

**SENIOR CLASS OF 1929**

**HISTORICAL PRESENTATIONS**

THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE  
VESSELS TO THEIR FINAL DISPOSITION, INCLUDING  
THE NEGOTIATIONS ABROAD, THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMPLICATIONS THAT AROSE, AND THEIR  
SETTLEMENT.

**Submitted by**

Captain Benjamin Dutton, USN  
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-HISTORICAL STUDY-

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Commander Benjamin Dutton, U.S. Navy, Chairman.

Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.  
12 February, 1929

List of Slides

<u>Slide No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
1.	Stephen R. Mallory.
2.	Burning of the NORFOLK Navy Yard.
3.	Ruins of NORFOLK Yard.
4.	Stephen R. Mallory.
5.	The COLUMBIANA.
6.	The JOHN FITCH.
7.	The first vessel equipped with a screw propeller.
8.	The clipper ship RED JACKET.
9.	Sovereign of the seas.
10.	A steamer of 1855.
11.	Matthew F. Maury.
12.	First Confederate Privateer.
13.	Confederate Privateer RATTLESNAKE.
14.	Yacht AMERICA.
15.	Commander Raphaël Semmes, C.S.N.
16.	The Old Navy Department Building.
17.	Lincoln's Inauguration.
18.	The WASHINGTON Navy Yard.
19.	The Confederate States Cruiser SUMTER.
20.	BROOKLYN pursuing SUMTER.
21.	Chart of the cruise of the SUMTER.
22.	Lt. Kell, executive officer of the SUMTER, and afterward of the ALABAMA.
23.	U.S.S. POWHATTAN.
24.	U.S.S. IROQUOIS.
25.	Chart of Harbor of ST. PIERRE.
26.	ROCK OF GIBRALTAR, with SUMTER, KEARSARGE, TUSCARORA.
27.	U.S.S. SACRAMENTO.
28.	Chasing a Blockade-Runner.
29.	U.S.S. RHODE ISLAND.
30.	A typical Ferry Gunboat.
31.	U.S.S. WYOMING, Flag of the PACIFIC Squadron.
32.	U.S.S. QUAKER CITY.
33.	Captain James D. Bulloch.
34.	C.S. Cruiser FLORIDA.
35.	Commander Maffit.
36.	Chart of cruise.
37.	Capture of the JACOB BELL.
38.	Destruction of JACOB BELL.
39.	Captain Morris.
40.	WACHUSSETTS.
41.	Chart of cruise of CLARENCE, TACONY, ARCHER.

<u>Slide No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
42.	The ALABAMA.
43.	Cruise of the ALABAMA.
44.	ALABAMA'S officers.
45.	ALABAMA capturing her first prize.
46.	ALABAMA and HATTERAS.
47.	Cruise of ALABAMA, Plate 3.
48.	Cruise of the ALABAMA, Plate 4.
49.	Deck scene.
50.	Chart of cruise, Plate 5.
51.	Cruise of the ALABAMA, Plate 6.
52.	The U.S.S. KEARSARGE.
53.	Captain Winslow.
54.	KEARSARGE gun in action.
55.	Chart of action off CHERBOURG.
56.	The KEARSARGE sinking the ALABAMA.
57.	The sinking of the ALABAMA.
58.	The last of the ALABAMA.
59.	Semmes after the fight.
60.	Complete cruise of the ALABAMA, Plate 5.
61.	The SHENANDOAH.
62.	Commander Waddell.
63.	Chart of the cruise of the SHENANDOAH.
64.	SHENANDOAH at LIVERPOOL.
65.	U.S.S. GEORGIA.
66.	The U.S.S. NIAGARA.
67.	The TALLAHASSEE.
68.	Captain J.T. Wood.
69.	The JAMESTOWN.
70.	The SABINE.
71.	The VANDERBILT.
72.	The CONSTELLATION.
73.	Graph - Summary American Merchant Marine.
74.	Let us clasp hands.
75.	Count Frederich Sclopis.
76.	Salle des Conferences.
77.	Secretary Fish and General Grant amused.
78.	Coin Certificate.

SECTION I

SLIDE 1: STEPHEN R. MALLORY

When the Confederacy was organized Stephen R. Mallory, of FLORIDA, was appointed Secretary of the Navy. For the preceding ten years he had been chairman of the Committee on Naval affairs of the UNITED STATES Senate, and he was therefore very well qualified for his new place. His task was to create a navy. He had at his disposal 329 officers and little else.

SLIDE 2: BURNING OF THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD

The NORFOLK navy yard then called the GOSPORT yard had been burned while the PENSACOLA yard had never been a construction yard. Both the NORFOLK yard and the PENSACOLA yard were blockaded by Union fortifications and ships. The South had no private ship yards of importance and there was only one shop capable of building a marine engine, and only one capable of

SLIDE 3: RUINS OF THE NORFOLK YARD

rolling a plate. There was an abundance of wood, but the day of the all wood ship had passed. There were few artisans capable of working either wood or iron. The Union blockade promptly sent the price of pig iron to \$1,500 a ton.

Under the circumstances Mallory naturally decided to obtain ships abroad if possible. When, and if, these ships were obtained, the Union presented an extremely vulnerable point of

SLIDE 4: STEPHEN R. MALLORY

attack. The Union navy had been concentrated on the Confederate

coast. A rich Federal merchant marine was abroad on the Seven Seas and unprotected. An attack on this merchant marine offered two advantages; first, it would impoverish the North, and, second it would tend to draw Union men-of-war away from the strangling blockade.

For a better understanding of the events that followed, and of their results, a brief account of the American merchant marine up to the beginning of the Civil War is required.

SLIDE 4: THE COLUMBIANA, 1837, Marine history of Mass., p.256

From the earliest colonial days the Americans of the northern states took to the sea with success. They were descended from a seafaring people, and owned a long coast line with many natural harbors. Shipbuilding material was abundant at tidewater, and, in the absence of good roads, the colonists were dependent upon water transportation. The people of the north had no lucrative crops, like the cotton and tobacco of the South, to claim their attention, and they therefore became predominant as the mariners of the country. Ships were built at half the cost of English construction. With cheap ships, and with the frugality and shrewdness developed by life on a meagre soil and in a rugged climate, the Downeasters entered into successful competition for the world's carrying trade. The American merchant fleet became the second in size of the world's merchant fleets, and this in spite of many artificial regulations by European countries designed to impede it.

SLIDE 5: THE JOHN FITCH, p. 79 of Robert Fulton, by T.W.Knox

Unrealized, the coming of steam driven vessels was to do away with the advantages enjoyed by American shipping. Americans, before the Civil War, were not skilled in the production or working of metals, or in the fabrication of machinery. Against the early inefficient steam vessels the sailing vessels of the Yankees competed on better than even terms. In 1839 steamers were when Ericson introduced the screw propeller, and the American shipbuilders responded by developing an improved

SLIDE 6: FIRST VESSEL EQUIPPED WITH A SCREW PROPELLER  
(The Sea, its History and Romance, Vol. 4, p. 31)

type of sailing vessel, the famous clipper ships. With these they continued to compete successfully for the world's carrying trade until the Civil War. The year 1855 was the banner year

SLIDE 7: THE CLIPPER SHIP RED JACKET

of American shipbuilding. In that year the American shipyards turned out more than five hundred vessels of a total of nearly 600,000 tons. The American clipper ships still held their own against the European steamers of the day in all but the passenger trade, and the American flag was conspicuous in all the

SLIDE 8: SOVEREIGN OF THE SEAS

world's ports.

After 1855 steamers began winning over sailing vessels, and American shipbuilding began to dwindle with surprising rapidity. In 1859, only four years after the peak production of American shipyards, production had dropped off more than two-thirds.

The day of steamers had arrived.

SLIDE 9: A STEAMER OF 1855  
(The Sea, Its history and Romance, Vol. 4, p. 26)

Very few American companies had been able to operate steamers successfully, and these only by the aid of subsidies, or special legislation, such as that which declared commerce between the ATLANTIC and PACIFIC coasts of the UNITED STATES to be coastwise navigation, and forbade foreign ships to participate in it.

By the beginning of the Civil War the American merchant marine was still the second in importance of the world's fleets, but it was composed almost exclusively of sailing vessels, and was decidedly on the wane.

SLIDE 10: MATTHEW F. MAURY

By this time the sailing routes of Maury had come into general use. Indeed it was only by using these routes, on which the ship followed the paths of the most favorable winds and currents that sailing vessels could compete at all with steam vessels.

We have, then, the picture of the American merchant marine at the beginning of the Civil War. It was still a vast fleet, although it had definitely begun its decline. It was composed almost exclusively of sailing vessels, followed definite routes on long haul, cheap freight business, and was practically unprotected by naval vessels. We should remember also that the first trans-oceanic cable had not been laid, so the world's com-

munications were extremely slow, and cruisers could operate for several weeks, or even months, in a given locality, before word of her operations could reach a central directing authority. All of these conditions made the American merchant marine a shining mark for cruiser warfare.

SECTION I.

THE CONFEDERATE NAVY DEPARTMENT IS ORGANIZED AND DECIDES ON  
CRUISER WARFARE.

SLIDE 1: STEPHEN R. MALLORY, Schart, p. 27

Stephen R. Mallory was appointed by President Jefferson Davis as the first, and only, Secretary of the Navy of the Confederacy. Mallory had been a member of the UNITED STATES Senate from FLORIDA for ten years preceding the secession of his state, and during most of that time had served as chairman of the Senate committee for naval affairs. Because of the knowledge and experience gained in that office he was unusually well qualified for the task of organizing the Confederate Navy.

The Navy Department, to the head of which Mallory was thus elevated, consisted of three hundred and twenty-one officers, all formerly officers of the Union Navy, and of nothing else. Else for this small nucleus of officers, the Confederate Navy had to be created.

The South, at the time of secession, was poorly equipped for the task that presented itself to Mallory. Since the earliest days of English colonization in AMERICA, the shipyards, ships, and sailors of AMERICA had been almost exclusively northern. It followed that Mallory had practically no shipyards, no ships, and no sailors with which to begin the task of bringing a navy into being. Under the circumstances he had, for a time, a surplus of officers.

The Confederacy came into possession of the navy yards at

NORFOLK and PENSACOLA. The Federal Naval officers, before they

SLIDE 2: BURNING OF THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD  
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, p. 693)

abandoned the NORFOLK yard, took steps to insure that that yard would be of a minimum usefulness to the Confederacy. The navy yard at PENSACOLA had never been a construction yard, but had been used merely as a base for ships operating in the GULF OF MEXICO. The usefulness to the Confederacy of both of these yards was greatly impaired by the fact that the Union from the first of the war held the fortifications that controlled their approach from seaward, and immediately established a naval blockade that completed their bottling up.

The South had quantities of crude materials for the construction of wooden ships, but lacked the artizans for their fabrication. Moreover the day of the all-wood ship had waned, and for the construction of the modern ships of the period the South was practically without resources. After the Union blockade had been established the price of pig iron soared to \$1,500 a ton. In the entire South there was but one mill capable of rolling a two-and-one-half inch plate, and but one shop capable of constructing a marine engine, and because of the lack of skilled artizans neither was capable of much expansion.

SLIDE 1: STEPHEN R. MALLORY  
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War)

For the task of creating a navy Mallory had but one possible decision, which he promptly made; namely, to convert into men-of-war any available craft found interned in Southern ports,

and to seek abroad for additional men-of-war.

The next question was the mission of the navy about to be created. Against the relatively powerful navy of the North, direct action offered no reasonable chance of success; but to the most casual observer the Union had a vulnerable spot. Her

SLIDE 3: RUINS OF THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD  
(Photographic History of the Civil War, p.73)

rich merchant marine, the second in size of the world's merchant fleets, was scattered over the Seven Seas. For the purpose of establishing the blockade of the three thousand miles of coast line of the Confederacy, the Union had withdrawn practically all of the naval protection of this rich prize, leaving it open to attack by weak forces. Cruiser warfare, thus left temptingly open to the Confederacy, offered two great advantages; first it would impoverish the Union, and second it would tend to draw vessels away from the strangling blockade that from the very first deprived the Confederacy of a chance for ultimate success.

Mallory's first decision was therefore to create a navy by the conversion into men-of-war of all available vessels left in southern ports, and by the acquisition of ships abroad; and to attack the Union merchant marine. As the war progressed the Navy Department of the Confederacy assumed many other activities, including even direct attack on the Union navy, and for a single day the famous MERRIMAC filled the North with apprehension, but the outstanding success of the Southern navy was to be accomplished in the prosecution of its first mission, whose history

we are about to relate.

For a better understanding of the events that followed, and of their results, a brief history of the American merchant marine up to the time of the beginning of the Civil War will first be presented.

