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JUTLAND DECISIONS

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The Commander in battle usually makes his decisions according to his "tact of judgment", as ever-changing situations confront him. These changing situations are presented generally as result of information. This information is registered through several sources, notably reports from others and what the Commander himself sees and hears. Fortunate, indeed, as well as unique, is the Commander who, blinded by the usual maze of information had in battle, is able to see the truth, and is able likewise to prevent his adversary from seeing the truth. This coup d'oeil, if possessed by the leader, is a manifestation of the divine spark of genius.

It is conceived that no decision can be reached unless inspired by information, which may or may not reveal the truth of a situation or from which an attempt is made to deduce the truth.

In the effort on part of Commanders to reach proper decisions as the result of information or lack of it are seen the prime realities of their functions of command in battle. It is proposed here to review some of the realities of war in this respect that faced various commanders at Jutland.

The operations at Jutland have been presented already in a very comprehensive form by various contemporary authorities. These presentations have fostered the idea that during the course of the action considerable ignorance existed on the part of the Fleet Commanders and their subordinates as to what was going on. For example, both Admirals Beatty and Hipper knew little or nothing of the strength of the forces opposed to them until they made sight contact with each other. Admiral Beatty had no adequate advance information of the presence of the High Seas Fleet before he bumped into it during his battle with Admiral Hipper.

Again, Admiral Scheer was in complete ignorance of the fact

that he was facing the overwhelming force of the entire Grand Fleet.

In view of these and many other examples of failure as well as of success in obtaining and disseminating information, it is thought that an analysis of the battle from the viewpoint of action and decision or lack of it, as result of information may prove interesting as well as beneficial.

Jutland, generally speaking, consisted of two well-known major phases, the battle cruiser action and the proceedings after the two Main Bodies joined in action, including the sporadic contacts during the night. During these two general phases the following outstanding incidents occurred when early information was vital: First, on the occasion of the meeting of the two battle cruiser forces of Admirals Beatty and Hipper; second, on the approach of the German High Seas Fleet from the southward during the battle cruiser action; third, on the approach of Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron from the northeastward in his effort to reinforce the Battle Cruiser Fleet; fourth, as the Grand Fleet approached during the running fight of the battle cruisers to the northward; fifth, during the two well-recognized intervals when the German Fleet apparently disappeared from the scene of action; and sixth, during the night in keeping informed of the movements of the High Seas Fleet and in locating and attacking the enemy, on the part of the German light forces.

The daylight screening and scouting dispositions and procedure of the two Fleets for the purpose of gaining early information were somewhat different. The Germans used their light forces in a circular formation; the British in a screening or scouting line, or lines, in advance and generally at right angles to the direction of advance or assumed direction of the enemy. Altogether the British employed 27 light and armored cruisers for this purpose at Jutland; the Germans, 11 light cruisers. Admiral

Beatty's battle cruisers were designated as a separate "fleet", although the Commander-in-Chief laid down quite distinctly in his battle orders that the battle-cruisers were a "scouting force". Nevertheless this designation of the battle cruisers as a separate "fleet" would seem tacitly to imply the idea of a fighting "fleet", distinct from the main body of the Grand Fleet proper. It is thought this designation was an unfortunate one. A sort of dual role is recognized, even though perhaps mistakenly so, namely, - a smart fast fighting "fleet" designated by the Admiralty and a "scouting force" of and within the Grand Fleet as laid down by the Commander-in-Chief. On the contrary, Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers were designated "Scouting Division I", which leaves little conjecture as to their intended major mission.

To take up the first opportunity presented to both sides to obtain, report and act upon early enemy information, it will be remembered that Admiral Beatty, steaming to the eastward with six battle cruisers and four QUEEN ELIZABETH'S in the early afternoon of May 30, 1916, reached the vicinity of a point designated by the Commander-in-Chief, and at 2:15 p.m., changed course to the northward in obedience to orders to effect junction with the Main Body, distant some 65 miles. At almost this exact moment the first contact was made. Figure I gives a general idea of the situation at this time. (Insert Fig. I).

It will be observed that Admiral Beatty's scouting line, or screen, consisted of three squadrons of light cruisers (First, Third, and Second, in this order from the North) - 12 ships in six pairs extending at intervals of five miles, eight miles in advance of the battle cruisers. One light cruiser of the center pair, the YARMOUTH, was in position about half way between the battle cruisers and the scouting line as visual-signal linking

ship. Admiral Hipper had available only five light cruisers which were disposed ahead in a semi-circle, radius about eight miles from the battle cruisers. Each German cruiser in the scouting line was accompanied by several destroyers. There were no destroyers on the British scouting line; later, however, in August 1916, after the loss of two light cruisers as result of a submarine trap, Admiral Jellicoe considered their presence essential and issued instructions accordingly.

At the moment Admiral Beatty ordered the change of course to the northward, the attention of the GALATEA, in the port wing position of the British light cruiser screen, was drawn by "a steamer bearing south 72° east, about 12 miles, blowing off steam, and the masts and two funnels of a war vessel were made out in her vicinity". While all other vessels of Admiral Beatty's force turned to the northward the GALATEA and her mate, the PHAETON, closed this contact at high speed, followed shortly by the INCONSTANT and the CORDELIA, the next pair. It was then found that two German destroyers had stopped the steamer and that a hostile squadron of cruisers and destroyers were a little to the north-eastward, "apparently steaming in various directions, which made it difficult to send an adequate report".

On the German side what actually happened was that the ELBING, the westernmost scout, sighted the Danish Freighter "U. FJORD" to the westward. The destroyers accompanying the ELBING, the B-109 and B-110, were dispatched by Captain Madlung of the ELBING to board this freighter. The actual contact and enemy movement reports made are shown in Table I to accompany the picture of the contact as drawn in Figure I.

The six signals in this table indicate in chronological order the initial contact vague enemy movement reports made by the British GALATEA and the German B-109. Twenty minutes after

contact there was still ambiguity on both sides as to enemy character. The British erroneously reported enemy cruisers; the Germans so far are more conservative. There was presented to Commodore Sinclair in the GALATEA a situation involving the duty to report intelligently the presence of "scattered" enemy cruisers and destroyers. The formula for such a report evidently was not furnished or apparent; the Commodore found it "difficult to send an adequate report". The reports of cruisers at 1420 and 1430 refer erroneously to the Destroyers B-109 and B-110; the other scattered enemy forces are not mentioned. German practice in providing in their formula "scattered forces" under the circumstances of uncertainty (vague reports) appears to eliminate early guesswork.

These reports resulted very naturally in the beginning of a general concentration of all forces on both sides toward the point of contact. Admiral Jellicoe who, it will be observed, intercepted the GALATEA's radios, ordered steam raised in the Main Body for full speed. There is no indication that Admiral Scheer with the German Main Body intercepted any of the B-109 reports.

The GALATEA and PHAETON continued to close the contact at high speed. The ELBING had sighted smoke to the westward beyond the destroyers and the "U. FJORD", and was steaming toward this smoke and closing her two destroyers at full speed. Table II shows information of the enemy sent by both sides, subsequent to the original reports.

It is seen that the ELBING's first contact report likewise was erroneous in mistaking an enemy light cruiser for a battle cruiser and so reporting. However, this particular mistake had little bearing on events as the report was not received as sent. It is interesting as revealing a tendency to jump to conclusions on the part of commanders of light cruisers on both sides. The ELBING's message was misread by Admiral Boedicker in the FRANKFURT and by Admiral Hipper in the LUTZOW, to indicate that approximately 25 battleships had been sighted. Admiral Boedicker immediately

directed a concentration of his Scouting Division II to the Westward abandoning further operations to the Northward. The misreading of the ELBING's report also caused Admiral Hipper to turn his battle cruisers sharply to the Southward (from WSW to SSW) to present broadside fire to the reported enemy battleships which he was further led to believe, from the number of splashes observed around the ELBING (13 miles to the Eastward) were not far away.

The GALATEA soon discovered her own mistake and corrected her first report to read "Destroyers" instead of "Cruisers", and almost simultaneously, as sight contact was made with the ELBING rushing to the support of the B-109 and B-110, she made a correct report of this German cruiser giving own D.R. position.

Note should be made that Admiral Hipper in the LUTZOW made two reports to the Commander-in-Chief in the Main Body 57 miles to the Southward, of the presence of the enemy and his own position. The first was originated (2:27 p.m.) before receipt of the ELBING's garbled message in regard to a large number of battleships; the second was sent as result of the misinformation had from the ELBING and stated simply the position of the Battle Cruisers on the new southerly course. Admiral Hipper refrained from passing on to his Commander-in-Chief the intelligence had from the ELBING of the presence of enemy battleships. His reasons for doing so are not known but it may be assumed that he desired confirmation before acquainting his chief with the startling news. No similar reports were made from Admiral Beatty to Admiral Jellicoe who, however, through intercepted messages, was perhaps as fully informed of enemy forces as Admiral Beatty himself at this time.

The foregoing sets forth the nebulous and erroneous ideas still had by nearly all concerned one half hour after the first

contacts. The stirring events which follow demonstrate that practically until action was joined between Admirals Hipper and Beatty, no one really knew the situation, although it would appear ample opportunity was presented to obtain definite information. The course of events may be followed in detail by analysis of the dispatches contained in Table III, together with the actual movements made.

Communications (Table III) from 1439 to 1526 cover a period of about three-quarters of an hour from the moment Commodore Sinclair in the GALATEA was aware of the probable presence of strong enemy forces, because of a "large amount of smoke as though from a fleet bearing E.N.E.", to the moment Admirals Beatty and Hipper actually sighted each other. During this period neither Commander knew with any degree of certainty the composition of the forces opposed to him; they were both left to find out for themselves. No German light cruiser had even so much as sighted the British Battle Cruisers; Admiral Hipper had no intimation of their presence until he saw them himself. Furthermore, Admiral Hipper knew nothing until later of the presence of Admiral Evan-Thomas in the four QUEEN ELIZABETH's. Admiral Beatty was perhaps more fortunate in getting earlier, if vague, news that the enemy in force was in the vicinity seemingly seven ships or, "seven columns of ships". Clearly it had to be determined what this smoke covered and the whole course of Admiral Beatty's procedure during this period was result of decision to that end. But so far as being assisted in driving into the unknown, his light cruisers failed him. What actually happened was this: the GALATEA, was closing together with the PHAETON, to develop the contact with two German destroyers and the ELBING. One minute only after reporting the ELBING, Commodore Sinclair

sighted the large amount of smoke on the horizon behind the EL-BING. The Commodore closed for four minutes more and then with the PHAETON turned away under fire to a northwesterly course. Commodore Sinclair explains his decision as follows:-

"Proceeded to the Northwest in extended order, keeping just out of gun range (he was hit by the ELBING at 12,500 yards), the Vice Admiral commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet, who was to the W.S.W. about 15 miles, having signalled that he was steering east, and it was hoped by drawing the enemy N.W., the battle cruisers would be able to get in between them, but shortly after the battle cruisers were seen in action with the enemy's heavy ships".

(Note: Words in parentheses are inserted).

It is not the purpose to criticize Commodore Sinclair's decision, particularly because of lack of knowledge of the Commodore's precise instructions. Admiral Beatty in his report dated 12 June 1916, does not mention this procedure of the GALATEA which eventually drew all eight cruisers of the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons away instead of toward the enemy, but states erroneously that

".....the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
.....spread to the East",

and further that

".....the work of the light cruiser squadrons was
excellent and of great value".

It may be stated without hesitation that the turn-away or recoil from the enemy at 1440 of Commodore Sinclair was conspicuously contrary to scouting doctrine. The "excellence" and "great value" of the work of the GALATEA and the seven light cruisers which followed her, and discovered themselves some 20 miles to the Westward of Admiral Hipper when he opened fire on the British battle cruisers

will be found, if at all, in their compliance with a doctrine or not concerned with scouting.

Figure II gives a general idea of the situation at about 3:25 p.m. when Admirals Hipper and Beatty definitely recognized each other. Comparison of this Figure with Figure I makes it appear that eight British light cruisers from positions averaging well in advance of Admiral Beatty were forced off in the course of an hour by three German light cruisers. In all fairness it must be stated also that in following the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons, the three German cruisers were denied information of the British strong forces present. This possibility, however, probably was not a factor considered by Commodore Sinclair in making his decision. Figure II also shows the positions of the four remaining cruisers of the Second Light Cruiser Squadron. The NOTTINGHAM and DUBLIN remained close to the LION, the Flagship of Admiral Beatty, so that the NOTTINGHAM'S Despatch (1524) reporting five columns of smoke was no news to Admiral Beatty, who could see from the LION even better than Captain Miller on the bridge of the NOTTINGHAM.

From the viewpoint entirely of scouting doctrine it appears that the GALATEA clearly should have continued to close the ELBING, changing course at once to the E.N.E.'d to develop the large smoke contact. The German battle cruisers, as a matter of fact at this time, were themselves only 16 miles distant, having turned to the southward and westward, and were approaching the GALATEA at high speed.

