

SENIOR CLASS OF 1929

HISTORICAL PRESENTATIONS

NAVAL AND COMBINED OPERATIONS  
ON THE ATLANTIC COAST  
DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

Submitted by

Captain B.C. Allen, U.S.N.  
Chairman, Committee No. 4

Members

Commander H.K. Hewitt, USN  
Commander J.W.W. Gunning, USN  
Major J.P. Marley, USA

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DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NEWPORT, R. I.

1928 - 1929

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Department of Intelligence  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.  
1928-1929

COMMITTEE No. 4.

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NAVAL AND COMBINED  
OPERATIONS ON THE ATLANTIC COAST,  
DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

The people of these United States have generally had a superiority complex as to the comparative strength of its navy, and as usual, at the outbreak of the Civil War most of her ships were outclassed by those of the same tonnage in many other navies. The efforts of Dahlgren had resulted in the equipping of all ships with smooth bore shell guns and boat howitzers equal to any afloat and the rifled gun in an experimental state, had appeared on a few vessels.

SLIDE 1: "CONGRESS"

Many old sailing ships such as the SABINE (50 guns), ST. LOUIS, CONSTELLATION (22), PORTSMOUTH (22) and CONGRESS (50), were still in active service; the wooden ship still held its own, even in the more modern steam frigates and sloops, such as the MINNESOTA,

SLIDE 2: MINNESOTA, Page 617, Series I. Vol. V.

COLORADO and ORANOKE (10 guns), HARTFORD, MONONGAHELA, etc. The MINNESOTA carried 42 IX Smooth bores and .1-150 lb. rifled gun and together with the COLORADO and WABASH, constituted the battleship force of that day.

The personnel was fairly efficient and the effect of the Naval Academy, founded in 1854, had begun to be felt.

SLIDE 3: LOCATION OF SHIPS, Spears IV, p. 33.

It numbered 78 captains, 114 commanders, 321 lieutenants with



proportional junior ranks and 5000 men. Whether by deliberate intent or merely due to the exigencies of the service, the inauguration of Lincoln found the ships of the Navy scattered, with only four vessels in northern ports. Several, commanded by Southern officers, were in Southern ports or at Vera Cruz, but a high sense of honor prevented their seizure and retention by the South. Seven vessels on the Coast of AFRICA, out of mail touch, did not reach the UNITED STATES until September, four in the EAST INDIES not until December.

As most of the officers from the Cotton States were imbued with a culture of fealty to the state rather than to the Government, they resigned their Commissions or were dismissed, following the secession of the states, and after the inauguration of

SLIDE 4: LINCOLN

Lincoln, 4 March of 1861, 259 joined those who had previously left the service.

Generally, these officers were not disloyal to their service up to the moment of separation from it, though there were cases in the Navy Department and at the NORFOLK YARD, where they plotted against the Government.

In the North, the defection of so many experienced officers magnified the difficulty always incident to the expansion of a navy at the outbreak of war, especially as the enlisted personnel increased from 5000 to 50,000. Officers and seamen were taken in from the merchant service and given acting appointments in various grades, the duties of which they filled generally very

satisfactorily. Fortunately, the Confederates failed to appreciate the value of a navy, though M.F. Maury of Hydrographic

SLIDE 5: MAURY, "CSN" Scharf, p.97.

fame, urged the building of a navy with particular reference to small ships mounting large guns. He also advocated a battery on runners for use against the Federals when their ships became frozen in. Though they captured the NORFOLK NAVY YARD with some 3000 guns and its building facilities, no ship ready for service fell into their hands.

The shipbuilding facilities of the South were meager, so that the Confederates were unable to build nor could they buy many vessels suitable, except as to speed, to cope with the especially built ships of the North in which the engines and boilers were protected to some extent.

About 35 vessels were built in southern shipyards during the war, the largest of these being the rams ALBEMARLE, sunk by Cushing's torpedo boat; ARKANSAS, CHICORA, etc., all of about 150' in length, twin screws with iron armor over wooden hulls. The total number of vessels in the Confederate Navy built, bought, seized or captured was about 215.

SLIDE 6: BURNING OF NORFOLK NAVY YARD, Porter, p. 31.

Before evacuating the NORFOLK (GOSPORT) Navy Yard, the Federals destroyed all possible naval stores and vessels, including the line of battle-ship NEW YORK, on the ways. They partially destroyed the PENNSYLVANIA, COLOMBIA, DOLPHIN, RARITAN



GERMANTOWN, PLYMOUTH, DELAWARE and COLUMBUS, all sailing vessels and the steam frigate MERRIMAC which was burned to her copper line and sunk, only to reappear later for a short but momentous period.

A few of the Confederate vessels became famous as blockade runners, among them the FINGAL, later the ram ATLANTA, a 10 knot British built steamer; the FLORIDA, GEORGIA, reputed to be very fast, ARMSTRONG, TROPIC, HARRIET LANE, NASHVILLE and the SUMPTER known later as "HABANA". For this purpose fast light draft vessels were required.

Over fifty vessels were commissioned as privateers, most of them schooners. The famous ones such as ALABAMA and SHENANDOAH are considered in another narrative. One submarine, the PIONEER, was granted a letter of marque and one, the H.L. HUNLEY, appears on the Confederate Navy list.

SLIDE 7: HUNLEY, p. 256, Vol. 1, Series II.

She went down with the HOUSATONIC which she had torpedoed February 17, 1864 off Charleston. The Navy Department attempted to obtain others abroad through Commander Bullock, the agent in LONDON. These were to be steamers capable of admitting and expelling water to reduce freeboard and were armed with spar torpedoes.

The lack of facilities for building steel vessels of any size prevented the Confederates from answering the Federal monitors with anything more effective than the armor plated rams of which the MANASSAS



SLIDE 3: MANASSAS, p. 259, Series II, Vol. I.

was probably the most remarkable, though not the most effective, so that the end of the war found the Confederates little, if any, better off as to effective vessels, than the beginning of it. There were but five iron works in the South and of these only one covered roll plates. Both Confederate and Federal navies considered capture or destruction by boarding a possibility, and the former had developed plans for boarding attack on the monitors in which blinding the pilot by throwing a wet sail over the pilot house and blowing up the boilers by bombs thrown down the funnel were featured.

The Confederate navy list of 1863-64 shows 4 admirals, 10 captains, 31 commanders and 753 junior and staff officers and 5000 enlisted men - only one tenth of the enlisted personnel of the Federal navy. The pay of a captain was \$4300 per year and of a commander \$2825 - about 60% of today's rate of pay.

The value of the men's ration was \$1.50 due to the difficulty of obtaining provisions while whiskey fit for the use of the men had to be discontinued as a part of the ration when it reached a cost of \$60 to \$75 per gallon.

The Federal list of vessels shows nearly 1100, although a few of these were never in service. In speed they ranged from the 14 knots of the VANDERBILT, presented to the Government by Commodore Vanderbilt, to "2 knots upstream."

Of these 408 were built and 412 purchased at a cost of

\$19,000,000, 318 of the latter were steamers.

Although the majority of the ships were too slow to be effective against especially designed blockade runners, a total of 1504 of the latter was captured or destroyed during the war.

The Federal Government, having command of the sea and much greater building facilities than had the Confederates, was able to purchase or build at will so the end of the war found the UNITED STATES Navy the most powerful afloat.

SLIDE 9: ERICSSON, Porter 125.

The MONITOR, invented by John Ericsson and built at GREENPOINT, LONG ISLAND just in time to save the Federal Navy from destruction by the MERRIMAC, though she later proved unseaworthy and foundered off HATTERAS about ten months after her famous exploit, was the prototype for a fleet, the UNITED STATES having contracted for 21 single and double turretted monitors. Of these many saw service, especially the WEEHAWKEN, PASSAIC, MONTAUK, ONONDAGA, PATAPSCO, SANGAMON, TECUMSEH, CATSKILL, NANTUCKET, NAHANT, KEOKUK and MONADNOCK. Contracts were let in the spring of 1863 for delivery that year. The first one completed, the CHIMO, had only 3 inches freeboard although she was designed for 15 inches. They were overall 200 feet, beam 45, draft 11' and displaced 844 tons. Hulls were of iron with a wooden envelope plated outside with 1" iron. The turrets

SLIDE 10: MONITOR, Frontispiece, Vol. 7, Series I.

were 20' in diameter, 9 feet high and made of 1" plate built up to a thickness of 11 inches. On top of the turret was the pilot



house of 8" thickness. They were to carry 2 XV inch guns but due to a shortage, had each 1 XV inch and 1 XI inch gun.

