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BATTLE OF JUTLAND

NARRATIVE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

The purpose of this paper is to give a simple narrative of the movements of the opposing fleets at Jutland in order that the Class will have a mental picture of these operations when the subsequent paper, "~~Major Tactics at Jutland~~" ^{Battle of Jutland, Tactics} is read. The analysis of the major tactical features of the battle can thus be more readily followed in that paper.

Germany, seizing the initiative, had made a series of cruiser raids on the British coast, escaping generally with little damage but raising a storm of criticism in England of British naval dispositions. The purpose of the raids was to cause a division of British naval forces from which division Germany hoped to create a favorable situation which they might exploit.

The British had held stubbornly to their original dispositions, with their main strength at Scapa, but fearful of the results of a raid by the Germans on the channel communications. The raids on the coast were annoying but not vital, while a raid in the channel might seriously affect the troop movement to France. As soon as safe bases should be provided in the southern area the British forces were to be redistributed to afford greater protection to the channel communications.

The Lowestoft raid, conducted by the German cruiser force and supported by the High Seas fleet, April 24-25, finally brought matters to a head.

Figure 1.

The 5th Battle Squadron, five Queen Elizabeths, were moved south to Rosyth, to reinforce Beatty's cruiser forces. The dispositions of the Grand Fleet were now as shown in Figure 1, the main body being at Scapa, one battle squadron and one cruiser squadron at Cromarty, and Beatty's cruisers plus the fifth Battle Squadron at Rosyth.

Each side now prepared plans to surprise the other. The British hoped, by cruiser operations along the Kattegat, to

lure a part or the whole of the German fleet to sea and defeat it; the Germans, by cruiser operations in the same area, supported by the High Seas fleet, hoped to cut off a part of the British fleet and defeat it, thus reducing the British superiority.

The German plan matured first, in fact would have been put into effect some eight days earlier but for the weather which prevented the aircraft reconnaissance, which Admiral Scheer felt necessary for the success of his operations. German submarines had been dispatched on May 15 to their observation stations between Norway and the Forth and were in position May 22. If the German subs were to take part, the operation must be started before the submarines were obliged to return to their bases.

This delay allowed the British plan to advance to such a point that British submarines and a mine layer, the Abdiel, had been directed to be in position off the Vyl light vessel, 1 June to 3 June, for operations against the German fleet if it should come into that area.

The stage was set for Jutland.

Figure 2.

At 2:00 a.m., 31 May, Admiral Hipper, with five battle cruisers, eight light cruisers and thirty-three destroyers, left the Jade with orders to "show himself off the Norwegian coast so as to ensure his presence ^{being} himself reported to the British Admiralty" while Admiral Scheer prepared to follow secretly with the German battle fleet.

The British intelligence service had kept the British Admiralty informed of the assembly of the High Seas fleet in the Jade, German submarines were known to be out, a German move in force was probable and Admiral Jellicoe was so informed at noon, 30 May. This information was re-inforced at 5:40 p.m. by information that all sections of the High Seas fleet had received an important operation order. The Grand Fleet was ordered

to concentrate as usual East of the "Long Forties" and be ready for eventualities. By 10:30 p.m., 30 ~~May~~¹⁵, the Grand Fleet was at sea proceeding to ~~their~~^{its} rendezvous, in anticipation of the German operation which was not to be commenced for some four hours to come.

Admiral Beatty's force was to rendezvous at a point 69 miles S.S.E. of the Commander-in-Chief. Three submarines had been dispatched from the Harwich forces to take stations off the Vyl lightship in accordance with the original British plan.

The German submarines on observation duty saw and reported the departure of the various British subdivisions but evidently their opportunities for observation were so limited and the movements so apparently disconnected that the German high command did not attribute to the movement a concentration of the Grand Fleet. German submarines made several unsuccessful attacks upon British light forces during the sortie of the fleet but otherwise no opposition was met. Thus at 2:00 p.m. the subdivisions of the Grand Fleet were in positions as shown in this diagram.

On the German side, Hipper left the Jade, May 31 at 2:00 a.m., followed a half hour later by the battle fleet. By 2:00 p.m., the two forces were in the positions shown in this diagram.

