

File 1483-A.

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN ACCOUNT

OF THE

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

(Rear Ad. vom Hofe, German Navy (retired))

*(This the only copy on file)*

REPLY REFER TO  
FILE NO.

U. S. SUBMARINE FORCE  
SUBMARINE DIVISION FOUR

U. S. S. EAGLE 58

Naval War College  
Newport R.I.

I find the enclosed in my personal file, but have no recollection of where it came from. As it is very interesting I felt that it may be of some value and am forwarding it for such use as you can make of it.

Cestoy  
J. B. Bate  
Lt Com USN

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NEWPORT, R. I.

9 November, 1933

Lieutenant Commander J.F. Bates, U.S.N.  
U.S.S. EAGLE 58.

My dear Bates:

The pamphlet you forwarded to the War College under your letter of recent date, entitled "Translation of a German Account of the Battle of Jutland", although not a War College issue, is appreciated, and will be filed with our other publications on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

S.A. TAPPINDER,  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Secretary.

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DESTROYER FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET,  
U.S.S. SEATTLE, FLAGSHIP,

At Sea, Lat. 36-12 N., Long. 75-21 W.

11 January 1917.

From: Commander, Destroyer Force  
To: Destroyer Force

SUBJECT: Translation of a German Account of the Battle of  
Jutland.

1. The Commander, Destroyer Force has received from Commander Gherardi, Naval Attache' at Berlin, a translation of an account of the Battle of Jutland, taken from a book recently published by a German Retired Rear Admiral. The Force Commander has had a number of copies made of this translation for the information of the officers of the Destroyer Force and he takes pleasure in sending a copy to you.

ALBERT GLEAVES.

THE BATTLE OFF THE SKAGERRAK, according to  
REAR ADMIRAL VON HOFE (retired).

The following is a translation of a part of "Our Fleet in the World War 1914-1916", whose author is Rear Admiral Kalan vom Hofe, a retired officer who has often written on naval subjects for the press.

Before the book could be published, it had, of course, to pass through the censorship (Press Bureau of the Admiralty Staff) and therefore any points of the battle which are regarded as confidential have been eliminated. Nevertheless it appears to me to give the most connected narrative yet published in Germany, as well as better diagrams -- the latter to be found on pages 175, 179, 182, 185 and 191. Certain minor descriptions in the article assist in getting a picture of the action in the mind.

On the 31st of May at dawn the German High Sea Fleet left Wilhelmshaven, the scouting groups and torpedo-boat flotillas in advance and forming on the march to the north a broad belt which on the right approached closely the western coast of the Jutland peninsula. The thick mist which hovered over the Jade during the night had settled somewhat after passing Wangeroog and Helgoland; but the sky remained overcast, the sun trying in vain to break through the clouds which were hanging pretty low over the sea. Under these circumstances the High Sea Fleet could not expect the cooperation of the naval airships and hydroaeroplanes. The reconnaissance had to be left to the cruisers, a very difficult task considering the thick weather and one which could only be carried out satisfactorily because all the ships had radio installations which permitted the transmission of information from all places of the reconnoitring belt and placed the admirals in a position to receive the most rapid information of the sighting of the enemy, his strength and his movements. From the scouting ships nothing could be seen of the enemy; the smaller craft on watch as advance posts which the fleet passed could report nothing of importance. The cheerful mood which was noticeable on all the ships in the early morning gave way to disappointment when at noon no news had arrived that enemy ships had been sighted. The cruisers which had pushed ahead thirty to forty miles to the north would soon sight the coast of Norway and would then have to return, and another cruise was made in vain.