SECTION II.

SLIDE 5: COLUMBIANA, 1837  
(Marine History of Mass., p. 256)

Once the English colonists were fairly established in AMERICA they immediately began the creation of a merchant marine. This resulted from their heritage from a race of seafaring people, from the abundance of shipbuilding material that existed in the raw state in the colonies, from the length of the coast and its many natural harbors, and from the great need of the colonists for water transportation. Most of this merchant marine was owned and operated by the people of the northern states. In the Southern States the cotton and tobacco crops furnished a lucrative employment for most of the people, so that they naturally were not attracted to the sea to the same extent as the people of the north. Moreover, the harbors of the South were not comparable to the harbors of the North. Thus from the start the sea commerce of the American people was largely in the hands of the Northerners.

Once this merchant marine was established it grew very rapidly, and even before the independence of the colonies it was the object of a very considerable jealousy on the part of the

English people, and was restricted by some very obnoxious regulations by the mother country. Nevertheless, it continued to grow until it received a great setback during the war for independence. After independence was attained the northern states took to the sea with renewed energy. In spite of the reverses received during the war of 1812 and the Napoleonic Wars, the merchant marine of the UNITED STATES grew rapidly in importance and became one of the principal sources of wealth of the northern states. Between 1835 and 1861 it was the second in importance of the world's merchant fleets, and was a very close second, GREAT BRITAIN being first.

SLIDE 4: FIRST STEAMBOAT,

(to be found on p. 79 of Robert Fulton, by T.W. Knox.)

As long as sea commerce was carried in sailing ships the Americans could compete successfully with any other nationals. Three Americans, however, had much to do with putting the American ships at a disadvantage. They were John Fitch with his steamboat, Robert Fulton, with his development of Fitch's invention, and Erricson with his screw propeller.

With the growing use of steam driven vessels the Americans were at a distinct disadvantage. Before the Civil War the American people had made little progress in the production and working of metals, and were not skilled in the manufacture of

SLIDE 5: THE FIRST STEAM VESSEL FITTED WITH A SCREW PROPELLER,

(from The Sea, its History and Romance, Vol. 4, p. 31)

machinery. So it happened, that as iron vessels driven by steam came into use, AMERICA lost the advantage it had held in abun-

dance of shipbuilding material and artizans skilled in its fabrication.

Against the growing use of steam driven iron vessels the American naval architects strove valiantly to maintain their position. Competing against steam and iron they developed and refined their wooden ships to a point never before reached by any other nation, this was in the production of the famous American clipper ship. In the clipper design the old high poops and quarter galleries disappeared, with the lateen and lug sails

SLIDE 7: THE CLIPPER SHIP RED JACKET

(to be found on the wall of the second floor hall, East Wing of the building)

brigs, barks, and ships; the sharp stern was permanently abandoned; the curve of the stem above the house poles went out of vogue, and vessels became longer in proportion to beam. Hollow waterlines fore and aft were introduced, the forefoot of the hull ceased to be cut away so much and the swell of the sides became less marked. The bows became sharper, and were often made flaring above water, and the square sprit sail below the bowsprit was given up. The broadest beam was at two-thirds the length of the hull. Double topsails were abandoned.

SLIDE 8: THE AMERICAN CLIPPER SHIP SOVEREIGN OF THE SEAS  
(to be found in the hall, second floor, East Wing)

The records of some of these clipper ships were remarkable. The FLYING CLOUD, for instance, made 427 miles in a single day. The COMET made 1512 miles in 120 consecutive hours. The SOVEREIGN OF THE SEAS made 436 miles in one day, and for four days

her average was 396 miles, better than 16 1/2 knots.

SLIDE 9: STEAMER BEFORE 1855  
(The Sea, Its History and Romance, Vol. 4, p. 26)

For a time the clipper ships competed successfully against the early crude and inefficient steam vessels, but after 1855 the tide had turned definitely against them, and the decline of the American merchant marine had surely set in. The truth of this assertion is shown by the fact that between 1855, the banner year of American shipbuilding, and 1859, the production of the American shipyards was reduced more than 66%.

It is evident that by the beginning of the Civil War the American merchant marine had definitely begun its decline. Very few companies had been able to operate steam vessels successfully, and these only by a subsidy, or special legislation, such as that which declared commerce between the ATLANTIC and PACIFIC coast of the UNITED STATES to be coastwise navigation, and forbade foreign ships to engage in it. It therefore happened that at the beginning of the Civil War, the American merchant marine was almost exclusively composed of sailing ships, a fact that made it particularly vulnerable to the attacks of fast steam commerce destroyers. To this fact, as much as to any other, is due the phenomenal success that attended the operations of the Confederate cruisers.

SLIDE 10: COMMANDER M.F. MAURY, Scharf, p. 96.

At the time the Civil War began the sailing routes of Matthew Maury had come into use by all sailing vessels. Indeed it

was only by the use of these routes, on which the sailing vessels followed the localities of the most probable favorable wind and weather, that the sailing vessel was able to compete at all against steam. Thus it was only necessary for a Confederate commerce destroyer to search in the routes laid down by Maury to be sure of finding her prey, and, if the cruiser was a steam vessel, the result was a foregone conclusion.

SECTION III.

PRIVATEERS.

SLIDE 11: FIRST CONFEDERATE PRIVATEER  
(The Confederate Privateers, p.38)

While it was early recognized by the southern states that their principal effort on the sea must be made with ships obtained abroad, it was at once decided to use the few ships available in southern ports to start the operations. The thoughts of the Southern leaders naturally turned at once to privateering. The rich and unprotected commerce of the North was passing by the entire length of the southern seacoast, and offered a tempting prize.

At the outbreak of the Civil War privateering had been outlawed by all of the principal nations except the UNITED STATES, by their adherence to the Treaty of PARIS of 1854. The UNITED STATES had been holding out for the total abolition of the right to capture private property at sea, and had not seen fit to adhere to a treaty that accomplished only a part of the aims of the American statesmen of that day. As a result of this delay,

the merchant vessels of the UNITED STATES could still be legally captured by privateers.

SLIDE 13: CONFEDERATE PRIVATEER RATTLESNAKE  
(Confederate Privateers, p. 130)

On May 14th, 1861, the Confederate Congress, at a special session called for the purpose, authorized the granting of letters of marque, and the first privateers got to sea in the same month. They were mostly slow and inefficient vessels, and no one of them accomplished much. The most successful was the brig JEFF DAVIS, which captured a total of eight vessels in the summer of '61.

Events moved rapidly to destroy the efficiency of the work of the privateers. First, the neutral nations, in their declarations of neutrality, forbade the entry of privateers or prizes into their ports. Second, the blockade of the southern ports was declared by the Union on the same day that the Confederate Congress authorized privateering. By the end of the first year of the war this blockade had become so efficient as to make it extremely difficult to send any prizes into the ports of the Confederacy, and as they were already forbidden the use of neutral ports, the southern privateers could only dispose of their prizes by sinking or burning them at sea. This at once took the profit out of privateering. At the same time the blockade established an extremely profitable use for all available fast vessels as blockade runners. The result was that by the end of the first year of the war privateering had practically disappeared.

During the year of its existence it was engaged in by numerous

SLIDE 14: YACHT AMERICA, Frontespièce Official Records,  
Series 1, Vol. 1.

vessels of all types and conditions, ranging in size upward from the famous old yacht AMERICA. Of many of them there is no remaining record. While no one of them was remarkably successful, the total result of their operations was very painful to the North, as may be judged from the following extract from the New York Herald of August 10th, 1861:

"We are satisfied", says the Herald, "that already \$20,000,000 worth of property has been lost in various ways through the operations of these highwaymen of the seas, increasing daily in numbers, and becoming more and more daring from impunity. The worst effect is not the loss of the vessels and their cargoes, but the destruction of our trade. Our commerce with the WEST INDIES was immense before the pirates commenced their depredations. Now no northern vessels will get a charter or can be insured for any reasonable sum. .... Thus our shipping interest is literally ruined. .... English bottoms are taking all our trade."

SECTION IV.

THE SUMTER AND RAPHAEL SEMMES.

While preparations were being made to secure suitable cruisers abroad, the Confederate Navy Department made a survey of the various vessels that were available in the ports of the

Confederacy that might be suitable for conversion into cruisers. Only one such vessel was found. This was the steamer HAVANA, one of a regular line of passenger steamers, that, before the war, ran between NEW ORLEANS and HAVANA. The vessel was at NEW ORLEANS, where she was surveyed by a board appointed by the Navy Department, and reported unfit for use as a cruiser. However, an officer on duty in the department, after reading the report of the board of survey, was convinced that the vessel could be made to serve, and volunteered to take her out. This officer

SLIDE 15: COMMANDER RAPHAEL SEMMES, C.S.N.

(to be found in Naval History of the Civil War, Porter, p. 602.) was Commander Raphael Semmes, C.S.N., who at that time had no great reputation as a naval officer. However, the Secretary of the Navy was impressed with the opinion of Semmes, and ordered him from duty as head of the Light House Board to the duty of fitting out and commanding the HAVANA, whose name was changed to the SUMTER.

Semmes was born in Maryland in 1809. He was appointed a midshipman in the UNITED STATES Navy in 1826, but did not enter active service until 1832. The intermediate years he spent in the study of law, and he was admitted to the bar. During the Mexican War he served as flag lieutenant to Admiral Conner, in command of the Gulf Squadron, and in the siege of VERA CRUZ he commanded one of the naval batteries on shore. Later, in the

SLIDE 16: THE OLD NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING  
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War)

same war he was in command of the brig SOMERS, and was in com-

mand of her when she capsized in a heavy gale. His subsequent service in the UNITED STATES Navy was mostly with the Light House Board at the Navy Department. In the Federal service he was never popular, and his ability was very lightly estimated. He was thought to be a bookworm, whose principal interests were centered in subjects not related to his profession. Although he was a Marylander, whose state did not secede from the Union, he was one of the first to offer his services to the Confederacy. Upon the secession of ALABAMA in February, 1861, Semmes resigned from the UNITED STATES Navy, and proceeded to MONTGOMERY, then the site of the Confederate Government, where his services were promptly accepted.

The first duty assigned to Semmes seems very remarkable when viewed today with the knowledge of subsequent events. He was sent to the Northern States to secure mechanics skilled in

SLIDE 17: LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION  
(Battles and Leaders, p. 34)

the manufacture and use of ordnance and rifling machinery, the preparation of fixed ammunition and percussion caps and was present at Lincoln's inauguration. He was also to procure any other war material that he might be able to purchase. At RICHMOND he inspected the VIRGINIA State Arsenal, and Tredegar Iron Works, with the view to their future use for casting cannon, shot and shell.

THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD  
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, p. 617)

At WASHINGTON he examined the machinery of the Federal Navy Yard,

and conferred with mechanics whom he induced to go South. Later he visited NEW YORK and CONNECTICUT, and purchased anything in the line of war material that he desired, including large quantities of percussion caps, powder, and other munitions and had them sent to MONTGOMERY without any attempt at disguise, and also made contracts for light batteries and other munitions for shipment at a later date. Semmes always refused to reveal the names of the thrifty northern merchants who had entered into these profitable relations with him.

Upon his return to the South, Semmes was appointed head of the Light House Board of the Confederacy. He organized that board and continued in its service until he was ordered to the command of the SUMTER under the circumstances already related.

SLIDE 19: THE CONFEDERATE STATES CRUISER SUMTER. (To be found in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate States Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. I page 612.)

On April 18th, 1861, Semmes took charge of the fitting out of the SUMTER. She was a ship of 437 tons register, 184 feet long, 30 feet beam, 12 feet depth of hold, barkentine rigged. She had a speed under steam of from nine to ten knots, but could carry coal for only eight days steaming, and was very slow under sail, due to the drag of the propeller. Under Semmes' direction she was armed with one eight inch shell gun, pivoted amidships, and four light 32-pounders in broadside. On June 3rd she was put in commission with Semmes in command, and Lt. Kell as executive. We will find Kell again executive for Semmes on the

more famous ALABAMA.

By this time the blockade of the mouths of the MISSISSIPPI had been established, and the U.S.S. BROOKLYN, a much more powerful vessel than the SUMTER, was on guard there. Semmes dropped down the MISSISSIPPI from NEW ORLEANS to the head of the passage, where the MISSISSIPPI divides into its several mouths, and waited for his opportunity. It was June 30th before the opportunity presented itself. The BROOKLYN had gone off to the eastward in chase of a strange sail, and when she had reached a point eight miles from the mouth of the PASS A L'OUTRE, the

SLIDE 20: BROOKLYN PURSUING SUMTER,  
Service Afloat (Semmes) p. 112.