Figure 3.

The positions of the opposing forces at 2:00 p.m. 31 May, and their compositions are as shown in this diagram. It will be noted that one battleship of the 5th battle squadron and two battle cruisers of Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons are absent, these vessels being in the dockyards.

Figure 4.

This figure shows the disposition of the British battle fleet for cruising.

Figure 4 A.

This figure shows the German battle fleet cruising dispositions.

Figure 5.

This shows the cruising formation of the forces under Beatty.

Figure 5 A.

This shows the German Scouting fleet's cruising formation.

Figure 6.

This was the disposition of German submarines and airships at 3 p.m., May 31.

Figure 7.

At 2:00 p.m., the British cruiser force was standing East at 19 knots, zigzagging. At 2:15, not sighting any enemy vessels, Beatty headed north towards the rendezvous, with his screening vessels disposed to the eastward of him. Some fifty miles to the eastward and on a northerly heading was the German cruiser force, with the German battle fleet in support, 50 miles astern. At this time a steamer, lying between the British and German cruiser forces was sighted by vessels in the screen of each, which vessels promptly turned to investigate. In a few minutes each side had contact with the screen of the other and had reported by 2:20 p.m. Hipper turned west to support his screen, while Beatty seven minutes later, turned S.S.E. to cut off the enemy's escape, for by this time the Galatea had reported a large amount of smoke bearing E.N.E. Admiral Jellicoe, 65 miles to the northward intercepted these reports, raised steam for full power and stood on towards the rendezvous at increased speed.

The British light forces headed N.W., with the German light forces following, while Beatty's battle cruisers headed around to the eastward. Hipper continued N.W. in support of his light forces until at 3:30 p.m., the two battle cruiser forces were 13 miles from each other on N.E. - S.W. bearing, with the light cruisers on the north flank bearing N.W. from their own battle cruisers. The British 5th battle squadron was about 6 miles to the westward of Beatty's battle cruisers.

Figure 8.

This shows the reported contacts and the reaction thereto of the British forces from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. while

Figure 9

shows their movements from 3:00 to 3:30 p.m.

Figure 10.

At 3:20 p.m., the German battle cruisers sighted the British battle cruisers steaming towards them from the southwest and at 3:33 they turned back towards their supporting battleships, at the same time recalling their light forces.

At about 3:30 Beatty made out the German battle cruisers, but on account of the reduced visibility to the eastward could not make out what they were doing so he held on to the Eastward at 25 knots to close. At about this time a sea plane from the Engadine reported the enemy heading South. At 3:45, Beatty ^{ordered} ~~formed~~ his battle cruisers ^{to form} on line of bearing ~~N.W.~~ ^{S 8 (NW-SE) and then changed course to} ~~course~~ E.S.E.

The fifth battle squadron was six miles on the port quarter of Beatty and trying to keep up.

Hipper formed line of bearing on course South and at 3:48 opened fire at about 17,000 yards. The British replied, but on account of confusion in signals, the British fire distribution left one German battle cruiser, the Derfflinger, unfired at for about ten minutes.

Figure 10 A:

Gives the track of Beatty's flagship from 3:21 to 4:45, at which time he had turned North to avoid the German battleships which had been definitely located by the Southampton.

Figure 10 B.

Shows the actual and reported track of the Southampton which had at 4:33 located the German battleships to the Southeastward.

Figure 11.

Returning to the battle cruiser action, Beatty continued Southward changing course to bring the German battle cruisers abeam, while the Germans continued towards their own battle-

ships, closing the range to about 13,000 yards by 3:54, at which time they were using both main and secondary armament. Visibility and wind favored the Germans in this gun duel.

On the northern flank, Scouting Division II turned east to avoid fire from Battle Squadron V which was endeavoring to reach support position.

At 3:57, both sides maneuvered to open the range. British Flotilla IX steaming at high speed to keep up, was on the engaged side of the British battle cruisers and its smoke hampered the fire of two of the cruisers considerably.