A slight northwest wind had risen and it commenced to rain. In the afternoon the sun broke at times through the clouds and it appeared as though the weather would clear up. Then at 4:30 in the afternoon the report flew through the fleet that enemy cruisers had been sighted in the north. On the left wing of the reconnoitring line, about seventy sea miles from the coast of Jutland, the lookout in the crow's-nest of the small cruiser FRANKFURT had discovered a group of enemy's cruisers consisting of four ships, accompanied by a large number of destroyers, steering south at full speed. As answer to this report, Vice Admiral Hipper gave the order to attack. The cruisers of the long-drawn-out reconnoitring line assembled as fast as possible with their units on the Admiral ships which had already taken course in the direction of the enemy. The English cruisers on their part had also discovered the enemy and after having established the superiority of the latter, had turned off and sped off in a northwestern course; several shots were exchanged at a very long range which did not hurt anybody. The English cruisers could report to their commander, Vice Admiral Beatty, who had returned from a cruise to the southern North Sea during which he had not sighted the enemy, at 4:55 not only the sighting of the enemy but also his superior force. The flagship of Vice Admiral Beatty was at the time about one hundred sea miles west of Hanstholm. The German cruisers followed at high speed, the II. Scouting Group with the torpedo-boat flotillas in advance, followed by the I. Scouting Group consisting of the large cruisers under the personal command of Vice Admiral Hipper.

#### Sketch I.

Position of the opposing fleets  
on the early afternoon of May 31st, 1916.

On the 30th of May the different squadrons and flotillas of the English Armada had left their harbors and anchoring places to attack the German High Sea Fleet in case the latter should again attempt to make a raid on the naval ports of the eastern coast of England, for which they appeared to find indications in the reported activities west of Helgoland during the preceding week. Strong dissatisfaction was being manifested in England by a large portion of the English people over the continued inactivity of the Grand Fleet which was succeeding neither in starving out Germany nor in suppressing the "U" boat danger and which had proved itself incapable of preventing the repeated attacks of German cruisers on the English coasts. The Allies also, especially France, had entreated the English Government to finally make use of its superior naval forces and cut off

Germany completely from the north. The First Lord of the Admiralty, to calm the population, had even announced in a letter to the Mayors of Yarmouth and Lowestoft, dated May 8th, a change in naval strategy to the effect that a special squadron would be stationed before the southern part of the coast and that the Grand Fleet would be given great freedom to develop its power.

From noon of May 30th, the assembled English Battleship fleet, under command of Admiral Jellicoe, steamed back and forth between Scotland and the southern point of Norway; further south, so that cooperation was possible at any time, was the bulk of the English cruiser fleet which had farther advanced its feelers in order to watch the movements of the German fleet. The main fleet consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 4th battleship squadrons, the 3rd battle cruiser squadron, the 1st and 2nd cruiser squadrons, the 4th light cruiser squadron and the 11th and 12th destroyer flotillas. The 3rd battleship squadron, consisting of 12 battleships of the KING EDWARD class and several older dreadnaughts, had been sent to the Thames with the intention of engaging the German High Sea Fleet in its raid to the west, to hold it long enough so that the Armada from the north could appear and attack it in the rear. Admiral Beatty, who commanded the 1st and 2nd battle cruiser squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd light cruiser squadrons, as well as the 1st, 9th, 10th and 13th destroyer flotillas, had attached to his command also the 5th battleship squadron which contained the five fastest ships of the English fleet, armed with 38 cm. guns, to enable him either to bring quick assistance to the attacked 3rd battleship squadron in the south or, in case the German fleet should undertake one of its customary raids in the Skagerrak, to cut off its retreat at Horns Reef or to engage it otherwise so as to enable the assembled Grand Fleet to participate. The high speed of the groups under his command, all developing a speed of more than 25 sea miles, offered the best possible security for the success of one of these plans and permitted Vice Admiral Beatty in case of unfavorable circumstances to extricate himself from the difficulty.

