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2. An Estimate of the Situation embodying

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This decision is the strategic plan.

MISSION.

The Mission of the Blue fleet is to gain and to maintain command of the sea in whatever may, for the time being, be the principal theater of war; thereby assuring the fullest and freest cooperation of Blue sea and land forces, which will be directed toward the overthrow of Orange power.

This may mean the destruction of the Orange fleet if it can be encountered, or the containing of that fleet if it successfully evades action, or the isolation and defeat of any Orange force that has invaded Blue territory; and comprehends the eventual impoverishment and exhaustion of Orange by such acts of repression as the circumstances of the war may make necessary or desirable.

ORANGE FORCES.Their Strength and Disposition; Also a Review ofProbable Intentions of Orange.

In general terms, the Orange Naval strength is inferior to Blue. It is markedly inferior in battleships, but it possesses superiority in numbers of torpedo vessels. This superiority in torpedo vessels would however not be manifest except in operations within a restricted area close to Orange possessions. Of the 62 destroyers in the Orange Navy there are but 4 of 400 tons or over and all the rest are inferior in size, armament, and seakeeping qualities to Blue destroyers. Opposed to 4 Orange destroyers of over 400 tons Blue has 36. (For detailed statement of Orange Naval strength see data furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence Nov. 1910, in Information Folder.)

Orange is superior to Blue in organized transport service, and could probably with but little fore-warning project an over sea operation involving a simultaneous movement of 100,000 troops.

Any knowledge of the disposition of Orange forces would be of little importance prior to the period of strained relations, and will not therefore be discussed at this time.

The activities of Orange immediately after the outbreak of hostilities with Blue would depend largely upon the dispositions that may have been made of the Blue naval forces at that time.

With the Blue main fleet in the Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities, the resistance that Blue could offer in the Pacific, outside of its fortified points at Corregidor, Oahu and possibly Guam, would likely not prove to be a serious hindrance to any operations that Orange might undertake in any part of the Pacific Ocean.

Under the most favorable conditions of preparation by Blue and readiness of the Blue fleet to move, it would be at least 3 months before the Blue main fleet could reach a threatening position with respect to Orange, and be prepared to conduct an aggressive campaign, if opposed, in the Eastern Pacific.

During this time how far might Orange project its operations?

Would Orange content itself with operations within a comparatively short radius of its home bases, or would it seek to employ its strength and readiness and its undisputed control of the sea to inflict the maximum amount of damage upon

Blue with the least expenditure upon its own part of its resources for war?

One of the first objectives of Orange would probably be the capture and occupation of all the Blue outposts in the Pacific with a view to increasing the possibility of its permanent strategic control in that ocean, and make as difficult as possible the advance of the Blue fleet across the Pacific; or, if the Blue fleet reached the Far East by any other route, to make it impracticable for Blue to establish a line of communication between its Pacific ports and its fleet.

Guam, Midway, Kiska, Hawaii, and Samoa are notoriously weak and weakly held, nor could they, with the possible exception of Oahu and Guam, be put in a state of efficient defense before they could be attacked by Orange. In their present state of defense they could be taken by Orange with a relatively small expenditure of force, and once taken could be held and denied to Blue.

The Hawaiian Islands constitute the strategic point of greatest value to both Orange and Blue. In their present state of defense, they could be taken by Orange, the naval base at Pearl Harbor could be occupied, and all available

anchorage where coaling operations might be conducted, not more than 3 in number throughout the islands, could be covered by mortar batteries and their use effectively denied to Blue.

Any attempt on the part of Blue to regain this position would entail a major operation, conducted at the extremity of a line 2100 miles long, with no means of making a sustained attack, owing to the lack of any place near by for necessary refuge and fuel supply. Practically the same conditions would obtain in any attempt to regain, if lost, the other places mentioned.

The capture of these positions by Orange, unless greatly strengthened, would scarcely occupy its main naval force at all, and could be accomplished by making a disposition of not more than 35,000 troops, their necessary transport, supply, and equipment.

It should suffice for Orange to provide an attacking force of 25,000 troops to take and securely hold the Hawaiian Islands, 5,000 for Guam, 3,000 for Samoa, and 2,000 for Kiska.

This would not amount to much more than a diversion for Orange, and, if accomplished, established for Orange such a command of the Pacific as to make Blue operations to the

westward of the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line from Blue west coast most hazardous and extremely difficult.

It would even be possible for Orange to project its campaign during this period of unobstructed freedom in the Pacific still further to the Eastward.

A naval force, convoying an army of 100,000 men, might seek to occupy Blue mainland on the Pacific Coast, with a view to denying the use of its ports to Blue and holding that territory as a hostage for peace. Such a campaign (on the Blue mainland), however, is not thought to be probable, because it would entail the maximum effort of Orange employed in an area far removed from its bases of support, and where Blue is certain ultimately to be the stronger.

The threat of submarines themselves, known to exist on the Pacific Coast, would act as a strong deterrent upon any such project of Orange.

The greatest danger of such a campaign to Blue would lie in its difficulty to control the Peace-at-any-price School, which has always been in strong evidence in all of our wars of great magnitude.

Such a campaign by Orange should be considered, however, as a possibility if not as a probability.

The invading force thus employed would be doomed to be ultimately lost to Orange without the accomplishment of any permanent good; and the natural hazard of the attempt, coupled with its violation of an established military maxim, that it is a weak form of war to project the campaign into the theater where your enemy is strongest, would seem to brand the conception as too fantastic to be seriously contemplated by Orange.

Corbett in his "England in the Seven Years War" states the above maxim in words that are peculiarly applicable to this case. He says, "To be tempted into taking the offensive in an area which is not the true area of the war and in which the enemy is naturally stronger, is not to show vigor but to play stupidly into the enemy's hands".

Panama might become an objective of Orange, but the only operations that would likely prove of any value there would be in the nature of a raid to destroy Blue property in that region. As the canal approaches completion, such a movement would be of increasing importance to Blue. At the present time the results of such a raid would not be sufficiently promising to warrant so wide a diversion in the early stages of the war.

Other probable intentions of Orange will be embraced in the considerations of hostilities beginning when the Blue fleet is in the Pacific.

In that case Orange activities of a serious and compelling nature would probably be confined within an area including the Philippines, Guam and Orange home territory and outlying possessions. Diversions extending beyond this area may be attempted, but they are likely to be of a minor character, and in their nature, more of a threat than a serious movement.

In order to deny to Blue the use of the resources contained within the Manila-Subig region it would be clearly a duty of Orange to make a combined attack in considerable force, to gain the control of and hold this region.

Likewise to deny to Blue the use of Guam as a base of support or refuge for coaling and supplies, Orange would probably move to gain possession of and to hold that point as an advance base for its fleet, or as a base from which scouting operations might be conducted.

While operations against Luzon and Guam are in progress, dispositions would probably be made of Orange Naval forces to capture or destroy all the Blue forces at large in Philippine waters, and to mine and otherwise place in a state of defense,

as far as possible, the regions best suited for a base for the Blue fleet in the Philippines, Manila and Subig being denied. The regions thus prepared would probably be the Casiguran-Polillo, Malampaya Sound, and South Coast of Mindanao regions.

