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War College, November 1896.

C o n f i d e n t i a l .

S I T U A T I O N

in case of
War with Spain.

If a war should break out between the United States and Spain, the situation under existing circumstances would be briefly as follows:

1st. Spain itself could be attacked. This would involve an unduly large expenditure of life and treasure; and the issue of such a campaign would be somewhat doubtful.

2d. Spain's possessions in the East could be attacked. This would require fewer men and less money, and the issue of a resolute campaign against the Philippines might be regarded as reasonably certain to be successful. Success there, however, would not be of great value to us, as it would not certainly bring the enemy to terms.

3d. Spain's West Indian possessions could be attacked. This campaign would require still less men and means as the West Indies are at our doors, and the transportation difficulties would be a minimum.

It would not certainly bring the enemy to terms if we should occupy Cuba and Porto Rico, but it would throw upon the enemy the chief burdens of the continuance of hostilities; he being on the other side of the Atlantic, while we are practically at home.

The strategic relation of Cuba to the Gulf of Mexico is so close and intimate that the value of that island to the United States in a military and naval way is incalculable.

The third alternative is therefore selected and the method of attack is now to be considered.

The conditions surrounding Cuba as a theatre of operations are those most favorable to the United States.

1st From our nearness to the field of work we shall have an advantage probably in case of sudden war, and by the use of ordinary diligence we may complete many movements before an additional home force of Spain can be brought into the theatre of action.

2d. It is probable that when the re-inforcements now en-route (September 1896) for Cuba have arrived, the effective Spanish force which could be collected to resist the advance of our troops after landing would not be far from 70,000 men.

The Spanish naval force in Cuban waters is weak in fighting power and it is likely that thirty days will elapse before any considerable re-inforcements will arrive.

During that time we shall have control of the sea without question; and in twenty five days place upon the shores of Cuba, a force of 30,000 men, and in the following twenty days can reinforce that number by 50,000, and thereafter without limit as necessity demands.

3d. When the home force from Spain, land and sea, arrives, our fleet will still be equal to theirs, and would welcome an engagement, but should not follow far to seek one but should regard Havana as at all times the primary objective.

4th Havana is the natural objective for obvious reasons. It is the Capital. It is the nearest point on the Island to our bases. It is the commercial and military center of the Western half of the Island, which is the portion projecting into the Gulf of Mexico, and principally concerning us for strategic reasons.

The eastern half of the Island, can, in the event of the present war be safely left to the insurgents now actively contesting that region with the mother country, aided by our arms, money and countenance; and it is not probable that this section would be used as a landing place by the Spanish forces, nor in any way as their base.

Outside the chief cities over the whole island the insurgents seem to be in partial control and probably the fact that the United States had taken up their cause and was supplying them with arms would bring such additions to their ranks that all but the chief cities would be practically held by them.

Considering these conditions, we perceive that we should if possible occupy the western portion of Cuba, and capture Havana before the full strength of Spain could be exerted in the Island.

It is believed that our Naval force alone cannot take and hold Havana as its harbor is commanded by forts in such a way as to make this unlikely. It is thought however that possibly the disaffection among the troops as well as the people of Havana itself may be so great that a demonstration in force against the city might result in a surrender being forced upon the authorities. This demonstration however must in no way stop or retard the active preparations for complete investment of the city. Its defenses must be turned by a land force, operating upon their flank and rear. Our first step therefore should be to effect a landing in force at some point near Havana.

The occupation of the Isle of Pines and a landing near Batabano (about 25 miles from Havana) offers many advantages, but involves a complete separation of the army from the fleet, and is therefore rejected; at least for the earlier part of the campaign.

The north shore is therefore selected for landing the troops who will when landed, move towards Havana with their seaward flank resting upon the fleet, which will move with them, keeping touch.

The Spanish troops now in Cuba, if distributed judiciously, ready for concentration, could be quickly assembled at any point within twenty miles of Havana or near the "trocha", in sufficient force to menace seriously any attempt at landing. A point of disembarkation should therefore be chosen beyond that distance.

The vicinity of Matanzas to the Eastward and of Cabanas and Bahia

Honda to the westward suggest themselves. The latter are chosen because railroad facilities for the enemy's quick concentration are fewer to the westward of Havana, and although there is a large body of Spanish troops west of Havana, the insurgents also present a large force which would probably prevent or retard the rapid concentration of troops to resist our landing.

It is suggested that a slight feint be made at Cabanas, followed by a strong demonstration against Matanzas, lasting long enough to draw the enemy in that direction, and that finally the real landing takes place at Cabanas and Bahia Honda.

The question now presents itself of our naval bases, and points of embarkation for our troops.

Nearness to the theatre of operations being of prime importance we have to consider Key West and Dry Tortugas, Tampa, New Orleans and *Mobile*

Dry Tortugas is rejected as depot because colliers and supply vessels cannot lie there secure from direct gun fire from an enemy outside, and at the same time be free from torpedo boat attack from almost any point of the compass. This valuable harbor should not on this account be abandoned as the enemy in such a case might use it as a vantage point to harass our movements.

Key West is selected as a temporary advanced depot near the front of operations for immediate supplies of coal, ammunition and other supplies, and for slight repairs.

Tampa, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans are selected as bases of supply and points of embarkation for troops. These are selected in order to give adequate terminal facilities for rapid embarkation.

It is expected that a blockade of the ports of Cuba would be declared and would be made effective at the different ports as fast as vessels could be chartered and armed.

SPANISH NAVAL FORCE IN CUBA.

1st Division.

Off shore cruising.

Name	Dis- place- ment.	Draft	Speed	Torp. tubes.	Remarks-type, main battery.
Reina Christina	3520	17	18	5	Cr. 6-6".2 B.L.
Alfonso XII	3090	17	18	5	same. Flagship Havana.
Reina Mercedes	3090	17	18	5	same.
✓ Conde de Venidito	1130	13	14	2	G.B. 4-4".7 B.L.
✓ Infanta Isabel	1130	12	14	2	same.
✓ Isla de Luxon	1030	12	16	3	same. 2".5 protected deck.
✓ Marquis de la Endenada	1030	12	15	4	same Bahia Honda
Jorge Juan	935	12	13		Wood, 3-4".7 B.L.

2d Division.

Coast patrol within 3 mile limit.

✓ Filipines	750	8.5	20	4	2-4".7 R.F.
✓ Galicia	571	10.	19	2	2-4".7 R.F.
✓ Martin H. Pinzon	571	10.	19	2	same
Vincent Pinzon	571	10.	19	2	same
✓ Marquis de Molenes	571	10.	19	2	same
Magellanes	524	9.	11	1	3-4".7 B.L.
Neuva Espana	630	12.	18	2	2-4".7 B.L. Cape Maysi
Alvarado	300	11	11	2	2 R.F.
Hernan Cortez	300	11	11	2	2 R.F.
Pizzaro	300	11	11	2	2 R.F.
Ponce de Leon	300	11	11	2	2 R.F.
Sandoval	300	11	11	2	2 R.F. Port Bartiguere
Vasco Nunez de Balboa	300	11	11	2	2 R.F.