If a large number of fast cruisers are in motion at full speed, their route is designated by a thick, black cloud formed by the smoke from the smokestacks of the various ships which, rising, is visible high up in the skies for a long time. The cruiser chase in a north-westerly direction had continued an hour when the German commander in the west and the English commander in the east discovered heavy clouds of smoke. Admiral Hipper soon

after discovered two groups of large ships which stood out in bold relief against the clear background of the western sky and which appeared to be steering a southeasterly course. He turned his ships towards this more noteworthy adversary and approached him at high speed. At 5:49 in the afternoon, when the head of the German High Sea Fleet was well within forty sea miles south, the firing of the heavy artillery began simultaneously between the two fighting lines on a south-southeastern course and at a range of 13,000 m. On the German side, Vice Admiral Hipper on his flagship Luetzow, the large cruisers Derfflinger, Moltke, Seydlitz and Von Der Tann; at a greater distance the small cruisers of the II. Scouting Group with the torpedo-boat flotillas, the latter having sighted in the west two other enemy cruiser groups with destroyer flotillas. With the English, the flagship Lion was followed by three other battle cruisers of the same class and two of the Indefatigable class. The second light cruiser squadron which had been chased by the German cruisers, had placed itself at the head of the English battle column, the 1st and 3rd light cruiser squadrons -- these were the ones sighted above -- followed with the destroyer flotillas. The 5th fast battleship squadron under command of Rear Admiral Evan Thomas, which had a position between the main fleet and the battle cruiser squadrons, approached from the northwest at high speed but was only able after half an hour to open a harmless fire at 24,000 m. range at our small cruisers, as Vice Admiral Beatty evidently attempted to get ahead with full speed in order to intercept the German cruisers' course to Horns Reef.

The action of the heavy artilleries between the two battle cruiser columns was carried on with great energy. On the German side there were forty-four 30.5 cm. and 28. cm. guns; on the English side, forty-eight 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm. guns in full activity. Salvo followed salvo. The light was favorable and the sea quiet. Hits were observed on both sides. Mighty bursts of flame with destructive effect burst forth from the smoke-clouds of the giant shell. A shower of heavy pieces from exploded shell fell upon decks, turrets, smoke-stacks and superstructures, shattering everything in its path. The great ships trembled under the tremendous force of the explosion of the salvos striking the water in their vicinity and throwing up columns of water as high as the masts. After a fight lasting a quarter of an hour, soon after six o'clock, a mighty explosion took place on the rear ship of the English line, the battle cruiser Indefatigable. A thick black cloud enveloped the ship, rose to a height of a hundred metres and veiled the gruesome destruction and sinking of this powerful ship.



This first success brought the German cruisers a noticeable relief which urged them on to the highest development of force in order to defeat the English battle cruisers before the arrival of the fast battleship squadrons. The small cruisers and torpedo boat flotillas drawn to the disengaged head of the column ("in Feuerlee") received orders to attack the enemy column. At nearly the same time, an equal number of destroyers on the other side advanced to make a torpedo attack on the German cruisers. In this manner, a heavy fight ensued at about 6:30 in the afternoon between the two flotillas advancing against each other between the battle lines, in which the small cruiser REGENSBURG participated successfully. Three English destroyers succeeded in breaking through and in firing torpedoes at the German cruisers; the cruisers, however, by skilful manoeuvring were able to evade them. Two English destroyers and two German torpedo boats were sunk, partly by gunfire, partly by torpedoes. The destroyers NOMAD and NESTOR stopped, being disabled. They were later destroyed by ships of the High Sea Fleet which passed them, after the crews had been rescued and made prisoners.

During this engagement of the light forces, the gunfire of the big giants continued uninterruptedly over them, and the position of the Germans changed materially to their disadvantage because the ships of the 5th battleship squadron commenced to reach the German rear ships with their 38 cm. guns. However, they were unable to prevent another enemy battle cruiser's being blown up; it was the third ship from the head -- the QUEEN MARY, as later established. She was hit by a full salvo; her powder magazines caught fire and finished the destruction in a moment. The sea trembled, masts and smokestacks cracked, parts of the ship, such as turrets, were shot up a hundred metres into the air; everything was wrapped within a few seconds in a thick black cloud of smoke which rose up to a thousand metres, like a mighty column of water. From the black, creeping column, red and green flashes of flame burst forth like lightning, a gruesome sight. The ships behind made a wide detour to avoid this place of misfortune and the hovering column of smoke. The battle continued in a wild chase in a southern direction -- but for a short time only.