The three principal straits, San Bernardino, Surigao, and Basilan may be occupied by Orange and it is probable that torpedo boat flotillas will be used for this purpose.

Strategic areas would be declared in possible sites for Blue bases in the Lu Chu, Goto, Bonin and Kuril Islands, and these places would probably be put in a state of defense capable of denying access to raiding or reconnoitering detachments, and of offering a formidable resistance to even a large naval force.

Scouting outposts, with colliers, might be provided at Marcus and Wake islands, basing themselves on the Bonin Islands and Guam, and it is probable that an effort would be made to destroy the cable station at Midway and cut the cable to Hawaii.

It is necessary to consider too the effect of a diversion that might be made by Orange in the direction of Kiska. Such a threat of a descent upon the Puget Sound region may be made with a view to drawing the Blue fleet, or a considerable por-

tion of it, away from Hawaii, if based there.

Such a movement by Orange might prove to be very disconcerting to Blue, if not entirely successful in its object; unless Blue remains firm in its conviction that to hold securely the Hawaiian Islands, is its immediate and paramount duty; and that by holding ^{that position} ~~it~~, he guards most effectively the Pacific coast from any serious attack by Orange.

Having secured as far as may be practicable in the time allowed and with the resources at hand all the strategic points necessary to complete control of the sea in the Far East, the Orange main fleet will probably retire behind its extended frontier to a base from which it can best direct harassing attacks upon the Blue fleet in its efforts to gain a base anywhere in the theater of war in the Far East. It is probable that Orange will not seek any contacts except such in which it is certain to be in very superior force, or is reasonably certain of inflicting a crushing blow without too great a sacrifice of its own force; as for instance an attempt at the destruction of the Blue train en route across the Pacific.

Orange would probably conduct a vigorous offensive-defensive until such time as the Blue fleet may have suc-

ceeded in securing a base in the Far East. From that time the operations of the Orange fleet would probably be purely defensive, trusting to time, weather, and lack of necessary resources to reduce the Blue superiority of force, when a vigorous offensive could be assumed with every prospect of final success.

The Orange forces in Manchuria and Korea would be prepared and augmented, if necessary, to resist any eccentric attack that might be planned upon those areas; or to securely hold in check any popular uprisings that might be fostered by Blue in those countries.

BLUE FORCES.Their Strength and Disposition; Also a Review
Of the Courses of Action Open to Blue.

In general terms the Blue Naval Strength is superior to Orange. While it is probable that the Blue naval strength as indicated in the list of vessels belonging to the Blue navy will be somewhat reduced by vessels under extensive repair and not immediately available, it is also probable that the listed strength of the Orange navy will be reduced for similar reasons and the relative superiority of the Blue main naval force will not be reduced.

No minimum of forces necessary for success in such a war as the one under study can possibly be stated. Nothing short of every combatant unit that Blue has or that can be procured should be deemed sufficient for conducting a war of any magnitude across the seas; and every possible resource of Blue should, when hostilities become probable, be directed towards increasing the force available at the outbreak of war.

There are two dispositions of the Blue fleet to be considered as existing at or just prior to the outbreak of hostilities:-

1. The Blue main fleet in the Atlantic, with present detachments on the Pacific Coast and in Asiatic waters.

2. The Blue main fleet in the Pacific, with present detachment in Asiatic waters.

Before discussion^{ing} the possible courses of action open to the Blue main fleet, consideration will be given to the possible courses of action open to the detachments in the Pacific. These detachments are very weak relative to the forces that might be opposed to them, and careful consideration should be given to their disposition during the period of strained relations to assure the possibility of their employment to the best effect at the outbreak of war and thereafter.

The Blue Naval Detachment in Asiatic Waters.

^{vessels} Some of the Blue Naval force in Asiatic waters would not be serviceable elsewhere, because of their restricted radius of action and limited powers of offense and defense. The cruisers, destroyers, and monitors, however, may be of greater service to Blue elsewhere than in the Philippines. The importance to Blue of holding Guam is so great from every point of view of a campaign in the Far East, that every effort should be made to strengthen it and to deny its use

to Orange. While this may not be possible with the facilities at hand or capable of being provided before war is declared, it seems clear that a well designed effort in that direction would make of its capture by Orange a difficult task, which would entail the expenditure of great effort. This would tend to reduce the power of Orange aggressiveness in other localities, or delay the prosecution of a more extended campaign.

If, therefore, during the period of strained relations, the cruisers, destroyers, and monitors, the advance base material now at Cavite, all the marines, and an additional force of 2000 troops with their necessary military stores, equipment and supplies, were withdrawn from the Philippines to Guam, it would seem to provide a far more effective defense of the Blue position in the Far East than would result from the employment of the same force in the Philippines with no defense of Guam.

Such a disposition of Blue force would not entail any decrease in the effort that Orange might make in gaining control of the Philippines, and it would entail a very strong effort on the part of Orange to secure control of Guam, and that effort might fail. If it did not fail, it

would at least curtail Orange effort in other vital directions.

The monitors and destroyers should be left at Guam, and the cruisers should fall back further upon the Blue base at Pearl Harbor and join the Blue detachment in the Eastern Pacific.

The Blue Naval force in Asiatic waters, not useful in strengthening the Blue position at Guam, will be employed in the Philippines and ultimately retire behind the defense of Corregidor.

The Blue Naval Detachment on the Pacific Coast.

This detachment may be employed as a force to threaten any attempt made by Orange to land an army on the Pacific coast, or as a means to strengthen the Blue position in the Hawaiian islands, by hurrying reinforcements to the Blue base at Oahu and by harassing any Orange force that may be sent to secure a foothold in the Hawaiian Islands. If forced to retire ultimately, this detachment could fall back upon a base on the Pacific coast if there be one available, or if all Pacific coast bases are denied to it, then upon Panama to effect a concentration with the Blue main fleet.

The submarines and destroyers might be disposed in

Puget Sound and in San Francisco Bay.

THE BLUE MAIN FLEET.

It is probable that, during the period of strained relations, Blue will be able to accomplish much in the way of naval mobilization.

While the acquirement and preparation of the large number of vessels necessary ultimately to form the train of the fleet may take considerable time, the available fighting units could be placed in a state of readiness speedily, and, with a train sufficient for the time being, might rendezvous as follows:-

Battleships and cruisers
The ~~main force~~ with train at Guantanamo.

The torpedo vessels with their attendant towing craft
at Culebra.

As soon as this concentration is effected, the entire Fleet might proceed on its course around South America. If hostilities seem to be inevitable, such a movement in anticipation might successfully advance the fleet on the first leg of the cruise to the Pacific from Guantanamo before war is declared, even assuming that the knowledge of a movement in force in that direction would be the signal for Orange to begin hostilities.

With the Blue main fleet in the Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities, the courses open to that force upon arrival in the Pacific will depend very largely upon the situation that may present itself as a result of Orange activities.