SLIDE 11: MACLAY, Vol. 2, p. 316.

In smooth water with clean bottom they could make 7 knots but under service conditions made about four. The guns could be fired at about 7 minute intervals.

These monitors were generally unseaworthy and almost uninhabitable in hot weather but proved effective for the inshore and harbor warfare of the war.

SLIDE 12: NEW IRONSIDES, Series I, Vol. 8, Frontispiece.

The NEW IRONSIDES was one of the most powerful vessels of this time - an ironclad screw steamer of 3500 tons, 8 knots carrying 2-150 pound and 2-60 pound Dahlgren rifles and 14-XI" Dahlgren S.B. She saw much active service.

The double turretted monitors MIANTONOMAH, 3800 tons 4-XV" guns, MONADNOCK, PURITAN and AGAMENTICUS, later TERROR, saw little or no active service.

SLIDE 13: N.I. KEOKUK AND WABASH, "S.F. Dupont", p. 188.

Economic Situation.

The chief product of the South, with its cheap slave labor, was cotton and the sale of the cotton crop was vital to the finances of the Confederacy. The Northern markets being unavailable, the maintenance of communications with EUROPE and especially ENGLAND, was essential. Too, the lack of manufacturing facilities in the South made them dependent upon the European markets for ships, engines, iron, shell, powder, cannon, rifles,

pistols, cloth, clothing, shoes, leather goods, stationary, nitrates, blankets, etc.

The lack of nitrates caused the shut down of the powder factory at PETERSBURG on one occasion.

As the army had first call upon the clothing, shoe and blanket factories and had absorbed all the available stock at the outbreak of war, the navy was particularly dependent upon English and French markets for these as well as for medicines.

The Confederate naval representative in ENGLAND was Captain J.D. Bullock, through whom all purchases for the navy were made.

As the Federal Navy had command of the sea and its lines of communications were open at all times except for the sporadic raids of the privateers, a discussion of the economic dependence of the North upon the navy is unnecessary in this narrative.

GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION. PORTS, RAIL HEADS, WEATHER  
CONDITIONS, ETC.

SLIDE 14: NORTH CAROLINA COAST, Ammen, 163.

The ATLANTIC Coast of the Confederacy extended from CAPE HENRY to KEY WEST - a distance of about 1000 miles.

The fringe of long low sandy islets along almost the whole length of this coast forming sounds particularly in NORTH CAROLINA, provided an almost ideal locale for the operation of shallow draft blockade runners, most of them operating from nearby neutral islands.

A glance at the Chart of NORTH CAROLINA Coast shows that the Sounds may be entered both north and south of MATTERAS, thru



several inlets, but that of these, HATTERAS INLET, 13 miles south of CAPE HATTERAS

SLIDE 15: HATTERAS INLET, p. 48, Porter.

is the deepest and least changeable. This was the most convenient entrance for the distribution of supplies to the Confederate Army in VIRGINIA and the neighboring shores produced large quantities of so-called naval stores and cotton, furnishing ample outbound cargoes for blockade runners. NEWBERN on the NEUSE RIVER and MOREHEAD CITY on BEAUFORT HARBOR were rail heads.

About 100 miles to the South and West, WILMINGTON, also at RAIL HEAD, lay on the CAPE FEAR RIVER protected from seaward by FORT FISHER and FORT CASWELL.

SLIDE 16: SOUTH ATLANTIC COAST, Ammen p. 13.

Along the SOUTH CAROLINA Coast, GEORGETOWN and SANTEE RIVER entrance offered some possibilities to the blockade runners but CHARLESTON, at RAIL HEAD, with its labyrinth of interconnecting sounds and rivers was the principal port of entry.

SLIDE 17: CHARLESTON AND NEIGHBORING TERRITORY.  
(Consult: C.S. Chart 1239)

Vessels of light draft, unable to enter direct, could slip into STONE RIVER, NORTH EDISTO RIVER, ST. HELENA SOUND or PORT ROYAL SOUND and thence in a few hours make CHARLESTON.

In the same way SAVANNAH could be reached through PORT ROYAL, WASSAW, OSSABOW and ST. CATHERINE SOUNDS.

SLIDE 16: SOUTH ATLANTIC COAST, Ammen p. 13.

To the Southward, along the GEORGIA and FLORIDA Coasts,

the same system of sounds and rivers prevailed but except for CUMBERLAND SOUND upon which FERNANDINA is situated, they were of minor importance due to their distance from the battle area and their lack of outbound cargoes.

SLIDE 18: BLOCKADED COAST, Soley, p. 36.

The distance from BERMUDA and NASSAU, the principal ports of operation of blockade runners, to NORTH and SOUTH CAROLINA ports is about 600 miles.

For the Gulf ports, HAVANA was the principal distributing port. The railroad system of the South as it existed at this time is evident from the slide.

SLIDE 19: RAILROAD OF SOUTH IN CIVIL WAR

Weather conditions along the Coast vary with the season and the latitude. From CHESAPEAKE BAY to HATTERAS the percentage of fog is 30 from March to June, diminishing to the Southward, tho it is found as far South as FLORIDA.

North of HATTERAS INLET the winds are westerly except in September and October when they are northeasterly along the entire Coast. Along the FLORIDA Coast they are easterly to northeasterly.

The Coast pilot fails to mention bad weather along the NORTH CAROLINA Coast, yet to the seafaring man even in these days of high powered ships, an uneventful passage of HATTERAS, especially in the winter, is, a hope rather than an expectation, and few would deliberately choose blockade duty there amidst its gales and "busters".



At any rate, Admiral Stringham anticipated dirty weather for in a letter to the Secretary in May, 1861, upon sailing to initiate the blockade, he asks for an additional surgeon because the fleet surgeon had been sick at sea for the past ten years.

The lack of adequate vessels of war, already discussed, precluded the Confederates from all fleet action and from practically all ship for ship action unsupported by forts so that the operations of the Federals were almost entirely blockade, destruction of privateers and joint actions with the army, for the reduction of fortifications, the latter for the purpose of obtaining operating bases for their own ships or denying them to the enemy and blockade runners.

The problem of effectively blockading a coastline 1000 miles in length and almost ideal geographically, was in itself sufficiently difficult and it was made much more so by the attitude of GREAT BRITAIN whose Prime Minister openly avowed that the Confederate belligerency had been recognized in order that the UNITED STATES might be disrupted and thereby made less dangerous as a commercial rival of GREAT BRITAIN. The blockade meant idleness in the British cotton mills and a much reduced market for many of her products, a circumstance which certainly did not urge her to strict neutrality, at home or abroad. As always, the lure of large premiums was a great incentive

SLIDE 20: BLOCKADE RUNNER, Boynton II-88.

and some blockade runners operated even from the ports of the North. The total number can be imagined since 1500 were captured

or destroyed during the war.

The task of the Federal Navy on the ATLANTIC was the maintenance of its own lines of communication against the privateers and the cutting of the Confederate line from EUROPE.

SLIDE 21: SOUTHERN STATES, Formby, Map 1.

By presidential proclamation on April 19, 1861, a blockade of the ports of SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, ALABAMA, FLORIDA, MISSISSIPPI, LOUISIANA and TEXAS was ordered and on 27 April, it was extended to include the ports of VIRGINIA and NORTH CAROLINA..

The U.S.S. NIAGARA, Captain McKean, was the first vessel on blockade arriving off CHARLESTON about 6 May, 1861.

The inadequacy of the blockade and the necessity of a port nearer than HAMPTON ROADS from which to operate led to attacks, coordinated with the army, upon the principal ports and to attempts to block channels by a "stone fleet".