At 6:40 in the afternoon the small cruisers of the 2nd light squadron, far ahead of the English van, had sighted the German battleship fleet hastening to the scene. Vice Admiral Beatty at once turned to starboard to course northwest in order to get in touch with the main fleet under Admiral Jellicoe whom he knew to be approaching from the northwest. The 5th battleship squadron followed this movement. The German cruisers also made a turn to the north and continued the fight with the British battleships, in which the foremost German battleships participated with

interruptions at very long ranges. From 6:50 in the afternoon, the fight drew along for an hour towards the northwest at high speed. By making good use of their superior speed, the English succeeded in drawing ahead of the German column in a wide circle, directing their fire principally against the German battle cruisers which as a consequence gradually changed their course to the north.

The weather had in the meantime undergone a change. The wind had shifted from northwest to southwest; in the north and east in the direction of the Skagerrak range of vision was greatly decreased so that the approaching main fleets, in uncertainty as to each other's positions and movements, came in contact. As soon as Admiral Jellicoe had received the report of the approach of the German fleet and of the cruiser fight drawing along in a south-southeastern direction, he placed the grand fleet at full speed on a course southeast to south, which, according to his calculations, would have to lead to a reencounter with the High Sea Fleet steering for the north. His fleet was formed in a broad front so that the battle column could be established as rapidly as possible. At the head was the 3rd battle cruiser squadron. At 7:30 the flashes of the salvos of the cruiser fight could be observed from the 3rd battle cruiser squadron in a southwestern direction, without the possibility of distinguishing the ships or even which were friend and foe. Upon this report Admiral Jellicoe, in order not to pass by the fight, countermarched and sent the 3rd battle cruiser squadron to the northwest to help Vice Admiral Beatty. In carrying out this order, these battle cruisers at 7:45 sighted German small cruisers accompanied by torpedo boat flotillas on a northerly course. The Heavy salvos of the battle cruisers caused the German small cruisers to turn away, while the torpedo boat flotillas advanced to attack the battle cruisers, forcing the latter to evade the attack (ausweichen). In this attack, the small cruiser WIESBADEN was disabled, having received a heavy hit in the engine room.

The flotillas, advancing alone on a northeasterly course, were suddenly facing the whole English fleet, which on a northwesterly course steaming at high speed, did not offer a favorable object for attack. This discovery was of the greatest importance. When the flotillas returned to their cruisers, they were surrounded by a heavy fire from the ships of the 1st English cruiser squadron and the 4th light cruiser squadron which in the rear of the Armada (steering a northern course) attacked the torpedo boats. The faster torpedo boats soon disappeared in the mist, the English cruisers now taking course toward the burning WIESBADEN, the only object remaining visible. The German small cruiser fought gallantly. In her immediate vicinity she saw within a short time the armored cruisers DEFENCE and BLACKPRINCE blow up and sink. The WARRIOR, also

heavily damaged, and the small cruisers -- except one which remained on the scene, a complete wreck, and sank later -- steamed away as fast as possible on a northern course. This terrible destruction emanated from the German I. Scouting Group which just at this time approached on a northeasterly course; with the exception of this delivery from superior numbers of the enemy, Vice Admiral Hipper could not bring help to his little comrade as he was soon after engaged with the assembled English fleet, of whose presence the announcement of the torpedoboats no longer left any doubt.

