

RESTRICTED

NOTES ON JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST

Presented to the
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

by

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24 August, 1936

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DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

22 August, 1936

CAT-HEAD COTTAGE
JAMESTOWN
RHODE ISLAND

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My dear Roberts,

Enclosed are a couple of Japanese studies and some data on Japan. Stuff that I have worked up during the past 5 years, -since my retirement.

Perhaps it will help to save many hours to some fellow who is doing a bit of research work on the subject. Dispose of it as your judgment dictates. Either in the files or by burning. Sorry not to have seen something of you this fleeting Summer. We were busy getting this cottage painted & repaired.

On Wednesday we leave here for NY and leave there on Thursday for San Francisco by rail taking Lexington & Louisville Kentucky in our stride. Sail from SF on Pres Hoover on 4 Sept. Do a month in Honolulu & a month in Japan & then 6-9 months in Pei-Ping. Ticket on Dollar Line good for 2 years. Mrs W and daughter Clifford. My compliments and respects please to Adm & Mrs Kalbfus.

Same to you and your spouse. Cordially,
Admiring regards to Cooke.

Edward H. Watson

FHR:avh

24 August, 1936

My dear Captain:

Your thoughtful donation to the War College of Japanese studies made by you during the past five years is acknowledged with many thanks. I am having them properly bound and labeled for circulation and ultimate file in the War College Library where I trust, as you say, they will save many hours to some fellow who may be looking for the facts of the Far East boiled down in the form in which you present them.

I noted with interest that you mentioned the Japanese aversion to the reappointment of Cotton for second tour as Naval Attache'. To bring that same idea more to date, ARE YOU TRAVELING INCOGNITO, on your coming trip? For I remember well that the Japanese had an 8 - 8 program brought out into God's sunshine and the world's view by another illustrious Naval Attache', the reader of this note not excepted from suspicion!

I regret that the summers are so soon gone, that Jamestown is separated by water from Newport and that your departure is about upon us. However, Mrs. Roberts joins me in wishing you, Mrs. Watson, and Clifford wonderful and happy experiences during the coming two years.

With every good wish, I remain

Most sincerely,

F. H. Roberts,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

P.S. Admiral Kalbfus is away for the day but I shall take pleasure in showing him your letter.

Captain Edward H. Watson,
Cat-Head Cottage,
Jamestown, R.I.

①

DATA ON JAPANESE AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA

(1)

Data on Japanese Aggression against China. both political and economic,
for some forty years at least

1. An examination of this record shows that the basis of Japan's foreign policy has ~~long~~ been the establishment of Japanese control over ^{in Korea and} China (principally Manchuria)
2. The late Captain Lyman A. Cotten, our Naval Attache at Tokyo-1912-15-in Lectur-
at the Naval War College upon his return, stated his conviction that Japan
would expand on to the adjacent main land.
3. His outstanding ability, and understanding of their affairs made such an impression
in Tokyo that when the news of his prospective return for another tour was sud-
denly announced ^{in 1922, surprised}, it shocked the habitually good mannered and self-controlled
Japanese into expressions of protestation and regret. It was abundantly manifest
that his designation was considered inimical to the best interests of Nippon.
4. Not going back beyond 1879, we note in that year a small, tentative, territorial
aggression against the Loo Choo Islands probably designed to ascertain the re-actin of her huge, powerful
neighbor. The annexation resulted in nothing more serious than threats.
5. Encouraged by this incident, and a second, distinct diplomatic advantage ob-
tained in Korea in 1882-Japan built up her military and naval forces (Western
model) to be ready against the day when disorders in Korea and unpreparedness
in China, would invite her to declare war on China and assist Korea to gain her
independence.
A decade ~~was~~ --- to
6. ~~An ample term of years~~ devoted to intrigue in Korea and the most complete, la-
borious study of the situation in China-parallelled the period of military
preparation. Nothing was to be left to chance. rights in Korea-that country
7. In August 1894, Japan sent an Expeditionary force into Korea, declared war
and
Japan took advantage of disorders in Korea to revive certain old claims to
against China, and made an offensive alliance with Korea.
8. So superior were the Japanese in every way, that the campaign of unbroken
successes was over in eight and a half months.
Chinese
Port Arthur was captured, Peking threatened, and the navy destroyed.
9. Not only did China have to acknowledge the independence of Korea but
to cede Liaotung, Formosa, ^{and} the Pescadores and pay a huge indemnity.
10. Arbitrary action on the part of Russia, France, and Germany compelled
Japan to relinquish Liaotung.

11. A bitter and entirely unexpected blow, something new learned about the Western, Christian, nations. Something calling for action when an opportunity should occur or could be brought about.
12. But the glory was great, and the spoils were immense, and the prestige was enormous. Certainly the expenditures on the military establishment had paid promptly and handsomely. The Samurai tradition was more admired than ever. The military received the plaudits and the gratitude of the nation.
13. 1895 Four months later, in October, a popular tumult-engineered by the Japanese authorities-broke out in Seoul. A mob invaded the palace and murdered the Queen. The Emperor took refuge in the Russian Embassy. control at beginning of 1904
1898. Russia obtained lease of Port Arthur (Liaotung Peninsula). GB. obtained Wei-hai-wei.
1900. Boxer Rebellion in China. Still in full
1900. Boxer Rebellion in China. was regarded by Japan as a Russian attempt to occupy Korean Territory.
14. 1903. Russian activity on the Yalu river (on their timber concession)
15. So, in Feb. 1904, Japanese troops were landed at Chemulpo and the Korean Emperor signed a Treaty agreeing to follow the advice of the Japanese Government in the execution of political reforms; Japan guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Korean Empire and the safety of the Imperial Household.
Practically, Korean independence was at an end.
16. Japan had demonstrated her efficiency in Diplomacy as well as in War.
17. Japanese and Russian ambitions in Korea and Manchuria were antagonistic.
18. Emboldened by her success with China, Japan determined upon war with Russia.
19. Seven years of secret preparation and an exhaustive study of the Russian situation, preceded Japan's declaration of war in March 1904. (Her investigations had convinced her that the efficiency of the huge Russian military establishment was greatly over-estimated. Also that the single-tracked Trans-Siberian railway was inadequate for a successful Russian Campaign in so distant a theater of war as Siberia)
20. The war was actually brought on by the extension of Russian military power along the railroad through Manchuria, and the non-fulfillment of Russian pledges to withdraw from that nominally Chinese Province, in 1903.

- 2.
21. So well had Japan chosen her time, so correct was her estimate of the situation and so well-planned was her plan of campaign--that it was a repetition of the Sano Japanese operations.
 22. Port Arthur surrendered -----2 Jan. 1905.
Mukden surrendered-----March 1905.
Russian combined fleets annihilated--28 May 1905.
at the request of Japan
 23. The US mediated, and peace was concluded at Portsmouth, 5 Sept. 1905.
 24. ~~---Although the only territory---there was---~~ Russia paid no indemnity and ceded
Southern?
no territory except the Northern half of Saghalin Island, ~~J-David had again--~~
But she transferred the Liaotung Peninsula and the railroad from Port Arthur to
Changchun to Japan--Conditional on the consent of the Chinese Government.
~~defeated Goliath--~~ Japan, a comparatively unknown, insignificant nation had
Russia and Japan both pledged themselves to evacuate Manchuria within eighteen
months, and to restore it to the exclusive administration of the Chinese --the 2 govts
defeated one of the great, powerful Western Powers. Japan had "arrived".
~~retaining only their railway guards.~~
 25. The victory left her free to work her own will on Korea, (1906)-
 26. Japan intimated her intention to establish two naval bases in Korea. (1906)
 27. Japan formally annexed Korea as Chosen and abolished the old name. (Aug. 23, 1910.)
 28. Thirty years (1876-1910) of intrigue and two wars (one with China and one with Russia) had finally secured Korea and more or less incidentally added Formosa, the Pescadores and half of Saghalin to the Empire of the Rising Sun.
 29. But the war with Russia -while it proved successful--was always fraught with grim potentialities.
 30. As it progressed and Japan saw her initiative threatened, she hastened to secure mediation and to bring it to a quick conclusion. Her judgment, unimpaired by success, was as excellent as her courage was magnificent.
 31. Had America been less eager to fill the role of peace-maker, or Russia declined mediation--consequences of large dimensions would have been avoided and peace in the Far East given a longer lease of life.
Japan's ambitions would have been curbed, and the white man's prestige maintained.
1912. Chinese Republic declared.

32. 1914(Aug) World War. Japan declared war against Germany.

33. It was difficult for Japan was to choose between the belligerents.

Her army was German trained :her navy Britain trained.She strongly inclined to a belief in Teutonic victory. For twelve years,she had enjoyed and been proud of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

She decided that her best interests would be served by joining the Allies,and operating against the German Concessions in China and the German Islands in the South Seas.A promising and not difficulty or expensive program. Satisfactory payment for her services would be in hand even before she took her seat at the Peace Table.

And she resolved to carry on her operations against Germany so as to stir up only the minimum of ill-feeling,so that if ,perchance,the Central Powers won -Japan wouldn't have backed the wrong horse too heavily.
not

This procedure proved too difficult,as the Allies were anxious to keep down Japan's bill bill for war services,and so abstained from asking her to send her armies to either the Russian,or Western fronts.

34. The port of Tsing-Tau(Kiao-Chow)surrendered to Japanese forces(17Nov.)

and the Marshall,Pelew,Caroline,and Marianne Islands passed into their possession. It had all worked out according to plan-as she had hoped and believed.

35. As usual,through foresight,good-management,and the efficiency of her military establishment,Japan was again able to take advantage of the jealousies,quarrels,difficulties,and struggles of other nations.

36. Since all the Western nations except the US,were thoroughly occupied with the World War-and under the circumstances too far away to interfere-it seemed just the time to go ahead with her plans with regard to China.

37. So in 1915,Japan's "Twenty One Demands" were presented to China.

(An ultimatum,at the point of the bayonet,that would have reduced China to a vassal state of Japan.Their rigor and completeness were an appalling expose of one nations ambition at the expense of the extinction of another.)

38. Under Tuan Chi-Jui and the Anfu Party, China became powerless in the hands of the Japanese; since the Allies were too pre-occupied with the World War to interfere. Civil war in China, between North and South. Constantly involved in difficulties (1914-21.)
39. Retention of Shantung led to Chinese boycott against J. goods with Japan. In March 1915, the Peking Govt concluded military and naval agreements with Japan whereby the Japanese--under the pretext of action against a Bolshevist danger--obtained a complete hold on Northern China--including control of the Chinese Eastern and Northern Manchuria.
40. 1917(March) China declared war against Germany. At the Peace Conference(Versailles) Japan's actions with regard to China during the War received the endorsement of the Allied Powers when Lloyd George and Clemenceau, in accordance with secret pledges given to Japan in 1917, and Pres. Wilson--in order to save the League of Nations, and relying on the Japanese promise eventually to evacuate Shantung--accorded Japan all the former German "rights, title, and privileges" in the Province of Shantung.
- The Chinese Delegates refused to sign the Versailles Treaty which contained the Article relating to Shantung.
41. At the Washington Conference(1921), China insisted on bringing the "Shantung Question" before the Conference. Japan wished to negotiate with the Chinese directly.
42. The Shantung Treaty, signed by Japan and China early in 1922, provided for the restoration to China of the former German Leased Territory of Kiao-Chow and the evacuation of Shantung by Japan.
43. Chinese boycott against Japanese and British goods. 1925.
44. Japanese armies invaded Manchuria and captured Mukden(undeclared war)(18 Sept 1931) (An Japanese Intelligence Officer had been shot by the Chinese and a portion of the South Manchurian Railroad track torn up).

