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JUTLAND



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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.
February, 1936

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R E S T R I C T E D

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Remarks of Vice Admiral The Honorable Sir Matthew Robert Best,
K.C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., R.N., Commander-in-Chief America and
West Indies Station, and Flag Captain H. P. Boxer, R.N.,
Commanding H.M.S. YORK, and Commander A.B. Fanshawe, R.N.,
executive officer of H.M.S. YORK, upon the Battle of
Jutland.

During the visit of Vice Admiral The Honorable Sir Matthew Robert Best, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., R.N., Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies Station, to Newport in H.M.S. YORK, he kindly consented to deliver a talk at the Naval War College upon the Battle of Jutland and other war time experiences. This talk was given during the forenoon of 18 September, 1935. All War College officers were invited to attend.

Several officers attached to the YORK accompanied Admiral Best, and two of these, Flag Captain H.P. Boxer, R.N., the Commanding Officer of the YORK, and Commander A.B. Fanshawe, R.N., the Executive Officer, gave their impressions from the viewpoint of destroyer officers, of the battle.

These talks were delivered extemporaneously and were not recorded at the time. The following notes are a compilation of the personal recollections of certain War College officers of the outstanding remarks made by these British officers.

The remarks of these officers were made with the express understanding that they were not to go beyond the walls of the War College. This applies also to the following extracts from an unnamed source on Jutland.

Vice Admiral Best was a member of the Staff of Admiral Jellicoe. During the battle he was stationed in the foretop of the Fleet Flagship to keep the Admiral informed of the situation. His talk was in the nature of a narrative, no attempt being made to draw any lessons from the action. In view of the fact that approximately twenty years had elapsed between the battle and the talk, it is difficult or impossible to judge how much ideas or knowledge obtained since the battle have influenced his "memory" of the eventful day. While he voiced no criticism or praise it was apparent he did not now give his whole hearted approval of all the action taken.

The Admiral in paying tribute to the personalities in the battle stressed the fine character and ability of Jellicoe, Beatty, Arbuthnot and Goodenough. Jellicoe and Beatty both had high courage. The former through long years of splendid service had everything a leader should have. The latter was by instinct a natural leader and drew men to him by his personality.

The Jellicoe-Beatty controversy started with newspapers and was kept alive by petty subordinates. In this connection an early incident of the war is worthy of note. The press visited Jellicoe. He said to them "I am glad to see you, I am glad to have you for lunch. If you have come to see the Fleet you are welcome -- if you have come expecting me to tell you my strategy and tactics -- that I cannot do -- if I did you could not publish it, etc." At lunch two correspondents of the "Daily Mail" sat one on each side of Admiral Best. The correspondents said nothing during the meal, except that one leaned across Admiral Best and stated to the other -- "We wont forget that" -- and they didn't. They started the press campaign against Jellicoe, which lasted for a long time. All other correspondents accepted the interview in good grace.

When Churchill went north to see Jellicoe about attacking and taking Heligoland, Jellicoe waited until all had had their say and then asked Churchill: "Are you in command of the Grand

Fleet?" No more was heard of the matter.

In addition to his remarks on the Battle of Jutland, Admiral Best described the sinking of the AUDACIOUS. He was within 100 yards of her when she blew up and sank. The ship on the other side of the AUDACIOUS had three killed. On his ship they noted only the blinding flash and felt no concussion.

At the beginning of the war there was a great lack of organization in the Grand Fleet and a tremendous effort was made to whip the fleet into shape for battle. There were no "Battle Orders" covering the disposition of light forces or their tasks in battle. There were no plans for deployment or for the employment of the Battle Line. These had to be developed after war had commenced.

During the battle Admiral Best could see so little of what was going on that he took great pains to impress upon his listeners the visibility conditions of the day. Most of the time nothing was seen of the enemy. Occasionally, through haze and smoke, dim outlines of enemy ships were observed, which were fired upon. At no time did he see more than five enemy ships at one time. It was impossible for him to see all the British forces or get a clear idea of what was occurring. Ships were firing along the line but in many cases he could not determine at what they were firing. Each ship apparently fired whenever an enemy ship came in view. The IRON DUKE opened fire in the battle with common shell filled with powder, and hit one or two of the KAISER class, undoubtedly influencing Scheer to turn away. He stressed the unfortunate smoking of the battle line by the battle cruisers.

He spoke of seeing the sinking of the INVINCIBLE. At first he thought it was a Zeppelin on the water.

The Admiral spoke particularly of the functions of light cruisers. In fleet action they must get information of the enemy and transmit it accurately to the Commander-in-Chief, driving in until they get it regardless of cost.

(NOTE: It is not known whether in his remarks he considered the value of adequate contact scouting by aircraft.)

Admiral Best said that the lack of good accurate reports was keenly felt at all times, and particularly after the disappointment of missing the German fleet initially. Communications were very poor. It was difficult to read flag signals. Radio was not to be relied upon.

(NOTE: The comment on radio was evidently based upon the failure of the IRON DUKE to receive the contact reports of destroyers during the night).

The Admiral stated that the turn away of the British battle line from the threat of German torpedoes was not considered really serious at the time. (After the lecture the Admiral was asked privately if the German destroyer attack appeared to him to be a serious threat. His reply was, "Not at all, not at all, there were only nine destroyers".)

Admiral Best explained Admiral Jellicoe's dispositions for the night and the expectation that they would be adequate to contact the Germans during their retirement. When Admiral Jellicoe found that the Germans had given him the slip, he issued instructions for assembling the vessels of his fleet, and then turned to Admiral Madden, his Chief of Staff, and said: "Charles, I think that is about all. I will go to my cabin for a few hours and do not wish to be disturbed except on chance of action". That chance came and Admiral Best was given the task of disturbing him. He found Admiral Jellicoe sitting in his cabin reading a detective story.

Admiral Best spoke feelingly of the night, when even one report of contact with the High Seas Fleet would have permitted Jellicoe to intercept it after daylight. Yet reports of all the contacts of cruisers and destroyers and even of the actions witnessed by the battleships failed to reach the Commander-in-Chief. He regretted the lost opportunities of the destroyers during the night.

Captain Boxer commanded a destroyer of the Fourth Flotilla under Captain Stirling during the battle.

He confirmed the remarks of Admiral Best in regard to the visibility and said that at no time did he see more than twenty enemy ships of all types at any one time. (In a private conversation Captain Boxer said he thought one reason for lack of information in the Flagship was because the visibility was so tricky, individual commanding officers thought the Flagship could see what they saw, and did not send messages which they thought would give information already possessed by the Flagship.)

His remarks indicated that there was considerable confusion in the destroyers. Part of this confusion was caused by total failure of some radio communications and delay in others, and part was caused by lack of information -- not knowing the location of own and enemy ships -- and lack of orders.

He spoke amusingly of how in his position on the right flank of the battle line during the approach, he thought he knew more than the Commander-in-Chief and took station for deployment to right when the fleet deployed to the left, and thus found himself separated. It was some time before he joined his flotilla which remained on the starboard quarter of the battle line.

Captain Boxer said that his Flotilla made no daylight attack on the enemy. He indicated that he didn't know why, but assumed that the flotilla "was never released".

Commander Fanshawe was second in command of a destroyer of the Twelfth Flotilla during the battle.

This officer indicated in his talk that during the battle "they had a station and a course" and in the absence of orders, did their utmost to maintain both.

He said that during the night the boats of his flotilla attempted to make contact reports. Since no one knew that their next superior in command had been sunk, the calls went unanswered.

(NOTE: The ship he referred to as sunk was not distinguished).

Effect of over-confidence in the Germans, will to fight.

14. Torpedo Attacks

Difficulty of attacking by day in face of serious counter attack. Need for supporting gunfire.
Result of day attacks - 1 hit on "MARLBOROUGH" and 1 hit on "SEYDLITZ".
Several attacks never reached torpedo firing range.
Successful 12th Flotilla attack at dawn shows possibility of this form of attack at night and in short visibility.

15. Exhaustion

Effect of exhaustion both mental and physical during the night following a day action.

16. Review of the battle in the light of the Principles of War as now accepted.

17. Effect and Emotions. German

Compare utterances of Scheer in his despatch (Official Despatches, page 600), with German Official History, page 251. Naval Operations Vol. IV gives a good summary of British, enemy and neutral reaction.

"The Fatherland rejoices and gives thanks":-

"The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm" (German Chancellor).

Scheer "The Victor of the SKAGGERAK" (Austro Hungarian Attache).

BUT

"the submarine must be employed if we are not to bleed to death"
(Scheer)

"No second time" (Persius).

18. Conclusion

Admiral Pakenham's despatch. (O.D. page 159).

Analysis of Signal Communications

The periods chosen are those when the most difficult conditions obtained.

Battle Cruiser Force ... between 1420 and 1818.

98 flag signals, or 1 every 2.4 minutes for 4 hrs:

These were from S.Os. to their squadrons and not signals repeated by ships of a squadron.

"IRON DUKE"..... between 1759 and 2028.

One signal every 5 minutes for 2½ hours.

One W/T signal every 6.6 minutes.

Battlefleet & Attached Units (not B.C.F.)

129 flag signals during the same time or one signal every 1.07 minutes.

JUTLAND. Torpedo Fire from Heavy Ships.I. Torpedoes fired by Heavy Ships

Firing Ship	Time	Number Fired	Target	Remarks on Shots
LION	:1645- :1715	1	:Battle Cruisers.	:Enemy a/c 16 pts.
VALIANT	:1801	1	:Leading Battleship	:Outside Range.
MALAYA	:1805	1	:3rd Battleship.	: " "
LION	:1800- :1815	2	:WEISBADEN.	: " "
LION	:1805- :1818	3 (1 E.R.)	:High Seas Fleet.	:Possible shot. :Result unknown.
MARLBOROUGH	:1910	1	:WEISBADEN.	:Within Range(7000 ^x).
REVENGE	:1915	1	:High Seas Fleet.	: " " (8500 ^x : to cross track).
MARLBOROUGH	:1925	1 (E.R.)	:5th Battleship.	:H.S.F. Steering : directly away.
PRINCESS ROYAL	:2030	1	:DEUTCHLAND : Class.	:Outside Range :(14,000 ^x to cross : track).
MOLTKE	:1604- :1608	4	:Battle Cruisers.	:Outside Range :(16,000 ^x to cross : track).
LUTZOW	:	2	:	:
DERFFLINGER	:1916	1	:1st & 2nd : Divisions : (Presenting : Block Targets).	:(12,000 ^x to cross : track).
KONIG	:1925	1	:LION	:Within Range :(10,000 ^x to cross : track).

II. Opportunities missed by Heavy Ship Units

Subsequent movements of the Target Ships on each occasion would have given the attack a reasonable chance of success.

- 1805-1808. 1st and 2nd B.C.S. were 14,000^x ahead of the High Seas Fleet. The Grand Fleet was then deploying, and an attack would have embarrassed the H.S.F. "LION" fired 1 torpedo.
1820. 5th B.S. had good opportunity. They were on the bow of the H.S.F. 45°, 10,000^x, and even the H.S.F.'s subsequent turn to the eastward would not have taken them clear as their line was too long.
1830. The High Seas Fleet before their first 16 pt. turn away, should have directed a zone against the G.F. to endanger them should they pursue.
1910. 1st Scouting Group was on the bow of the 3rd, 4th and 5th divisions of the G.F., 40°, 12,000^x. These divisions were almost abeam of one another and made a fine block target.
1915. 5th and 6th Divisions of G.F. were on the bow of the H.S.F., 20°-40°, 13,000^x. An attack made then might have reached the H.S.F. while still in confusion at their turning point.

<u>Time of Despatch</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Message and Time of Origin</u>
8.33	INCONSTANT	S.O.,B.C.F.	S/M Lat. 56° 56' N., Long. 6° 06' E. (2030).
8.51	BLACK PRINCE	C-in-C	Urgent S/M on port hand Lat. 56° 55' E., Long. 6° 11' E. (2045).
9.30	CORDELIA		Remarks. S/M on port bow.
10.3	GARLAND	D.4	German S/Ms astern.
10.25	D.4	C-in-C	S/M 5 miles North of DRAGON FLY (sic) at 10 P.M. (2220).

Note: - Actually no submarines were present at Jutland on either side.

.....