The scene of the cruiser fight just described lay between the two battle cruiser groups which had been for nearly two hours in the fight, resulting in their losing sight of each other for the time being. On the other hand, the German 3rd battleship squadron, which at the head of the German High Sea Fleet had followed the gradual change of course to the north and northeast of the battle cruisers, had taken up the running fight with the English 5th battleship squadron. About this time, out of sight of the German fleet, the two English groups which had been separated up to now, met under circumstances which caused the English commander-in-chief much painful surprise and interrupted and retarded the intervention of the battleship squadron. Shortly before 8:00 o'clock, Vice Admiral Beatty discovered an English battleship squadron and cruisers to the north about five miles off, and believing that the van of the English fleet was approaching him from the north, changed to an easterly course and advance at full speed to clear the way for the fleet and to place himself ahead. To the 3rd battle cruiser squadron, suddenly emerging from the veil of mist, he gave orders to prolong his line ahead and reported to his superior the position of the enemy's fleet. The 3rd battle cruiser squadron executed this manoeuvre under heavy fire from the German battle cruisers and was roughly handled as it was pushed closer to the German column by the approaching battleship squadron than was good for it. To be sure, Vice-Admiral Beatty hastened with his 27-knot ships to assist the hard-pushed group and opened a heavy salvo fire on the German van, but was compelled to sheer out on an east-southeastern course to avoid his own fleet, and so had to approach the German guns closer than he had before, which played havoc with his battle cruisers which had tried to keep a range of 12,000 m. The English battle cruisers kept this course for the time being and went out of sight when the German van engaged the van of the English 1. battleship squadron which, advancing from the north, emerged suddenly from the veil of mist, in a certain sense relieving the heavily damaged battle cruisers from the line of battle.

The advance of the English battleship fleet, drawn up in divisions en echelon which, as soon as Beatty's ships had been recognized to the south had countermarched, led to

the small cruiser WIESBADEN which, still burning, drew the fire of the passing enemy battleships. Without foreseeing the movements of the English fleet, the German commander-in-chief, Vice Admiral Scheer, had also headed for the WIESBADEN to protect her against the heavy fire seen in her vicinity. But the situation was cleared up very quickly; the German commander, in consideration of the seriousness of the situation in general, had to give up his intention; the English battle fleet, about on an east - southeast course, suddenly emerging from the mist met the German van at about 10,000 m. range and poured a heavy, well-aimed salvo fire over the German ships which could be much better seen against the western sky than could the English ships from the German side. It was not possible on account of the veil of mist produced by the smoke of the exploding shell and the smoke from the stacks, and also on account of the murky, rainy atmosphere, to see from the German flagship the hulls of the ships of the enemy. It was only possible to make guesses as to the strength and movements of the adversary from the flash of the salvos. The salvos of the heaviest calibres came flying from ahead, from right and left. The German fleet was capped and apparently had only one way out of this hell. The 38 cm. shells striking in the vicinity of the ships had such a powerful explosive effect that the giant ships trembled and those below deck believed their ship had received a direct hit or been struck by a torpedo. Heavy masses of water, mixed with pieces of exploded shell, large and small, fell on the decks with the crash of thunder. The mist made seeing very difficult. It was evident, however, that the fight with the English fleet had begun and that the German armored cruisers at the van had advanced to the centre of the English battle column and were exposed to an overpowering fire from all sides and that a decision had to be made quickly to improve the situation. The German commander-in-Chief gave a short order for the attack and turned his fleet towards the south. On the disengaged flank (Feuerlee) the small cruisers and torpedo boat flotillas were put in readiness.

When the heavy salvos of a battle squadron were poured upon him, Vice Admiral Hipper turned off on a southern course and opened up the running fight with the head of the enemy battle column. The heavy artillery fight was now carried from the armored cruisers to the foremost squadron of battleships, from ship to ship.

At 8:17 the flagship MARLBOROUGH (ten 34 cm. guns) of the 1st English battleship squadron (the other ships of this squadron carrying ten 30.5 cm. guns each), opened at 10,000 m. range against the German armored cruisers; the 4th battleship squadron, commanded by Admiral Jellicoe on the flagship IRON DUKE, followed at 8:30 and then the 2nd battleship squadron.

The 4th battleship squadron contained the latest ships with guns of from 30.5 cm. to 38.1 cm. calibre; the ships of the 2nd squadron carried throughout 34.3 cm. guns. The van of the battle column was reenforced by a new division with 38.1 cm. guns, and at the rear was attached the 5th battleship squadron which had not participated in the race of Admiral Beatty to get ahead of the British battle fleet. The rest of the cruiser groups and destroyer flotillas followed on the disengaged flank abreast the van. The English battle fleet represented the most powerful force which had ever been seen on the oceans. Three squadrons of eight battleships each, one squadron of five battleships and a division of three ships carried over ninety 38.1 cm., twenty 35.6 cm., one hundred and fifty-two 34.3 cm. and one hundred and thirty-four 30.5 cm. guns, thus a total of 396 guns with a calibre of over 30 cm. Compared with this, the German fleet had one hundred and twenty-eight 30.5 cm. and seventy-two 28. cm. guns.