Name	dis- place- ment	Draft	Speed	Torp. tubes.	Remarks-type,main battery.
Valasquez	300	11	11	2	2 R.F.
Cuba Espanola	225	6	6		1 - 6".3 M.L.
Cazador	179	6.5	8		1 - 5". M.L.
Coutra Maestro	179	6.5	6		1 - 5" M.L.
Descupredor	179	6.5	7		1 - 5" M.L.
Ericsson	179	6.5	6		1 - 5" M.L.
Gacela	179	6.5	4		1 - 4".7 M.L.
Golendrina					
Guardian	179	6.5	5		1 - 6".3 M.L.
Indes	179	6.5	7		1 - 4".7 M.L.
Muesajeim					
Telegrama	179	6.5	5		1 - 5" M.L.
Vigia	179	6.5	7		1 - 5" M.L.
Yumuri	179	6.5	6		1 - 5" M.L.
Alcedo	217	7			1 - 4".7 B.L.
Ligaspi	1024	12	9		2 - 9 pdrs.transport, Flagship Eastern Div.
Vole Mercante					Despatch Boat
Audaz					Despatch Boat.
Civiola					Despatch Boat
Satelite					Despatch Boat

Bays and Inlets.

Alerta	Armed Launch
Alemendares	"
Ardilla	"
Baracoa	"
Cometa	"
Delgado Parejo	"

Name	dis- place- ment.	Draft	Speed	Torp.	Remarks,	main battery, type.
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Ligera					Armed Launch	
Lince					"	
Martinez Campos					"	
Seven more, same as last					"	

Other vessels

Alfonso XII	3628				Transatlantic Line, impressed for Cuban service.	
Alfonso XIII	2632				same	
Cuidad de Cadiz	1844				same	
Reina Cristina	2631				same	
Santo Domingo	1856				same	

Preparing for Cuba.

Ariete	97	5	26	2	Torpedo boat 4-3pdrs.R.F.	
Azor	108	6	24	3	same	
Halcon	108		24	3	same	

Vessels of Companie Transatlantia available as cruisers.

Buenos Aires.....	3367 tons ^s net	
Monte Video	3304 tons net	
Isla de Ingon	2773 tons net	
Isla de Panay	2332 tons net	
Espana	2006 tons net	
Cataluna	1989 tons net	
Cuidad de Santander	1989 tons net	
Reina Mercedes	1980 tons net.	
Antonio Lopez	1979 tons net	Has been armed.
St. Ignacio de Logola.....	1951 tons net	
Habana	1766 tons net	
Cuidad Coudal	1751 tons net	
San Francisco	1720 tons net.	

Spanish vessels possibly ready to reinforce Cuban fleet.

Name	Displacement	Speed	Draft	Coal	Main Battery	Belt	Gun	Deck	Balance
Pelayo	9900	16	24-11	800	2-12.5" 2-11" 1-6.2"	17 3/4	19 1/4	4	Indiana
<i>Zarabaldi</i>	<i>6840</i>		<i>23 3</i>		<i>2-10</i> 2-11"	<i>10.6</i> 6		<i>1 1/2</i>	
Oquendo	7000	20	21-6	1200	10-5.5"	12	10 1/2	3	Brooklyn
Maria Theresa	7000	20.25	21-6	1200	do	12	10 1/2	3	New York
Princessas Asturias	7000	20.	21-10	1200	do	12	10 1/2	2	Texas-Montgomery
Viscaya	7000	21	21-6	1200	do	12	10 1/2	3	Maine-Newark
Carlos V	9090	20	25	1700	2-11" 8-5.5" 4.3.9"	2	10	6 1/8	Puritan
Alfonso XIII	5000	20	20	1200	4-7.8" 6-4.7"			4 1/2	Minneapolis-Essex
Lepanto	4826	20	20	1100	do			4 3/4	San Francisco
Reina Cristina	3520	17.5	16-5	600	6-6.2"				Chicago.
Sister ship									Atlanta
Sister ship									Raleigh
Aragon	3342	14	20-11	470	6-6.2"				Lancaster
Sister ship									Hartford
Sister ship									Alliance
Infanta Isabel	1130	14	12-5	220	4-4.7"				Helena
Sister ship									Wilmington
Sister ship									Nashville
Sister ship									Castine
Sister ship									Marblehead
Sister ship									Enterprise
9 Torpedo gun-boats	830	20			2-4.7"				Steam Yacht
Others 17 torpedo boats Small gun vessels etc									Torpedo-vessels & one-half Mosquito flotilla

UNITED STATES VESSELS REMAINING.

Massachusetts
Amphitrite
Cincinnati

Miantonomah
Katahdin
Dolphin

Terror
Columbia
Bancroft

this

In studying ~~the~~ the question of ~~a possible war with~~ Spain, the War college has seriously considered the subject of blockading the ports of Cuba. A blockade of the island in whole or in part can be accomplished in time and it should be a part of the plan of the campaign.

It is not the province of the College to enter upon political considerations relating to the policy which it may be advisable to pursue in a war of ~~this~~ kind, but only upon those questions on which sound military principles depend.

Cuba has a sea coast of over 1,500 miles which is about the same as that of the Confederate States during our Civil War, excluding the southern part of the peninsular of Florida which ~~was~~ never ~~blockaded~~ required much attention of our vessels.

While it may be said that we have had experience in conducting an efficient blockade, ~~the experience is now only historical with most of the officers in the service.~~ Others have ~~also~~ had experience in evading ~~blockades.~~ *it.*

We can put an improvised force off every Cuban port, but to be effective against the blockade runner alone the force must be very large.

The proclamation of blockade during the Civil War was dated April 19th 1862. Ports of entry were successively captured by our navy which limited the ports to which the blockade runners could enter and at the same time lessened

the number of ports to be blockaded, and yet from July 1862 to June 1863 fifty seven steamers and 91 sailing vessels left Nassau ~~alone~~ for the Confederate ports, of which 6 steamers and 36 sailing vessels were captured. From Bermuda, Havana, and other ports there was probably an equal amount of blockade running.

the Spanish Military force was as

While Cuba is not self-supporting as the South was during the rebellion and would consequently suffer a greater hardship from an effective blockade, Spain has on the other hand a navy which can break up a blockade, while the Confederate States had practically none. Our blockade would be effective only by the means of vessels that would be inefficient when pitted against regular men of war, and while our regular vessels are superior to theirs if we can only meet them, it is easy for them to avoid a meeting with our fleet and devote their energies to raising the blockade of ports that are protected by the auxiliary force, which of necessity we must employ. If we separate our regular fighting force to do blockading duty, the vessels can be overcome almost as easily as the improvised force for ~~they~~ ^{the enemy} would come combined ~~in~~ ^{the hands of} force while our vessels would be acting alone. ^{Straggle in feeble groups}

If in such a case our vessels rally in sufficient numbers to meet the enemy, they only do it at the expense of the efficiency of the blockade, for the instant they leave their stations in the face of a superior enemy, the blockade is no longer effective.