The success of these operations meant the end of effective resistance by the Confederates.

The offensive against privateers resulted in the capture of the SAVANNAH among others, operating under a letter of marque signed by Jeff Davis. It was contended that vessels so operating were to be considered as pirates and her crew were landed in NEW YORK to be tried on a charge of piracy. The charge was dropped however, in consequence of the capture at BULL RUN of many Federal officers whom the South held as hostages for the safety of the SAVANNAH'S crew. They were afterward exchanged and the question did not again arise.



SLIDE 22: SAN JACINTO AND TRENT, Porter, p. 71.

About this time there transpired an event which might have had most serious effects and possibly have resulted in drawing GREAT BRITAIN into the war against the North. Two southern politicians, Messrs. Slidell and Mason, embarked in the British steamer TRENT at HAVANA for GREAT BRITAIN as Commissioners from the Confederacy.

Captain Wilkes of the U.S.S. SAN JACINTO, feeling himself

SLIDE 23: WILKES, B.&L., Vol. II, p. 139.

justified in so doing, awaited the TRENT in the BAHAMA CHANNEL and forcibly removed Slidell and Mason from her. His act was received with great acclaim in the North but in GREAT BRITAIN, already greatly incensed at the North and led by Palmerstai, there was great indignation. GREAT BRITAIN indeed acted as if she were at war with the North, made military preparations and embarked a large body of troops for CANADA.

SLIDE 24: ADAMS, C.F. Adams, Front.

Actual hostilities were averted by the tact of the American Minister in LONDON - grandfather of the present secretary of the Navy and Lord Lyons, the British Minister in WASHINGTON. Slow communications between the countries gave both sides time for sober reflection, to which circumstance, according to Adams, the averting of war is attributable.

The naval and combined operations on the ATLANTIC Coast were carried out by two main task groups - the North and the South Blockading Squadrons, with the Potomac Flotilla operating

in the Virginian rivers. Offshore operations in the ATLANTIC came under the West India Flying Squadron.

SLIDE 25: STRINGHAM - Porter, p. 46.

On May 1, 1861, the Coast Blockading Squadron was ordered established under the command of Flag Officer, Silas H. Stringham whom the Navy Department directed to hoist his flag on the fore instead of the mizzen of the MINNESOTA in view of his having been over fifty years in the Service and nearly twenty as a captain.

After the attack on HATTERAS INLET, Stringham requested relief and

SLIDE 26: GOLDSBOROUGH - Porter, p. 109.

Rear Admiral Goldsborough took over the NORTH ATLANTIC and Rear Admiral Dupont the SOUTH ATLANTIC Squadrons.

On 4 September, 1862 Admiral Goldsborough was relieved of the Command of the NORTH ATLANTIC Squadron by acting Rear Admiral S. P. Lee who retained it until relieved by

SLIDE 27: PORTER, Boynton, Vol. 2, p. 567.

Rear Admiral David Porter in 1864. Rear Admiral Radford assumed command in 1865.

Rear Admiral S. F. Dupont commanded the SOUTH ATLANTIC Squadron from 1861 to 63, being relieved by Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren

SLIDE 28: DAHLGREN, Memoirs, p. 320.

in consequence of the dissatisfaction of the Secretary of the Navy as to Dupont's failure to capture CHARLESTON.



The Confederate forces were grouped locally and known variously as the Naval Defenses of VIRGINIA and NORTH CAROLINA under flag officer Lynch, the JAMES RIVER Squadron under flag officer Buchanan formerly of the MERRIMAC and flag officer

SLIDE 29: TATTNALL, Spears, Vol. 4, p. 168.

Tattnall the author of "blood is thicker than water", a peppery old character who having been placed, as he thought, subordinate to General Johnston, asks the Secretary of the Navy for prompt relief from his command, saying, "Some younger man, whose backbone is more supple than fifty years of naval pride has made mine, can be found, I hope, for the sake of harmony, to take my place and carry out the views of the Department." He later commanded the defenses of SOUTH CAROLINA and GEORGIA.

Flag Officer Pinckney commander the naval defenses of CAPE FEAR RIVER, while the defenses of CHARLESTON were under Flag Officer Ingraham and later, Flag Officer Tucker.

The number of engagements which occurred during the four years of the war is so great as to preclude a detailed study of them in this narrative, therefore only the more important expeditions and engagements will be taken up, chronologically.

SLIDE 30: SOUTHEAST VIRGINIA, Series 1, Vol. 8, front.

Had the Confederates understood the value to them of the rivers of VIRGINIA and been able to control them, they might have taken the offensive and made McClellan's and Grant's Campaigns of 1862 and 1864 impossible. They did awake to the necessity of

naval cooperation to the extent of planning an attack on Grant's army on the JAMES, only to have their offensive blocked by the sinking of stone schooners at TRENT'S REACH on 15 June 1864.

The Federal forces on the rivers comprised at its maximum about 75 vessels, mostly small craft but including some monitors and were under the command of the admiral of the NORTH ATLANTIC Blockading Squadron. Operations were under the immediate command of Commander John Rodgers and later, Commodore Radford, except on the JAMES in 1864 when Admiral Lee commanded in person.

The work of these forces was rarely, if ever, spectacular, and there is little appreciation of the fact that it was their unseen but steady and effective pressure on the flanks as well as its logistic help which saved McClellan's army at HARRISON'S LANDING following the Peninsular Campaign of 1862 and made possible Grant's Campaign to the Southward in 1864 which in spite of reverses at COLD HARBOR with its horrible losses, culminated in the evacuation of PETERSBURG and Lee's surrender at APPOMATTOX.

The JAMES RIVER was kept open to DREWRY'S BLUFF, seven miles below RICHMOND and the YORK, PAMUNKEY and RAPPAHANOCK were clear for Federal operation.

SLIDE 31: CUSHING, Porter, p. 687.

Cushing and Lamson were most active in undertaking cutting-out expeditions, making surprise attacks and cooperating with the army especially in the NANSEMOND RIVER, where their audacity made up for the small numbers of their forces.



SLIDE 14: SOUNDS OF NORTH CAROLINA.

The early appreciated importance of the Sounds of NORTH CAROLINA from whose fortified inlets of HATTERAS and OCRACOE small vessels operated against passing merchantmen and into which blockade runners poured, brought about the first expedition of importance, that against HATTERAS INLET in August 1861.

SLIDE 15: HATTERAS INLET, Porter, p. 48.

This was a combined operation, the conception of the Navy Department, 860 men of the army under General B.F. Butler providing the landing force. Flag Officer Stringham left FORTRESS MONROE with the MINNESOTA, WABASH, MONTICELLO, PAWNEE and HARRIET LANE, a revenue cutter and transports ADELAIDE and PEABODY, the latter towing two schooners loaded with large unwieldy iron surf boats, arriving the same day, 25 August, off HATTERAS INLET. The sailing frigate CUMBERLAND and steam frigate SUSQUEHANNA joined the next day.

SLIDE 32: FTS. HATTERAS AND CLARK, B.&L. I-635.

On the morning of the 26th the naval attack got underway, the WABASH towing the CUMBERLAND, the MINNESOTA and SUSQUEHANNA standing in to engage FORT CLARK, the outer fort and FORT HATTERAS, the inner, both on the eastern side of the inlet, while the transports, covered by the PAWNEE, MONTICELLO and HARRIET LANE attempted to land troops through the surf.

SLIDE 33: LANDING, B.&L., I-639.

The iron surf boats were thrown high on the beach and two flat

boats stove in, leaving about 315 troops on shore without supplies of any kind and with most of their ammunition wet. Further attempts to land were discontinued, but the troops on shore took possession of FORT CLARK about 2 p.m. The ships then attacked FORT HATTERAS at long range and therefore ineffectually, withdrawing at sunset, except for the light draft vessels which stood by the troops over night.

At daylight of the 27th, the attack was renewed and the landing of troops completed, the weather having moderated. The large ships anchored off the Fort and reduced it, in comfort, as the guns of the fort could not reply at that range. At 11 a.m. it surrendered. There were no casualties on the Federal side and only a few Confederates were killed and wounded. Their force was under Flag Officer Barron and Colonel Martin.