If these activities have extended the Orange frontier to the line Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa, that in itself constitutes a threat against the easy or safe occupation by the Blue force of our mainland bases north of the Isthmus of Panama. In that case Blue's course would be to concentrate and base its main force at Panama, and move thence up the coast to establish itself at San Francisco, as a preliminary to an advance westward.

A movement by Blue direct to any one of the salients of the assumed new Orange frontier would be an unwarranted hazard, if attempted before being firmly established in a base on the Pacific coast north of Panama.

If the above Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line be not held by the enemy, the Blue force could proceed to base itself at any of the salients of this line with its rear reasonably secure.

Manifestly, establishing itself at a base in the center

of this line, as that Hawaii, has preponderant advantages over either extremity in strategic position, in ease of access as regards steaming radius, in greater harbor facilities, and in better climatic conditions.

It is not probable that Orange would send its fleet or any considerable part of it to a point so far distant as Panama, and Blue's occupation of that point would probably be unopposed. From that point northward, a movement in force by Blue, if opposed, should result in an advantage to Blue, owing to Blue superiority of force, and therefore such movement might not be seriously opposed. In the time that must elapse after the outbreak of hostilities before the Blue main fleet could concentrate at Panama it is not probable that Orange would succeed in establishing itself so as to hold and deny to Blue its mainland bases on the Pacific coast; but even so, there are suitable places among the offlying islands of the southern California coast that would be available for use by Blue as a temporary base.

During the time necessary to bring the Blue fleet to a threatening position in the Pacific, Blue would be forced into a weak defensive along its frontier in the Pacific (advanced beyond its mainland), and the enemy would have

practically unrestrained freedom of movement throughout the Pacific during that time.

If the enemy has been able during this time to secure and hold in force the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line, which is easily possible and quite probable, unless sufficient troops and military stores be gotten to Oahu before Orange can invest that place, the ultimate Blue campaign westward of that line becomes one of great hazard and difficulty.

The great importance to Blue of at once making secure and holding at all costs the base in the Hawaiian Islands cannot be overstated.

Its loss to Blue would amount to an irretrievable disaster that would exercise a permanent and powerful influence upon the Blue campaign. History is full of examples of strong strategic positions, insecurely held, falling to a strong fleet or to a combined sea and land force; and the same places, subsequently held in strength, resisting successfully every effort at re-capture, even though the attacking force had undisputed control of the sea. Gibraltar, Minorca, and Malta are historical demonstrations of these facts that it is well to have in mind when considering the subject of properly defending or regaining, if lost, such a strategic

position as the Hawaiian Islands.

10,000 men rushed by Blue to Oahu before Orange could reach that point would probably hold that base secure for at least the necessary time to bring the Blue Fleet into that area. There, if opposed by the Orange fleet, would be settled for the war, the command of the sea. If not opposed by the Orange fleet, the control of the eastern half of the Pacific is assured to Blue.

If Orange can not gain possession of the island of Oahu, its campaign in the Eastern Pacific has failed; and if an invading force has occupied the Pacific coast, it is doomed to ultimate defeat because it cannot be supported, or relieved, nor can its natural losses incident to campaigning be made good.

Realizing this, Orange may contemplate raids on the Pacific coast, but it can never contemplate invasion in face of the assured approach of a superior Blue fleet with a secure base in a commanding strategic position ready for that Fleet upon arrival.

If Oahu is properly garrisoned by Blue, therefore, that point and not the Pacific coast must be the center of maximum effort of the combined Orange forces. Islands of the Hawaiian

group other than Oahu may easily fall, being undefended, and become a supporting point for investment of Oahu, but that investment could not succeed before the Blue fleet could arrive, if Oahu is properly garrisoned and defended.

The proper defense of the Pacific Coast is here at this strategic point, rather than on the Pacific coast itself.

However, if Oahu be lost to Blue, and the enemy has been able to gain a strong foothold on the Pacific coast, the Blue fleet could secure a base at some point on the coast or in the outlying islands, from which base it could cooperate effectively with the Army in the ultimate overpowering of the invading force on the mainland.

In the next stage of the campaign, involving a movement by Blue to the westward, to transfer the war into the theater of the Far east, the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands by Orange would present an obstacle that would be almost insurmountable.

Orange in this position would effectively flank the Blue advance and make the Blue approach to the Far East by either the central route via Hawaii or the northern route via Kiska too hazardous an undertaking to be seriously contemplated. An effort to regain the Hawaiian Islands, if strongly held

by Orange as they would be, if taken, would entail the maximum effort on the part of Blue, that would be so prolonged that, even if it ultimately succeeded, which is extremely doubtful, it would be a wasteful and uneconomical use of Blue force. For, if successful, Blue has not gained in any degree what Orange may gain by the delay entailed upon a campaign in the Far East. If Blue's effort to regain this position is carried to the supreme test and is unsuccessful, the war will end on terms favorable to Orange, because Blue will no longer be able to carry on the war. In such a case it would seem wiser for Blue to disregard for the time being the Hawaiian Islands and proceed along other lines.

A southern route of approach to the Philippines would be the only practicable one. It would be very long, wearing on the personnel and materiel, and would entail difficulties in respect to maintenance of supplies that increase as the line of communication lengthens, and would present more frequent opportunities for an enemy, securely based on the flank, to attack it to advantage.

Steaming radius of the fleet and means of guaranteeing the supply of fuel to so large a body are likely to be controlling factors in deciding the movements of the Blue fleet.

The magnitude of this problem of fuel supply to sustain a fleet, projected into a theater so vast and so remote, without bases or points of support, will be bound to restrict Blue movements to a step by step progress that will consume time, energy, effort, resources and men, vastly disproportionate to the same expenditure on the part of the enemy.

To hold the three salient points mentioned, Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa, would not entail upon the enemy any expenditure of his combatant Naval forces. These would be available at all times for harassing Blue en route, or, should a favorable opportunity present, for an attack in force.

The Blue force must be prepared at all times in its advance, by whatever route it takes, to ward off harassing forces or to meet the enemy in force.

The Blue Main Fleet in The Pacific

The following considerations are based on the assumption of the Blue fleet being in the Pacific at the outbreak of hostilities.

Under this assumption Orange activities will be restricted and will not comprehend movements of a serious nature so far to the eastward as the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line. The consideration of courses open to Blue in the theater to the west-

ward of this line may be discussed as applicable to both situations -- Blue fleet in the Atlantic and Blue fleet in the Pacific at the outbreak of hostilities, bearing in mind the fact that with the Blue fleet in the Pacific at the outbreak of hostilities, the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line may be securely held by Blue, and with the Fleet in the Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities, these points may be lost to Blue.

Blue holding the line, Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa, may proceed by either the northern route, central route, or southern route, to establish itself at a base in the Far East.

The northern route, while shortest, has climatic or weather disadvantages that will control throughout at least six months of the year. It is the most remote route for the line of fuel supply to the Blue fleet, which would need to replenish at Kiska.

If the advance were to begin in the spring it might be possible to secure a base in the Kuril Islands from which point the Orange home territory could be threatened. It is doubtful if this would be a serious menace to the enemy, for any operations directed from such a base, in order to be effective, would have to extend so far south as to disrupt the ordinary and usual commercial routes; in doing which

such operations would be flanked on both sides by the enemy and be rendered innocuous.