Confederate ship made a dash. The BROOKLYN, seeing a dense column of smoke coming down the river, immediately turned to intercept, but the SUMTER had a strong current with her, and since the BROOKLYN had long been on blockade duty, and was using an apparently quiet day to clean one of her two boilers, the SUMTER got cleanly away after a long chase.

Semmes' instructions were "to do the enemy's commerce the greatest possible injury in the shortest possible time." He proceeded about his task with alacrity. On July 3rd, three days later, he made his first capture, the bark GOLDEN ROCKET, of MAINE. Her crew were taken off and the bark burned. The loss to Federal Commerce was \$40,000.

SLIDE 21: CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE SUMTER  
(to be prepared by Commander Schelling.)

On the next day the brigantines CUBA and MACHIAS were cap-

tured, but as they had neutral cargoes, Semmes headed for CIENFUEGOS, CUBA, with his prizes in tow, his intentions being to ascertain if SPAIN would follow the example of FRANCE and GREAT BRITAIN in closing her ports to the prizes of the belligerents. Being compelled by heavy weather to cast off the CUBA, Semmes ordered the midshipman in charge of her to follow him into port, but the crew of the prize overpowered the prize crew and escaped. The prize crew were afterward tried in the Federal court at NEW YORK on the charge of piracy, but were released.

On the following day Semmes captured two brigs, and on the next day a brig and a bark, completing seven captures in four days, one of the captured vessels having escaped. The six remaining prizes were taken into CIENFUEGOS, and Semmes wrote a very adroit letter to the Spanish governor, at HAVANA for the purpose of securing the permission of that official to leave them there until the end of the war. War upon commerce was being tried under circumstances that had not existed in any previous war. Formerly there had always been a chance for a belligerent to return his prizes to at least one of his own ports for adjudication in the prize courts. The captured vessels and their cargoes thus enriched the country of the captor at the same time that they impoverished the enemy. Now, however, the entire coast line of the Confederacy was closed by a blockade that was becoming more effective each day. At the same time the Treaty of PARIS of 1854, had closed the ports of

neutrals as havens for captured vessels. Semmes knew that GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE had declared their intention of enforcing the provisions of the Treaty of PARIS, but had some hope that SPAIN, although she had also declared her intention of adhering to the treaty, would not rigidly enforce it.

Semmes was well received in CIENFUEGOS, and was allowed to take all the provisions and coal that he required. However, the letter to the Governor had to go to HAVANA, and as no reply had been received after a week, Semmes decided to sail to the southward and left his prizes in CIENFUEGOS in charge of a Cuban prize master. After his departure the answer of the Spanish governor was received in CIENFUEGOS, and was the contrary of all that Semmes had hoped. Not only was the desired permission to leave his prizes in Cuban ports refused, but, on the grounds that Semmes had violated Spanish territory in making some of his captures inside of the three-mile limit, all of the prizes left in CIENFUEGOS were seized and returned to their original owners as a retaliation. Semmes did not hear of this adverse action of the Spanish governor until much later. He then disclaimed any violation of Spanish neutrality, and claimed that some bribery had been used by the Northern owners to get their ships returned.

SLIDE 15: LT. KELL, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE SUMTER, and  
AFTERWARD OF THE ALABAMA.

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. IV, p. 606)

The decision was a momentous one for the Confederacy.

There was now no way of disposing of a prize except by destroying her or releasing her under bond. Thus war upon commerce lost the attractiveness that it had had in all former wars. Semmes then adopted the policy of burning all prizes of which both the ship and cargo had enemy character. If the ship was of enemy character and the cargo neutral, the ship was bonded, that is, she was released upon bond signed by her captain, in behalf of her owners, to pay a definite sum to the Confederacy at the conclusion of hostilities. Needless to say, none of these bonds were ever paid, but they were counted by both the officers and crews of the Confederate Government to be paid as prize money after the war. Later, the Confederate Government agreed with the crews of subsequent cruisers to put half the value of all burned prizes to the credit of the prize funds of their ships. Officers and crews of these ships kept books in which they entered up their shares of the amounts due for the burning or bonding of captured ships. The sums of these individual shares rapidly mounted to small fortunes, even for the underratings of the crew, but of course these fortunes were never realized.

SLIDE 21: CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE SUMTER

Upon leaving CIENFUEGOS, Semmes headed the SUMTER for CAPE SAN ROQUE, where there is an important crossing of ocean commercial lanes, and where Semmes hoped to have rich hunting. Being delayed by adverse winds, he had to put into the Dutch colony of CURACAO for coal. When the SUMTER arrived at ST. ANN,

the capital of this little colony, the American consul did all

ADDITIONAL SLIDE. CURACAO, The American Mediterranean,  
By Bonsal, p. 119.

that he could to persuade the governor that she was not a legitimate war vessel, and that officer therefore forbade the SUMTER to enter the port. Semmes was, however, well aware that these colonial dignitaries were generally men of little character or intelligence, so he sent one of his brightest officers ashore with a letter of protest and orders to establish friendly relations, while he, Semmes, prepared to play a trump card at the proper moment. Admiral Porter, in his history of the navy in the Civil War, gives the following account of the subsequent scene ashore:-

"When the governor had read this communication, he summoned all of the civil and military dignitaries of the colony, and it took a lot of smoking, talking, thinking and drinking to get the matter fairly embedded in their brains, the Confederate officer meanwhile making friends with the citizens, and helping them in their drinking, which seems to have been their principal occupation."

After waiting an hour or so, Semmes thought he would go to quarters and fire a few shells at a target; but it so happened that one of the shells passed across a window of the room where the council was in session, and, exploding, shook up the little town as if by an earthquake. Up flew the windows of the council room, and out popped the heads of the dignitaries.

It was decided nem. con. that the Confederacy should be recognized, and the SUMTER allowed to enter the port, which she did shortly afterwards. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm with which the SUMTER was received at CURACAO. Semmes and his officers were the heroes of the hour. . . . . Everything needed was supplied to the ship without question, and Semmes was everywhere honored as the representative of the Confederacy, although few people had any idea what that was."

It seems that the above quoted account does not give sufficient credit to the Yankee consul, who was bluffing as hard as Semmes, and probably providing just as much to drink as Lieut. Chapman, C.S.N. He unfortunately lacked a few big guns.

It was only a short run from ST. ANN to VENEZUELA where the UNITED STATES had a considerable commerce through the ports of LA GUAYRA and PORTO CABELLO. Semmes accordingly headed in that direction, and off the port of PORTO CABELLO captured a bark, the ABBY BRADFORD, loaded with a neutral cargo. Leaving his prize outside he entered the harbor and addressed a letter to the local authorities similar to the one he had addressed to the Governor of CUBA and requested permission to leave his prize in the port. In reply he received a preemptory demand that he deliver the prize to the local authorities who would determine whether or not she had been seized inside of the three-mile limit. Semmes then went to quarters, and steamed out of the harbor. He sent the ABBY BRADFORD to NEW ORLEANS in charge of a prize crew, but she was captured en route by

the U.S.S. POWHATTAN under the command of Lieutenant Porter.

SLIDE 23: U.S.S. POWHATTAN

(Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series One, Vol. I, p. 104)

Thus, of the first eight captures made by the SUMTER, every one was restored to the original owners, and it became perfectly apparent that commerce warfare could be carried on only by bonding or destroying the captured vessels.

Semmes next proceeded along the SPANISH MAIN to PORT OF SPAIN, TRINADAD, where he was received with open arms and made the object of much entertainment by the British. Remaining a week for recreation, coal, and stores, he then set out for MARANHAM. In the meantime, Lieutenant Porter on the POWHATTAN had learned from the ABBY BRADFORD of the SUMTER'S general location, had applied to his immediate superior in command for permission to go in pursuit, and had been given the desired permission. However, the POWHATTAN had been on blockade duty for so long that her boilers were very unsatisfactory, and it was necessary to run on one boiler while repairs were being made to the other. If the POWHATTAN had been a fit ship for the undertaking, Lieutenant Porter, possessing great skill and initiative, would have been able to catch the slow SUMTER, and her career and that of Semmes might have ended here, and possibly the destructive cruise of the ALABAMA would never have taken place.

Due to strong head winds and currents the SUMTER ran out

of coal and had to use sails but finally reached the port of PARIMARIBO and obtained coal and provisions. Leaving PARIMARIBO, Semmes continued on the way for MARANHAM. At PARIMARIBO he

SLIDE 21: CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE SUMTER.

told the pilot that he was leaving for the BARBADOES, and this information was later passed on to Porter in the POWHATTAN, but Porter was not deceived for he knew that Semmes had to go to MARANHAM for coal.

At MARANHAM the SUMTER was well received by the Governor, who, being an advocate of slavery was sympathetic to the Southern cause. Semmes was received with every honor and was much entertained. He remained here for two weeks, and was supplied with everything necessary to his vessel. Finally he departed for the trade wind sailing routes of the equatorial regions. The progress of the ship was slow as it was necessary to conserve coal and proceed under sail as much as possible. A captured schooner contained about everything the ship required, even to live stock, and three days were spent in transferring the desired parts of her cargo to the SUMTER.

ADDITIONAL SLIDE: FORT DE FRANCE, Cuba and Porto Rico, by Hill, p. 327.

After fifty-five days the SUMTER arrived at PORT OF FRANCE MARTINIQUE, on November ninth. The ship was now one hundred and thirty-two days out of NEW ORLEANS. The accomplishments of the cruise had been almost nil. Only two captures were made on the long cruise up from MARANHAM, bringing the total for

the cruise to twelve, of which eight had been returned to their northern owners. The value of the vessels destroyed was not very great, probably not in excess of one hundred and sixty thousand dollars.

At PORT OF FRANCE Semmes learned that the U.S.S. IROQUOIS

SLIDE 24: U.S.S. IROQUOIS

(Official Records, Union and Confederate Navies in the Civil War, Series One, Vol. I, p. 213)

was in the vicinity, and immediately left for ST. PIERRE. The reason for this move seems to be that the harbor of ST. PIERRE has a very wide entrance, nearly twelve miles across, so that it offered a poor chance for the Federal gunboat to establish a close blockade. On November 14, the IROQUOIS arrived off the city and sighted the SUMTER moored to a dock, engaged in coaling. Captain J.S. Palmer, in command of the IROQUOIS, steamed in to half gunshot distance and kept the SUMTER under his guns. The city awoke from its tropical siesta and swarmed down to the dock, expecting great things. The IROQUOIS approached so close to the SUMTER that Semmes beat to quarters, and ran out his guns. Palmer refused to anchor, but kept underway in the harbor all night. In the morning a French man-of-war came over from PORT ROYAL, the seat of the government, only twelve miles distance. Her captain asked Palmer to cease blockading the port as he was doing, and either come to anchor

SLIDE 25: CHART OF HARBOR OF ST. PIERRE.

or go outside the three-mile limit. Palmer then anchored, whereupon the governor came on board with an international law

book under his arm, and called Palmer's attention to the fact that neither belligerent could get underway until twenty-four hours after the first had left the harbor. Palmer took a quick look at the SUMTER, saw that she was raising steam, called "Up anchor" and got underway without giving the governor time to leave the ship. Thereafter Palmer steamed back and forth across the entrance to the harbor, outside of the three-mile limit, and kept close watch on the SUMTER for eight more days. At first the moon was favorable to the IROQUOIS, but it was waning, and Palmer saw that in the absence of moonlight, and with the thick mists that rose over the harbor at night, the SUMTER would have a good chance to escape. He so reported to the Navy Department in a letter written before the event. The townspeople, being French, were all in favor of the SUMTER, which they were told belonged to the French state of LOUISIANA. Palmer had no friends ashore except a British subject who was acting consul, and the captain of an American schooner that was moored to the dock. With the latter, he arranged a series of signal lights by which the departure of the SUMTER after dark was to be reported, as well as the direction she headed. News of this system of signals reached Semmes, and he used it to make good his escape. On the night of the 23rd of November, in the dark of the moon, Semmes left the dock and headed south. As soon as the signal for this course had been made from the American schooner, Semmes reversed his course. Meanwhile the IROQUOIS was off at full speed to intercept the SUMTER on a

south course. The result was, of course that the SUMTER made good her escape. In spite of the fact that Palmer had made every effort to intercept her he became the victim of a newspaper hue and cry, and was relieved of his command.

SLIDE 21: CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE SUMTER.

