

18 December, 1936.

MEMORANDUM ALL CLASSES:

The summary of Lieut. Colonel Peck's lecture of 16 December; The Lessons of Gallipoli, is furnished herewith for information.

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LESSONS OF GALLIPOLI

1. The value of mines in base defense was clearly demonstrated. Mine fields should be covered by artillery fire, especially quick firing guns effective against mine sweepers.
2. The value of searchlights in the defense of mine fields was demonstrated. Ships' fire was singularly ineffective against them.
3. Submarines clearly demonstrated their value in the defense against landing attacks. A few old type submarines attached to the defense would greatly handicap the work of the attacker.
4. The casualties suffered in attempting to land in pulling boats against machine gun fire demonstrated the value of small, fast, bullet-proof boats for the leading subwaves.
5. Ships cannot be counted upon to silence coast defense guns. At Gallipoli the ships succeeded in silencing temporarily, but did not destroy, the forts. But it must be remembered that the forts were old. Kale Sultanie was built in 1463. The armament of the forts was generally antiquated and there was a shortage of the heavier armunition. Also the old forts were plainly visible and the British used direct fire. Modern defenses would not permit of this.
6. It was demonstrated that ships were most ineffective against mobile field artillery. At the same time the heavier armored ships suffered only superficial damage from these guns.
7. It was demonstrated that the ships which stood in to point blank range were the most successful in silencing machine gun fire.
8. Naval gunfire can render valuable support to attacking troops, especially on forward slopes, but its efficiency in this regard is not to be compared with that of land artillery which is especially designed for this type of work. The special system of fire control necessary for this type of operation should be previously worked out and practiced.
9. Initial landings should generally be on a broad front in an attempt to find a soft spot in the defenses. General reserves must be immediately available, and there must be flexibility in planning, in order to exploit immediately this soft spot prior to the arrival of the hostile general reserves. A general reserve is necessary in order to retain freedom of action.
10. Gallipoli demonstrates the value of the mobility inherent in sea transport, which, in landing operations, enables the attacker to retain the ability to effect tactical surprise up to the moment when he lands his general reserve.

11. Time is the essence of success in the landing attack.
12. The dangers of lack of planning and lack of training were clearly demonstrated. A landing attack is generally for limited objectives and permits of detailed planning, while the necessity of coordinating boat and troop movement with naval gunfire and air support necessitates detailed planning.
13. The danger of lack of command planning was demonstrated by Hamilton's failure to enforce his views regarding reinforcing the Y Beach landing, and by Hamilton's failure to be closely in touch with the vital operations at Suvla Bay.
14. The British Official History states: "Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915 would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to spring from one fundamental cause - an utter lack of preparation before the campaign began."
15. You cannot extemporize a landing attack.