A demonstration in force against any important point in Orange home country would not be likely to result in the Orange fleet uncovering itself; because all such ports are so strongly fortified that such a demonstration on the part of Blue would, if pushed to an attack, most probably fail, and result in a reduction of Blue naval superiority which would be playing the enemy's game for him.

It would ultimately be necessary to secure a base more to the southward, to do which from a position to northward is hazardous because of the flanking position of the enemy in his greatest possible strength.

The middle or central route has the advantage of shorter lines of communication, and a wider choice of geographic objective, combining certain points that belong peculiarly to its own line of advance, with all the possible points which might be the objective in the approach by either of the other routes.

Moreover, the resources of the Hawaiian Islands as a base are immeasurably superior to either Kiska or Samoa. From Pearl Harbor as a starting point with everything secure in

Blue's rear, as it well could be, any movement by Blue, directed toward establishing itself within the area dominated by the enemy, can be executed in shorter time than by the southern route via Samoa and in greater security and with less chance of serious harassment by the enemy than by the northern route.

The route via Samoa does not afford any greater measure of security than via Hawaii, for any direction of approach to the hostile area that is possible from Samoa is equally possible from Hawaii. Moreover, to proceed by the route via Samoa uncovers both Hawaii and Kiska, leaving them exposed to eccentric operations, whereas a movement via Hawaii would cover the entire line from Kiska to Samoa. There does not seem therefore to be any good reason why an approach via Samoa in preference to one via Hawaii should be considered.

Until Blue has been able definitely to determine the location of the Orange fleet, its objective must be a geographic one.

Any encounter with the Orange force at large, up to the time that Blue reaches its geographic objective, should turn to the advantage of Blue and hence will probably be avoided by Orange.

It is not probable that Orange will hazard any considerable portion of its force very far from a secure base, in face of Blue superiority, and in absence of any knowledge of where the Blue fleet may stop for coal. Acting even on positive information of the location selected by Blue for coaling after leaving the Hawaiian Islands, it is doubtful if Orange would be able to interfere seriously, if the point selected by Blue were any possible one to the southward and eastward of Guam.

It is true that the destruction of the Blue train prior to the arrival at the point for coaling would be a calamity that would stagger the Blue fleet and make its further operations, except in retreat to a refuge, impossible for a long time, if it did not in fact jeopardize the security of the fleet itself.

An effort in that direction on the part of Orange would entail the use of a considerable part of its fighting strength; and, with the Blue superiority of force within the area of possible contact, Orange would be risking the destruction of the force so employed, which would tend to increase the disparity in strength of the two forces.

With Guam in possession of Blue, that point becomes the

immediate objective of the Blue main fleet, by whatever route across the Pacific Blue may approach the theater of operations in the Far East. Securely based there, the Blue fleet is in an advantageous position for beginning operations in whatever direction may seem wisest in furtherance of the Blue campaign.

If, however, Guam is in possession of Orange, before the Blue force can proceed to the westward of Guam it must inform itself of the situation at that point. Two courses are open to Blue with respect to Guam. As it will probably be found that that point is so strongly held by the enemy as to necessitate a major operation to bring about its reduction, the Blue force must either undertake this reduction at once, or, while it proceeds to the selection and occupation of a base to the westward of Guam it must leave behind and maintain a detachment that will be sufficient to cover Guam and deny its use to Orange as a base for raiding operations on the Blue line of communications across the Pacific.

It will be imperative to hold securely for the time being a line of communications across the Pacific; because, whatever base may be selected by Blue, the only reasonably secure line by which supplies can follow will be the line by which the fleet made its approach, and of which there is, therefore, a

certain knowledge of its hazards, and a reasonable sense of the measure of protection necessary to guard it.

There must be no stoppage of or protracted delay in the arrival of supplies to Blue. It must be provided that these shall follow in the wake of the fleet. To make any other route secure would entail operations the extent of which could not be foreseen, in the knowledge that Blue can be expected to have of the conditions in the immediate theater of operations either before or immediately after the establishment of the Blue fleet at a base in the Philippines.

Multiple lines of supply could unquestionably follow the successful establishment of Blue at a base, when it could be said to control the sea in its vicinity; but for at least one month after arrival at a base, Blue should not be expected to cover more than one line of supplies to its base. Even then Blue's ability to control and secure the line of communications will depend entirely upon the activities of the enemy in the theater of operations. Blue's situation at best, cruising within the hostile area with a powerful though inferior fleet unlocated and practising evasive tactics, is so precarious that absolutely nothing can be left to hazard in respect to Blue's supplies.

With the Blue fleet in a base to the westward of Guam, and Guam in possession of the enemy, any naval force that Blue may find at Guam might be contained, although it might entail such a large detachment from the Blue fleet as to reduce the concentrated Blue superiority of the main body to a very dangerous extent if it did not wipe out that superiority altogether.

If the enemy chose to make extensive diversions in the direction of Guam with a view to harassing the Blue line of communications, it would be making an uneconomical use of its naval force; for the chances of its success in the operation would be too small, and the risk of destruction at least equal to the chance of success. The Blue main fleet secure in a base will with its superiority of force restrict the activities of an enemy, constrained to caution by its dependence upon its fleet, to the defensive.

It may be possible, therefore, temporarily to neutralize Guam though it remain for the time being in enemy possession.

The reduction of Guam, strongly held by the enemy, would mean a major operation -- with combined forces -- and, if to be undertaken before the Blue fleet proceeds beyond to establish itself in a base further west, the plan should be completely formulated before leaving the base in Hawaii.

Possible Bases in the Philippines

The region in the Philippines that may be selected by Blue as a base will be governed by the following main considerations:-

1. The resistance likely to be met with in securing possession.
2. Its strategical position and natural strength.
3. Its anchorage capacity and ease of defense.
4. The security of possible lines of communication.

Under the assumption that at the outbreak of hostilities the Blue main fleet is in the Atlantic and that it will approach the theater of operations in the Far East via the Pacific, it may reasonably be assumed that (excepting Corregidor) the Philippines will be in complete control of Orange by the time the Blue fleet can possibly reach that region.

It cannot reasonably be assumed that all available places of refuge or anchorage for a fleet in this region can be controlled or held by the enemy in such strength as to deny their use to Blue.

Subig Bay would undoubtedly be denied to Blue; and Manila Bay, even though Corregidor holds out, could not afford a safe or secure base for the Blue fleet, if Luzon

is held by Orange; but in one of the three following named localities the Blue fleet would probably find refuge without encountering resistance that would entail serious delay or danger to it:-

1. The Polillo-Casiguran region on east coast of Luzon.
2. The south coast of Mindanao, -- Gulf of Davao or Dumankilas Bay.
3. Palawan Island, -- Malampaya Sound.

The first of these regions possesses the following advantages:- Any resistance offered in this region could not cover the entire region, and Blue could undoubtedly establish itself firmly without the expenditure of great force.

