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B L U E - O R A N G E S T U D Y

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NOTE: This copy contains comments by Captain
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Naval War College
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S E C R E T

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"Secretary, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

30 Mar '33 -

SUBJECT: THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FAR EAST.

I

THE STUDY PRESENTED

This is a study of the interrelation of the Far East policies of the leading nations and the results to which their continuance is likely to lead, with especial reference to the position of the United States.

II

FACTS BEARING UPON THE STUDY

(See plate 1.)

1. Historical background.

In the last part of the 19th century the European powers in their race for markets intensely exploited China, forcing upon her treaties granting them colonies, leased territories, spheres of influence and various concessions.

In the war of 1894 Japan acquired from China the Pescadores, Formosa, the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria, and the recognition of the independence of Korea.

Germany, France, and Russia objected to Japan acquiring territory on the continent and forced her to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula which Russia later took from China by treaty. Germany took the port of ^{Kiao-chow} Kiochow in Shantung from China by treaty. France and Great Britain acquired footholds farther south in China.

As our own trade with China became profitable we desired equal trade opportunities rather than special concessions.

In the war of 1898, through the acquisition of the Philippines, we acquired a stake in the Far East. Our influence induced the European powers to recognize the Open Door Policy and prevented the further partition of China among them.

With Japan our influence in this direction was less successful. In the war of 1905 she ejected Russia from Manchuria, took

the Liaotung Peninsula, and assumed a protectorate over Korea. In 1910 Korea became a possession.

In 1914 Japan seized the German possessions at Kiochow ^{Kiao Chow} and penetrated further into Shantung. Her Twenty-One Demands of 1915, made after five and a half months of the World War, indicated her policy of political, military and economic domination in China.

After the World War Japan received as a mandate the German Islands in the Pacific north of the equator.

In the Washington Treaties of 1922 the United States forswore further increases of fortifications in the Western Pacific, and Japan returned Shantung to China. These treaties pledged the integrity of China and the Open Door Policy.

The events in Manchuria commencing in September, 1931 (at the stage of the World Depression when Great Britain was forced to abandon the gold standard) indicate that the Japanese policies behind the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 remain fundamentally unchanged.

In 1868 Japan consisted of four islands of about 147,000 square miles and 35,000,000 population. Since then the cycle of conquering some territory, conceding part of it, consolidating, recuperating, has been repeated, more or less completely, four times. Her territory now, including Manchuria, covers about 640,000 square miles and contains about 90,000,000 population, excluding the inhabitants of Manchuria, who are not yet amenable to her control. Except for the outlet afforded by the Philippines, Japanese islands now guard the entire coast of China.

2. Economics.

Investments in China and foreign trade with China are about as follows:

	<u>Investments</u>	<u>Trade</u>
Japan	\$1,250 million	\$277 million
England	1,250 "	144 "
Russia	300 "	
United States	250 "	167 "

Manchuria, considered part of China, accounted for about 22% of the Chinese foreign trade before 1932.

About 20% of Japanese exports go to China; about 34% to the United States.

About 25% of United States foreign trade crosses the Pacific. About one-fifth of this is with China; between two and three fifths is with Japan.

United States trade with China is increasing and has very great possibilities for development. United States trade with Europe is decreasing.

Japan, in order to be largely self-sufficient, requires complete domination over the raw materials and markets of Manchuria and probably sea control of some additional Chinese markets.

3. Conflicting policies.

The fundamental policy of the United States in the Far East is equal trade opportunities in China. The policy of Japan is indicated in a note from the United States to Japan after the Twenty-One Demands:

"The United States could not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military, or economic domination over China by a foreign Power, and hopes that Japan will find it consonant with their interests to refrain from pressing upon China an acceptance of proposals which would, if accepted, exclude Americans from equal participation in the economic and industrial development of China and would limit the political independence of that country."

The policy of France is based upon spheres of influence.

The policies of Great Britain and of Holland have been the Open Door.

4. Security of policies.

Conflicting policies were reconciled by treaties in Washington in 1921 and 1922.

The Four Power Treaty cancelled the agreement between Great Britain and Japan and was signed Dec. 13, 1921.

The Five Power Treaty on limitation of armaments was signed Feb. 6, 1922.

The Nine Power Treaty agreeing to the Open Door policy and the integrity of China was signed on the same day as the treaty on limitation of armaments.

All three treaties were required to make the situation satisfactory to all the powers.

With the British-Japanese alliance cancelled, the limitation of arms treaty became possible. This treaty, with the United

States restricted in Naval bases in the Western Pacific, was apparently intended by Statesmen to limit and balance naval armaments in such a way as to make war impracticable,- at least two of the three sea powers having to combine to insure success in any warlike undertaking.

At the same time the United States secured her policies by the nine power treaty in which Japan agreed to give up the aggressive policies embodied in her Twenty-One Demands. However, by not keeping its Navy up to the authorized strength, the United States has passed to Japan the controlling power in the Western Pacific and has given Japan, at least for the present, the power to pursue her policies without grave danger of being molested.

The United States attempted better to secure the treaty position of her policies by the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nevertheless, in succeeding limitation of arms treaties Japan has strengthened her military position in the Far East.

The present attitude of Japan as evidenced by her Manchurian and Shanghai activities indicates that she has reverted to the policies enunciated in her Twenty-One Demands.

From the foregoing it is evident that Japan is prepared to use force in the prosecution of her policies in the Far East. On the other hand, the United States evidently relies entirely upon Treaties for the protection of her policies.

Recent events in the Far East indicate that our dependence upon treaties will not protect our policies, and that they can be

supported only by adequate military-naval power. It is not probable that the United States would get to war over Manchuria or even if Japan further extends her sphere of influence in China. But the closing of the door of trade in the greater part of China or an invasion of the Philippines probably would cause a war, whether or not we were prepared for it.

The Philippines may thus become either a source of strength or weakness to the United States.

Strength, if maintained secure against invasion - making it always a potential base for naval operations in the Western Pacific,- especially providing we maintain our Naval Ratio.

Weakness, if insecurely held and we adopt an aggressive policy in the Far East,- especially if we let our naval ratio lag. It then becomes a temptation for Japan, once and for all, to remove our potential power and influence in the Western Pacific by taking and securing all our possessions West of the Hawaiians.

5. Relative naval power.

In case of war with Japan either in support of our policies in China or to defend or retake the Philippines it would be necessary to exert our naval power in the Western Pacific. This would require secure bases in the theater of operations. The Philippines are lightly held and could well be secured to Japan before the arrival of our Fleet. Our Fleet has never been built up to the treaty limit, is actually weaker than Japan's in light forces and is of slower speed. It has not the necessary auxil-

aries or base facilities to make it self-sustaining on arrival in the Western Pacific even if a Base there be available. Under present conditions to send the Fleet across the Pacific might well result in its complete loss and consequently the ultimate loss of the Hawaiians. It would take many years to regain the position we now hold. If the Fleet is not sent across we are secure in our own waters but it would take years of preparation before we could be ready to reduce Japan to terms satisfactory to us. (Appendix 1)

6. Requirements for support of our Far East policies.

Nothing in the Washington treaties prohibits the United States from maintaining a mobile army of any strength in the Philippines, thereby making the islands secure against invasion. Also our Fleet not only can be built up to treaty strength but also, by fully utilizing the possibilities in the unlimited class of 20 knot auxiliaries, it can be made practically self-sustaining and highly mobile. (Appendix 2)

7. Conclusions.

(1) The closing of the door of trade in China or the seizure of the Philippines for the purpose of removing the potential power of the United States from the Western Pacific would not be inconsistent with Japan's present policies and past performances.