45. The Shanghai Incident.

Apparently over-anxious to equal the successes of the army in Manchuria, the commander of the Japanese naval force at Shanghai landed men to put down the boycott.

To extricate this hopelessly involved, inadequate force—and save the national "face", an army of 75000 men and strong naval reinforcements were sent from Japan (Feb. 1932)

46. Threatened complications with the Foreign Powers having Concessions in Shanghai, together with the stiffening of Chinese resistance, induced the Japanese to accept foreign diplomatic mediation which freed their military forces for service in Manchuria and saved both the Japanese and Chinese "face".

47. It seems certain that the initial Japanese landing at Shanghai was a mistake for which the naval commander was entirely responsible. His Govt backed him up. The Japanese had no wish to draw Chinese attention to their invasion of Manchuria by a simultaneous attack on Shanghai.

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SOME NOTES ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS DURING THE PAST FIFTY YEARS.

INCLUDING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR.

Some Notes on Sino-Japanese Relations During the Past Fifty Years

Including the Psychological Factor.

Although Japan has been in Manchuria since Sept. 1931, thus achieving a certain measure of success in the effort and ambition of 30 odd years, it is quite a different sort of victory from those that have previously perched upon her banners.

When she went to war with, and defeated in short order, the vast old empire of China—the astonished nations were interested and complimentary.

When she challenged and overcame the giant Russia, an astonished world offered full measure of admiration and respect. All agreed that quaint little Japan had gone far and fast since 1854, when the American Commodore Perry had persuaded her to grant limited intercourse.

The reaction of Russia, France, and Germany to Japan's acquisition of Chinese territory in 1895, was shown by their arbitrary action in forcing her to relinquish Liaotung.

Perhaps the most valuable observation to be made on both wars was Japan's long and meticulous preparation for each.

A decade was devoted —on both occasions —to exhaustive study of the situation, and to the training of the army and navy.

Skillful propaganda built up a marvellous war-spirit.

So superior were the Japanese to the Chinese that the campaign was over in eight months.

In the case of Russia, Port Arthur and Mukden were taken and the Russian combined fleets annihilated —in eighteen months.

The triumph of her arms had added Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula, —the right to build the South Manchurian Railway and to occupy a zone for its safeguarding (all ceded by China) and the Southern half of Saghalin Island (ceded by Russia).

Also, Japan had forced Russia to evacuate Manchuria, hand over Liaotung, and leave Korea to her mercy.

With these material fruits of success and conquest, went unstinted prestige and glory for the Japanese army and navy. They received the plaudits and the gratitude of the nation. The old Samurai tradition was held in even more esteem than ever before.

They told themselves and others, that the victorious Japanese armies mastered the strange, new weapons, and fearlessly met and overcame more powerful enemies because they were a warrior race. A psychological slogan of real potency.

And to which their rightful claim was made good at Port Arthur (203 meter hill)

But a logical appraisal of these two campaigns will bring us to conclusions the more valuable because so seldom arrived at.

In both wars, the enemy was surprised, unprepared, inefficient, and badly led.

The Chinese army and navy were unworthy of the name. The surrender of the fortress of Port Arthur was a pusillanimous performance. The Russians were tremendously handicapped by having only a single-tracked railroad to Siberia.

And in the case of the Russian Campaign, as soon as Japan saw her initiative threatened, she hastened to secure mediation and to bring it to a quick conclusion.

Had America been less eager to fill the role of peace-maker, or had Russia refused the mediation-consequences of large dimensions would have been avoided, and peace in the Far East given a longer lease of life.

Japan's ambitions would have been curbed, and Caucasian prestige maintained.

As it was, the popular sentiment cast the victorious Japanese in the role of David, and the two great enemies were assigned the part of Goliath.

Described some forty years ago, by some foreign admirer, as "an intensely proud, sensitive, war-like people-requiring special treatment", they have incredibly succeeded in securing it ever since. Everywhere and from everybody, always! Its a surpassing and monumental achievement.

As proof of this, Lord Lytton (who investigated the Japanese quarrel and made a report to Geneva) in a recent interview - "Colliers" - spoke of "the tremendous and sensitive pride of the Japanese, as newcomers among the nations".

"The Japanese are a very proud people, and may be appealed to only through the things which they most revere; that is, their history, their past achievements, and their present position in the world. They now feel that they are as good as anybody. Their victory over Russia greatly strengthened Japan's confidence in herself. Japan is in no mood to be ordered about. Her attitude toward the world at this moment is defensive. That is always dangerous. That attitude can be changed only by sympathy, tact, and understanding."

"Japan is made of very explosive material, and if this material is either shocked or fired, it will explode in the face of the world. She would not count the cost."

As successful propagandists, it is apparent that the present generation of Japanese is worthy of its ancestors.

In 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea. (It had practically signed away its independence to Japan, in 1904).

This was an important success, achieved through intrigue, diplomacy, and war--16 years.

(From 1592-1598, Japan maintained an army of 300,000 men in Korea.

Upon the Japanese Regent, Hideoshi's death, in 1598, it was withdrawn,--the port and fishing privileges of Fusan remained in Japanese possession, a heavy tribute was exacted, and until 1790, the Korean King stood in humiliating relations towards Japan. Korea never recovered from the effects of this war, which bequeathed to all Koreans an intense hatred of Japan.)

Japan's failure to live up to her solemn guarantees of the integrity and independence of Korea and the safety of the Imperial Household,--was a matter of interest only to the unfortunate inhabitants of that miserable little peninsula.

In 1914, Japan sided with England, joined the Allies, and declared war against Germany.

Japan took from the Germans some places on the Yellow Sea that Germany had made China give her in 1898, helped the British navy, and joined the Allies in sending an army contingent to Vladivostok.

The German Islands also came into her possession,--Marshall, Caroline, Marianne.

When the places on the Yellow Sea came into her possession, Japan said she would give them back to China, although she was not very eager to do so. Instead, she began to bully China. An ideal time, since the remainder of the world was too busy to interfere.

In 1915, Japan made the "Twenty One Demands" on China. (An ultimatum, presented at the point of the bayonet, that would have made China a vassal state of Japan).

The Chinese made some, but not all, of the promises.

In 1917, China-inspired principally by the US-declared war on Germany, and joined the Allies

(In 1912, the Manchu dynasty had come to an end, and China had become a republic.)

Under the Chinese premier Chi-Jui, and the Anfu party, China became powerless in the hands of the Japanese.

In March 1918, the Peking Govt concluded military and naval agreements with Japan, whereby the Japanese-under the pretext of action against a Bolshevik danger-obtained a complete hold on Northern China (including control of the Chinese Eastern railroad and N. Manchuria.)

From 1914-21, there was civil war in China-between the North and the South.

The record shows that Japan took advantage of this domestic situation, interfering, from time to time, with a view to preventing the establishment of a strong, unified government.

In 1919, At the Versailles Peace Conference, where Japan sat as one of the Five Principal Powers, she was accorded all the former German "rights, title, and privileges" in the Province of Shantung.

Japan having previously, in 1915 and 1918, coerced China into agreeing to the cession of Germany's rights and possessions, especially Shantung, -insisted on these claims and added priority in Manchuria.

The Chinese delegates made every possible protest, and refused to sign the treaty containing the Shantung article, -but Japan succeeded in having the territory of another ally awarded to her.

When the League of Nations, in 1920, approved the Japanese Mandate for the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianne Islands, -it was abundantly proven that in diplomatic

exchange with the most formidable representatives of the Western nations, Japan had more than held her own.

For small, comparatively ~~unimportant~~ services, in the greatest of all wars, the proud nations with which she had been associated had bestowed upon her the reward of her own choosing, -China's sacred Province of Shantung and the former German islands in the Pacific, North of the Equator. (On the territory of a mutual ally, and the Islands of great strategic importance to America-whose representative consented to ~~the~~ "Shantung" to save the League of Nations).

It may well be that a recollection of this experience in ^{ingratitude} cynicism ~~and~~ ethics encouraged Japan in her recent occupation of Manchuria, and supported her in the controversy with that same League of Nations.

On account of the retention of Shantung, China declared a boycott of Japanese goods.

Japan was well satisfied with the results of her participation in the world war. Through fore-sight, good management, and the efficiency of her military and diplomatic departments, she had again been able to take advantage of the quarrels, jealousies, difficulties, and struggles of other nations.

Once more-and this time associated with a group of powerful, arrogant, foreign ~~nations~~ ^{countries}-she had secured great gains of her own choosing, in return for but little expenditure and effort, -just as with China and Russia previously.

The war was an immensely valuable experience for Japan, and a liberal education for her navy. As always, the tradition of foreign wisdom and invincibility was shattered by association. All her horizons were widened, and her morale was built up.

Having suffered nothing from the war and enjoyed stupendous gains in commerce, manufactures, and shipbuilding, -Japan was astonished and shocked at its sudden termination. It had been with her a golden era, -full of pride, prestige and profits. It seemed a pity to have it come to an end.

So much was heard in the US of a great new navy that Japan was building to meet the menace of the American 1916 program approaching completion, and the Japanese press carried so much talk of war with America, -that a Conference on Reduction

of Naval Armaments was called by the US and was in session in Washington from November 1921 to February 1922. (The Crown Prince of Japan went to England, presumably to secure the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) An unprecedented event. America, in order to make the Conference a success, and in the hope of advancing the cause of peace, offered to scrap 900,000 tons of new ships, if Great Britain would sacrifice about a third and Japan about a fourth of that tonnage, and agree to a 5-5-3 ratio.

England and Japan, convinced that any nation that would offer so much would take less, -accepted the ratio/^{but}only to apply to battleships and airplane-carriers.

The astounded foreign Delegates returned home to receive the rewards and decorations that they were ashamed to accept.

Although Admiral Kato had to meet the threat of being stoned because the Japanese didn't like the "3" in the ratio, -he was Premier within a year.

Mr. Balfour got the Garter, and an Earldom.

The Conference provided for the status quo in Pacific fortifications, (American, British, and Japanese), and in respect to insular possessions (American, British, Japanese, and French). The Nine Power Treaty (the US., Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal), related to policies concerning China. It guaranteed Chinese independence and maintained the "open door" policy. The Anglo-^{Alliance,} Japanese, which had completed its twentieth year, was not renewed, (causing much bitter feeling in Japan, -towards England for abandoning the alliance at America's behest -and towards America for interfering with Japan's affairs.)

Also, at the Washington Conference, China insisted on bringing the "Shantung Question" up (Japan was anxious to negotiate with China directly).