The possession of the Island of Polillo would give Blue an excellent preliminary strategical position, easy of defense and secure from anything but possible attack by sea, which Blue could easily control. The Island should afford too a secure base for the military forces that may be sent ultimately for land operations on the island of Luzon or elsewhere in that theater of operations.

This region presents furthermore a good point from which further operations could be pursued towards locating

and operating against the enemy naval force, being within easy striking distance of the Pescadores, the enemy's strongest base advanced from its home territory. It has the disadvantage, however, of presenting certain difficulties in maintenance of a secure line of communications, and is not yet properly charted.

The second of these regions, -- South Coast of Mindanao -- possesses the following advantages:-

The resistance to Blue occupation would probably be even less than it would be in the case of the Polillo-Casiguran region. Blue would have the choice of several available anchorages all of which could not be held in such force by the enemy as to deny their use to Blue. The Pacific line of communications to a base in this region, assuming Guam to be still in the enemy's possession, would be more easily protected than in the case first cited.

The strategic position, however, is not as good as the Polillo-Casiguran region. The south coast of Mindanao recommends itself strongly as a temporary place of refuge for Blue to replenish its stores, with an idea of moving on to the selection of another point at which to establish a base.

There are, however, certain evident disadvantages in

this region that should have great weight in determining the question of establishing a Blue advance base there.

Not only would the base be in the nature of a mainland base in an enemy country, the tenure of which would probably be disputed by enemy land forces even if at first successfully occupied by Blue; but any operations by Blue conducted from this point as a base to the northward would be flanked throughout their entire extent by the enemy holding the Philippines and the passages between the Islands. Such a position, except as a temporary base for Blue, is too remote from the possible bases of the Orange fleet to permit of successful operation against that fleet.

Such a position, therefore, lacks security from land attack, inasmuch as it may be assumed that the Island of Mindanao may be held by Orange troops, and is not well located with a view to supporting an aggressive campaign against the Orange fleet or the land forces that may be in the Philippines.

The third region -- that of Palawan, which includes Malampaya Sound -- has an initial disadvantage that may not be found to be insuperable; while on the other hand it seems to possess some marked advantages. Manifestly, the resistance to approach and occupation, which would be the great

and initial disadvantage, would be stronger in this region than in either of the other two. The routes leading to this region pass through restricted areas, where the superiority of torpedo craft possessed by Orange would have the greatest weight and widest application.

It would seem reasonable to suppose too that Orange, realizing the great value of Malampaya Sound, would select that as one of the places where considerable force would be disposed and preparation made for defense against occupation. It may be possible, however, that Orange would consider the hazards of entering the narrow waters of the southern Philippines so great that the Blue force would not risk an attempt to push through to this point; and, therefore, it might be left without any material local defense.

Malampaya Sound possesses the advantage of capacious and safe refuge in all weathers, a strategic position of great strength, capable of easy defense, and its possession would insure one line of communication that could be protected with the smallest expenditure of force and be perfectly secure. This line would be one from the Blue east coast via the Mediterranean or Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean. The Orange possession of Guam would be ultimately completely neu-

tralized; and all the southern islands of the Philippines, in fact all the area to the southward of Luzon, would fall at once under Blue control.

A Blue force safely based in Malampaya Sound would be in a position to prosecute an aggressive campaign with less anxiety about its communications than from either of the other two possible regions, and would be in easy striking distance of the Orange fleet wherever it may be, outside of its own home waters.

A thorough reconnaissance in force of this area and the approaches thereto via Sibutu Passage and Balabao Strait, while the main body of the Blue fleet coaled and refreshed itself on the south coast of Mindanao, might indicate that whatever resistance Orange may have prepared against the passage of a fleet to this point could be broken down and the objective, Malampaya Sound, gained in safety.

Possible Operations for Blue After Securing a Base in the Philippines

D. Space
The Blue fleet being securely based at some point in the Philippine region, must give its first attention to the security of its line of communications by whatever route it seems wisest to establish it.

With a secure line of supplies, Blue's next objective becomes the determination of the location of the Orange fleet.

It is probable that Blue will be largely upon its own resources and will be acting without advices from its home government and with very uncertain and contradictory information from various sources in the theater of operations.

It seems manifest that no eccentric operations of any magnitude can safely be begun by the Blue Fleet, until it has made a complete survey of the theater of war with a view to determining the strength of the enemy's outlying positions and the location of the enemy fleet.

This can only be accomplished by a reconnaissance in force with the Blue main fleet, after it has secured its base from a counter attack or raid, during absence of the fleet on this reconnaissance.

It is not probable that the enemy fleet would base itself in the Manila-Subig region, but, if it were so based, Blue would probably get reliable information to that effect after its arrival at its base in the Philippines.

If the Orange fleet is not based in the Philippines the only other possible base outside of home waters would be the Pescadores. A reconnaissance in force on this point would uncover the presence of the Orange fleet if it were based there.

If it were found that the enemy was not using the Pescadores as a base, or had retired from that position, the strength of the place should be thoroughly developed with a view to its reduction or at least its subsequent denial as a base for Orange. Combined operations conducted by Blue against the Pescadores might lead to an offensive action on the part of Orange with its fleet to regain control of this area, which would make this area one of possible contact between the opposing fleets.

If, however, the Pescadores are so strongly held that the enemy fleet based therein is secure from attack, no operations in this region are possible, except to endeavor to keep the Orange fleet under observation.

Blue might then retire on its own base, clear the Philippine waters of all enemy craft, harass Orange communications with the Philippines, strengthen its own base with troops and material sent from home, and prepare to meet any move in the meantime made by Orange from its base.

Every effort of Blue should be towards drawing the enemy fleet from its Pescadores base and bringing about a contact that will be decisive. If contact is successfully evaded by Orange, Orange must be forced to retire on a home port and not

be permitted to regain the security of its base in the Pescadores.

In such a case, even supposing Orange to have a large army in the Philippines, it would seem to be better to employ such land forces as Blue could accumulate at its base in the capture of the Lu Chu Islands and reduction of the Pescadores than to begin extensive land operations for the recapture of Luzon.

The Philippine situation will take care of itself for the time being, if Blue can successfully control the sea areas in that region; and the force that Orange may have in the island of Luzon or other islands of the Philippines would, from that time, cease to influence Blue operations except in so far as such a force would serve as a bait to draw support from Orange home territory.

An obvious alternative to this plan would be for Blue to cover the Philippines and mass its forces coming from home, under the condition of partial control of the sea, the enemy fleet not having been met, and proceed to the re-conquest of Luzon and such other islands of the Philippines as may be occupied by Orange.

With the Lu Chu Islands in Blue possession and the Pes-

cadres denied to Orange, Blue would have absolute control of the sea in the theater to the southward of Orange home territory, and could, from Amami O Sima as a base, pursue a campaign against Orange commerce, which would lead ultimately to the isolation of Orange. Attacks against Orange home territory would likely prove fruitless. If alliances were to be considered, an alliance with China on the basis of the return to her of complete sovereignty over the territory of Korea and Manchuria now under Orange rule for which China will agree to support armies of her own and conduct operations against Orange in Manchuria and Korea, would be likely to cause Orange to sue for peace upon the best terms possible.