(2) From the foregoing and from Appendix 1, the United States cannot under present conditions require by force the ful-

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fillment of the treaty obligations of the Nine Power Pact, or even retain possession of Guam or the Philippines against seizure by Japan.

(3) Within the Limitation of Arms Treaty the United States can secure the Philippines against seizure by Japan, and by building up her fleet, can put herself in a position to support her policies in the Far East.

Note: If the Philippines be granted independence the guarantee of that independence by us is probable and would be in accord with our traditional policy. It is also probable that we would retain, by lease or otherwise, the right to use and to defend certain naval bases in the islands. Therefore, independence of the Philippines probably would not alter essentially our military position in the Western Pacific, however great the resulting economic disadvantages might be both to the United States and to the Philippines.

III

ACTION RECOMMENDED

1. Refrain from provocative attitude in regard to the situation in the Western Pacific until we are in a position to support our policies there, or until we have withdrawn completely from the Western Pacific leaving no hostage subject to the grasp of Japan.

2. If it is desired to support our policies and defend our possessions by force if necessary, secure the Philippines and build up the Navy (within treaty provisions) as outlined in Appendix 2.

3. Under the present conditions, in case of war with Japan, base the fleet in the Eastern Pacific in the initial stages and operate thereafter in accordance with the conclusions of Appendix 1.

D. Syant

Appendix 1.

SECRET

January, 1933.

ORANGE War under
Present Conditions

Condensed Estimate of the Situation

1. BLUE MISSION.

A summary of the general situation is contained in the foregoing study.

The BLUE Joint Army-Navy Mission has been determined to be the following:

"To gain and exercise control of ORANGE vital sea communications in order to isolate ORANGE."

Extensive studies through many years have led to the conclusion that the only practicable method of compelling ORANGE to defer to our policies is by the execution of the Mission quoted above. Many weeks would be required to follow these studies through. Suffice it to say that there is substantial agreement upon their results.

This Mission is the basis of this Estimate. The degree to which it is to be carried out depends upon the concept of the war as determined by the President from the underlying causes of the war and the policies which it is desired to establish. This concept of the war cannot be predicted with certainty. It will probably take this form:

"An offensive limited war, primarily naval, directed toward the isolation of ORANGE and the disruption of ORANGE economic life through control of ORANGE vital sea communications."

This or any other concept involving the sending of our Fleet to the Western Pacific would ^{entail?} require a very decided curtailment of ORANGE economic activity. This affords sufficient directive for this broad, condensed Estimate.

COMPARISON OF BLUE & ORANGE NAVIES AS OF 31 DEC. '32.

(Ratios are based on 5 as Treaty Allowance for BLUE.)

Type	Treaty Allowance	Total Completed Tonnage	Completed Tonnage Underage	Building or Appropriated	Additional to fill allowance *
BLUE	5	4.3	4.1		
Capital Ships	525,000	455,400	429,300	---	---
ORANGE	315,000	298,400	298,400	---	---
	3	2.8	2.8		
Carriers	5	2.9	2.9	13,800	55,200
	135,000	77,500#	77,500#	---	12,130
	81,000	68,870 ^x	68,870 ^x	---	
	3	2.6	2.6		
8" Cruisers	5	2.5	2.3	90,000	7,150
	180,000	90,200	82,850	---	600
	108,400	<u>123,520</u>	<u>107,800</u>	---	
	3	3.4	3.0		
6" Cruisers	5	2.5	2.5	---	73,000
	143,500	70,500	70,500	34,000	Excess 3,445
	100,450	<u>93,375</u>	<u>81,455</u>		
	3.5	3.2	2.8		
Destroyers	5	8.9	0.6	16,500	133,500
	150,000	267,470	16,560	16,536	10,029
	105,500	121,065	<u>92,385</u>		
	3.5	4.0	3.1		
Submarines	5	6.4	4.9	2,260	25,630
	52,700	67,790	51,290	11,700	Excess 11,272
	52,700	<u>77,842</u>	<u>76,408</u>		
	5	7.4	7.2		
Totals	5	4.3	3.05	122,560	1.2
	1,186,200	1,028,860#	728,000#	62,236	294,480
	763,050	783,072 ^x	725,318 ^x		22,759.5
	3.2	3.3	3.05		.09

*This column includes replacement tonnage which should be laid down in 1933.
 #Includes 15 kt. 11,500 ton LANGLEY - experimental, 19 yr. old) These may be
 x " 25 kt. 7,470 ton HOSHO - " , 11 yr. old) replaced at
) any time.

%Disregarding excess of 14,717.

2. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES.

The relative strength of BLUE and ORANGE has been analyzed in great detail in the studies referred to above. It will be considered here only broadly, and under two heads: in the Western Pacific, and in the Eastern Pacific.

In the passage of the BLUE Fleet with a large train across the Pacific, BLUE would suffer more severely than ORANGE. Subsequently, ORANGE with home base facilities close at hand would be able to have at all times, and particularly at any times selected by her, a larger proportion of her entire force ready for sea.

In order to control ORANGE vital sea communications BLUE must maintain superior strength in the critical areas.

This is impossible if we consider only total underage tonnage of which BLUE has 2,000 tons less than ORANGE (disregarding the experimental LANGLEY of 15 knots and HOSHO of 25 knots).

Considering underage tonnage, BLUE has roughly:

144%	of	ORANGE's	capital	ship	tonnage,
107%	"	"	carrier	"	" ,
77%	"	"	8" cruiser	"	" ,
87%	"	"	6" "	"	" ,
18%	"	"	destroyer	"	" ,
67%	"	"	submarine	"	" .

Considering total completed tonnage, BLUE has 246,000 tons more than ORANGE,

131%	of	ORANGE's	total	tonnage,		
153%	"	"	capital	ship	tonnage,	
113%	"	"	carrier	"	"	,
73%	"	"	8" cruiser	"	"	,
75%	"	"	6" " "	"	"	,
221%	"	"	destroyer	"	"	,
87%	"	"	submarine	"	"	.

These percentages differ substantially from those of underage tonnage in these respects:

- (1) ORANGE cruiser superiority is greater.
- (2) BLUE has more than double ORANGE destroyer tonnage.

BLUE's overage tonnage is	301,000 tons,
" superiority of total tonnage is	246,000 tons,
" obsolete World War destroyers total	251,000 tons.
" superiority of total tonnage is less than BLUE's ton-	

nage of obsolete World War destroyers.

The status of BLUE's 251 destroyers is as follows:

In commission, Fleet	59	
" " , Training Squadron	9	
" " , Special Service Squadron	<u>2</u>	70
In Rotating Reserve Commission		19
In commission, Asiatic Fleet	13	
Turned over to Coast Guard	<u>15</u>	28
Designated for targets	2	
Out of commission	<u>120</u>	122
Light minelayers in commission	4	
" " out of commission	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>
Grand total		<u>251</u>

14 of the above are under the treaty age limit.

34 were laid down before 1914, and displace 910 tons or less each.

96 have not been in commission since about 1922.

71, now out of commission, as well as all the light minelayers out of commission, are equipped with boilers of a certain type. In 1929 and 1930 all 54 destroyers then in commission with boilers of this type were stripped and stricken from the list because of weaknesses incident to service which had developed in most of their boilers. They were replaced, in general, by those believed to be the best of the destroyers then out of commission.