After his escape from the IROQUOIS, Semmes crossed the ATLANTIC to CADIZ, with his vessel in very poor condition. He arrived in CADIZ on January 4th, having made a few more captures on the way. The next day he received a preemptory order from the military governor to proceed to sea within twenty-four hours. To this he replied that it was the duty of SPAIN to extend to his ship the same hospitality that would be extended to a ship of the other belligerent, that his vessel was crippled, and that he had forty-three prisoners on board whom he desired to hand over to the consul of the UNITED STATES. The matter was referred to MADRID, and in pursuance to orders from the capital, the prisoners were landed, and the SUMTER was permitted to make barely such repairs as would suffice to keep her afloat. On January 17th, Semmes was served with a preemptory order to depart within six hours, and as he had not been permitted to coal, he had barely sufficient fuel to take the ship to the British port of GIBRALTAR, whither he decided to proceed.

Between CADIZ and GIBRALTAR the SUMTER made two prizes, and reached the latter port January 19th, 1862. On February 3rd, he received funds from the Confederate envoy at LONDON,

but when he attempted to purchase coal he found that the local merchants had closed the market against him, and an application for a supply from the government was denied. Then he sent Paymaster Myers and Thomas J. Tunstall, ex-UNITED STATES consul at GIBRALTAR, to CADIZ to buy a supply. The French steamer on which they took passage touched at the Moorish town of TANGIERS, where they were arrested by the local authorities on the requisition of the UNITED STATES Consul. By the consul they were turned over to the commander of the naval forces at ALGECIRAS, who sent them to the UNITED STATES in irons.

SLIDE 26: ROCK OF GIBRALTAR, WITH SUMTER, KEARSARGE, TUSCARORA  
(Service Afloat, Semmes, page 316)

The SUMTER was now blockaded in GIBRALTAR by the Federal steamers KEARSARGE, CHIPPEWA, and TUSCARORA, and as she could obtain no coal, Semmes decided to sell her. She was sold at auction in December, 1862, and was subsequently used as a blockade runner. After the war the Federal government sued in the admiralty courts in LONDON for her recovery, but lost the suit. She was finally lost in a gale in the NORTH SEA, not far from where the ALABAMA was sunk.

The cruise of the SUMTER may be summed up as follows: During a cruise of six months she captured eighteen vessels, of which eight were burned, and the remainder bonded or recaptured. As the bonds were never paid, the direct loss to the north probably did not exceed \$320,000, for all of her captures were sailing vessels of small value. The direct loss was, therefore,

insignificant, but the indirect loss, due to the holding of ships in port, the re-routing of ships, the transfer of American ships to foreign registry, the increase of insurance rates, and the temporary stoppage of American trade along the routes where she was reported, was probably enormous. Moreover, the operations of this first Confederate cruiser showed the South the possibilities of such operations, the characteristics of the ships that would be required for them, and, perhaps most important, the SUMTER served as a school for

SLIDE 15: RAPHAEL SEMMES

Raphael Semmes, who used his knowledge in planning the operations of his next command, the famous ALABAMA, in which he struck the death blow to an American merchant marine that, as we have seen, was already on the wane.

SECTION V.

UNION COUNTER EFFORTS DURING THE FIRST PHASE

SLIDE 27: U.S.S. SACRAMENTO  
(Official Records, Vol. 3, p. 563)

When the SUMTER was blockaded in the harbor of GIBRALTAR, in January of 1862, the first phase of the Confederate warfare against commerce came to an end. During this phase the war had been conducted by privateers and by the lone cruiser SUMTER. All of these vessels had been fitted out from the vessels available in the ports of the Confederacy at the beginning of hostilities. In the second, and final, phase, operations were conducted almost exclusively by vessels ob-

tained abroad, although there was an occasional outbreak of privateering by local vessels, which however, met with the most meagre success.

SLIDE 28: CHASING A BLOCKADE-RUNNER  
(Maclay, Vol. II, p. 508.)

In considering the Union efforts against the Confederate campaign one fact must be kept constantly in mind. As early as May, 1861, the Union had decided that the blockade of the entire Confederate coast was to be the principal mission of the Union navy. This decision was adhered to with admirable constancy, and on all occasions received the first consideration of the Navy Department.

SLIDE 29: U.S.S. RHODE ISLAND  
(Official Records, Vol. 2, p. 235)

At the beginning of the war, we find the consternation, usual on such occasions, among the shipping interests of the North. Insurance companies, shipping companies, and companies that had wares in shipment at sea, all petitioned the government for protection. Letters suggesting the means of affording protection were sent to the Navy Department by many persons, including a good many cranks. The citizens of NEW JERSEY petitioned their senators to call upon the navy for warships to protect their defenseless coasts. The residents of VINEYARD HAVEN wanted a warship all to themselves in their own little sound. The bankers of NEW YORK called the attention of the Navy Department to the fact that \$40,000,000 in gold was shipped annually by the PANAMA steamers, and demanded protection. The

NEW YORK Chamber of Commerce viewed with alarm the possibility of a Confederate cruiser steaming into the harbor and shooting up the town. To meet all this the Navy Department had thirty-eight ships of the regular navy, six of which were on the PACIFIC Coast, and the others, for the most part, widely scattered at the beginning of the war.

SLIDE 30: A TYPICAL FERRY GUNBOAT.  
(Maclay's History, p. 495)

In the confusion of the unaccustomed rush of business at the Navy Department we find many strange courses resorted to in order to provide some measure of protection. The Commandant of the NEW YORK Navy Yard, being called upon to send out a vessel to suppress a privateer that had appeared off the port, and having no ship in the yard, looked over the merchant vessels in the harbor, chartered one, equipped her as a man-of-war, commissioned her, and had her at sea in three days. The committee for the NEW YORK underwriters, having a schooner that was normally employed in piloting vessels in the waters about KEY WEST and NASSAU, armed the schooner, and directed her skipper to defend "all vessels in which the NEW YORK underwriters might be interested". Later, the skipper of this schooner requested the Navy Department for a regulation book and some signals, in order that he might be a real man-of-war, and got the books.

SLIDE 31: U.S.S. WYOMING, FLAG OF THE PACIFIC SQUADRON  
(Official Records, Vol. II, p. 393)

As the PACIFIC squadron could not join the blockading

forces, except by sailing around the HORN, it was put to guard-  
ing shipping between PANAMA and SAN FRANCISCO. The BRAZILIAN  
Squadron was withdrawn from its station and added to the block-  
ading forces. This was certainly a mistake from the point of  
view of commerce protection, but the blockade had to come first.

Operations against privateers were conducted by sending  
vessels to the areas where they had been reported. In some in-  
stances these ships were temporarily detached from blockade du-  
ty, in other cases they were hastily fitted out from available  
merchant vessels. By the close of the year 1861 many strange  
names began to appear on the list of navy ships, names like the  
SHEPHERD KNAPP, the MORNING LIGHT, and the W.G. ANDERSON.  
These ships were under the command of acting volunteer lieute-  
nants, and were sent to sea under sealed orders to proceed on  
a cruise to a certain locality for the protection of merchant  
shipping, and not to come back until all provisions and stores  
were exhausted.

Upon the appearance of the SUMTER, a sailing brig, the  
BAINBRIDGE was sent to cruise off ASPINWALL, and the QUAKER CITY,  
POWHATTAN, and IROQUOIS were sent to cruise at large in pursuit

SLIDE 32: U.S.S. QUAKER CITY  
(The Confederate Privateers, p. 38)

Later the RICHMOND and the PENQUIN were added to this force.  
In September Midshipman A.T. Mahan wrote to the Secretary of  
the Navy suggesting the use of mystery ships to decoy the SUM-  
TER under the fire of a single heavy gun hidden in a collapsi-  
ble structure on the forecastle. The suggestion was not acted

upon.

It should not be assumed that these measures of the Union side were unsuccessful during the first phase. By the end of this phase of the cruiser warfare, privateering had been practically abandoned, and the SUMTER, after a cruise of slight success had been driven off the sea.

SECTION VI.

THE COMMISSIONER IN EUROPE FOR THE CONFEDERATE STATES

NAVY DEPARTMENT

SLIDE 33: CAPTAIN JAMES D. BULLOCK.

In the spring of 1861 Commander James D. Bulloch was sent to ENGLAND as the agent of the Confederate States Navy Department. Briefly stated, his instructions were to purchase naval stores, and to purchase or have built a number of men-of-war. In this business he was to avoid breaches of neutrality and was especially required to inform himself of the proclamations of the British relating the enforcement of neutrality. Following these instructions he consulted a firm of British barristers, and obtained from them an opinion to the effect that it was no breach of neutrality to build a man-of-war in ENGLAND for operations against a state with which ENGLAND was on friendly terms, providing it was not armed in ENGLAND. According to this remarkable opinion the vessels could be built in every respect as men-of-war, and the ordnance and ordnance

stores could be purchased in ENGLAND, and it was only necessary to install the ordnance and ordnance stores outside of British waters to avoid any breach of neutrality. Armed with this decision, and supported by the sympathy of the governing classes in ENGLAND, Bullock proceeded with his mission, and within a month after his arrival in LONDON had the first of the British built Confederate commerce destroyers in frame.

SECTION VII.

THE COMMISSIONER IN EUROPE FOR THE CONFEDERATE  
STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT.

SLIDE 24: CAPTAIN JAMES D. BULLOCK  
(The Confederate States Navy, by Schart, p. 56)

The SUMTER was the only one of the Confederate cruisers fitted out in American waters that made a material contribution toward the accomplishment of the mission of the navy to harass the enemy commerce and interrupt his lines of communication, and, as we have seen, the work of the SUMTER was of value more as an experiment than from its actual accomplishments. It was early realized that the lack of naval resources at home made it imperative that the equipment for this work must be acquired abroad. Accordingly, a commissioner was despatched to ENGLAND in April, 1861. For this important post the Navy Department selected Commander James D. Bulloch, C.S.N., a former officer of the UNITED STATES Navy. His service in the UNITED STATES Navy had been of such a nature as to specially fit him for the

duties he undertook. He had had an unusual amount of sea service, and had served on every type of war vessel from a sloop of ten guns to a line of battle ship of eighty guns. During the years immediately preceding the war he had been loaned by the Navy Department to the Law Line of steamers and in their service had commanded two of their steamers, after having supervised their construction. He was known to be a man of energy and tact, and his subsequent success as naval commissioner amply justified his selection.

Bulloch did not arrive in ENGLAND until June 1861. He immediately set to work, but under the greatest difficulties. He had no funds, but had been informed that the firm of Fraser, Trenholm and Co., would be the financial agents of his government. This firm had received no funds, and had not received word that any were on the way. Nevertheless they authorized Bulloch to contract for such supplies as were urgently needed and to refer to them for the financial arrangements. Within one month Bulloch had succeeded in buying a fair amount of naval supplies and had laid the keel of the first foreign built Confederate cruiser, and had her partly in frame, before any funds had been received from home.

The commissioner's instructions from the Secretary of the Navy are outlined by him as follows:

He was to expect that the European governments would recognize the Confederacy as a de facto government, and would grant to the commissioned cruisers of the Confederate States the shel-

ter and privileges conceded to all belligerents by the comity of nations. He was warned to be prudent and heedful, so as not to involve the diplomatic agents of the Confederate States in embarrassing complaints for alleged violation of neutral law or obligation, and directed to acquaint himself, as soon as possible with the nature and scope of the British Foreign Enlistment Act, and the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality, if one should be issued. Reverting to the special objects of his mission, he was impressed with the necessity of getting cruising ships of suitable type afloat as early as possible and of forwarding naval stores to southern ports at the earliest possible moment. He was left the widest discretionary power within the limits of the above general instructions, and it may be mentioned in illustration of this that the types and equipment of the vessels he was expected to secure were left entirely to his judgment. The success of these ships in their subsequent operations is proof of the ability of the man.

Bulloch's work was greatly hampered of course by the neutrality regulations that were issued at an early date by all of the maritime powers of EUROPE, and these proclamations were supplemented from time to time by Admiralty orders and regulations defining the conditions upon which the ships of both belligerents would be allowed refuge in the neutral ports, to make repairs and to obtain supplies. The chief restrictions specified in those orders were; that no ship should reinforce her crew, or make greater alterations and repairs than were neces-

sary to ensure her safety; that armament should not be changed or increased, and that no ordnance or other description of stores classed as contraband of war should be taken on board; that the quantity of coal to be taken should be no more than enough to carry her to the nearest port of her own country, and after receiving that quantity she should not enter any harbor of the same neutral power for another supply until the expiration of three months.

Bulloch thus describes the restrictions which would hamper Confederate cruisers, and which influenced him in selecting the types he ordered built:

"A Confederate cruiser had no home port for outfit or retreat. She was compelled to be as nearly as possible self-supporting. Her flag was tolerated only, not recognized. Once upon the seas, she could never hope to re-supply the continual waste of her powers of offence or defence, and could obtain but a grudging allowance of the merest necessaries. Her military chest was the paymaster's safe, and her financial resources were the moderate supply of sovereigns with which she began her cruise. In case of difficulty there was no resident Minister to whom the captain could refer for counsel or support, no consular representative who could set his case before the authorities in foreign ports.