The continuous outcry and clamor of the Chinese for the return of their sacred Province (with the consequent undesirable publicity for Japan), together with the tremendously injurious Chinese boycott on account of the retention of Shantung, -led to the signing of the Shantung Treaty, early in 1922. (The Japanese had meantime made a very real economic penetration in the meantime).

The news that Japan was to participate in the Conference was received by the press of the country with an extraordinary outburst of rage, suspicion, injured pride, and distrust. So completely did all the newspapers lose their heads and their habitual reserve and self-control, that after a period of seven days, the Premier felt constrained to call upon them to desist from so un-edifying and so illuminating an exhibition.

There is no question of their reluctance to attend the Conference, or that they expected to have some measure of control devised for interference in their affairs. They were well aware that their record in China would not bear inspection.

One of their national weaknesses is their hatred of any form of criticism whatever. They can hardly bear it. And they are avid for praise and the most fulsome flattery. Hence their distaste for the invitation to Washington, and the outcry of the press against it.

The delegates were prepared to be subjected to personal violence at both ends of the journey. They accepted the task as a dangerous, patriotic duty, - ruinous to their future careers.

On this occasion, they did not expect to receive special, privileged treatment. But they planned to take full advantage of the fact that the US was host, and manifestly bound to go the limit to secure the success of the Conference.

Imagine their surprise to be received in San Francisco and Washington, with every manifestation of courtesy and honor.

They stiffened their resolution and sharpened their wits to take full advantage of so weak and foolish an adversary.

They were ^{not altogether un-}prepared to have to give up Shantung; they bitterly resented England's defection, but America had voluntarily scrapped a great new navy - while Japan had consented to forego the building of some blue-print capital ships whose cost would have adversely affected her financial well-being.

They broke more than even, They had ^{suffered} no loss of "face".

As for the treaties signed at the Conference, they remembered what Germany had ^{perhaps} done to Belgium, in spite of treaties.

In 1928, the blocking of the Nanking army's advance on Peking by a Japanese army at Tsinanfu, caused the bitterness between China and Japan to become acute, and was responsible for an anti-Japanese boycott that lasted two years.

Due to the general situation in Japan, the Militarists were able to gain full control in the Spring of 1930, and to carry forward the final preparations to take advantage of the economic and financial world crisis, ~~and~~ ^{and} the demand for Disarmament.

Under their experienced guidance, the steadily increasing tension between the Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria came to a head on the 18 September, 1931, - when Japanese troops from the SMR zone seized Mukden and various other points outside the zone. Undeclared war.

China immediately protested the Japanese ^{action} /to the League of Nations.

(The League urged both Powers to withdraw their troops, and abstain from hostile acts. It then adjourned for three weeks)

On 28 January 1932, urged by the desperate need to halt the anti-Japanese boycott, and a series of violent local clashes, the Japanese naval commander at Shanghai demanded the suppression of all anti-Japanese organizations and all anti-Japanese activities, primarily the exasperating and ruinous boycott.

The Chinese, threatened by 4,000 marines and 23 vessels accepted the Japanese demands in full. Nevertheless, the Japanese proceeded to occupy Shanghai.

To extricate the inadequate, hopelessly-involved landing force, an army of 50,000 men, with naval re-inforcements, was dispatched from Japan to Shanghai.

Threatened complications with the Concession Powers, together with the stiffening ^{resistance} of Chinese, and the need for the troops in Manchuria, - induced the Japanese to accept foreign diplomatic mediation - which permitted them to withdraw, and saved both Chinese and Japanese "face".

Regardless of the pressure of the boycott, their operations in and around Shanghai cost them, in the eyes of the world, even more than they cost the Chinese in suffering.

Japan was far from wishing to invite attention to her invasion of Manchuria, and Shanghai was certainly the most unfortunate location for such publicity.

It proved a most disastrous affair for Japan, from every point of view.

A trained, equipped Japanese army made so poor a show against a small, poorly outfitted Chinese force that held out incredibly against it for thirty-four days, and the Japanese naval force did so badly against the Woosung Forts, -that Japanese naval and military prestige suffered a blow from which it will be long in recovering.

In spite of ~~al many advantages~~ ^{advantage}, Nipponese arms had suffered a check at the hands of the despised Chinese.

And this reverse in the face of unfriendly and critical foreigners, at Shanghai.

Most serious of all, Japan's actions at Shanghai had affected the friendly admiration and regard of the whole civilized world.

In mid-February, ^{international} ~~furtheher reducing her own~~ /good-standing, (with the idea of ridding herself of costly boycotts, and anti-Japanese movements) Japan suggested to the Powers a revision of the Nine Power Treaty to "neutralize" Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin, and Tsingtau.

Washington immediately rejected the proposal, -looking upon it as suggesting a renewal of the old process of Partitioning China, and in direct violation of the pledges of Japan and the spirit of existing compacts -including the Nine Power Treaty-guaranteeing the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

London shared the attitude of Washington.

Having occupied Manchuria, Japan asked that the treaty be so altered as to concede sovereignty in that rich and vast Province.

Her actions at Shanghai, and this proposal to revise the treaty, would seem to be ample proof of the dis-ingenuousness of her altruistic declarations in regard to Manchuria.

On 15 Sept. 1932. Japan formally recognized "Manchukuo", -the puppet state she had erected in Manchuria.

This act preceded the presentation of the Lytton Report, and was a studied affront to the League, as well as a display of bad faith.

On 21 Feb. 1933, Japan announced the beginning of her campaign to conquer Jehol

Province and add it to "Manchukuo". (This in spite of the League's warning against such action). The Military, in the saddle, were apparently bent on committing the Country to a course from which there could be no retreat.

On 24 February, 1933, after 18 months of fruitless effort, having failed to conciliate China and Japan, adopted a Report embodying findings of fact (with which the US is in "general accord") and Recommendations for the settlement of the dispute (with which the US "expresses its general endorsement"). The 43 members of the Assembly present, in unanimous accord.

The League finally condemned Japan's aggressive action in Manchuria, and her announced plan to conquer Jehol and add it to "Manchukuo".

The League recommended that the present regime in Manchuria be replaced by a new form of government, autonomous, but under Chinese sovereignty; that Japan withdraw her forces into her SMR zone; pledged its members to continue not to recognize "Manchukuo", and called on Japan to accept mediation and arbitration of her issue with China.

The Japanese delegation walked out of the Assembly in protest against its censure of Japan's Manchurian policy.

China accepted the League Recommendations, subject to their acceptance by Japan. Japan persistently contended before the League that its military measures were self defense, and that "Manchukuo" originated spontaneously; -and it appealed to the sanctity of treaties in claiming an obligation to protect what "Manchukuo" asserts to be its territory.

The League rejected Japan's self-defense plea, found Chinese boycotting justified, Manchuria an integral part of China, and "Manchukuo" artificially created by Japan, -and not to be recognized either de jure or de facto. (In regard to "Manchukuo", the US is on "common ground" with the League, -and the Soviet Union has announced its acceptance of such "international decisions".)

On 24 Feb. 1933, the League set up an Advisory Committee to safeguard the peace of the world, and co-ordinate the actions and attitude of the nations.

(A non-voting representative of the US participating).

The now accepted Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of any situation effected by means contrary to the treaties-not only relates to "Manchukuo", but also to the entire state of affairs which Japan has brought about.

Non-recognition is a denial of the correctness of facts created, of action taken, and of their consequences,--and puts the concert for action in opposition to every detail of the entire set-up.

Japanese troops captured Jehol City on 4 March, 1933.

On 27 March, Japan notified the League of her decision to withdraw because of "irreconcilable" differences with the League over Manchuria.

The Japanese Note tersely repeated the contention, so often heard at Geneva, that as China was not an organized State, the instruments governing the relations between ordinary countries must be modified in application to her.

It declared that the Report, besides mis-apprehending Japan's aims, contained gross errors of fact, and the false deduction that the Japanese seizure of Mukden in Sept. 1931--was not defensive. Failure to take into account the tension which preceded, and aggravations which followed the seizure, was alleged.

The failure of the Powers concerned to take forcible action when their interests were threatened and their nationals endangered, at Shanghai (Jan. '32), together with their refusal to accede to her suggested revision of the Nine Power Treaty--and their criticism of such a direct violation of her treaty pledges guaranteeing the territorial and administrative integrity of China, led Japan to believe that--since she had shown her hand so fully--she might just as well--or even better, go all the way.

So she ignored the wishes and conciliatory efforts of the League and formally recognized "Manchukuo" in Sept. '32, and occupied Jehol in Mar. '33.

She countered the League's verdict--adverse and injurious--by a spectacular withdrawal; a protest to an unjust world, and a gesture of magnificent defiance for the benefit of the homeland.

The final decision to withdraw was not made until after the leading elders of the Empire had been summoned for consultation. (The heads of the branches of the Imperial Family, all the former Premiers, Admiral Count Togo, and

Marshal Uyehar, and Prince Saionji. Former heads of the army and navy were also asked to take part in the deliberations. (The Cabinet's decision to withdraw from the League was taken as an indication of the extent of the Army's continued hold on the nation). The Japanese government took the position that withdrawal would be a turning-point in the Empire's history.

Under the surface, the departure from the League is causing extreme misgivings amongst the older, experienced statesmen of every school.

At present, a militant party is in control in Japan; the Wakatsuki Cabinet having been driven out of power by it eleven weeks after the invasion of Manchuria began. Japan has abandoned the more parliamentary form of gov't developed after the War and gone back to the Prussian military system.

Araki, Minister of War, and at one time Pres. of the Military College, is the "man of the hour" in Japan. The only General who could "ride the tiger". When he came into office, in Jan. 1932, the army was said to be honey-combed with dis-satisfaction, and worn out with "spineless diplomacy". There were sinister rumors that the legislators were to be bombed out of their halls and a military government installed. Political instability was extreme.

The army in Manchuria found him the perfect Secretary of War. With Araki in the Cabinet, the Empire is behind the Army. He is practically independent of the Cabinet, and subject only to the command of the Emperor. He has made full use of his powers. Today the army thinks it has solved the Manchurian problem, and given Japan room to exist and expand. It has cut the diplomatic cobwebs and forced through a foreign policy which 90% of the nation has been brought to believe is vital to Japan's existence. It has demanded and obtained the funds needed to put its equipment on a level with that of the Russian army.

Araki was recently quoted as follows:—The Year of the Cock (1933) means that everything can be accomplished. It is fraught with great significance for Japan. The celestial light is guiding Japan toward expansion—It is impossible to foresee what action the League of Nations will take regarding Manchuria, but there is

no occasion for the Japanese to feel concerned--By acting boldly, the Japanese can overcome all obstacles. By striking those who stand in our way, the Japanese can realize their national aspirations."

Japan owes her present position in the world to her armed forces, so there is every reason why she should have confidence in them, and follow their lead.

Constantly pre-occupied with the spread of communism, always alarmed in regard to Soviet Russia's antagonistic ambitions in Manchuria and Mongolia, and disturbed by the adverse economic and financial conditions at home, -the disconted, powerful, united, and aggressive Military Party decided to take advantage of the world-wide depression and demand for disarmament, and move into Manchuria; alleging an intolerable condition of chaos, and the necessity for self-defense.