British Battle Line

		<u>Large Calibre Rounds Fired</u>	<u>Hits re- ceived</u>
1st Divn.	((F) KING GEORGE V	9	
	(AJAX	6	
	(CENTURION	19	
	(ERIN	0	
2nd B.S.			
2nd Divn.	((F) ORION	51	
	(MONARCH	53	
	(CONQUEROR	57	
	(THUNDERER	37	
3rd Divn.	((F) IRON DUKE	90	
	(ROYAL OAK	38	
	(SUPERB	54	
	(CANADA	42	
4th B.S.			
4th Divn.	((F) BENBOW	40	
	(BELLEROPHON	62	
	(TEMERAIRE	72	
	(VANGUARD	80	
5th Divn.	((F) COLOSSUS	93	2
	(COLLINGWOOD	84	
	(NEPTUNE	48	
	(ST. VINCENT	98	
1st B.S.			
6th Divn.	((F) MARLBOROUGH	162	
	(REVENGE	102	
	(HERCULES	98	
	(AGINCOURT	144	
Total		1,539	

Note:- About 200 rounds fired at WIESBADEN.

5th B.S.	((F) BARHAM	337	6
	(VALIANT	288	0
	(WARSPITE	259	13
	(MALAYA	215	8
Total		1,099	

German Battle Line

		<u>Large Calibre Rounds Fired</u>	<u>Hits re- ceived</u>
	((F) KONIG	167	10
	(GROSSER KURFURST	135	8
5th Divn.	(MARKGRAF	254	5
	(KRONPRINZ	144	
3rd Squadron	((F) KAISER	224	
	(PRINZ REGENT LUITPOLD	169	
6th Divn.	(KAISERIN	160	
Fleet Flagship	(F) FRIEDRICH der GROSSE	70	
	((F) OSTFRIESLAND	111	
	(THURINGEN	117	
1st Divn.	(HELGOLAND	63	1
	(OLDENBURG	53	
1st Squadron	((F) POSEN	53	
	(RHEINLAND	35	
2nd Divn.	(NASSAU	106	
	(WESTFALEN	51	
	((F) DEUTSCHLAND	1	
	(POMMERN	0	1 and sunk
3rd Divn.	(SCHLESIEN	9	
2nd Squadron	(SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN	0	1
4th Divn.	(HESSEN	5	
	((F) HANNOVER	0	
	Total	<u>1,927</u>	

Battle Cruisers in order in
which they were formed in battle

<u>British</u>		<u>Large Calibre Rounds Fired</u>	<u>Hits Re- ceived</u>
	(LION	326	12
	(
1st B.C.S.	(PRINCESS ROYAL	230	8 or 9
	(
	(QUEEN MARY	150	About 5 and sunk
	(
	(TIGER	303	17
	(
2nd B.C.S.	(NEW ZEALAND	420	-
	(
	(INDEFATIGABLE	180	About 5 and sunk
	(
	(INVINCIBLE	about 88	About 5 and sunk
	(
3rd B.C.S.	(INFLEXIBLE	88	
	(
	(INDOMITABLE	175	
	Total	<u>1,960</u>	

German

LUTZOW	380	24
DERFFLINGER	385	17
SEYDLITZ	376	21
MOLTKE	359	4
VON DER TANN	170	4
Total	<u>1,670</u>	

The new enemy fired with extraordinary rapidity and accuracy, with the greater ease as regards the latter that he met with almost no opposition, as our battle cruisers were fully engaged with Admiral Beatty's ships."

The German Official History says that "the end ships of the German line were thus exposed to a regular hail of 15 inch projectiles, 'VON DER TANN' being hit almost immediately". The effect of this blow made her steering engine run hot.

The Culminating Phase.

It should be noted here that "LION's" main W/T got shot away just before 1610 (vide Red 122).

The Destroyers Move.

While all this was going on the 9th Flotilla which had been with the 2nd Battle Cruisers was between the lines and trying its damndest to get to the van. The Vice-Admiral's remarks in his report that its smoke was a very great nuisance.

In a few minutes, however, the Vice-Admiral was glad of the close proximity of these destroyers as "LANDRAIL" on the port beam of him reported a periscope at about 1610 and a torpedo was seen from "LION" passing from starboard to port. "NOTTINGHAM" also reported a submarine on the starboard beam. In his report the Vice-Admiral attributes to the presence of "LANDRAIL" and "LYDIARD" the fact that the submarine attack was not more dangerous. He thought at the time that he was passing through a submarine screen, but we now know that there were no submarines there and that the torpedo sighted may have been one of four fired by "MOLTKE"; there is also an unconfirmed rumour that it may have been one which rolled accidentally out of the tube of one of our destroyers.

The Vice-Admiral had made a signal at 1555 (Red 114) to Captain D.13 in "CHAMPION" pointing out that the situation seemed favourable for an attack, and at 1609 he ordered an attack (Red 121) but this signal does not seem to have reached "CHAMPION" till about one hour later. However, at 1615 the destroyers having got about one mile clear ahead of the battle cruisers moved in to attack.

At about 1612 the Vice-Admiral altered course about 4 points to port to close the range which was now about 18,500 yards.

The situation at about 1615 is therefore on the face of it very suitable to us. The 5th Battle Squadron is in action and you will see that our two forces are giving a good exhibition of the ideals dreamt of by the advocates of divided tactics, added to which our destroyers were moving in to the attack.

To quote the Vice-Admiral's despatch:- "From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character....Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably". Hipper says: "It was nothing but the poor quality of the British bursting charges that saved us (the Germans) from disaster".

Unfortunately in the time available a decisive result was not reached, in fact another catastrophe was soon to fall on us.

"QUEEN MARY" sunk.

At about 1626, the "QUEEN MARY" blew up. Von Hase (gunnery officer of "DERFFLINGER") who was directing his fire against the "QUEEN MARY" says of this period of the action: "The 'QUEEN MARY' had selected 'DERFFLINGER' as her target. 'QUEEN MARY' was firing less rapidly than we but usually full salvos..... I could see the shells coming and I had to admit the enemy were shooting superbly, as all eight shots fell together but they were nearly always over or short, only twice did 'DERFFLINGER' come under this infernal hail and each time one heavy shell hit her....For full salvos the enemy was firing with fabulous rapidity....But poor 'QUEEN MARY' was having a bad time. In addition to 'DERFFLINGER' she was being engaged by 'SEYDLITZ'.

"About 1626 was the historic moment when 'QUEEN MARY', the proudest ship in the English Fleet, met her doom....First of all a vivid red flame shot up from her forepart. Then came an explosion forward followed by a much heavier explosion amidships....A gigantic cloud of smoke arose, the masts collapsed inwards, the smoke cloud hit everything and rose higher and higher.

"Thus sank the 'QUEEN MARY' and as 'TIGER' and 'NEW ZEALAND' raced by her, her stern disappeared with the propellers still revolving in the air."

It was at this juncture that the Vice-Admiral made the remark about there being something wrong with our adjectived ships today and told his Flag Captain to alter course towards the enemy.

Concerning the English gunnery on the run south Hipper says: "The fire of the English Battle Cruisers resulted in no serious damage to our battle cruisers.... On the other hand the fire of the ships of the 'MALAYA' class and later of the main enemy fleet created an excellent impression. The reason for the British failure to achieve greater results is due to the defective shells, in particular to the insufficient bursting charge of the latter".

As a matter of fact the fire of the 5th Battle Squadron cannot have been particularly devastating during this period either. They were supposed to be concentrating on the two rear enemy ships "VON DER TANN" and "MOLTKE", and during the whole run to the south these two ships only are credited by the Germans with having received three hits apiece. All of these were however after the 5th Battle Squadron had opened fire.

Of the targets engaged by the battle cruisers during the run south and apart from any share they may have had in the six hits on "VON DER TANN" and "MOLTKE" they succeeded in hitting "SEYDLITZ" and "LUTZOW" three times apiece but "DERFFLINGER" got off free. In the same period the Germans claim about 29 hits on our battle cruiser squadron.

Let us examine the reasons for this:-

First and foremost we have the smoke from the 9th Flotilla of which the Vice-Admiral complains in his report.

Then there was the question of visibility. Hipper describes it as excellent from his point of view whereas both Admirals, Beatty and Evan-Thomas, refer to the very indistinct targets we had to fire at, in fact Admiral Evan-Thomas states that often the flash of the enemy's gunfire only could be seen. This is fully confirmed by the evidence of other eyewitnesses.

Here, then, is where we wanted aircraft spotting, but it is interesting to conjecture what position the spotting aircraft would have had to take up in order to get results. "ENGADINE's" seaplane had to get very close to the enemy to get material for her reconnaissance reports.

Even if the B.C.F. was not up to the Grand Fleet standard what was the reason? One reason certainly was that they had no practice area.

The Fleets converge.

The German forces put to sea at the following times:-

Midnight 30/31 - Flanders submarine flotilla to keep watch on our southern ports.

0200 G.M.T. - 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups (Hipper).

0230 " - Battle Fleet (Scheer).

Both the Battle Cruisers and the Battle Fleet cleared the minefields without incident and advanced according to plan.

Formation.

The German Battle Cruisers were screened by the 2nd Scouting Group formed on the arc of a circle of 8 miles radius. It is of interest to note that destroyers were attached to the cruisers in the screen to assist in searching strange ships. This is a point worth remembering, particularly as the Grand Fleet was delayed somewhat through the necessity for examining strange ships also done by destroyers. It adds to the already multitudinous duties of destroyers, but this duty is one apt to be forgotten about in peace practices.

The German Battle Fleet formation was a line of squadrons 10 cables apart with the 4th Scouting Group and all available destroyers disposed as a screen all round it. Advancing in line like this with their cruisers close in and not spread they were in danger of surprise, and certainly you can't say they were looking for the enemy.

The Fleets converge.

Both Fleets with the Battle Cruiser Forces in advance were now converging on a spot in the ocean just to the eastward of the GREAT FISHER BANK.

They were ignorant of each other's presence.

Of the German submarines watching our exits U.32 was the only one which succeeded in firing torpedoes. This was done at the "GALATEA" who was in company with our B.C.F. and later on U.32 made a report (Blue 9) which, as you will see, was not a very adequate one.

The other report came from U.66, whose proper station was also off the FIRTH OF FORTH but who, for various reasons, one of which was anti-submarine activities likely to be experienced in that vicinity, selected a position for himself 60 miles east of KINNAIRD HEAD, and from there he sighted our Cromarty Firth contingent and later on made his report (Blue 11). In this you will see that the northerly course reported was definitely misleading to Scheer.

We were, on the whole, fortunate as regard the outcome of the submarine plan of operations.

Had the original dates been adhered to, the Grand Fleet would undoubtedly have encountered more of the submarines and information of its movements been communicated to Scheer. In addition, all submarines would have been aware that the Fleet was at sea and therefore been on the alert off our Bases for its return. The crews would have been fresher, through being at sea less time. There is no doubt that the long wait off our Bases, during which time they were continually being harassed, detracted largely from their efficiency, and the bad weather which developed after the Battle put the final touch on their discomforts.

The Germans drew a lesson from the comparatively poor result obtained from the submarines to the effect that to be successful they must be working on the surface and in consequence be outside our patrols. Only by keeping on the surface could the submarine act conjointly against any enemy forces which might be sighted.

Admiral Scheer had received these reports from U.32, "NEUMUNSTER" and U.66 (Blue 9,10), but to use his own words:- "The reports gave no indication of the enemy's intentions. The difference in the composition of the individual units and their divergent courses did not show that they intended to cooperate or that their movements had any connection whatsoever with our operation."

Airship reconnaissance had not been possible in the forenoon, but between 1300 and 1400, 5 Zeppelins ascended for reconnaissance duties over the NORTH SEA according to plan, but they did not observe anything of either fleet, nor did they hear anything of the engagement, though L.14, according to her reckoning, was over the scene of action at 2100.

To quote the German Official History - "This intelligence in no way affected the projected plan. On the contrary, it only increased the hope that it would be possible to bring a part of the enemy's fleet to action."

Admiral Jellicoe knew even less. During the forenoon an extraordinarily worded German signal had been intercepted (Red 30). (This was really the R.A.F. practising W/T). However, about 1241 he received a signal from the Admiralty saying "German flagship was still in Jade" (Red 42). This signal was also taken in by Vice Admiral B.C.F.

Now the higher command at the Admiralty was ignorant of the fact that this signal had been sent and was, in fact, in entire disagreement with it.

Actually what had happened was that "FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE" had transferred her call sign to the 3rd Entrance at WILHELMSHAVEN (Blue 6) in the normal way when the High Seas Fleet went to sea. Thus the "call sign" had been D/Fd. and the Admiralty had told the Commander-in-Chief it was the ship herself. A mistake with far-reaching consequences. The Germans take credit in their history for this as an example of great cunning on their part. It did not, however, deceive the higher command at the Admiralty.