Had Commodore Sinclair elected to drive in, he would have found himself with the PHAETON in eight or nine minutes observing the German battle cruisers at a comfortable distance and busily engaged in close action with the ELBING, and engaged also with the PILLAU and FRANKFURT at approximately 11,000 yards. Such an

aggressive decision very likely would have resulted in severe damage to the ELBING. The GALATEA and PHAETON surely were a match for the approaching PILLAU and FRANKFURT, if a nearer approach was found advisable, and besides, the INCONSTANT and CORDELIA were rushing to the support, conceivably finishing off the ELBING and putting out of action a destroyer or so en route. It is thought that these British light cruisers should have pushed on until driven off by superior forces. The above hindsight picture of what might have happened seems to indicate that the First Light Cruiser Squadron could have determined the composition and movements of Admiral Hipper's Division without much difficulty. Commodore Sinclair, however, says that he conceived of the idea of drawing the enemy, whatever he was, - and he was not sure it was an enemy, - to the northwestward, relying on his aggressive Chief to push on and discover for himself what should have been discovered for him. The Commodore kept Admiral Beatty advised as to the apparent movements of the unknown enemy "Fleet", but he forced Admiral Beatty to take grave and unnecessary risks in being compelled to develop this contact with his own strong forces. It is very probable that Admiral Beatty considered that he was fully warranted in closing because of a feeling of assurance that he would be able to cope with any force of the enemy from which he could not escape. At least it may be said that his movements throughout the approach, dictated as they were by the vagueness of Commodore Sinclair and his own spirit of aggression, showed no hesitation which might be laid to embarrassment because of ignorance of the enemy force. He drove in always after or to head off that "smoke". It is fortunate he discovered only Admiral Hipper. The situation might have been exceedingly critical had he missed the enemy heavy scouting division passing it to the Southward, and had bumped up against the High Seas Fleet instead, as he did later. Had this happened, it is conceivable that Admiral

Beatty's entire force might have been crushed between the two fires of the German Main Body and the German battle cruisers.

As for the Germans during this period, an examination of the messages in Table III develops that the ELBING's erroneous report as drafted of enemy "battle cruisers" (received as 24 or 26 battleships) was degarbled by the FRANKFURT which now reported that there were no battle cruisers present but instead that only four light cruisers were in sight. This report from Admiral Boedicker also eased the situation with respect to the erroneous report which gave the impression that the entire British Grand Fleet was present.

Admiral Hipper thus relieved of the possibility of a surprise engagement with the Grand Fleet, now still in total ignorance of Admiral Beatty's presence, felt free to support his light cruisers which were engaged with an ever-increasing number of enemy light forces to the northwestward. Accordingly, Admiral Hipper changed course from the Southwestward to the Northwestward at high speed in pursuit, reporting to his Commander-in-Chief that only four enemy light cruisers were in sight after all. This pursuit continued for about 35 minutes, during which time Admirals Scheer and Hipper frequently exchanged position reports, when Admiral Hipper himself suddenly saw the British battle cruisers driving in from the Southwestward. Admiral Hipper's next signal (1526) is fully indicative of the failure of his light forces in that it becomes necessary for him to notify his own scouts of the presence of "strong enemy forces". Figure II shows this situation.

Thus it would appear at this stage of the Battle of Jutland that light cruisers had not justified their existence as scouting forces. On the German side this is true in further consideration of the fact that Admiral Hipper was willing to accept battle with Admiral Beatty, five against six, even on a northerly course away from his Main Body. It is possible that he would not have

accepted battle had he known that the British battle cruisers were supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron which he did not see until after action was joined. Admiral Hipper, while on a northerly course after sighting the British Battle Cruisers did actually order fire distribution from the RIGHT, ready at any moment to engage, and only turned to form his battle line on a southerly course, ordering a redistribution of fire from the LEFT, in reply to an apparently similar southerly move on the part of Admiral Beatty.

It now becomes both Admiral Beatty and Hipper to assume the roles of Commanders of major scouting forces in action. The urgency for this procedure is more apparent for Admiral Hipper than for Admiral Beatty as the latter is being drawn toward the German Main Body. To Admiral Hipper now this battle is largely preliminary to delivering Admiral Beatty over to Admiral Scheer in order that he may finish the business; to Admiral Beatty, on the contrary at this stage, there is no prospect that Admiral Jellicoe will be engaged. The business so far as he can judge at this time is only between Admiral Hipper and himself with his Commander-in-Chief being left far behind.

Criticism has been leveled at Admiral Beatty for not so disposing his forces as to permit all of the heavy forces, including the Fifth Battle Squadron, to engage simultaneously. It must be remembered in this connection that the QUEEN ELIZABETHs constituted a temporary support for the Battle Cruisers for the purpose of unforeseen eventualities in view of the detachment of the 3 B.C.S. They were slower ships and could not be expected to maintain station in a battle cruiser battle line. The battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty were habitually maintained in superior numbers to the enemy battle cruisers. The command was vested by the Commander-in-Chief in Admiral Beatty, not in Admiral Evan-Thomas; the battle cruisers were regarded as the main fighting force of this detachment. Had the Fifth Battle Squadron

been the main body of this force with the officer in tactical command in the BARHAM, with the Battle Cruisers simply a subordinate fast wing, then it is possible events might have taken a different turn. But critical analysis seems to reveal that even under these circumstances, with the Senior Admiral in the battleships, the battle cruiser procedure in all probability would have been very much the same.

Reference again to Figure I shows that Admiral Evan-Thomas was placed on the proper bearing as a support in the cruising disposition. It is true there appears to be no reason for the Fifth Battle Squadron originally being placed so distant, six miles away from the probable direction of threat from the enemy. The more fact that these battleships were slower than the battle cruisers, conceivably should have led the Vice-Admiral to keep them nearer his fast ships. However, there can be no reason for falling back on a support unless confronted by superior forces. Admiral Beatty was not confronted by superior forces. It appears that he was perfectly justified as a heavy scouting force in driving in ahead of his slower support to develop the contact, especially as his Third and First Light Cruiser Squadrons had failed him. Having developed a contact with what appeared to him decidedly inferior forces but whose speed very likely precluded anyone but himself from engaging, he seems again to have been thoroughly justified in his decision to engage at once. Otherwise there would have been no battle. Admiral Hipper certainly would have refused action against both Admirals Beatty and Evan-Thomas; undoubtedly he would likewise have refused action had Admiral Hood instead of Admiral Evan-Thomas been present.

Admiral Beatty's decision does not appear to have been one peculiarly characteristic of himself, but, on the contrary, a decision that would have been made probably by any Admiral on the spot. No one will deny that it would have been exceedingly fortu-

nate for the British had they been able or permitted to array at once the nine or the ten capital ships against the five Germans. There is no reason to suppose that Admiral Hipper could not and would not have avoided such a combination against him. Even had Commodore Sinclair developed this contact informing Admiral Beatty the exact composition of the enemy, Admiral Beatty would have been equally justified in engaging at once without thought of falling back on his support.

The battle started under conditions decidedly unfavorable to Admiral Beatty. He lost several opportunities of letting the Fifth Battle Squadron close his battle cruisers thus bringing them into the action much earlier. The Germans opened fire at comparatively short ranges while the British were in the midst of an evolution. The Germans were permitted to close to these favorable ranges largely due to inferior British optical instruments. Thus Admiral Beatty, thinking he was still out of range, did not take advantage of the possibilities of his heavier guns; he did not open fire for some time after the Germans and then most of his salvos were well over. Furthermore the British fire distribution was not understood in some of the British ships; the DERFLINGER was not fired upon at all for some ten minutes. One cause of fire distribution not being received or understood appears to have been a decided laxity on part of Admiral Beatty's signal staff in not complying with the Commander-in-Chief's (Admiral Jellicoe) Battle Instructions that when in presence of the enemy all signals were to be made by flags, searchlights and radio. This laxity contributed very largely to the failure of the Fifth Battle Squadron to close up before the battle cruisers became engaged and furthermore, later on, as will be seen, brought these same battleships under the heavy fire of the High Seas Fleet and very nearly led to disaster. Admiral Beatty must shoulder much of the blame for permitting the Germans to get the jump on him. This contributed without doubt among other more im-

portant factors to the loss of the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY". After the loss of these two ships, the idea may have crossed the Vice-Admiral's mind to retire on his support; he would have been entirely justified in doing so, but there is no indication that such an idea ever occurred to him. Admiral Hipper was willing to engage 5 against 6; why should Admiral Beatty not be willing to continue 4 against 5? Later, when Admiral Beatty crashed against the High Seas Fleet, there was naturally no hesitation in first falling back on his immediate support, and with his entire force back on the ultimate support of the Main Body.

A careful review of the signals and messages in Table IV reveals the states of mind of both Admirals Beatty and Hipper as previously suggested in the roles of Commanders of Major Scouting Forces, and tells a story of renewed inadequacy of early enemy information. Exchange of exact information as between Admirals Hipper and Scheer is essential as they are about to effect a junction. During the hour in which the Battle Cruisers fought it out while rushing to the Southward, Admiral Hipper was so occupied with the business in hand that he sent only one position and action report to his Commander-in-Chief. It was, however, very complete and exact. This was drafted at 3:48 p.m., sent six minutes later, at the precise moment he hauled down the signal, "Commence firing". In reply the Commander-in-Chief, a few minutes later, fully advised Admiral Hipper of his position and movements. Thereafter, the Commander-in-Chief knew practically nothing of what was going on until he actually sighted the battle cruisers with his own eyes almost ahead. It should be noted that no light cruisers preceded Admiral Hipper to the southward; it was found necessary to leave them far behind, except the REGENSBURG

which was busily engaged supporting the destroyer attack and the WIESBADEN which was making all speed possible to reach the van.

In the meantime, Admiral Scheer, 57 miles to the southward, upon receipt of Admiral Hipper's dispatch (15:34), knowing nothing as yet of the presence of the four QUEEN ELIZABETHS, decided to head his fleet to the Westward in order that Admiral Beatty might be caught between two fires, from himself and the battle cruisers. He did actually head to the Westward to carry out this idea, but resumed the Northerly course at high speed to join his battle cruisers with all dispatch when advised by the FRANKFURT (1620, at the moment the QUEEN MARY was sinking) that the British 2d Battle Squadron of five ships was supporting Admiral Beatty (actually the four British QUEEN ELIZABETHS). Notwithstanding the errors in this report, the type of vessel reported was correct. The report was indeed a valuable one.

Furthermore, Admiral Scheer's farthest advanced scout, the STETTIN, naturally the first to make contact with the enemy rushing to the Southward, erroneously reported first (1628), gunfire four miles away (actually about 10), and second, (1636), that Admiral Boedicker's Scouting Division II was in sight ahead, when what he saw was actually the enemy 2d Light Cruiser Squadron. At the time of this report Scouting Division II was 25 miles distant, Scouting Division I was 16 miles distant, and the 2d Light Cruiser Squadron 8 miles distant from the STETTIN. This misinformation although apparently immaterial to the Commander-in-Chief whose course of action was clear, could not be other than confusing to an Admiral and his staff who wanted exact information then if ever they wanted it in their lives.

Thus, again, on the German side the light cruisers at this particular phase, except for the FRANKFURT, were of little or no use to either Admirals Scheer or Hipper; in fact, both Ad-

mirals were "forced to rely on their own observations for an estimate of the situation". Admiral Scheer now ordered all his own light cruisers to the rear, in order to have light forces on both flanks, inasmuch as Scouting Divisions I and II were ahead.

On the British side Commodore Goodenough in the SOUTHAMPTON ordered (15:55) the cruisers of his 2d Squadron to spread out ahead of the LION on a scouting line. This line was maintained about 6000 yards in advance of Admiral Beatty. While on this line the Commodore himself, sighted a ship on the port bow which was challenged and recognized a little later and reported (16:30) as an enemy cruiser. This was the STETTIN (not the ROSTOCK as sometimes stated) who made simultaneously the report previously mentioned, of sighting what he thought was the German Scouting Division II. Commodore Goodenough, who was not party to the earlier general retirement of Admiral Beatty's light cruisers, and fully imbued with the spirit and doctrine of scouting, drove in toward the enemy, forcing back the screen he had observed. Eight minutes later he made sight contact with, developed and reported (16:38 Urgent Priority), the enemy High Seas Fleet steering North. A certain analogy is noted here with what would have occurred had Commodore Sinclair previously done likewise. At the same moment, the CHAMPION, also well ahead of the LION with the 13th Destroyer Flotilla, and about to support a destroyer attack, reported the German Battle Fleet in sight. Admiral Beatty, taken completely by surprise, thinking the enemy main body was still in the Jade Basin, pushed on for several minutes more until he saw enough to be convinced that the line line of hulls, funnels and masts rising from below the horizon ahead, was indeed the High Seas Fleet. Only then did he order column right-about (16:40) to escape on a Northerly course.

Admiral Evan-Thomas, following with the Fifth Battle Squadron

eight miles astern of Admiral Beatty, had not intercepted the contact and enemy movement reports of the SOUTHAMPTON and CHAMPION. The LION's radio had been shot away so that Admiral Beatty could not communicate with Admiral Evan-Thomas rapidly to advise him of the critical situation which had arisen. Admiral Evan-Thomas observed the turn-around of the Battle Cruisers ahead but could not understand the reason for this evolution, and naturally continued on to the South. Admiral Evan-Thomas passed two miles to the westward of the battle cruisers, which blanketed his fire. In passing, flag signals were eventually made out on the LION, giving the bearing (no distance) of the German Fleet and directing a turn-about of the Fifth Battle Squadron. Before this order could be complied with, the BARHAM, Flagship of Admiral Evan-Thomas, passed the NEW ZEALAND, the last Battle Cruiser in the British column, when the Admiral suddenly found himself face to face with the High Seas Fleet, under its fire and being hit. He turned at once to follow the battle cruisers at reserve speed and fetched up 3 miles astern of them. The radio in the BARHAM likewise was shot away.