Manchuria is to crown 50 years of constant, increasing, and successful aggression, - (by war, diplomacy, and intrigue, has she extended her encroachments, and consolidated her gains-at China's expense) and ^{be} added ^{be} to the Loo Choo's, Formosa, the Pescadores, Korea, and the Liaotung Peninsula.

Its vast, rich area-448,000 square miles (including Jehol), contains the coal, iron, oil, and foodstuffs so greatly needed by the little island nation whose population ^{are increasing} and industries/only less rapidly than its ambitions.

Manchuria has a population of 32,000,000 Chinese, 600,000 Koreans, and 120,000 Japanese. It is ideally situated, geographically.

It is a great prize, long desired and struggled for, an Empire in itself-and worthy of greater risks than the League of Nations typifies in the mind of Japan.

Prompt, decisive action on the part of the League might have halted the early operations, but 18 months delay played into the hands of the military in control in Tokyo, and convinced Japan that continued support of "Manchukuo", withdrawal from the League, and the conquest of Jehol were safe enough to go ahead with.

against Japan's flagrant disregard of her solemn treaty obligations, and her determined stand mediation and arbitration by the League, are not explicable unless they indicate the weakness of her case, and the conviction that united action against her is unlikely. Her proven courage, cynical shrewdness, and incredible audacity have secured her

the opportunity such qualities almost invariably command.

It was largely due, however, to the low state of the rest of the world.

Whether or not her abilities, resources, and strength are equal to the task, remains to be seen.

Its difficulties are commensurate with its magnitude, and Japan will have to achieve her successes without assistance, and against the organized, expressed condemnation of the League of Nations. This she will feel very deeply.

There would seem to have been a regrettable failure, by Geneva, to take Japanese psychology into account, - and a thorough and successful understanding of the foreign brands, - by the Japanese.

Japan's military successes against China and Russia, her association with the Allies on terms of equality, - together with her diplomatic victories at Shimonoseki, Portsmouth, Versailles, and Washington, - brought her to the belief that the Great Powers were no longer any serious menace to the territorial ambitions of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Although their own histories recorded that they had been dangerous to those who had challenged them, the World War had apparently reduced their spirit as well as their strength. The prestige of England had waned, Germany had been defeated, Having suffered no losses whatever, Japan was relatively much stronger for the War. An unprecedented economic and financial crisis depressed the world materially and spiritually.

Japan, - proud, frugal, ambitious, aggressive, and true to the Spartan cult and practice - felt able to challenge the Western World,

The cult of Westernization gave the Japanese an inferiority complex.

Their naive pride and pleasure in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the bitter-

ness they felt over its not being renewed, were an index of this state of mind.

As recently as 1932, they were still pre-occupied with being considered as good as anybody else.

But since that time, they felt that they were so considered, -until the tentative attempt of the League of Nations, in 1931, to remind them of their solemn treaty obligations, both disappointed and enraged them.

Their withdrawal from the League, and their denunciation of its verdict, were not surprising under the circumstances.

It is regrettable that fourteen years of constructive, progressive effort towards universal mediation and arbitration, should be thus seriously impaired.

And there is also the prospect that this aggressive nation, by its occupation of Manchuria, will be so enhanced in resources, strength, strategic position, and prestige, - as to be able and encouraged to engage in further progressively ambitious campaigns of conquest.

Some Notes on Sino-Japanese Relations during the past Fifty Years.
including
the Psychological Factor.

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3

NOTES FOR NOVEMBER TALK

Japan at the Time of Perry Treaty-1854. Seclusion-Shogunate-Espionage-Govt-

Restoration of the Mikado, 1868. Army & Navy-Students-Foreign instructors

& experts-Shintoism, cult of patriotism

Chinese-Japanese War, 1894. Korea-Tryout of Forces-8 months campaign-

Foe ignoble-Passion for Flattery-Territory.

acquired-Russian action re Liaotung

Chinese Boxer Rebellion, 1900.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902. Eride, pleasure, prestige-Loyal, 20 yrs-Psycholog

ical value-Non-renewal-Morale increased-Market

Russo-Japanese War, 1904. Preparation-Russian handicap-Port Arthur, Fleet

Peace, 18 months-Saghalin-Great Power-Patriotism

national ecstasy-Ambition, pride, ego-Enemy qual

ity-Situation correctly estimated, Superiority ized.

overwhelming-War terminated before enemy organ

Annexation of Korea, 1910. Independence, 1895-Submission, 1904-Significant

marking complete cynical disregard treaty obli

gations-Milestone self-confidence&Indiff inter

national opinion-West averted eyes-Chinese bli

portentous conquest, 16 yrs-Foreign indiff. en-

couraged Japan continue career aggression-Ledd

her discount probability foreign interference.

World War, 1914. Ally-Tsingtau, German Islands, Liaotung & German

Concessions in Shantung, -No troops either front

Services rendered-Period unexampled prosperity-

Navy good service, valuable experience-21 Demands

Hold gained N. China, C. E. R. & N. Manchuria-Undeclared

war-Performance "enfant terrible" gives one to think seriously

Japan at Versailles, 1918.

Confirmed in possession of Shantung, US consenting to save League-Cynical sentiments regard ethics&practice foreigners confirmed-Racial equality refused-Experience educational in re hatreds, jealousies, clashing interests & conflicting ambitions dividing natural enemies Well satisfied-Recognition-Triumph diplomatic exchange World exhausted & impoverished-Japan rich, strong, prosperous & ambitious-Divided & weak world offers opportunity Spartan State-Began building meet Completion US naval program, beyond means or necessity-Bid renewal A-J Alliance-Did much to bring about Washn Conference.

Effects of the War on Japan.

Japan gets Mandate over German Islands in Pacific-1920.

League approved, Marshall, Caroline, Marianne, & Pelew-Incredible folly & stupidity-Invites to conflict through contempt as well as loss-Suggests US negligible in war as

Washington Conference for Reduction

of Naval Armaments, 1921-22. Called by US-Vain, futile attempt disarmament by example, peace by altruism & generosity-Fantastic offer accepted only on Jap terms-GB scrapped obsolete ships, Japan blue print GB & US agreed status quo Pacific fortifications, rendering innocuous 9 Power Treaty and Policy Open Door-A-J Alliance denounce US Behest-Japan returned Shantung.

Effect on the Japanese.

Triumph over powerful opponents-Predisposed to folly, altruism, and philanthropy, American ostrich insisted on burying head deep in the sands of illusion-Scrapping fleet, giving up bases weakness & stupidity bred contempt-Loss respect, regard lead to slights, quarrels & conflicts-Gesture futile, dangerous unsuccessful-Others built cruisers, destroyers, subs-Japan embittered denouncing A-J Alliance-Convinced Caucasian race natural enemies-Freed anxiety in re China, & prestige vastly augmented, fitness demonstrated Hegemony of Asia-Manchuria.

Japanese Occupation of Manchuria, Sept. 1931.

Friction-Mukden seized-Un-declared war-

9 Power Treaty & Briand-Kellogg disregarded

Protest to League-Admonished-Adjourned.

Shanghai Incident, Jan. 1932.

Pressure boycott-Jap ultimatum-Landing for
ce involved-Ships & Army sent from Japan-

Complications induced J accept foreign medi
ation & withdraw-Operations damaged in eyes

of world-Prussian character first displayed-

Prestige forces suffered severe loss when vi
ewed close at hand, not impressive even against

Chinese, Regard, admiration world seriously re-

duced-Civilization a parently only skin deep

to deceive foreigner, -Meticulously guarded ve

il of distance & mystery temporarily drawn aside

and tradition of chivalry and invincibility giv

en a mortal blow.

Nine Power Treaty, Early 1932.

Jap suggestion for revision rejected and critici

zed-The operations at Shanghai and this propos-

al would seem abundant proof of the dis-ingenu-
to Manchuria.

ousness of her altruistic declarations in regard

Recognition of "Manchukuo", Sept. 1932.

An affront to the League & an act of bad faith.

Early in 1933, against the solemn warning of the

League, Jehol Province was over-run and added to t

the new State-The Military, in control, were commit-

ting the country to a course from which there could

be no retreat.

Japan and the League of Nations, Early 1933

After 18 months fruitless effort, the 43 mem-

bers adopted a unanimous Report, called on J. to

withdraw her forces, accept mediation arbitration-

Rejected her plea of self-defense, found Chinese boy

cotting justified, Manchuria an integral part of China, "Manch

ukuo" artificially created by the Japanese-Jap Delegation walked out of the Assembly in protest its condemnation of her Manchurian policy-League pledged members to continue not to recognize new State-Set up an Advisory Comm. to safeguard the peace of the world-Japan gave notice of her decision to withdraw from L on account irreconcilable diffs over Manchuria-J. Note contended China not an organized State & therefore not entitled unmodified application of instruments governing the relations amongst ordinary countries-Declared Report incorrect in fact & deductions-claimed no allowance situation. made for tensions, aggravations that were serious factor in

Reactions of the Japanese.

Lack of prompt forceful action by Foreign powers at Shanghai, & other attitude toward sugg revision of 9 power Treaty led Japs ignore conciliatory efforts League-Spec withdrawal protest to unjust world, superb gesture defiance for proud people-Decision concerned turning point, Military in saddle today. nation had confidence in forces that had put it where it is Cleverly capitalized situation at home and abroad, united whole country in favor Manc. adventure, offering as a panacea for all ills, foreign domestic, economic, political, Great prize of vital strategic, material value, worth risk typified by moribund League & her association with the GP's has bred contempt Versailles, Washn, Shanghai, & Geneva, lead her to believe no one of Asia. likely to interfere with her in the W. Pacific or on mainland

The Japanese Army.

Undisciplined & inexperienced as principal at Armageddon-no service on either front, only minor operations Tsingtau and Vladivostok, negligible for experience and education.-Handicapped by this lack of service in modern war-but animated by splendid patriotism and drilled and trained to exhaustion -possess great advantage of fighting enemies who must operate in a far distant theater, with practically no bases

The Japanese Navy.

Took part in the reduction of Tsingtau, policed the Western Pacific, convoyed Australian and New Zealand troops to the Mediterranean, did some convoy duty in that area, and performed the necessary service in connection with the army contingent at Vladivostok—Untried in modern war, as a principal—Benefitted by association with the Allied navies—While Tsushima is a glorious tradition, it affords no assurance of success against a modern enemy of the first quality—Its strength lies in the spirit of its people, and in the fact that the enemy would have to operate in Far distant Japanese waters, with only poorly defended bases.

The Miraculous Record.

An unbroken succession of victories over more powerful enemies—Change from a mediaeval to a modern civilization, an agricultural to an industrial era—building up of a national consciousness & a devoted patriotism unique in the history of the world—The natural growth of self-confidence, pride, and Ambition with the triumph of her arms and the enlargement of the Empire by conquest—The consequent enhancement of national prestige—The inevitable contempt felt by a Spartan people for more powerful countries weakened by easy living and the growth of luxury, The clever propaganda built up abroad, over a period of 30 yrs, by which a shrewd & sophisticated world was brought to accept the belief that the Japanese are a "proud, sensitive, warrior race—entitled to special treatment, and dangerous if not granted such consideration—The incredible obtaining of the desired special consideration—all achieved in eighty years.