If it had not been for the limitations and restrictions previously referred to, many more vessels might have been got to sea under the Confederate flag; but it would have been man-

ifestly improvident, and a purposeless waste of the limited resources of the Confederacy, to commission ships for distant and continuous cruising, unless they could carry ample supplies of all necessaries, especially of ordnance stores, and could sail as well as steam at a good rate of speed. A vessel without good sailing qualities, and without the arrangement and means for lifting her screw, would have been practically useless as a Confederate cruiser. She could only have made passages from one coaling station to another; and as she could only coal at a port of the same country once in three months, her career would soon have been brought to an untimely end."

The necessities of the case then dictated the type of the ships and the FLORIDA and the ALABAMA were designed to meet those requirements.

Bulloch early sought the advice of a firm of eminent British barristers as to the legality of building ships for the Confederacy in British waters. The following is the opinion they rendered for him:

"1. It is no offense for British subjects to equip a ship at some country without her Majesty's dominions, though the intent of the cruise be against a friendly country.

2. It is no offense for any person to equip a ship within her Majesty's dominions, if it is not done with the intent to cruise against a friendly state.

3. The mere building of a ship within her Majesty's do-

minions by any person is no offense, whatever may be the intent of the parties, because the offense is not the building, but the equipping.

Therefore any shipbuilder may build any ship in her Majesty's dominions, provided he does not equip her within her Majesty's dominions, and he has nothing to do with the acts of the purchasers done within her Majesty's dominions without his concurrence, nor without her Majesty's dominions even with his concurrence."

SECTION VIII.

THE FLORIDA.

SLIDE 34: C.S. CRUISER FLORIDA  
(Schart, p. 792)

The first of the Confederate cruisers built in ENGLAND was the FLORIDA. She was built under the name ORETO. For her construction Bulloch selected the firm of William C. Miller and Sons of LIVERPOOL. He selected this firm for the reason that the senior member was a former shipwright of the British navy, and had served in Her Majesty's dockyards as a naval constructor. He was therefore familiar with the construction of vessels of war. Moreover, he had a set of drawings of one of the latest British gunboats, and this set of drawings was used as a guide for the construction of the Confederate cruiser. The length was increased over the standard of the British Navy, and the vessel was given finer lines for better speed. Also the

sail area was increased for the purpose of giving better coal economy.

While the ORETO had become an object of suspicion and disquietude to the UNITED STATES minister who was pressing the British Government to examine and detain her. The Italian Government disclaimed the vessel. It became advisable to get her out of ENGLAND earlier than had been anticipated. She was loaded under the supervision of the British customs officials, who were simply building an alibi for a sympathetic British Government, and sailed on April 22nd, 1862 for NASSAU, under the British flag and in command of an English captain. She had on board an officer of the Confederate States Navy as the representative of the Confederate Government. At the same time her ordnance and other military equipment were started for NASSAU on a British steamer, the BAHAMAS.

The ORETO arrived in NASSAU on the 28th of April, after a passage of 37 days. On the cruise she had demonstrated her best speed under steam to be 10 and a half knots, and under sail under the most favorable conditions to be thirteen and a

SLIDE 26: COMMAND MAFFIT (Scharf, p. 392)

half knots.

On arrival at NASSAU Lieutenant Maffit, C.S.N., took command although the fiction of a British skipper of a merchant ship was maintained. The UNITED STATES consul immediately began to press the government to detain her.

On the 15th of June notice how slowly these events are

moving - some of the crew of the ORETO, all of whom were British, went on board the H.M.S. GREYHOUND and stated to the commander that they had left the ORETO because they were not able to ascertain her destination and she was trying to ship another crew. The vessel was then seized by the British authorities, but on the morning of the 17th was released, the Attorney General being of the opinion that there was not sufficient evidence to hold her. Notwithstanding this opinion she was again seized on the same day, and proceedings were forthwith instituted against her in the Vice-Admiralty court for violation of the foreign enlistment act of the British Government. As a result of these proceedings she was again freed, for lack of sufficient evidence, and ordered to be returned (quote) "to the master claiming on behalf of her alleged owner." (unquote)

SLIDE 25: FLORIDA

This was on August 2nd, four months and eleven days after the vessel had sailed from ENGLAND under the protest of the American minister. In all of that time the vessel was practically known to be a Confederate man of war, but no effective steps had been taken by the Federal Government to prevent her getting to sea in an active state.

SLIDE 36: CHART OF CRUISE

The ORETO now proceeded to GREEN CAY, a small desert island on the edge of the BAHAMA bank, sixty miles from NASSAU. There her ordnance equipment was transferred from the steamer PRINCE ALFRED. Maffit had but two firemen and eleven deckhands, and

no doctor and no paymaster. The work of equipping the ship as a man-of-war with this small force was extremely difficult, and proceeded slowly. Yellow fever broke out. Two Federal gunboats appeared in the neighborhood. The yellow fever became so general that it was necessary to go somewhere for aid. Maffit escaped the Federal gunboats, and proceeded to CARDENAS, CUBA, where he was well received, and the vessel supplied with all necessary stores. A Southern doctor then in CUBA came on board, and took charge of the sick. Maffit himself became ill with yellow fever, but was treated by a Spanish naval surgeon, and recovered. Twelve new men were obtained for the crew, and the ship moved to HAVANA. Here, however, the neutrality regulations were so strictly enforced that Maffit determined to proceed to MOBILE to obtain a crew. On the afternoon of September 4th he made the entrance of that harbor.

The FLORIDA had now been out of ENGLAND more than five months, and was not yet in condition to assume the role of a man-of-war. In all that time the Federal government had not been able to take any effective measures for the suppression of this helpless but threatening ship.

Off MOBILE, Maffit found three Federal ships blocking his passage into the harbor. He couldn't fight, and he had no place to go but MOBILE. There was no other course open to Maffit but to try to run past the blockaders. This he did. He passed close to the ONEIDA, and received that vessel's broadside at pistol range. For two hours the FLORIDA received the

gunfire of three Federal men-of-war. During all that time she did not cast loose a gun, for there were no men to work them, and as there was nothing to distract the Federal gunners it is marvellous that the FLORIDA was able to run through their fire, but she did. She arrived in MOBILE badly cut to pieces, the foretopmast and the fore gaff were shot away, all the boats were cut to pieces, the hammock nettings were nearly all swept off on one side, the main rigging was cut adrift, and she was hulled in many places. One eleven inch shell had gone clean through her just above the water line.

The explanation of the seemingly miraculous escape of the FLORIDA is to be found in her close resemblance to a British man-of-war. It will be recalled that she was built from the plans of a British gunboat. It must be understood that there were British men-of-war on the Gulf coast at the time, and that they were there for the purpose of inspecting the blockade. GREAT BRITAIN had never been cordial to the idea of the blockade of the southern ports, and occasionally inspected to see if it were really effective. Her gunboats were allowed to approach the blockaded ports, and upon making themselves known, to enter the ports. Maffit, when he approached MOBILE, was flying British colors. Captain Preble of the ONEIDA had no idea that the FLORIDA was the faster vessel and drew less water, and so was able to reach shoal water where she could not be followed. Upon news of this affair reaching WASHINGTON, Captain Preble of the ONEIDA was summarily dismissed from the

UNITED STATES Navy, but was afterward re-instated when the truth became known. In an investigation held after the war at the request of Captain Preble, Captain Maffit of the FLORIDA testified as to the effectiveness of the ONEIDA'S gunfire.

SLIDE 37: CAPTURE OF THE JACOB BELL

The FLORIDA was refitted in MOBILE, at last secured a crew, and escaped the blockading forces during a norther on January 15th, 1863. Ten months had now elapsed since the vessel had left ENGLAND, and she was at last ready to begin her career as a commerce raider.

SLIDE 38: DESTRUCTION OF JACOB BELL

In her subsequent career the FLORIDA cruised at large for more than 14 months and spent six months in a French Government dockyard. She captured thirty-seven Union Merchant vessels, ranging in value from \$1,500,000 down to \$10,000. We find her subsisting just as the German cruisers afterward did, by taking needed supplies from her captures, including coal

SLIDE 36: CRUISE OF FLORIDA

which she transferred to her own bunkers in Brazilian waters. Two events in her career stand out as remarkable. The first is her repair and the renewal of her crew in a French government dockyard.

Early in June the FLORIDA arrived in BREST in great need of repairs. No private dockyard was available. After some correspondence with the French government the latter gave per-

mission to use a government dock. The FLORIDA remained in dock five or six weeks, and the French authorities, when they became satisfied of her wants permitted them to be supplied in full. Permission was given to land the small arms to be overhauled by a local gunsmith, upon a guarantee through the Customs authorities that they would be re-shipped without any addition in quantity. Application was made to land some of the gun-carriages for the same purpose, but this was refused. However, new gun-carriages and necessary gear for the pivot guns were made in NANTES, and arrangements were made to deliver them just outside of French waters when the FLORIDA sailed. After the work in dock was finished the FLORIDA remained in BREST for several months accomplishing other repairs, and even received permission to recruit seventy-five new men for her crews. Of this procedure Bulloch, in his History of the Secret Service of the Confederate States in EUROPE, says "This, it must be admitted, was a strange and somewhat unusual proceeding, but we Confederates had no concern with the matter as a diplomatic controversy, or as a question of international law. The FLORIDA wanted the men.... The only question was how to get them."

The explanation for these remarkable breaches of neutrality is found in the fact that the French emperor was then engaged in an effort to erect a French empire in MEXICO, and desired the success of the Confederacy to place a buffer state between the Empire of MEXICO and the hostile northern states

of the Union.

SLIDE 39: CAPTAIN MORRIS (Scharf, p. 88)

While in BREST Maffit resigned the command because of ill health, and Lieutenant Morris took the ship to sea for further raids in February, 1864, and continued operations until October, when the ship was finally disposed of by the Federal Navy under circumstances that make the violation of international law in BREST seem tame. The circumstances were briefly as follows: the FLORIDA entered the harbor of BAHIA, BRAZIL, after dark on the night of October 4th, 1864, and anchored. In the

SLIDE 40: WACHUSSETTS (Official Records, Vol. 2, Page 593)

morning she found herself in close proximity to the U.S.S. WACHUSETTS. Morris went ashore to pay his official calls, and was advised to strictly regard all the provisions of BRAZIL'S neutrality, and further to move his ship to an anchorage such that a Brazilian sloop of war would lay between him and the WACHUSETT. This was done, and liberty was granted to men and officers. On the night of October 5th, when only a part of the officers and crew of the FLORIDA were on board, the WACHUSETT got underway, stood for the FLORIDA, rammed her, opened fire on her, and demanded and received her surrender. The WACHUSETT then took the FLORIDA in tow, and left the harbor, being fired on in the process by the Brazilian sloop of war and the forts, but without effect. The FLORIDA was then taken back to HAMPTON ROADS. The Brazilian Government of course demanded her

return, and the Department of State made no attempt to defend the act. The Secretary of State admitted that the act was an "unauthorized, unlawful, and indefensible exercise of the naval force of the UNITED STATES, within a foreign country, in defiance of its established and duly recognized government." Nevertheless the FLORIDA was not returned to the jurisdiction of BRAZIL because she sank in HAMPTON ROADS, and it may be presumed that her sinking was not accidental.

### SECTION IX.

#### THE FLORIDA'S CUBS

##### SLIDE 41: CHART OF CRUISE OF CLARENCE, TACONY, ARCHER

On May 6th, 1863, the FLORIDA captured, off the Brazilian coast, the brig CLARENCE of BALTIMORE. Maffit converted her into a Confederate cruiser by transferring to her Lieutenant Charles W. Read, four petty officers and sixteen men, and one 6-pounder boat howitzer. Read added to her battery some Quaker guns, made from some spare spars. The battery was weak, but it must be remembered that the name of this man-of-war was CLARENCE.

Read set out on a cruise that developed into one of the most colorful cruises in history. He made an uneventful passage northward as far as HATTERAS. Off that cape he made his first capture, on June 6th, 1863. This proved to be the bark WHISTLING WIND, bound for NEW ORLEANS with stores for the UNITED STATES Army. In the next six days Read made six more cap-

tures, the last one being the fine brig TACONY. As this was a better craft than the CLARENCE, Read transferred to her and burned the CLARENCE, and with the TACONY captured the brig ARABELLA on the same day. All of this was going on in an area that was constantly traversed by the Union men-of-war going to and from their blockade stations.