The German fire was very effective at this time, the Lion being nearly destroyed by a shell hitting and entering one of her turrets and starting a serious fire. At 4:00, the Indefatigable was struck by a salvo, sheered out of formation, was hit by another salvo and sank at 4:05. By 4:05, the range had opened to some 20,000 yards so that Hipper ceased fire.

The 5th Battle Squadron was now in sight of the German battle cruisers and opened fire on the rear ship, 19,000 yards range.

Figure 12.

This fire of the 5th Battle Squadron caused the German cruisers to zigzag to avoid damage.

Both battle cruiser forces changed course to close the range and at 4:17 the action reopened. As the Lion was still out of the battle line, trying to put out the fire in her turret, there were five German cruisers against four British, which resulted in a concentration on the Queen Mary, at about 15,000 yards. At 4:26, struck by a salvo, she blew up and sank.

The situation that now existed was as shown in this diagram. Four British battle cruisers engaging five German battle cruisers at 12,000 yards with the 5th Battle Squadron supporting at 16,500 yards, the British 13th Flotilla in position to attack, the German 9th Flotilla in position to counter attack,

the light cruisers on both sides not in support positions, the Germans being especially badly placed, only the Regensburg being near position.

Figure 13.

As the British 13th Flotilla advanced to attack it saw the German flotillas starting an attack on the British line and turned to intercept them.

Both battle cruiser lines turned away while the destroyers of both sides fought out their duel. The German flotillas fired at long range and retired. None of these torpedoes were effective. The British boats closed the German cruisers in their chase of the German destroyers and two fired two torpedoes each at 5,000 yards and again at 3,500 yards but the turn away of the German battle cruisers rendered the torpedoes ineffective.

The net result of the two attacks were no torpedo hits but one British destroyer and two German destroyers were badly damaged, the German's being in a sinking condition.

During this destroyer melle the whole situation suddenly changed. At 4:33, the Southampton, two miles on the port bow of the British battle cruisers reported German battleships in sight southeast of him. Beatty turned to S.E. to investigate, and within two minutes sighted the leading battleship ahead and less than 12 miles away.

He immediately changed course by column right movement to N.W. recalling his destroyers. The 5th Battle Squadron, following after the British battle cruisers and some eight miles behind them, kept up his fire on the retiring German cruisers and continued on towards Beatty.

The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron continued on towards the advancing German battleships until they could make out the German dispositions, which brought them to within 13,000 yards, when they turned and retired, avoiding all injury by rapid changes of course. The German battleships were advancing with

seven of their latest Dreadnoughts in the lead, then nine of the older Dreadnoughts and last six pre-Dreadnoughts. With the battleships were five light cruisers and three and a half flotillas of destroyers.

Figure 14.

The situation was now reversed. Where before the German cruisers had been drawing Beatty's force towards the supporting German battleships, Beatty now was attempting to lead the German fleet to the British Grand fleet.

The two crippled British destroyers, in the path of the advancing German fleet were soon under gunfire and were abandoned, but not before their last torpedoes had been launched, none of which hit. Two other retiring destroyers fired torpedoes, one of which hit the Seydlitz at about 4:50.

Beatty's battle cruisers stood N.W. and then North, the 5th Battle Squadron following about three miles on his port quarter. Hipper had countermarched on joining the German battleships and was on northerly headings, engaging the British battle cruisers intermittently and the 5th Battle Squadron almost continuously. The German battleships had headed N.W. by divisions and such as were in range opened on the retiring 5th Battle Squadron. Two British destroyers stood in to attack the German battleships, one being driven off by the Rostick, while the other fired one torpedo at 8,000 yards, which missed. Both destroyers escaped.

Figure 15.

On account of the poor visibility to the eastward the advantage in gunfire was all with the Germans. The Lion received another hit near a magazine which seriously threatened her, while the 5th Battle Squadron were under heavy fire, especially the rear ship the Malaya, which received ten hits below the water line, causing her to list badly..

The two abandoned British destroyers were sunk by 5:15 and by 5:30 all fire had ceased as the British ships were outside

German gun range while the Germans were practically invisible to the British ships.