The loss of the key to the ALBERMARLE was a great blow to the Confederates, not only in depriving them of a valuable base for blockade runners, but also in giving the Federals a base from which to operate against the whole coast of NORTH CAROLINA and its sounds and rivers. It became a coal and supply depot and the center of operations of Commander Rowan in the PAWNEE, who on 16 September captured and destroyed FORT OCRACOKE.

SLIDE 14: COAST AND SOUNDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, Ammen, p. 163.

With the capture of the southern inlets the Confederates fell back upon ROANOKE ISLAND where they had fortifications, a considerable garrison and several steamers which could transport



that garrison wherever wanted. This made the capture of the northern inlets by the Federals much more difficult.

On 30 September, the 20th Indiana Regiment under Colonel Brown, was sent to take possession of these inlets, landing with 800 men near the village of CHICAMACOMICO where he entrenched to await reinforcements and supplies. The army tug FANNY returned the next day with guns, ammunition and supplies, but was captured by three small Confederate vessels before she could unload.

Commodore Lynch who had assembled a considerable force in the Sounds, embarked three regiments of about 2000 men and attacked Brown's post, landing one regiment above and one below the Federals. Only the arrival of the SUSQUEHANNA and some army reinforcements saved the Federal troops from defeat and as it was, they abandoned supplies and arms which the Confederates took away with them. The Federals withdrew to FORT HATTERAS and the Confederates to ROANOKE ISLAND and no further attacks were made until the following January.

The next step toward denying the enemy the Sounds of the Coast, was the expedition against HILTON HEAD.

SLIDE 34: PORT ROYAL ENTRANCES, B.&L., Vol. 1, p. 678.

After the capture of HATTERAS, all available naval vessels were put into readiness for an attack and transports made ready for the army corps of 15,000 men assembling at ANNAPOLIS under General T.W. Sherman. The fleet under Flag Officer Dupont con-

sisted of WABASH, SUSQUEHANNA, three sailing frigates, five sloops of war and 25 colliers ready to form a large coaling depot.

On 25 October the whole fleet including 32 transports was ready at HAMPTON ROADS, the transports towing enough surf boats to permit the landing of 4500 men each trip.

That the expedition was forming was known to the Confederates, but its destination was not known and concentration of troops for defense was impossible.

HILTON HEAD was selected as the point of attack because of its domination of the entrances to a labyrinth of canals and rivers about equidistant from CHARLESTON and SAVANNAH and because it was the source of great quantities of rice and of sea island cotton which brought ten times the price of the ordinary cotton. The bay of PORT ROYAL and the Islands of ST. HELENA, loosely defended, offered an excellent operating base. A heavy gale struck the expedition just south of HATTERAS on the 1st and 2nd of November and the fleet was badly scattered. The naval vessels had little difficulty but the transports, not built for heavy weather, in many cases, were considerably damaged. Four had to seek shelter, several saved themselves by jettisoning their cargoes, two were sunk on the enemy coast and their crews made prisoners, two others sank at sea but most of their men were saved by other vessels. On 4 November most of the ships of the expedition arrived, in spite of damage, and were ready for action.



The entrance to PORT ROYAL is difficult due to a bar with 18 feet over it at high water, and to a tortuous channel through numerous sand banks. Inside is a large and deep bay running far inland and connecting with the network of canals.

General Ripley, commanding the defenses of the SOUTH CAROL-

SLIDE 35: INTERIOR OF FORT BEAUREGARD.

INA Coast, had erected FORT WALKER on the island of HILTON HEAD and FORT BEAUREGARD about 2 miles away. They were fitted with parapets and with platforms and embrasures for guns, some of which were installed in the face of the enemy fleet. Insufficient bomb proofs were provided. FORT WALKER had 20 guns, BEAUREGARD 19. Of these only eight of the former and seven of the latter had sufficient range to reach the fleet while only eight of these fifteen had a calibre of more than 6".

General Drayton, commanding the force of that area, was a

SLIDE 36: DRAYTON, Porter, p. 370.

brother of Captain Drayton who commanded the PAWNEE, one of the attacking fleet.

Following the capture of PORT ROYAL, a series of smaller operations was undertaken to effect its security. An expedition under General Stevens and Commander C.R.P. Rodgers resulted in the permanent abandonment of attempts to regain PORT ROYAL ISLAND.

SLIDE 37: TYBEE REGION, B&L., II, 3.

Following this, a reconnaissance up the TYBEE RIVER was made by Captain C. H. Davis, Commander C.R.P. Rodgers and General H.G. Wright with 2400 troops. The OTTAWA, SENECA, ELLEN and WESTERN

WORLD participated and reached FORT PULASKI which was abandoned. This was only a demonstration for the purpose of drawing troops

SLIDE 38: PULASKI, B.&L., Vol. II, p. 1.

from other places for the protection of SAVANNAH. Similar expeditions under Commander John Rodgers and others kept the Confederates uneasy and gave the Federal officers much local knowledge. PULASKI was reoccupied by the Confederates.

SLIDE 39: J. RODGERS, Porter, p. 406.

In early March of 1862, Dupont, with such vessels as could be spared from blockade duty, entered FERNANDINA, FLORIDA with seventeen men of war and six transports carrying a brigade of army troops under General Wright and a battalion of marines.

The Confederates having learned from the PORT ROYAL attack, of the futility of opposing the guns of the fleet, abandoned FORT CLINCH and its supporting batteries, though they might have made the Federals pay dearly for it.

SLIDE 40: ST. AUGUSTINE TO ST. ANDREWS SOUND.  
(Consult: C.S. Chart IIII)

PORT CLINCH was the first of the national forts to be recaptured. General Lee had pronounced FERNANDINA perfectly defensible against naval attacks but in spite of its strategic value it was not defended. With it, the Government obtained control of the Coast and inland waters from ST. SIMONS, North, including BRUNSWICK, ST. MARYS, ST. AUGUSTINE, and ST. JOHNS and eliminated that large area from the operations of the blockade runners.

Dupont returned to PORT ROYAL where a detachment from the



WABASH assisted the army in serving the batteries of heavy guns erected on TYBEE ISLAND for the reducing of FORT PULASKI, which fell on 11 April.

Meanwhile, in January 1862, a force of about 19 naval ves-

SLIDE 41: ROWAN, Porter, p. 111.

sels under the general command of Rear Admiral L.M. Goldsborough and under the immediate command of Commander S.C. Rowan was assembled to cooperate with 17,000 troops under General Burnside in the reduction of the defences on ROANOKE ISLAND and the capture of ALBEMARLE and PAMLICO SOUNDS. These vessels were chosen because of their light draft and generally were river steamers, ferry boats, tugs, etc. of light construction, unfitted to stand heavy weather. They arrived at HATTERAS INLET on 13 January, just as a gale was making, but got over the bar without serious damage. The transports did not get across the bar till the 22nd. The Confederate gunboats which might have done much damage while the Federals were entering, did nothing except to fire a few long range shots which failed to reach a target.

SLIDE 42: MAP AND PLAN, ROANOKE ISLAND, B.&L., I, p. 641.

A glance at the slide will show that ROANOKE was the key to the chain of sounds and passages from HATTERAS INLET to the DISMAL SWAMP CANAL which enabled the Confederates to cover NORFOLK in the rear and keep open their communications with RICHMOND. They were building some heavy ironclads up the ROANOKE RIVER for which all material, machinery and guns had to be ob-

tained from RICHMOND and NORFOLK. Realizing its importance they had built defences in the shape of sunken obstructions and piles in the Channel and mounted some 56 guns in six separate works, five guarding the water approaches and one masked battery guarding the rear. Against these were pitted 48 guns in the unprotected makeshift fleet.