It would seem therefore that an attack on Cuba cannot ^{through a blockade alone nor without} be successful ^{a vigorous offensive}, or in other words ^{by} ~~by~~ ^{without} a serious demonstration [^]

ships and by troops against ~~the~~ ^{and the other cities} Havana, and that any closing of ports in the nature of a blockade must be by the capture of the port itself and holding it by troops.

The ultimate cost of the war, too, in life and money will be less by starting from the first with the most vigorous preparations on such a scale that there shall be no ~~possibility~~ ~~of~~ ~~possibility~~ of a failure. Anything less than this is liable to meet with such a resistance ~~and~~ or perhaps such a failure at first as will cause a greater delay in the final settlement.

If we could feel sure that our fleet would at once meet & fight the Spanish fleet, the blockade would ~~of course~~ ^{a more effective force} become possible ~~and~~ but long continued work at the ^{war} College, with the constant end in view ~~of~~ determining the probability of thus meeting the Spanish fleet, result in the conviction that the chances of finding them and bringing them to battle are not good if they wish to evade our ^{regular fleet} and strike our ~~blockading~~ detachments

In case the Army is not ready with one brigade of infantry and 5 batteries of artillery to take part in the demonstration against Havana on the 12th day, or for any other purpose where a landing party may be needed to take possession of a place surrendered to the fleet, a Naval Brigade will be organized at once, two vessels will be chartered and it will sail for the fleet off Havana without delay.

The organization of the brigade will be as follows:

Commanding Officer, a Commander U.S. Navy, and the Chief of Staff and Adjutant, regular Naval Officers.

500 marines, commanded by a Major U.S.M.C.

300 seamen infantry commanded by an Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Commander.

500 seamen for artillery commanded by an Acting Volunteer Lieut. Commander.

Probable sources of supply of seamen and Acting Volunteer Officers. From the Naval Militia organizations 600 men. From recruits 400 men.

As this body, when landed is only for the purpose of holding a position until relieved by the military, it will carry 30-3 inch B.L.R. or other guns to be mounted in entrenchments.

Probable sources of supply for the guns are

Naval Academy 12

Naval Militia Organizations 9

Training Station 3

Accompanying squadron 6

Note Pilots for the ports on the Coast of Cuba in the vicinity of Havana when wanted may probably be found at Key West by applying to Jefferson S. Brown, Collector of Customs, William Curry's Sons, John Lowe Jr. and John Jay Philbrick. With the exception of the first named they were the owners of fishing vessels that carried fresh fish into those ports. Heavy duties have stopped the trade but the men are still about Key West.

*Later reports indicate that there were no good
only for light draft vessels -*

(continued.)

San Augustin.....	1541 tons net
Guipuzcoa	1377 tons net
Mexico	1359 tons net
Panama	1347 tons net
Baldomero Iglesias.....	1025
Larache	980
Manuel L. Villaverde.....	738 tons net.
Rabal.....	538 tons net
Joaquin Pielago	590 tons net
Mogador	297 tons net

NAVAL FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ATLANTIC
and probably able to concentrate in thirty days.

-- Battle Ships.--

Indiana	Texas	Massachusetts
	Maine.	

-- Double Turret Monitors. --

Miantonomah	Puritan	Amphitrite
	Terror.	

-- Armored Cruisers. --

New York	Brooklyn
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- Ram -

Katahdin.

-- Cruisers. --

Columbia	Minneapolis	Newark
San Francisco	Lancaster	Cincinnati
Raleigh	Chicago	Montgomery
Marblehead	Alliance	Essex
	Enterprise	

-- Gunboats.--

Castine	Bancroft	Dolphin
Helena	Wilmington	Nashville.

-- Torpedo Boats.--

Alarm	Vesuvius	Cushing
Ericsson	Stiletto	No. 3
No. 4	No. 5	No. 6
	No. 7	

-- Old Harbor Defense Monitors. --

Ajax	Mahopac	Manhattan
Catskill	Jason	Lehigh
Montauk	Passaic	Nahant
	Canonicus.	

WAR IS DECLARED.

The general naval and military plan will be to attack Cuba and secure Havana first, and afterwards the chief coast cities and the whole island.

The military force it is supposed will be an advance corps of all the regular troops available (about 30,000 men,) and a main body of 250,000 men enlisted for three years or for the war.

Note: It is supposed that the company organizations of the U.S. Army will be filled at once to 100 men making 40,000 in all, of which 30,000 will probably be available for the advance corps.

It is recommended that the advance will concentrate 10,000 men at Tampa, 10,000 men divided between Mobile and Pensacola, and 10,000 men at New Orleans, and that these men will be ready and embarked on board transports at the points designated by the 20th day after the declaration of war.

That the main body of three years volunteers will collect at their several State camps and as fast as organized will concentrate at the above mentioned ports for embarkation for Cuba.

The Commander-in-Chief applies to the Department for officers for the following duties:

Chief of Staff, Aides, Secretaries, etc.

Military Aide.

Chief of Improvised flotilla

Chief of Coal Supply.

Chief of Scouts and Information.

Captains of the Port at the following ports: Key West - Tampa, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans - with two regular and six or more volunteer officers as assistants.

Military Aide to the Commandant of the Station at Key West.

Captain of the Port at each point of Debarkation of troops in

Cuba (Cabanas and Bahia Honda.)

Surgeons in charge of floating and field hospitals.

The Captains of the Port will at once begin the preparations for the arrival of the troops and their speedy embarkation.

Those detailed for Cuban ports will prepare anchors and chains for moorings, pile drivers, lumber, dredgers, car flats for improvised wharves, charter tugs, etc.

The Light House tenders of the 6th, 7th, and the 8th districts will take on board as many buoys and fittings as they can load, lanternsⁿ for temporary harbor lights, etc. and will proceed to Key West. They accompany will ~~accompany~~ the advance naval force to Cabanas and Bahia Honda and will buoy out the channels under the direction of the Captains of the Ports.

Note The U.S. Navy or the Army regulations not recognizing the position of Captain of the Port as an official to take charge of all material afloat in joint expeditions, the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will be requested to issue orders to both the War and Navy Departments establishing the office.

[See appended letters.]