Both our forces were rather behind time when nearing the rendezvous. The Battle Fleet had been delayed while destroyers examined some trawlers in the line of advance, the B.C.F. on account of altering to avoid "YARMOUTH's" imaginary submarine.

In preparation for his turn to the north and his concentration with the Grand Fleet, Admiral Beatty redispersed his forces (Red 44, 45 and 46). The reasons for this movement were:-

- (a) To have his cruisers in the direction from which the enemy might be expected.
- (b) To have his whole force ready to take their places in the Grand Fleet Cruising Disposition.

Criticism has been levelled at the 5th Battle Squadron being stationed five miles to the N.N.W., (you will find it in Admiral Bacon's and Admiral Harper's books). The 5th Battle Squadron was stationed five miles on a N.W. bearing at 1010 (Red 38) and it would appear that the reason for so doing was to facilitate them fitting into their place in the cruising disposition when contact with the Grand Fleet was made. (Red 48) shows that the Vice Admiral's thoughts were concentrated on effecting a junction. The Vice Admiral no doubt looked upon the 5th Battle Squadron as a support to his Battle Cruisers, and further that his Battle Cruisers present would be able to deal with any force they would encounter which would have superior speed to the 5th Battle Squadron. The difficulty was that the 5th Battle Squadron was outside the range of flag signalling.

Then again the Admiralty signal (Red 42), made at 1230, would foster this idea that the next part of the performance would be to get into touch with the Grand Fleet. You will remember that the Commander-in-Chief provided for this in his operational signal (Red 17). Actually this separation of five miles would not have been very material had the force manoeuvred as a whole, but we will see later that this did not work out.

At 12.20 we see the Commander-in-Chief was thinking about the junction with the B.C.F. (Red 41).

CONTACT.

At 1415 the B.C.F. altered course to North by E. to join the Grand Fleet (Red 49), and at the same time the Vice Admiral B.C.F. made a signal (Red 48) warning ships to look out for the Battle Fleet.

We now get the situation of the opposing battle cruiser forces steering on similar but converging courses about fifty miles apart with the wing tips 22 miles apart. Had the British battle cruisers not altered course to the north they would have passed about 40 miles astern of the German battle cruisers, and 20 miles ahead of the German Battle Fleet.

Neither knew of the presence of the others and there was no particular reason why they should discover each other. Whether such a situation will ever happen again in these days of aerial reconnaissance gives much food for thought.

At all events it fell to the lot of a neutral steam ship, the Danish U.FJORD, to bring about the battle. She was about mid way between the screens and each side decided to have a look at her. She was sighted blowing off steam by "GALATEA" at 1410, and to quote Commodore Sinclair's despatch:- "GALATEA", in company with "PHAETON", closed at high speed. It was then found that two German destroyers had stopped the steamer and that a squadron of cruisers and T.B.Ds. were a little to the northeastward apparently steaming in various directions which made it difficult to send an adequate report.

The actual report sent was signal (Red 53) by wireless.

This was Contact.

It is of interest to speculate as to what would have happened had the Danish ship not been there. There is little doubt that contact would ultimately have been achieved and probably the German Battle Cruisers would have found themselves in a difficult position. That is the opinion expressed in the German Official History.

German Movements.

The ships sighted by "GALATEA" were the destroyers B.109 and B.110, and later the "ELBING", by whom they had been detached to examine the Danish Vessel. They formed the western ships of Admiral Hipper's screen.

After clearing the swept channels the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups had proceeded north at 16 knots, the light cruisers being spread in fan formation eight miles ahead of the Battle Cruiser Squadron.

At 1430 this advanced force had reached the latitude of LIM FIORD and the High Seas Fleet were some 50 miles to the southward.

At this time "ELBING" had sighted the "U.FJORD" and had sent B.109 and B.110 to examine her. While doing this they sighted "GALATEA" closing them rapidly and "ELBING" and B.109 made enemy reports (Blue 14 and 16).

The Opening Moves.

Directly the Vice Admiral got the enemy report he acted. His object was to get between the enemy and his base. "GALATEA's" first reports originated at 1420 (Red 51 and 53), and at 1425 the Vice Admiral made a signal to show that he would be turning to S.S.E. (Red 54). "GALATEA" made a confirming enemy report signal at 1430 and two minutes later the B.C.F. altered course to S.S.E.

The signal made at 1425 (Red 54) was passed by S.L. to "BARHAM". It is logged as being received by her at 1430. (5 mins.)

If you look at the position of the ships it is quite clear "LION" could have done this.

That "BARHAM" received this signal is proved by the fact that "FEARLESS" logs the same signal as being received from "BARHAM" at 1434, i.e., 4 minutes after "BARHAM" received it from "LION". (9 minutes after "LION" made it).

In carrying out a post mortem on these signals it must always be remembered that the time of receipt does not mean the time it reached the officer most concerned. For example, the new disposition of the screen (Red 54) was received at 1430 in "BARHAM" and at 1432 (Red 58.A) we see the 5th Battle Squadron being turned two points to port on to the port leg of the zig zag. This put "LION" only one point from astern of "BARHAM" and a westerly breeze no doubt added to the difficulties of visual communication. Had the significance of the Vice Admiral's signal (Red 54) been realised it is unlikely that the 5th Battle Squadron would have turned away. The probability is that Red 54 had not reached the Admiral in the "BARHAM" by that time and that the zig zag signals were being made at periodical intervals by some subordinate.

Then at 1432 the Vice Admiral made by flags the signal to alter course to S.S.E. (Red 58).

Earlier in the day "TIGER" had been told to repeat all signals to "BARHAM" (Red 26), but in the existing disposition was in a less favourable position to do so than "LION" herself.

The practice in the B.C.F. was not to waste much time in signalling, and the battle cruisers were trained to follow the Admiral's motions, so we may presume that they were pretty quick on to the turn.

Getting the signal passed by searchlight to "BARHAM" while the ship was doing a big turn probably took time, at all events it was not until 1440 that the 5th Battle Squadron turned to follow the battle cruisers (Red 64) and in the eight minutes which elapsed, the two forces had increased their distance from each other by five miles. Then again "BARHAM" had been told to look out in the opposite direction (Red 48) and this may have contributed to the delay in taking in the signal, ships are usually and inexcusably very directional in their look out.

Admiral Evan Thomas, in his letter to the "Times" of 16th February, 1927, attributes the delay to the fact that the signal was in the first instance made by flags only, which, under the prevailing conditions, could not be seen.

It would seem, however, that the importance of "GALATEA's" report was not appreciated in "BARHAM" nearly to the same extent as it was in "LION". Admiral Evan Thomas's despatch shows that the "enemy in sight" signal was taken in by "BARHAM". On the other hand, there is no evidence as to the time it reached him on the bridge, and it is possible that there may have been decoding delays.

"BARHAM" remarks in her record of the battle "2.38 p.m. S.S.E. 22 knots in consequence of 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reporting enemy cruiser S.S.E. at 2.35 p.m." Apparently "GALATEA's" signal at 2.20 took that time to be decoded and reported. The fact that the battle cruisers were seen to be turning, as has been acknowledged, might have led the 5th Battle Squadron to follow suit, but on the other hand the alteration might reasonably have been regarded as a move to adjust the distance from the 5th Battle Squadron from 5 to 10 miles prior to meeting the Grand Fleet and taking up cruising disposition No. 5, in which the Battle Cruiser Squadron would be stationed that distance from the 5th Battle Squadron.

Be the cause what it may, the result was that 5th Battle Squadron did not get into action against the enemy battle-cruisers until nearly 20 minutes after "LION's" squadron, and then only at a range of about 20,000 yards. Whether or not the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" might have been saved by closer support is a matter of pure conjecture, but there is no doubt that until the 5th Battle Squadron came into action the German Battle Cruisers suffered comparatively little damage from the B.C.F. Von Hipper in his report makes a definite statement to that effect.

GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

For the purpose of reconnoitring that portion of the NORTH SEA in which the Grand Fleet was known to assemble when covering a sweep into the German Bight, nine submarines were detailed, their instructions being to search for and attack enemy warships in the areas shown on the slide between 17th and 22nd May. An operational zone of 100 to 120 miles long by 15 to 20 miles broad was allotted to each boat. These areas were to be patrolled on northerly and southerly courses, in order to give the impression if sighted that they were either going to or returning from the west coast of ENGLAND.

From 23rd May onwards they were to take up positions off the enemy bases - two boats to PENTLAND FIRTH, seven to the FORTH. Each boat was to remain ten days in its sector, i.e., until 1st June inclusive. In addition to the nine boats aforementioned "U.27" was sent on 20th May to force her way into the FORTH past MAY ISLAND, to remain out fourteen days, whilst "U.47" was to patrol off SUNDERLAND, the locality that had been chosen for bombardment, remaining there till 22nd May and then proceeding to patrol off PETERHEAD. Three large submarine minelayers - U.72, 74 and 75 - were detailed to lay mines off the FORTH, MORAY FIRTH, and westward of the ORKNEYS. If, as intended, the main operations followed immediately the laying of these mines, there was a chance that we should not have had time to locate them. But even if they were discovered, it was expected that they would hamper our Fleet putting to sea. U.74 sailed on 13th May, and the others on 23rd and 24th May. UB.21 and 22 sailed on 21st May to keep the HUMBUR under observation.

U.67 and U.46 were sent on 22nd May to patrol off TERSCHELLING. U.46 had to return owing to a damaged periscope on the 30th after narrowly avoiding destruction by a torpedo from one of our submarines.

Thus there were a total of seventeen submarines co-operating with the High Seas Fleet in this operation.

Now for results. The submarines patrolling the Reconnaissance area had orders to leave the area for their new sectors off our Bases late on the 22nd, the evening previous to the date originally fixed for the main operations. Though this date had to be postponed, the submarines' orders were not altered; nothing was seen, and instead they had a long and arduous wait in their new sectors. Had the Grand Fleet come out when the area was occupied, the Main Fleet and Battle Cruiser Squadron would certainly have traversed the area.

Of these submarines U.52 got into a net 90' E. of MAY ISLAND. She freed herself, but only after sustaining serious damage to periscope and mine deflectors.

Others took up their stations and were constantly hunted by Patrols and also by submarines. Owing to narrowness of sectors it was difficult to avoid entering neighbouring sectors when being chased.

U.47 reconnoitred SUNDERLAND and reported that apparently there was no minefield in vicinity, as movements of shipping were normal. She then proceeded to her area off PETERHEAD.

U.27 detailed for patrol inside the FORTH duly arrived and made her way in past the BELL ROCK. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left the FORTH early on the 24th and were sighted by U.27 and other submarines who were not in a position suitable for attack.

JUTLAND II

RUN TO THE SOUTH

At the end of the first part we left off with the turn of our advanced forces to S.S.E. At 1432 (the same time as Admiral Beatty turned the battle cruisers), "ELBING" had become engaged with "GALATEA" and "PHAETON" and registered one hit on "GALATEA", thus drawing first blood in the Battle of JUTLAND. The shell, however, did not burst.

On receipt of the first enemy report, to quote the German Official History, the Admiral in Command of the 2nd Scouting Group "Rear-Admiral Boedicker (Frankfurt) abandoned further reconnaissance in the direction then being followed, more particularly as visibility to the northward was very good and proceeded at full speed to the westward". Hipper had at first altered to W.S.W. (Blue 15) and then to S.S.W. (Blue 23). The reason for this southerly turn is interesting and shows that we did not possess a monopoly in mistakes. "ELBING" had at 1420 tried to inform the Admirals of 1st and 2nd Scouting Group the letters forming our recognition signals, unfortunately it was received as a report of 24 to 26 battleships being in sight, and in consequence Hipper very naturally thought that a little discretion was indicated. When the situation became clearer we find him altering round to west, (Blue 25) and finally N.W. (Blue 27) in pursuit of our light cruisers. (Blue 29).

Light Cruisers in Action.

Now this is exactly what Commodore Sinclair wanted the enemy to do. His report says:-

"The 1st L.C.S. proceeded to the N.W. the Vice Admiral Commanding, B.C.F. having signalled that he was steering E and it was hoped by drawing the enemy to the N.W. the B.Cs. would be able to get in behind them".