On February 7th, the naval force engaged the batteries at PORK and SANDY POINTS and the Confederate gunboats to clear the way for the troops and by afternoon the troops began to land. On the 8th the forts surrendered and about 2700 Confederates were taken prisoners. The casualties on both sides were comparatively light. Unfortunately the Confederate vessels escaped to take refuge behind the battery at COBB'S POINT. Rowan had left but 20 rounds per gun but was undaunted. With nine small and frail gunboats he attacked the Confederates who were behind the fort which mounted 32 pounders and a schooner mounting two 32 pounders.

Running in at full speed, the Federals held their fire until close aboard. All of the Confederate vessels were captured by boarding, rammed or burnt.

This was the first operation in which the army and navy cooperated whole-heartedly and resulted in complete control of the Sounds of NORTH CAROLINA.

SLIDE 43: MERRIMAC, BEFORE AND AFTER, Porter, p. 127.

The partially burned MERRIMAC abandoned, with the NORFOLK



NAVY YARD by the Federals, was raised by the Confederates and following a plan suggested by Lieutenant John M. Brooke, a former officer of the Navy, she was converted into an ironclad by being cut down to her berth deck, decked over at both ends and a

SLIDE 44: MERRIMAC IN DOCK, B.&L., I, p. 694.

heavy superstruction built of oak timbers covered by iron plating. This superstructure was 175 feet long, rounded at the ends and sloped back at an angle of 55°. She had an iron ram and a protected pilot house, but her propeller and rudder were unprotected. Her armament consisted of seven inch bow and stern guns and two six inch rifles and six nine inch smooth bores. Under the name of VIRGINIA, she was commanded by Flag Officer

SLIDE 45: BUCHANAN, Porter, p. 120.

Franklin Buchanan with Lieutenant Catesby Jones as Executive. The guns crews were selected from the army at RICHMOND.

The Confederates knew of the building of the MONITOR and of her date of completion, so made every effort to have the VIRGINIA ready for service before the MONITOR.

SLIDE 10: MONITOR, Front., Vol. 7, Series I.

On March 8, 1862, the VIRGINIA stood down to HAMPTON ROADS where off FORTRESS MONROE were the MINNESOTA, ROANOKE, ST. LAWRENCE and some army transports and off NEWPORT NEWS, the CONGRESS and CUMBERLAND. Information of the MERRIMAC had been obtained prior to her coming, but its value was discounted and no dispositions made for defence against her.

SLIDE 46: MERRIMAC-CUMBERLAND, B.&L., I, 700.

Buchanan's attack was somewhat governed by the fact that his brother was an officer on the CONGRESS, so he hoped for the surrender of that vessel. He rammed the CUMBERLAND, firing at the CONGRESS as he passed her and receiving the fire of both CONGRESS and CUMBERLAND. The CUMBERLAND kept up the fire of her guns until she sank. The CONGRESS, seeing the unequal conditions under which she fought, endeavored to get under the guns of the Fort, but the MERRIMAC continued a destructive fire to which her reply was ineffective. After an hour's fighting she surrendered and was set on fire by the Confederates. The ROANOKE, ST. LAWRENCE and MINNESOTA had attempted to get into action by means of tugs but ran aground above FORTRESS MONROE.

About 5 p.m., the MERRIMAC attempted to reach the MINNESOTA but her pilot would not enter the channel so she anchored at SEWELL'S POINT. About this time Buchanan was wounded by a rifle shot from shore and the command of the MERRIMAC was taken over by Lieutenant Catesby Jones.

SLIDE 47: JONES, Porter, p. 121.

The news of the victory raised the hopes of the Confederacy to the highest peak; unlimited success was at hand, but that night the MONITOR, commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, arrived and anchored off the MINNESOTA after a well nigh fatal

SLIDE 48: WORDEN, Porter p. 126.

trip from NEW YORK. The MERRIMAC had planned to destroy the MINNESOTA first and then the rest of the Squadron and got under



way at daylight for the purpose. The MONITOR and MERRIMAC stood toward each other, opening fire at about one mile. The MERRIMAC was able to make few hits on the small target offered her by the MONITOR and such hits as she made were ineffective. The MONITOR'S shells were not penetrating the MERRIMAC'S armor, though had she used the steel shell she had on board for use with heavier charges, but which she was ordered not to use due to supposed weakness of the XI guns, they would have penetrated.

SLIDE 49: MONITOR AND MERRIMAC, Crapo.

Attempts to ram the MONITOR failed as did an attempt to board her, so Jones engaged the MINNESOTA again. While the fire was hottest the MERRIMAC grounded in maneuvering to meet the approach of the MONITOR. When she got free she headed down the bay, then attempted to ram the MONITOR but failed. Lieutenant Worden was wounded at this time and the MONITOR, left for a few minutes with no officer in the conning tower, appeared to withdraw from the action. The MERRIMAC, realizing that she could not damage the MONITOR and that she was in danger herself, withdrew to NORFOLK, to the unutterable relief of the North, to whom the success of the MERRIMAC meant not only the Confederate occupation of HAMPTON ROADS and the raising of the blockade of the Southern Coast with consequent strengthening of the South and possible victory for it, but also the dire possibility of destruction of shipping and the bombardment of the great cities of WASHINGTON, PHILADELPHIA, NEW YORK and BOSTON. In fact, at a cabinet meeting, Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, stated

as his opinion that a shell from the guns of the monster might crash through the roof before the meeting adjourned. Repairs to the MERRIMAC were completed the last of March and under Commodore Tattnall she stood down to HAMPTON ROADS on 11 April, hoping to meet the MONITOR again. He could not get her alone so failed to engage. The evacuation of the Forts and NORFOLK left the MERRIMAC without a base, since she could not be lightened enough to get her up the JAMES RIVER. She was destroyed by her crew on CRONEY ISLAND FLAT, within a few hundred yards of the spot where her last namesake, the battleship VIRGINIA was rammed and almost sunk by the OLD DOMINION liner MONROE, forty-five years later.

SLIDE 14: SOUNDS OF NORTH CAROLINA.

The next step in the campaign to deny the NORTH CAROLINA SOUNDS and rivers to the Confederates, was the reduction of NEWBERN, which under the command of the energetic Rowan started from HATTERAS INLET on March 12, 1862. It consisted of 13

SLIDE 50: ROUTE TO NEWBERN, Annen, p. 191.

light draft gunboats with the DELAWARE as flagship, and of 12,000 troops in transports, General Burnside commanding.

The fleet passed through formidable obstructions, the lower barrier being composed of a series of piling driven in securely and cut off below water's edge and backed by another row of pointed and iron capped piles driven at an angle of 45° pointing downstream. Near these were 30 torpedoes, or more



properly, mines, each with about 200 pounds of powder, fitted to explode by percussion when the piles were struck. The PERRY and BARNEY were slightly damaged by the piles but the torpedoes did no harm. The Confederate forces, about equal in number to the Federals, were supported by six forts mounting 32 guns, but the defense was not very effective so that the city was in the hands of the Federals after small loss, on the 14th. Two hundred prisoners and a large quantity of equipage and supplies fall into the hands of the Federals. FORT MACON fell on 25 April. The CHESAPEAKE and ALBEMARLE CANAL was blessed by Flusser, the "Lion Hearted".

SLIDE 51: FLUSSER, Porter, p. 434.

In an attempt to blockade NEW RIVER INLET, Cushing in the ELLIS, went aground and lost his ship by gunfire. Further action in the Sounds was desultory.

SLIDE 52: DUPONT, Porter, p. 61.

The SOUTH ATLANTIC Squadron under Dupont, was engaged in blockading CHARLESTON and SAVANNAH, which were the only large ports of entry left the Confederates by the opening of 1863. The old wooden vessels had been reinforced by the NEW IRONSIDES and several single turreted monitors, while the Confederates had built rams.

SLIDE 53: PALMETTO STATE, Porter, p. 368.

On 31 January, 1863, the rams CHICORA and PALMETTO STATE came out at night and attacked the MERCEDITA and KEYSTONE STATE.