Details of the expedition

upon the declaratoion of war the Mass., Indiana, Maine, Texas, N.Y.?, Brooklyn, ^{Katahdun} Columbia, Newark, Montgomery, Raleigh, ^{Cestice} Princeton, Cushing, and T.B. nos, 3-4-5-6- will sail for Key West and Havana.

These vessels will be accompanied by as many of the mosquito fleet as are ready, if any have been prepared in advance of the declaration of war. It is essential however that a number of light draft armed vessels shall accompany the fleet even if they have not been fitted out as they should be.

Each vessel of the fleet therefore will take with it (in tow if necessary) a suitable sea going vessel of not more than 9 feet draft. These vessels will take on board before sailing a sufficient quantity of lumber to strengthen the decks. They will be officered and manned ~~from the~~ from the fleet and recruits will fill the vacancies on board the latter as fast as they are enlisted. On the passage south the mechanics of the fleet will strengthen the decks, build suitable bulkheads for securing coal protection for the engines and boilers, etc. When the weather is suitable ~~the~~ during the passage or upon arrival at Key West the vessels will be armed with such R.F. guns from the fleet as are suited to them.

This is but a temporary arrangement for the purpose of striking a sudden blow at Cienfuegos and capturing it before it can be protected by additional defenses. As soon as vessels have been properly fitted and armed they will relieve those with the fleet and they in turn will be properly fitted out

In order not to unduly weaken the fighting force of the vessels of the squadron and to assist in the attack of the defenses of the port by landing and occupying the forts until relieved by the army, 2,000 men will be taken on board the vessels of the squadron and one transport to be chartered for the purpose. They will also take the necessary small arms and ammunition if it is on hand and can be furnished without delaying the sailing of the fleet, otherwise the arms must be provided by the vessels of the fleet.

The Essex, a freight steamer and an armed tug will be loaded with supplies and ammunition for the insurgents of the eastern half of the island. The Alliance, a freight steamer and an armed tug will load for the western half of the island. These vessels will sail as soon as ready and report to the Com. in Chief off Havana.

(Note) - The information as to the best places at which, to land the supplies for the insurgents will be ascertained from the leaders of the Cuban movement in the U. S.

The C.S. Str. Blake will be provided with grapnels for dragging for the Cuban cables to Haiti and Jamaica, and will accompany the fleet.

Upon the arrival of the fleet at Keywest two squadrons will be formed.

1st. The Mass., Indiana, Raleigh, Montgomery, Katahdin, Cushing, Ericsson, will blockade Havana and adjacent ports.

2d. The Texas, Maine, Columbia, New York, Brooklyn, Newark,

Castine, Blake, T.B. Nos. 3-4-5-6- and all the improvised vessels and the transports will sail for Cienfuegos via the Yucatan Passage, keeping out of sight of the coast of Cuba. The Columbia will proceed ahead of the fleet to Grand Caymanto pick up pilots and will rendezvous south of Xagua bank.

The squadron will endeavor to surprise Cienfuegos at daylight, running the defenses, landing the naval brigade to ^{+ hold possession of} assault the forts, and capturing all the shipping in the harbor

After it has finished its work ^{of capturing} ~~off~~ Cienfuegos the squadron will be divided into three divisions, one to remain for the defense of the port and the blockade of Trinidad and the Gulf of Cazones, ^{the second} ~~one~~ to demonstrate to the eastward and with the Blake to cut the cables to Haiti and Jamaica and the third to scour the Gulf of Batabanua and capture or destroy the enemy's shipping. The second and third squadrons with the exception of the improvised vessels will return to ~~Havana~~ Key West etc etc

see page 14 -

DETAILS OF THE EXPEDITION.

Upon the declaration of war, the Indiana, Massachusetts, Katahdin, New York, Brooklyn, Columbia, Newark, Montgomery, Raleigh, Ericsson, Cushing, and torpedo boats Nos. 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - will sail for Havana.

These vessels will be accompanied by as many of the mosquito fleet and other auxiliary armed vessels as are ready, if any have been prepared in advance of the declaration of war, and if none are ready they will follow as soon as possible. # 2

The Massachusetts, Indiana, Columbia, and Newark, will remain at Havana or in the vicinity and blockade that port.

The New York, Montgomery, Castine, and Torpedo boats 3 and 4, will make a strong demonstration to the westward, around Cape San Antonio and along the southern coast of Cuba. The Brooklyn, Raleigh and Torpedo boats Nos. 5 and 6 will demonstrate to the eastward and around Cape Maysi until it meets the first squadron. These squadrons will capture or destroy all the enemy's vessels they can find and particularly those that are armed.

The Texas, Essex, a freight steamer and an armed tug will be loaded with supplies and munitions for the insurgents in the eastern half of the island. The Maine, Alliance, a freight steamer and an armed tug will be loaded for the western half of the island. # 3

(Note : - The information as to the most suitable place for the delivery of supplies to the insurgents on the Cuban coasts will be ascertained from the leaders of the Cuban movement in the United States.)

The Coast Survey Steamer Blake will prepare grapnels for dragging for and cutting the Cuban cables to Jamaica and Haiti and will accompany the Texas and Essex to assist in landing supplies to the insurgents. # 4 These vessels will sail as soon as ready and will join the squadrons engaged in destroying the enemy's shipping. If these squadrons have passed the points at which supplies are to be landed for the insurgents, the delivery will take place before joining, but otherwise the vessels

will join and the supplies be landed later. # 5

When the eastern squadron arrives at Cape Maisi it will cut the cables between Cuba and the islands of Jamaica and Haiti.

(Note) The vessels of the auxiliary fleet will be hastened in their preparations and in their sailing for their stations. They will be required for immediate use in blockading the enemy's ports as fast as they have been cleared of shipping.

The squadrons of demonstration will be accompanied by four colliers having a total capacity of about 4,000 tons.

The squadrons ^{from Crecujagos} will return to Key West by the 20th day to be ready to assist in the landing of the advance of the Army unless notified to the contrary.

(Note : Request to be made to the Secretary of the Treasury to order the Blake to report to the Senior officer of the squadron for this service and thereafter to be used in surveying the Cuban ports as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

The Chicago, Enterprise, Marblehead, Dolphin, Vesuvius, Alarm, Stiletto, Torpedo boat No. 7 and as many scouts as are ready will proceed to Hampton Roads and Tybee Roads to convey the fleet of transports to their destination in the Gulf of Mexico, one half the force sailing by the seventh day and the other by the tenth day.

The four double turret monitors, ^{and} the Jason, Ajax, Mantucket, Catskill and Montauk, will sail for Key West as soon as ready, fill with coal and await orders.

The vessels conveying the transports will proceed to the different points of embarkation as follows:

Convoy No. 1 at New Orleans - Chicago, Dolphin.

Convoy No. 2 At Mobile and Pensacola - Enterprise, Alarm, and Stiletto.