Thus, the magnificent effort of Commodore Goodenough who, in the meantime, approached within 13,000 yards of the German Main Body to develop and report his contact, and who was subjected to an intense fire before being driven off, went for practically naught. Both Admirals Beatty and Evan-Thomas, as was the case with the German Admirals, were forced to make their own personal observations before reaching decision. The only criticism that can be made of the procedure of the 2nd L.C.S., if the gallant and courageous conduct of its Commodore and his ships is open to criticism at all, is that it would have been fortunate had the scouting line been formed farther in advance of the LION, but it is doubted that Commodore Goodenough had sufficient excess speed. The reason for the failure of interception of the SOUTHAMPTON and

CHAMPION contact reports by Admiral Evan-Thomas in the BARHAM is not known. Commodore Goodenough with his scouting line was ideally situated in advance with respect to Admiral Evan-Thomas if not to Admiral Beatty. It can only be conjectured, of course, what Admiral Evan-Thomas would have done had he intercepted the SOUTHAMPTON and CHAMPION reports, as did Admiral Jellicoe in the IRON DUKE, 66 miles away to the North. It is highly improbable, however, that with this contact information in hand, he would have turned on his own initiative to the North at the time of observing Admiral Beatty's turn. It was his business to support Admiral Beatty.

Meanwhile, Admiral Jellicoe was somewhat perturbed, due to lack of information. He knew Admiral Beatty was engaged on a Southerly course, but was not sure that Admiral Evan-Thomas was in support. He dispatched a radio message direct to the BARHAM asking for information. The reply was simply - "Yes; I am engaging enemy". Very shortly thereafter Admiral Jellicoe received the SOUTHAMPTON's contact report with the STETTIN, followed in a few minutes by the receipt of the first Urgent Priority message sent that day when the SOUTHAMPTON reported the enemy Main Body, course North. It will be observed that Admiral Beatty, as soon as he headed North to escape, made effort to report the situation in part to Admiral Jellicoe. His radio was shot away and he directed the PRINCESS ROYAL, the next astern, by visual, to "Report Enemy's Battle Fleet to C-in-C bearing S.E.", which was hardly sufficient information. The PRINCESS ROYAL sent the message by radio to the Commander-in-Chief almost exactly as received from the LION. As finally relayed to the IRON DUKE, however, the course, instead of bearing, of the German Main Body was given as Southeast. The SOUTHAMPTON, however, a few minutes later confirmed her first report that Admiral Scheer was heading North. Apparently Admiral Jellicoe upon receipt of this second report from Commodore Goodenough, discounted Admiral Beatty's contrary report (which inci-

dentially, as drafted gave no course of self or enemy), and concluded the Germans were actually heading North. Accordingly, he so notified the British Main Body by visual and advised the Admiralty by radio that "Fleet action is imminent," as he said he would do in his famous letter to the Admiralty dated 30 October, 1914, soon after he assumed command of the Grand Fleet.

Figure III gives a general idea of the situation at the moment of contact - Admirals Beatty and Scheer (4:40 p.m.).

-FIGURE III-

We now enter upon a stage of the battle when conditions were reversed as regards the two opposing forces. On the run South, Admiral Hipper led the British Vice-Admiral into the trap prepared by the German High Seas Fleet; on the run North it is now the British who lead the entire battle strength of the Germans into the trap prepared by the Grand Fleet under Admiral Jellicoe. We have seen both Admirals Beatty and Evan-Thomas completely surprised by the sudden appearance of Admiral Scheer's Fleet. Due to lack of information we are now about to witness for identical reasons the complete surprise of the German Commander-in-Chief when he suddenly faced Admiral Jellicoe. The latter is aware, however, that the German Fleet is rushing into his arms as was Admiral Scheer previously aware that Admiral Beatty was about to be embraced. There is a marked difference, however, in the two situations inasmuch as Admiral Scheer knew exactly where he would receive the British Battle Cruisers; Admiral Jellicoe, as will be seen, because of a maze of conflicting reports, had very little idea of where Admiral Scheer would strike as his arms were outstretched to receive him, very much as in a game of blind-man's buff with both sides blindfolded.

The proceedings in detail of all ships, particularly the British, on the run North, are of interest as contributing factors to the decisions made by both Commanders-in-Chief, when the two

main bodies clashed shortly after 6 p.m. The decision of Admiral Jellicoe with respect to his deployment is still a controversial subject. We will follow the Admiral as closely as possible at his elbow in order to disclose exactly what happened on the bridge of the IRON DUKE to influence the Admiral in his decision.

It can be imagined that his attention was fixed on a plotting chart showing his own successive relative positions with respect to the enemy and his own ships when contact or enemy movement reports were received. The measurements of distance from himself to the many and conflicting places the enemy seemed to be according to the reports; the estimates of the enemy's line of approach and his speed from these conflicting positions; estimates of the time of making contact, - all these can be visualized. So far as the Admiral could tell from reports, the German Fleet could be almost anywhere to the southward, within very wide limits, and events proved that he was actually outside of these limits. It is a wonder Admiral Jellicoe could make up his mind at all. On the occasion of receipt of one message of vital importance he was forced to the correct conclusion that the exact contrary to the information contained in the report was true. At the last minute, practically in face of the enemy, who had appeared at time and place seemingly unjustified by previous reports, he had to do something, and quickly. He did what is considered would have appeared right to any man of experience in his position.

The information he received, however, during this time was abundant, if not adequate, mostly through the continued splendid effort and understanding of Commodore Goodenough. This name stands out at Jutland as do few. The great difficulty was that the Commodore was not in sight contact with his Commander-in-Chief, or with linking ships, in order that relative instead of dead-

reckoning geographical positions could be given. Every report he made to the Commander-in-Chief giving his own assumed geographical position together with bearing, and sometimes distance of the enemy from himself, although valuable, seemed to have served as an additional puzzle to Admiral Jellicoe when the report was plotted on the chart before him. That the dead-reckoning of the IRON DUKE and SOUTHAMPTON did not synchronize was no fault of the Commodore's, who kept a constant stream of reports pouring into the IRON DUKE.

Admiral Beatty has been criticized for the almost total lack of information vouchsafed the Commander-in-Chief as emanating from himself in the LION. It is considered that this criticism is somewhat justified. However, in extenuation, as has been pointed out, the LION had no radio at this time. Furthermore, Admiral Beatty's report via the PRINCESS ROYAL, thence by radio to a battleship of the Main Body, thence again to the IRON DUKE by visual, arrived in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief in such a garbled state as to be practically worthless except for the dead-reckoning position of the LION. The operators of the IRON DUKE did not intercept this radio from the PRINCESS ROYAL. These operators and their supervisors were very busy men. Their business was principally with the other high admirals, - the PRINCESS ROYAL was out of their picture. Admiral Beatty himself was a very busy man. He was in a ship on fire as result of an explosion which nearly sealed the fate of the LION and everyone in her. His ship, one of four remaining out of six, was a shambles topsides. It is understood the bridge was almost untenable on account of the fire forward. Furthermore, he was accompanied by 12 light cruisers for whose every action he was responsible as the immediate superior. Thus, although it does appear that Admiral Beatty and his Staff were lax in respect to reports as well as to compliance with instructions, he must be given due responsibility

for the reports of his subordinates. And it may be stated without hesitation, thanks to Commodore Goodenough, these were ample. Under the actual circumstances it is believed that further reports from Admiral Beatty himself would have served only to make matter more confusing for the Commander-in-Chief. It is true that the Commodore's reports could have been amplified to advantage, demonstrating the desirability of a more regular form of report as used by the Germans so that no important detail should escape. But no reports would have given Admiral Jellicoe the exact information or the vitally necessary clear conception of events nearby unless the reports emanated from a vessel whose relative position was known to him. The only accurate information in this regard received during this time by Admiral Jellicoe was during the last few minutes when his right flank battleship, the MARLBOROUGH, sighted the battle cruisers, and when Admiral Beatty, a few minutes later, came in sight of the IRON DUKE. It is a sad commentary on the service of intelligence that the Commander-in-Chief was forced to make his decision as to deployment based, it may be said, exclusively on meagre information contained in three messages after Admiral Beatty made sight contact with the Grand Fleet.

So again we have an example of an Admiral at Jutland being compelled to reach decision as result of his own visual observations, with little preparation for the situation confronting him.

There is given in Table V pertinent signals and despatches sent during the Battle Cruiser run to the North. The information derived from these signals and despatches as received by the British Commander-in-Chief is plotted in Figure 4, presumably as it was actually plotted by Commanders Forbes and Bellaires of the Admiral's Staff.


Referring to this figure, the dead-reckoning line of advance of the IRON DUKE is shown in the shaded area, upperleft. The

main body was proceeding in six columns of 4 battleships each, on course S.E. by S., speed 20 knots. The IRON DUKE flying the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, led the left center column.

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had been sent from its cruising station 25 miles in advance of the Main Body to reenforce Admiral Beatty. For all practical purposes this Squadron of three battle cruisers with an accompanying screen of two light cruisers and four destroyers had been detached temporarily from the Main Body.

There remained with the British Battle Fleet the following scouting or screening forces. Farthest in advance was a line consisting of eight armored cruisers in two squadrons commanded by Admiral Arbuthnot in the DEFENSE. This line actually was eight to ten miles ahead of the Main Body and extended approximately thirty miles, nearly at right angles to the line of advance. Thus there was an approximate interval of six miles between each of the large armored cruisers. Between this advanced line of cruisers and the Main Body was placed the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron of five light cruisers, Commodore Le Mesurier in the CALLIOPE, in fairly close formation only three or four miles ahead of the Main Body. The armored cruiser HAMPSHIRE and the Light Cruiser ACTIVE, were disposed between the two above-mentioned lines as visual-signal linking ships. It is interesting as well as aggravating to record that the first enemy report Admiral Jellicoe received from a vessel, with which he was in actual touch, the BLACK PRINCE, in the armored cruiser line, unfortunately gave him dangerously inaccurate information. Thanks to the Admiral's good judgment he made a correct interpretation of this report. But no doubt largely influenced by its erroneous purport, he did not accept it. As a matter of fact, as we shall see, in this report was contained the key to the entire situation. Had the Admiral accepted this key and used it, his deployment troubles would have been over.

The first urgent priority contact report (1638) was received, as will be remembered, from the SOUTHAMPTON and indicated from the dead-reckoning position given of the reporting ship that the German Main Body was approximately in position "A" (Fig. 4), proceeding on course North, as shown, at unknown speed. Simultaneously, a second report was received from the CHAMPAION which, when plotted, placed the German Main Body approximately at "B", 18 miles to the Westward and 17 miles to the Northward of the position indicated by the SOUTHAMPTON. The CHAMPION and SOUTHAMPTON were only one mile apart at this time. The CHAMPION reported the enemy steering East North East, a report the accuracy of which was discounted by Admiral Jellicoe who, a few minutes later, advised his Main Body by visual that the "Enemy Battle Fleet is coming North".

The next report received was from Admiral Beatty himself via the PRINCESS ROYAL, as previously discussed, which placed the LION at , but gave no course and speed of the LION. The report as received stated that 26 to 30 battleships, probably hostile, bore South South East and were steering Southeast. This report likewise was discounted by the Commander-in-Chief who, by this time, was convinced that the German Main Body was actually coming North. Admiral Beatty's report, however, placed the High Seas Fleet at approximately position "C" at 1645, so that up to now Admiral Jellicoe's plotting chart shows three possible positions of the enemy Main Body - "A", "B", and "C". He concluded the enemy was standing North, so it is conceivable he plotted three lines of possible enemy approach in this direction, one from each of the three above positions. So far he has no information of enemy speed.

The Admiral was strengthened in his conclusion as to enemy course a few minutes later, at 1648, by the receipt of a second

and confirmatory report from Commodore Goodenough in the SOUTH-HAMPTON. This report placed the enemy at position "D" very close to the line of approach drawn from position "A", and still steering North. The distance between "A" and "D" is three miles, indicating an approximate enemy fleet speed of 18 knots. There are now four possible positions of the German Fleet plotted on Admiral Jellicoe's chart - "A", "B", "C", and "D". The positions "A" and "D" seemed the most likely ones.

The next report was received at exactly 5 o'clock, again from the SOUTHAMPTON, and placed the German Fleet at position "E", 8-1/2 miles to the Westward of the line of advance previously reported. But the German course was still reported NORTH. An error is certainly indicated here, as the enemy could not steer North from either position "A" or "D" and reach "E". It would appear to those in the IRON DUKE that either the enemy was steering a Northwesterly course or the SOUTHAMPTON in the meantime had corrected her dead-reckoning position. From the approximate positions as given, however, at "A", "D", and "E", it would further appear that the enemy was actually steering North as reported, as speed on this course between these three positions was computed as from 18 to 19 knots, a speed which it could be assumed the Germans were actually making. If, however, the Germans were steering Northwesterly, which appears now to be possible, considering the position "E", Fleet speed would have to be 27 knots from "A" to "E" in the given time. It is interesting to note here that Admiral Scheer was actually heading to the Northwestward contrary to the seemingly logical deductions made in the IRON DUKE. We now have five possible positions of the enemy - "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E".

The Commander-in-Chief, at 1716, advised Admiral Beatty of his position at 1713. This is the first position of the IRON DUKE plotted on Figure 4. It should be noted that all the Commander-in-Chief knows of Admiral Beatty is that he was reported at position 1 at 1645.

It will be remembered that the British First and Second Light Cruiser Squadrons had been left far behind the Battle Cruisers on the run South, so that on the run North they naturally preceded them, the Third Light Cruiser Squadron in the van, generally six miles ahead of the LION with the First Light Cruiser Squadron following three miles astern. Thus the Third Light Cruiser Squadron was naturally the first to make contact with the previously mentioned Advanced Screen or Scouting Line of armored cruisers ahead of the Grand Fleet. The FALMOUTH, Flagship of the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, according to her log, sighted cruisers to port at 5:30 p.m. and soon overhauled the BLACK PRINCE, the left flank Cruiser in this line. In passing her fairly close aboard at 5:36 p.m., the FALMOUTH signalled by visual the information,

"BATTLE CRUISERS ENGAGED SOUTH SOUTHWEST OF ME."