The smoke of the PALMETTO STATE was sighted by the MERCEDITA and all hands went to quarters, but fire was withheld, pending identification. The PALMETTO STATE rammed the MERCEDITA and damaged her body below the water line while a shell destroyed the condenser and port boiler. Helpless, Captain Stellwagen surrendered and his executive went aboard the ram to give parole, after which she attacked the KEYSTONE STATE, the CHICORA joining in the attack. The KEYSTONE STATE, struck in both steam chests, was unable to ram or maneuver and had two feet of water in her hold, so was most fortunate in being saved by the AUGUSTA, QUAKER CITY and MEMPHIS, which towed her out of danger. The rams hauled off and anchored inside the bar.

The Confederates, backed by the foreign consuls at CHARLESTON and the Captain of a British man of war, claimed that the blockade had been raised, a claim not supported by fact since the blockading vessels were on station the next morning. The NEW IRONSIDES and monitors POWHATAN and CANANDAIGUA reinforced the blockading force immediately.

SLIDE 54: MONTAUK-NASHVILLE, B.&L., IV, p. 29.

That the blockade was effective is shown by the fact that the Confederate steamer NASHVILLE, a fast and well appointed steamer, lay for eight months, loaded with cotton, awaiting a chance to run the blockade. She finally gave it up and was converted into a privateer, but never escaped to be an ALABAMA. She grounded and was destroyed by Worden in the MONTAUK in Feb-



ruary, 1863, though under the guns of FORT McALLISTER on OGGE-CHEE RIVER.

A determination to test the new monitors in action led to an attack on FORT McALLISTER by the PASSAIC, Captain Drayton, PATAPSCO, Commander Ammen and NAHANT, Commander John Downes. This was indecisive as neither could injure the other seriously. Much was expected of the monitors, but due to the slow fire of the XV<sup>th</sup> guns, about one round per five minutes, it was not realized. The quick firing guns of the NEW IRONSIDES, firing once per minute were much more effective. However, this attack was of value in preparation for the attack on CHARLESTON which the Navy Department was urging upon Admiral Dupont against his judgment.

SLIDE 55: CHARLESTON HARBOR AND DEFENSES, #1 Boynton II, p.440.

The defenses of CHARLESTON were extremely powerful and consisted of FORTS PINCKNEY, RIPLEY, MOULTRIE, BEAUREGARD, SUMPTER and JOHNSON, with thirteen supporting batteries, all mounting the heaviest and most destructive ordnance then known. Across the main ship channel from SUMPTER to SULLIVAN'S ISLAND were pile obstructions, covered by the cross fire of most of the batteries.

Lacking obstructions in the channel, it had been proved easier to run by fortifications than to stop and fight them; this Dupont decided to do.

His plan called for the buoing of the bar by the KEOKUK, after which the squadron consisting of NEW IRONSIDES, flag, and

monitors WEEHAWKEN, PASSAIC, MONTAUK, PATAPSCO, CATSKILL, NANTUCKET, NAHANT and KEOKUK, in column, was to run the defenses without returning fire until they could attack FORT SUMPTER from the northwestward at ranges of 600 to 800 yards.

The attack got under way on 7 April, the WEEHAWKEN leading with a torpedo raft ahead of her. One torpedo exploded harmlessly. Upon arriving at the obstructions the Squadron was thrown into great confusion, being unable to pass them; the NEW IRONSIDES anchored twice to prevent grounding and the monitors got within 550 to 800 yards of the Fort where they were subjected to a heavy cross fire from SUMPTER, MORRIS ISLAND and SULLIVAN'S ISLAND. KEOKUK was so badly damaged that she sank the following day. NEW IRONSIDES, at times with only a foot of water under her, was unable to maneuver in the current, to an effective range so Dupont ordered withdrawal from action, lest failure become disaster. After learning from the commanding officers of the condition of their ships and their opinions of further attack, Dupont decided that the capture of Charleston by the force at

SLIDE 57: BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER.

his command was impossible. After being under fire only forty minutes, the NAHANT, Captain Downes, had her turret out of action, the PASSAIC, Captain Drayton found the 11" gun jammed and out of action, the PATAPSCO, Commander Ammen, lost the use of the rifled gun after five rounds and the NANTUCKET, Commander Fairfax, had her XV" gun put out of action. In this action 124 shots were



fired at SUMPTER of which 55 struck the walls and others fell inside. Only two went through the walls and while many made deep craters in the walls, the effect on the Fort was not serious.

Admiral Dupont has been severely criticised for his failure to capture CHARLESTON, one fault attributed to him being that he failed to use heavier charges. Since the weight of charge was prescribed by the Bureau of Ordnance and he had no authority to change it even had he known the guns would stand it, this is an unfair criticism.

That the operations against CHARLESTON were considered of the utmost importance is shown by the fact that both President Lincoln and Secretary Welles sent communications to Dupont, the former directing him to hold his position inside the bar until further orders. These he received at PORT ROYAL where he had proceeded with the ironclads, leaving the wooden gunboats to keep the blockade.

SLIDE 58: ATLANTA, Porter, p. 385.

The blockade runner FINGAL, unable to escape from SAVANNAH, was converted into an ironclad of the MERRIMAC type. This type was the child of necessity since the South could not roll plates.

Known as ATLANTA she attempted to get out of WARSAW SOUND on 17 June, 1863, expecting to destroy the Federal vessels on blockade there. With her were several steamers loaded with spectators. About a mile and a half from the WEEHAWKEN, she lay to await attack by the WEEHAWKEN and NAHANT, showing more bravery

than judgment, for the WEBHAWKEN approached to within 300 yards of her, fired only five shots and forced her surrender. She was the most powerful ironclad built by the Confederates and had a speed of 10 knots, so that properly handled, she might have done some damage, although she could not have destroyed the monitors. Much had been hoped for her as a commerce destroyer as well as a man of war.

This was the last operation under Dupont who at his own request was relieved on 4 July. Rear Admiral Dahlgren took over the command.

SLIDE 28: DAHLGREN, Porter, p. 433.

A repetition of Dupont's failure to capture CHARLESTON by the navy unaided, was made unnecessary by the cooperation of the army, which under General Gilmore, started an advance on MORRIS ISLAND on 3 July. His plan was to erect batteries on the North End of FOLLY ISLAND which would dispossess the enemy of MORRIS ISLAND. Naval attack would be subject only to the fire of batteries GREGG, MOULTRIE and WAGNER at long range, while the ships would be bows on. That this method was not used in the first attack on CHARLESTON is because of the belief of the Navy Department in the power of the monitors and their desire to make an impression upon the European countries then hovering on the brink of recognition of the Confederacy.

SLIDE 55: CHARLESTON HARBOR.

On 10 July Gillmore commenced attack with his batteries which had been erected to command the South End of MORRIS ISLAND.



The CATSKILL, MONPAUK, NAHANT and WEEHAWKEN steamed along MORRIS ISLAND on the flank of the advancing troops, firing at any Confederates seen. About 9 a.m. they opened on FORT WAGNER at a range of 1200 yards. They fired over 500 shell and shrapnel and were struck repeatedly, the CATSKILL being struck sixty times but not effectively. Several attempts by the army to capture the Fort were repulsed, even though the forts had been silenced temporarily by the monitors which got in to 300 yards on the second attack, so it was evident that only a persistent and prolonged siege could succeed. Gillmore built a series of parallels or earth works with heavy siege guns and on the marsh installed the celebrated gun Swamp Angel

SLIDE 59: STAMP ANGEL, B.&L., IV, p. 72:

which could fire into CHARLESTON, five miles away. As much of this work was performed in swamps it involved great engineering skill and vast quantities of sand and rock which could be landed only at high water.

During this construction work the PAWNEE, MARBLEHEAD and HURON were attacked by batteries in the STONE RIVER but drove them out, although badly damaged themselves. The navy landed, or protected in landing, troops on JAMES ISLAND and MORRIS ISLAND.