This ended the first phase of the battle. At 5:35, the Chester, a part of the screen of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, made contact with Scouting Division II of the German fleet, and new forces were about to enter the field.

Figure 16.

The last figure showed contact between the Chester and the German Scouting Division Two. Almost simultaneously, the British 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to the northward of Beatty, sighted the British 1st Cruiser Squadron, on the right flank of Jellicoe's advancing battleship force. So that now the British forces were joining.

The Chester, on making contact, turned to starboard to engage, and found herself engaging not one but three ships. She was almost immediately smothered with gun fire. She then turned northeast with only her after gun in action and escaped being sunk by rapid change of course.

The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, hearing gun fire to northwest, turned towards it and in a few minutes made out the German light cruisers chasing the Chester. The Germans as soon as they realized their predicament, turned to starboard to escape, but before they could do so the Wiesbaden was a wreck and the Pillau and Frankfort badly injured. The German destroyers with the 2nd Scouting Division advanced to attack what was supposed to be British battleships (the 3rd Cruiser Squadron).

At the end of this period, Beatty's battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron were engaging the German battle cruisers to the eastward, while the 5th Battle Squadron was also engaging the leading German battleship division to southeastward.

The junction of the British forces was about to be accomplished.

Figure 17.

This figure shows the German light forces and supporting battle cruisers turning eastward, then southeastward and finally to southerly and southwesterly courses to avoid the pressure from what they thought were British battleships to eastward but what was, in fact, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron; The German battleships had changed from northerly to northeasterly headings following their own battle cruisers. No German forces had as yet located the British battleships but ten miles to the northward.

On the British side, at 5:56, Beatty sighted the right flank division of Jellicoe's advancing battleships and immediately headed east to take station ahead of what he expected to be the deployment. The 5th Battle Squadron was following.

This meeting of the two British forces was more or less unexpected and confusing as the various reports had led Jellicoe to believe that Beatty was some eleven miles to the westward. This error was later laid to inaccurate navigating data. At any rate, the contact, together with the fact that Beatty was engaging an enemy to southward caused Jellicoe to order deployment on the left flank. Deployment has not yet started in this diagram.

The end of the period shows the British 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron retiring northeast to avoid torpedoes fired by the German 9th Flotilla and 12th half Flotilla while the German battle cruisers are turned southwest to avoid an attack by the four destroyers of Admiral Hood's force, and one of Admiral Beatty's destroyers, the Onslow.

Figure 18.

During this period important and critical events occurred for both the British and the German fleets.

On the German side the Wiesbaden, badly damaged by gun fire and a torpedo hit from the Onslow, was left helpless between the

converging battle lines. The retiring German battle cruisers sighted their battleships and reversed course to northeast, but coming under heavy fire from the northeast turned southeast. Other German light forces conformed to this movement, while the German battleships followed closely behind their battle cruisers.

As the German battle cruisers advanced northeast after joining their battleships a torpedo from one of the British destroyers, the Acasta, got home on the Lutzow, which damage combined with heavy gun fire from the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, caused the Lutzow to haul out of formation.

The Wiesbaden became a focus for the two opposing fleets, the Germans trying to protect her in her predicament while British forces closed on her to bring about her destruction. This resulted in contact being made between Jellicoe and the German fleet.

Taking up the British side of the situation, Jellicoe's decision to deploy on the left flank, forced Beatty to move across the whole line of the deployment, which movement blanked the fire of the battleships, division after division, as well as leaving a pall of smoke in his wake. The 5th Battle Squadron, seeing that a like movement on its part would further delay the deployment, trailed in behind the right flank battleships.

The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, that had retired to avoid torpedoes, reversed course and took station ahead of Beatty's battle cruisers.

And Jellicoe himself, to expedite the arrival of Beatty in the van, slowed his battleship divisions, causing some crowding and confusion in the rear.

By 6:30, the Iron Duke, fleet flag, and ships astern, sighted the leading German battleship, the Koenig, and opened fire on her and such other ships following that they could see; by 6:32, Beatty had reached his position, and at 6:33, the British increased battle fleet speed to 17 knots. The British

Deployment, as far as battleships and battle cruisers were concerned, was practically completed, and the capital ships were ideally situated.