Some of the 120 destroyers out of commission could be made ready for service in 2 months. Most would require much longer,

and it is doubtful if all could be ready in 6 months.

From the point of view of attrition tactics in the passage of the BLUE Fleet across the Pacific BLUE destroyers would be of great value in defending large ships against night attacks. To accomplish this many would have to be stationed as pickets to warn of an approaching attack. If however the objective of the attack is the pickets themselves, the attacking light forces using star shell to develop and engage the picket line, withdrawing before adequate cruiser defense can be concentrated to oppose the attack then the losses of destroyers after several such attacks would be much greater for BLUE than for ORANGE. This is particularly true in view of the fact that all but ten of the 102 ORANGE destroyers are each superior in gun power, ship for ship, to each of ours by at least 35%, and these ten are each superior to each of ours by at least 10%.

The numerical superiority of BLUE destroyers could be utilized effectively only offensively against ORANGE capital ships. It is doubtful that these would hazard themselves near the BLUE Fleet in its passage across the Pacific. In other words, in the isolated engagements resulting from attrition tactics ORANGE would usually be able to bring superior gun power to the point of contact, and the tremendous torpedo attack power of BLUE destroyers would not be able to come into play effectively.

If the passage of the BLUE Fleet across the Pacific is to be successful the following factors require decided BLUE light force superiority:

- (1) Attrition tactics by ORANGE.
- (2) The necessity of guarding all sides of the large train against concentrated light force raids.
- (3) The necessity for conserving BLUE's small carrier superiority by refraining from free use of planes to beat off such attacks as are made by day.

Without decided light force superiority BLUE will be faced with gradual diminution of his screening light forces to the point where his capital ships, carriers and train will be most vulnerable to night torpedo attacks and where his battle line even though still superior would be at a tremendous disadvantage in a general engagement.

It seems certain that inadequate BLUE light forces would be available upon arrival in the Western Pacific.

Battleships alone cannot control ORANGE vital sea communications.

No estimate of relative strength in the Western Pacific can rightly fail to take account of the fact that there will be considerable light force attrition enroute, even though the amount of that attrition is properly a study which should be covered elsewhere.

In the Eastern Pacific, that is nearer Pearl Harbor than any substantial ORANGE base, BLUE with strength equal to ORANGE could meet ORANGE on terms of equality or superiority if BLUE is without a train. The difficult situation of cruiser inferiority would be

a question that the BLUE Commander-in-Chief would have to handle as best he could by his dispositions and battle plans. This cruiser inferiority would be less detrimental when cruising without a train than with one.

ORANGE without a base in the Eastern Pacific could not operate in that area except by occasional raids.

To sum up, BLUE not only lacks a real initial superiority, but she has in the Western Pacific no base which is either secure or possessed of adequate repair facilities.

3. ORANGE PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

ORANGE Mission.

Since we are less familiar with the probable ORANGE concept of the war than with our own, we shall first examine ORANGE's fundamental national Mission.

The continuing policies behind ORANGE's Twenty-One Demands of 1915, as evidenced by her present occupation of Manchuria, are directed toward the military, political and economic domination of China. China's markets and raw materials are necessary for ORANGE's aims of industrial and political expansion. Dominance in the Far East is essential to this program.

BLUE's Far East possessions, coupled with her traditional attitude on the Open Door and the integrity of China, constitute an ever present challenge, and the only serious one, to ORANGE dominance in the Far East.

The ORANGE national Mission must be:

"To secure definite dominance in the Far East in order to further ORANGE industrial and political expansion."

Both Russia and Great Britain are now too seriously involved in internal difficulties to give serious opposition to ORANGE in the Far East. Broadly then, the task for which the ORANGE nation is at war is:

"To terminate BLUE's influence and potential power in the Western Pacific in order to secure definite dominance in the Far East."

Courses of Action Open to the ORANGE Nation.

(1) To drive BLUE from Guam and the Philippines; to consolidate ORANGE positions; and to rest then upon the strategical defensive ready to take the tactical offensive under most favorable circumstances should BLUE enter the Western Pacific,

or (2) To drive BLUE from Guam and the Philippines; to consolidate ORANGE positions; to project air, cruiser, and submarine raids outside the Western Pacific; and to concentrate against the BLUE Fleet when it has been sufficiently reduced in strength to insure ORANGE success.

*to carry a base in the
Blue area? W.P.*

The choice between these courses of action determines the ORANGE concept of the war. The question is whether BLUE's influence and potential power in the Western Pacific can be terminated without decisive destruction of the BLUE Fleet. ORANGE must consider whether BLUE, with her Fleet destroyed, might not be goaded to the extreme measure of a long determined fight to the finish; whether BLUE might not find but little internal unity in support of a war solely, in the view of many, to regain Guam and the Philippines, her activities in other parts of the world having been unmolested.

We cannot be certain which of these courses will govern, but it seems clear that the second, involving operations far from ORANGE bases and wide separation of her naval strength, would subject ORANGE to greater likelihood of defeat. Of course the question of alliances, both with BLUE and ORANGE, must have important influence on this question, but of these little can be predicted

with confidence, and the basic conflict between the two nations most vitally concerned must furnish the source of our initial deductions.

ORANGE is able to prosecute a short war. Her situation as regards finances and raw material makes it likely that she will wish to avoid a long war. Unless ORANGE receives great help from Allies, which seems unlikely, we can feel sure that for this step in her expansion she will be content with consolidating her position in the Far East and will refrain from overextending her strength beyond the Western Pacific by other than small diversions.

We then conclude that the ORANGE concept of the war is somewhat as follows:

"A limited war directed toward the seizure of BLUE possessions in the Western Pacific and the consolidation of ORANGE position in that area."

The Mission assigned the Military-naval forces then becomes:

"To seize Guam and the Philippines and to harass and nullify the BLUE Fleet should it enter the Western Pacific, in order to terminate BLUE's influence and potential power in the Western Pacific."

Courses of Action Open to ORANGE Naval-Military Forces.

Only two courses of action are available. They differ only in the order in which the two tasks of the Mission are undertaken. Selection between them depends upon the practicability of seizing Guam and the Philippines without such naval losses as to jeopardize effective opposition to the BLUE Fleet should it enter the Western Pacific.

The prompt securing of the tangible objects of the war is desirable

(1) for the moral effect at home and throughout the world,

(2) because delay may result in increased defenses to overcome,

(3) because defenses should be established at the earliest time to deny BLUE a base in the Western Pacific.

Consideration of the defenses of Guam and the Philippines and of BLUE naval forces in the Western Pacific leads to the conclusion that ORANGE will have decided that she can master them all without suffering serious naval losses, well before the BLUE Fleet could arrive, even from Honolulu.

ORANGE Probable Intentions.

We shall assume that ORANGE will undertake the tasks of her Mission in the order named.

In the course of these tasks it is probable that ORANGE will take many of the following steps:

(1) Destruction of BLUE Asiatic Fleet without the warning of a declaration of war.

(2) Elaborate statements to the world to the effect that ORANGE motives are purely defensive and in support of an ORANGE "Monroe Doctrine" designed to promote peace and prosperity in the Orient and to further the self-determination of peoples such as the Filipinos who will probably be granted prompt independence un-

der ORANGE protection made possible by the establishment of ORANGE bases in the Philippines.

(3) A time most favorable to ORANGE will be chosen, probably between early winter and late spring -- the period best suited for landing operations in the Philippines, or a time when a substantial part of the BLUE Fleet is in North Atlantic waters.

(4) Attempts to obstruct the Panama Canal coincident with the initial steps in the Orient.