On 17 August, Gillmore's preparations were complete and the bombardment commenced in earnest, supported by NEW IRONSIDES, seven monitors and some other vessels. FORT WAGNER was silenced by PATAPSCO and PASSAIC and fire shifted to SUMPTER. After

heavy bombardment for several days, SUMPTER, on 24 August, was

SLIDE 60. FORT SUMPTER, Johnson, p. 166.

in ruins and Gillmore threatened to fire on CHARLESTON unless SUMPTER and MORRIS ISLAND were surrendered. In spite of being in ruins the guns of SUMPTER were able to continue their effective fire as were those of WAGNER and GREGG. The bombardment of CHARLESTON produced no measurable result. Unfortunately for the success of the operation, there were insufficient troops to permit the occupation of SULLIVAN'S ISLAND simultaneously with MORRIS ISLAND, so its defenses as well as FORTS JOHNSON, RIPLEY, PINCKNEY and the iron batteries were ready to pour in a cross fire.

In early September a difference of opinion arose between Gillmore and Dahlgren as to methods of attack. Dahlgren proposing to run the battery and attack from the land side while Gillmore wished the ships to keep along with the troops.

On 8 September Dahlgren decided upon a naval attack on SUMPTER. When he applied to Gillmore for the necessary boats for his landing parties, he learned for the first time, that Gillmore also planned an attack for that night. The hitherto excellent cooperation had begun to fail. The attacks were not coordinated and as SUMPTER, though considered a ruin, was filled with troops, rifles, hand grenades and had plenty of grape and canister for its guns, they failed disastrously, with heavy losses.

Dahlgren's attempt to run the batteries on 7 September re-



sulted in the grounding of the WEEHAWKEN off CUMMINGS POINT where she was under heavy fire until the next day when she was freed. On this occasion NEW IRONSIDES under Captain Rowan, took position between WEEHAWKEN and FORT MOULTRIE and silenced, temporarily at least, the guns of the fort before withdrawing after two and one half hours of fighting.

SLIDE 61: DAVID, Ammen, p. 140.

The New IRONSIDES was the most feared of all the Federal vessels and was torpedoed by a DAVID under Glassell in October, 1863 off MORRIS ISLAND. The officer of the deck of the IRONSIDES was killed but she was not seriously injured.

Up to this time the Federal attack had not proceeded much beyond Dupont's line of advance, but it had succeeded in rendering CHARLESTON useless as a base for privateers and blockade runners due to Dahlgren's more aggressive tactics and operations inside the bar, and more of a liability than an asset as it required troops to defend it.

SLIDE 62: WEEHAWKEN, B.&L., I, p. 622.

Except for the sinking of the WEEHAWKEN due to a heavy sea going down her fore hatch, the rest of 1863 was uneventful in the SOUTH ATLANTIC.

In February, 1864, the HOUSATONIC, a new sloop of war, was sunk off CHARLESTON by a torpedo; the torpedo boat, HUNLEY, being carried down with her, with all its crew. Following this

SLIDE 63: HOUSATONIC, Hunley.

success the Confederates began a wide use of torpedoes and succeeded in sinking the steamer HARRIET A. WEEK and the transport "MAPLELEAF". The Confederate success in this respect was much greater than that of the Federals although the indefatigable and audacious Cushing sank the Confederate ram ALEMARLE with a spar torpedo.

In general, the operations of 1864 in the SOUTH ATLANTIC consisted of small operations in the Sounds around CHARLESTON and SAVANNAH and up the FLORIDA Rivers. Except for the entrance to WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, the whole of the ATLANTIC Coast of the Confederacy was thoroughly blockaded, CHARLESTON was of no use and was held only from sentimental reasons so that the Confederacy was being severely affected by stringency of food and supplies. The destruction of the VIRGINIA crops of the Federals, the calling of so many farmers to the colors, and the desertion of the negro field hands to the Federals added to the distress. In November the forts at WILMINGTON were saved from being starved into surrender only by the opportune arrival of the

SLIDE 64: BANSHEE, Series 1, Vol. 9, p. 319.

BANSHEE which ran the blockade. In December there was not enough meat in the South for the armies in the field.

In the NORTH ATLANTIC an expedition against the defenses of the CAPE FEAR RIVER began to assemble in September 1864, the command of which was offered to Admiral Farragut. Failing



health caused him to decline this command which was then given to Rear Admiral David Porter, who at once began assembling and drilling his force. The fleet was formed into three divisions, one of them comprising the ironclads. There were five commanders, Thatcher, Lauman, Godon, Schenck and Radford, the last commanding the ironclad division.

The blockade off CAPE FEAR RIVER had been close but not effective due to the large number of fast blockade runners built in ENGLAND for the purpose, which with their shallow draft and fifteen knot speed, made capture by the slow deep draft Federal vessels almost impossible.

Admiral Lee's squadron had destroyed over \$10,000,000 worth of these blockade runners, but as about eight out of ten got through and profits were great enough so that the success of only one in three was highly profitable, the venture was popular in ENGLAND. Just before the first attack on FORT FISHER, the blockade had been strengthened and consisted of three lines of vessels, the inner one close to the shoals, the middle about 12 miles off and the outer 130 miles off shore. This was effective and resulted in the capture of about one blockade runner per day.

The powerful Confederate ram ALBEMARLE, built on the ROANOKE RIVER, attacked the SOUTHFIELD and MIAMI under Flusser, the two being lashed together, thereby losing their great superiority of speed, and sank the SOUTHFIELD while the MIAMI re-

treated having lost her Captain, Flusser, killed by a fragment of a shell, possibly one of his own rebounding from the ALBEMARLE.

The fact that the ALBEMARLE was building had been known for nearly a year but no effort had been made to destroy her or to get shallow draft monitors into the Sound to fight her. Following her victory the forts at PLYMOUTH surrendered to the Confederates. In May, she was attacked by a squadron under Captain Melancton Smith and though not severely damaged she withdrew to

SLIDE 65: ALBEMARLE - SASSACUS.

be strengthened. In this engagement she damaged the SASSACUS severely and the WYALUSING and MIAMI more or less and although driven off remained a menace to operations in the Sounds.

In October, Lieutenant W.B. Cushing, already distinguished for his daring, was given command of three steam launches fitted as torpedo boats and left NEW YORK with them, losing two en route to HAMPTON ROADS where he arrived in pitiable condition. Admiral Porter, to whom he reported on arrival, had orders to try Cushing by court martial for some former violation of neutrality, but upon investigation cleared Cushing and quashed the Court. After resting, he proceeded through the DISMAL SWAMP CANAL, made an attack on the ALBEMARLE at night in which he broke

SLIDE 66: BLOWING UP ALBEMARLE, B.&L., IV, p. 638.

through the booms surrounding her, drove off the guns crews by his own gun fire, lowered the spar torpedo under her overhang



and exploded it, sinking her. The torpedo launch filled with water and seeing that she would be captured, Cushing and others of his crew jumped overboard and swam downstream under heavy rifle fire. He crawled out on the bank about half a mile below the town and while lying there, learned from the conversation of some ALBEMARLE officers passing by, of the success of his mission.

Following this the Squadron under Commander W.H. Maccomb recaptured PLYMOUTH after a very gallant action. //

Porter's large fleet, constituted by weakening other squadrons, had been waiting at HAMPTON ROADS for the troops necessary for the capture of FORT FISHER, but General Butler who was to furnish the troops, was loath to spare them. The command of the troops was given to General Weitzel upon Porter's request that Butler be not given command. Butler suggested the fitting out of a powder vessel to be exploded against the fort and one, the steamer LOUISIANA, was loaded with 150 tons of powder and put under the command of Commander Rhink, former Captain of the WEEHAWKEN. After various delays, she was put as close as possible to the Fort and exploded, but so far away that the Confederates at the fort thought a blockade runner had gone up in the distance.

In order to be safe from the explosion, General Butler and the transports had gone to an anchorage about sixty miles away, whence they straggled in and failed to support the naval attack

on FORT FISHER, which Porter had informed Butler, would follow the explosion of the powder boat on 18 December, actually on 23 December at Butler's request.

SLIDE 67: DEFENSES OF CAPE FEAR RIVER, B.&L., IV, p. 645.

FORT FISHER and its supports comprised a series of works over one mile in length, constructed of sand bags, and represented a vast amount of labor under the best engineering talent of the South. It was considered strong enough to repel any naval force of ships which might be brought against it, especially as only nine feet could be carried over the bar at ordinary tides. Except with Northwest winds the sea broke heavily on the bar and the Channel was tortuous.