Read now sailed northward in the TACONY to the MAIN coast, and in twelve days captured fourteen vessels. The last capture was the schooner ARCHER. Read shifted to her and burned the TACONY. What he really craved to command was a steamer, and hearing from some captured fishermen, that the revenue cutter CALEB CUSHING was the only armed vessel in PORTLAND harbor, he went after her. On the 27th of July he sailed into PORTLAND harbor in his peaceful looking schooner unmolested. After dark he took the revenue cutter by boarding, and secured her crew below decks. Going out of the harbor at dawn, he met the BOSTON steamer coming in. It happened that the commanding officer of the Cushing was on the BOSTON steamer with orders in his pocket to take the CUSHING out in search of the TACONY. Thus was the capture of the CUSHING discovered. The major commanding the fort at PORTLAND organized a recapturing party of troops and citizens, embarked on two steamers and three tugs. The expedition overtook the CUSHING and ARCHER by eleven a.m., and Read, finding himself surrounded, surrendered, first blowing up the CUSHING.

In a space of twenty-six days Read had captured three ships, three barks, three brigs, twelve schooners, one revenue cutter, and an unclassified vessel named the CONRAD. His fate was a peculiar one for a good sailorman. He was finally surrounded and captured on the high seas by the army and militia!

INTERMISSION

SECTION X.

THE ALABAMA.

SLIDE 42: THE ALABAMA, (Official Record, Vol. 1, p. 770)

The ALABAMA was built on the MERSEY under the same general arrangements as have been described for the FLORIDA. She went by her dockyard number, the 290, until she was christened the ENRICA, and it was told about the dock yard that she was destined for a Spanish firm. She was built as a man-of-war, but had no ordnance material on her when she left the dockyard. As she neared completion she was placed under the command of an officer of the Cunard line. Her first crew had the status of the crew of any merchantman. An officer of the Confederate Navy was on board as the representative of the Confederate Government. It had been arranged that Bulloch should command her when she assumed her true character, but the Confederacy found Bulloch indispensable in ENGLAND, and Semmes was ordered from the SUMTER, then immobile in GIBRALTAR, to take the command.

SLIDE 15: SEMMES, (Two Years on the ALABAMA, Sinclair, p. 3)

As was the case with the FLORIDA, the ALABAMA'S true nature was more than suspected by the American legation, and as a result of the correspondence between the legation and the British Government the departure of the ALABAMA from British waters was forced at an earlier date than had been anticipated. While the ALABAMA was fitted out at LIVERPOOL with everything required for a long cruise, except ordnance stores, the bark AGRIPPINA was loaded at LONDON with her ordnance equipment and a reserve of coal, and both vessels cleared for TERCEIRA, on

SLIDE 43: CRUISE OF THE ALABAMA (Plate 2)

of the AZORES. Captain Semmes and the officers were despatched in a third vessel for the same port, where all arrived by August 20th, 1862. In two days the battery of the ALABAMA was mounted, and all of her ammunition and ordnance stores were transferred and stored. In two more days she was coaled, and on the 24th she steamed out beyond the marine league and was placed in commission as a Confederate cruiser. She had twenty-

SLIDE 44: ALABAMA'S OFFICERS  
(Service Afloat, Semmes, p. 416)

four officers, some of whom are shown, and no crew. The crew that had brought her out was picked up in the streets of LIVERPOOL, and no official papers bound them to a voyage other than of a merchant character. It seems probable however, that they must have had some inkling of the true state of affairs. After the commissioning Semmes made a soul stirring address to them, explained the status of the Confederacy, and the nature of the

cruise that the ALABAMA was about to undertake, promised double pay in gold, besides large sums from the Confederate Government as prize money, equal to one half of the value of all vessels destroyed, and invited them to enlist in the Confederate navy. A crew of one hundred and twenty Englishmen was thus obtained,

SLIDE 45: ALABAMA CAPTURING HER FIRST PRIZE  
(Service Afloat, page 424)

and the career of the ALABAMA as the most famous commerce raider in history was on. Off PICO, one of the AZORES, she made her first prize.

There is time for only the briefest outline of the subsequent cruise, and to pick out a few of the most interesting features.

Semmes first cruised two months in the NORTH ATLANTIC, reaching the NEWFOUNDLAND BANKS in that time, and making twenty captures. He proceeded most of the time under sail alone, but finally had to proceed to FORT DE FRANCE, MARTINIQUE for coal. There he found the AGRIPPINA, but in order to conceal his movements sent her at once to BLANQUILLA. This was on the 18th of

SLIDE 43: CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE ALABAMA  
(Plate 2)

November. The next day the Federal cruiser SAN JACINTO, appeared in the harbor, but as the governor proposed to enforce the twenty-four hour rule, did not anchor, but proceeded immediately outside the harbor to wait for the ALABAMA to come out. She did not have long to wait. On the 20th, early in the evening, the ALABAMA put out. Signal was made from an American

brig in the harbor, and Semmes was prepared for a critical engagement. But the night was dark, and the SAN JACINTO was lying well out beyond the entrance; and though she had two boats on the watch, the ALABAMA got out unobserved. As the SAN JACINTO, however, was deficient in speed, she would have had some difficulty in maintaining an engagement, even had she met the enemy.

After coaling at BLANQUILLA from the AGRIPPINA, Semmes shaped his course for the MONA PASSAGE and thence for the WINDWARD PASSAGE. He remained cruising in and near the latter for five days. On the 7th of December he captured the PANAMA mail steamer ARIEL, for which he had been waiting. The ARIEL had a large number of passengers which Semmes proposed to land at KINGSTON before burning the ship, but the prevalence of yellow fever at that place prevented him from carrying out the plan, and the steamer was released on bond.

The next cruising ground was the GULF OF HONDURAS and the coast of YUCATAN. At the ARCAS, a small group of islands in the BAY OF CAMPECHY, she met another coal-bark. She remained there two weeks coaling and refitting. Thence, on the 5th of January, 1863, Semmes proceeded to the coast of TEXAS, having formed the bold design of intercepting a part of the transport fleet, which he supposed would at this time be on its way to GALVESTON.

SLIDE 46: ALABAMA AND HATTERAS  
(Service Afloat, p. 549)

The port of GALVESTON was blockaded, and Semmes withdrew

from the area. He was followed by the HATTERAS, one of the blockading fleet, and Semmes, knowing his vessel to be the stronger allowed the pursuer to overtake him after they had passed beyond the support of the other blockading vessels. The HATTERAS was of about the same size as the ALABAMA, and carried about the same armament. She was, however, a very weak vessel, having been built as a DELAWARE RIVER excursion boat. The resulting action lasted just thirteen minutes, at the end of which time the HATTERAS surrendered in a sinking condition. Semmes rescued the crew, and later put them ashore at PORT ROYAL, JAMAICA.

SLIDE 47: CRUISE OF ALABAMA (Plate 3).

Next Semmes cruised by an indirect route to the coast of BRAZIL, where he remained two months, his usual time on any one station. Here he captured a bark called the CONRAD, which he commissioned as a Confederate vessel under the name of the TUSCALOOSA, arming her with two twelve pounder guns. The accomplishments of this vessel as a cruiser are of little consequence or interest. Semmes also captured coal, and coaled from his prize in the harbor of FERNANDO DO NORONHA. Ten vessels were captured on this coast, and Semmes then proceeded, with his new cruiser in company, to CAPETOWN, arriving the 29th of July, 1863.

SLIDE 48: CRUISE OF THE ALABAMA, (Plate 4).

Here a controversy arose as to the status of the TUSCALOOSA. Prizes were not permitted to be brought into British

ports, and the question for the British Government was as to whether this ship was a prize or a man-of-war. The British Admiral decided that as she had a mere prize crew on board, and a battery so weak as to be negligible, and still retained her original cargo, she was a prize, and should be seized by the British. The Governor overruled the Admiral and released the vessel. Upon news of this reaching LONDON the home government sustained the Admiral, and informed the Governor that he should have seized the vessel. This was calculated to

SLIDE 49: DECK SCENE

(Two Years on the ALABAMA, Frontispiece)

quiet the protests of the American Government, but when the Governor seized the TUSCALOOSA on her next appearance in CAPE TOWN, the home government again reproached him, stating that, as the TUSCALOOSA had once been allowed to leave, her status had been established as a sure enough man-of-war. One cannot doubt where the sympathy of the British Government lay.

SLIDE 50: CHART OF CRUISE, (Plate 5).

The ALABAMA arrived off the West Coast of AFRICA just a year after she had steamed out of the MERSEY as a merchant vessel. Her career was about over. She was still to remain at sea in her role of commerce destroyer for eleven more months, but her prey had disappeared. As a result of the heavy losses of American merchant vessels there were fewer vessels to capture. This was in **large** part due to the fact that many ships had been transferred from American registry to that of foreign

flags, in order to avoid the possibility of capture by Confederate ships, and in part due to the fact that the people of the North were heavily engaged in the war, either in combatant roles or in the supply and manufacture of war material, and hence the sea absorbed a relatively small part of their energies compared to the situation before the war. The increasing difficulty of finding American ships to capture is shown by the fact that in the first twelve months after leaving the MERSEY the ALABAMA captured fifty-six vessels, and in the eleven months that she continued to act as a cruiser thereafter she captured only twelve, or just a little better than one a month.

On the African coast the ALABAMA captured only one vessel, the bark SEA BRIDE, which vessel with her cargo Semmes sold to an English merchant, making the transfer at ANGRA PEQUENA in the Hottentot country, to avoid any fracture of the British neutrality laws. For the remainder of the year Semmes cruised in the STRAITS OF SUNDRA, the CHINA SEA, and the BAY OF BENGAL, with poor success.

SLIDE 51: CRUISE OF THE ALABAMA, (Plate 6).

Semmes then again crossed the ATLANTIC, and again raided the sea lanes off the coast of BRAZIL. This time he had very indifferent luck in the waters that formerly swarmed with American ships. He made only two captures, and finding such poor hunting he decided to try his luck in the NORTH ATLANTIC off the coast of EUROPE.

SLIDE 52: THE U.S.S. KEARSARGE

(Two Years on the ALABAMA, by A. Sinclair, p. 250)

On June 11th, the ALABAMA came to anchor in the harbor of CHERBOURG, FRANCE, and three days later the U.S.S. KEARSARGE came across from SOUTHAMPTON, under the command of Captain John A. Winslow. The vessels fought their famous action off CHERBOURG on Sunday, June 19th, 1864.

SLIDE 53: CAPTAIN WINSLOW

(Scribner's History of the U.S., Vol. 5, p. 303)

Thousands of people gathered on the southern heights overlooking the British channel to witness the combat, and the French ironclad CORRONE and the British yacht DEERHOUND moved to and fro outside the range of the guns.

The fight between the KEARSARGE and the ALABAMA is one of the most famous ship duels in history, but its fame attaches mostly to the great interest that existed at the time in the

SLIDE 54: KEARSARGE GUN IN ACTION

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, p. 621)

ALABAMA. This ship had been followed with dread and hate by every shipping man in the North, and had been followed with the greatest interest, not to say enthusiasm, by all the shipping interests of the British Empire. Her record had been a bright spot in the news of the Confederacy, and it may be said that she was easily the most famous ship of her day. Her final duel, with a great gallery of spectators, was one of the most dramatic that has ever been fought. But of the fight itself there is little to be said.

SLIDE 55: CHART OF ACTION OFF CHERBOURG

(Ironclads in Action, by H.W. Wilson, Vol. I. p. 162)

The ships were fairly evenly matched, and steamed around on opposite sides of a circle firing at each other until after one hour and ten minutes the ALABAMA was in a sinking condition and surrendered. Whatever advantage there was in the strength of the vessels was with the KEARSARGE, and Semmes complained after the action that his powder was old and of little force, but he went into the action from choice, and certainly was then in a position to know the condition of his powder. Semmes also complained that the KEARSARGE was nearly an armored ship, as her skipper had ranged his bower chains over the side

SLIDE 56: THE KEARSARGE SINKING THE ALABAMA

(Duel between ALABAMA and KEARSARGE, Hall Picture)

of the ship abreast the fire rooms and engine room. But the very fact that two ships could engage each other for seventy minutes at ranges of less than a mile shows that the ships were rather evenly matched. Thus ended the career of one of

SLIDE 57: THE SINKING OF THE ALABAMA

(Scribner's History of the U.S., Vol. 5, p. 301)

the most remarkable ships of history. She had been at sea as a Confederate man-of-war for very nearly two years, and was never in her entire career in a port of the land whose flag she flew. With very slender resources she had maintained herself all of that time by the energy and resourcefulness of

SLIDE 58: THE LAST OF THE ALABAMA

(History of the Navy, E.S. Maclay, Vol. II, p. 526)

her officers, and such assistance as could be occasionally ob-

tained from neutrals. Her crew were originally nearly all British, and she was able as the cruise progressed to keep her crew lists full by recruiting from the crews of captured ships. She captured a total of sixty-eight ships, with a value

SLIDE 59: SEMMES AFTER THE FIGHT  
(Two Years on the ALABAMA, Sinclair, p. 10)

probably around six million dollars, and her operations had reduced the waning American Merchant Marine to an insignificant position among the fleets of the world. The chart of

SLIDE 60: COMPLETE CRUISE OF THE ALABAMA, (Plate 5).

her complete cruise shows by a flag the location of each of her captures. The closeness of the flags for the early parts of the cruise, when compared with the wide spacing between flags for the latter parts of the cruise is an excellent graphic presentation of the effect of this single ship upon American Commerce.