"GALATEA" continued to report (Red 61, 63, 66, 68 and 75), and from these the Vice Admiral came to the conclusion that it was not merely an isolated unit of enemy L.Cs. he was up against. Acting on these reports he gradually hauled round to the N.E. which course he was steering at 1515. (Red 69, 74 and 81). He was on this course for about 10 minutes when he sighted 1st Scouting Group on his starboard bow (Red 91). "NEW ZEALAND" being in a more advanced station had sighted 5 columns of smoke somewhat earlier 1515 (Red 83)

The sighting of the two B.C. Forces seems to have been more or less at the same time, about 1525. Our Official History gives the Germans an advantage of 12 minutes in the sighting which is used to prove a corresponding marked advantage in visibility. I cannot find justification for so much difference in time either in the signals made or the action taken. As regards visibility - this was very patchy and variable during the day, but at this particular moment it was good enough to enable observers in the tops of the "LION" and "PRINCESS ROYAL" to see the enemy while they were still hull down, and in the narrative of the gunnery officer of the "LION" given in "The Fighting at JUTLAND" he says that at the time of sighting "It is a perfect day".

The reason why it was the B.C.s themselves who first sighted their opposite numbers was due to the fact that 1st and 3rd L.C.S. by "marching to the sound of the guns" and by closing "GALATEA" had cleared the front of the B.Cs.

In fact, at the time of sighting on a N.E.ly bearing the whole of the 1st and 3rd L.C. Squadrons were concentrating 12 miles to the Northward of the B.C.F. and only the four ships of the 2nd L.C.S. remained in company with the Battle Cruisers and were later on to prove themselves to be so useful.

This is an interesting example of the difficulties of cruiser work. Commodore Sinclair took the view that if he withdrew to the N.W. the enemy in sight would follow and so facilitate the Vice Admiral's move to get in behind them. In consequence of this he did not press his action with his opponents. Rear Admiral Napier in "FALMOUTH" decided to go to the support of the L.C.S. which he saw was already in action. As it turned out this concentration was premature and left a big hole in the screen. It also resulted in us having 8 cruisers opposed to 3 Germans, so was contrary to an order which was brought in to the G.F.B.Cs. in December '15, as regards cruisers on the A.K. line which said:- "Their forces should be economized so that more ships do not concentrate at any one point than are necessary to accomplish their object".

The ultimate effect was that the British Battle Cruisers were late in getting into line ready for opening fire, and it is interesting to note that von Hipper remarks in his report upon this delay and ascribes the failure of the British ships to open fire sooner to this fact. He also says "an earlier opening of fire would have made it possible for our adversary to get out of range at once. The enormous disadvantage under which we suffered in comparison with the English, one that cannot be remedied in the case of our present ships due to the limited range of our guns, and the superior speed of the enemy, and in spite of the excellence of our gunnery, can only be made up for in future, and then only partly, if we can use to the full the possibilities of opening fire late".

The point, however, which I wish to emphasize is that the result of any considerable 'bunching' of the screening cruisers at one point on the screen may lead to uncovering the front of the fleet and so depriving the fleet of information, and also facilitating the task of the enemy's reconnaissance vessels. X

The result, as I have said, was that battle cruisers themselves did the sighting of the enemy and so had no spare time to get into the most favorable fighting formation.

At 1521 the Vice Admiral broke W/T silence and told everyone his position, course and speed (Red 87).

Situation at 1530.

To quote from the Vice Admiral's despatch. "At 3.30 p.m. I increased to 25 knots and formed line of battle with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base our situation was both tactically and strategically good".

He was, of course, under the impression that the German Main Fleet was still in harbour. X

By this time, 1530 the 5th Battle Squadron had closed to 8 miles from "LION" as they had been able to cut the corner when the battle cruisers had altered to the northward.

According to the German history, von Hipper first judged that our battle cruisers were steering North. Their course being in fact North East. (Blue 46).

To quote the German Official History "Acting in accordance with the German plan of operations and in no way disinclined to take the proffered opportunity of an engagement Admiral Hipper determined to accept action in a northerly and therefore unfavourable direction. He ordered the 2nd Scouting Group to close".

Actually if you take the signals you find Hipper going at 25 knots to catch 4th Light Cruiser Squadron (Blue 36, 35). But at about this time he gets a further signal from "ELBING" (Blue 37). So he slows down (Blue 40). About 1525 he sighted our battle cruisers so at 1530 he recalls the 2nd Scouting Group (Blue 43) and five minutes later he alters course to South East (Blue 45). This latter would probably be when he made out that our Battle Cruisers were altering course to East so as to get astern of him and cut him off from his support. Or was it due to his seeing 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron alter course to South to take station on 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

To quote Mr. Winston Churchill: "As on January 24th 1915 he (Hipper) acted with promptitude. He turned about and ran apparently for home. But this time there were two new factors at work. Beatty knew for certain from their relative positions at sea that he could force his enemy to battle. Hipper knew that he was drawing Beatty into the jaws of the advancing High Sea Fleet. We see these splendid squadrons steaming through the water that will soon be lashed by their cannonade, each commander with the highest hopes, the British Admiral exulting because he had surely overtaken his foe; the German nursing the secret of his trap. So for a space both fleets drove forward in a silence".

There is a book called "Jutland, a plea for a Naval General Staff" written by a Major Alexander which contains more than its fair share of misrepresentation, but it does contain the rather interesting criticism that Admiral Beatty should have engaged on a Northerly course and thus have facilitated the concentration of our forces with a corresponding dispersion of the enemy forces. This, says the writer, would have been consistent with the Principles of War. Perhaps it would, but he forgets that the whole experience of the war was that the enemy battle cruisers made for home at the earliest moment and about the last thing which could occur to Admiral Beatty would be that they would follow him to the Northward. Consequently he took the obvious step of steering so as to cut them off from their base.

A seaplane from "ENGADINE" had joined in the reconnaissance. She was got away at 1508 and it was the distinction of Flight Lieutenant Rutland with Assistant Paymaster Trewin as observer to be the first two people to take an active part from the air in a full scale naval battle.

The low clouds necessitated the seaplane flying at about 1,000 feet and to close the enemy ships to within about a mile and a half to get his first report which drew a fairly heavy A.A. fire from the enemy.

The total visibility from the height of 1,000 ft. was estimated to be from 1 to 4 miles and was not sufficient to enable both our ships and the enemy to be kept in sight at the same moment. (See also additional note re "ENGADINE").

Three reports were made by W/T by the seaplane, and reached "ENGADINE" but not "LION", and "ENGADINE's" efforts to pass them on (Red 99) were unsuccessful.

At 1545 the seaplane had to descend on to the water owing to a break in a petrol pipe.

The Battle Cruisers' Report.

Practically simultaneously Admiral Hipper and Admiral Beatty informed their Cs-in-C, of the situation. (Signals Blue 46 and 53, Red 102).

At 1544 the Vice Admiral's report was amplified by one from "FALMOUTH" (Red 105). The gaps - course and speed - were filled in and with very good accuracy. The Vice Admiral confirmed this one minute later (Red 104). None of these reports gave a distance of the enemy, but "FALMOUTH" makes mention of the fact that it is unknown.

At 1545 the Vice Admiral formed his squadron on a line of bearing North West (Red 103) so as to clear the smoke. At the same time he altered course to E.S.E. (Red 108).

The enemy having altered also at 1545 together to S.S.E. (Blue 50) the Battle Cruiser Forces were converging at an angle of 4 points.

By this time they must have been well within range but it was not till 1547 that fire was opened practically simultaneously by both sides. (Red 111, 112, Blue 51).

The Action Begins.

Let us examine the situation at 1547 - the moment of opening fire. To the south and east of our battle cruisers are the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and 13th Flotilla. Well to the northward and out of range were our other two Light Cruiser Squadrons. The 5th Battle Squadron was still 7 miles to the North West and had just sighted the 1st Scouting Group. (Red 110).

Hipper's light cruisers were all astern of him and he was steering straight to join his Main Fleet.

Criticism has been levelled at the Vice Admiral for not waiting till the 5th Battle Squadron was in line before opening fire. Why should he?

The 1st and 2nd battle cruiser squadrons were numerically and individually more powerful than the enemy. His experience in the war all went to show that the chance of getting at the Germans was fleeting and had to be grasped quickly. To delay so as to get up reinforcements was not consistent with his past experiences. The C-in-C says in his despatch:- "When Sir David Beatty sighted the enemy battle cruisers he adopted the correct and only possible course in engaging and endeavouring to keep between the enemy and his base".

Why did he wait to open fire till the range was about 15000^x? The answer to this is that owing to smoke, haze or excitement the range finding conditions appear to have been indifferent. Both sides overestimated their range and the Vice Admiral opened at what he thought was 18000^x when 18500^x was the maximum range of the 12 inch ships; but in fact it must have been about 15300 yds.

The Germans were nervous of our supposed ability to outrange them and Hipper is supposed to have rejoiced to see the danger zone passed without our opening fire. The Germans, however, made the same error, in overestimating the range as is evident from the graphic description of Von Hase, the gunnery officer of "DER-FFLINGER" who says:- "The second salvo crashed out. Again it was over. 'Down 400^x' I ordered. The 3rd and 4th salvos were also over in spite of the fact that after the 3rd I had given the order 'Down 800'. "Good God, Stachow, there's something wrong. I cursed 'down 800'".

The 6th salvo, fired at 1552, straddled. The range on the clock being 11900 metres (13000^x). Starting at 18500 "TIGER" comes down 7,100 yards in six minutes and "NEW ZEALAND", starting at 18100, comes down the same amount, 7,100 yards in 4½ minutes. "PRINCESS ROYAL" on the other hand started with 16,000 yards and had only to come down 3,200 in six minutes. The change of range in these 6 minutes was about 2,600 yards. It seems that the correct opening range was about 15,300.

The Run to the South.

Four minutes after opening fire "LION" was hit twice. A minute afterwards "TIGER" was hit. About this time the Vice Admiral altered course to the southward and a parallel action developed.

This slide shows the order of our battlecruisers.

Both sides made alterations of course to disturb their enemy's gunfire. The Germans turning together and our battle cruisers in succession. The German diagram shows our battle cruisers turning together, which is incorrect.

At this time the nominal speeds were -

1st Scouting Group.	18 knots.
Our Battle Cruisers.	25 knots.
5th Battle Squadron.	24 knots.

You will see that Von Hipper was on this occasion in no particular hurry to get to safety and seemed to be quite enjoying the fight.

The mean course steered by our battle cruisers was slightly diverging from that of the 1st Scouting Group and this coupled with our increase of speed had the effect of opening the range so that by about 1615 the battle cruisers were about 18,000 yards apart.

At 1555 the Vice Admiral reported to the C-in-C, that he was in action (Red 113).

The Germans also reported to their C-in-C what was taking place (Blue 53) and asked for the battle fleet's position.

"LION" shortly afterwards received her heaviest blow, a shell entered the gun house of Q turret and burst over the left gun. It was a common shell filled H.E. (paschen). The men in gun house and working chamber were nearly all killed, but the O.O. T. Major Harvey, R.M., gave the order to close the magazine doors. The precaution coupled with the check on promiscuous supply of ammunition which was enforced by the Gunner of the ship, now Commander A. Grant, saved the ship. Major Harvey was awarded a posthumous V.C. It is sometimes stated that Major Harvey had both his legs shot off, but this was not the case.

Shortly after 1600 our first serious loss occurred. A salvo from "VON DER TANN" struck "INDEFATIGABLE" in the stern. An explosion followed and she hauled out of line sinking by the stern. The next salvo from her adversary struck her near the fore turret. A second explosion followed, she turned over and disappeared.

5th Battle Squadron.

However, a powerful reinforcement was now to come into action. The 5th Battle Squadron which had been closing up at about 1606 began firing on the rear German ship ("VON DER TANN") (Red 119) at a range of about 19,000 yards. Scheer says, "this made the situation critical for our cruisers.

Therefore let us learn from this that a fleet base in the future must have a proper practice area attached.

Another misfortune was that the battle cruiser fire distribution signal at the beginning of the fight miscarried. It was intended to concentrate the two leading ships on the first enemy ship and then engage ship for ship. Actually the concentration on the leader was effected. Our third ship, the "QUEEN MARY", took on the enemy's third ship, with the result that "DERFFLINGER" had a free shoot, for some time and until the "PRINCESS ROYAL" shifted on to her.

I have attempted to show what was intended and what actually happened in these three slides.

The Destroyer Attacks.

I have already mentioned the Vice Admiral's signals to the destroyers about attacking (Red 115 and 121) and that at 1615 their attack was started. On the way in, "NOTTINGHAM" was found to be in their course and to avoid her the divisions separated.

Hipper at the same time, or perhaps on seeing this attack developing ordered out his flotillas (signal Blue 65). To avoid the attack and being also under very heavy gunfire he turned away first of all five points (Blue 66) then two more turns each of two points (Blue 69 and 70) and for some minutes ceased fire. This had an important result, as when our battle cruisers turned to the North the enemy battle cruisers were also under helm and so unable to take advantage of the opportunity which our turn afforded them.