On 24 December at daylight the fleet stood in to engage the forts, the NEW IRONSIDES, MONADNOCK, CANONICUS and MANOPAC anchoring about one mile from the forts and getting out springs. Following them the MINNESOTA, MOHICAN and COLORADO took their assigned positions, all covering themselves by heavy fire. Twenty-one gunboats took position to the Northward and Eastward of the monitors. Two of the magazines of the fort were blown up by shells and the fort silenced after about an hour and a half, but a moderate fire was kept up in order to prevent the Confederates from resuming fire and to call up the transports, a few of the latter arriving about sunset. The fleet retired to a safe anchorage for the night, having no casualties from the guns of the enemy, though bursting of 100 pound Parrott cannon on the



TICONDEROGA, WANTIC, JUNIATA, MACKINAW and QUAKER CITY killed and wounded a total of thirty-six officers and men.

On Christmas Day the attack was resumed, the ships, reoccupying their former positions and firing only to distract the attention of the forts from the landing of the troops, who to the number of 3000 under General Weitzel, landed about five miles to the Northward, covered by the gunboats under Captain Glisson.

After reconnoitering, Weitzel decided attack to be impracticable and reembarked his troops. General Butler gave as his reason for ordering this, the lack of destructive fire by the fleet and the inability to approach the fort in sufficient force. He withdrew with his transports to HAMPTON ROADS and shortly afterwards was ordered to turn over his command of the army of the JAMES to Weitzel and was sent to his home in MASSACHUSETTS, thus ending his military career. Whether Butler who usurped the command, or Weitzel who was ordered to command is responsible for the army's fiasco in this affair, it would seem that the navy's part was well performed, since the COLORADO alone reported having fired 1569 shell into the fort on the 24th and 230 on the 25th so the forts could hardly be considered as remaining strong enough to repel attack. Several soldiers of the attacking party actually entered the fort without molestation, captured a set of colors, a horse and a mule and walked out with them.

The failure of the expedition occasioned much acrimonious correspondence and attempts were made to place the onus upon

Porter. General Grant's letter to Porter in which he says, "I will endeavor to be back again with an increased force and without the former Commander", seems to show that Butler's ineptitude was recognized.

Pending the organization of a second army expedition the Fleet proceeded to BEAUFORT, NORTH CAROLINA for coal and ammunition only to find that General Butler had seized the navy coal for his transports and that no more was being sent. Porter seized the army coal there and eventually received coal and ammunition from HAMPTON ROADS, so that despite gales and setbacks the fleet was ready when General A.H. Terry arrived on 8 January, 1865. Although Terry and Porter were not fully en rapport for the first few days of their association, friction and misunderstanding cleared away with the bad weather and

SLIDE 68: SECOND ATTACK ON FORT FISHER, B.&L., IV, 644.

on 13 January the navy began to land the army for the second attack on FORT FISHER. One hundred and twenty boats were used in landing the 8,000 men of the army with their equipage and artillery. The Confederates had taken advantage of the respite and the experience of the first attack, to strengthen the fort and increase the garrison, while General Bragg was given command.

SLIDE 69: BOMBARDMENT OF FORT FISHER, B.&L., IV, 656.

Terry's troops entrenched themselves across the neck above the fort, thus cutting off reinforcements.

Meanwhile the fleet stood in on a somewhat different plan, the NEW IRONSIDES, SAUGUS, CONANICUS, MONADNOCK and MAHOPAC



taking position about 800 yards from the fort, where they drew the fire of the fort and discovered the gun positions. Commander Rhind went in in a small boat to plant a buoy in four fathoms for the MINNESOTA. The fleet stood in in three columns, a total of about forty-eight vessels. The fire of the first day drove the Confederates to their bomb proofs and damaged some of their guns. On the second day, the 14th, Porter sent in the small gunboats to try to dismount the guns on the face of the works where the assault was to be made.

It was agreed that on the 15th, a heavy fire was to be kept up until 3 p.m. when 2,000 sailors and marines were to board the sea face of the fort while the troops assaulted the land side. The sailors were armed with short or cutlasses and pistols. The landing force had worked to within 200 yards of the forts and had dug rifle pits in which the marines were to remain and cover the boarding party by their fire. This they failed to do and as a result the sailors were driven off with heavy loss and that part of the assault was abandoned. The troops in the rear of the fort, met with success however, as the Confederates had concentrated at the front to repel the attack of the boarding party. They gained footing in two traverses -

SLIDE 70: TRAVERSES, B.&L., IV, 648.

bombproofs about sixty feet long, fifty wide and twenty feet high. There were seventeen of these in all, with guns between traverses. The IRONSIDES and the monitors fired into the traverses hold by the Confederates and cleared them out for the ad-

vancing troops, while the enfilading of FEDERAL POINT prevented the arrival of reinforcements. At 10 p.m. the Confederates were driven out of the last defense, BATTERY LAMB or the MOUND. Of the 2500 troops in the fort, 1800 were captured and the rest killed or wounded.

Following the capture of the Fort, the light draft gunboats found and buoyed the Channel, swept up the torpedoes of which there were many, some with as much as one ton of powder, then worked up toward FORT CASWELL. The Confederates blew up FORT CASWELL and several small works between FISHER and CASWELL, also the steamers TALLAHASSEE and CHICKAMAUGA and burned WILMINGTON before evacuating it.

Of the seventy-five guns captured in FORT FISHER, many of them fine rifles of heavy calibre, only two were in such condition as to be made useful.

The loss to the Federal Fleet, in dead, wounded and missing was 309.

Admiral Porter's operation order for this attack comprises operations, instructions, details, signals, etc. and requires 1022 words, his supplementary or landing orders about 500 words more.

With the fall of WILMINGTON the Confederates lost their last port on the ATLANTIC and without a source of supply, were almost at the end of their power to resist.



SLIDE 71: GENERAL SHERMAN, "W.T.S.", (Robbins, Front.)

The navy's cooperation with General Sherman in his march upon SAVANNAH and occupation of CHARLESTON beginning in November, 1864 in which rivers and sounds were kept clear of batteries and torpedoes and feints made to deceive the Confederates as to SHERMAN'S POINT of attack was not vital, perhaps, to the success of the campaign but was certainly of consequence. Although CHARLESTON was not captured by direct assault and its massive forts and batteries and earth works still stood grim and terrible when the Federals entered, its fall was brought about by sea power as surely as though by the guns of the fleet.

SLIDE 72: FORT SUMPTER, Johnson, p. 258.

The fall of CHARLESTON on 18 February, 1865, made a great decrease in the navy possible and it was reduced to a small force of patrol vessels to hold the captured ports and to control the many Confederate deserters.

In addition to its powerful defenses, the inner harbor of CHARLESTON was fitted with many ingenious and effective obstructions, such as rope entanglements intended to foul propellers, booms of heavy timbers supporting railroad iron, heavy piling driven into the bottom and several types of mines. Twenty-two Federal vessels were sunk by Confederate mines and torpedoes, the last being the HARVEST MOON, Dahlgren's flagship blown up in GEORGETOWN.

In June of 1865, Admiral Dahlgren, at his own request, was

relieved of his command.

Lying in the JAMES RIVER was the Confederate navy - three ironclads and five wooden vessels under Admiral Semmes, forming with the batteries at DREWEY'S BLUFF and the obstructions sunk there by the Federals, a bar to the Federal's advance on RICHMOND. Holding them impotent however, was the Federal force below the obstructions.

The night following Grant's capture of PETERSBURG, April 2, Abraham Lincoln spent on the MALVERN, Admiral Porter's flagship, waiting for the evacuation of RICHMOND. The President asked if the navy could not do something to make history on this occasion. Porter answered that it was doing its duty in containing the Confederate ironclads. "But", said the President, "can't we make a noise"? Porter opened fire with shrapnel about 11 p.m. and about twenty minutes later the Confederate ironclads blew up, although by their own hands.

With this, the first and last spectacular act of the navy in the ATLANTIC, its work was done. The blockade had throttled the Confederacy.