With the British light forces the situation was more complicated. Held close to their battle line during the approach, the sudden deployment in the face of the enemy caused cruiser divisions and destroyer flotillas to charge at full speed across the battle front, some barely missing collision with the deploying battleships and all laying a haze of smoke which materially decreased visibility.

The first Cruiser Squadron, three armored cruisers, hearing fighting to the southward, headed across the course of Beatty, two managing to pass while the third sheered off to eastward. The two that crossed, Defense and Warrior, stood on south, firing on the Wiesbaden until they ran into a concentration of fire from the advancing German fleet. The Defense, hit by two heavy salvos, blew up and sank, while the Warrior, badly damaged, managed to haul out to the westward, where she fell in with the Warspite. The latter, badly hit in her long running fight northward, had sheered out of formation with steering gear jammed, but was still engaging the enemy with all guns. Both ships eventually escaped destruction.

In the van of the British fleet Admiral Hood in the Invincible and followed by the other two battle cruisers of his division was pressing in on the German van and forcing it to the southward. At a range of 9,000 yards and with visibility in his favor, he was holding his own with the four German battle cruisers of Hipper. But again was the superiority of the German construction demonstrated, as at about 6:35, the Invincible was struck by a series of salvos, blew up and sank.

The end of this period finds the British fleet deployed, with fast forces in the van and rear, and approximately in position, with superior visibility conditions and holding the German fleet in a "T".

The German fleet might be considered to be in the worst possible tactical position; "T'd" and in a knuckle.

Figure 19.

This diagram shows the turn away of the German fleet to extricate itself from the serious situation it was shown to be in at the end of the last period.

This maneuver was one that had been designed by the German high command to meet just such a situation and had been used extensively in their peace time maneuvers. In it, upon signal to make the simultaneous turn away, each ship turns to the new course, and the formation then readjusts itself. With the fleet in column or in a more or less precise line of bearing, the maneuver is, to say the least, difficult. But the German fleet had several bends in the line and the van was under heavy gun fire. However, the German fleet accomplished the maneuver and hauled to the westward, almost immediately, disappearing from view of the British fleet. At the same time, to prevent a follow-up, the German destroyers were launched to attack and lay a smoke screen.

The result of Admiral Scheer's surprise maneuver was that the British fleet were absolutely in the dark as to the whereabouts of the German fleet that had but a moment before been at their mercy.

To head southwest would be running right into the destroyer attack and possible mines and might open the way for the Germans to retreat to Heligoland. To head southerly might cause them to lose the German fleet entirely, but at least the British fleet would be between the German fleet and their base. The southerly movement was decided upon, and the British fleet turned by divisions to southeast.

The British battle cruisers, heading around to the southward and not finding any enemy ships, Jellicoe at the end of this period, ordered his battleship divisions to course south.

At 6:54, Beatty reduced speed to 18 knots and ordered the two remaining cruisers of Battle Cruiser Squadron Three to take station astern of him.

The German destroyer attack was avoided by individual maneuvers on the part of the battleship divisions menaced; the Marlborough was hit by one of these torpedoes. Only three German destroyers took part in this torpedo attack, firing six torpedoes in all, at a range of about 7,000 yards. The other German destroyers had been recalled; after leaving, made their smoke screen.

But for British 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, guarding the right flank of the British battleship formation, the movement of the Germans after their retirement might have been entirely undetected. This squadron, as soon as the German fleet had become lost to view, headed south to regain touch, which he had done by the end of this period.

Figure 20.

The last figure showed the results of the surprise tactics of Scheer in withdrawing his fleet from an unfavorable situation. This figure finds Scheer using the simultaneous turn about to re-enter the action.

But for the activities of the British 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, this move might have come as a complete surprise. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron informed Jellicoe at 7:04 of the German move to the Eastward so that Jellicoe was well prepared for it.