Summary.

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and her flaunting of the League are regrettable in having impaired fourteen years of constructive, progressive effort towards universal mediation & arbitration. And there is also the prospect that this aggressive nation, by its occupation of Manchuria, will be so enhanced in resources, strength, strategic position, & prestige, as to be able & encouraged to engage in

Summary.

further progressively ambitious campaigns of conquest.

It would seem very desirable that the world should cease to take

the Japanese at their own valuation, stop according them any special treatment whatever, and earn their respect and good-will by the

establishment of settled national policies - obviously equitable and supported by adequate force and resolution.

Such procedure could not fail to have a helpful effect upon international relations, and consequently upon the peace of the world.

The Hiroshima Record.

The Japanese Navy.

Japan at the Time of Perry's Treaty-1854.

Seclusion-Shogunate, Espionage-Appreciation of the Dangers of Foreign Intercourse.

The Restoration-1867-1894.

Students sent abroad-Military Instructors and Experts imported-Mfg & Trade fostered.

Chino-Japanese War-1894.

Korea-Tryout of Forces-Whirlwind campaign-Ignoble foe-Passion for flattery-Warrior slogan-Concessions obtained-Contempt engendered,-Seed of Wars-Ceded Territory-Liaotung-Russian reaction,-Manchuria-Praise, Pride, and Prestige.

Russo-Japanese War-1904.

Preparation-Russian handicap-Port Arthur, Fleet, Peace-18 months,-Saghalin-Prestige One of the G. Powers-Emp. at the Front-Loyalty & Devotion-Patriotism nat. Ecstasy. White mans territory annexed-Ambition-pride, ego-World acclaim as Paladins. Enemy quality & handicaps-untrained, unprepared-Fleet foredoomed to annihilation-Jap superiority overwhelming-Situation correctly estimated in advance, War terminated before Russians organized.

Jap. Participation in Relief Peking Legations-Boxer Rebellion-1900.

Largest Contingent-Leading part-Well disciplined, equipped, organized, Very creditable.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance-1902

Pride, pleasure, & prestige-20 yrs-Loyal ally-Imp psychological effect at the time-Bitter over non-renewal & Amer. Interference-Consid. only by force of arms,-Every Foreigner a foe.-Loss a blessing-Morale increased-Markets gained.

Annexation of Korea-1910.

China forced ack. independence in 1895-Prac. submission in 1904-Sign. as marking compl. cynical dis. treaty obligations-Milestone self-conf. & indiff int. public opinion,-West world averted eyes-Chinas blindness during this portentous conquest extendg 16 yrs-Foreign indiff, encourg Jap, cont, career aggress-Lead her disc, prob for. interf.

World War-1914

Liaotung & Claim G, Concessions in Shantung Followed ally England-Tsingtau & German Islands-Service-No troops either front-Period unexampled prosperity-Navy good perf & val experience.

Notes for November Talk-Continued.

World War

Activities in China-21 Demands-Manchu Dyn fell 1912-Powerless in hands Japan-
 Civil war China, 14-21-Under Bol threat mil&nav agrees gave hold N.China-C.E.R.&
 N.Manc.-China joined Allies 1917 at solicitation Amer-J carried on undecl war with China
 while servg with Allies&Fantastic performance this "enfant terrible" gives one to
 think seriously.

Japan at Versailles-1918

Awarded spoils of own choosing-Confirmed in poss.of Shantung-Territor of another
 Ally-Cyn sents.in regard ethics&pracs foreigners abund confirmed-Racial equality
 not granted-Amer contd Shantung to save L.N.-Exp educational alst degree in acquain
 her jeals,h treds,clash intes&confl ambitions that div&kept apart her nat enemies

Effects War on Japan

Well satisfied-Recog as One of Prin.Powers-Success in Dipl Exch-World exh & improv
 J rich strong pros&ambit-Adm&resp for foreigners shattered by association,-a di&d
 weak world offered opps to nation Spar.tradition,cult&prac-Began bldg meet comple
 tion Amer wartime nav expan,Beyond means or necessty-Bid renewal A-J Alliance-
 News in US did much bring about Wasn Conf .

Japan Gets Mandate over German Pacific Islands-1920

L.N apprvd,Marshall,Caroline,and Marianne and Petew-Incred folly and stupidity-
 Invites to conflict through contempt as well as through so serious a loss-Suggests
 that Amer might prove no more formidable in war than in peace.

Washington Conf.for Reduction of Naval Armaments, 1921-22.

Called by US-Vain&futile attempt,Disarmt by example-Peace by altruism and generosity
 Fantastic offer accepted only if Ratio apply only to capital ships-One scrapped
 obsolete other blue prints-A and GB agreed status quo in Pacific fortifs,-thus rend
 ering 9 Pow Treaty guar ind C.&pol Open Door,Amer insist denouncing A-J Alliance
 embittered Japan,-J compelled sign Treaty returning Shantung.

Effect on the Japanese.

Triumph over most powerful opponents-Predisposed to folly,altruism,and phil.,the
 Amer ostrich insisted on burying its head deep in the sands of illusion.

Notes for November Talk-Continued.

Effects of the World War on the Japanese, Continued

Voluntary scrapping of Fleet & consent to give up Bases; Weakness & stupidity breed contempt, loss of resp & regard that lead to slight, quarrels, & conflicts-the Amer gesture a futile & danger one, accomplg no real reduction by others-They built cruisers, destroyers, & subs to keep up their nav strength; Amer insist upon GB giving up A-J Alliance embittered Japs & assured them that the Causasian race is their nat enemy-Freed from anx in regard to plans in re China they returned home with vastly augmented prestige-3d time gotten better of W Nations and demonstrated fitness for Hegemony of Asia-2ent ahead in Manchuria.

Japanese Occupation of Manchuria-Sept 1931

Friction & arrogance; Mukden seized & great prov came into the poss of Emp of R.S.- In spite of 9 Power Trty & Briand-Kellog Pact & It constituted un-declared war- China imm. protested to League, which urged both to withdraw and abstain from hostile acts-then adjourned for 3 weeks.

The Shanghai Incident-Jan 1932

Pres. of boycott-nav ultimatum, landing force involved, -ships & army sent from Japan complices & propors induced Japs to accep for mediation and withdraw, Operations had damaged in eyes of the world-Prussian charac first displayd to foriegner, Prestige armed forces severe diminution when surveyed close at hand-Effic nt impreeive even against Chinese-Regard & admiration world seriously reduced-Civilization apparently only skin deep & assumed only to deceive their nat enemy the foreigner-Metic guarded veil of distance & mystery temp drawn aside; tradition of Chiv & invincibility given a mortal blow

The Nine Power Treaty-Early 1932

J suggested revision, granting her sovereignty in the Province she had invaded- Suggestion rejected-The operations at Shanghai and this proposal would seem abundant proof of the disingenuousness of her altruistic declarations in regard to Manchuria.

Recognition of "Manchukuo"-Sept 1932

An affront to the League and an act of bad faith-Early in 1933, against the warn-

Notes for Talk-Continued.

Recognition of "Manchukuo".

ing of the League, Jehol Province was over-run and added to the new State.-The Military, in control, were committing the country to a course from which there could be no retreat.

Japan and the League of Nations-Early 1933.

After 18 months of fruitless effort, the 43 members adopted a unanimous report-called on J to withdraw her forces and to accept mediation & arbitration-Rejected her plea of self-defence-found Chinese boycotting justified-Manchuria an integral part of China, and "Manchukuo" artificially created by the Nipponese. J. deleg walked out of the Assembly in protest against its condemnation of her Manchurian policy-League pledged members to continue not to recognize "Manchukuo"-Set up an Advisory Com to safeguard peace of the world-J. gave notice of her decision to withdraw on acc of irrec diffs over Manchuria-The Jap Note contended that C. was not an organized State, & therefore not entitled to the unmodified application of instruments governing the relations amongst ordinary countries.-Declared the Report incorrect in fact and deduction, & claimed that no allowance had been made for the tensions & aggravations that were serious factors in the situation.

Reactions of the Japanese.

Lack of prompt & forceful action by the Foreign Powers at Shanghai, together with their attitude toward the sugg revision of the 9 Power Treaty, led the Japs to ignore the conciliatory efforts League-Spec withdrawal served as a protest to an unjust world and was a superb gesture of defiance for the proud populace at home-Decision a turning point in the history of the Empire-But the Military were in the saddle & the nation had confidence in the forces that had put it where it is today-They cleverly capitalized the situation at home and abroad, & united the whole country in favor of the Manc. Adventure, offering it as a panacea for all ills-for. & domestic, economic & political.

Notes for Talk-Continued.

Reactions of the Japanese.

J. has decided that this great prize, of vital strategic & material value, worth the risks represented by the moribund League-in her association & experience with the GP's familiarity has bred contempt, Versailles & Wash'n, Shanghai & Geneva, lead her to believe no one likely to interfere with her in the W. Pacific or on the mainland of Asia.

The Japanese Army.

Undisciplined and inexperienced as a Principal at Armageddon-Bursting with the valor of ignorance-Puffed up with easily won success against surprised, inefficient & unprepared nations--3 decades ago--this comp. ig & uned soldier knows very little of the demands & rigors of war today-Lacking service on either front, has no faint concept of the nervous & physical endurance required by such an ordeal- only exp at Tsingtau and Vladivostok-Both minor operations, at former in overwhelming superiority and at latter so poorly disciplined and arrogant as to be diff to serve with and to have built up in the hearts of the people of Siberia a hatred full of serious potentialities-

At Shanghai Jap staff underestimated the resistance of the Chinese & overestimated the fighting value of their own troops-After sev days exposure to wet & cold, & 25% casualties in action, Jap troops lost the will to fight & disproportionate losses in officers because they had to expose themselves unduly to get their men on their feet. Except at Tsingtau this the first time under fire since 1905, thirty years-Diff to imagine in confl with vet of Europe & Amer.

The Japanese Navy

Superior in every way to Army-Comparitively little in politics, Has no illusions as to outcome of a war with a great W. Power-Is aware it is not yet ready to engage a first class navy-Has some appreciation of the resources, might, and prowess of other nations-and of the dangers and difficulties inherent in a struggle with them-Like the Army, it has had no real trial in modern warfare-While Tsushima is a glorious tradition, it affords no assurance of success against a modern enemy of the first quality-Except at Tsingtau & Shanghai, not under fire since the Russo-Japanese War--1905.

Notes for Talk-Continued

Japanese Psychology

The weakness of this people is their pride. For years pre-occupied in being as good as anybody else. Upset by foreign refusal to revise 9 Power Treaty, foreign criticism, and adverse report of the League-Disappointed and enraged-Withdrawal not surprising, nat reaction of outraged pride injured by refusal racial equality, Denunc A-J Alliance, failure & loss of prestige at Shanghai, & the finding of the League against her as an Aggressor nation-The cup of her bitterness overflowed-Araki called upon the whole people to repudiate the cult of Westernization and return to the spirit & practice of their ancestors & Asia for the Asiatics-Close students of foreign affairs & of the psychology of the probable & possible foes, they count confidently upon their mutual jealousies & comp spiritual poverty to prevent any lifting of the gauntlet so audaciously thrown down-This apparently acc estimate slowly & laboriously arrived at by the best talent in the empire-It was the Mil leaders whose pride, courage, discontent and amb translated it into action-They felt there is little to fear from a nation so handicapped by the habitual working of an inveterate altruism and generosity that it asked not a foot of territory at Versailles, abandons its war bases at Washn, acquiesces in the Jap mandate over the German Islands, and voluntarily scraps a great new navy to set a good example to others. Diff for them not to under-rate an enemy with a record so absolutely beyond their comprehension-Makes it impossible to recall their stupefaction at Amer alarming exhibition of strength and resources in the World War.