In case Blue present bases in the Philippines should not have become the objects of serious attack by Orange, and should be available for the Blue fleet upon arrival, the Blue problem of selection of a base after arrival will have been solved. If, however, these points were made objects of serious attack and the Blue forces on Corregidor still held out against a siege, the Blue line of action would be unquestionably restricted, whether wisely ordered or not, to the relief of that situation, which would be a wasting effort in time, men and materiel.

The holding out of Corregidor with Luzon in possession of Orange would not make Manila Bay a refuge for Blue, even though it be able to deny it as a base or refuge for Orange. It does not seem as though it would in any way relieve Blue from taking up a position in another locality as a preliminary to operations for the support of the beleaguered island. The above situation is such a one as might be found to exist in the case of the Blue fleet being in the Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities, and Orange having sufficient time to prepare and put into execution its investment of the Blue positions in Luzon.

If the Blue fleet were in the Pacific at the outbreak of hostilities, the time during which Orange could act against the Philippines would be relatively very short. Orange occupation of the Philippines and Philippine waters would probably not be established before the Blue fleet could arrive. The selection of a base in the Philippines by Blue would depend upon the information that Blue would be able to obtain either from home sources before departure, or en route or by reconnaissance after arrival in that area.

If the cause of war is a grievance for which Blue seeks redress, it may conceivably happen that Orange will fall back

upon a pure defensive throughout the territory and waters now under ~~her~~^{its} complete control.

The Blue fleet might be able to establish itself securely in Subig or Manila Bays without serious opposition and have secure lines of supply, and find the territory of the Philippines unmolested by Orange.

Blue's campaign in this instance must follow the same lines as that already laid down supposing the Philippines in the possession of Orange and Blue established in a base in that region; namely, the isolation of Orange home territory, the investment and capture of outlying Orange possessions, constant efforts to draw out the Orange fleet and destroy it, and threats at the repatriation of Korea and such parts of Manchuria as are under Orange control.

THE DECISION.

This will first be expressed with reference to the detachments in the Pacific and subsequently with reference to the Blue main body.

Decision with respect to Pacific Detachments.

Blue decides, as soon as strained relations exist indicating the possibility of war, to move the cruisers, destroyers and monitors in Asiatic waters, together with the advance base outfit now in Cavite, and troops to the number of at least 3000 (marines to be augmented by the army to this strength), with equipment, supplies, and war stores, to Guam and place that island in a state of defense. The monitors and destroyers will be left there to assist in the defense, and the cruisers will be further withdrawn

to the Blue base at Pearl Harbor to join the Pacific Coast detachment at that place. *All here - The smaller craft that cannot easily be withdrawn or moved to convenient elsewhere, will be employed in the Philippines and will ultimately retire, if necessary, behind the defenses of Corregidor.*

Less the destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines
The Pacific coast detachment will, during the same time,

proceed to Pearl Harbor, carrying and convoying troops and war material for the defense of the Blue base at that point.

When hostilities have begun and this force is pressed by an overpowering force of the enemy, this detachment, together with

*The destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines belonging to the Pacific
* Coast detachment will be retained on the coast to assist, if necessary,
in the defense of Pacific coast ports, and will join the Blue main
body after its arrival on the coast.*

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the cruisers that have joined it from Asiatic waters, will fall back upon the Pacific coast, if its ports are not denied, and if they are denied, will fall back in the direction of Panama to effect a concentration with the Blue main fleet.

Blue's paramount duty in this preliminary stage is to assure by every possible effort and means the security of these two main strategic points in the Pacific Ocean, Oahu and Guam.

DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE BLUE MAIN FLEET.

During the period of strained relations, Blue will place all its available fighting units in a state of readiness for a protracted campaign, and will at once begin the assembling and preparation of vessels necessary for use in the Fleet train.

Guantanamo will be appointed as a rendezvous for all the ~~main fighting units~~ *battleships and cruisers* and the train immediately necessary to guarantee the mobility and fighting efficiency of the Fleet, and Culebra will be appointed as a rendezvous for all the torpedo vessels and their attendant towing craft.

When all the available vessels have been assembled at Guantanamo and Culebra, the Fleet will proceed on its course around South America.

Blue's decision with regard to movements after the outbreak of hostilities will be specifically expressed under the two governing assumptions:-

1. The Blue main fleet in the Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities.
2. The Blue main fleet in the Pacific at the outbreak of hostilities.

Under either assumption the decision or decisions will be further governed by specific situations that may present themselves as possibilities.

Therefore, under the first assumption the decision will be expressed under the following heads:-

- (a) The Pacific Coast and the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line occupied by Orange.
- (b) The Pacific Coast occupied by Orange, with the Blue base in the Hawaiian Islands secure.
- (c) The Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line occupied by Orange, with no occupation by Orange of Pacific coast territory.
- (d) The Blue base at Hawaii secure and no occupation by Orange of Pacific Coast territory.

The decision in the last situation (d) would be common to both main assumptions (1) and (2); for manifestly, if in

any case Orange activities did not extend so far east as the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line, or were unsuccessful in that possible theater of war, the situation strategically would be the same as if the Blue fleet were originally in the Pacific; the only difference being in the time when a movement beyond Hawaii could be begun.

Furthermore, the broad strategic features of the Blue campaign beyond the point of securing a base in the Philippines will be common to both assumptions of original disposition of the Blue fleet. Therefore, the decisions under (a), (b), (c) and (d) will be stated only so far as to include the selection of a base; and then will follow the decision that will form the basis of the plan of campaign to be pursued beyond the base, with a view to bringing the war to a close.

(a) The Pacific Coast and the Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa Line
Occupied by Orange.

Blue decision is to concentrate at Panama, thence proceed in force to occupy the Santa Barbara Islands as a base and act in conjunction with the Army to regain possession of lost territory on the mainland.

When the situation on the Pacific coast mainland shall have become favorable to Blue, a reconnaissance in force will

be made of the Hawaiian Islands to determine the strength of the Orange position there.

This reconnaissance will be the basis of the decision whether or not the next effort of Blue will be to regain possession of those Islands. If the reconnaissance should develop that the Orange strength there is not such as would effectively deny to Blue a foothold in that region, an investment of the Orange positions in those islands will be the next step in the Blue campaign, and a movement of the Blue main fleet beyond the Hawaiian Islands will be delayed until those islands are again in Blue possession.

Should, however, the reconnaissance clearly indicate that Orange has so entrenched itself in these Islands as to make operations directed towards their retaking by Blue unreasonable or impracticable, Blue will disregard Hawaii and proceed via the line Nukuhiva-Ysabel Island to Philippine waters and secure a base in Malampaya Sound, if Manila and Subig are denied, and establish a secure line of communication to Blue east coast via the Indian Ocean.

Prior to the departure of the Blue main fleet from Nukuhiva, a reconnaissance of Tutuila should be made to determine the Orange strength there. If to retake Tutuila

does not entail too protracted an operation, that position will be regained, and the route to the Far East will be via Tutuila and Admiralty Islands.

