

OPERATIONS PROBLEM III and TACTICAL PROBLEM III

Senior Class - 1934

1858-D

OUTSTANDING FACTS (PART V)

and

CONCLUSIONS (PART VI)

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> RESEARCH DEPARTMENT Naval War College Newport, R.I. January 1934

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PART V

Outstanding Facts developed in this Problem

1. ORANGE with inferior fleet succeeded in drawing BLUE with superior fleet away from his base while ORANGE captured the base with other forces.

2. ORANGE with inferior fleet was unable to disengage from BLUE superior fleet without being decisively defeated.

NOTE: The following features affected this: (a) Action began in early morning. (b) Visibility was generally high. (c) Superior fleet was greatly superior in air force and destroyers.

3. Submarines as used were of greater value to ORANGE than to BLUE during the strategic phase.

4. Nearly all losses during the strategic phase of the problem were inflicted by air forces and submarines.

5. Neither side used submarines in the battle area except that 2 BLUE submarines got in by the end of the problem.

6. The opposing carriers were during the tactical engagement about 140 miles apart. The BLUE carriers were not bombed and the ORANGE carrier was not bombed until after about 5 hours of air operations.

7. There was no use of destroyers by either side except as anti-submarine screens.

8. Tactical mine field was used by retiring fleet. Forced slight detour on pursuing fleet at cost of 1 XCA and 2 DLs sunk in own mine field. Above detour was not important.

9. Smoke curtain placed to interrupt gunfire caused delay to pursuing fleet.

10. Use of smoke by anti-submarine screen was effective in breaking up torpedo plane attack. Note the special situation which existed, however.

11. Patrol type planes were very valuable in this area.

12. Scouting was done most effectively by aircraft.

13. No aircraft carrier used her guns during this problem.

14. No submarine used her guns during this problem.

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PART VI

Conclusions drawn from this Problem

1. The ability of an inferior fleet to break off engagement has been greatly reduced by the developments of modern naval air forces.

2. A base unable to defend itself is of no strategic value as a base. A Marine Corps Base Force should be developed to the highest possible standard of equipment, organization and training, if a situation such as faced BLUE in this problem is at all probable.

3. In the strategic use of submarines prompt initiation of their movements is vital to success.

NOTE: ORANGE lost 4 days in starting 35 submarines south from BASILAN STRAIT.

4. The concentration of submarines in restricted passages which may be traversed in one night period is not very effective.

5. The tremendous losses of aircraft suffered by both sides raise the question of whether the air operations in these problems is on a practical basis.