Convoy No. 3. at Tampa - Marblehead, Vesuvius, and Torpedo boat

The *Newark* will leave the fleet off Havana and proceed to Tampa reaching there by the 10th day ready to convoy the first transports to Key West.

In the absence of the Captain of the Port at the ports of embarkation the Senior Officer present will perform that duty.

The transports will sail from their ports as soon as ready in groups under convoy and will rendezvous at Tampa Bay.

(Note : The Secretary of War to be informed that whatever port on the north coast of Cuba is selected for a landing, the anchorage for deep vessels will be very contracted. It is essential therefore that all transports shall be as light draft as possible, and that none shall draw more than 20 feet when loaded.) The contracted anchorages will also necessitate the immediate departure of all vessels as soon as they are unloaded. The Secretary will be requested to order that all transports and other vessels chartered by the military authorities shall in every case have sufficient coal, water, provisions and supplies to reach a home port without requiring anything at the port of debarkation.)

If a reserve supply of ammunition for the great guns of the vessels of the fleet is at Key West or elsewhere near at hand a demonstration will be made against Havana as soon as possible after the declaration.

By the 10th day one brigade and 3 light batteries will sail from Tampa for Key West convoyed by the *Newark*. At Key West they will be joined by the four double turret monitors.

At the day of sailing from Tampa, the Commander of the squadron off Havana will give the Spanish authorities notice to remove the non-combatants from the vicinity of the fortifications and government buildings within twenty-four hours .

On the 12th day the fleet off Havana, reinforced by all the vessels mentioned above from Key West will open fire upon the forts and government buildings and will demand the surrender of the port, the brigade of infantry taking possession of the city, if surrendered.

If there is not a supply of ammunition for all the vessels of the fleet, at Key West or elsewhere near at hand, the bombardment must cease with the expenditure of not more than one-fourth the full allowance of each ship. Nothing must be allowed to interfere with the fleet having a full supply of ammunition on board when the enemy's reinforcements arrive from Spain.

Note: Notwithstanding this demonstration, preparation for the campaign will continue. The details below given are under the supposition that the demonstration has only served to test the strength of the gun defenses of the city.

The main convoy will consist of the following:

Note - The Secretary of War will be informed that the telegraph cables from Key West, land at Punta Rassa, Florida, and he will be requested to order that an adequate force may be sent for the protection of the station from the first troops arriving at Tampa.

Artillery detachments will have some of the guns mounted and in action. One battery of artillery will be embarked on board vessels carrying cavalry.

About 5 p.m. the 21st day a naval force consisting of the New York Brooklyn, Terror, Asphitrite, Raleigh, Montgomery, torpedo boats 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - and 12 mosquito fleet fitted with gear for dragging torpedoes will appear off Cabanas. They will make an attack on the defenses of the port, drag for torpedoes in the channel, make a decided demonstration in the nature of a feint lasting until near daylight, when the vessels will withdraw toward Rebecca Shoal to meet the second convoy.

The armed tugs attached to this squadron will be sent to report to the Senior Officer off Bahia Honda at Daylight the 23rd day to assist in clearing minefields from channels. Two of the single turret monitors will also sail from Key West in time to arrive off Bahia Honda at the same time.

The vessels of the convoy will be divided into two fleets, one with 10,000 men - including the 5,000 already at Key West and the other with 20,000.

The 5,000 remaining at Tampa from the first convoy will sail from port accompanied by the Chicago, Maine, Newark, Alliance, Marblehead. The Puritan and Miantonomah and the first brigade will join at Key West and be convoyed to Matanzas arriving by early daylight of the 22d day.

They will make a strong demonstration, shelling the battery San Filipe first and making every visible signs of landing even to sending in an advanced guard ashore in that vicinity. The demonstration will be kept up till after dark when the fleet will withdraw and steam to the westward effecting a landing at Bahia Honda the next morning.

Arriving off Bahia Honda at 6 a.m. the 23rd day the transports will keep out of range of guns from the shore. The vessels of the fleet will begin at once the bombardment of the forts at Point Cerro del Morrillo. Under its cover the armed tugs from Cabanas will drag the channels for mines, and will buoy its sides using spar buoys only.

Upon clearing the channel as far as Pt. de Difuntas the double and single turret monitors will steam in with the flat boats and boats of the

squadron filled with troops under their lee. The boats will be cast off when past Punta de Real and make a landing up the stream to the Southward. The monitors in the meantime will anchor off this fort in such a position that their guns will enfilade the fort and protect the landing of the assaulting party. During this assault on the fort as soon as gun fire is silenced, the troops not engaged in the assault will be conveyed into the harbor by the cruisers and ~~anchored~~ anchored. The latter will clear the beach in the vicinity of the port of San Deigo del Nunez where the landing will take place.

The remainder of the troops from New Orleans Mobile and Pensacola (20,000 men) will arrive off Cabanas about noon of the 22nd day and at the same time two of the single turret monitors from Key West.

(Note The information regarding the harbor of Cabanas is very conflicting. The sketch of the harbor published by the Hydrographic Office shows only the main channel and indicates ^{only} that there are bays opening from it in both directions. Old sailing directions state that the eastern bay is fit for coasters and the western for drafts of fifteen feet. Later sailing directions say nothing about these bays. The Map published by the U.S. Army Engineers in 1873 gives a narrower but a deeper entrance channel and shows plenty of space and depth of water in both the bays.)

The approximate plan of attack will be as follows: As soon as the channel is cleared of mines the double turret monitors will steam into the harbor side by side, bombarding the fort on the extremity of Cayo Don Juan Tomas, and anchoring one in each arm so that they can direct an effective cross fire on the fort. These will be followed by the two single turret monitors anchoring in the eastern bay, their guns commanding the town of Cabanas. The troops will follow, first capturing Cayo Don Juan Tomas and then effect a landing on the eastern side of the bay in the vicinity of the town.

Later the western bay will be taken and junction effected with the

Division at Bahia Honda eight miles distant.

The troops being ashore and securely entrenched, the New York, Columbia, Montgomery, Marblehead, and Cushing with ten light fast armed yachts from the mosquito fleet will make a reconnaissance along the north shore of Cuba as far as Cape Maisi. The Maine, Minneapolis, Dolphin, Raleigh, Ericsson and ten armed yachts will cruise along the south shore of Cuba. These two squadrons will capture or destroy all Spanish vessels they encounter and will make a demonstration against the chief ports of the island, returning to Key West after the duty is completed *and leaving every port well but blockaded -*

Four coal steamers will accompany these two squadrons.

Note ~~It is possible that the military authorities may consider it advisable that a port, Cienfuegos for example, on the south side of the Island should be taken, and that troops should be embarked for that purpose, in which case these ~~squadrons~~ squadrons will be increased or diminished in numbers or joined together as circumstances of the case may require.)~~

In case information arrives of the approach of the enemy's reinforcements from Spain these squadrons would be joined and confine their demonstration to the south side of the island.