(5) Prompt invasion of Luzon and a sufficiently strong attack upon Manila to ensure its fall within a month. Much of ORANGE merchant marine has been inactive during the depression, yet she has recently made repeated purchases of old merchant ships from other countries. Extensive preparations for transporting troops and their heavy equipment may have been made in many of these inactive ships.

(6) Prompt seizure of Guam.

(7) Establishment of defenses to deny BLUE all practicable fleet bases in the Western Pacific.

(8) Establishment of auxiliary bases in the Mandate Islands, some of which have recent harbor improvements, to facilitate the operations of shore based planes and submarines against the earliest stages of BLUE's advance west of the Hawaiian Islands.

(9) A few commerce raiders in the Atlantic to divert the much larger BLUE force necessary for their capture and as a source of success propaganda for consumption both at home and throughout the world.

(10) A few submarines off Balboa and BLUE west coast ports operating only against combatant ships, and a few off Pearl Harbor for scouting purposes and attacks on large combatant ships if favorable opportunities present.

(11) Carefully planned attrition tactics executed with both boldness and wise restraint against BLUE Fleet should it enter the Western Pacific.

(12) Concentration on the main objective (the BLUE Fleet if it enter the Western Pacific) in spite of such BLUE diversions as air raids on ORANGE home territory.

(13) Decisive engagement of the BLUE Fleet when attrition tactics, in the air, on the surface, and under the surface, shall have reduced it to clear inferiority.

(14) Vigorous submarine operations against BLUE large combatant ships and Fleet Train.

(15) Air operations against any base BLUE may establish. ORANGE possesses more military aircraft than BLUE.

(16) Operations to prevent supplies reaching any base BLUE may establish.

(17) Conciliatory attitudes towards China and Russia.

4. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE.

BLUE Mission.

"To gain and exercise control of ORANGE vital sea communications in order to isolate ORANGE."

Clearly this involves establishment, maintenance, and effective operations of superior naval strength in the critical area near ORANGE home territory.

Possible Courses of Action.

A base in the Hawaiian Islands or the Aleutian Islands would be too remote to permit more than occasional control of ORANGE vital sea communications.

There are two courses of action open to BLUE:

- (1) To establish the Fleet in the Western Pacific as soon as possible and operate against ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE commerce,
- or, (2) To augment the Fleet and its means of maintenance; then to establish it in the Western Pacific and operate against ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE commerce.

Course (1) -- (BLUE Fleet to the Western Pacific as soon as possible.)

Advantages:

- (a) Minimum time would be permitted ORANGE to fortify possible BLUE Fleet bases.
- (b) The prompt vigorous offensive, if practicable, is usually the quickest way to end a war favorably, and the cheapest both in

lives and in dollars.

(c) ORANGE's initial steps would probably outrage preponderant world opinion. Prompt termination of the war would permit minimum time for such sentiment to be changed. The longer a situation exists, such as ORANGE occupation of the Philippines and Guam, the more ready is the world to accept it.

Disadvantages:

(a) Continued operations near the home bases of an enemy, if they are to be successful, require a very decided superiority to that enemy in every point of naval strength. Instead of such decided superiority, decided inferiority exists in many essential respects, and we are entirely without the special types necessary for the Train which such operations would require.

(b) Manila, as at present defended, would fall before the BLUE Fleet could arrive. The best opinion believes Manila could not resist determined attack for thirty days. Manila is over 20 days steady steaming from Honolulu by the shortest route at the best speed of our present Train. Overwhelming submarine forces could be massed along the track of a Fleet which held to the shortest route. Two BLUE battleships are now in east coast yards and one is in a west coast yard, undergoing modernization. A Train of sufficient size could not be ready to leave Honolulu in ten days.

(c) The force specially trained for seizing and defending an advanced fleet base, the Marine Corps, is of inadequate size and

lacks equipment essential for such an operation.

(d) Mobile means for effecting underwater overhaul and repairs to large ships, other than floating drydocks which cannot be moved as fast as 5 knots, have not been developed. In the Philippines is one drydock, the floating DEWEY, too small for our large cruisers.

Course (2) -- (BLUE Fleet first to be augmented.)

Advantages:

(a) It makes success practically certain provided the war effort is maintained through the period of at least three years which would be required before the Fleet could start for the Western Pacific.

Disadvantages:

(a) Ample time is allowed ORANGE to fortify possible BLUE Fleet bases.

(b) Our trade to the Orient must be abandoned during the period of preparation.

(c) Our trade elsewhere is subject to interference unless convoyed.

(d) A larger, more costly Fleet, and a larger force to seize bases would be required to accomplish our Mission three years after the commencement of the war than would be necessary at its inception.

(e) Ample time is allowed for the world and for such of our own people as are lukewarm to the war to become used to the idea

of ORANGE control of the Philippines and Guam and definite ORANGE dominance in the Far East.

(f) Before three years the economic strain would undoubtedly move ORANGE to yield to the ever present universal demand for peace and agree to cease hostilities under some such basis as this:

- (1) The Philippines to be independent.
- (2) Guam to be neutralized under the League of Nations.
- (3) Re-acceptance by ORANGE of the Open Door Policy.
- (4) Acceptance by BLUE of an ORANGE "Monroe Doctrine".

Great pressure would be brought upon our government to accept these terms. It is conceivable that they might be accepted.

This would result in a repetition of ORANGE's oft-repeated process of acquiring something, yielding part of it, consolidating and recuperating until ready for the next step. In later years ORANGE would not find it difficult to discover convenient cause for intervention in the Philippines to maintain order, and out of that situation the Philippines might easily become another Korea.

It is believed that the general welfare of the people of this nation and incidentally of the people of the world, would suffer by such an outcome, *and our direct trade with China would cease.*

Selection of Course of Action.

Success under Course (1) is not only uncertain but is actually unlikely. The grave and far reaching consequences that might follow the decisive defeat of the BLUE Fleet force the adoption of

course (2) in spite of its disadvantages.

5. DECISION.

"To augment the Fleet and its means of maintenance; then to establish it in the Western Pacific and operate against ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE commerce in order to gain and exercise control of ORANGE vital sea communications."

6. SUPPORTING MEASURES.

In the execution of this decision it is probable that many of the following steps would be taken:

(1) Vigorous and immediate legal interference with ORANGE trade:

(a) Commerce raiding in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean by surface craft of the Asiatic Fleet, falling back to base on tankers at sea and Samoa.

Why Samoa - no defenses there -

(b) Later commerce raiding in the Indian Ocean by specially designed 40-knot small cruisers equipped with planes based on tankers at sea and Samoa.

(c) Commerce raiding along the Alaska-Australia line by small craft based at first on Samoa, Pearl Harbor and Alaska.

(d) Establishment of the "Kirkwall Practice" as may be feasible.

(2) Operation of Asiatic Fleet submarines against forces invading the Philippines and against ORANGE combatant ships, followed

by their retirement to base on Pearl Harbor.

(3) Enlargement of Pearl Harbor to accommodate the Fleet, and establishment of the Fleet there to increase the security of the Hawaiian Islands, to render hazardous any operations against our West Coast or the Panama Canal, and to support operations against ORANGE commerce along the Alaska-Australia line.

(4) Offensive operations against ORANGE commerce raiders outside the Western Pacific.

(5) Increase of local defense forces, both air and surface, in the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, the West Coast, and the Canal Zone.

(6) Operation of old, short radius submarines off the Hawaiian Islands, San Francisco, San Pedro, and Balboa.