SECTION XI.

THE SHENANDOAH.

(Re-arranged from Scharf)

SLIDE 61: THE SHENANDOAH  
(Official Records, Series One, Vol. 3, p. 749)

The last of the Confederate cruisers, and the one, with the exception of the ALABAMA, that inflicted the largest total of injury upon the commerce of the UNITED STATES, was the SHENANDOAH, which was purchased by Captain Bulloch to supply the place of the ALABAMA. She was originally the British merchant

steamer SEA KING, equipped with a lifting screw so as to be used under sail alone and was fully rigged as a ship, and was very fast under either sail or steam. The whaling fleets of the UNITED STATES were the largest portion of its commerce remaining, and this cruiser was especially fitted out to swoop down upon them. Bulloch paid 45,000 pounds for the ship, buying her through the medium of an English Merchant captain named Corbett, who was to transfer her upon the high seas. At the same time he purchased the blockade-runner LAUREL and loaded her at LIVERPOOL with the guns, stores, and equipment for the cruiser. The LAUREL also carried out to the rendezvous all the officers except one who went with the SEA KING to become acquainted with her. She sailed from LONDON and the LAUREL from LIVERPOOL on October 8th, 1864. The SEA KING was cleared for BOMBAY or any port in the EAST INDIES, and the LAUREL for NASSAU. On the 18th they rendezvoused off FUNCHAL, MADEIRA; and proceeded to LAS DESERTAS, an uninhabited island nearby, where in two days the armament and war material all were transferred to the SEA KING.

SLIDE 62: COMMANDER WADDELL  
(Scharf, page 816)

Captain James I. Waddell then hoisted her new colors and took command of her as the Confederate States man-of-war SHENANDOAH. The battery placed on board consisted of four 8-inch smooth-bore guns, two Whitworth 32-pounder rifles and two 12-pounders. The most serious obstacle that met the ship at the outset of

her career was the paucity of her crew. Eighty seamen had shipped for the pretended voyage to the EAST INDIES, but only twenty-three consented to remain under the Confederate flag; so that, including her nineteen officers, the ship had but forty-two men on board. This was soon brought up to the requisite number by enlistments from the prizes she took.

SLIDE 63: CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE SHENANDOAH

Captain Waddell steered for AUSTRALIA, and before arriving at MELBOURNE, January 25th, 1865, made prizes of the barks ALINA, GODFREY, WINDWARD, and DELPHINE, schooners CHARTER OAK and LIZZIE M. STACEY, and brig SUSAN, all of which were burned. The steamer KATE PRINCE was ransomed, to take home the prisoners, and the bark ADELAIDE was bonded. At MELBOURNE the SHENANDOAH was permitted to go into a private dock for repairs, and then trouble with the colonial authorities arose on an allegation that Captain Waddell had shipped a British subject in the port, in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. He refused to allow his ship to be searched, and his assurances that he had committed no breach of neutrality were accepted. The Government knew there had been a breach of neutral obligations in the repairs that had been permitted, but were saving face by the protest over the enlistment of one man. The SHENANDOAH left MELBOURNE February 8th, 1865, in excellent condition, and in three months passed from that far southern latitude to the beginning of her destructive work among the whalers in the BOKHOTSK SEA, BEHRING'S SEA, and the ARCTIC OCEAN. Be-

tween June 22d and the 23th she captured, and either destroyed or ransomed, 24 ships. They were taken in couplets, triplets and quartets, and it was necessary to release and bond four of them, in order to get rid of the numerous prisoners. On one occasion eight prizes were taken in a lump, as they had gathered around the disabled ship BRUNSWICK, and, in the words of the Southern historian, Scharf, "When the octette was fired, that Hyperborean sea was lit up with a wondrous mass of fire." This occurred on June 23th, near the mouth of BEHRING'S STRAITS, and was the last war exploit of the SHENANDOAH, and of the Confederacy.

The SHENANDOAH captured in all 38 ships, 34 of which were destroyed, and four ransomed; their total value was stated by the masters at \$1,361,983. Waddell had faithfully executed the programme of obliterating the American whaling industry in those regions. Many of his captures were effected after the close of the war, and in consequence, Secretary Welles accused him of continuing his belligerent operations when he knew that the armies of the South had surrendered. This was not quite the case. From papers taken from the prizes made on June 23rd he was informed of the correspondence of the previous April between Grant and Lee relative to the surrender of the latter, but they also informed him that the seat of the Confederate government had been removed from RICHMOND to DANVILLE, and that President Davis had issued a proclamation giving assurances of the continuation of the struggle by the Con-

federacy. With his knowledge of the condition of things in AMERICA thus limited, Captain Waddell had no right to suppose that the war had ended, or to cease his hostile endeavors. The SHENANDOAH came out of the STRAITS on June 29th, and while running towards the CALIFORNIA Coast spoke, on August 2nd, the British bark BARACOUTA, 14 days out from SAN FRANCISCO, from whose captain Waddell learned of the capture of President Davis and the capitulation of the remaining military forces of the Confederacy. The SHENANDOAH'S guns were at once dismantled, ports closed, funnels white-washed, and the ship transformed, so far as external appearance went, into an ordinary merchantman. Waddell decided to give the ship up to the British authorities, and brought her into LIVERPOOL on November 6th, not a vessel having been spoken to during the long voyage from the NORTH PACIFIC. He turned her over to Captain Paynter, commanding her Majesty's ship DONEGAL, who placed a prize-crew on

SLIDE 62: COMMANDER WADDELL

board, and Waddell communicated with Lord Russel, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In this letter he stated his opinion that the vessel should revert, with other property of the Confederacy to the UNITED STATES Government, and that point was quickly settled; but Mr. Adams raised the usual question of piracy against the officers and men of the ship, and there was also a liability to proceedings under the Foreign Enlistment

SLIDE 64: SHENANDOAH AT LIVERPOOL  
(Agent of America)

Act, if British subjects could be found on board. Mr. Adams

wanted the officers and crew held, he said, until he could procure evidence from SAN FRANCISCO, that Captain Waddell knew of the downfall of the Confederacy before his latest seizures of American vessels; but the law officers of the crown decided there was no evidence to justify their detention. On November 8th, Captain Waddell had the roll of the SHENANDOAH called upon her deck, and as not a member of the ship's company acknowledged to being British, they were discharged and allowed to depart. Mr. Adams, however, continued to urge the arrest of Captain Waddell, on charges of piracy; and when rebuffed by the British Government, he brought forward an affidavit made by one Temple, who purported to have sailed in the SHENANDOAH. He alleged that the crew were chiefly British subjects, and Mr. Adams claimed that they should have been held for violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but nothing came of his efforts; and he was, indeed, chiefly prompted by a motive to make up the record that was subsequently presented to the GENEVA tribunal. Captain Waddell and his officers were never molested. The SHENANDOAH was sold by the UNITED STATES to the Sultan of ZANZIBAR, and in 1879 was lost in the INDIAN OCEAN.

## SECTION XII.

### LESSER CONFEDERATE CRUISERS.

#### SLIDE 11: CAPTAIN MAURY.

The success of the Confederate commerce warfare was attained by the vessels already mentioned. A few instances in

the service of other vessels used for the purpose are worth mention.

The British gunboat VICTOR was surveyed as unfit for service and immediately bought by Captain Maury for the Confederacy. She left ENGLAND one day in the guise of a British merchant vessel, and appeared at CALAIS, FRANCE, the next day as a Confederate cruiser. Here, however, she was blockaded for the remainder of the war by Union vessels.

SLIDE 65: U.S.S. GEORGIA

The GEORGIA was a merchant steamer bought in ENGLAND, and converted into a cruiser. She was found unsuited for the work, and was re-sold to a British merchant. On her first subsequent trip as a British merchant vessel she was captured by

SLIDE 66: THE U.S.S. NIAGARA

the U.S.S. NIAGARA, and a UNITED STATES prize court held her a lawful prize because of her former status.

There were very few vessels in the Union service capable of making fourteen knots. The Confederates owned a blockade runner named the TALLAHASSEE that was capable of making that speed, she was converted into a cruiser, and made a successful

SLIDE 67: THE TALLAHASSEE

raid up the ATLANTIC Coast of the UNITED STATES. Because of her speed she operated with impunity off the entrances of Union ports between SANDY HOOK and PORTLAND, MAINE. Her commander, Captain J.T. Wood, even formed a plan to dash into NEW YORK

SLIDE 68: CAPTAIN J.T. WOOD

Harbor and raid the shipping there and the BROOKLYN Navy Yard. However, he changed his plan on second thought and confined his efforts to commerce destruction. His cruise was very successful, but was limited by his coal capacity. A second cruise of the same nature found the Federals ready for him, and was unsuccessful. The TALLAHASSEE was then returned to her former service as a blockade runner.

The largest, strongest, and fastest cruiser built for the Confederates in ENGLAND was the GEORGIANA, but before she had made a single capture she was knocked to pieces by Federal gunboats while attempting to run through the blockade into CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

SECTION XLII.

LESSER CONFEDERATE CRUISERS

Most of the damage done by the Confederate cruisers was accomplished by the ALABAMA and the SHENANDOAH. The Confederacy attempted to get other vessels to sea to carry on the same work. Most of the other vessels were unsuccessful because of the fact that they were poorly fitted for the work at hand. However, a few of them are worthy of a small account.

The RAPPANNOCK. In 1863 the British Government surveyed the gunboat VICTOR of the British Navy. She was a handsomely modelled screw steamer of 500 tons burden, and was purchased

SLIDE 9: CAPTAIN MAURY  
(Scharf, p. 96)

by Captain M.F. Maury, C.S.N., through an agent, on the pretense that she was to be used as a merchantman in the CHINA trade. Before she got to sea the British Government became suspicious of her intended use and ordered her seized, but she was run to sea before the seizure could be accomplished. She proved to be such a poor steamer that she was run into CALAIS for repairs. She remained in that port in commission as a Confederate cruiser until the end of the war, and did nothing more for the Confederacy than to detain a couple of Federal cruisers off that port to prevent her getting to sea.

The GEORGIANA. In 1862-63 the firm of Laird and Company built at BIRKENHEAD for the Confederate States a fast and powerful steamer called the GEORGIANA. She escaped from British jurisdiction under the pretense of being destined for the Chinese trade, and left LIVERPOOL for NASSAU January 22d, 1863; the intention being to run the blockade into CHARLESTON, where the ship was to be armed and fitted out as a Confederate cruiser. After being detained some time at NASSAU she started for CHARLESTON, but was discovered by the blockaders off the port and her captain ran her ashore on LONG ISLAND BEACH, on the SOUTH CAROLINA Coast, to avoid capture. Strenuous efforts were made by the Federals to get at her cargo, which was partly of military stores and known to be very valuable, but the Confederates kept off their landing parties by bringing field

batteries to bear upon them. The GEORGIANA, however, was knocked to pieces by their shells. Apart from her cargo, the loss was a serious one to the Confederacy, as she was a much faster and stronger ship than any one of its cruisers afloat and would have made a superb man-of-war.

SLIDE 53: THE GEORGIA  
(Official Records, Series One, Vol. 2, p. 807).