The next consideration will be the arrival of the reinforcements from Spain, probably consisting of a number of transports and a fighting force of one battleship and five or six armored cruisers, together with a number of smaller vessels.

This convoy may be ready to sail on the day of the declaration of war with sufficient coal to reach Havana by a circuitous route fifteen days later. It is not probable however that it will arrive before the thirtieth and perhaps not before the fortieth day. It is important however that our commander-in-Chief should receive the earliest information of its arrival.

It is thought the enemy's objective will be the vicinity of Havana and for this reason our heavy fighting force should be in that neighbor-

hood, with scouts observing the approaches to the eastward.

For the purpose of intercepting the reinforcements or any Spanish vessels that may be sent from Cuba to carry information to the Spanish approaching fleet, the following vessels will take station at the localities named and will capture all the enemy's vessels sighted and will report by cable the movements of any reinforcing squadron.

The Venezuela, City of Washington, and Saratoga will scout between Great Isaacs and Cape Florida.

The Newport, City of Para, Caracas and two fast armed yachts
~~in the old Bahama Channel.~~

The Orzaba, Yumuri ~~and~~ Yucatan, *from Crooked Island Passage, through*
The Windward Passage and north of ~~to~~
Jamaica.

Note The Secretary of State to be informed that it is very desirable for the successful issue of the war that all movements of the enemy's vessels be known to the Commander-in-Chief of the national vessels in the vicinity. He is requested to direct ~~and~~ all U.S. Consuls, particularly at the ports in and adjacent to the Caribbean Sea, to take steps to obtain information as to the movements of the enemy's vessels, and will report by cipher message to the Navy Department, and to the Commander of the nearest Naval vessel.)

The Minneapolis, Cincinnati and San Francisco will proceed to Gibraltar and obtain information as to the movements of the Spanish reinforcements and will report by cable as opportunity offers. # No 1

No.1 Page 19.

Unless otherwise ordered, these vessels will endeavor to keep touch with the enemy after it sails from Spain. If information is to be cabled, the vessel weakest in coal endurance will be sent to the nearest cable station from which it will return to a home port or to one of the Windward Ids. and report to the Department.

The Colliers Burks, Reading, Williamsport, Harrisburg, Pottsville, Lebanon of the Reading R.R.Co. will carry coal to Key West. The Saturn and Orion of the Boston Towboat Co. will carry coal to Tampa. As soon as discharged these vessels will run between New Orleans, Mobile and Pensacola and the fleet as ordered.

The Tank steamer Maverick with a tank barge in tow will fill with fresh water and proceed to Key West to supply the fleet. Standard Oil Company's tank barges Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 75, 76, will fill with fresh water and be sent under tow of the transports with the convoy to Key West.

The H.P.Dimock and Herman Winter of the Metropolitan S.S.Co. Pier 11 North River, New York, will proceed to New York for naval ordnance supplies and will then report at Hampton Roads for convoy. The supply will be as great as the vessels can carry.

The Ohio 3392 tons 13.5 knots speed, International Navigation Co. will be fitted as a floating repair ship. The Valencia 4115 tons, 14 knots speed, U.S. and Brazil Mail S.S.Co. will be fitted out as a torpedo repair and supply ship, the Ohio at New York and the Valencia at Norfolk. In addition to their supplies they will carry all the coal they can stow. These vessels will be commanded by Lieutenants with Junior Officers as Executives. A Chief Engineer and Assistants will be ordered to the Ohio in addition to the above.

The Commercial Cable Co.'s cable steamer will be chartered to immediately lay a cable from Key West to Cabanas.

The cable now running from Havana to Key West will be put under military control at once.

The Providence and Puritan, O.C.Steamboat Co., the Massachusetts and Connecticut, Providence and New York S.S.Co. will be fitted out at the Navy Yard, New York under the direction of the Senior Medical Officer as Hospital Ships. They will arrive at Hampton Roads to join the convoy sailing the 7th day.

Potable water for use on ship board and for Naval Brigades.

Attached to the fleet will be four vessels fitted with apparatus for distilling water, tanks for storing it on board, transporting barrels for carrying water on shore, steam pumps, hose etc. for quickly filling the tanks of any vessel requiring it.

This water is not intended for steaming purposes, but only for drinking and cooking.

S C O U T S.

The following named vessels will be purchased or chartered, coaled, and provisioned at New York or Norfolk, fitted with a battery of R.F. guns or others, with small arms and ammunition and will proceed to their destination as given ^{above} ~~below~~, sailing by the 20th day or will proceed to Hampton Roads or Tybee Roads to convoy the transports and supply vessels to their destination. They will take coal in all cargo spaces available. They will be officered by 4 Commanders, 5 Lieutenant Commanders, 8 Lieutenants, and 17 Junior Officers.

List of Scout Vessels.

	6 in.	4 in.	6 pd.	1 pd.	Mach.	
St. Louis	8		4		4	American Line
St. Paul	6		4		4	do
Paris	12		6		6	do
New York	12		6		6	do
Newport		8			5	P.M.Co.
City of Para.		8			8	do
Caracas		8			6	Red "D" Line
Philadelphia		8			6	do
Venezuela		8			8	do
Orzaba		8			6	N.Y. & Cuba Mail S.S.Co.
Yumuri		8			6	do
Seneca		8			6	do

List of scouts (Continued.)

6 in.4 in.6 pd.1 pd.Mach.

Yucatan	8		6 N.Y.& Cuba Mail S.S.Co.
City Of Washington	8		8 do
Saratoga	8		8 do
Seguranca	4	4	3 Brazil Mail
Vigilancia	4	4	3 do

Mosquito Flotilla.

These vessels will be strengthened in the bows, and be used as light gun boats and rams, or, will be fitted with Howell, White head or pneumatic torpedoes and tubes. All will be supplied with small arms and ammunition and a rapid fire gun, if time will permit. Until the Howell or other torpedoes are available they will be fitted with spar torpedoes.

They will collect at Hampton Roads, Savannah and New Orleans with coal, provisions and supplies on board, and will accompany the convoy to Key West or Tampa or will steam through the inland passage if necessary.

A large number of them will be employed to guard the line of communication along Hawkes Channel (inside the Florida reefs) and the line from New Orleans, Mobile and Tampa to Key West.

The others will act as guard to the Tampa Base and for landing of troops in Cuba.