The English battle cruisers carried thirty-two 34.3 cm. and forty 30.5 cm. guns; the German armored cruisers sixteen 30.5 cm. and twenty-eight 28. cm. guns.

The hail of shot from the English columns at times was of such terrific violence that the armored (battle) cruisers disappeared behind the columns of water and clouds of smoke arising around them and from the eyes of the ships' crews behind them. It appeared as though the English gunners tried to achieve victory not through exact firing but through the quantity of projectiles fired. The idea was not so unjustifiable as shown by a comparison of the number and calibre of the opponents. The effect of the fire was very soon felt on both sides.

At 8:30 a heavy explosion occurred on a ship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class which equalled the one which sank the QUEEN MARY; another ship of the same class ceased firing and circled, evidently in consequence of heavy damages to the steering gear. The flagship of the 3rd battle cruiser squadron, the INVINCIBLE, was severely injured and disappeared shortly back of the English front. On the German side, the flagship of Vice Admiral Hipper, the LUETZOW, against which the fire of the heaviest English calibres had been concentrated since the beginning of the battle, had suffered severely; fifteen heavy hits had literally riddled and smashed the forepart of the ship, yet she kept together and was able to keep up her speed until 8:45 in the evening. Then she had to leave the line and was left to her fate for the time being. The Vice Admiral was transferred by a torpedo-boat to another armored cruiser.

About this time, shortly before 9:00 o'clock in the evening, the torpedo-boats of the German 3rd torpedo-boat flotilla advanced from behind the armored cruisers to attack the enemy battleships; they got within torpedo range. The English flagship MARLBOROUGH received, before she could sheer out to avoid them, two hits which compelled her to leave her position, listing heavily to starboard. The other battleships were more cautious and smarter in manoeuvring to evade the torpedoes. The result was that at this point of the scene of the battle the artillery fire became silent and the opponents lost sight of each other in the clouds of smoke and powder.

After our torpedo-boats had returned from their attack, about ten minutes after nine, the English battle column which had again approached to a distance of 8000 m., opened fire against the German armored (battle) cruisers and battleships; these were silhouetted sharply against the western sky and offered the English gunners the best targets. The higher speed of the English battleships permitted them, just as in the cruiser battle, to draw their van around the German van, whereby the German column was gradually exposed to the flanking and superior fire of this part of the English column. The German Battleships met this exigency by sheering off.

The situation for the German column was at this moment unfavorable inasmuch as the stopping of the German battle cruisers and the turning off of the battleships threatened a mutual hindrance to the gun-fire. Led by the commander of the DERFFLINGER, the battle cruisers and other torpedo flotillas threw themselves at highest speed at the enemy to bring relief. A hail of shot was poured over them in their advance. They succeeded, however, in spite of counter attack by the enemy's small cruisers and destroyers, in getting within good range and forcing the English battleships to again sheer out and stop the fire.

After the torpedo-boats had returned from their attack, a second attack (Staffel) started and penetrated the veil of mist and smoke at about 9:35, but to their surprise they found no battleships but saw, principally in a northern and northeastern direction, a great number of small cruisers and destroyers.

At 9:30 in the evening the artillery fight had ceased. The German fleet, after the armored (battle) cruisers, again commanded by Vice Admiral Hipper, had returned to the head of the German battle column, and continued

its course to the south, expecting further English attacks; these, however, did not follow as Admiral Jellicoe had found it under no circumstances adviseable to expose himself during the night to the ferocious torpedo attacks of the Germans. Their performances during the day had inspired him with respect; and he was not curious to find out what they could do at night. In order to veil the retreat of the "Grand Fleet", he had designated a large number of cruisers and destroyers to form a screen behind the battleship squadrons; he succeeded in concealing his tracks as he had, an hour before darkness set in, disengaged himself from the enemy.