This message was exceedingly unfortunate, as it apparently gave Captain Bonham of the BLACK PRINCE the impression that enemy battle cruisers were referred to, as six minutes later the BLACK PRINCE, upon sighting some battle cruisers in the same general direction indicated by the FALMOUTH, reported by radio to the Commander-in-Chief -

"ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS BEARING SOUTH FIVE MILES."

These were actually the four remaining ships with Admiral Beatty; Admiral Hipper whom he reported was actually at this time ten miles to the Eastward. When it is considered that this report from the BLACK PRINCE was the first received by Admiral Jellicoe from a ship whose relative position he knew somewhat accurately,

the quandry of the Commander-in-Chief may be judged upon receipt of a report from her placing the enemy battle cruisers approximately at position "F". The IRON DUKE's corresponding position at 1740 is indicated on the British line of advance. To the Admiral's great credit, the report was discredited in the IRON DUKE, and it was correctly assumed that the BLACK PRINCE referred to Admiral Beatty's command. But even so, it seemed incredible that the Battle Cruiser Fleet could be so far to the Westward. Something must be wrong with the reported position of the BLACK PRINCE! Yet after all this position was plotted just about in the relative position in which the BLACK PRINCE should be!

The necessity for relative positions in tactical scouting has been pointed out. The BLACK PRINCE - FALMOUTH incident related above brings to light probably more forcibly than any other at Jutland the soundness of the so-called principle of relative positions. The relative position of the LION was known accurately to the FALMOUTH; the relative position of the BLACK PRINCE was known with corresponding accuracy to the Commander-in-Chief, yet no confidence was placed in this report from her, perhaps the most important enemy report that day. The friendly contact of these two ships, the first between Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty, afforded a golden opportunity to give both Commanders a very accurate picture of the relative dispositions of all the British Forces present, and to remove in the tactical situation which had arisen much confusion due to non-synchronous geographical positions by dead-reckoning. Unfortunately, Admiral Napier in the FALMOUTH did not grasp the opportunity thus offered to him. It is quite possible, and no doubt true, that the Admiral little imagined the Commander-in-Chief was not fully informed through Admiral Beatty, and that he thought, furthermore, a report from him would be merely superfluous. It is very likely

that the significance of this friendly contact did not occur to either Admiral Napier or to Captain Bonham. In the light of actual events, however, it is obvious that had this first contact been reported giving the known relative positions of own and enemy forces, Admiral Jellicoe's deployment and subsequent movements might have been influenced thereby to such a degree as to render the situation of the German Fleet even more critical than was the case. This incident only serves to show that inasmuch as contact and enemy movement reports are uncertain at best, every commander in action should studiously take advantage of every opportunity to give the High Command reliable information. Here, if it only had been realized, was an outstanding moment of the battle to clear away all doubts as to the situation in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief by the despatch of a message such as this:

"FALMOUTH PASSING BLACK PRINCE CLOSE ABOARD. BATTLE CRUISER FLEET PLUS FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON BEARING SOUTH, COURSE NORTH, SPEED HIGH, DISTANT SIX MILES, IN ACTION WITH ENEMY FLEET TO EASTWARD. ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS IN VAN BEARING SSE FROM FALMOUTH, DISTANT 10 MILES, COURSE NORTHERLY, SPEED HIGH."

However, to revert to actualities, we have seen that Admiral Jellicoe rejected the advice had from the BLACK PRINCE, that the enemy Battle Cruisers were at (F), and correctly assumed that it was in fact Admiral Beatty in this position. The Admiral had every reason to believe that the enemy was being engaged to the Eastward. His conclusion that Admiral Beatty was reported at (F) so far to the Westward, should, and no doubt did give the impression, that the enemy might be engaged somewhere to the Eastward of this point, or relatively within the area (G).

Admiral Jellicoe apparently placed little if any reliance in this inference as to Area "G", no doubt because of a growing

conviction that the enemy was really farther to the Eastward and more distant, based on what he must have considered more reliable reports from the Light Cruisers in company with Admiral Beatty. At the very moment the Admiral was weighing the BLACK PRINCE report another despatch was had from the SOUTHAMPTON which seems to have cast the BLACK PRINCE report into the discard for good in favor of the Light Cruiser report.

Of course the BLACK PRINCE dispatch, as interpreted by the Admiral, was correct and of inestimable value. If only greater reliance had been placed upon it as coming from a proper linking ship, the Admiral would have had time to form his battle squadrons in line of bearing E and W ready for deployment when the moment should arrive for action.

Simultaneously with this BLACK PRINCE report, Admiral Jellieco received at 5:40 p.m. his fourth report from the SOUTHAMPTON which placed the enemy approximately at position ("H"), the most Westerly position so far accepted for the enemy and very close to the position indicated by the earlier CHAMPTON's report, "B". This is the report which seems to have killed further consideration of the BLACK PRINCE despatch. In this SOUTHAMPTON's despatch the enemy is reported to have changed course to North North-West. Taking into consideration the various reported positions of the enemy, his speed can now, and was, without doubt, calculated as approximately 19 knots if previously on course NORTH. There must have been strong presumption now that the enemy was in the vicinity of "B" and "H" and that he had actually been heading NORTH.

It should be noted here that all of these reports give the reporting ships' positions. In only two cases so far is the enemy position indicated at all, and then only by bearing and distance from the reporting ship. Thus, except in two cases, the successive enemy positions that have been plotted in Figure 4 are, as they no doubt were, determined by assuming the bearing and

distance from the reporting ship. Apparently the British formula for these reports always required own geographical position to be included. The formula was defective in that it permitted non-definition of enemy position, probably the most important element of all enemy information. Thus it would appear that contact and enemy movement reports should follow a regular form, scrupulous observance of which would not fail to include defining enemy position as well as other vital details which otherwise might be omitted.

Immediately following the SOUTHAMPTON's fourth report, the Admiralty, London, despatched a message direct to the IRON DUKE giving the position, course and speed of the enemy Main Force at 4:30 p.m. This position, worked up to nearly 5:50 p.m. at the assumed enemy speed is at (I). It will be noted that it coincides in important respects very closely with the CHAMPION's single report (B), and is almost exactly the same position obtained from the SOUTHAMPTON's fourth report of only a moment before. All the more reason now, apparently, to forget the BLACK PRINCE report. It is reasonable to suppose that Admiral Jellicoe placed much reliance in the information thus obtained as to speed and line of advance contained in these three reports, and probably assumed the enemy to be actually within a few miles of the positions (B), (H) and (I) at about 5:50 p.m. heading North. It is certain that the Admiral now measured with some degree of confidence the distance from his own dead-reckoning position to that assumed for the enemy at the same time. This distance is approximately 36 miles. Accordingly, allowing a minimum fighting distance between fleets of six miles on account of visibility conditions, action should be joined in somewhat less than 45 minutes, or about 6:30 p.m. This is exactly the conclusion at which the Admiral arrived; furthermore, he was confident no doubt that his front was properly aligned to deploy quickly at right

angles to what would be the general bearing line of the enemy at 6:30 p.m.

The next report followed hard on the heels of the Admiralty message and was from another armored cruiser, the DEFENCE, the third ship from the right flank on the advanced scouting line of the main body, and whose relative position was fairly well known. The DEFENCE reported,

"SHIPS IN ACTION BEARING SOUTH SOUTH-WEST
STEERING NORTH EAST,"

and gave her own dead-reckoning position from which the ships she reported in action plotted at (J), within the area "G", where the enemy might be according to the previous report from the BLACK PRINCE. As a matter of fact, it was not the enemy the DEFENCE reported but the British Battle Cruiser Fleet. Admiral Jellicoe correctly assumed that this was the purport of the report. Without doubt, he was largely influenced in this assumption, believing, as in the case of the BLACK PRINCE report, that no forces except those of Admiral Beatty could possibly be so far to the Westward. At this time, however, the Battle Cruiser Fleet was actually in position 2 , eight miles to the Northwestward, and it was in this position that the DEFENCE sighted them, showing the vicious extent to which errors due to dead-reckoning can reach. It is a strange coincidence that Admiral Hipper himself was actually at (J). This was in the general direction from the IRON DUKE that Admiral Jellicoe assumed Admiral Beatty to be, judging from all reports received up to this time, except, of course, that of the BLACK PRINCE. It seems that now the Admiral was satisfied that he knew the general bearing of the enemy, but he still clung to the belief that the High Seas Fleet was much farther away in the general vicinity of (B), (E) and (I).

Again the Commander-in-Chief discarded an exceedingly important report from a linking ship whose dead-reckoning position

could be discounted because her relative position was known with a fair degree of accuracy. Both the BLACK PRINCE and DEFENCE reports were not given proper consideration because of an apparent over-increasing weight of evidence which seemed to discredit them.

At the moment the DEFENCE made the above-mentioned report to the Commander-in-Chief of vague "ships in action", the FALMOUTH was passing astern of her about four miles to the Southwestward, and signalled by searchlight:

"TWO HEAVY ENEMY SHIPS BEARING SOUTH SOUTH-EAST
STEERING NORTH EAST,"

and gave her dead-reckoning position which, when plotted in the DEFENCE, placed her four miles due East of the DEFENCE. This dead-reckoning position should have been and probably was of no concern whatever to Admiral Arbuthnot in the DEFENCE, who could certainly calculate with accuracy the relative bearing and distance of these two heavy enemy ships both from himself and from the IRON DUKE. Furthermore, the FALMOUTH report should have removed, and probably did remove, all doubt in Admiral Arbuthnot's mind as to the friendly identity of the "ships in action" he had just reported to the Commander-in-Chief. However, the Admiral did not see fit to pass this vital information on to the IRON DUKE. Had this been done, on the basis of dead-reckoning positions, the Commander-in-Chief of course would not have changed his estimate of enemy general bearing because of the previously-mentioned Easterly error in the dead-reckoning position of the DEFENCE. But even so, it would have given Admiral Jellicoe additional information besides that had from the BLACK PRINCE from which he could now recognize strong presumption that his enemy was far closer than other reports indicated and which he had considered more reliable. Admiral Arbuthnot had opportunity here, which was not grasped, to disclose to his Commander-in-Chief a true

picture of the situation based altogether on relative positions.

If Admiral Jellicoe had placed confidence in and accepted his interpretation of the BLACK PRINCE report, and, furthermore, had he assumed very logically, but of course incorrectly, that the DEFENCE was reporting the enemy, he would have actually stumbled on the true situation, the key to which was the neglected BLACK PRINCE report of Admiral Beatty at (F). Unfortunately, the Admiral could not make himself see this obvious solution; his mind had determined that the enemy was near (B), (H), and (I) and apparently could not be shaken clear of this error. Area (S) defines approximately the limits within which he still believed the enemy to be only five minutes prior to his deployment. The fact of both positions (F) and (J) for Admiral Beatty being Northwesterly of his initial position at L made no impression it would seem in the IRON DUKE, as a hint or suggestion that both the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the enemy were approaching on this approximate course rather than on NORTH.

Perhaps no incident in history reveals so forcibly the importance, the reliability, of relative positions.

The Admiral only five minutes after receipt of the DEFENCE report began to realize the full force of his mistaken deductions, largely due to discounting reports from linking ships, when he received three reports, one on top of the other, which tended to upset completely all his previous calculations. Of immediate importance were two reports, one by visual from the MURLBOROUGH, leading battleship of the right flank column, reporting "GUN FLASHES AND HEAVY GUNFIRE....." on her starboard bow, and another by radio from the light cruiser GALLIOPE, only 2-1/2 miles ahead of the IRON DUKE, reporting flashes of guns South South-West. Undoubtedly both the GALLIOPE and MURLBOROUGH were reporting the same thing which, by approximate cross-bearings, appeared to plot (K) at 5:55 p.m., only seven miles from the IRON DUKE. Of course, this was Admiral Beatty, and

Admiral Jellicoe rightly concluded it was he, although he could not be absolutely certain because of the BLACK PRINCE report ten minutes earlier that enemy battle cruisers were in that general vicinity.

The outstanding point of interest in these two reports is that now for the first time the Commander-in-Chief has information from ships which he can see, - relative positions are known with real accuracy. Suddenly Admiral Jellicoe realized that in all probability his Battle Cruiser Fleet was joining him many miles to the Westward of where it was expected and joining much sooner than anticipated. Evidently the German main body could now be expected to appear much earlier and considerably to the Westward also. To add to the Admiral's confusion, the third report mentioned above came at this time from the SOUTHLIMPTON again, reporting that the Enemy Battle Fleet had altered course back to NORTH and that the German battle cruisers bore South West from the main body, when just the contrary was true. This placed the High Seas Fleet at approximately (L), with the battle cruisers in the general vicinity then of (H). Obviously an error, as there was now strong presumption that Admiral Beatty was in action twenty-five miles from this position, at K. Nevertheless, the new position of the enemy at (L) could only tend to strengthen the Admiral's previous conclusions, which now, however, in spite of all the evidence which he had considered reliable, seemed to collapse like a house of cards on his plotting board. Admiral Jellicoe was compelled now to rely altogether on the reports of vessels in sight. Firing was now heard in the IRON DUKE from ahead around to the starboard beam. Accordingly he headed his fleet South in order to gain no more distance to the Eastward in anticipation of the enemy appearing from the Westward. In actual fact, Admiral Jellicoe could not know yet what to do.

Soon the IRON DUKE sighted the LION to starboard, in action, on fire, and followed by only three ships. The Admiral immediately, at 6:01 p.m., sent signal to the LION:

"WHERE IS ENEMY BATTLE FLEET?"