Yachts.	#	Almy	- - - - -	365 tons-draft	ft.in	9-6	New York
	#	Au Revoir	- - -	343- "	"	9-0	Wilmington
	#	Clermont	- - -	259 "	"	5-6	New York
	#	Sasquehanna	-	233 "	"	9-0	"
		Wild Duck	- -	233 "	"	7-6	Boston
	#	Tillie	- - - -	201 "	"	9-8	New York.
	#	Radha	- - - -	195 "	"	9-0	"

			ft.in.	
# Ibis - - - - -	184	tons-draft	9-0	New York
# Cora - - - - -	173	"	9-0	"
# Embla - - - - -	170	"	8-0	"
# Unquowa - - - -	160	"	8-6	"
# Riva - - - - -	159	"	4-6	"
# Norma - - - - -	158	"	10-0	Providence
# Seneca - - - - -	157	"	10-0	Norfolk
# Caiman - - - - -	154	"	2-6	New York
# Clifton - - - -	154	"	6-9	New York
# Ballymena - - -	145	"	7-6	Newport
# Neaira - - - - -	141	"	7-6	New York
# Oneida - - - - -	141	"	8-2	New York
# Viking - - - - -	141	"	9-0	"
# Jathnel - - - -	140	"	8-9	Boston
Narwhal - - - -	140	"	7-7	New London
Elfrida - - - -	123	"	7-6	New York
Lagonda - - - -	121	"	7-8	"
Sapphire - - - -	120	"	7-6	"
Falcon - - - - -	120	"	7-6	Wilmington
Avenal - - - - -	117	"	9-6	Philadelphia
Toinette - - - -	117	"	7-0	Boston
Nooya - - - - -	110	"	10-0	New York
Sybilla - - - - -	110	"	6-6	Philadelphia
Shearwater - - -	109	"	6-6	New York
Starling - - - -	109	"	9-0	New York
Restless - - - -	105	"	7-6	Rochester N.Y.
Admiral - - - -	103	"	6-10	Providence
Talisman - - - -	102	"	7-0	Boston

Note The vessels marked thus # will be particularly well armed and will accompany the reconnoitering fleet to assist in searching out and destroying the enemy's small vessels in the shoals and lagoons of Cuba.

The list of vessels given below is larger than the immediate needs of the flotilla but it is given in order to have enough vessels from which to select.

T U G S.

Name	Tons	Length	Depth	Port
El Chico - - - - -	106	100	7	New Orleans
El Moro - - - - -	104	94	8	do
Elmer E. Wood - - -	112	92	10	do
Governor Nichols - -191-		99	8	do
Grover Cleveland -	114	104	7	do
Louise - - - - -	127	111	7	do
Neptune - - - - -	146	106	7	do
Sentinel - - - - -	115	116	11	do
Underwriter - - - -	170	113	11	do
W.G.Wilmouth - - - -	150	99	11	do
B.D.Wood - - - - -	151	91	10	Pittsburg
Gulf City - - - - -	227	100	8	Mobile
C. C.Keyser - - - -	105			do
Mary Whittick - - -	127	103	11	do
Nimrod - - - - -	116	94	9	do
U.S.Grant - - - - -	112	100	9	do
Bessie - - - - -	185	112	8	Galveston
Cumberland - - - -	117	124	8	do
Effort - - - - -	119	100	7	do
Hortense - - - - -	130	99	9	Galveston
Louise - - - - -	105	95	7	do
Echo - - - - -	136	135	15	Pensacola
George H.Rea - - - -	133	119	9	St.Louis
City of Tampa - - -	125			Tampa
Monarch - - - - -	143	133	11	Pensacola
May Garner - - - -	101	94	7	Jacksonville.

Mosquito flotilla-- Rams and Torpedo Boats.

	tons		
America - - - - -	107,	10 to 12 knots,	Brooklyn, N.Y.
Astral - - - - -	128 "	" "	Newburg
Belvidere - - - - -	107 "	" "	South Amboy
C. C. Clarke - - - - -	150 "	" "	Camden, N.J.
C. M. Depew - - - - -	134 "	" "	Newburg, N.Y.
Harsimus - - - - -	112 "	" "	South Amboy, N.J.
Jamestown - - - - -	118 "	" "	Philadelphia
Jessie - - - - -	118 "	" "	Hoboken
Juniata - - - - -	112 "	" "	Brooklyn
L. Luckenback - - - - -	255 "	" "	Camden, N.J.
Meruer - - - - -	150 "	" "	Camden, N.J.
Nanie Lambertson - - - - -	117 "	" "	Perth Amboy
N.Y. Central Lightering Co.			
# 9 - - - - -	103 "	" "	Philadelphia
# 12 - - - - -	103 "	" "	Camden, N.J.
# 13 - - - - -	103 "	" "	Camden N.J.
# 17 - - - - -	147 "	" "	Newburg
# 18 - - - - -	104 "	" "	Newburg
Ocean King - - - - -	202 "	" "	Philadelphia
R. H. Rathbun - - - - -	200 "	" "	Newburg
Robert Lockhart - - - - -	138 "	" "	Newburg
Rochester - - - - -	118 "	" "	Philadelphia
Triton - - - - -	259 "	" "	Boston
Young America - - - - -	136 "	" "	Bordentown
Camera - - - - -	233 "	" "	Wilmington
Arthur Lambert - - - - -	125 "	" "	New Orleans
Arthur - - - - -	96 "	" "	New Orleans
Henry Marx - - - - -	200 "	" "	New Orleans
Resolute - - - - -	208 "	" "	New Orleans
Uncle Billy	80 "	" "	" "
Buckthorn - - - - -	64 "	" "	Galveston
Carbonera - - - - -	181 "	" "	Galveston.
Cynthia - - - - -	100 "	" "	Galveston
S. T. Maddox - - - - -	302 "	" "	Galveston.

The following vessels will load with coal; and report at Key West
The vessels from New York will tow ten railway car flats to Key West.

Bowden - - - - -	-768 tons	11 knots	Bostn Fruit Co.
Bernard - - - - -	881 "	10 "	"
Breakwater - - - - -	-794 "	10	Macheca Bros, New Orleans.
Wanderer - - - - -	266		do
Catherine Whitney -	565 "	9	W.H.Phillips, Philadelphia
Czarina - - - - -	810 "	9	do
Elihu Thompson - - -	-896 "	9	Sprahue and Breed, Boston
Jos.Oteri, Jr. - - -	465 "	9	L.J.Oteri, New Orleans
Prof. Morse - - - - -	698 "	10	S.J.Oteri, New Orleans
S.Piazzati - - - - -	660 "		do
Progresso - - - - -	-1805 "	11	J.M.Waterbury, New York.

At Massau H.P. there are also pilots for the ports on the north coast of Cuba. The U.S. Consul Mr. McLean will probably be able to ascertain their names.

Extract from ENGINEERING MAGAZINE - October 1896.

Water Supply of Havana.

Vento Springs emerge from the bank of the Almendares River -- at the foot of the hills called **Del Barco** -- The river is tunnelled and thence to Havana a closed masonry and brick aqueduct. -- The largest spring is situated ~~7 1/2~~⁹ miles, about S. X W. from the Morro and is between the railroad running to Batabano and that running to Artemisia.