Summary.

Japans record of achievement during the past eighty years is nothing short of miraculous-In her case Character has certainly been Destiny-the Spartan cult has given a supreme demonstration-other peoples with less stiffening matter in their composition have given way before this Lion in the Path.

It would seem desirable that the world should cease to take the Japanese at

Summary-Continued

their own valuation stop treating them as they desire to be treated-
earn their respect and good will by the establishment of settled nation
al policies, obviously equitable, and supported by adequate force.

Once they realize that the world has a shrewd and accurate knowledge of
just how formidable they actually are, it cannot fail to have a helpful
effect upon international relations and consequently upon the peace
of the world.

Like all Oriental nations, they have respect, in the final analysis,
only for force.

For generosity and altruism, which they regard only as forms of weakness,
they have only contempt.

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Japanese Invincibility-An Asian Myth.

1 January, 1934.

Edward H. Watson.

Japanese Invincibility-An Asian Myth.

Filled to bursting with an incredible ego, fed upon forty years of success in the field and at the treaty table, this little nation ^{with} of comparatively limited ability and a very late start, -is only distanced in her actual achievements by her own estimate of their magnitude.

Those who are directing her course apparently believe that she has proved herself invincible-and is able to bid defiance to a world convinced of her impregnability.

Imbued with supreme confidence in her own star, she has a great contempt for many of the other nations of the earth.

Such are the fruits of unbroken success with the sword.

Nourished upon them, She gratifies her appetite for conquest by the sudden and drastic occupation of Manchuria; deliberately ^{ing} ignor her solemn treaty obligations.

This aggressive action is prejudicial to the serious interests of other nations, in addition to being an irreparable loss to China.

It actually constitutes nothing less than undeclared war.

Ignoring every effort of the League to mediate and arbitrate, this stiff-necked people add insult to injury by openly flaunting the finding and judgment of the League, and publicly withdrawing from it, thereby dealing a most serious blow to 14 years of progressive effort in the cause of peace and civilization throughout the earth.

While the spectacular career of this Empire of the Rising Sun held ample warning for all who were not blind, the inevitable denouement in Manchuria apparently found the world as surprised and unprepared as is customary when Japan issues her challenge.

But even so, is Japan so formidable that all the other nations must accept the dictates of her great and constantly growing ambitions .

Or is this fabled might on ly an Asian myth-built up over a period of thirty years, by superlatively clever Japanese propaganda.

Japan at the Time of Commodore Perry's Visit.

In 1853, when Perry arrived in Japan to open up trade and diplomatic relations with that country, he found the people living in a strict and chosen seclusion—under the military rule of the Shogun, the Commander of the Mikado's armies.

The great feudal lords carried on internal wars and intrigue, employing a special warrior class—whose bravery, loyalty, endurance, and pride are still traditional.

From this Samurai nucleus, the superb fighting spirit was diffused throughout the whole population, enabling the new armies of Nippon—trained under European instructors to achieve an unbroken series of victories against China and Russia.

Appreciation of the Significance of Foreign Intercourse.

In accepting limited intercourse at the hands of Commodore Perry, the Japanese were clear-sighted enough to realize that they were yielding to force,—and that the only salvation for their future lay in providing themselves with defensive forces that would be adequate to preserve their independence.

They were clever enough to realize this at the very outset of their relations with the Foreign Powers,—and to proceed at once to take action to safeguard their future.

Across the narrow Japan Sea, the Flowery Kingdom afforded a horrible example of how not to deal with the foreigner.

Little Nippon resolved, then and there, to fight them with their own weapons.

The Chinese-Japanese War (1894).

After ten years of careful training and preparation, Japan used the quarrels over Korea—which she was determined to deny to Russia and to take for herself—as a pretext; and went to war with China.

She was after a cold-blooded try-out of her new army and navy.

The campaign, lasting only eight months, surpassed her most sanguine expectations.

It was a picturesque performance.

Efficient land and sea forces functioning with swift precision against the background of quaint little Japan and vast, somnolent China.

The imagination of the Western world was seized, and the consequent praise, admiration, and flattery grossly exaggerated a victory that had been secured by secret, laborious preparation over a long term of years—against a surprised, thoroughly un-ready enemy.

The pertinent fact is that the foe was ignoble, and the victory—actually—a cheap one.

But the scene was laid under a far-distant horizon, and the totally unexpected triumph was a popular one,—so why strain over dull and hampering facts.

The Reaction of the Japanese to their Victory.

The Japanese received this meed of adulation with complete imperturbability. If they didn't possess it before, they then and there developed a passion for fulsome flattery that is insatiable, and which constitutes a blind segment in their generally realistic vision. It may yet prove their eventual un-doing.

The foreign furor corroborated their own idea of the truly marvellous courage and strategy they had displayed,—so they numbered their more than considerable spoils and came to the not-surprising conclusion that the sword was their natural weapon and that they were "a proud, sensitive, warrior-race," entitled to special consideration from everybody else. As a matter of fact, this was a foreign characterization,—but the clever Japanese immediately sensed its value, and adopted it as a slogan ever since.

And, amazing as it may seem, they have incredibly succeeded in obtaining this same special treatment ever since. From old, cynical, sophisticated Europe, and young, shrewd keentrading America. Not always, of course, but in the main. Tentatively requested, at first, it has long been demanded and received. To the Oriental mind, such concessions are regarded always as signs of weakness, and are immediately taken advantage of and steadily increased. Not only are material gains thus obtained, but a feeling of contempt is naturally engendered and developed. And this feeling, between nations, is the seed of wars.

Planted in the rich soil of Japanese ambition, it has brought forth conflicts and aggressions that continue to trouble the peace of the world.

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Material Fruits of the Victory.

The whirl-wind campaign had added Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and a huge indemnity to Japan's possessions.

Only the selfish and arbitrary action of France, Germany, and Russia prevented her from annexing the Liaotung Peninsula, which Russia secured for herself, about three years later.

Russia's Reactions to Japan's Victory in 1895.

Russia's

Her action in securing the cooperation of France and Germany in preventing the acquisition of Liaotung by Japan speaks eloquently enough.

The ambitions of the two countries, in regard to Manchuria, were strongly opposed.

Their interests—both at the expense of China—continually clashed.

For thirty odd years, they have been engaged in a struggle for that vast Province.

Its rich resources and strategic value make it well worth a great price in blood and treasure.

The Russo-Japanese War—1904.

This state of affairs and the success of her attack on China—led Japan to spend some eight years preparing to go to war with Russia, and then, when the time was ripe, to attack her over-night.

Once again, her courage was equal to her ambition.

Handicapped by the single track of the Trans-Siberian railway, and almost totally unprepared, the Russians found Port Arthur taken and their fleet destroyed and peace declared by the astute Japanese before they could organize to operate successfully against them.

The Russian cession of the Southern half of the island of Saghalin was of very little material value, but the prestige for Japan was enormous.

By world-wide acclamation, she was one of the Great Powers.

Some of the Effects of the War on Japan.

In 1867, the Shogun voluntarily relinquished the power that he had held for some three hundred years, and the Emperor was restored to the full exercise of the temporal power. Shintoism, an old Japanese faith, was revived, ^{additional and supplementary to Buddhism} ~~it~~ practically a cult of patriotism.

During the war with Russia, the Emperor took the field with his armies; headquarters be-

ing located only a short distance behind the lines.

There he lived on frugal soldier-fare, with no pomp or state whatever.

His devoted and adoring people ascribed the speedy and triumphant campaign to the virtue of their peerless Ruler, the descendant of the divine Sun-Goddess.

An extraordinary loyalty and devotion was felt by every individual in the Empire. During the investment and capture of the supposedly impregnable Russian stronghold of Port Arthur, the Japanese soldiers were slaughtered by tens of thousands, happy to die for their Emperor.

Japanese patriotism became a national ecstasy.

Prestige and Pride.

If the nation was elated over its successes in the war with China, how describe the ~~un-~~ ~~bear~~ feelings engendered by this victory over one of the great Western nations.

The arrogant pride of the white man had been reduced on land and sea, and territory taken from ^{him} and put under the standard of the Rising Sun.

The consequent prestige was simply enormous.

And deservedly so, because the risks involved and the courage required were of paramount quality.

Is it any wonder that, thereafter, their ambition should march with their pride.

And that their arrogance should keep step with both.

The acclaim of the whole world assured them that they were ^a truly marvellous people.

Some of the Unconsidered Facts.

Without in any way wishing to detract ~~from credit~~ ~~from~~ ~~for~~ a magnificent performance, it is certainly fair, interesting, and worth while to appraise the Japanese victory in terms of the enemy's quality.

As in the case of China, the foe was unprepared, inefficient, and taken by surprise.

The single-tracked Trans-Siberian railway was inadequate for the re-inforcement and supply of the Russian armies in the distant theater of war, -5600 miles from Moscow.

Their equipment was short and of inferior quality.

The personnel lacked training, loyalty, and morale.

The fleet was a heterogeneous mass of ships of various types, un drilled, and unorganized

and fore-doomed to annihilation at the terminatino of the long and anxious journey to meet a thoroughly prepared and rested antagonist, -close to his home-base, and lying in wait in a narrow strait.

Full credit is given for training, organization, and dispsitions, -it is only pointed out that the superiority was so great that the contest was too one-sided to demand any great amount of efficiency or endurance.

In a way, Russia gave as poor a show as China.

And while Japan, ^{to all outward appearance} seemed to risk her very existence, ^{yet} the most exhaustive study of the enemy ^{in advance} strength, preparation, and resources had completely convinced her that Russia was in no condition to cope with her successfully, afloat or ashore.

The distance and the lack of transportation were too great.

Further, with wise foresight, Japan brought the struggle to a prompt conclusion before her powerful enemy could fully organize.

It was a well-planned, excellently executed set of operations, -carried out successfully against an inferior foe, poorly commanded and badly led.

The only real strain suffered by the Japanese was anxiety that the Russians might prove to be in any way efficient, -and thus complicate the affair.

Annexation of Korea.

Korea was finally annexed by Japan in 1910.

Having forced China, in 1895, to acknowledge its independence, Japanese intrigue and coercion accomplished its practical submission in 1904. Its inevitable inclusion in the Empire was a foregone conclusion.

The event is significant as marking a complete, cynical disregard of her ~~secret~~ treaty obligations with the little Hermit Kingdom.

It was a mile-stone along the way of her increasing self-confidence and indifference to international opinion.