Admiral Jellicoe at first kept a course leading to Horns Reef, out of sight and range, and retained the battle cruisers under Vice Admiral Beatty to observe the German fleet, the battle cruisers having come up to the disengaged flank during the fight of the battleships, reenforced by the 2nd cruiser squadron, and the 1st and 3rd light cruiser squadrons. This group accompanied at 14,000 m. distance and out of sight the head of the German fleet which had been seen last at about 9:30 in a northwesterly direction on a southwestern course. About an hour later Vice Admiral Beatty sent the small cruisers forward to locate the position of the German ships. When this had been done, he advanced to within a short distance of the German column, i.e. about 9000 m., and poured for a short period an unsuccessful fire on the German ships. He then turned off with the battle cruisers and followed the "Grand Fleet" which had earlier disappeared out of sight on a northeasterly course, surrounded by small cruisers and destroyers.

After dark a similar attack was made against the IV. Scouting Group bringing up the rear of the German fleet; this attack was carried out by the English 5th (fast) battleship squadron. These attacks were evidently made for the purpose of deceiving the German fleet in regard to the retreat of the rest of the battleship squadrons and to create the impression that the defeated German fleet was being heavily pursued during its retreat. The German commander-in-chief in the meantime made preparations for the night march and the attacks to be expected from the light enemy forces, as well as the possible intervention of the battleship fleet at the break of day. Great activity was displayed on the individual ships in repairing damages sustained in the battle and preparing for a new fight. During this time the fleet steamed at moderate speed in the direction of Horns Reef.

We had to mourn the loss of the WIESBADEN and the probable loss of a good many lives.

The two last-mentioned feigned attacks of the English very probably served the purpose of enabling their small cruisers and destroyer flotillas which, according to Jellicoe's plans were to have the task of giving the death blow to the German fleet during the night, to trace the German fleet and establish the course the German ships had taken. This in itself was not a very difficult task, for the German Admiral, after the English ships had sheered off and broken off the day battle, had no other choice than to take the course to Heligoland, passing Horns Reef, in order to bring his damaged ships to safety and replenish his ammunition supply which had suffered greatly, especially on those ships at the head of the fleet which had been in the most violent fight.

The Grand Fleet steamed on an eastern course to the coast of Jutland and reached the Janner Bay in the Skagerrak where it was discovered by a naval airship at daylight. This manoeuvre was successful insofar as that our torpedo-boat flotillas which had lost track of the battleships in consequence of the early turning off of the fleet, searched in vain for the ships, although several of them had fights with some English destroyers. It was possible for the English fleet on the broad North Sea to reach its bases on the far-stretching coast of England Scotland by different courses, and it was not limited in its evasive movements as was the German fleet which was hindered in its retreat by the western coast of Jutland and had to reckon with the mines laid by the English with such great prodigality.

Soon after midnight the attacks of the English destroyer flotillas commenced, the destroyers being accompanied by cruisers. These attacks extended over the early morning hours, with short interruptions, from one to three o'clock. The attacks were made partly on the squadrons in the rear of the column and partly on the squadrons at the head. With wonderful accuracy the battleships of the squadrons involved repelled, with the aid of searchlights, the attempts of the destroyers to hit them with torpedoes. As soon as the destroyers came within the cone of light of the searchlight, they were either set afire by the rapid fire of the small artillery in a very short time, or they escaped with heavy damages and were afterwards, helpless and abandoned wrecks, found by Dutch and Danish fishing craft. An English destroyer got lost within the German lines and was cut clean through by the ram of a battleship. The collision was so violent that the keel-hole of the destroyer was firmly welded together with the bow of the battleship. The IV. German Scouting Group, made up of the older small cruisers, had an engagement with superior enemy forces shortly after midnight, taking them under fire with good effect. According to English sources, the cruisers SOUTHAMPTON and DUBLIN very probably received their honorable injuries here.