Admiral Beatty could not see the High Seas Fleet and replied:

"ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS BEARING SOUTH EAST,"

the only enemy he could see. This would put Admiral Hipper at (M). But the Commander-in-Chief must know the position of the German main body. He was racked by the uncertainties of the situation, especially as his last information of the main body from the SOUTHAMPTON was that it was ahead of the battle cruisers which, if true, placed Admiral Scheer about in position (N). To add further to the mess, the SOUTHAMPTON at this moment reported that she had lost sight of the enemy main body but was engaging the enemy battle cruisers at (O) according to the plotting of the report. This conceivably might make it appear to the Commander-in-Chief that Admiral Hipper was between the SOUTHAMPTON and Admiral Beatty, lending color to the report that the German main body, after all, might be at (N). Naturally, Admiral Jellicoe resumed his former course and emphatically repeated at 6:10 p.m. his signal to Admiral Beatty -

"WHERE IS ENEMY BATTLE FLEET?"

Four minutes later all uncertainties were dispelled on receipt from Admiral Beatty, who had in the meantime again sighted the High Seas Fleet as he closed on the Easterly course:

"HAVE SIGHTED ENEMY BATTLE FLEET BEARING SOUTHWEST."

This put Admiral Schoor approximately at (P), only six or seven miles away as nearly as the Commander-in-Chief could judge by visibility conditions. This position was confirmed almost at once by a report received from Admiral Evan-Thomas in the BARHAM. Admiral Jellicoe lost no time in immediately ordering a deployment

to port at 6:15 p.m. on a course approximately perpendicular to the general bearing line of the enemy. What Admiral, under the circumstances, could or would have deployed otherwise?

It has been stated that this orthodox form of deployment, (Fig. 6) by the Grand Fleet should have been considered unnecessary in face of an inferior enemy who, it was correctly assumed, would not himself deploy for battle against the superior strength of the Grand Fleet, - but on the contrary, run away - as actually proved to be the case.

Admiral Jellicoe never assumed the enemy would not fight. As regards the strength of the force opposed to him, the report from Admiral Beatty, through the PRINCESS ROYAL, that the enemy's fleet comprised 26 to 30 battleships, led him to conclude that he had present 18 dreadnoughts (his information from the Admiralty being that this number was available), and that he also had at least one squadron of 8 pre-dreadnoughts. The Admiral further concluded at least 88 destroyers were with the High Seas Fleet. It appeared to Admiral Jellicoe, under these conditions that Admiral Scheer might well consider himself strong enough to fight. He certainly did not anticipate an immediate retreat on his part. It is true that Admiral Jellicoe told the Admiralty in 1914 that he expected the enemy would employ retiring tactics so as to draw him over mines or submarines or into torpedo fire, but it did not follow at all that he would not use his guns as well. Thus the Admiral considered it was essential to deploy the Fleet into line to allow of fire being opened. The idea of an immediate chase never occurred to him.

But even though the Admiral had immediately turned in chase of the High Seas Fleet, it appears that it would have been impossible to force a decisive action before dark unless Admiral Scheer had so willed it. Undoubtedly the Germans would have pursued an

unremitting torpedo offensive against a pursuing fleet; at least Admiral Jellicoe expected that they would do so, in which case the difficulty of pursuit would have been increased by the counter-turning movements of the British. These movements unquestionably would have been any as the Admiral considered it a most risky proceeding to turn-toward when a successive wave of destroyer attacks is being dealt with and that, it was known to him was the German mode of attack.

During this phase of the Battle when Admiral Jellicoe was racked by the uncertainties of the crisis which he knew was impending, the German Commander-in-Chief rode blithely on in pursuit of Admiral Beatty until he in his turn was brought face to face with an extremely critical situation requiring immediate action.

The High Seas Fleet had been proceeding in single column since departure. It was screened by five light cruisers, each accompanied by a destroyer. The reason for maintaining column formation seems fairly clear. It is certain that Admiral Scheer shared in the conviction that "past developments had shown that in the North Sea area a battle was hardly to be expected." Certainly he would not provoke one against the present strength of the Grand Fleet. Had even the remote possibility of being drawn into a fleet action, without ample warning, crossed the Admiral's mind, no doubt he would have disposed his Battle Squadrons ready for approach or deployment in a manner similar to the British disposition. But we know Admiral Scheer had no intention whatever of deliberately deploying for battle with the Grand Fleet itself. Admiral Jellicoe had been steaming during the night since his own departure in single column, but at dawn he formed the Battle Fleet cruising for approach in "divisions line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, columns eight cables apart, organization No. 5." During Admiral Scheer's pursuit of Admiral Beatty the German column was widely strung out except for the three leading divisions; the three rear divisions straggled at times as far as six miles astern. Pursuit

tactics do not lend themselves to adherence to rigid formation. The Commander-in-Chief cared little for maintaining his Fleet in any particular formation so long as he had to do only with the pursued forces of Admiral Beatty. This pursuit lasted for about an hour and a quarter with no indication whatever that Admiral Scheer was rushing into the arms of the Grand Fleet. These indications now appeared with striking and disconcerting rapidity.

The four light cruisers of Scouting Division II in close formation led the German Fleet in the pursuit, and naturally were the first to make contact with the British forces ahead. This contact was with the CHESTER, one of two light cruisers in the screen of Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was proceeding to the southward to Admiral Beatty's support from a position some twenty-five miles in advance of the British Main Body. The general situation at the time of this contact is shown in Figure 5. A sharp and unequal action ensued in which the CHESTER was very badly cut up by Admiral Beedicker's four light cruisers. No report was made of this initial contact and action by either side. However, Admiral Hood, eight miles to the Eastward of the CHESTER, turned at once to the sound of guns and soon not only had the retreating CHESTER under his protection, but had the four German light cruisers under a somewhat effective fire in which the WIESELDEN was heavily hit and disabled. Visibility was very bad.

In the meantime, Admiral Beatty in joining his own Main Body had turned his ships to an Easterly course and in doing so had so crowded Admiral Hipper that the German battle cruisers were themselves also heading away to the Eastward.

It is now for the first time that the German Admiral's comparative peace of mind is considerably disturbed by hearing heavy gunfire to the Eastward, nearly ahead, and by receipt, almost at once, at 6 p.m., of a brief report from the FRANKFURT:

"AM UNDER FIRE FROM ENEMY BATTLESHIPS,"

indicating, it would seem, that the Germans were bumping into fresh enemy forces nearly ahead.

Simultaneously the WIESBADEN reported to Admiral Beedicker by radio that she was disabled, but this intelligence did not reach either the Commander-in-Chief or Vice-Admiral Hipper until much later.

Thus up to this time absolutely all the information Admiral Hipper had was that Scouting Division II, originally in advance of him, was "under fire of enemy battleships." It must have been an exceedingly trying time for the Vice-Admiral. Something had to be done quickly, but what? At this very moment he saw his light cruisers emerge from the mist on his port hand and rush toward him away from this new enemy - BATTLESHIPS. Scouting Division II now, it was observed, only consisted of three ships. These passed at high speed immediately ahead of Admiral Hipper in the LUTZOW and practically swept the battle cruisers along in their rush. Not unlike mob psychology.

The battle cruisers were precipitately turned together by signal to follow the light cruisers, away from exactly what was not known, but at all events, prudently away. This would appear to be the explanation of Admiral Hipper's first turn-away. He himself had not as yet even seen the "enemy battleships," much less been under their fire. These "battleships", of course, were Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron which was forced away after their attack on Admiral Beedicker's light cruisers by a vigorous attack on part of the advanced German destroyers. This destroyer attack incidentally was intended by Admiral Hipper to be launched against Admiral Beatty who, as previously mentioned, was crowding rapidly to dangerous ranges forcing Admiral Hipper to the Eastward. His thought was to push Admiral Beatty away. But the destroyers bumped up against Admiral Hood instead who, very opportunely, made his appearance at this moment.

It should be mentioned that no ships of Admiral Hood's detachment had seen the German battle cruisers, whereas, on the contrary, Admiral Hood's presence with heavy forces, whatever they

night be, was known to the Germans. This is explained by the fact that the German light forces on the spot were decidedly superior.

We now see the spectacle of Admiral Hipper retiring before a vague menace of enemy battleships following the lead of his light forces. During this dash for safety, time was had for Admiral Boodicker to supplement his previous hurried report of enemy battleships by more accurate reports to the Commander-in-Chief as follows:

"ENEMY BATTLESHIPS IN 025-E; WIESBADEN
DISABLED IN 024-E."

Admiral Hipper intercepted this message which gave him the first news of the disabled WIESBADEN, and explained the presence of only three light cruisers as they rushed ahead of him a few minutes before. This circumstance of abandoning the WIESBADEN coupled with the fact that he was rushing headlong into the now close and rapidly advancing main body and destroyer flotillas, requiring him to do something to get clear, impelled him to turn his battle cruisers back to a northerly course again, driving into an unknown force of "enemy battleships". He could not continue his retreat if the Commander-in-Chief would not also retreat. With Admiral Boodicker it had been different; the battle cruisers had followed him while he himself continued on out of the battle for good. Again the Vice-Admiral is carried along not by light cruisers this time but by the force of his Commander-in-Chief pushing behind him. His action in both instances was by force of circumstances largely determined by the other Admirals who shuttle-cocked him back and forth.

As for the Commander-in-Chief at this time, what was passing through his mind? As previously mentioned, almost exactly at 6 p.m. he was startled by the first news of the probable presence of enemy battleships. He could not be sure that it was Admiral Boodicker reported. It must have appeared impossible that Admiral

Beatty so closely pursued could have arrived in that quarter of the field. Yet what was it? He must wait for further information. He could make no decision now, so he pressed on. Ten minutes later the confirmatory report arrived from Admiral Beedicker in the FRANKFURT stating the position of the "enemy battleships" and the plight of the WIESBADEN. While reading these reports in vain effort to visualize the true situation, his leading battleships witnessed the rush of the battle cruisers toward them and their turn-about to resume station close ahead, as described above.

There can be little doubt in view of subsequent events that had Admiral Hipper not turned back to Fleet course when he did, but had continued his retreat to within sight of the Flagship, the eighth battleships in the column, Admiral Scheer might have ordered his famous turn-away at this time instead of later, following the lead of his battle cruisers, as did those a few minutes earlier follow the lead of the light cruisers as they retired.

However, Admiral Scheer, lacking any definite information more important than of the WIESBADEN, ordered a change of course in the reported direction of this disabled cruiser. It is of interest here to realize that Admiral Bohneke in the leading battleship KOENIG, had similar reactions to this situation as had by his Commander-in-Chief, in that he having also intercepted the FRANKFURT's reports, and witnessing the turn-around of the battle cruisers toward the enemy again, immediately ordered his own Squadron to take up the same course toward the WIESBADEN subsequently ordered by Admiral Scheer. Here was displayed a splendid spirit, shared no doubt by all who could see the greatest contributory factor to this spirit, the dash again at the enemy on part of Admiral Hipper. It was well that it was not known that the Vice-Admiral had really no other alternative. His turn-toward was practically forced upon him.

Of this move Admiral Scheer is quoted as saying:

"I made the advance because I thought I ought to assist the WIESEBADEN, and because the situation was quite obscure to me for I saw nothing of the LUTZOW and received no W/T reports."

Admiral Hipper now rushes back closely leading the Fleet to the approximate position where he ordered his first retreat. Admiral Beedicker in his light cruisers is left far behind. Admiral Hipper had retired for ten minutes; he then advanced for ten minutes, when he was made personally aware that the previous report of the FRANKFURT was probably more than correct. As he emerged from the mist within dangerous ranges of the head of the still deploying British battle line, he was met by a most devastating fire which could ill be returned if at all on account of poor visibility to the Northward and because of the fact that his ships were generally in line ahead with the enemy also ahead. He could not even make out what it was he had bumped into; much less so could the Commander-in-Chief in the formation four miles astern. A second time the battle cruisers turned away, but not so far; they steadied together on Southeast, which would at least present broadside fire while retiring, in case opportunity was had to open on the enemy. No doubt consideration was given to duplicating the complete turn-away of twenty minutes before, but this course obviously was impracticable with the Main Body so close astern. It was fortunate for the Germans that they did not turn completely away, otherwise they would not have destroyed Admiral Hood's INVINCIBLE. The LUTZOW, flagship of Admiral Hipper, with twenty major calibre hits is out of action; the DERFLINGER leads. The Commander-in-Chief now received the following apparent explanation of this turn-away which he had vaguely observed through the mist, by radio from Captain Hartog in the DERFLINGER:

"SCOUTING DIVISION I IS TURNING OFF AS NO OBSERVATIONS POSSIBLE ON ACCOUNT OF SUN."

He did not mention the all-important fact which now must have been fully appreciated by Admiral Schoer that the battle cruisers had run into a terrible fire which they found irresistible on account of visibility conditions. It is very possible that the correct report of this impossible situation was unnecessary.

Under the circumstances Admiral Schoer could do no more than accept the temporary solution to this nebulous but apparently grave situation offered by Captain Hartog. The Commander-in-Chief immediately ordered the Fleet to follow Captain Hartog in the DERFLINGER as guide.

Admiral Behncke again anticipated this order of his Commander-in-Chief in performing the obvious by heading around with the leading battleships in the wake of the battle cruisers. He, too, in his turn, came under the same fire which turned away the battle cruisers without being able to make satisfactory reply. His turn-away was governed by identical reasons. He required no order, and the extent of his own turn-away was governed altogether by the battle cruisers in the lead. Subsequently his own action was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief's order to the Fleet to follow the DERFLINGER.

The leading Division of battleships, Division V, while turning to follow the battle cruisers, passed through this inferno of fire. This could be observed more closely by Admiral Schoer than the punishment received by the battle cruisers much farther away. The next battleship Division, Division VI, which was trailed by the Fleet Flagship, was entering into this same zone of maximum enemy fire from a source that was unknown, but its effect was even more forcibly brought home to the Commander-in-Chief. At this very moment a report was handed to him from Commander Behncke of the Fifth Flotilla that

"ACCORDING TO REPORTS OF PRISONERS FROM THE DESTROYER NOMAD, 60 LARGE SHIPS IN VICINITY, INCLUDING 20 NEW BATTLESHIPS AND 6 BATTLE CRUISERS."