The busy and distant Western world averted its eyes and refused to have its sympathies enlisted by the pathetic spectacle of a whole helpless people taken possession of and put under the inexorable military rule of a conquering nation flushed with victory.

China's failure to learn a lesson from this portentous instance of aggressive conquestia extending over a period of 16 years must affect the worlds sympathy in her loss of Manchur And foreign indifference to the fate of Korea surely encouraged Japan to continue along the path of her constantly increasing ambition. It lead her to discount the probability of foreign interference.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In 1902, the Japanese were made very proud and happy by an alliance with Great Britain.

It was a very handsome recognition and was a source of pleasure and prestige.

It was destined to run until 1922, with mutual benefit to both nations, and the record shows that Japan was *a good* and loyal ally.

The Japanese had a very great admiration for British diplomacy and the British navy.

Their own navy was **British** trained, and their Foreign Office had a number of British advisors.

The Alliance had a very real and important psychological effect upon the Japanese.

It gave them the confidence ^{they} needed in dealing with foreign nations.

There was comfort and credit in such an alliance.

It was England that encouraged Japan to go to war with Russia, ^{later} and caused her to join the ^{Allies}.
 And when England decided, -at America's behest, -not to renew the Alliance, in 1922, at the Washington Conference - Japan felt a very keen bitterness and disappointment.

She felt that she had been sold-out to America.

And that this was another instance of the Western nations combining against her, -as in the case of Russia, France, and Germany in regard to Liaotung.

It served to ^{harden} both her heart and her resolution

It strengthened her determination to maintain her independence, and convinced her that the only consideration the other races could obtain from the dominant Caucasian, -was by force of arms.

She has long taught her people that every foreigner is a foe.

The loss of the Alliance proved a blessing in disguise.

Acting entirely alone, she was free to further her own interests, -and to develop along her own lines.

Recognizing these advantages as they became apparent, she rejoiced to be entirely ^{on} her own and the natural reaction built up her morale very rapidly .

While Great Britain saved her supremacy at sea, at the Washington Conference, the denouncing of the Alliance proved costly to her interests in Asia.

The World War.

It was difficult for Japan to decide which side to join.

The German character, with its sabre-rattling proclivities, is very like her own.

And she was strongly inclined to believe that the Central Powers would win.

Her own army was German trained.

But she didn't forget that the British navy ruled the seas.

She followed her Ally into the war.

It seemed the most advantageous thing for her to do.

With British co-operation, she beleaguered and captured the German concession of Tsingtau, -thus finally securing Liaotung and a claim for the German concessions in Shantung.

In the South Seas, she came into possession of the German Islands.

Thus, early in the conflict, she had secured the spoils of her own choosing.

Her services to the Allies consisted in patrolling Asian waters, convoying Australian and New Zealand troops to the Mediterranean, doing some convoy duty in that area, and supplying a quota of troops for the occupation of Vladivostok.

No Japanese troops were sent to either front.

Not called upon to make any real warlike effort, she was free to develop her industries and supply the enormous needs of her allies.

Under arms and sharing the glory; wealth and prosperity crowned her efforts.

Serving with great foreign navies, the Nipponese sea forces gave a good performance, and acquired a most valuable war-experience.

Japanese Activities in China during this Period.

With the rest of the world thoroughly pre-occupied with the Great War, Japan seized this opportunity to carry on **widespread** aggressive activities against China.

In 1915, she presented the "Twenty One Demands"-a military ultimatum that would have reduced the Flowery Kingdom to a vassal State.

China acceded to some, but not all of the demands.

In 1912, the Manchu dynasty had fallen, and the country become a Republic.

The change of government, and Japanese intrigue made the country powerless in her hands. There was civil war in China, between the South and North, from 1914 to 1921. Under the threat of Bolshevik danger, Japan secured military and naval agreements with the Peking government that gave her a hold on North China, and the Chinese Eastern railway and North Manchuria.

In 1917, China joined the Allies *at the earnest solicitation of the U.S.* Japan had given another astounding performance.

While ~~actually engaged in the World War, as one of the~~ ^{of the} Allies ~~she had carried simultaneously,~~ ^{on,} and successfully, ~~un-declared war with China, another~~ ^{of the} of the Allies.

Japan at the Peace-Table at Versailles.

At the Peace-table at Versailles,
Japan ~~sat~~ ^{was} as one of the ~~Five~~ ^{Five} Great, Conquering Nations.

Entirely satisfied with the spoils actually in hand, and determined to have them awarded to her.

She had no idea of keeping the promise she had made ^{China to} to return to ~~her~~ ^{China} the Former German Concessions.

In spite of China's impassioned pleas for the return of her own Sacred Province of Shantung, Japan was confirmed in her possession, -with the vague understanding that she would eventually evacuate it.

Japan had succeeded in having the territory of another ally awarded to her.

Her cynical sentiments in regard to the ethics and practices of the Great Nations were abundantly confirmed.

Her only failure was in regard to the recognition of racial equality.

America consented to Shantung, in order to save the League of Nations.

Japan found her experience at Versailles, with the Great Powers, educational to the last degree in acquainting her with the jealousies, hatreds, clashing interests and conflicting ambitions -that divided and kept apart the nations whom by now she had ~~become~~ ^{become} convinced ~~were~~ ^{were} her natural enemies.

The Effects of the World War on Japan.

Japan ^{was} very well satisfied with the results of her participation in the struggle.

She was now acknowledged as one of the Principal Powers.

She had been associated, on terms of equality, with the Great Nations of the Earth.

She had more than held her own with them, - in the give and take of diplomatic exchange.

While the long, grim struggle had left the rest of the world impoverished and exhausted, Japan, on the contrary, was rich, prosperous, strong, and ambitious. Having suffered no losses whatever, Japan was relatively much stronger for the War.

The admiration and regard she had once felt for the foreigners had been shattered by association.

She had been out in the wide world, in time of war, and had found herself able to hold her own.

A divided, exhausted world - weakened in spirit as in treasure and strength - offered opportunities to a nation with the Samurai tradition and the Spartan cult and practice. Affected by the spectacle of America's great naval expansion - a wartime program approaching completion - she secretly began a naval effort far beyond her means or her necessities.

It was certainly a diplomatic bid for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

And ^{perhaps} a shrewd effort to induce altruistic America to make some attempt to put a stop to competitive building, and hence to war.

The Japanese have long been keen and successful students of American psychology.

In any case, the news of Japan's unprecedented naval expansion did ^{much to} bring about the Washington Conference for the Reduction of Naval Armaments.

Mandate over the South Pacific Islands.

In 1920, the League of Nations approved the Japanese Mandate over the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianne Islands.

It seems incredible that these islands - of very great strategic importance to America, could have been placed under the mandate of Japan.

That such a thing could have happened, invites to conflict through contempt, as well as through so serious a loss.

It seems ^{ed} to indicate that America might prove to be actually no more formidable than Russia

The Washington Conference for the Reduction of Naval Armaments.

Called by the United States in the Autumn of 1921, ^{the Washington Conference} ~~it~~ was a vain and futile attempt to accomplish dis-armament by example; peace by altruism and generosity.

America's fantastic offer to scrap her whole new Navy if Great Britain and Japan would each scrap incredibly less and agree to a 5-5-3 Ratio resulted only in something far worse than the exchange of a birthright for a mess of potage.

England and Japan finally acceded to the ratio-to be applied only to ^{and plane-carriers} capital ships- with the result ~~that they actually scrapped~~ only obsolete ships and blue-prints.

And in order to secure even this preposterous acceptance of the unprecedented offer, America and Great Britain incredibly agreed not to further fortify their bases in the Far East. Otherwise, Japan refused to agree to the Ratio.

By consenting to this status quo in Pacific fortifications, America rendered innocuous the Nine Power Treaty, guaranteeing the independence of China and maintaining the policy of the Open Door.

American insistence on the Denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance-about due for renewal at the end of 20 years, caused bitter feeling in Japan.

The Chinese Delegation seized the opportunity to agitate the Shantung Question, with the result that Japan was constrained to sign a Treaty for its return.

The Effect of the Conference on the Japanese.

Japanese

In the international diplomatic arena they had triumphed over their most powerful opponent. Predisposed to folly, altruism, and philanthropy, the American ostrich insisted on burying its head ^{deep} in the sands of illusion.

Voluntarily scrapping ^{her} their great new fleet, to inspire others by so noble an example, it was not too difficult to persuade ^{her} them to scrap ^{her} their bases-upon which ^{her} their fleet must depend in all operations in the Western Pacific.

Such weakness and stupidity must inevitably breed contempt, -with the loss of respect and regard that leads to slights, quarrels, and conflicts.

Thus America's generous gesture was a futile and dangerous one, -accomplishing no real reduction on the part of other nations.

The Ratio ^{ap} applying only to Capital ships and plane-carriers, the other countries built up their strength in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

America's insistence upon Britain's scrapping the Anglo-Japanese Alliance embittered the Japanese against both the Anglo-Saxon nations and even more completely convinced them that all the Caucasian races were their natural enemies.

Freed from any real anxiety in regard ^{to American interference with} their Chinese program, they returned to the Far East with immensely augmented prestige.

They had again, and for the third time, publicly gotten the better of the Western Nations and demonstrated their fitness for the Hegemony of Asia.

With painstaking care they continued to consolidate their position in Manchuria, and to prepare for the opportune time to occupy it with their military forces.

The Occupation of Manchuria.

Constantly increasing friction in Manchuria, between Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, - with the mounting arrogance of the numerous Nipponese military, - came to a head in September 1931, when Japanese troops seized Mukden and other important places, and the great province came into actual possession of the Empire of the Rising Sun.

This in spite of Japan's solemn ~~treaty~~ obligations under the Nine Power Treaty, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, renouncing war.

it actually constituted un, declared war.

Owing to the general situation in Japan, and the economic world crisis, the Militarists in that country were able to gain full control - and to accomplish the seizure of Manchuria. China immediately protested to the League.

The League urged both to withdraw their troops and abstain from hostile acts.

It then adjourned for three weeks.

The Shanghai Incident.

In January 1932, the heavy pressure of the boycott and numerous local clashes, - led the Japanese naval commander at Shanghai to demand the suppression of all anti-Japanese manifestations.

In spite of compliance with his demands, he proceeded to occupy the city.

To extricate the hopelessly involved landing-force, more ships and an army of about 50,000 men was sent from Japan.

The situation assuming complications and proportions undesirable for the Japanese, they accepted foreign mediation and withdrew.

But not before their operations had seriously damaged them in the eyes of the civilized world

With complete indifference, they subjected the civilian population to the rigors of modern war.

It was a striking exhibition of the Prussian element in the Japanese character.

It gave undesirable publicity to the invasion of Manchuria.

And Shanghai was certainly the poorest possible place for such publicity.

Further, the Japanese military and naval forces—equipped and trained—made a most unfortunate show against the small, miserable Chinese force that held out against it.

The prestige of the Nipponese armed forces suffered a very severe diminution when surveyed close at hand. This fact should give the world seriously to think.

Their efficiency had not proved impressive,—even when employed only against the despised Chinese.

And this reverse to their arms had been experienced in the face of unfriendly and critical foreigners,—at Shanghai.