(7) Operation of some long radius submarines against ORANGE combatant ships in the Western Pacific.

(8) Retention of some long radius submarines with the Fleet.

(9) Raids against ORANGE advanced bases in the Eastern Mandate Islands.

(10) If favorable opportunities present, raids against ORANGE bases further west.

(11) Construction of a fleet at least 60% superior to the fleet ORANGE could have by the time of its completion.

(12) Construction of an adequate 20-knot Train including:

(a) Development of mobile means to effect underwater overhaul and repairs.

(b) Construction of adequate transports with necessary

special equipment for landing against opposition.

(13) Increase of the Marine Corps.

(14) Thorough education of the people of this country in the benefits of foreign trade and in the fact that the underlying cause of the war is our insistence upon equal trade opportunity with the four hundred million people of backward but awakening China.

When an adequate Fleet and adequate auxiliaries are ready:

(15) Seizure of ORANGE bases in the Eastern and Central Mandate Islands, and establishment of BLUE auxiliary bases.

(16) Projection of the Fleet westward coincident with the establishment of bases.

(17) Seizure of a principal advanced base or bases in the Western Pacific. The Western Mandate Islands are nearer Japan than are the Southern Philippines. ORANGE air power can be brought against the Western Mandates effectively only through floating means. If ORANGE holds Luzon, ORANGE Army air forces can rapidly step down from the home country to any base in the Southern Philippines. Unless developments of the war hold the greater part of ORANGE air power at home, the Fleet's base will probably be located in the Western Mandates secure from effective bombing by ORANGE shore based aircraft.

(18) Operations against ORANGE vital sea communications.

(19) As far as practicable, interference with the activities of ORANGE outlying bases but not seizure of those which are strongly held.

Appendix 2.

SECRET

Subject: Requirements for support of our Far East Policies.

I

The Study Presented

The Estimate of the Situation in Appendix 1 indicates that at the present time we are unable to support our Far East policies or even to hold the Philippines against invasion.

This is a study of the means, within treaty provisions, by which we can effectively support our Far East policies.

II

Facts Bearing Upon the Study

1. Fundamental requirements.

In order to support our policies in the Far East our Fleet must be able to operate in that area. This depends upon three requirements:

- (a) A secure base in the Hawaiian Islands,
- (b) A secure base in the Western Pacific,
- (c) A Fleet of such strength and with such repair facilities that it can arrive and be maintained in the Western Pacific superior to the ORANGE Fleet.

2. Bases.

- (a) A secure base in the Hawaiian Islands.

The best anchorage in the Hawaiian Islands for our entire Fleet is the open roadstead off Lahaina. It is not suitable for effecting repairs. It is poorly suited for overhaul, provisioning, or fueling, and even a limited amount of boating is sometimes almost impossible. Adequate protection against underwater attack would be most difficult and most expensive.

Pearl Harbor in Oahu is well defended and is provided with a large drydock and some repair facilities. But until funds are available for further removal of coral from the harbor it can accommodate only a small portion of our Fleet.

A naval anchorage could be cleared in Kaneohe Bay on the East side of Oahu at no great cost but it would require large Army expenditures for its defense.

(b) A secure base in the Western Pacific.

Manila Bay would answer the requirement for a secure and sheltered anchorage with convenient labor resources. It could be made untenable if strong enemy aviation activities were established in Luzon. Since it has very meager repair facilities and none at all for large ships, these would have to accompany the Fleet. Increases there of facilities for shipping and aviation represent corresponding increases in the naval value of the port and should be encouraged by all appropriate government agencies. *This - provided Luzon is secured.*

Whether or not enemy operations render it inadvisable to occupy Manila Bay, other bases should be available.

Strategic studies show that a base north of Luzon, such as Nimrod Sound, could not be held by our Fleet in the initial stages of a campaign. If a base farther south is selected the importance of our holding Manila Bay securely is evident.

There are in the Southern Philippines four practicable fleet anchorages. One in particular could be effectively defended and is favorably located. Its harbor is excellent; it is below the typhoon belt; its communications to the south could be protected.

None of these four anchorages in the Southern Philippines has any base facilities. These, to a considerable extent, would have to accompany the Fleet.

3. Base defenses.

Lahaina Roads is undefended and would be most difficult to defend.

Pearl Harbor is securely defended.

Manila Bay can be kept available for the Fleet by preventing an invasion of Luzon. Army forces of about 75,000, with attached aircraft, could probably hold Luzon for an extended period. About 12,000 are now assigned, more than half of which are native constabulary. Present fortifications could probably prevent the entrance of surface craft into the Bay. Adequate underwater defense could be provided without great difficulty.

None of the four anchorages in the Southern Philippines may be fortified in time of peace. Their defense in time of war would have to be provided for by the forces afloat. Special floating equipment for this purpose and an increased force of Marines in the Philippines, as well as any base facilities that could be assembled afloat by the C-in-C Asiatic Fleet, might make the task of the U.S. Fleet correspondingly less difficult. The organization and arming of Moros would render the defense of these bases more secure. In an Army study it was estimated that 100,000 Moros suitable for this purpose could be obtained.

Assignment of a large part of our Submarine Force to the Philippines would greatly add to their security. These submarines should be based on tenders, operated normally in different localities under unpredictable schedules, and anchored secure from surprise attack even with BLUE-ORANGE tension at a minimum.

Tender based seaplanes are of no use to the Fleet in its movement across the Pacific and should be assigned in large numbers and operated throughout the islands in time of peace.

Advantage should be taken of situations such as Moro troubles and the recent sending of troops to Shanghai for gradual and unobtrusive increases of our strength in the Philippines. Relief of men discharged or sent home sick should be in excess of losses.

4. The Fleet.

In the World War Great Britain could maintain about two-thirds of her Fleet in battle readiness,- this with all the repair facilities of a home country and fully equipped bases.

Our Fleet even with greatly increased commercial repair facilities at Manila would have to depend primarily on repair ships of the Fleet.

We could not expect to maintain more than two-thirds of our Fleet in war readiness. Japan ^{selected} on ^{for a short interval} occasions could have all of her Fleet in war readiness for a raid. If we could arrive in the Western Pacific with a 5 - 3 ratio of superiority in naval strength we could maintain 2/3 of 5 or a 3-1/3 ratio. In addition various ships would be guarding lines of communication for protection of our own and interception of Japanese supplies. We might well have to meet Japan at or somewhat below parity. It is therefore essential that we build the Navy fully up to the Treaty limit with no overage ships.

In addition our Fleet must have the auxiliaries necessary for

its maintenance and for the transportation and efficient landing of the specially trained Marine Corps Expeditionary Force for the seizure and defense of a base. It has been repeatedly demonstrated in games at the War College that a slow moving Fleet would suffer severe attrition in crossing the Pacific; and that the attrition would diminish as the speed of the Fleet was increased.

The number of auxiliaries of not over 20 knot speed is unlimited by treaty. All auxiliaries should therefore be built for 20 knots sustained speed. This speed would not normally be used due to high fuel consumption but could be used in an emergency. With considerable under water damage a 20 knot ship could maintain 15 knots.