It is of interest to note that in spite of the existing orders, our destroyers were sent into attack with torpedoes, but that in so doing the other course of action of driving off enemy destroyers by gun fire was forced upon them.

Destroyer Action.

The "CHAMPION" did not join in the attack, but the "REGENSBURG" supporting the German flotilla gave our destroyers a very bad time.

The result of the action was the German Battle Cruiser squadron turned away twice; for 7 minutes "DERFFLINGER" did not fire a single round owing to smoke from destroyer action and partly also the fire of the 6 inch guns throwing out the control.

(The object of the attack - see p.57 (at bottom) "Fighting at Jutland".)

The torpedo result of this attack was that out of 20 torpedoes fired by our destroyers one hit was obtained on "SEYDLITZ" and one on V.27.

On the German side 18 torpedoes were fired and possibly one hit was scored on a destroyer. Each side lost two destroyers. The German Battle Cruisers and our 5th Battle Squadron turned away to avoid the torpedo menace.

The 5th Battle Squadron by turning away 2 points seem to have run the torpedoes out of range.

The clash of the opposing flotillas spoilt the effectiveness of the attacks, but our destroyers certainly constituted the greater threat owing to the determination with which they pressed home their attack. This is evident from the large turn made by Hipper.

At 1643 Admiral Beatty on receiving signal 1633 (Red 126) hoisted the Destroyers Recall but this was not instrumental in stopping the leading division of the 13th Flotilla led by Commander Bingham. They were already into close range and continued to press home their attack.

To quote the Vice Admiral's despatch, "NESTOR", "NOMAD" and "NICATOR" pressed home their attack, firing torpedoes at a range of 5000^x - 6000^x being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. 'NOMAD' was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. (This was at about 1640). Subsequently 'NESTOR' and 'NICATOR' altered to the S.E. and found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on and fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at 3000^x". "NESTOR" and "NOMAD" were badly damaged and stopped, subsequently being sunk by the German battleships who passed close to them on their way north. "NICATOR" got away.

Von Hase says:- "From numerous hits with 10.5 c.m. shell we ascertained that the English destroyers subjected us to a heavy fire. They had only taken effect in the unprotected parts of the ship. They had damaged our wireless aerials and some of the gunnery control wires in the tops. After the action an officer found an unexploded 10.5 c.m. shell in his bunk".

Quote from Fighting at Jutland - "NESTOR" and "NOMAD".

"PETARD", "NERISSA" and "MOORSOM" also completed an attack before rejoining "CHAMPION".

The results of the British attack show clearly the value of taking the initiative at the earliest opportunity. In this case it was not taken full advantage of owing to delay of "CHAMPION". It also clearly indicates that the turn away avoiding movement was accepted both by ourselves and the Germans.

The High Sea Fleet Appears.

While Hipper was expecting to sight the High Sea Fleet at any moment, the Vice Admiral on the other hand had still no reason to think that the German Battle Fleet could be in these waters (vide Admiralty signal Red 42). Suddenly, however, the whole scene was changed. "SOUTHAMPTON" scouting ahead of the B.C.F. at 1630 reported an enemy light cruiser and three minutes later 1633 reported by S/L "Battleships S.E." (Red 125 and 126). What she had seen were the leading ships of the High Sea Fleet.

Scheer's Movements.

Scheer was coming north at 15 knots, when at 1535 he got Hipper's first report (Blue 46). Believing he had only a detachment of our fleet to deal with he at once went on to full speed (Blue 49) so as to reach Hipper and on receiving Hipper's amplifying report (Blue 55) he altered first to North West and then to West (Blue 56 and 61). The idea being to get between the British Battle Cruisers and their base at the same time squeezing them between the High Sea Fleet and the 1st Scouting Group. At 1620 "FRANKFURT's" signal (Blue 62) put a different aspect on the situation and Scheer decided to alter course so as to close Hipper as quickly as possible, (Blue 63). At 1630 he sent a reassuring message to Hipper to let him know he was coming north to him at 15 knots (Blue 68). The maximum station-keeping speed of Mauve's squadron was 16 knots. That is how Scheer came to be where he was at 1633.

The Battle Cruisers.

The Vice Admiral on receipt of "SOUTHAMPTON's S/L signal at once altered towards "SOUTHAMPTON". (Note value of a visual signal). Practically simultaneously he made out the masts and funnels of the lone line of the enemy's Battle Fleet. The Vice Admiral at once grasped what it meant and swung round in succession 16 points to starboard and when round steadied on North to close the C-in-C by the quickest route (Red 130).

The roles of the British and German forces were now reversed, The Germans were now in hot pursuit of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, all unaware of the proximity of the Grand Fleet, and Admiral Beatty was nursing a secret similar to that of Hipper earlier in the day.

Commander Gill, U.S.A., gives a good appreciation of this situation. He says: "Sighting Scheer's battleships presented to Beatty an enlarged situation. Up to now his object had been to cut off and destroy Hipper's detachment. The unexpected advent of Scheer, however, made the destruction of the German battle fleet the primary object. Henceforth Beatty's essential mission was to maintain contact with Scheer, and keep Jellicoe informed of the enemy's course, speed and formation, so that the Grand Fleet might be brought into action quickly and effectively. In other words instead of it being Admiral Beatty's own private battle it was now evident that it was the full scale affair and the role of the B.C.F. was changed from that of the striking force which they had by custom assumed, to that of a reporting and reconnaissance force".

The Battle Fleet reported.

At 1638 both "SOUTHAMPTON" and "CHAMPION" made reports by W/T (Red 127 and 129). On receipt of these there could be no question in the mind of the C-in-C that the enemy B.F. was out and coming north. But the "position of own ship" in the reports was different by about 22 miles, whereas they were within a few miles of each other in reality. As the battle cruisers steadied on their northerly course the Vice Admiral whose W/T was not working told "PRINCESS ROYAL" to report, which she did at 1645 (Red 133 & 134). "SOUTHAMPTON" after her first report stood on to the S.E. Sir Julian Corbett says "Commodore Goodenough elected to regard the General Signal (to turn 16 points) as not overriding his primary duty as the eyes of his chief He was bent on reporting every detail and if possible making a torpedo attack". At any rate he got to 13000^x before he turned and it was not till then when the Germans saw his ship had 4 funnels that they opened fire, and in so doing he was able at 16.48 to make a really good enemy report. (Red 138) amplified by another at 1700 (Red 144). Admiral Bacon in his book does not exaggerate when he says that Commodore Goodenough's conduct throughout the battle was a model that may well be studied by scouting Admirals of the future.

Hipper's Movements.

We left Hipper making a drastic turn away under cover of the attack of the German 9th Flotilla. At 1641 he resumed his southerly course, this being one minute after our battle cruiser started their 16 point turns. The 1st Scouting Group were therefore carrying out a turn of about 8 points at the time our battle cruisers were turning in succession, which no doubt reduced the gunfire which otherwise might have been expected to be developed on to the turning point. At about 1645 the 1st Scouting Group sighted the van of their fleet and at 1657 the 1st Scouting Group turned 16 points in succession to starboard which synchronized with the turn of our 5th Battle Squadron.

The turn of the 1st Scouting Group ran them into the danger zone of the torpedoes fired by the 13th flotilla and, on the turn, "SEYDLITZ" was hit (Blue 69, 70, 71, 72 and 78). The torpedo which hit was probably fired by "PETARD".

To cover the turn of the German Battle Cruisers, the 11th $\frac{1}{2}$ Flotilla made an attack on our 5th Battle Squadron and fired 7 torpedoes.

The German account says:

"Although the chances of hitting were very favourable, because the hostile battle cruisers and battleships were passing one another during the attack, yet not one of the torpedoes apparently took effect".

The attack was made by six boats at a range of 8,700 to 9,800 yards and it is interesting to notice that each destroyer was rationed to 2 torpedoes. If the chances of hitting were very favourable it might have been better policy to have gone all out on it.

The 5th Battle Squadron's Turn.

When the Vice Admiral at 1640 was making his general signal to turn 16 points the 5th Battle Squadron were 8 miles to the northward. The signal was made by flags and apparently by S/L to "SOUTHAMPTON". There is no trace of "NEW ZEALAND" as rear-ship having passed it by light to "BARHAM". At any rate 5th Battle Squadron although they saw the Battle Cruisers turn held on as they were. It must be remembered that they were fighting a perfectly good action and were unaware of any reason to turn. The Rear Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, would not yet have received "SOUTHAMPTON's" first enemy battleship report made at 1633 by S/L to "LION". As "LION" and "BARHAM" approached the Vice Admiral signalled to 5th Battle Squadron to turn 16 points in succession to starboard (Red 139) i.e. away from the Battle Cruiser Squadron.

There is some doubt as to when this signal was hauled down. If Mr. Churchill has the correct information it was still flying at 1653 when the two squadrons were abeam of each other, and of course the executive for the manoeuvre would be the hauling down of the signal. The 5th Battle Squadron started their turn at 1657, by which time shell from the German battlefleet had started to fall round him. This was the first intimation the Rear Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, had that the High Sea Fleet was in sight. In the interval they got 3 miles astern of the Battle Cruisers and well within range of the leading German Battleships.

The turning point became a most unhealthy area and was the point of concentration from all the German battleships within range. No ships were actually hit during the turn. "MALAYA" anticipated the turn a little as she saw what was in store ahead and this may have saved her some punishment.

It does seem that a turn together would have had a distinct advantage over a turn in succession at this juncture, but

- (a) the Vice Admiral definitely ordered a turn in succession, and
- (b) a turn together would have put the Vice Admiral in rear.

The delay of the 5th Battle Squadron in turning enabled the squadron to inflict considerable damage on the German Battle Cruisers, and the head of the German line during the run to the North, and by drawing the fire of the High Sea Fleet covered our four remaining battle cruisers.

In passing judgment on the two much discussed turns of the 5th Battle Squadron we must remember that they had never before worked with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and that the idea of divisional freedom and initiative was perhaps still not fully understood.

Shortly after the turn "MALAYA", our rear ship, soon had salvoes falling round her at the rate of six a minute and was twice so badly hit below the water line that she began to list.

British Light Cruisers.

The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons had by now found the Battle Cruisers again and formed in ahead of them on the run to the North.

"ONslow" and "MORESBY" who had been screening "ENGADINE" were on their way south, had come under fire from the 2nd Scouting Group. "MORESBY", however, carried out a torpedo attack on the 1st Scouting Group without result.

The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was still astern of the 5th Battle Squadron (German diagram wrong re formation). They were subjected to a very severe fire but were not hit. This is attributed to intelligent zig-zagging.

Admiral Scheer does not give much credit to the able way the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron dodged the fire. He says "their vague and purposeless hurrying to and fro led one to think that our fire had reached them and that the action of our warships had so surprised them that they did not know which way to turn next".

The C-in-C's appreciation.

What had the C-in-C, been doing while all this was going on?

When he intercepted "GALATEA's" first enemy reports at 1420 he was still 12 miles to the westward of his rendezvous. Remember he had been proceeding at the economical speed of his destroyers and searching trawlers en route. Now this 12 miles represented 36 minutes at 20 knots. In the action which followed where time was everything these 36 minutes would have made a profound difference. I think Admiralty signal Red 42 has its share of blame for this. The signal giving the position of the F. der G. as in the JADE lulled the C-in-C. as it had done the Vice-Admiral into a sense of false security. Directly "GALATEA's" reports came in he ordered steam for full speed (Red 62). On getting further reports he increased to 18 knots at 1455 and went to B.J.I. (Red 70 and 73). He followed this by ordering the screen to get 16 miles ahead (Red 78).

The margin of speed of the screen over the battlefleet was not great and they never succeeded in getting more than 12 miles ahead of the Fleet. Some of this was lost in various activities when nearing the scene of action with the result that at the critical moment of contact the screen was only about 6 miles ahead of the fleet.

On receipt of an Admiralty Directional he opened out to maneuvering distance and increased speed (Red 79 and 85). Three minutes after he received "NOTTINGHAM's" smoke contact report (Red 90) he broke W/T silence and informed the S.O.B.C.F. of his position course and speed. (Red 92). Directly he heard S.O.B.C.F. was in action (Red 113 and 117) he went on to 20 knots (1556) i.e. maximum station-keeping speed.

Shortly afterwards he ordered 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to support the Vice-Admiral (Red 120). Actually Admiral Hood had anticipated this. At 1511 he had gone on to 22 knots and steered E.S.E. so as to intercept the forces the B.C.F. were apparently chasing to the northward. He had reported his course and speed to C-in-C. at 1515. At 1545 he had altered to S 26 E but did not inform the C-in-C.