It seriously affected the regard and admiration heretofore felt for Japan by the whole civilized world.

Their civilization had proved to be only skin-deep, and assumed only to deceive their natural enemy—the foreigner.

The whole incident—an erratic one—was very illuminating.

The metriculously guarded veil of mystery and distance was temporarily drawn aside, and the painstakingly built-up traditions of chivalry and invincibility given a mortal blow.

The Nine-Power Treaty.

Early in 1932, in violation of her pledges guaranteeing the territorial and administrative integrity of China, -Japan suggested a revision of the Nine-Power Treaty, -granting her sovereignty in the great Province she had occupied.

The suggestion was rejected.

The operations at Shanghai and this proposal, would seem to be abundant proof of the dis-ingenuousness of her altruistic declarations in regard to Manchuria.

Recognition of "Manchukuo!"

In September 1932, Japan formally recognized "Manchukuo", the puppet state she had erected in Manchuria.

Six months later, against the warning of the League of Nations, Jehol Province was occupied and added to the new state.

The Military, in control, were committing the country to a course from which there could be no retreat.

The League of Nations.

Early in 1933, after eighteen months of fruitless effort, the 43 members of the League adopted a unanimous report, condemning Japan's aggressive action in Manchuria.

It called on Japan to withdraw her forces, and to accept mediation and arbitration.

The League rejected Japan's plea of self-defense, found Chinese boycotting justified, Manchuria an integral part of China, and "Manchukuo" artificially created by Japan.

The Japanese delegation walked out of the Assembly in protest against its condemnation of Japan's Manchurian policy.

The League pledged its members to continue not to recognize "Manchukuo".

It set up an Advisory Committee to safeguard the peace of the world and coordinate the actions and attitude of the nations.

At the end of March, Japan gave the League formal notification of her decision to withdraw on account of irreconcilable differences with the League over Manchuria.

The Japanese Note contended that China was not an organized state and therefore not entitled to the unmodified application of instruments governing the relations amongst ordinary countries. It declared the Report incorrect in fact and deduction, and claimed that no allowance was made for the tension and aggravations that were serious factors in the situation.

Reactions of the Japanese.

The lack of prompt and forceful action by the Foreign Powers, at Shanghai, together with their attitude towards the suggested revision of the Nine Power Treaty, -led the Japanese to ignore the conciliatory efforts of the League.

Her spectacular withdrawal served as a protest to an unjust world and constituted a superb gesture of defiance for the proud populace at home.

Taken only after the most solemn consultation and deliberation by the Imperial Family and its most experienced and responsible advisors, it was regarded as a turning-point in the history of the Empire.

It is a source of very real anxiety amongst the older, more-experienced statesmen. But the Military ----- is in the saddle, and the nation has confidence in the forces that put it where it is today.

The dominant Military Party, under the leadership of Araki-Minister of War and Man of the Hour in Japan-cleverly capitalized the situation-at home and abroad, and united the whole people in favor of the Manchurian adventure, -offering it as a panacea for all ills, foreign and domestic, economic and financial.

Nippon has decided that this great prize, of vital strategic and material value, is well worth any and all risks typified by the moribund League.

Her association and experience with the Great Nations has shown her that familiarity breeds contempt.

Her recollections of Versailles and Washington, and the lack of action at Shanghai and Geneva, lead her to believe that there are none in the world today to interfere with her in the Western Pacific or on the mainland of Asia.

The Japanese Army Today.

This army, inexperienced and undisciplined as a principal at Armageddon, is bursting with the valor of ignorance.

Puffed up with easily-won successes against surprised, inefficient, and unprepared nations—three decades ago—the comparatively ignorant and uneducated Nipponese soldier knows very little of the demands and rigors of war today.

Lacking service on either the Western or the Eastern front, he has no faint conception of the nervous and physical endurance required by such an ordeal.

His only experience in the World War was at Tsingtau and Vladivostok, two minor operations that provided no real test and had little or no educational value.

At Vladivostok, their arrogant behavior and indiscipline made them very ^{difficult} to serve with and built up in the hearts of the people of Siberia a hatred full of serious potentialities.

Except at Tsingtau and Shanghai, the Japanese soldier has not been under fire since 1905.

It is difficult to imagine him in conflict with the veteran of Europe and America.

Imbued with a magnificent patriotism, and drilled almost to exhaustion, he is more than adequate for service on the Asian mainland—against the Chinese, where he operates against unorganized and poorly equipped forces,—under target-practice conditions.

The technique and the tempo, and the magnitude of the effort and resources required in the case of a powerful enemy, would put a terrific strain upon a Service lacking any experience in the shock of modern war.

Yet until a short time ago, it was the Japanese War Minister, Araki, the most ambitious individual in the most aggressive country in the world who was the Man of the Hour in Japan.

A state of affairs pregnant with alarming possibilities.

For in two short years, the Prusso-Japanese form of diplomacy has undone the work of eight decades, and caused irreparable injury to Japan's record and standing in the Family of Nations.

A tremendous responsibility assumed by an organization not too well-fitted to bear it.

The Japanese Navy.

This Service is more widely travelled, and has for many years made more educational contacts than the Army.

It is much better informed and more broadminded.

It has ^{comparitively} very little to do with politics, with which the Army is always pre-occupied.

The Navy, -unlike the Army, -has no illusions as to the ultimate outcome of a War with one of the great Western Powers.

It is aware that it is not yet ready to engage a great foreign navy.

Unlike the Army, it has some appreciation of the resources, might, and prowess of other nations, and of the resources and efficiency necessary in such a struggle.

Like the Army, it has had no real trial in modern warfare.

While Togo's victory at Tsushima is a glorious tradition-it affords no assurance of success against a modern enemy of the first quality.

As in the case of the Army, ^{except at Tsingtau and Shanghai} it has not been under fire since the Russo-Japanese War-1905.

Japanese Psychology.

This courageous and successful little nations weakness is her pride.

For years, she was pre-occupied with being considered as good as everybody else.

This goal seemed to have been achieved until the attitude of the Great Powers in refusing to accede to her suggested revision of the Nine Power Treaty, and their criticism of such a direct violation of her treaty pledges, -together with the adverse report of the League, -both disappointed and enraged her.

The withdrawal from the League was not surprising under the circumstances.

It was the natural reaction of outraged pride, -injured at Versailles by the refusal of racial equality; at Washington by the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and America's interference in her affairs; by her failure and loss of prestige at Shanghai, and by the finding of the League against her as an Aggressor Nation.

The cup of her bitterness overflowed.

It gave the War Minister, Araki, the opportunity to denounce the whole cult of Westernization-with its inevitable inferiority complex-and to call upon the whole nation to return to the spirit and practice of their ancestors.

The inspiring slogan is "Asia for the Asiatics".

Close students of foreign affairs and of the psychology of ~~their~~ probable and possible Japanese enemies, ~~the~~ count confidently upon their mutual jealousies, and comparative spiritual poverty, -to prevent any lifting of the gauntlet so audaciously thrown down.

~~This~~ apparently accurate estimate of the situation was slowly and laboriously arrived at by the meticulous investigation ~~of~~ the best talent available in the Empire.

It was the military leaders whose pride, courage, discontent, and ambition translated this estimate into terms of action.

America

They felt that there is little to fear from a nation so handicapped by the habitual working of an inveterate altruism and generosity that it asked not a foot of territory at Versailles; abandoned its bases at Washington; acquiesced in Japan's receiving the Mandate over the ex-German islands in the South Pacific, and voluntarily scrapped a great new navy to set a good example to others.

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Rumors That Japan Will Again Attack Russia.

A high-handed disregard of Russia's rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway, and on the Kamchatka fishing grounds, is steadily and dangerously increasing the tension created by Japanese arrogance and aggression towards the Soviet Republic.

While Russia is anxious to avoid war and to concentrate all her energies on her internal development, Japan's actions have driven her to prepare for the conflict that certainly threatens.

Only the insatiable ambition of the Japanese army ^{would} even consider adding war with Russia to the present difficulties and dangers inherent in the Manchurian situation. And even its ego must have more than a dim perception that Stalin's Red Army is probably something very different from the troops that served under the double-eagle of the Czars.

In this enemy there might be equality new in the experience of Nippon, -and its training, equipment, resources, and morale might call for all or more than the Japanese are prepared to give.

Such a supreme piece of folly would risk the Japanese victories and gains of eighty years.

Once engaged in a struggle with a Principal Power, Japan would be menaced by discontented populations rising against her in Korea and Manchuria, and by at least the active hatred and passive resistance of the Chinese.

The facts seem to show that this greatly-over-rated nation is actually formidable only to weak, chaotic, and helpless China.

Through distance, the lack of bases, and the necessity of defending their far-flung dependencies, a campaign in the Western Pacific would be costly, difficult, dangerous, and long-drawn-out, -even to one of the Great Powers.

But there could be but one issue to the conflict, -Japan's reduction to a Third or Fourth class Power, and the end of her dreams of the Hegemony of Asia.

Even superlative character, courage, and ambition cannot overcome odds far beyond her strength and resources.

Summary.

This short review and analysis of Japan's progress and development during the past eighty years, is an amazing record of achievement against incredible odds.

A long, unbroken succession of triumphs over powerful enemies.

The change from an agricultural to an industrial era, and from a mediaeval to a modern civilization.

The immediate realization of the fact that the treaty of limited intercourse was actually imposed by force, and that her independence could only be maintained by fighting her new foes with their own weapons. The ability, tenacity, courage, and audacity unfailingly displayed in successfully carrying on this bitter struggle.

The building up of a national consciousness and a devoted patriotism almost unique in the history of the world.

The natural growth of self-confidence, pride, and ambition with victories over more powerful enemies and the enlargement of the Empire by the conquest of their territories.

The consequent enhancement of national prestige.

The disillusion, disappointment, and loss of regard inevitable upon association with the Great Powers—relentlessly pursuing their own interests and ambitions.

The natural contempt felt by a Spartan people for other more powerful people, weakened in spirit and in flesh by easy living and the growth of luxury.

The clever propaganda built up abroad, over a period of thirty years, by which a shrewd and sophisticated world was brought to accept the belief that the Japanese are "a proud, sensitive, warrior race entitled to special treatment—and dangerous if not granted such consideration".

The logical resentment, withdrawal, and defiance engendered by the modification of this form of treatment, long accorded and assumed to be a right.

The desireability that the world should cease to take the Japanese at their own evaluation. Stop treating them as they claim they should be treated, and earn their respect and good-will by the establishment of settled national policies—obviously equitable—and supported by adequate forces, and determination.

Special note: The world has been misled by the Japanese propaganda that the

Once they realize that the other nations have a shrewd and accurate knowledge of just how formidable they actually are, it cannot fail to have a helpful effect upon international relations, and consequently upon the peace of the world.

Like all Oriental nations, they have respect—in the final analysis—only for force.

For weakness, generosity, and altruism they have only contempt.

Mr. Roy Howard states in an article published after a personal survey in Japan, that the cause of peace were best served with this nation by building up the United States Navy to the ratio agreed upon at London.

25 Years too Late.

The Tune Without the Words.

The Higher They Climb.

Too Long Dead.

Togo's Manner of Dying.