5. Combatant ship building requirements.

In order to fill her treaty allowance by 1936, BLUE would have to lay down during 1933, in addition to all tonnage now appropriated for, these amounts:

Aircraft carriers	55,200 tons
6" Cruisers	73,000 "
Destroyers (in 1933-34)	133,500 "
Submarines	<u>25,630</u> "
Total	287,330 "
On the same basis, ORANGE total	22,759 "

Whether or not the proportions of tonnage allowed the various types are most advantageous to us, those proportions are fixed by treaty, with certain minor exceptions, ~~and~~ it seems clear that each type is essential as long as other navies include ships of that type; that sea power can be exercised most effectively by strong ships of long radius; and that the task of exercising our sea power in the Western Pacific would not be easy even with all our allowed combatant strength and a large, fast, modern train.

In modern completed tonnage (disregarding the experimental LANGLEY and HOSHO) BLUE on 31 Dec. '32 was 2,168 tons below ORANGE. Instead of the 5/3.2 treaty ratio (changed from 5/3 by the London Treaty of 1930) this ratio is 3.0/3.0. If all BLUE and ORANGE tonnage now building or appropriated for had been completed on 31 Dec. '32 this ratio would have been 3.3/3.1.

Three recent articles written from the civilian standpoint indicate clear understanding of BLUE's need for a strong navy. They are "Why a Navy?" in the Saturday Evening Post of 21 Jan. '33, "America's Policies in the Pacific: Two New Moves" in the New York Times of 22 Jan. '33, and "The U.S.: A Self-Contained Nation?" in Fortune of Mar. '33.

6. Auxiliary ship building requirements.

In order to maintain itself in the Western Pacific the Fleet must take with it a Train containing:

- (a) An advanced base defense force, with necessary planes, specially trained and equipped for landing against op-

position, adequate to seize if necessary, and to defend a base in the Southern Philippines.

Seizure and defense of an advanced base for the Fleet is the primary Mission of our Marine Corps. This Mission guides its study, training, equipment and organization. Its present size is inadequate. It lacks essential, new equipment which exists only in test quantities.

(b) Transports suitable for efficient landing of troops and their equipment, with necessary armored boats of special design.

(c) Facilities for underwater repairs and routine bottom cleaning for ships of all types.

In the Philippines is only one drydock (the floating "DEWEY"), too small for our large cruisers. Underwater damage would certainly be sustained in a war time movement of our Fleet across the Pacific. Methods of carrying out extensive underwater repairs and routine bottom cleaning without drydocks are believed feasible. Funds have not been available to develop these methods.

(d) A speed of 20 knots.

A few of the ships necessary could be improvised from ships in our Merchant Marine. Most of them could not be improvised and should be maintained by the Navy at all times. Our Navy has not a single ship suitable for such a Train.

The announcement of the detailed characteristics of the ships which should comprise such a Train will undoubtedly be withheld until their construction is undertaken.

7. Conclusions.

(1) Adequate base sites for the exercise of our sea power in

the Western Pacific are available, but have inadequate facilities.

(2) The Philippines can be securely defended without violating existing Treaties.

(3) Combatant ships, adequate to support our Far East policies can be built without violating existing Treaties.

(4) An adequate force of Fleet Auxiliaries can be built without violating existing Treaties.

(5) An adequate Fleet with adequate bases can effectively support our Far East Policies.

III

Action Recommended

If our Far East policies are to be effectively supported *all* these steps should be undertaken:

- (1) Increase anchorage area in Pearl Harbor in accordance with present plans.
- (2) Increase Army forces in the Philippines to secure Luzon for six months.
- (3) Increase strength of Marine Corps forces and special floating base defense equipment in the Philippines as necessary to defend a base in the Southern Philippines.
- (4) Increase commercial shipping facilities in the Philippines.
- (5) Increase submarines and tender based seaplanes assigned to Asiatic Station.
- (6) Build Navy up to Treaty limit.
- (7) Build an adequate force of Fleet Auxiliaries, with special emphasis on facilities for underwater repairs. *Dry dock?*
- (8) Increase strength of Marine Corps and its equipment to provide an Advanced Base Defense Force adequate to seize and defend a base in the Southern Philippines.

Send to Captain A. Stetson U.S.A.
Office of Chief Coordinator
Room 5026 Interior Bldg.
Washington
D.C.

Dear Stetson:

As Blue Orange Study
enclosed.

Will you comment on it
and write on appendix 3.

The object of this is to give
to Sec. State, President, or other
civilian. It must be short.

The Study itself is 10 pages
long.

Appendix 1 is a brief Estimate
in case of Char today.

Appendix 2 is what we need to
carry out our policies.

Appendix 3 is an Estimate based
on completed preparations as outlined in
~~appendix~~ appendix 2. Very sincerely yours
R. H. Wood

App. 3

Written by
Agrowth,

An outline for App. 3
given to me by an officer here - return
this with your estimate.
14.

ORANGE WAR

Under Present Conditions except that the
measures recommended in Appendix 2 are
assumed to have been accomplished.

Estimate of the Situation

General Situation

The measures recommended in Appendix 2, now assumed to have been accomplished, would render an ORANGE war extremely unlikely.

We must assume that improbability of financial success in China has so threatened the military in their control of the ORANGE government that they desperately require a tangible accomplishment to cover abandonment of their efforts to control a considerable part of China's markets.

We must assume that acquirement of the Philippines and termination of BLUE's influence in the Western Pacific have been selected as tasks which will firmly unite the ORANGE nation, and which if accomplished will leave the ORANGE people willing to live with tightened belts for the lean years of recuperation which must follow.

1. BLUE Mission.

BLUE's Mission of Appendix 1 is unchanged:

"To gain and exercise control of ORANGE vital sea communications in order to isolate ORANGE."

BLUE's concept of the war is also unchanged:

"An offensive limited war, primarily naval, directed toward the isolation of ORANGE and the disruption of ORANGE economic life through control of ORANGE vital sea communications."

2. Relative Strength of Opposing Forces.

We assume:

- (a) BLUE and ORANGE Fleets at Treaty allowances.
- (b) Present excess of ORANGE submarines not diminished.
- (c) For BLUE, an adequate 20 kt. Train, including:
 - (1) adequate underwater repair facilities,
 - (2) an adequate Advanced Base Defense Force.
- (d) For ORANGE, a similarly adequate Train and an equally well developed Advanced Base Defense Force.
- (e) Adequate Fleet anchorage in Pearl Harbor.
- (f) Luzon secure for 6 months.
- (g) In the Philippines, floating base defense equipment and a Marine Corps unit for the defense of a base in the Southern Philippines.
- (h) In the Philippines:
 - ARGONAUT and Subdivs 7, 8, 10, 14 (1 SM, 23 SS),
 - at least 24 VP, 24 VT (tender based).

Some of the factors which are or may be made available to

BLUE:

(1) Military - naval.

(see later pages)

(2) Diplomatic.

(a) Acquirement of allies and benevolence of neutrals.

(b) Acceptance by neutrals available to ORANGE trade of a "Kirkwall Practice" and quota restrictions upon their imports.

Purpose: To restrict ORANGE's sources of raw materials.
To increase her dependence on own shipping.
To secure military - naval assistance (both active and through use of bases and other facilities).

For barter: BLUE's tremendous purchasing power.

Prospect of BLUE joining League of Nations.

(3) Economic (see later pages).

(4) Propaganda (see later pages).

(1) Military - Naval.

Note: Letters assigned for identification
and without regard to order in which
operations could be undertaken, if ever.

A - Blockade along Unalaska, Midway, New Guinea line.

On station: 187 scouts, distance 25 miles.

Out and In - maintaining a line constantly
shifted to prevent enemy predicting exact location
of ships.

12 XCVs, with a few scouts and enough
bombers to ^{deploy} dispatch 2 CAs, backing up line, each
assigned a 360 mile front; Midway and Unalaska based
planes taking about 100 miles in each direction (All
Army planes and Army pilots).