That was enough! Admiral Scheer immediately accepted this report as the explanation of the still vague situation into which he was plunging and acted accordingly by ordering as soon as he possibly could, at 6:30 p.m., his own famous turn-away of the entire Fleet. In a sense this turn-away on the part of the High Seas Fleet is analagous to the deployment of the Grand Fleet, - both the deployment and the turn-away being the initial tactical movements involving the entire Fleet on either side as result of the near presence of the other.

Admiral Scheer is quoted as saying with respect to this turn-away:

"I soon saw that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire and that I could not risk the Fleet on the WIESBADEN's account."

To continue with the procedure of the German Fleet: we have witnessed the turn-away and disclosed the apparent reasons, such as they were, which impelled the Commander-in-Chief to retreat so precipitously. Admiral Scheer got his main body turned to a course generally South West, then West, with the battle cruisers straggling to the Southeastward. Firing gradually ceased. The Grand Fleet had not even completed its deployment.

The retreat as above described of the German Fleet continued for twenty-five minutes, when it was turned around again. During this interval the only additional information received or observed by Admiral Scheer was, first, that the rear (formerly the van) of his Fleet was still under major fire some few minutes after he ordered the turn-away; second, a report from Captain Von Karpf of the MOLTKE received shortly after firing was observed to have ceased on his rearmost ships that the

"ENEMY VAN BEARS EAST BY SOUTH,"

at the time of the turn-away; and third, the approach of some enemy light cruisers bearing generally North-Northeast apparently for the purpose of tactical scouting.

Thus to summarize, the Admiral knew that he was heading West in comparative safety. He feared from Commander Heinicke's report that it was very probable the Grand Fleet was in the vicinity. He knew that the van of the enemy, very possibly the Grand Fleet, bore approximately East by South. He did not know the course or formation of the supposed Grand Fleet no more than Admiral Jellicoe knew the disposition of the High Seas Fleet upon contact. The British might be steering in any direction from the position of the van as given by Captain Von Karpf. Admiral Beatty has last been seen at very close ranges heading around to the Eastward to be sure, crowding his own ships likewise to the Eastward. It was certainly possible by now for Admiral Beatty to be near the position designated by the MOLTKE as the enemy van. Yet it was hardly possible, - in fact incredible, - that it could have been Admiral Beatty together with the Fifth Battle Squadron, for "battleships" were reported, who appeared earlier so suddenly in his van. It was all a horrible jumble; he knew practically nothing and it was impossible for him to deduce the truth. The only clue appears to have been given by the appearance of Commodore Goodenough with the Second Light Cruiser Squadron to the Northeastward as possibly defining the rear of the enemy with the van as indicated. A Nelson might have visualized the true situation on this field of battle, but it seems doubtful that even he could have penetrated this maze. It was not, of course, visualized by Admiral Scheer, for had he so deduced the true general disposition of the enemy, never would he have dived into it as he did.

It is idle to consider acceptance of Admiral Scheer's written explanation of the reasons for his second turn-toward. These are familiar to all. After analysis, they do not even merit review.

He explains that it was too early to take up night cruising order. The British could follow, and by compelling him to fight, force him to adopt a particular course of action under enemy pressure. The initiative would pass into their hands and they would be able to cut off his retreat from the Bight. There was only one way to avoid this: by advancing regardless of consequences and sending all destroyers to the attack. A bold offensive would upset Admiral Jellicoe's plans for the rest of the day and, if the blow fell heavily, facilitate the German retreat during night. It would give the opportunity, too, for a last effort to save the WIESBADEN, or at least rescue her crew.

Nor does the statement that "his intention was more probably to slip past the rear of the British Fleet and make for home" deserve any credence whatever.

Admiral Scheer, in the first place, did not know for certain that the Grand Fleet was present. Nobody had seen it, and what reliability was he justified in placing on statements of enemy prisoners in the NORD? In the second place, he did not deduce with the information at hand that indeed the enemy, whatever it might be, was disposed and headed as it was, enabling him "to slip past the rear of the British Fleet and steer for home."

No, we must look elsewhere for his reasons, and it is thought they may be found in the simple human reactions of a very desperate man under these conditions of great uncertainty.

Without doubt, Admiral Scheer, during this initial retirement, gave much consideration to continuing his retreat. Had he been positive in his own knowledge that he faced the entire Grand Fleet, it is highly probable he would have cleared out of that area as fast as he could, as he did a few minutes later when at last he grasped the true situation. This in spite of what he writes to the contrary.

But he was not positive by any means. It might very possibly be that he was retreating before inferior forces. In this case

history would make short shrift of him. His reputation was at stake. How, if this were true, could he face his Emperor and his country? He was running away, he must realize now very forcefully, from the menace of an enemy absolutely unknown to him, no matter what his suspicions might be. He had relied in his decision to do so very largely on information had from enemy prisoners, and he had acted instantly on this very dubious information. He turned back "at the enemy" because he felt morally compelled to do so, even as anyone most likely would do. He must find out for himself what was this enemy; he must taste his fire and make him taste his own. If he found him the superior Grand Fleet, then well and good, - he was justified in running away; but he knew full well he was not now so justified.

The only way he could go back in a hurry was the way he came, - ships about, - exactly as Admiral Hipper went back not many minutes before.

The Austrian Naval Attache quotes Admiral Schoor as saying in this regard:

"The fact is I had no definite object.....

When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."

Here we have the truth in all its simplicity.

On the German side there is little more to tell except how Admiral Schoor achieved justification for a precipitous retreat, and of his grim determination to continue unalterably on his course for home at all costs as the best way out of a grave situation, - the decision of a man in a very desperate situation.

Admiral Schoor ordered the advance of the entire Fleet, "at the enemy," at 6:55 p.m. His turn-toward was completed a little after 7:00 p.m. By 7:06 there began a grim repetition of the onfi-lade hammering of his van. He twice ordered a rescue of the crew of the WIESBADEN. An abortive attempt was made by some destroyers

to reach her. In the meantime the battle cruisers leading the Fleet emerged from the smoke and mist, making excellent targets for the British battle line which had by now arrived at a position for a perfect crossing of the German T. Furthermore, visibility conditions continued very favorable for the British. The Germans could see very little except a ring of fire extending from the Northeast to the Southeast; numbers and types of ships could not be made out. As the German leading divisions emerged in succession into view of the British, there could be no doubt now on the part of anyone who witnessed this ring of fire that indeed it was the Grand Fleet.

The report of the NOKIA prisoners had been correct! The battle cruisers took all the punishment they could stand for something less than ten minutes. Captain Hartog turned away at 7:15 p.m. The battle cruisers had been ordered first to attack the enemy and then to attack the enemy van, which was suggested by Captain Von Karpf's previous report. The battle cruisers had already made these attacks: they could do no more in this hell of fire.

First, Battleship Division V, then Division VI, in following the battle cruisers, began to suffer under this onfilade fire, the intensity of which beggars description. The Commander-in-Chief himself and the ships astern of him now began to taste the bitterness of this medicine. At almost the precise moment Captain Hartog, in the lead, concluded he had had enough; the Commander-in-Chief likewise came to the same conclusion. He had witnessed the long ring of enemy fire, undoubtedly now the Grand Fleet; he had seen his leading ships smothered in the effects of this fire.

Again, it was enough! He must get out of this. Now, indeed, he could run away and no one could say he was not justified in doing so. Again he ordered the main body to turn away, at the same time directing the battle cruisers and destroyers to attack, as previously mentioned, in order that his retreat might be covered.

Now at last the German Admiral feels justified in ordering a retreat. The decision for the first turn-away also is vindicated. Honor is not lost, nor is one's reputation lost in running away from such a superior enemy, especially after such a gallant attack! There is nothing ignominious now in this retreat. Admiral Schoer must have felt somewhat pleased over his act. His duty had been done. True, it was costly; he had placed his Fleet in a most precarious position, probably inherently the most dangerous situation in which a modern fleet ever has been or ever will be. But he did not know what he was running into; how could he know? All the more glory for the pluck displayed! What blame on this account could compare with the shame of not finding out who had hit him and of not hitting back? No, his mind could be at rest on this score. He had dared to attack, and it turned out to be, after all, the Grand Fleet. Running away was nothing now.

As a matter of fact, he was fortunate enough to have struck the most powerful fleet in the world and to have been able to extricate his own fleet for the moment at least. Perhaps herein lies genius. At least German history can make much of it. Analysis will cause a smile. And so are modern battles fought!

These reflections, if entertained by the Admiral at the time, must have given way now to the momentous business at hand, that of avoiding RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE AT DAYLIGHT THE NEXT MORNING. Above everything, this must be done. It is fairly clear that the Admiral did not arrive at his decision as to exactly how he would go about the accomplishment of his purpose until about 9 p.m., when there is every evidence that his mind was completely made up, and that he was pursuing the course selected with a resolution characteristic of magnificent leadership.

After getting his Fleet clear to the Westward, about 7:30 p.m., he turned gradually through South West to South, which latter course he set at 7:45 p.m. This headed him directly for the Ems, distant something over 200 miles. Definitely and perhaps instinctively he had renounced all idea of escape by rounding to the North-

ward of Denmark into the Kattegat. The distance involved precluded taking this course. Without doubt there had already been impressed on his mind the obvious necessity of gaining the security of his own waters before dawn, as the only possible means of avoiding day action with the British in the early morning.

The enemy was still snapping at his van, forcing him farther and farther to the Westward in spite of fleet course being South. At 8 o'clock he ordered his destroyers to attack, hoping thereby to drive off the enemy and enable him to gain sea room toward his bases.

As darkness gradually set in, British pressure relaxed until it practically ceased, about 9 p.m. In the meantime, Admiral Scheer had weighed in the balance the various courses open to him and had arrived at unalterable decision for his procedure during the night. The only way he could possibly achieve his purpose of avoiding another day action was to gain by dawn the swept channels through his own mine fields. The British could not follow him there.

His present course South, for the Ems, certainly would enable the British to re-engage in the morning, at which time he would still be a long way from home and the protection of his mine fields. To take a course slightly more to the Eastward for Helligoland offered the same objection. He could reach the channels near Horn Reef by a little after 3:00 a.m. These were the only ones he could reach by nearly dawn. This, then, was the course he was BOUND TO STEER, the only course possible for him in view of his objective, to avoid day action.

It would be necessary for him to break through the British Fleet. This he fully realized and accepted as inevitable. He was quite willing to risk a night action in order to avoid another day action.

It is interesting to note here that the British, on the contrary, were unwilling to risk a night action in order to insure

resumption of the day action in the morning. The British procedure during the night will be discussed later.

Admiral Schöer was confident he was at least on equal terms with, if not superior to, the British in night combat. The training of the German Light Forces had been very thorough in this respect. He could easily imagine the terrors of night attacks weighing more heavily on the British than on himself, especially as he might conceive that British procedure during the night would most likely be governed by motives exactly opposite to his own.

He was absolutely committed to the Horn Reef course. The night action which would be brought about thereby was merely incidental to the necessity of gaining the security of his mine fields at the earliest possible moment. Be the consequences of this night action what they may, he would head for Horn Reef and maintain his course at all hazard.

This is exactly what he did. At 9:10 p.m. he set the course of the main body SSE, 1/4 E. for Horn Reef, and subsequently during the night made certain slight changes in this course which appeared to the navigators necessary as more direct. The Admiral used language in ordering the course of the main body which left no room for doubt on the part of his subordinate commanders that it was to be maintained without deviation.

As is well known, Admiral Schöer's Fleet crossed astern of the British Fleet during the night and arrived safely off Horn Reef in the early morning. He had outplayed Admiral Jellicoe. During the night his fleet, like a spearhead, not to be turned, was hurled by the master through the light forces disposed in rear of the British main body. The spearhead was hardly blunted by the slight resistance offered. It drove straight and true for Horn Reef. The High Seas Fleet was saved; another day action was averted.

We now revert to British procedure after Admiral Jellicoe's deployment in effort to discover how it could be that the daschund could snap with apparent impunity at the lion and escape with its life.

It seems that no deployment of the many from which Admiral Jellicoe had to choose could give promise of more success. It is true that Admiral Jellicoe could not be fully aware of its general excellence in capping the German T so completely, as shown in Figure 6. He deployed very hastily on meagre information after an hour or more of heartrending uncertainty. More is the wonder it was conceived so well.

Criticism has been directed at this deployment, especially from the point of view that it would have been better had he deployed on the right flank division instead of the one on the left. One must fully appreciate the beating taken by the WARSPITE on the right flank as the Fifth Battle Squadron joined the Grand Fleet, to realize the disaster that would have overtaken the British van with the MARLBOROUGH leading into a perfect T formed by the on-coming German Battle Line. Figure 6 gives something of an idea of this situation. Certainly among Admiral Jellicoe's Jutland decisions he can be complimented on his deployment. The British nation should be very thankful that he deployed exactly as he did.

The deployment was made while the enemy was still out of sight, but the Admiral had a very good idea from Admiral Beatty's last visual report of the distance the High Seas Fleet was from him. Simple calculations on the Admiral's plotting chart must have been reassuring for the Admiral, as it would appear that he had a good chance of capping the head of the German Fleet if it was still in line-ahead formation, as originally reported by the SOUTHAMPTON, but of course he did not know it was still so disposed.

The truth is that the Admiral's expectations in this regard, if they were had by him at all, most probably would have been realized had not the German van been driven back prematurely by

the sudden appearance of Admiral Hood, as has been described. It cannot be presumed, however, that had the German Fleet initially run headlong into this British T it would have suffered more than it did later when it actually did so. No doubt, had this happened, the van would have been similarly crumpled, but the Fleet similarly extricated, and sooner, by the turn-about movement.