The GEORGIA was an iron merchant steamer bought in ENGLAND. She was of 600 tons burden. As usual with steamers bought in ENGLAND, the British Government had good reason to believe that she had a belligerent destination and ordered her seized just in time to let her get to sea. She was outfitted off the French Coast by the steamer ALAR with her military equipment, and formally put in commission as a Confederate cruiser, under the command of W.L. Maury. Her battery consisted of five Whitworth guns, two 100-pounders, two 24-pounders, and one 32-pounder. Her crew were made up of men who had come out in the ship from ENGLAND and from the crew of the ALAR. The field of her operations was in the ATLANTIC. That field had been already swept rather clean, but in her short career she made captures worth about a half a million. Because of deficient sail power she had to coal so frequently that it was not considered advisable to continue her as a cruiser. She was taken to LIVERPOOL, dismantled and sold to a LIVERPOOL merchant. This was done against the protest of the American minister, who gave notice that his government would not recognize

the transfer and requested Commander Craven, then in command

SLIDE 54: U.S.S. NIAGARA  
(Official Records, Vol. 3, p. 461).

of the U.S. frigate NIAGARA, lying in the port of ANTWERP, that he must endeavor to intercept and capture the converted Confederate. The ship was stripped of every vestige of war fittings and put into service as a merchantman under British register. She was captured off the TAGUS RIVER by the NIAGARA, taken to the UNITED STATES and sold as a prize. Her British owner appealed to the British foreign office for redress, but was informed that the case of the GEORGIA must go before the prize courts of the UNITED STATES and that he must defend his interests there, where of course he lost his case.

SLIDE 55: TALLAHASSEE  
(Official Records, Series One, Vol. III, p. 701).

The TALLAHASSEE (Atlanta). This vessel was a splendid twin-screw, 14-knot blockade-runner, built on the THAMES. After making several trips into and out of WILMINGTON her name was changed from the ATLANTA to the TALLAHASSEE, and she was commissioned as a C.S. ship of war under command of Commander J.T. Wood. The battery consisted of a 32-pounder rifle, a lighter rifle and a brass howitzer.

On August 6th, 1864, the TALLAHASSEE went to sea from WILMINGTON under the fire of the blockaders, whom the speedy ship soon left behind. Her cruising ground was the ATLANTIC Coast and when within 80 miles of SANDY HOOK, on August 11th, she took her first prize. In two days in these waters she made

eight additional prizes, and was then chased off by a half

SLIDE 56: COMMANDER J.T. WOOD  
(Scharf, p. 120)

dozen Federal gunboats. Commander Wood had formed a project to dash upon the BROOKLYN Navy Yard and escape to sea by way of HELL GATE after doing all the destruction possible; but this scheme was abandoned and the TALLAHASSEE ran to the eastward, where she made further captures off the eastern end of LONG ISLAND, and then proceeded up the coast of MAINE. She arrived at HALIFAX on the 18th of August, but was ordered out at once after taking enough coal to take her back to WILMINGTON. She left HALIFAX on the 19th, and between there and WILMINGTON was fruitlessly chased by Federal cruisers. On the 25th, she boldly ran past the blockade squadron at the CAPE FEAR RIVER, and came to anchor off FORT FISHER. On this eventful cruise of nineteen days she had burned 16 vessels, scuttled 10, bonded five, and released two.

She made one other cruise as a commerce raider, but without much success, and was finally used as a blockade runner to bring supplies through the blockade for the Army.

SECTION XIV.

UNION EFFORTS (SECOND PHASE)

SLIDE 40: U.S.S. WACHUSSETT  
(Official Records, Vol. II, page 593)

It is difficult to give any clear account of the Union efforts to suppress the British-built Confederate cruisers.

No orderly account of them has been found in any publication. The following has been gleaned from many sources, but principally from the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies.

By the time the ALABAMA had left ENGLAND in the fall of '62, the Union Navy had greatly increased from the thirty-eight vessels that were in commission at the beginning of hostilities. It probably numbered several hundred vessels by that time, for by the end of the war it had increased to more than six hundred in commission. There were available by the fall of the second year of the war a number of steamers that could be spared from the blockade.

When news of the ALABAMA'S escape from ENGLAND reached WASHINGTON, in September, '62, the first precaution seems to have been the formation of a WEST INDIAN Squadron. This was organized at once, and seven steamers were assigned to it, the WACHUSSETT, DACOTAH, CIMARRON, SONOMA, TIOGA, OCTARORA, and SANTIAGO DE CUBA, under the command of Commodore Wilkes. This squadron was ordered to search in the waters of the WEST INDIES and the BAHAMAS, with permission to leave their station in pursuit.

SLIDE 69: THE JAMESTOWN  
(Official Records, Vol. III, Frontispiece)

The old sailing frigate JAMESTOWN was ordered to the EAST INDIES at the same time.

At the end of October, when news of the first depredations

of the ALABAMA arrived, the following orders were issued within eight days:

The TUSCARORA, KEARSARGE and ST. LOUIS to the AZORES and CANARIES. (The ST. LOUIS was a sailing frigate)

The SAN JACINTO to NOVA SCOTIA.

The PHILADELPHIA to BERMUDA and the WINDWARD ISLANDS.

SLIDE 70: THE SABINE  
(Official Records, Vol. II, page 79)

The SABINE to cruise from NEW YORK to the AZORES, CAPE VERDES, BRAZIL and home.

The INO to ST. HELENA and vicinity.

Steamers were sent to the NEW YORK and LIVERPOOL steamship lanes, and the CALIFORNIA steamers were provided with convoys.

Two of these ships found the ALABAMA, but neither could hold her. The SAN JACINTO met up with her in MARTINIQUE, and the ST. LOUIS in FUNCHAL.

SLIDE 71: THE VANDERBILT  
(Official Records, Vol. II, page 445)

In November the fast VANDERBILT was ready and left on a carefully planned cruise that had every prospect of success but which was ruined by the mistake of Commodore Wilkes. He met the VANDERBILT at sea, and liked her so well that he commandeered her as his flagship on the West Indian station until he received a peremptory order to send her on duty assigned. It is practically certain that the VANDERBILT'S pre-arranged cruise would have brought her into contact with the ALABAMA had it not

been for the delay occasioned by her detention by Wilkes.

As news of the depredations of the ALABAMA and FLORIDA continued to roll in on the Department, the Brazilian Squadron was again organized, but just too late. Meanwhile the PACIFIC Squadron was maintained, and strong steam frigates were constantly maintained at GIBRALTAR and in English and French waters.

During the year 1863, eighty men-of-war were employed in the chase of the Confederate cruisers. Of these, fifty-nine were steamers, some of which would have been out of luck if they had met the FLORIDA or ALABAMA. In addition thirteen private steamers and ten sailing vessels were employed to search for and gather news of the Confederate cruisers. An equal force of both men-of-war and chartered vessels was maintained during 1864. Even the old CONSTELLATION was employed in the chase.

It seems that such a force should have succeeded in making the seas reasonably safe for Union merchantmen. That they

SLIDE 72: THE CONSTELLATION. SHE SEARCHED FOR THE ALABAMA!  
(Official Records, Vol. I, page 332)

failed to do so is partly explainable by the slowness of communications to all remote parts of the world. The despatches that reached the Navy Department and the commanders of ships have been studied and it appears that there was always a surfeit of information as to where the Confederate cruisers had been, but it was rare that there was any news less than two weeks old.

Admiral Porter says: "It was not the particular smartness of Semmes that enabled him to escape capture; it was the omission or indifference of the Navy Department in not sending the right ships to proper localities." But when we consider the exploits of the EMDEN in the days of radio and of many cables, it does not appear that the Navy Department was necessarily remiss.

SECTION XV.

SUMMARY

SLIDE 73: GRAPH - SUMMARY AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE

In all, the Confederate cruisers captured a total of 264 Federal merchant vessels, of which only two were steamers. This number includes many of very small size and value, such as a few schooners and brigs, and some fishing vessels, as well as a few pilot boats. In the tabulation of the value of the various captures no estimate is given for many of them. For those for which a valuation is given the least value is \$6000, and the highest value given is \$1,500,000. Of the total captures quite a large number were released under bond because their cargoes were neutral, and of course these bonds were never paid. The three cruisers built in ENGLAND accounted for a total of 175 of the 264 vessels captures, and for these 175 vessels the court of arbitration afterward adjudged a direct loss to the UNITED STATES of \$15,500,000. On this basis it seems probable that the total direct loss was not more than

\$20,000,000. The indirect loss was undoubtedly much larger than this, and as a rough estimate, the total loss, direct and indirect, may be assumed as between \$50,000,000.00 and \$100,000,000.00. This was a huge sum for those days, and had other factors been more equal might well have swayed the balance to the side of the Confederacy. As it was the operations of the Confederate cruisers had very little effect in deciding the issue.

That the operations of these cruisers did not furnish the explanation of the loss of leadership of the American Merchant Marine is proven by the fact that after the war was over, and the American ship owners had been in large part reimbursed for the loss of their vessels, they did not again attempt to dispute with ENGLAND the mastery of the world's commercial shipping. Iron ships and steam driven ships had come to stay, and in the production and operation of this type of vessel ENGLAND had a distinct advantage. The great commercial expansion that took place in the North after the war drew American men and capital into other fields of endeavor, and as a nation we have ever since been willing to leave the world's carrying trade to other nations.

#### CONCLUDING SECTION

#### THE ALABAMA CLAIMS.

#### SLIDE 74: LEST US CLASP HANDS

(The History of the American People, Vol. 9, p. 302)

Immediately after the war the UNITED STATES Government be-

gan to urge upon the British Government a set of claims for the damage inflicted upon her commerce by those Confederate cruisers which had been built and practically equipped in British waters. The British Cabinet that had permitted the ALABAMA and her sisters to leave ENGLAND was still in power, and naturally were loath to admit any liability on the part of their government. The claims did not reach a point beyond the correspondence stage until a change of cabinet occurred in ENGLAND. Thereafter the proceedings were long drawn out, but finally, in 1871, a commission was appointed to sit in WASHINGTON in order to arrive at a mode by which the question might be settled. The British Commissioners suggested arbitration, and the American Commissioners agreed, provided the "principles which should govern the arbitrators should first be agreed upon." It was finally agreed that the following rules should apply:

A neutral government is bound:-

(1) To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable grounds to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adopted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to war-like use.

(2) Not to allow either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a base of operations against the other, or for the purpose of renewal or augmentation of military supplies or the recruitment of men.

(3) To use due diligence in its own ports and waters and as to all persons in its jurisdiction to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

SLIDE 75: COUNT FREDERICK SCLOPIS  
(History of the American People, Vol. 9, p. 292)

The above arrangements were incorporated in the Treaty of WASHINGTON, 1871. Article one, after expressing regret for the escape of the ALABAMA and other vessels from British ports and for the depredations of those vessels, provided that the claims growing out of the acts of the said vessels should be submitted to a tribunal consisting of five arbitrators, one of whom should be appointed by each of the contracting parties, and one each by the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation and the Emperor of BRAZIL.

By the treaty the contracting parties agreed to observe the above rules in all future cases and bring them to the attention of all other nations.

SLIDE 76: SALLE DES CONFERENCES  
(History of the American People, Vol. 9, p. 296)

The Court met at GENEVA in December 1871, and after hearing the case presented, adjourned until the following June. It was found that the UNITED STATES case included claims for damages for the indirect loss occasioned by the cruisers, such as

the increased rates of insurance, the transference of the American Merchant Marine to the British flag, the cost of pursuit, and the prolongation of the war. There was also some harsh language in the presentation of the American case, such as the terms "insincere neutrality, veiled hostility, premature recognition of belligerency", etc. This caused great excitement in ENGLAND and there were demands for

SLIDE 77: SECRETARY FISH AND GENERAL GRANT AMUSED  
(History of the American People, Vol. 9, p. 303)

the annulment of the treaty. The court announced that it did not consider indirect losses a matter of jurisdiction under International Law, and proceeded to reach a decision. It found that GREAT BRITAIN was legally responsible for all the direct losses caused by the ALABAMA and FLORIDA, and for those caused by the SHENANDOAH after she left MELBOURNE, and awarded a gross sum of \$15,500,000 to the UNITED STATES.

The stipulation that the three rules should be submitted to other nations as rules for neutral conduct has never been carried out.

An English author, writing in 1896, summed up the award of the GENEVA Tribunal as follows:

The principles under which GREAT BRITAIN was tried were first announced in 1871, five years after the close of the

SLIDE 78: COIN CERTIFICATE  
(History of American People, Vol. 9, p. 298)

Civil War. The alleged offense of GREAT BRITAIN was therefore

ex port facto, and she was unjustly convicted, but preferred to pay the award rather than go to war with a sister nation. Proceeding, he lets the cat out of the bag by remarking that GREAT BRITAIN had twice before disposed of the troublesome American Merchant Marine, once during the Revolution, and once during the War of 1812, but it had come back to life each time. It was finally disposed of by the enthusiastic negligence of the British Government during the Civil War, and was now remaining dead. Meanwhile, the British submission to the GENEVA award had established a precedent that would prevent any neutral from turning the tables on her now triumphant merchant marine in any future war. It was a good bargain, says Mr. Wilson, but just the same GREAT BRITAIN had best always remain superior to all other powers in cruisers for the protection of her shipping. We hear the echoes of that policy today.