From 1555 to 1638 the C-in-C. received not a word of information as to how the action was progressing "LION's" main W/T was shot away, and "PRINCESS ROYAL" informed at 1610.

Having heard nothing for a bit the C-in-C. asked 5th Battle Squadron at 1617 if they were with the B.C.F. and was reassured (Red 123, 124).

Thinking no doubt that the appearance of the German Forces in the area presaged an attempt to get raiders through, the C-in-C. ordered the 10th Cruiser Squadron to take up the Eastern Patrol at 1638 (Red 128). The Grand Fleet were then in a position of cover for the 10th Cruiser Squadron.

It must have been about now that he got the various enemy Battle Fleet reports and at 1647 we see him making the signal informing the fleet of the situation (Red 137). Four minutes later at 1651 he made the momentous signal to the Admiralty "Fleet action is imminent" (Red 141).

Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Squadron's signal 1645 (Red 134) as received gave the C-in-C. the impression that the entire German High Sea Fleet was out, instead of the actual number, 22 ships. He expected "BADEN" and "HINDENBURG", also the 8 Deutschland's and possibly other ships.

As Sir Julian Corbett says: "everywhere as the long-despaired-of news was whispered through the air and sped along the wires excitement grew. Dockyards all round the coast were astir and tugs were getting up steam to assist crippled ships, and nowhere was the tension higher than in the squadrons that were still in port". These were as you know 3rd Battle Squadron and Harwich Forces.

The Southern Forces.

The signs of liveliness had not passed unnoticed by the Admiral Commanding 3rd Battle Squadron and also Commodore T. The former got under way and proceeded to the Black Deep (Red 143). The latter had been "champing at the bit" and at 1645 asked the Admiralty for instructions. (Red 135). Just after despatching this he intercepted the "SOUTHAMPTON's" report of the Battle Fleet (Red 127). This was too much. Out he went at 1715 and reported the fact (Red 149). His signal crossed one from the Admiralty in reply to his previous telegram (Red 148). Not to be put off he carried on only to be peremptorily ordered back at 1735 (Red 155). He therefore returned to HARWICH.

If Commodore T. had been allowed to proceed at this time he could have arrived off the enemy's southern swept channel into the BIGHT at daylight June 1st, (but as we shall see the Germans did not go back that way).

You remember that at 2235 on May 30th, i.e. about the time the Grand Fleet sailed, the Admiralty gave orders to Commodore T. that at daylight on May 31st he was to be at 1 hour's notice and to send 8 destroyers to the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Swin (Red 20). This time represented the latest time Commodore T. should sail to be able to make contact with the B.C.F. at the 1400 R.V.

In order to be able to join the Grand Fleet before dark Commodore T. should leave HARWICH by 0500. We find him therefore at 0450 on 31st reminding the Admiralty that he had received no orders. (Red 29). The reply was almost rude. It referred him to the previous Admiralty telegram and repeated the orders to remain at one hour's notice. (Red 29).

It is difficult to know why the Admiralty kept this force of 5 light cruisers and 20 destroyers in harbours more especially in view of their letter of 14th November 1914 (M03177/14) in which they promised that the Harwich Force would be despatched on learning from him that a Fleet action was imminent. One theory is that, owing to the long interval which had elapsed since the Admiralty had definitely stated their intention, the promise had been entirely forgotten. However, they did keep them back, and one can only assume it was the good old invasion bogey. But why? They knew the night before that the 2nd Squadron were going with the High Sea Fleet.

Reflections on the Run to the North.

Those who criticise the actions of the battle cruisers make capital from the fact that they did not maintain touch with the enemy during the whole of the run north and that the Vice-Admiral was unable to report the whereabouts of the enemy battle fleet when he got into visual touch with the Commander-in-Chief.

As regards the first point, our battle cruiseers were out of touch with enemy forces for half an hour; the visibility, however was variable, and at 1725 the Vice-Admiral realized that he had to turn more to starboard to get into touch again.

At 1727 the Vice-Admiral told the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to get in touch with the enemy battle cruisers, and at 1747 light cruisers were ordered to attack the enemy battle cruisers with torpedoes (Red 166) - but they ran into the cruisers ahead of our battle fleet before they could develop the attack. It might seem from this that the Vice-Admiral was more concerned with fighting the enemy battle cruisers than with reporting their battle fleet. In this respect it is significant that Von Hipper's full title was Chief of Reconnaissance.

As regards reporting the enemy battle fleet it would seem that the 5th Battle Squadron could have provided the required information, but in this respect it must be remembered that "BARHAM's" W/T gear had been shot away during the Run to the North.

As the result of this run to the northward an interesting misconception arose. The Commander-in-Chief in his report on the Battle says that the German 3rd Squadron developed an unexpected turn of speed as they were able to keep up with the 5th Battle Squadron. Actually this was not the case. Admiral Evan Thomas could not haul to the westward as he wanted to close the Grand Fleet. On the other hand, Scheer was steering a converging course and so, although the range was not opening, the Germans were, in fact, dropping in bearing.

Another interesting point arises. The course steered by our squadrons was by no figment of the imagination the one for their bases. Why did not Scheer tumble to this and realize they were falling back on their supports? In appreciating the situation perhaps it was overlooked.

There is one point which has struck me and which I have not seen mentioned anywhere else, and that is whether it would not have been to our advantage if our battle cruisers and 5th Battle Squadron had steered much more westerly and so drawn the enemy further from his bases. We know that Scheer was all out for following up (Blue 81, 85, 86), and it seems that every yard of westing would have been to our advantage.

"CHESTER" and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron engage the 2nd Scouting Group.

Before considering the problem as it presented itself to Admiral Jellicoe, I must first refer to the activities of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.

They had proceeded at 1510 to the Support of our B.C.F. first of all steering so as to cut off any enemy forces escaping into the SKAGGERACK, but on hearing that enemy battle cruisers were present they had altered course to S.S.E. to join up with "LION".

As, however, "LION's" reported position was to the eastward of her actual position, coupled with the fact that LION" had turned 16 points and had not reported it, the course set by Admiral Hood was taking him well to the eastward of the fight. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron had "CANTERBURY", "CHESTER" and four destroyers in company. "CANTERBURY" was about five miles ahead; "CHESTER" about five miles W.N.W., where she had been acting as a link between the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and the Grand Fleet screen. As the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron drew ahead "CHESTER" was unable to maintain this visual link, and at 1607 the Senior Officer of the Grand Fleet screen reported to the Commander-in-Chief that "CHESTER" was out of sight.

At 1727 "CHESTER" heard firing on her starboard side and turned to S.W. to investigate.

Six minutes later she sighted a three-funnelled cruiser and a destroyer on her starboard bow. She got no reply to her challenge, and "CHESTER" altered course first to west and then to north. By the time she had altered course to north, two other cruisers were sighted astern of the first one to be sighted, and the enemy opened a hot and accurate fire on "CHESTER" to the extent that within five minutes three of "CHESTER's" guns were out of action, and she made off at full speed to the north-east. She had bumped into the 2nd Scouting Group.

Admiral Hood, hearing the firing, turned to north-west, and at 1750 the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opened fire on the 2nd S.G. Within five minutes the "WIESBADEN" was crippled, "PILLAU" and "FRANKFURT" badly hit. That shook the 2nd Scouting Group, and they made off to the southward.

The 2nd Scouting Group made enemy reports (Blue 98, 100, and 101), in which the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron are reported as battle ships.

This, you will remember, occurred at a moment when Hipper had already more trouble on his hands than he wanted, and no doubt added weight to the evidence which decided him to turn round and close his battle fleet.

Effect of the appearance of 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron on Scheer.

This report of battleships had also a considerable influence on Scheer's actions, as we shall see later.

The unexpected appearance of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron had the effect of drawing off from our battle cruisers the attack of the German flotillas ordered by Hipper's signal (Blue 96). In its first stages it gave Admiral Hipper the impression that the whole Grand Fleet was ahead of him and caused him to fall back on his battleships; when he again turned to the north-east he was attacked by destroyers. Scheer in his despatch reports that 2nd Scouting Group shortly before 1800 encountered "several battleships including "AGINCOURT", so it is evident that he also in his turn was led into a serious miscalculation of the relative position of the Grand Fleet.

Actions between Light Forces ahead of 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Scouting Group.

First of all five boats of the German 12th half flotilla attacked at a range of about 6,500 yards. They only succeeded in firing six torpedoes, one of which was aimed at a destroyer.

"LION" reports the bearing of H.S.F.

As soon as "LION" was in sight the Commander-in-Chief asked where the enemy battle fleet was (Red 180) and was told that the German battle cruisers bore south-east.

Getting no immediate reply about the battle fleet he repeated the signal nine minutes later. Four minutes later, "LION" was able to report the enemy battle fleet bearing S.S.W. (Red 180).

This was backed up by a signal from "BARIAM" also received at 1814 (Red 188) but neither report gave the vitally important information of the enemy's course.

Just previous to this the Commander-in-Chief had received "SOUTHAMPTON's" 1750 (Red 171) from which it was assumed that the German battle cruisers were astern and not ahead of their battle fleet.

Never in history, I suppose, has a Commander been required to make up his mind with more rapidity as to how the battle was to be fought and on such scanty and contradictory information. The decision taken resulted in a situation almost incredibly favourable to our fleet.

The German Official History says of this period (p:98):
"Large masses of smoke from the hundreds of ships making at full speed for the scene of battle..... already lay between the lines. Before a light south-westerly breeze these smoke clouds drifted to the north-east, where they combined with the artificial fog put down by the 2nd Scouting Group and Torpedo Boats, to form an impenetrable pall, pierced only here and there by the flash of salvoes, the detonation of hitting shells and flames from fires and explosion."

Scheer's inner thoughts at this moment would be of interest had they ever been recorded. Instead of being in a position to concentrate on our battle cruisers and 5th Battle Squadron, over which his forces had already achieved considerable success, he suddenly finds himself running into our main fleet apparently deployed across his line of advance, he had his own fleet strung out in the worst possible direction and all his advanced forces had been driven in. The version in his book is "There was never any question of our line wearing round to avoid an encounter. The resolve to do battle with the enemy stood firm from the first." One might add "But did not last many minutes".

As a matter of fact, our battle ships were not yet across his line of advance, but the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron had been wrongly reported to him as battleships, and it was from the east and South-east that Scheer expected their intervention.

Loss of the "Defence".

You will remember that just before six o'clock "CHESTER" got entangled with the 2nd Scouting Group and the situation was saved by the opportune arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron which caused the 2nd Scouting Group to make off, leaving the "WIESBADEN" partly crippled. At about 1747 some of the 1st Cruiser Squadron ahead of the fleet sighted the 2nd Scouting Group in retirement and at about 1800 "DEFENCE" and "WARRIOR" turned to starboard in pursuit, engaging the "WIESBADEN" hotly. In so doing they cut

across the bows of the "LION", who had to alter course to port to avoid a collision. "DUKE OF EDINBURGH" could not get across the bows of the battle cruisers, so turned to port and held on towards the van of our battle fleet. "BLACK PRINCE" was soon to turn to the westward, and her subsequent movements are unknown.

Intent on making an end of the "WIESBADEN". Admiral Arbuthnot closed her to 5,500 yards, and in doing so was suddenly confronted with the German battle cruisers and battlefleet at less than 8,600 yards range. "DEFENCE" was overwhelmed with fire and sunk immediately, and "WARRIOR" made off to the westward to avoid a similar fate. She was shielded a few minutes later by "WARSPITE's" involuntary turn, to which I will refer shortly, and was able to make good her escape for the moment. Ultimately and after a brave effort on the part of "ENGADINE" to tow her home, she had to be abandoned in a sinking condition in the early hours of the morning.

Criticisms are sometimes heard as to Admiral Arbuthnot having made a Berserk rush at the enemy. Be that as it may, the 1st Cruiser Squadron was fulfilling its role of denying to the enemy information of our fleet, by driving in the enemy's advanced forces. Knowing what one does of Sir Robert Arbuthnot I think one can say without hesitation that if this was his conception of his duty he would have carried it out even if he saw that it must entail coming under the fire of the enemy battlefleet, actually he could not have known how close the German fleet was to him.

Consideration of reporting omissions and errors up to the time of deployment.

Let us consider for a moment the enemy reports which were made, so as to extract what experience we can from them. In the first place it must be remembered that the units making the reports were, generally speaking, those with the most experience of fighting of any of our forces.

"GALATEA's" signals of the first sighting gave fairly full information. In the important one made at 1420 (Red 53) she was, however, unable to make out the enemy's course and gave no idea of distance. The ships originally supposed to be cruisers were eventually reported by her to be destroyers at 1430. In most of the reports which follow from "GALATEA" and "FALMOUTH" the information except for the distance to the enemy is given; there was, however, a difference of about six miles in the D.Rs. of the two ships.