Chief of Coal Supply.

You are hereby appointed as Chief of Coal Supply and you are charged with supplying the fleet, torpedo boats, scouts, mosquito flotilla and other auxiliary vessels with all the coal needed by them. You are authorized to charter or if necessary to seize any vessels that may be required to carry out these orders.

This duty includes the purchase and transport of the coal, organizing and managing the coal delivery service at the bases and elsewhere.

The chief points for the collection of coal will be Key West and the Florida Keys; but in addition you will have at most of the shoal harbors on the ^{Florida Coast} ~~Gulf of Mexico~~, small quantities of from 100 to 200 tons stored afloat ready for use by torpedo boats or other vessels.

The supply for the fleet at Key West will probably average about 1200 tons per day, but after accumulating at that point an equal amount to twice the bunker capacity of the fleet, it will be advisable to hold an equal amount loaded on steamers of fair speed divided between the ports of New Orleans, Mobile and Pensacola, inside the Gulf and between Charleston, Port Royal and Savannah outside. These will be ready to sail at a moment's notice for Key West or any other point as may be ordered.

At Key West you will have a sufficient quantity of coal in bags loaded on scows ready to go alongside all the vessels of the fleet with one half the total bunker capacities of the vessels. The Commandant of the Station will furnish the tugs for the purpose of handling the lighters. You will employ the necessary foremen and laborers to handle the coal at the bases and to stow the bunkers of the vessels of the fleet.

Pay Inspector - - - - - and Chief Engineer - - - - - have been ordered to report to you for duty in the inspection and purchase of the coal. You are also authorized to select six competent men who are thoroughly familiar with the nautical part of the shipment and transport of coal and send their names to the Department for

Commissions as Acting Volunteer Ensigns and Lieutenants J.G.

For the use of the scouts and other vessels that may require coal and not be able to purchase it, you will charter five vessels of at least 1,000 tons each, load them with coal and send one of them to each of the ports named below to report to the U.S. Consul for orders. The ports are; St. Thomas, St. Lucia, Fort de France, and Gonaives. *Samana B.*

(Note The Secretary of State to be requested to inform the Consuls of these ports that these vessels are to await the arrival of a naval vessel in want of coal or orders from one to join her at a rendezvous.)

A small squadron will be despatched about the 25th to cruise along the north coast of Cuba and another along the South Coast. Two coal vessels will be prepared to accompany each of the se squadrons sailing from Key West.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C.

To the Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. At all joint bases of supply and ports of embarkation and disembarkation of joint expeditions of the army and navy, the Military authorities shall have command ashore and the Senior Naval Officer shall have command afloat.
2. A Naval Officer not below the rank of Lieutenant Commander will be assigned to duty at these ports with the title of Captain of the Port, who will represent the Senior Naval Officer in all matters relating to the administration of the local affairs of the port.
3. An Army Officer not below the rank of Major, will be assigned to duty at these ports ashore with the title of Military Landing Officer who will represent the Commandant of the Base in all matters relating to the landing or loading of troops or supplies.
4. The Captain of the Port will have authority over the Harbor Master if there be one and if not he will perform the duties of that position. He will have the pilots of the port under his charge. He will enforce the quarantine regulations.
5. He or his representatives will board every vessel entering the port and will assign to them, berths or anchorages. He will have authority to inspect the papers or the cargo of any vessel entering the port.
6. The Masters of all chartered vessels will report to him upon arrival, in general terms, the character of their cargoes. He will have the authority to control the movements of all vessels after their arrival at the port.
7. He will transmit without delay to the Commandant of the Base or the Military Landing Officer the reports of arrivals of vessels engaged in carrying troops or army supplies, and will see that these

vessels are sent to a convenient berth for unloading as soon as he is informed by the Landing Officer that he is ready to receive them.

8. Upon a vessel completing her loading or unloading he will be informed by the Landing Officer that she is ready to sail, whereupon he will see that she leaves the wharf without delay and is assigned to an anchorage if she is not to sail at once. If she is to proceed under convoy he will see that her Commanding Officer is furnished with all the Regulations, private signals, etc. that may be decided upon by the Senior Naval Officer.

9. The Military authorities will select and charter such vessels as they may deem suited to their needs, but every vessel engaged in sea transport or sailing under convoy with military supplies or troops will be commanded by a commissioned Naval Officer. The Navy Department will either order an officer to the command or will commission the master of the vessel. If the Department has ordered no one and the vessel is required for immediate use the Senior Naval Officer at the base or of the convoy will order an officer to temporary duty of command until the Navy Department takes action.

In the Charter Party the substance of the above paragraph will always appear, and no vessel will be employed on this duty whose owners do not agree to it.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C.

To the Secretary of War,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. At all joint bases of supply and ports of embarkation and disembarkation of joint expeditions of the army and navy, the Military authorities shall have command ashore and the Senior Naval Officer shall have command afloat.
2. A Naval Officer not below the rank of Lieutenant Commander will be assigned to duty at these ports with the title of Captain of the Port, who will represent the Senior Naval Officer in all matters relating to the administration of the local affairs of the port.
3. An Army Officer not below the rank of Major will be assigned to duty at these ports ashore with the title of Military Landing Officer who will represent the Commandant of the Base in all matters relating to the landing or loading of troops or supplies.
4. The Captain of the Port will have authority over the Harbor Master if there be one and if not he will perform the duties of that position. He will have the pilots of the port under his charge. He will enforce the quarantine regulations.
5. He or his representatives will board every vessel entering the port and will assign to them, berths and anchorages. He will have authority to inspect the papers or the cargo of any vessel entering the port.
6. The Masters of all chartered vessels will report to him upon arrival, in general terms, the character of their cargoes. He will have the authority to control the movements of all vessels after their arrival at the port.
7. He will transmit without delay to the Commandant of the Base or the Military Landing Officer the reports of arrivals of vessels engaged in carrying troops or army supplies, and will see that these ves-

sela are sent to a convenient berth for unloading as soon as he is informed by the Landing Officer that he is ready to receive them.

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9. The Military Authorities will select and charter such vessels as they deem suited to their needs, but every vessel engaged in sea transport or sailing under convoy with military supplies or troops will be commanded by a Commissioned Naval Officer. The Navy Department will either order an officer to the command or will commission the master of the vessel. If the Department has ordered none and the vessel is required for immediate use, the Senior Naval Officer at the base or of the convoy will order an officer to temporary duty of command until the Navy Department takes action.

In the Charter Party the substance of the above paragraph will always appear, and no vessel will be employed on this duty whose owners do not agree to it.

Situation 12th day

Tampa

Key West

Havana

San Juan

Santiago

Cayman

Jamaica

Yucatan