Admiral Jellicoe, from first to last, during the remaining hours of daylight after deployment had to contend with various conditions and circumstances which rendered his quarry most elusive. It is very difficult for anyone not present to appreciate the conditions. Nevertheless we know that visibility conditions were generally bad, especially perhaps during the deployment with ships rushing to the van, leaving trails of black smoke, behind which the enemy was obscured, though even otherwise barely in sight because of the mist and haze. As mentioned previously, Admiral Jellicoe had no real knowledge of the formation or course of the High Seas Fleet at the moment of contact. The mist and smoke made visibility so difficult that it was impossible to make anything out clearly, particularly from the IRON DUKE in the center of the line. The Admiral himself, for instance, was never able to see more than three German capital ships at a time. The weather conditions and smoke produced extraordinary effects. The Admiral gives an example of being able to distinguish vessels at perhaps 12,000 yards in one direction while at the same moment ships known to be distant 3000 yards in a different direction were not visible. Furthermore, his enemy did not want to fight the Grand Fleet. As has been seen, the Germans recoiled twice at whispered suggestions of the Grand Fleet, and finally ran away for good when they knew they had actually tasted its fire. Not that anyone blames them. It takes two to make a fight; this was not a fight by any means. Lastly, Admiral Jellicoe, fully appreciating the attitude of the Germans in not wishing to stand up against the Grand Fleet and accordingly expecting their dodging and run-away tactics,

would not permit himself to be drawn into real or fancied traps, - mine, submarine, or what not, which obviously could be anticipated as a means by which an inferior enemy would attempt to weaken a stronger fleet.

It may be, as has been claimed, that this attitude on the part of the British Admiral resulted in display of a certain timidity on his part in closing the Germans. Analysis tends to lessen this claim. Certainly his deployment, which has been condemned from this point of view, rises above criticism. He turned away from German destroyer attacks, but so did the Germans turn away. That was the recognized thing to do, as it is today under certain circumstances. As a matter of fact during the war every Admiral, namely, Admirals Jellicoe, Beatty, Evan-Thomas, Hood and Hipper who had to deal with destroyer attack countered it by turning away.

Again and again he made effort to close, but to no avail.

No, the plain truth is that Admiral Jellicoe did everything he could to fight a conservative, regulation, knock-down, drag-out, day action with a fellow who would not fight, either then or the next morning. No blame to Admiral Scheer for not playing into his enemy's hands, - standing up to the Grand Fleet. All honor to him for getting off so lightly after so severely bruising his adversary. But one can not altogether blame Admiral Jellicoe for not presenting to his country on May 31st a Nelsonian Victory over an enemy who would not fight but who dived through the ropes as soon as he discovered he was in the ring with the champion.

If any criticism at all can be laid at the doors of the British High Command during the daylight hours of May 31st, it will be in lack of fleet policy to obtain victory by relentlessly closing or pursuing at all hazard an enemy who, as a foregone conclusion, could be relied on to beat a hasty retreat. This would probably involve a special form of chase-deployment, turning into destroyer attacks a willingness to risk submarine and mine traps, - in general, a display of the bulldog tenacity of the reckless killer confident of his strength. This was not in evidence on the

part of Admiral Jellicoe. It is certain that it should have been if complete victory, - annihilation,- was sought by the British Admiralty and by Admiral Jellicoe. The conclusion to which analysis forces one to arrive is that the Admiralty, and of course that includes Admiral Jellicoe, its representative in the field, would forego VICTORY if it had to be purchased at this price. If blame is to be distributed on this score, Admiral Jellicoe must take his just share, and it is believed he would be the first to accept it.

This cautious fighting policy of the Grand Fleet was fully set forth in Admiral Jellicoe's previously-mentioned letter to the Admiralty, appended. This was approved by the Government. It is quite possible that Admiral Jellicoe's views influenced the Government to no small degree. He knew that a disaster to the Grand Fleet meant inevitably the loss of the war. Furthermore, in the Spring of 1916 we know that relations with the United States were very delicate. A short time before Jutland, Admiral Jellicoe received from the Admiralty a State paper in which the United States made the strongest protests against the British blockade. The language used was such that it seemed to the Admiral quite possible that the United States Navy might be brought against him. The Admiral fully realized that his capital ships were not well equipped to withstand hits by torpedoes; one torpedo was quite sufficient to sink a battleship. In this connection the MARLBOROUGH was fortunately hit by a torpedo in the one spot where her protection was fairly adequate - otherwise she would not have survived.

Again the conclusion is that he loyally fought the Fleet in strict accordance with the policy of his Government. As to whether this policy was right or wrong, in view of the state of the world at this time, we will not enter here. It is sufficient for our purposes in discussing Jutland decisions to say that Admiral Jellicoe may certainly have hoped that a turn of the wheel of fate would give him a cheap victory, but that the purchase of victory at the expected price was not contemplated. Admiral Jellicoe, of

all men, know what would be the consequences of not presenting to his country a sweeping victory on May 31st. He had the courage to hold himself within the fighting limits imposed, perhaps largely self-imposed. He was perfectly frank and straightforward in his reports shortly after the battle when the temptation to offer excuses might have influenced a lesser man. His subsequent writings and his life have been such as could be expected from such a sterling character.

However, to resume. In accordance with the British Commander-in-Chief's desire to close his nebulous enemy for the death blow, we find that 15 minutes after deployment was ordered he directed, at 6:29 p.m., a main body change of course three points toward the enemy. This was almost at the exact moment Admiral Scheer ordered the first turn-away of the German Main Body. Admiral Jellicoe's signal was immediately negatived, as the deployment has not been completed. Inevitable confusion would have resulted at the rear of the British bent column. Apparently he was committed to his present course until completion of the deployment. To close at this time was most desirable, as it would be through safe waters not previously occupied by the Germans. There could be no prearranged traps here. Of course the Admiral realized this and no doubt more than regretted and was most impatient over his self-imposed inability to overcome this check. As previously related, the Germans by the time the deployment was completed, about 6:42 p.m., had disappeared from the field on account of their turn-away. Admiral Jellicoe considered that he was impotent to close until his Battle Line had straightened out; at least one must judge that the Admiral felt so, as instantly the Fifth Battle Squadron swung into line at the rear the Admiral ordered a turn-toward of only one point this time, by Divisions, to Southeast.

One point was not enough. The Germans had vanished, not even a real destroyer attack was vouchsafed. After ten minutes on course Southeast he ordered the Fleet, at 6:54 p.m., to change

course by Divisions four more points toward the enemy to South. The reason for this ten-minute delay is explained by the vagueness and uncertainty of the situation. As previously mentioned, it is very difficult to appreciate the extraordinary effects due to weather conditions and smoke. The Admiral did not see the enemy turn away on this or on the later occasion, nor was the turn-away ever reported to him. Afterwards, the Admiral ascertained that it had been seen by some ships and even by one or two officers in the IRON DUKE who were clear of smoke, though not by anyone on the bridge with him. When the enemy disappeared at this time from view the Admiral took it to be due to a momentary re-thickening of the mist, especially as ships at the rear of the line were still firing. Thus he did not turn at once in the direction in which the enemy was last seen, not anticipating for a moment the enemy's immediate retreat.

In the meantime, the irrepressible Commodore Goodenough, at the rear of the line, had advanced on his own initiative in the direction of the vanished enemy, for tactical scouting. He witnessed while under heavy fire the completion of the turn-toward of the German Fleet and placed in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, at exactly seven o'clock, a report by radio that the enemy Battle Fleet was steering East South-East, straight into Admiral Jollicoe's arms. The Admiral's immediate reaction to this great news was to meet the enemy half way. He ordered another three-point change toward the enemy to Southwest by South.

Hardly, however, had he steadied on this new course than there appeared out of the mist and smoke a swarm of enemy destroyers, as well as the van of the High Seas Fleet. He recoiled from this torpedo threat, first to South, and eventually to South-east. Thereafter the main body never regained contact with the fleeing enemy in spite of consistent efforts to do so.

Much has been said in regard to Admiral Beatty's message of 7:47 p.m., urging the Commander-in-Chief to follow him with the battleships, - "We can then cut off the whole enemy's Battle Fleet."

At the time this message was sent Admiral Beatty was well ahead and out of sight of the British Battle Fleet, which was directly astern of him and steering exactly the same course, - South West. Of this fact Admiral Beatty was in ignorance. When this dispatch was deciphered and handed to Admiral Jellicoe shortly after 8 p.m., he acted upon it at once by directing Admiral Jerran in the battleship van to follow the Vice-Admiral. Admiral Jerran could really do nothing about it as he did not know for certain where were the battle cruisers. But in directing his own van to follow the Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, it should not be inferred for a moment that the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the situation was not as correct and more so than that of Admiral Beatty; for this is far from the truth. Between 7 and 7:30 p.m., the Battle Fleet was actually nearer the enemy than were the battle cruisers and this fact was well known to the Commander-in-Chief. Furthermore, at 8 o'clock, just before Admiral Jerran was directed to follow the battle cruisers, Admiral Jellicoe had already altered course to WEST, the battle cruisers continuing Southwest for some fifteen minutes more.

Nevertheless the British were in a fair way to "cut off whole of enemy's Battle Fleet," when darkness interfered.

Thus by 9:00 p.m. the two main bodies had approached to within 12,000 yards of each other without contact because of the approaching darkness. At 9:00 o'clock Admiral Jellicoe ordered course SOUTH and directed his dispositions for the night. It will be remembered that Admiral Scheer himself was steering South at this time, so that now the two fleets steamed parallel to each other for about an hour. It was shortly after 10:00 o'clock when the German Fleet was finally steadied on course for Horn Reef, as has been described, rapidly closing the British, which course eventually led the German Fleet safely across the wake of the Grand Fleet.

Thus we find the day at an end without definite results, beyond question very largely because of the conservative tactics employed by Admiral Jellicoe.

So much for the battle during daylight of May 31st. We have already followed Admiral Scheer in formulating his decision for the ensuing night. We now take up British night proceedings in effort to read what passed through Admiral Jellicoe's mind to determine his decisions.

We know that as darkness fell he set course South for his battleship squadrons. This course was not altered until about dawn of June 1st, by which time the Germans had slipped away behind him.

We have seen that Admiral Scheer's procedure was for the ultimate purpose of having such freedom of action at dawn as to enable him to avoid another day action. Conversely, Admiral Jellicoe's procedure was for the ultimate purpose of re-engaging the High Seas Fleet at daylight. Admiral Scheer ordered the destroyers to attack during the night, trusting thereby to further his main object of avoiding day action. In doing so, he knew full well that he could not rely on having them with him in the morning. Admiral Jellicoe concentrated all of his forces, including his destroyers and light cruisers, in an effort to hold and preserve all units together during the dark hours so that he could strike again with his entire force well in hand at daylight. It is of minor consequence how the Admiral concentrated his forces during night in order to conserve them for the business of the morning, as compared to the all-important feature of his dispositions in that these precluded deliberate search, tracking and attack on the part of his light forces. What was in the Admiral's mind is very apparent. He would manage in some manner to keep in touch with the High Seas Fleet during the night without assistance from his light forces. Having renounced their aid in this effort, he would be compelled to rely on his deductions as to Admiral Scheer's intentions, derived largely from guess-work, as he certainly could not count on special contacts if he deliberately ordered his forces not to seek them.

Undoubtedly the appreciation of Admiral Jellicoe at this time was somewhat as follows: The Germans, in order to gain their base,

unquestionably would attempt to steer southeasterly courses to the swept channels at Horn Reef, at the mouth of the Ems, or to the Westward of Heligoland. Which one he did not know. His impressions always were, however, that Admiral Scheer would try to regain his base by either the Ems Channel or the Channel about Northwest from Heligoland. He assumed that if the British Fleet steered a Southerly course at about the same speed as his enemy, or perhaps a little faster, it would act as a buffer during the night against any attempt of the High Seas Fleet to gain sceroon to the Eastward, which would be necessary in order to reach the various swept channels mentioned. If, indeed, as could be expected, the enemy should bump against him during the night, he could be expected to recoil as against a spring. It was anticipated that any bumping of the two Fleets would probably occur at the rear of the British formation, as the British speed was slightly in excess of that reported for the High Seas Fleet, and, furthermore, the two Fleets were nearly abreast of each other as darkness fell. Inasmuch as all the British destroyer flotillas were massed at the rear, they appeared to be well placed for such a contingency in driving off any German advance to the Eastward. The Admiral very likely conceived the situation so well in hand that it was unnecessary to employ light forces to keep him informed of German procedure. At all events, even though the Admiral may have desired to detach scouting forces during the night, the advisability of so doing apparently weighed less in the balance than the advantage of insuring their presence with the Fleet for the battle contemplated at daylight.

We know that everything went contrary to the Admiral's expectations during that night. The German Fleet escaped astern of him and his light forces were dispersed. How could an Admiral be so completely deceived, and how could one's plans be so thoroughly disrupted? In order to visualize at this distance the reactions in the IRON DUKE to the various incidents during the night, it is necessary to remain practically blind, as was Admiral Jellicoe, to

what actually happened outside the Flagship and consider only the information vouchsafed to him. In this way one is enabled to make one's own deductions as to what was going on and to understand those at which the Admiral arrived. We will again follow the Admiral at his elbow as closely as possible.

Having made his original dispositions for the night at 9:00 p.m., and knowing from several reports, even though somewhat conflicting, that the enemy was generally to the Westward, the Admiral was soon reassured that all was going as expected.