Then if you look at the Vice-Admiral's signals at 1545 and 1555 (Red 107 and 113) the difference in position represents one mile on a westerly course, whereas in actual fact he had gone two miles on an easterly course in the interval.

I have tried to show in the diagram (Appendix p.88D) the situation of the enemy battlefleet as it would have appeared to the Commander-in-Chief. The course shown is that of the leading German battleship worked up from their report.

First of all you get the separate reports of "CHAMPION" and "SOUTHAMPTON" at about 1638 (Red 129,127) from which two positions of the enemy battle fleet would be deduced differing by about 20 miles. "CHAMPION's" D.R. being 12 miles too much to the north and "SOUTHAMPTON's" about 13 miles too much to the east.

"CHAMPION's" estimation of the enemy's course was a poor shot, E.N.E. instead of north by west.

This difference between "CHAMPION" and "SOUTHAMPTON" emphasises need for Reference Positions. The Commander-in-Chief made Reference Position signals at 0800, 1200, 1530 and 2145, but there is no record of any such signal having been made in the B.C.F.

The Vice-Admiral made his 1515 position by ^{miles} W/T at 1521, (Red 87), this, however, was addressed only to Senior Officers of Squadrons and does not seem to have been acted upon as a Reference Position.

There would, of course, have been a difference between the Reference Positions of the two forces, but the reports from any one of the units should have been much more consistent had such a system been employed in the Battle Cruiser Force.

Then the positions given in "SOUTHAMPTON's" three signals 1630, 1638 and 1646 (Red 125, 127 and 138) give her a speed of 60 knots between the first two and 45 between the last two.

The Vice-Admiral's signal 1645 (Red 134) is a near approximation of the enemy's position. I cannot quite make out how the D.R. is arrived at, it is about five miles more easterly than the position worked up from the earlier ones. The effect of this would be to neutralize "LION's" actual easterly D.R. error and so give a nearer approximation to the enemy. Unfortunately this signal arrived in a garbled condition.

The Admiralty D.Fs. were not bad, but would probably not have been given so much weight as reports from ships in contact with the enemy.

On the run north "SOUTHAMPTON" continued to give vitally important reports, in which, however, her easterly error in reckoning is apparent; but she made a bad break in her signal 1750 (Red 171) in signalling southwest when north-east was intended. This added to the difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief in sizing up the situation.

The Vice-Admiral made no report of the enemy on his way north and did not, in fact, maintain touch with the enemy consistently throughout this period so was unable at once to answer Commander-in-Chief's "Where is the enemy's B.F.", made at 1801. Neither did he inform the Commander-in-Chief that he was himself proceeding towards the Grand Fleet.

The 5th Battle Squadron who were in action with both the enemy's battle fleet and battle cruisers, made no report at all.

"LION's" signal made to the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at 1806 giving his position; the latitude is one degree wrong. This error would, however, be obvious.

A summary of the reports made is as follows:

Between 1420 and 1535 there were ten reports of enemy light cruiser forces. Then from 1540 to 1550 there were six reports of enemy battle cruisers.

Now follows a reporting silence of 39 minutes. From 1638 to 1700 we get five reports of the enemy battle fleet, three of them being made by "SOUTHAMPTON".

Then follows another silence of 40 minutes.

Between 1740 and 1803 there are three reports from "SOUTHAMPTON" and several indefinite reports from other ships, reporting gun flashes, etc.

One can imagine the Commander-in-Chief's feelings during the two silences, but the only outward sign of anxiety or impatience is the signal to the 5th Battle Squadron made at 1617 asking them if they are in company with our Battle Cruisers (Red 123).

No report was made either by "CHESTER" or by Admiral Hood in the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron of his action with the 2nd Scouting Group. On the other hand "DEFENCE" reported as best she could at 1746 (Red 165) and the Captain of the "WARRIOR" laments in his report that the visibility prevented him from getting data for making a useful report of the enemy battle fleet when they came in sight.

(Demonstrate "Situation as viewed by C-in-C".)

What do we get from this? Firstly, that position errors are likely to occur. The present system of Reference Position should improve matters in this respect, but in spite of this it is no easy matter to serve up the D.R. exactly correct at the right moment.

Then there is the importance of establishing the visual link between two separate groups of ships, as soon as contact is made.

The system of showing a ship's position by a minute circle is liable to give a fictitious appearance of accuracy. Navigating officers might give this point consideration. Why not indicate the ship's position by a circle, the radius of which is the Navigating Officer's estimation of the probable accumulated error?

The opportunity to do this occurred at 1733, when "BLACK PRINCE" and "FALMOUTH" sighted each other. We see that "FALMOUTH" passed on her latest information to "BLACK PRINCE" (Red 156). In this case, however, it would have been very difficult to correlate the D.R.s of the two units as it has since transpired that "BLACK PRINCE's" position as signalled in Red 163 was seven miles out relative to "IRON DUKE". "FALMOUTH" should, however, have known her relative position from "LION" fairly accurately as they had been in sight of each other at 1700.

Again there is the importance of reporting the enemy movements which you can see and which it is likely the Commander-in-Chief is likely to require information about. Lastly, it is evident that in the excitement of the moment it is not easy to make a complete and accurate report.

To my mind this last point indicates the necessity of having a regular reporting discipline. Only by discipline can you guarantee that personnel will function correctly at the first excitement of sighting an enemy. The procedure for making the report should be so well-established that the risk of forgetting any part of the report or of making an avoidable error in position is eliminated.

A photo of "DERFLINGER" shows that the number of hits does not tally exactly with the German Official History, but the point of interest is that only one hit is shown on the starboard side, that is during the run to the South. "KONIG" was drawing so much that she could not get over the AMRUM BANK until 0930.

On our side.

"WARRIOR" in tow of "ENGADINE" was abandoned at about 0700 on 1st June because of her bad condition and the rising sea. She was not sunk, as her Captain thought she might be picked up when the weather moderated. The doubt whether or not she had sunk caused the C-in-C. some apprehension, and at 1545 he sent the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to search for her, and, if impossible to salve her, to sink her. But she was never seen again.

"SPARROWHAWK" had her bow and stern cut off, and at 0400 "MARKSMAN" started to tow her stern first. This was, however, abandoned, and she was sunk by gunfire.

Our other damaged ships got home safely, but submarine attacks were made both on "MARLBOROUGH" and "WARSPITE" before they reached safety.

Summary

Now I will embark on some general observations.

The loss in capital ships on the British side was out of all proportion to the German losses, compared hit for hit.

Referring to the Run to the South, Brassey's Naval Annual of 1924 points out that in previous wars "weaker squadrons have from time to time gained some advantages in a fleet action, but there is no precedent at all for a British squadron superior to its opponent in speed and gun-power being outfought and practically defeated in 53 minutes".

The causes of this come under five headings:-

- A. Adverse conditions of visibility. If the form shown in previous actions of the war goes for anything, this factor is probably the most important of all.
- B. Bad shell. Our shells were no good for oblique impact, and the H.E. filling of our armour-piercing shell was too sensitive and would not carry through a plate more than 1/3 of a calibre in thickness.
- C. Lack of anti-flash precautions. It was the habit to fill the handing rooms with charges and to leave the magazine doors open. If a flash got to the handing room of a ship where this state of affairs existed, the ship was bound to blow up. "LION" had provided against this, and, as a result, the ship did not go when Q turret was burnt out.

Taking the battle cruisers alone "LUTZOW" received 24 hits, "DERFLINGER" 17, "SEYDLITZ" 21, "MOLTKE" 4, "VON DER TANN" 4, "LION" 12, "TIGER" 10, "PRINCESS ROYAL" 6, and "QUEEN MARY", "INVINCIBLE" and "INDEFATIGABLE" about five each. Yet the three latter were lost as against "LUTZOW" on the German side.

The loss of the British ships was attributed to gun-fire on the turrets penetrating to the magazines. Yet "LUTZOW" had one, "DERFLINGER" two, and "SEYDLITZ" two turrets completely gutted yet remained afloat.

Fortunately for them the Germans had learnt their lesson at the Dogger Bank.

D. Poor armour protection to the magazines in our battle-cruisers, particularly against plunging fire.

E. Cumbersome spotting rules. The then-existing rules were much slower in operation than the present rules.

Discussing the material side of the battle, Winston Churchill writes in his book (World Crisis II) - "It was, however, proved by the test of battle that the British heavy armour-piercing shell was inferior to the German shell of equal size in carrying its explosion through the armour. Such a result should for ever banish complacency from the technical branches of our Naval Ordnance Department, and should lead successive Boards of Admiralty repeatedly to canvass and overhaul the scientific data with which they are presented, and to compare them in an open-minded record with foreign practices".

In two other respects I think we can give the Germans credit for superiority over us as became apparent when their fleet surrendered.

First. Their ships were better sub-divided.

Second. Their organization for dealing with damage in action was far in advance of ours, and I am not sure whether we have taken full advantage of what we learnt from them in this respect.

Need for a trained staff.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to think that the main lessons learnt at Jutland were to do with material. Surely, throughout the action, one can see the need for a trained staff both at the Admiralty and afloat. The many errors and omissions which came to light should be reduced with the more general knowledge of the Art of War and its application at sea. In these days, in which developments in material are circumscribed by agreements, it is up to us to see that the main factor is made the most of.

Intelligence.

The Admiralty had at their disposal better information than we may ever hope to have in the future, and which they certainly did not make the best use of. They not only withheld information at a very critical period of the battle, but they also prejudiced the value of the information by sending out a report which proved to be incorrect and was in fact not in accordance with the intelligence at their disposal. The C-in-C. was not only badly served as regards intelligence by the Admiralty, but by subordinate commanders and individual ships who saw very important movements but did not report them.

Signal Communications showed their weakness in that reliance on them brought about the situation of waiting for orders. The number of unnecessary signals made by individual ships was enormous, and this still persists today, as is exemplified by a study of the communication returns of strategical exercises. The battle showed that flag signals were a most uncertain method of communication, and the need of a reliable daylight flashing apparatus was proved.

Reconnaissance.

As regards reconnaissance, the Commodore in command of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron realised the functions of a cruiser. The C-in-C was given very little information throughout, even in the initial stage just before contact with the main fleets was made. It also did not seem to be realised that not only during the approach should cruisers obtain information for the C-in-C, but also when the action was broken off, visibility decreased, or smoke screens were put up to deny the C-in-C view of what was happening. It is interesting to speculate upon what would have happened had each side possessed good air reconnaissance from carriers. The probable result would have been that no fleet action would have been fought.

Centralised Command.

One of the criticisms sometimes made of the conduct of the fleet was that the execution was over-centralised, and that in consequence the initiative of subordinate leaders was not exercised.

The orders in force certainly gave no cause for this, but it is true that the C-in-C himself, after the battle, called special attention to the freedom of action he expected from divisional leaders.

Reviewing the battle, it is not very obvious where greater freedom of action could have been employed with much advantage.

It has been suggested that the 5th Battle Squadron could have followed the Germans round at their first turn away. As regards the drawbacks to manoeuvring the fleet as a whole when the C-in-C reformed the fleet into line ahead at about 1915, it may be argued that, in so doing, some of the fleet had to move away from the enemy.

Or again, it may not be considered to have been necessary to turn the whole fleet away from the torpedo attack at 1922, but no great harm was done here as Admiral Jerram turned his squadron back as soon as he saw he was clear of danger, thereby showing he realised that he was responsible for the good tactical handling of that squadron.

There was also the inability of the C-in-C to turn the whole fleet towards the enemy in the middle of the deployment which bears on this point.

In general, it would appear that the fleet was able to carry out the C-in-C's orders during the battle with promptitude and accuracy (although no doubt it did not always realise the exactitude which it is customary to see in the diagrams of the battle).

In regard to the ability of the C-in-C to direct his fleet in action, Scheer says that from his position in the centre of the line:-

"During the whole time that fighting was going on, I had a clear look out over the whole line, and was able to signal with great rapidity in both directions..... I should not have been able to overlook my entire line from the wing, especially under such heavy enemy firing."

The lesson from Jutland in this respect is really not so much that the C-in-C cannot manoeuvre his whole fleet, but rather that it is unwise for him to do so with a big fleet as he will not be able to judge what effect a whole fleet manoeuvre may have on various distant parts of the line.

German Tactics.

Underlying the Battle Orders of that time there is the expectation that the Germans would make full use of their highly trained flotillas, and a corollary to this was that their fleet would seek a close-range action in order to cover the attack of their flotillas.