If Guam should hold out and be available for the use of Blue, that island would become the first objective of the Blue fleet after leaving Isabel Island. After the Blue fleet in this instance shall have established itself at Guam operations will be conducted from that point towards the Philippines to relieve Corregidor and to establish an advance base in Malampaya Sound.

(b) The Pacific Coast occupied by Orange, with the
Blue Base in the Hawaiian Islands Secure.

Blue decision is to concentrate at the Galapagos Islands, thence proceed in force to occupy the base at Pearl Harbor and make it secure; capture or destroy all Orange vessels that may be encountered anywhere in the Hawaiian group of islands; and from that point conduct operations to cut off Orange communications with any troops it may have on the Pacific coast mainland or in the Hawaiian Islands.

After the situation on the Pacific coast has become favorable to Blue, the fleet will proceed via the line Pearl Harbor-Mortlock-South coast of Mindanao to secure a base in

Malampaya Sound if Manila and Subig Bays are denied, and, this accomplished, to establish a secure line of communications via the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean via Hawaii.

If Guam should hold out and be available for the use of Blue, that island would become the first objective of the Blue fleet after leaving Pearl Harbor. After the Blue fleet, in this instance, shall have established itself at Guam, operations will be conducted from that point towards the Philippines to relieve Corregidor and to establish an advance base in the Casiguran-Polillo region, maintaining its line of communications across the Pacific via Hawaii and Guam.

- (c) The Kiska-Hawaii-Samoa line occupied by Orange, with no occupation by Orange of Pacific Coast Territory.

Blue's decision is to concentrate at the Galapagos Islands, thence proceed in force north to San Francisco, to check any attempt by Orange to extend its activities to the Pacific Coast mainland.

When the mobile land defense on the Pacific Coast is strong enough to resist any attempt of Orange to gain a permanent foothold, a reconnaissance in force will be made of the Hawaiian Islands to determine the strength of the Orange position there.

This reconnaissance will be the basis of the decision whether or not the next effort of Blue will be to regain possession of those Islands. If the reconnaissance should develop that the Orange strength there is not such as would effectively deny to Blue a foothold in that region, an investment of the Orange positions in those islands will be the next step in the Blue campaign, and a movement of the Blue main fleet beyond the Hawaiian Islands will be delayed until those islands are again in Blue possession.

Should, however, the reconnaissance clearly indicate that Orange has so entrenched itself in these islands as to make operations directed towards their retaking by Blue unreasonable or impracticable, Blue will disregard Hawaii and proceed via the line Nukuhiva-Ysabel Island to Philippine waters, and secure a base in Malampaya Sound, if Manila and Subig are denied, and establish a secure line of communications to Blue east coast via the Indian Ocean.

Prior to the departure of the Blue main fleet from Nukuhiva, a reconnaissance of Tutuila should be made to determine the Orange strength there. If to retake Tutuila does not entail too protracted an operation, that position will be regained, and the route to the Far East will be via

Tutuila and Admiralty Islands.

If Guam should hold out and be available for the use of Blue, that island would become the first objective of the Blue fleet after leaving Ysabel Island. After the Blue fleet in this instance shall have established itself at Guam, operations will be conducted from that point towards the Philippines to relieve Corregidor and to establish an advance base in Malam-paya Sound.

(d) The Blue Base at Hawaii secure and no occupation

By Orange of Pacific Coast Territory.

Blue's decision is to concentrate at Pearl Harbor, and, while preparing for an advance to the westward, make a reconnaissance of Guam if that place is held by Orange to determine the Orange strength there, with a view to deciding whether that point could be regained. If the reconnaissance develops that Guam is not strongly held, preparations will be made to seize it, in which case Blue will coal in the Caroline group and proceed thence to Guam. After securing possession of Guam, the Blue fleet will proceed to establish its advance base in the Casiguran-Polillo region and maintain its line of communications across the Pacific.

If Guam be found to be so strongly held by the enemy that it would entail a major operation to effect its reduction, Blue fleet will for the time disregard Guam and proceed via the Caroline Islands to the south coast of Mindanao, and secure a base in Malampaya Sound, if Manila and Subig are denied, and establish a secure line of communications to the Blue east coast via the Indian Ocean, maintaining at the same time its communications with Pearl Harbor, via the route Pearl Harbor-Admiralty Islands-Sibutu Passage.

In any of the foregoing situations, if Manila or Subig Bays are not denied to Blue as a base for its fleet, that region will be the geographic objective in the Philippines of the Blue fleet. If Corregidor alone holds out, it does not assure to Blue a secure base in Manila Bay for operations.

Having established a secure base for the fleet in either Manila, Subig, Casiguran-Polillo, or Malampaya Sound, and secured its line or lines of communications, according to the circumstances above set forth, the Blue decision with respect to further operations with a view to ending the war is as follows:-

Blue will now prepare for a long and exhausting campaign, and if the facilities and resources of Subig and

Manila are denied to Blue, steps will at once be taken to prepare the base selected to answer in every essential respect the requirements of a main naval base. Work will at once be begun on a drydock capable of taking the largest ship in the fleet, if the DEWEY is not accessible. If it is accessible, it will be enlarged to a capacity sufficient to accommodate the heaviest battleship.

Permanent fortifications will be erected, wharves and docks built, buildings suitable for indispensable machinery for repairs, for barracks, and for base hospital erected, clearings made for military camps, storage for coal and oil and facilities for handling coal installed, and distilling plant erected.

The main fleet of Blue will remain concentrated at all times and will always be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity to bring the Orange fleet to action in open waters.

While awaiting the arrival of troops from home, the Blue fleet will make a reconnaissance with its full fighting strength to determine the location of the Orange fleet; will clear Philippine waters of all Orange craft; will isolate any land forces Orange may have disposed in the Philippines by severing all communications with these forces from their

home territory or possessions; will, if Luzon has fallen and Corregidor is still holding out, relieve Corregidor with supplies, and if the floating dock has not been destroyed remove it to the base occupied by the Blue fleet.

If the Orange fleet is found to be based on the Pescadores, when a force of troops with necessary siege material and transports for one division shall have been accumulated at the Blue base, the Blue fleet will proceed, covering a convoy of 20,000 troops, to invest and secure a foothold upon the island of Amami-O-Sima where a temporary base will be established. Meanwhile a detachment of the fleet will be disposed to keep the Orange force in the Pescadores under observation.

Leaving its own Philippine base secure by the added strength of the troops and material, and holding its advanced position at Amami-O-Sima with a sufficient force, and keeping the Orange fleet in its base at the Pescadores under observation by detachments of the fleet, the Blue fleet will cut all Orange communications to points to the southward of its home territory, and will probably eventually force the withdrawal of or induce some action on the part of Orange that will uncover the Pescadores. Every effort

will be made by the Blue fleet to gain contact with the Orange fleet; but failing in this, the Orange fleet escaping to refuge in home waters, Blue will proceed with the forces at its disposal to conduct a combined operations to strengthen its hold on the Lu Chu and Meiaco-Sima groups of islands and invest the Orange base at the Pescadores to such an extent at least as to deny its further use to Orange as a base.