Various reasons for Scheer's return as given by him, are; that he wishes to rescue the crew of the crippled Wiesbaden; that it was too early to attempt a final breaking off of the action; and that he wished to force the British destroyers to attack and thus expend their torpedoes. The British think that he hoped to cut off a part of what Scheer believed to be the divided British forces.

At any rate he crashed back into a worse situation than he had just extricated himself from. The entire British fleet heading on southerly courses was deployed across his path.

Opening on the German Battle Cruisers and then their battleships as they came into view, practically the whole British battleship line engaged at ranges from 9 to 14 thousand yards. The situation was untenable. Already the head of his column was turning to the southward. The simultaneous turn about again became necessary to save Scheer's fleet.

The destroyers were ordered to attack and to cover the maneuver of the battle line with a smoke screen. In addition, as the desperateness of the situation became evident, the German battle cruisers were ordered to "attack the enemy without regard to consequences".

Such was the situation at the end of this period.

Figure 21.

This figure shows the German fleet again hauling out of an apparently hopeless situation, by their now justly famous turn about, the move being covered by a vigorous use of their destroyers in attacking the enemy and covering their own retirement with smoke. The German 11th and 17th half flotillas attacked first, followed by the 3rd and 5th Flotillas, all making smoke as they turned after attacking. The only British light forces to counter this attack was the 4th British Light Cruiser Squadron, on the disengaged side of the fleet. This squadron at full speed rounded the van of the British fleet and attacked the retiring German destroyers. It will be noted that the British destroyers are all close to their own battle line.

Owing to the torpedo threat Jellicoe turned his battleships away two points at 7:22 and two more points at 7:25. By the end of this period the German torpedoes were passing through the British battleship line.

The turn away of the British together with the German smoke screen eased the pressure on the German battle cruisers that had been under terrific gun fire during the turn away of their own battleships so that they too could turn off to the westward and escape destruction. But although escaping destruction, Hipper's five battle cruisers were in sorry shape; the Lutzow was little better than a wreck, torpedoed and badly battered by gun fire; the Seydlitz, torpedoed and with her forward compartments flooded and well down by the head; the Derfflinger with her turrets all more or less useless; and all of his ships suffering from the effects of the gun battle they had just passed through.

But again the German fleet had escaped. Except for the attacking German destroyers no German ships were in sight of the British battleships.

Figure 22.

The German torpedoes having passed through the British battleship line, the latter changed course to south at the beginning of this period. The German destroyers, two having been lost during the attack, retired on westerly headings. Except to Beatty's battle cruisers, no German ships were in sight. At 7:30, Beatty signalled that a few of the enemy bore N.W. by W. from him about 10 miles, but as Beatty's position relative to the battleships was in doubt, this information was not given full weight. However, Jellicoe formed line ahead and changed course to S.W. at about 7:45.

At 7:45, Beatty asked that the van battleships follow battle cruisers, and that the leading German battleships bore N.W. by W. from him on course S.W. Action on this signal was not taken until after this period ended.

On the German side, the retirement continued until well clear of gun range when a southerly course was taken, Scheer having decided that he would retire to Horn Reefs.

Figure 23.

This period was devoted to efforts of the British fleet to locate and close the German fleet while the German forces were endeavoring to form up and at the same time avoid detection.

The British battleships headed on westerly courses by divisions while Beatty's battle cruisers and light cruisers took generally southwest courses. The British 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron at 8:10 saw German Scouting Division IV bearing W. by N. and heading across his bows. This division paralleled the German's course and opened fire. British 11th Destroyer Flotilla, supported by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, located and drove off the German 12th Half Flotilla of destroyers, but themselves coming under fire of German battleships, had to retire.

At 8:15, Admiral Beatty sighted and engaged the German battle cruisers (Scouting Division 1). The visibility was all

in favor of the British and the German suffered severely, especially the Derfflinger. The German pre-Dreadnought squadron (Battle Squadron II) which was in the German van on the southerly course, held off Beatty while the German battle cruisers and light forces passed through to the disengaged side of their line.

All the German forces then headed westerly and again disappeared from view.

So that, although Jellicoe knew definitely where the German fleet was, none of the enemy were in sight of his battleships at the end of the period.

