried on in order to affect that purpose? and, Is everything ready for carrying on the war in the manner requisite to make it fulfill its purpose? As a competent Government does not draw back from a position once taken up, seeing that to draw back implies a violation of the rule "Look before you leap", the three preliminary questions have to be answered before the first step is taken in negotiations which, if their result is not favourable, may lead to war. p347v

A fully developed mind is found only among the members of a civilized State, who, in living together for generations, have gradually developed a whole series of ideas, which they could never have had in separation; ideas such as law, government, public affairs and national defense. p361v

Tell me a man's birthplace, his family, his school, his occupation, sect and party, and I will tell you with pretty fair accuracy his stock of thoughts. p361v

Thus thought and wills, or mind and spirit, have in them a collective and an individual elements, and the collective part is by far the larger. In national affairs the collective element alone is visible. Especially is this the case when there is a quarrel between two national States. p362v

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just". But that this is the ultimate truth every man believes in his heart. p364v

"God defend the right!" p365v

The first hint of unfriendly purpose on the part of any Great Power ought to be the signal to such a call to arms as will make plain Great Britain's determination to carry her cause through in spite of all opposers. p366v

The accepted maxim of all parties was: "The greatest of British interests is peace". p368v

The one great over-ruling condition of success in war is concentration of purpose: "Whatsoever they hand taketh to do, do it with thy might". The nation that goes to war must be united. p369v

A Government that knows its purpose will be quick to detect the beginnings of a quarrel upon a vital issue; will divine opposition in the distance, and, long before there is any palpable sign of the coming struggle, will have analysed all its possibilities, have thought every difficulty, and made ready for every emergency. This is not mere rhetoric; it is a bald but true description of the action of Governments which have succeeded in war. p370v

War is merely a means to an end; it is a piece of political action. No statesman in his senses would resort to violence and bloodshed if he saw a way to attain his object without them; still less would any prudent man wish his nation to make the sacrifices and to run the risks involved in the recourse to arms unless he were satisfied that this rough and arduous road would in fact lead to the proposed destination. p372v

Is there not perceptible in the men who have charge of the country's fate, able and high-minded as they are, is there not visible in them all a certain lack of simplicity and strength? Do they reveal that singleness of eye, that devotion to one purpose, that absorption in one object, which marks the great figures of history? p389v

There are two ways of regarding a nation. The legislator thinks of it as a collection of individuals, if and when his object is to give full scope to the action and development of each individual, so long as it does not hamper the action or the development of the others. But in the affairs of the world each nation is an individual, which must assert its claim to unhindered action and development. p391v

Perfect wisdom might have induced them to give way without fighting, but the ideas for which they fought were inseparable from the social framework of their lives, and the war was necessary to free them from those ideas. p393v

The qualification for the management of a branch of business, whether of the nation or of some smaller proprietor, is not genius but a familiarity with that branch of business. p402v

Nothing is more effective in war than to take your enemy by surprise. Except by surprise, says Clausewitz, the greatest of all writers upon war, it is logically impossible to bring a superior force to the decisive point. p404v