If the Orange fleet is not found to be based on the Pescadores, the Blue decision will be the same, except that the detachments for observation of the Pescadores would not be necessary, and only a patrol will be established to prevent any supplies reaching that base. An investment will follow, as before stated, when sufficient troops and material are available; but the first strategic move of Blue, when ready to operate with combined forces, will be to make a determined dash to secure and hold an advance base on Amami-O-Sima, and, as before stated, proceed to seize and hold all the islands of the Lu Chu and Meiaco-Sima groups, and completely isolate Luzon and Guam, if held by Orange, and Formosa.

If the Orange force in Luzon is large, it may become

necessary ultimately to operate with troops against that force on shore to regain control of the island of Luzon, but such operations will be delayed until after the campaign above outlined has been executed, and the necessary additional troops accumulated for that purpose.

Having thus severed one of the main arteries leading to the heart of Orange, namely the possibility of its territorial expansion to the southward, Blue will proceed to operate upon a second vital artery, the total destruction of Orange commerce.

When this has been accomplished by Blue, nothing further will be necessary to bring about terms of peace favorable to Blue. Territorial expansion in all desired directions save to the westward will be denied to Orange. Expansion to the westward will probably be curtailed by Russia and China as a consequence of the war. Commercial expansion in all directions will have been contracted to the vanishing point; and the power of Orange will be confined within the limits of its main islands, where it may remain unassailable, but be powerless to carry on the war, because it will be unable to project a successful campaign beyond its borders.

A proposed method of transfer of the Blue Main Fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific in time of war via the Straits of Magellan, providing for coaling en route outside the Marine league to avoid any diplomatic question relative to the violation of neutrality.

Assemble the battleships and cruisers with the necessary train at Guantanamo; and the destroyers with their attendant towing craft at Culebra.

It is herein designed to tow the destroyers throughout the voyage except through the Straits of Magellan and during heavy weather elsewhere on the voyage.

This method of handling the destroyers will be more economical, more expeditious and will increase their radius of action so that they may always be together and with the Fleet if desired.

The vessels assigned to this towing duty might well be and should be a selected and specially fitted (for towing) group, designed ultimately for use as part of the permanent fleet train, carrying a reserve supply of coal for the fleet and train equal to the amount necessary to refill fleet bunkers once -- an amount shown in the Solution of the Coaling Problem, Proceedings of

Conference, 1910, page 141, to be 156,000 tons -- plus a reasonable allowance for wastage in handling.

Estimating the wastage due to handling and loss due to poor stowage as 5%, the cargo capacity for these Colliers should be 165,000 tons.

The following list of Colliers in the Atlantic - Navy and Merchant - would satisfy this requirement, as well as that of being very suitable as towing craft.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Cargo Capacity</u>
1 Cyclops	14	11,000
2 Jupiter	14	11,000
3 (X)	14	11,000
4 Vestal	16	6,400
5 Prometheus	16	6,400
6 Hector	12	8,100
7 Mars	12	8,100
8 Vulcan	12	8,100
9 Samland	14	8,200
10 American	12	7,000
11 Californian	12	7,000
12 Oregonian	12	7,000
13 Isthmian	13	7,000
14 Hawaiian	12	7,000
15 Virginian	13	8,200
16 Massachusetts	12	8,200
17 Missouri	14	8,200
18 Everett		7,200
19 Malden		7,200
20 Melrose		7,200
21 Grecian		3,500
22 Tuscan		3,000

165,000 tons

Arrangements should be made well beforehand to have at the various points selected for coaling, Colliers with a sufficient amount of coal to fill the fleet bunkers.

The basis of estimate may be taken as follows - see Proceedings of Conference, 1910, Part II, Problem 12, page 127.

4/9 of a ton per mile at 10 kts. for battleships, armored
cruisers, and large cruisers.

1/6 of a ton per mile at 10 kts. for Merchant Scouts, gunboats
and small cruisers.

1/10 of a ton per mile at 10 kts for destroyers
(or the equivalent in oil fuel)

1/8 of a ton per mile at 10 kts for transports and train.

The rate of consumption in port per day is equivalent to the
amount consumed in 70 miles steaming at 10 knots.

There are two practicable routes from Guantanamo to the
Straits of Magellan. From the Straits of Magellan, the Gal-
apagos Islands are within the steaming radius of the Fleet,
and Panama but 20 miles beyond the assumed radius of 4000
miles.

The first route from Guantanamo to Panama (or the Gala-
pagos if permissible) is as follows:

Guantanamo to Gulf of Paria (Trinidad)	970 miles
Gulf of Paria to Ilha Grande Bay (Brazil)	3500 "
Ilha Grande Bay to Possession Bay (Straits of Magellan)	2085 "
Possession Bay to Panama	4020 "
Possession Bay to Galapagos	3640 "

The destroyers would proceed under tow direct from
Culebra to Ilha Grande Bay 3945 miles, and omit Gulf of Paria
in their itinerary.

The second or alternative route to Panama (or to the Galapagos if permissible) is as follows:

Guantanamo to the Brazilian Coast off Bahia	3645 miles
Off Bahia to Possession Bay	2910 "
Possession Bay to Panama	4020 "
Possession Bay to Galapagos	3640 "

The first route affords the securest anchorages and leaves no doubt of ability to coal under any conditions of weather, and is the route herein recommended.

Coal could be easily arranged for, to be delivered in the Gulf of Paria, and Ilha Grande Bay, and no valid protest could be sustained against coaling within that bay or in Ilha Grande Bay.

The entrance to Ilha Grande Bay is ten miles wide in its narrowest part widening to 25 miles as the headlands are passed. If this distance of 10 miles from headland to headland should be accepted as clearly defining the whole bay of Ilha Grande as neutral territory, the Coast to the southward and in the immediate vicinity of Ilha Grande and Sao Sebastiao Islands offers better advantages for coaling than the coast between Bahia and Cape Frio.

The alternative route allows for coaling, within the limits of the radius of action of the fleet, anywhere between the lat-

itude of Bahia and Cape Frio, but the anchorages along this coast are very open and weather conditions may interfere during certain seasons of the year. Should unfavorable weather be experienced so that coaling operations would be difficult and dangerous off the Coast of Brazil the first route has unquestionable advantages and the time that may be lost by one additional stop for coaling (in the Gulf of Paria) will be more than compensated for by the security and certainty with which coaling operations may be conducted and planned for in advance regardless of weather conditions. The distance from Guantanamo to Ilha Grande Bay is 4500 miles, and this is assumed to be beyond the possible radius of the fleet under the conditions of weather and current usually experienced on this route.

On the west coast of South America, there are no possible anchorages outside of the marine league where a fleet could coal. If it were necessary to coal on this coast the fleet might divide between the various ports of Chili and Peru and accept the rights accorded by the Hague Convention to take coal either to full bunker capacity or sufficient to go to the nearest home port.

Possession Bay to Panama is 4020 miles and under the usual weather and current conditions on this coast that

distance should be within the steaming radius of the Fleet.

The Galapagos are well within the steaming radius from Possession Bay, and, coaling at this place would have to be accomplished within the marine league, because there are no anchorages in these Islands outside of that distance from shore.