Figure 24.

This figure shows the track of the component parts of the two fleets from 8:30 until midnight together with contacts.

It will be noted that at 1000 the High Sea Fleet was between Beatty and Jellicoe and that by midnight the High Sea Fleet had crossed under the stern of Jellicoe.

Figure 25.

Except for action between the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and German 2nd Flotilla, which was heading for home via the Skaggerak, all firing had ceased and at 9:17 the British took night cruising formation.

At 9:30 the two fleets were approximately as shown in this diagram.

On the German side, destroyers were out ahead, then two battle cruisers, then a division of light cruisers, then the battleships with a division of light cruisers to port and last, two more battle cruisers. The fifth battle cruiser, Lutzow, was in a sinking condition, some miles astern.

On the British side, Beatty's battle cruisers with two light cruiser squadrons and a destroyer flotilla some 12 miles on the starboard bow of the British battleships, 2nd Cruiser Squadron and some attached cruisers between Beatty and Jelli-

oe, light cruisers ahead of the British battleships, and the destroyers covering the rear, supported by the 2nd Light Cruiser Division.

The British 6th Division of battleships had dropped some distance astern on account of the torpedo in the Marlborough and the 5th Battle Squadron was standing by it.

Figure 26.

With forces disposed generally as shown in the last diagram both fleets stood on, the British on southerly courses to intercept the German fleet if it attempted to return to its base, the German fleet inclining to eastward towards Horn Reef.

The British destroyers were spread across the British rear to protect it from German destroyer attack, while the German light forces were immediately ahead of their column with orders to clear the way for their fleet to pass to Horn Reef.

The result was a series of contacts, which the British believed to be attempts on the part of the German destroyers to attack the British battleships but which the Germans knew, having intercepted and decoded Jellicoe's signals as to his destroyer dispositions, to be the rear guard of the British fleet.

The first contact was at 10:04 between the Seydlitz and Scouting Division II on the one side and the Castor and the 11th Flotilla on the other. The Germans, on being challenged, turned on searchlights and opened a heavy fire on the British. The Castor was put out of action almost immediately. Three torpedoes were fired by the British but the Germans turned away and no hits were made. Most of the British destroyers thought that the ships seen were British and so did not fire.

The second contact was between the German Scouting Division IV and British Light Cruiser Squadron Two. Light Cruiser

Squadron Two, having seen the gun flashes of the previous contact was expecting trouble. The Dublin opened fire as soon as his recognition signals were not answered, and the five German cruisers at once turned on searchlights and replied. The Southampton fired a torpedo which struck and sank the Frauenlob. The Southampton and Dublin suffered heavily from the German gun fire and the whole division was withdrawn to the eastward until they fell in with the 5th Battle Squadron. They then formed up as a rear guard.

According to Corbett, both of these contacts confirmed Jellicoe in his belief that the Germans would attack his rear, so his dispositions remained unchanged.

Figure 27.

This figure shows the German fleet heading to pass under the stern of the British fleet, while the latter stood on.

At 11:20 the British 4th Flotilla saw ships to starboard on a converging course. He closed to a thousand yards and then challenged. He was answered by salvos of shells. The five leading destroyers fired torpedoes immediately, the rest when they were sure the ships seen were enemy.

Figure 27 A.

This shows in more detail the contact just described, together with the subsequent efforts of the 4th Flotilla to push home their attacks on what proved to be the van of the German fleet.

The first contact was between the 4th Flotilla and Scouting Division II of the German fleet. The first torpedo fire resulted in a hit on the Rostock which later was abandoned. In turning away from the British torpedoes, the Elbing and Posen collided, the Elbing sinking and the Posen falling out of formation. The British lost the Fortune and Tipperary while the

Porpoise was put out of action. The rest of the flotilla was badly scattered. Immediately afterwards the Spitfire and what proved to be the German Dreadnought Nassau rammed each other. The British destroyer was a complete wreck forward from the effect of this collision, but she limped into port later with some twenty feet of the Nassau's side plating and part of her anchor gear on the forecastle.