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More than/hundred English destroyers were active during the night, most of them using their torpedo tubes -- of which they had four to six -- at least once. The estimate that about 500 torpedoes were fired against the German fleet is probably too low rather than too high. In the light of the searchlights the numerous foam streaks caused by the torpedoes were discovered at the right time so that in most cases contact with the rushing torpedo could be avoided by a corresponding manoeuvre. Yet we had some losses to mourn in the night battle. The battleship POMMERN was successively hit by two torpedoes so disastrously that a heavy explosion took place which caused the complete loss of the ship and its entire crew. The small cruiser ROSTOCK was also put out of action by a torpedo. During the repeated evasive manoeuvres during the dark night, when the ships had to run with screened lights and without sidelights, the small cruiser ELBING ran athwart the column of a squadron and was rammed. Her injuries were so severe that she had to be given up like the ROSTOCK. After the crews had been removed by torpedoboats, the ships were sunk, as they could not be taken in tow because of the nature of their injuries.

The small cruiser FRAUENLOB, belonging to the IV. Scouting Group, was also during the night heavily injured by gunfire or torpedo shot; she remained and was missed.

On the English side, the losses during the night amounted to at least twelve destroyers, five of which burned up at once; three small cruisers suffered heavy damages. An armored cruiser of the CRESSY class had apparently lost herself and had approached the flagship on a bow bearing. The flagship covered her with shells, as did the ship next to the flagship. After forty seconds she burned, and in four minutes she sank.

When the morning of the 1st of June dawned and permitted a view, no enemy ship could be seen from the German Fleet, which had not yet passed Horns Reef. The "Grand Fleet" excelled by virtue of its absence. The Zeppelins which ascended in the light of the morning established the presence of the majority of the English ships in the Jamber Bay, more than one hundred sea miles from the German Fleet; another portion they located steaming to the west and the bulk of the cruisers to the northwest of Horns Reef, in the middle of the North Sea. They were also able to report the advance of a squadron of twelve battleships from the Thames; it appears, however, that this squadron had received warning from Jellicoe who had not been in a position to continue the fight. Soon after this squadron was discovered by our airships, it countermarched and disappeared; it had advanced as far as to the middle of the line Terschelling-Horns Reef.

In the night, the commander-in-Chief of the "Grand Fleet" had given his orders for the salvage of the damaged ships. Their number was not small. The new battleship REVENGE became flagship in place of the heavily damaged MARLBOROUGH (of the 1st squadron). The armored cruiser WARRIOR sank on the forenoon of June 1st, after the mother aeroplane ship ENGADINE had towed her 75 sea miles from the place of battle. Many ships were mission of which all news was lacking.

There cannot be the slightest doubt but that Admiral Jellicoe had on the morning of June 1st the time and the possibility of attacking the German fleet with great superiority and of inflicting heavy damages before it had time to reach the waters infested with English mines. This was probably his desire in order to rehabilitate himself for the day before. If he restrained himself in this respect, it is very probable that he had good reasons for doing so. In the first place, judging by the experiences of the day before when the weather conditions interfered with the efficiency of the German artillery, much more than they did with the English, he was not quite so sure of his success that he could venture the loss of a great number of battleships. The losses by German shells spoke a very plain language; it was to be assumed that the disappointment in England would be great, yet there was hope of being able to soothe them. Still greater losses would create a panic in England and could lead to the destruction of its political prestige in the whole world. If the "Grand Fleet" could not sink the German Fleet to the bottom of the North Sea without great losses to itself -- and this had been proved an impossibility on the day previous -- it would certainly be to the best interest of England to act as if it could be done at any time. The world believed it and that was sufficient for the present to rule the oceans. As the German Fleet was en route for Helgoland, it was not necessary for the "Grand Fleet" to be in a hurry to go home with its sound ships; it could, unmolested, give itself and the English public the pleasure of posing the next morning as the master of the battlefield when passing the scene of battle on the march from Jamber Bay, a pose with which the world was to be deceived as to the ill success of the English Armada.