24 ODDs, two to each XCV - as plane guards
and for use in transferring prize crews.

Off station: 50%, or

94 scouts

6 XCVs

12 ODDs

Bases: Unalaska, Midway and a base in Marshall Is.

Support: 6 fast XCLs against cruisers or carriers.

5 divisions ODDs with latest listening equipment against submarines.

SECRET

Washington, D. C.
May 31, 1933

Dear Koch:

Your paper is generally excellent and in the comments which follow I don't want to be misunderstood as I may be mistaken about the purpose you desire it to serve. Under the belief that it is a study to be used at the College for instruction purposes and not necessarily a plan for use in war, I am venturing to express myself quite frankly.

In my opinion a study for the instruction of officers who may some day have to make a plan under which the war is fought should be very broad in scope, complete in the discussion of factors bearing upon it, and as definite as it is wise to be on the various situations which can be visualized. With this idea in mind I will proceed with the comments in the hope that some may serve to improve your effort.

General Wood used to open many of his preparedness talks with the statement that no nation can long exist unless its leaders have vision. Platitudinous as that statement may be, its obvious truth must never be forgotten.

As I understand the color designations, Orange means the Japanese Empire and all the resources at her command including those of her friends, Blue, the same thing for the United States. Accordingly, any Orange-Blue study should encompass adequate discussion of all factors bearing on their respective war-making powers and how each may use them most effectively towards breaking the will of its assumed enemy. This, your study does not appear to do. *Advanced course -*

With modern wars contemplating the use of every effective man, woman and child in a battle station, the most telling blows may well be struck by those armed only with economic or financial weapons, especially against a nation whose communications with other nations are so vital to her. There are many people who visualize future wars, initiated by one major power against another, as soon developing into a world-wide conflagration, with neutrality no longer in style. The experience of the last war and the trend of developments in world politics since then have lent much in support of such a view. Accordingly, I think your study should be made from a much broader viewpoint, for in all probability any Orange-Blue war in the near future might well involve other powers.

Now that our Navy has been reduced below the point which many naval officers consider necessary to support our national policies, what are we doing about it? Are we substituting the strength of other navies for what we have lost; are we taking steps to preserve the "spirit" of the Navy - something more important even than ships; are our policies being revised to fit the present strength of our Navy; or are we drifting alone into perilous waters?

It seems to me that our far eastern policies together with our published intentions to rely on world public opinion rather than force to support our policies has greatly weakened, if not destroyed our prestige in the Far East. *yes*

The Open Door Policy enunciated a generation or more ago has become an American shibboleth which probably fools few besides ourselves. With the present state of Japan's industrial development and her proximity to China, there is no reason for Japan to give it much thought at the present time. The controlling elements in trade are cost of production, insurance, and freight. Tariffs, boycotts, and the like are temporary and transient expedients to which there is an answer. He who puts on the doorstep of Mr. Ultimate Consumer what he wants at the best price is going to get the bulk of his business in the long run. By juggling the exchange, Japan has been able to do this with many articles even in our own country in spite of our tariff wall. Why should she unnecessarily involve herself over attempting to close the door in China?

I am in full accord with the opinion expressed last year at the Army War College by General Connor that the worst thing a victorious enemy could say about his defeated adversary would be that he was stupid. In the words of Henderson; after the statesmen have gotten their policies into an inextricable tangle they then call on the general with such soldiers as he may happen to have at the time to draw the sword and cut the Gordian knot. The cost of such a war as your study visualizes would be stupendous, with small chance that success would be achieved before the war spirit of our nationals broke under its load. If our statesmen do get the Nation into a stupid war it should only be with full knowledge of the picture as the responsible military advisers see it. A heavy duty rests upon them to keep their responsible statesmen fully advised. The picture must be made as clear to them as it is possible to make it. No brief summary will suffice. If, however, in spite of this advice the military advisers find themselves in a war of such tremendous moment their consciences are clear and they will of course carry on to the best of their ability. But an abiding faith in the righteousness of their cause, an understanding of the objective sought, how it is proposed to attain it, and a conviction that it can be done with the tools provided, are quite necessary. It is apparent, therefore, that any color study should contain an accurate and complete consideration of all such matters, including the facilities, both foreign and domestic, which can be made available to assist the Blue Navy.

As to the political history, Orange's intentions are pretty well indicated by a recital of her international transactions since 1895. Her formal promise not to annex Korea, her violation of the 1922 Treaties, and the danger of reliance of her treaty commitments and promises should not be omitted. Such a recital should give a good picture of her political aspirations, and, whether or not the Tanaka Memorial is spurious, Orange is running pretty true to it. On the other hand, the policies of Blue since the acquisition of the Philippines injected us into far eastern politics as an Asiatic power, are matters which deserve similar treatment. The political discussion of the two nations should culminate in a terse statement of their conflicting policies of today which might result in war.

Another criticism of your study is the absence of any consideration of how the financial, economic and propoganda resources of Blue and her friends could be used in neutral countries for this "limited war primarily naval."

Orange has a powerful, strategic position. I can not conceive of how Blue Navy could possibly force her into a major naval action except on Orange's own terms even assuming that we could build up in three years to a 60 per cent superiority. If Orange gets away with her present venture in China she will become strategically independent of the rest of the world from which position no one nation alone can dislodge her. Russia and England are our natural allies for disrupting Orange's economic life through control of her vital communications. In the absence of such aid how is our Navy going to do it? Your estimate is given over largely to the old familiar march across the Pacific but does not impress as adequate in its provisions as to what we are to do when we get there. What do you assume Orange will be doing during the three years we are building a fleet? Can't she build almost as fast as we can? Will Orange take Guam and the Philippines, and what will we do, when we get into the Western Pacific, if she does? Assumptions must be made as to what courses of action Orange will take that will give us the most concern and what measures we should take to overcome them. Cervera and Rodjesvidsky both crossed the ocean but neither accomplished anything towards the disruption of the economic life of their enemies. Australia and Holland as well as England and Russia would be very useful to us. What are we doing towards enlisting their help?

It seems to me that the trend of developments in the United States since the World War culminating in our recent economy measures toward the Navy have pretty clearly indicated that such a mission as you assign the Navy will not be required of us under conditions as they exist today. However, if a study of such a venture is made, the picture should be complete and much deeper inquiry into

all factors bearing on it should be made. Such a study would serve a very useful purpose in preparing officers both for the making of a war plan and for executing it if we are ever called upon to do so.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Always yours faithfully,

D. Statur

1 Enc.

Captain R. A. Koch, USN,
Naval War College,
Newport, R. I.

Naval War College

Newport, R.I.

April 3, 1933

*File this
Confidential
for reference
-

Memorandum for Chief of Staff.

Subject: The Position of the United States in the Far East.

Reference: (a) Estimate of the Situation by Captain Koch.