This firing and confusion in the German van caused the German fleet to incline to starboard until 11:34 when it resumed its course for Horn Reefs.

At 11:40 five destroyers of the 4th Flotilla, having formed up and standing southerly, made contact with the German 2nd Battleship Division which promptly turned on search lights and opened with rapid fire.

In maneuvering to fire torpedoes, three of these British destroyers collided and all were put out of action, one, the Sparrowhawk sinking the next day. The torpedoes fired made no hits.

Shortly afterwards some more ships of this flotilla standing southward fell in with the German van and fired two torpedoes with no effect and no damage to themselves but were chased to the eastward.

At about this time the British cruiser Black Prince, which early in the deployment of the British fleet had avoided collision with Beatty's cruisers by turning east and had ever since been trying to get to her station, was standing southerly and suddenly found herself abreast of what was the center of the German fleet. The latter promptly turned on searchlights and opened with a heavy fire. In two minutes the Black Prince was in flames.

Shortly afterwards she blew up and sank with all hands.

The last attack by the 4th Flotilla was made by the Ardent,

standing south alone hoping to join her division. She saw an enemy ship and fired torpedoes without effect and was herself sunk at 12:19.

This ended the attack by the 4th Flotilla. A total of 14 torpedoes had been fired and one hit made, that on a light cruiser.

Figure 28.

This figure shows the track of the component parts of the two fleets from midnight at 3:00 a.m., together with the contacts made during this period. At the end of the period, the British fleet is seen making a northerly movement.

Figure 29.

This shows the 13th Flotilla making contact with the German van. This flotilla had moved to the eastward to avoid overs from the fight going on between the 4th Flotilla and the German van, and then turned southwestward again, passing across the German battleship path in a most excellent position to fire. The Petard, next to last in this column of six destroyers, passed about 300 yards ahead of the leading German battleship. But she had no torpedoes. The last ship, the Turbulent, was sunk by gun fire almost immediately. The others failed to fire.

The German fleet passed through the gap left by the maneuver of the 13th Flotilla.

Figure 28 A.

The move of the 13th Flotilla to the eastward in the last diagram forced the 12th Flotilla, in order to gain sea room, to the eastward and northward, in all some 30 miles N.E. of the British battleships. From this position it was heading south together with three destroyers of the 13th Flotilla that had become separated from their own group.

At 1:45, sighting large ships on his starboard bow (the rear of the German battleship force and two battle cruisers,-

Van der Taun and Derfflinger), he headed on parallel course, then countermarched to starboard to attack.

From an ideal position six of the destroyers fired a total of 17 torpedoes, one of which hit the battleship Pommera and sank her with all hands. The other British ships failed to fire either owing to a misunderstanding as to the direction of attack or to having their fire blanked by their own destroyers.

The German van eased off to starboard as the British destroyers turned away after attacking and contact was lost.

Shortly afterwards, a German destroyer was struck and sunk by a torpedo from the destroyer Moresby which was aimed at the rear of the German column as it stood southeastward.

The 12th Flotilla failed to regain touch with the German fleet which now had a clear way to Horn Reef.

Figure 30.

This figure shows the movements of the two fleets up to 6:00 a.m., 1 June, as well as the positions of the British submarines and mine fields.

The Ostfriesland struck a mine of the mine field at point (A) but was able to make port.

At about 3:42, (position D) the Indomitable and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron drove off a German airship that was on observation duty.

By 4:30, Jellicoe had received word from the Admiralty that the German fleet had returned to port and he put his fleet into cruising formation.

Scattered light forces on both sides were rejoining their formations or returning to their bases. The Lutzow had been sunk by her own crew, the attending destroyer bringing in the survivors.

The crippled Warspite, while returning to Rosyth, was

attacked by submarines but managed to escape by use of speed and the zigzag.

The Warrior had to be abandoned, her crew being taken off by the escorting Engadine.

The British fleet swept northward back over the course of the previous day's and night's battle track, picking up survivors as they went, finally returning to port, without having seen anything except for a momentary sight of the Regensburg by the Dublin (position E), this contact being lost almost immediately.

The Battle of Jutland was ended.