Judging on their performance, we gave much too much credit to the German flotillas. We expected to be inferior in numbers to the Germans in this respect, but actually we had seventy destroyers present as compared to their 61, and in addition we had an unused reserve of 24 with the Harwich Force.

The 6th and 9th German Flotillas had a busy day, and to a lesser extent their 3rd Flotilla: but the 2nd, their crack flotilla, 5th and 7th took practically all their torpedoes home unfired.

Their work at night was by no means ambitious, neither did they press home their daylight attacks to the same extent as did our 13th Flotilla during the run South.

It was also a great pity that we credited the Germans with a wish to fight and did not perhaps expect such drastic 'break away' tactics as they employed.

Richard is rather illuminating about this; he says:-

"Scheer who, after all, was not morally obliged to commit suicide, gave Jellicoe, at least twice, proofs of good will towards it. First by dashing on him at 7 p.m. when, if he had continued to the westward, Lord Jellicoe would certainly have never seen him again; afterwards by throwing himself, during the night, right in the middle of the flotillas."

Scheer does rather pose as if he was thirsting to renew the battle in the morning, by which time he was quite sure of his line of retreat being open; this is hypocritical, as when L.11 reported an isolated group of our ships in a position in which he might have cut them off, he did not do so.

In his book he says:-

"There was no occasion for us to share an encounter with this group, but owing to the slight chance of meeting on account of visibility conditions, it would have been a mistake to have followed them."

He goes on to give, a little further down, the more convincing arguments.

"The reports from the battle cruisers showed that the 1st S.G. would not be capable of sustaining a serious fight, besides which the leading ships of the 3rd Squadron could not have fought for any length of time owing to shortage of ammunition. There were also only three fast cruisers left."

The shortage of ammunition was not really very acute. The "MARKGRAF" fired the greatest number of rounds of any ship of the 3rd Squadron which worked out to 25 per gun out of an allowance of 80 or 90 per gun.

Our tactics during the battle have been called by Commander Gill "a cautious offensive", and he goes on to say "History has taught, no matter what the weapons may be, a cautious offensive never gives decisive results. It takes an aggressive offensive to gain complete victory".

The tactics which aroused this criticism may be attributed to over confidence in the German will to fight.

On the other hand, reckless handling of the Grand Fleet could not be countenanced. The Americans were not at that time by any means pledged to come in on our side, and there was nothing behind the Grand Fleet. Nelson at Trafalgar was much more fortunate in this respect. Had he been defeated, there were other fleets to take up the issue.

Torpedo Attacks by Day.

The action showed the difficulty of getting a torpedo attack home by day in the face of serious counter attack. The result of all the attacks made was two hits, one on "MARLBOROUGH" and one on "SEYDLITZ", but in addition several attacks never got to the torpedo firing stage.

Destroyer attacks by night had not at this time been developed. The only organised night attack, which was made by the 12th Flotilla, showed the possibilities of this form of attack at night or in low visibility.

Exhaustion.

There is another factor which enters largely into the conduct of actions, and that is one of exhaustion. When night came on, organised attack by the Battle Fleet on the German Fleet was not considered wise: consequently officers who had been up all day took the opportunity to rest. Had more alertness been shown at night, particularly in the Battle Fleet, it is possible that information would have been given to the C-in-C of the various encounters and sightings.

Tactics during the Night.

Here we seem to have allowed the initiative to pass to the enemy. Had we harried him through the night his escape must have been delayed.

Von Schoultz says:-

"In my opinion, Admiral Jellicoe acted quite rightly in not closely pursuing the enemy during the night. But the British C-in-C, in breaking off the evening action, took no precautions to maintain touch with the enemy during the night, and did not send his destroyer flotillas to attack by night. In this way the British side lost the opportunity of continuing the battle the following morning."

Reviewing it all in the light of the Principles now accepted, we might say:-

Maintenance of the Object.

The destruction of the enemy's fleet was the object. This was recognised, but too much faith was put in the supposition that the battle would follow "set-piece" lines. If the enemy were unwilling to fight, and did not conform to this supposition, sea room and time were necessary to enable this principle to be upheld. Unfortunately neither of these was available. This problem is still with us.

Offensive Action.

The offence was centred around the big gun and the co-ordinated weapon offensive was not sufficiently considered.

It must be remembered however, that at that time the torpedo was not so efficient a weapon as the one we know nowadays, whereas the gun was the same gun that we now have, so this mitigates to some extent the point of view taken at that time.

Our night procedure lacked the offensive spirit and allowed the enemy to exercise full initiative. Had a vigorous night offensive been taken by our flotillas, who can say what would have happened.

Surprise.

Great consideration was given to possible ways in which the enemy might surprise us, such as using submarines with the fleet, minefields and long range torpedoes, but less attention was given to how we might exploit surprise on the enemy. This attitude rather tended to surrender the initiative.

Economy of Force.

Our forces were brought at full strength (except for the Harwich Force) to the decisive point and thrown against the enemy in a masterly manner. Here again a criticism may be raised on the excessive reliance placed on the gun to the exclusion of torpedoes.

Concentration.

The cruising formation of our fleet and subsequent deployment enabled a tactical concentration to be effected on the enemy fleet such as we can hardly ever hope for again. Weapon concentration between ships at this time was still in its infancy. The cruising orders of the German Fleet in single line was, I think, a violation of the principle of concentration.

Security.

The security for the conduct of the offensive against successful counteraction of the enemy was well exemplified in the early stages of the battle.

Our forces were brought in full strength to the vital point, provision being made to guard against submarine attacks. Information of our movements was denied to the enemy.

After deployment, it was security which prompted the C-in-C to turn away from torpedo attack, and it was not till later that it became apparent that when an enemy was unwilling to fight and time was short, the greater risk of turning towards would have to be accepted.

The disposition of our destroyers at night was I think an example of safety as opposed to security in its true sense.

Mobility.

Our fleet manoeuvred very well but on at least one occasion it was found impracticable to carry out a manoeuvre owing to the unwieldy size of the fleet and the effort to manoeuvre it as a whole. It is probable that a fleet of the size of the Grand Fleet loses mobility once action is joined if it is continually manoeuvred as a whole. Several instances of this could be quoted.

Co-operation.

The co-operation of all forces towards the destruction of the enemy main fleet was not well exemplified in the employment of our destroyers at night.

Effect and Emotions, German.

The H.S.F. got back to Harbour the forenoon of June 1st. The Battle became "The Victory of the Skaggerack" and Scheer "The Victor of the Skaggerack".

The Austro-Hungarian Attache reported to his Government that "The fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated with victory. The awful nightmare, the fear that the war would end without an encounter between the two fleets which had oppressed everybody is gone... all down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with confidence".

This was justifiable propaganda. To see the other side of the picture we have only to take Scheer's confidential report on the Battle to the All Highest.

He says - "Should the future operation take a favourable course, it may be possible to inflict appreciable damage on the enemy, but there can be no doubt that even the most favourable issue of a battle on the high seas will not compel ENGLAND to make peace in this war.... A victorious termination of the war within measurable time can only be attained by destroying the economic existence of GREAT BRITAIN, by the employment of submarines against British commerce."

Elsewhere he writes in a slightly different strain as though more for the public: (G.O.H. P. 251) "The Battle has also proved that the policy of making our Navy a High Sea Fleet was correct. Only by a High Sea Fleet can the German National idea be carried out into the world in face of ENGLAND's opposition.

"But the submarine must also be employed to lay hold of ENGLAND's vital nerve, her food supply, if we, in our present position are not finally to bleed to death in the material sense". In other words the essence of his words were that the submarines were to be used to effect what the surface ships could not. Captain Persius the well known German Pre War Naval critic writing in the "Berliner Tageblatt" on 18th November 1918 says "Our Fleet's losses were severe. On 1st June 1916 it was clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be the last one. Authoritative quarters said so openly".

On our side, the paralysing effect of the first announcement made public of the battle was perhaps the most remarkable part of the whole affair.

Newbolt, in 'Naval Operations', Vol. IV, gives a very illuminating summary of the effect, immediate and subsequent, of the battle in belligerent and neutral countries.

Conclusion.

The result of the Battle of JUTLAND was a profound disappointment to the Service. The Service knew that it had tried hard, as will be endorsed by all who were in the Home Fleets during the hectic years immediately preceding the war. The conclusion is therefore that a lot of the training then carried on was on incorrect lines. A lot of time was spent on the development of the individual gun efficiency without sufficient attention to the Battle use of the weapon. On the other hand the gunnery efficiency of the Grand Fleet proved to be high and they made good use of the fleeting opportunities which they had.

It is, I think, this disappointment which has given rise to a great deal of ill considered judgment and attempts to fix the blame somewhere.

Professor Spencer Wilkinson summed up the situation when he said "The result of sea battles is predetermined by the character of the National efforts made during a long period of peace.

"In TRAFALGAR and TSUSHIMA we see nothing but the inevitable consequences of the previous lives of the Navies concerned".

These words, written before the war, were prophetic, and have a peculiar poignancy if we apply them also to JUTLAND as the life of the Navy concerned on this occasion is part of our own lives and of those with whom we have served.

I have endeavoured to lay the facts before you and the more one knows about the battle, the less it seems to me to be a matter of controversy. The Service as a whole had its lesson to learn and it is to be hoped that we have learnt it.

I have not referred to the possible effect on the War which an overwhelming victory at JUTLAND would have caused. No doubt it would have been great, but an overwhelming victory is hard to achieve against an enemy fighting close to his base and with the fixed intention of getting home as soon as possible. It is questionable whether the most faultless handling of our fleet would in the time available have brought about such a state of affairs.

May I again remind you that when criticising the actions of those concerned in this battle it is necessary to bear in mind how little they knew what was going on. Do not fall into the trap of thinking in terms of a complete diagram of the battle as viewed from an arm chair. Most critics outside the Service do this.

An even greater disappointment to the Service was that we never had an opportunity of showing that we had learnt the lessons of JUTLAND. One can hardly blame the Germans for denying to us that opportunity and the only crumb of comfort is to be found in this signal.


In concluding this series of lectures on the battle of JUTLAND I cannot do better than to quote from the report of Admiral Pakenham who commanded the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron. In summing up the results of the Battle he says:-

"The British felt that although an unlimited success had been earned, only a limited one had been obtained. The Germans had more cause for rejoicing as they had escaped annihilation.

"From such a point of view they might well congratulate themselves; but in its nature such success is essentially different from victory, even though some of the benefits of victory accompany it. By the many who have ignorantly believed that any and every meeting of the Fleets must include a sweeping British victory, the inconclusive nature of this Battle will be deeply felt; yet inconclusive actions are the rule in naval warfare, and of all the greater military events recorded in history, the least common has been the Naval victory in which the whole force of the enemy has been obliterated".

That concludes my lectures on this subject and I hope I have equipped you to deal with this situation.

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LIST OF BLUEPRINTS.

- B-36-64 BRITISH SYSTEM OF COMMERCE PROTECTION.
- B-36-65 COEBEN AND BRESLAU, 1st phase
- B-36-66 " " " 2nd phase
- B-36-67 KNONPRINZ WILHELM, CAP TRAFALGAR, KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE,
and the MOEWE.
- B-36-68 KARLSRUHE at the outbreak of the war.
- B-36-69 " operations, 30 August to 25 October.
- B-36-70 " sinking, return voyage of RIO NEGRO.
- B-36-71 GERMAN SQUADRON IN EASTERN PACIFIC.
- B-36-72 GERMAN SQUADRON IN WESTERN PACIFIC.
- B-36-73 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE EMDEN; 27 Aug. to 30 Sept.
- B-36-74 " " " " , 30 Sept. to 20 Oct.
- B-36-75 " " " " , 21 Oct. to 9 Nov.
- B-36-76 SYDNEY versus EMDEN.
- B-36-77 EMDEN LANDING PARTY, route of the AYESHA and CHOISING.
- B-36-78 Cruise of the BERLIN and of the GRIEF.
- B-36-79 Cruise of the PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH and of the CORMORAN.
- B-36-80 Battle of CORONEL.
- B-36-81 Battle of FALKLAND ISLANDS.
- B-36-82 Cruise of the GEIER.
- B-36-83 Cruise of the WOLF.
- B-36-84 Cruise of the SEEADLER.
- B-36-85 Cruise of the KOENIGIN LUISE and of the METEOR.
- B-36-86 Defence of TSINGTAO.
- B-36-87 Cruise of the KONIGSBERG and sinking in Refiji Delta.
- B-36-88 Cruise of the DRESDEN, escape after Falkland Ids. etc.