1. After a study and analysis of reference (a) which presents the Far Eastern picture more clearly than I have ever seen it before, the following notes are submitted for your consideration:

(a) Facts bearing upon the study. We must not forget that the United States position in the Far East and in the Pacific has been an advancing one since the days of Perry's expedition. Our interest in Japan and China, even though we have accomplished much through the Navy, Missionaries and commerce, has since the Civil War brought envy to Japan. When we began to build up our Navy in the 80's and early 90's Japan resented our efforts in Hawaii. After the Spanish War in 1898 she could see possible chances of attempting to dominate the Far Eastern situation, And, coming along to the days of John Hay and the Open Door policy after the turn of the century, she was glad to get into the Russian War and show her desire for Manchuria. At this period, and especially due to the feeling of resentment against President Roosevelt for the apparent advantage which the Russians gained in the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese people began to be inflamed over our superior attitude. While we mention these diplomatic sore spots, there remains the great one which then and now is in my opinion the real sore spot of the American-Japanese feud - and that is, the United States refusal to admit Japanese citizens to have the same rights in our country as visitors that are accorded or were accorded to the lowest order of citizens of the most decrepit nations of Europe. It is useless to camouflage this subject by any diplomatic or economic smoke screens, and as an officer recently expressed it upon his return from the Far East, the subject is "taboo."

Along this line it is interesting to quote what Baron Matsuoka said in the New York Times of April 2, 1933: "I do not like to say there is a prejudice among you. But I think you will agree with me when I say that there exists a widespread distrust. And we may have given you some cause for it." From this visitor to our shores this statement is more of a threat than a promise.

Added to the other facts which are brought out in reference (a) may also be added the former paternal feeling which the United States used to have for Japan, even to the extent of having a Japanese Cadet at the Naval Academy up to 1900. It is probable that since that time the feeling has gradually become worse between the two nations, and it is believed the facts of the case in the State Department, and known to the President of the United States, were that over the immigration question (the continuous sore spot) Japan was ready to declare war against the United States in 1907-8; again in 1912-13; in 1916-17; in 1921; and finally in the Spring of 1932. It is barely possible also that her real war plan was close from October 1932 to the present time. We realize that this feud between the United States and Japan, like a family feud in Kentucky or like any feud which exists in business or in any community, must come to a head, and in coming to a head the real question at issue must not and cannot be passed into other phases of the situation. The above points, it is believed, should be mentioned under Historical Background.

(b) Under Conflicting policies, it would appear that some others should be mentioned besides those quoted from the Twenty One Demands.

(c) Under Security of policies, it is certainly a fact that Japan is prepared to use force in the Far East. This statement is more than confirmed by the present written statements and radio addresses of the former Japanese delegate to Geneva. And added to this must be considered the statement of Count Sforza, former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Fear has again seized the world as it did in the four or five years leading up to 1914," and after mentioning the new machinery of the new war, possibly poison gas, new aviation developments, or noiseless cannons, he further states: "Wars of the future will commence without formal declaration."

With these thoughts in mind, it would appear certain that most nations expect a war between Japan and the United States in the not distant future, and this subject also is taboo in the Far East at the present time. Therefore, on the assumption that a war may be forced upon us, it may be taken for granted that there are sufficient smoldering embers in the United States-Japanese fireplace just awaiting for the conflagration.

Commenting upon the strength of the Philippines as quoted from reference (a), par. 4, "if maintained secure against invasion *** especially providing we maintain our Naval Ratio," I cannot concur that this is possible. In my opinion the Philippines is always potentially a source of weakness to the United States for two reasons: first, that their geographic location and present position in the diplomatic vortex of the Far East make

them both impossible and impracticable of security; and second that maintaining our naval ratio according to the London Treaty does not and would not guarantee, under any circumstances, security to the Philippines. Whether we adopt an aggressive policy in the Far East and attempt to strengthen the Philippines and build up one hundred per cent to the London Treaty Navy, I believe we are not much better off in the end than we are now. Therefore, as referring to the strength and weakness as mentioned in reference (a), I believe that our grand strategy in the Far East is faulty and founded on quicksand. I strongly believe that the possible consideration of the Philippines in any grand strategy might in future years be stated as the cause of a stalemate or defeat in a war with Japan. With such a faulty conception in grand strategy, we are not getting anywhere by attempting any comparison of naval power now or in the near future between the United States and the Japanese Navy. With this in mind I cannot concur in sub-paragraph 3 of the Conclusions in paragraph 7, reference (a). I do not believe that in naval strategy alone the United States can secure the Philippines against seizure by Japan, or that she can with the London Treaty Navy support her present policies in the Far East.

At the present time I agree with recommendations Nos. 1 and 3 of reference (a), that is, to refrain from a provocative attitude in regard to the situation in the Western Pacific, or under the present conditions within the next two years base the Fleet in the Eastern Pacific and prepare for a war of not less than four years duration.

Referring to the comparison of BLUE and ORANGE navies as of 31 December 1932 in reference (a), I do not feel that such a method of comparison based upon tonnage and with no definite age factors can give us sound facts. This is especially so in the categories of carriers, cruisers and destroyers. Such a flat method of comparison is a source of danger to every one who cannot evaluate fighting strength, logistics, and high speed factors, damage control, seaworthiness, docking and base facilities, and all elements of grand strategy which must enter into the problem. It is under such a system in my opinion that the comparison of ship by ship and tonnage to tonnage give the United States an unfavorable deal in every conference. The conduct of a war against Japan requires a four zone navy and the size of each zone fleet would be such that the BLUE Fleet organized at Hawaii for an overseas expedition could not be much more than fifty per cent of the allowed London Treaty tonnages. The various figures under Relative Strength of Opposing Forces are apt to give the United States an apparent paper advantage under certain types which it does not really have.

Considering the remainder of the estimate, which has so clearly brought out various points, I do not concur with the fact that Pearl Harbor is securely defended, nor do I believe that 75,000 troops for an extended period could be kept supplied by the Navy. Under present conditions I doubt the wisdom of arming Moros and depending upon them. As to increasing our forces in the Philippines, I do not believe that any marked change in Army or Navy forces would fool the Japanese very long either in Washington or in Tokyo. It may be assumed that Japanese representatives will know within twenty-four hours of any change in plan of our fleet or Army troops; and if our fleet had to depend "primarily" on repair ships of the fleet as we now have them or could have them within three years for handling above water or under water damage, it could not long remain very effective.


As to the speed of auxiliaries, it is problematical as to how little under water damage would be required to reduce a 20 knot ship below 15 knots. As an example of the vulnerability of such ships, the recent PRESIDENT MADISON sinking on her side at Seattle, due to premature flooding, is a good one. It shows that in handling under water damage and in keeping the ship on an even keel at all times, a mistake on the part of one officer might be as fatal as on the PRESIDENT MADISON.

As to the auxiliary ship building requirements, it is interesting to note that 25 transports would be required alone for the 5,000 Marine advanced base force as presented by the recent Quantico officers. And as to the train required for the fleet, its size (as will be given in the letter on the Balanced Treaty Navy) will have to be tremendous.

Considering the various War College games and the conclusions and recommendation in reference (a), I seriously disagree with the statement that the Philippines can be securely defended and that enough combatant ships adequate to support our Far East policies can be built without violating existing treaties. I agree that if we desire we can build an adequate force of fleet auxiliaries and the size of the force represented would probably render such a plan entirely impracticable.

In considering the final action recommended, I do not believe that the measures proposed would insure an even chance of carrying out our Far East policies, for I believe that none of them, singly or together, could be adequate for the task imposed. I am not prepared to state the exact size of an adequate Navy for the United States, but it should be one at least four times that of Japan. I do ~~not~~ feel sure that even with such an "adequate" Navy we cannot alone in the Far East safely stake the life of the Nation upon one huge overseas expedition.

With such an insecure foundation of grand strategy, based upon the Philippines as a Gibraltar in the Far East, the steps recommended on page 10 of reference (a) cannot insure victory.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Wilbur R. Van Auken". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "W".

Wilbur R. Van Auken,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Head of Research Department.