Commodore Goodenough reported at 9:10 p.m. that the enemy destroyers which he had engaged and reported a few minutes earlier, had been "driven to the Northwest." This tended to strengthen the Admiral's opinion as to the buffer effect of his Fleet as he proposed to dispose it.

By 9:30 p.m., all necessary signals had been sent to have the Fleet "assume second organization" with destroyers on "station astern of Battle Fleet five miles...., course of the Fleet, South." Immediately after, at 9:32 p.m., to be precise, having regard for the possibility of some of his enemy slipping around him making for Horn Reef, in spite of confidence in his ability to keep between the major German forces and his bases, the Admiral ordered the ABDIEL to lay mines in that vicinity in a previously designated position. Already he had three submarines off the Horn Reef. This must have appeared to the Admiral as sealing, so far as he was able, the fate of the High Seas Fleet. His enemy could not possibly gain sea-room to the Eastward without bumping into him, and if he did this he would bounce off again to the Westward. Some forces, it appeared of course, might escape, but the ABDIEL's mines and the submarines would make it hot for these. Confidence in his own appreciation of the situation most likely cheered the Admiral.

Evidence of fighting by light forces in the rear was observed by the Admiral intermittently from 9:30 p.m. to midnight. This "destroyer fighting" in the rear at a long distance astern, led the Admiral to think that his destroyers were in action with

enemy destroyers and supporting light cruisers. He considered the effect of such fighting would be to turn the enemy to the Westward, "even if he had originally intended to take passage by Horn Reef."

Next, at 9:30 p.m. and 9:43 p.m., the Admiral was informed by Admiral Beatty of the position, course and speed of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and at the same time the enemy's bearing was given as North by West from the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the enemy steering WEST-SOUTHWEST. There was little, if any, doubt now in Admiral Jellicoe's mind as to the real position of his Battle Cruisers, largely because of an erroneous report of their position had previously from Admiral Jerran, which had been accepted as correct, and which appeared to be confirmed now by Admiral Beatty's own report of his position. The Battle Cruiser Fleet, according to this report, plotted to Westward a little abaft the starboard beam of the IRON DUKE, distant about 8 miles. Nevertheless, no matter exactly where was Admiral Beatty, and he was not where he was judged to be, but, on the contrary, well ahead on the starboard bow, the Commander-in-Chief was confirmed in the opinion that his enemy was still to the Westward endeavoring to make for the Ems or Heligoland, but recoiling on Westerly courses from the Grand Fleet. More than ever is he reassured.

Just before 10:00 p.m. the Admiral was advised by the Admiralty that three destroyer flotillas had been ordered to attack him during the night. This was not unexpected. Certainly the enemy would attempt to shove the Grand Fleet out of the way to the Eastward; how could the High Seas Fleet gain its base unless the British were made to give way? Evidence of these attacks apparently had been observed already at the rear. No, he would not give way. His resolve to hold course SOUTH, to ride off his enemy, in all probability now became as fixed as did Admiral Scheer's determination to steer for Horn Reef. He would not be turned away by these destroyer attacks; he would hold his enemy where he was to the Westward, thus denying to him any Eastings whatever.

A few minutes later, at almost exactly 10 o'clock, another despatch was received from the Admiralty from which it appeared on the plotting chart that the rear of the enemy was well on the starboard bow, distant some 15 miles and on a Southerly course. This information differed considerably from the reported enemy position as given only a few minutes before by Admiral Beatty, which placed the V.M. of the enemy on the starboard quarter distant 7 to 8 miles. The Admiral disregarded this Admiralty despatch as it was apparently incorrect; he naturally would trust a report from his Vice-Admiral, who was on the spot, in preference to it. In any event, no matter if the Admiralty or Admiral Beatty were correct, the situation was satisfactory: the enemy was being held off to the Westward.

Then for nearly an hour no news of any consequence reached Admiral Jellicoe except that the CANADA passed on to the Commander-in-Chief from the CONTEST that a German destroyer was in the vicinity and steering Northeast. The fighting by the light forces was observed continuing at the rear of the Fleet. But, "at 10:41 p.m. the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy was believed to be returning to its Base as its course was SSE-3/4-E. and speed 16 knots."

Here, indeed, was news; but what of it? What, if any, reliance could be placed on it? How long could the enemy head in this direction and not crash into the Grand Fleet? Certainly it could not do so if on his starboard hand and ahead as reported by the Admiralty. If, as more likely, his enemy was on the starboard quarter as reported by Admiral Beatty, his light forces astern would make short shrift of the SSE-3/4-E feature of this report. That was exactly why the destroyers had been massed astern! The firing, which had been observed at the rear, confirmed the Admiral in the belief that his enemy was being successfully ridden off. Naturally, the enemy might very well have tried to make a break to the Eastward. Of all things this was to be expected. But the

Admiral considered that it was impossible for the High Seas Fleet to do so without being observed. No, he had held his enemy off up to now, so he firmly believed, and he would continue to do so. It was deemed, no doubt, that the Germans desired, above all things, that the British give way to the Eastward. He would not play into the enemy's hands in this matter. More than ever he resolved to hold course SOUTH! To strengthen this resolve he now enquired of Commodore Hawksley, in the CASTOR, largely to confirm his own opinion, if he was engaging enemy destroyers. He was advised by the Commodore that he had been engaged by enemy cruisers. Of course it was thought that these were simply destroyer supports in their effort to make the Grand Fleet give way.

But now, at 11:30 p.m., at about the same time the above-quoted Admiralty telegram was deciphered and handed to him, another report came in from the BIRMINGHAM to the effect that battle cruisers, probably hostile, were in sight bearing Northeast, course SOUTH. The BIRMINGHAM's position in this report was given as 30 miles astern of the IRON DUKE. Manifestly this was in error; the BIRMINGHAM might be anywhere astern. As the BIRMINGHAM could not possibly have seen Battle Cruisers at a greater distance than two miles at night, the bearing N.E. was not of importance, whereas the course given, namely, SOUTH, was highly important. Naturally the Admiral trusted the accuracy of the BIRMINGHAM report in preference to the Admiralty message.

This report tended again to convince the Admiral that by heading South himself he was still, at 11:30 p.m., raiding off his enemy. The simultaneous Admiralty report of enemy course SSE-3/4-E could now be discounted as certainly only a temporary and expected enemy procedure. Also, at this time various units of the Fleet noticed that the firing astern had worked around from the starboard to the port quarter. No doubt likewise this general shifting of the fighting to the Eastward was remarked in the IRON DUKE, but its significance, if noted at all, escaped the Admiral or was dismissed

by him in his conviction that the enemy still remained to the Westward, even though his destroyer attacks may have penetrated well to the Eastward. Midnight came and went with no change in the Admiral's appreciation of the situation or his evident satisfaction with it. It was at this moment, as we know, but as he did not know, that the High Seas Fleet cleared his wake some 10 miles astern.

On and on he went until 1:00 a.m., then 2:00 a.m., with no enemy report of any immediate significance reaching him. Dawn would soon be upon him. He must now make up his mind what to do. By 2:30 a.m. he would be very close to the northern line of British mined areas. His light forces were astern. His obvious course was to head around and soon, to the Northward, picking up his light forces, forming for battle against the expected approach of the High Seas Fleet. Should the enemy fail to appear at once he would then close Horn Reef as the only remaining alternative. He could not head much farther South with safety.

Needless to say, the High Seas Fleet did not appear nor did Admiral Jellicoe close Horn Reef as his destroyers did not join up. It did not matter, however, what the Admiral did now; he was too late. Admiral Scheer was 30 miles away to the Northeastward closing Horn Reef. The German Fleet entered the swept channels about 4:00 a.m., now safely heading for home. What a relief! The joy of the Germans must have been unbounded. What tales of having twisted the lion's tail! Yes, the lion had been grievously wounded in body and in spirit. Outside, he looked about vainly for his enemy. Maddening hours passed, before the exasperated British called it a day and headed for home. Gradually the news of comparative losses filtered into the Grand Fleet bringing a sense of failure and impotency. Little now could one be consoled with the knowledge that one had fought in accord with the Nation's cautious policy. Little consolation could be had from a review of proceedings which must have convinced Admiral Jellicoe that he had done

his best under the circumstances. The galling fact remained that he had not achieved victory and that he had been badly hurt by a lesser foe. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet headed for home to face his Country's disappointment.

In conclusion it should be stated that the British Admiralty some ten years after the event, came to certain conclusions other than those reached by Admiral Jellicoe as to the German High Seas Fleet procedure during the night of May 31st-June 1st, 1916. It is not stated what are these conclusions, but it can be assumed with a certain amount of confidence that the Admiralty infers that it should have been evident that the Germans were actually slipping away astern of the Grand Fleet. That is well and good. A good many others similarly armed with hindsight have come to the same conclusion.

It must be realized that Admiral Jellicoe was not placed in full possession, by any means, of all enemy information had by the Admiralty that night. We know of at least one extremely important enemy message intercepted by the Admiralty and never passed on to him. This was the signal ordering airship reconnaissance at the Horn Reef at daylight. This ALONE undoubtedly would have been considered by the Admiral strong proof that the High Seas Fleet was heading in that direction. It is quite possible and no doubt very true that many other enemy messages were intercepted at the Admiralty but not relayed to the Commander-in-Chief which made it very clear to their Lordships that Admiral Scheer was heading for Horn Reef. This must be the case in view of their seeming conviction in this regard on that night and their subsequent conclusions. But instead of giving these messages or their exact purport to the Admiral in the field, they saw fit to condense them into a thoroughly innocuous dispatch which was capable of being discounted at once by the simultaneous report of the BIRMINGHAM as has been described. The Admiralty itself woefully failed the Commander-in-Chief.

There is no telling by Admiral Beatty himself or by anyone else, what would have been actual British procedure had Admiral

Beatty, the succeeding Commander-in-Chief, or other Admiral, been in Admiral Jellicoe's boots. Admiral Jellicoe was wrong. No one knows it or regrets it probably more than himself. But at the time this nobleman of the sea was right as he saw it. He had decided on a certain course of action and had the courage and resolution, also typical of the splendid leader as in the case of Admiral Scheer, to stick it out on the course selected, convinced in his own mind that he was right. Nothing during those night hours had occurred to seriously shake his appreciation of the situation. Another Admiral, of course, might have ordered destroyer attacks or search operations, or even sought the enemy for a night engagement, or perhaps deduced correctly Admiral Scheer's decision. This Admiral staked all on beating the enemy in the morning with his forces well in hand enroute to the Ems or Heligoland. His procedure was ever tempered by the caution demanded by his Government.

It is not the purpose to discuss here the results of this battle except as these were caused by the major decisions set forth above. Results may be grouped under various headings such as morale, losses, lessons, the conduct of the war, etc. Results so far as morale and losses are concerned are well-known. The lessons to be learned from Jutland seemingly are many and varied. They will be absorbed by individuals in their own way, as much and no more as they study it and reflect on it in the light of theory. So far as Jutland decisions affected the conduct of the war, it may be said they had no effect: the war went on very much as if the battle had not been fought. England retained her command of the sea and was able to continue her transport operations into the various theatres of war: the virtual blockade continued unabated. The status quo ante prevailed.

One cannot escape the view that this was the minimum requirement demanded of the Grand Fleet by British policy in 1916, and all that could reasonably be expected by this policy. However much there was hope for VICTORY and its results, the price to pay was too

great. A certain satisfaction was had with the best that could be bought with the limited means imposed. One had to learn to be content with what one could afford.

In a large measure, the two governments, the Admiralties, fought the battle of Jutland and are responsible to their respective peoples for its results. On the British side in particular, Admiral Jellicoe was the instrument, the man to whom the Admiralty entrusted the Fleet to do with it as circumstances permitted. He took the fleet as he found it. It was no fault of his that turret design in the capital ships was fatally at fault; no blame to him that these same ships were peculiarly vulnerable to torpedo fire; nor was it his fault that his armor-piercing shells were defective in that they crumbled on impact or that fire control installations were wanting. No, it was largely because of these and other defects and faults as well as the political situation that he was permitted to do little, but as much perhaps as any human mortal could under the circumstances. It is rather for the Admiralty to shoulder responsibility and explain the reason for lack of VICTORY

More and more as one reflects on the Battle of Jutland is one struck with the noble-mindedness of Admiral Jellicoe. More and more in research is one turned back, almost involuntarily, to his writings as a source of simple truth and straightforwardness. He emerges out of the after-mist and odium of Jutland in his true light - that of the simple, honest seaman - probably the finest character of the War.

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes
1410	S.L.	GALATEA TO LION (BEATTY) TWO FUNNELLED SHIP HAS STOPPED STEAMER BEARING ESE EIGHT MILES, AM CLOSING 1410
1420	Flags	GALATEA TO ALL. ENEMY IN SIGHT.
1420	Radio	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT TWO CRUISERS, PROBABLY HOSTILE IN SIGHT BEARING ESE, COURSE UNKNOWN. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 48' N; LONG. 5° 21' W. 1420. NOTE: INTERCEPTED BY IRON DUKE (JELlicOE)
1428	Radio	B-109 to REGENSBURG (Light Cruiser destroyer leader) 164y-IV, scattered enemy vessels in sight. Sighted Commander Fourth Half Flotilla. 1425
1429	Radio	B-109 to REGENSBURG. Reported enemy vessels steering East. Signed: Fourth Half Flotilla. <u>Note:</u> This message was intercepted by the British direction-finding system which plotted and reported to Jellicoe 40 minutes later an enemy destroyer at 1431 ten miles to the Northward of actual position of the B-109 at that time.
1430	RADIO	CALATEA TO LION. URGENT. MY 1420. CRUISERS ARE STOPPED 1422. <u>NOTE:</u> INTERCEPTED BY IRON DUKE.

(Note: In this and in succeeding tables, the German communications are shown in small type; the British communications in large type. Messages, signals, etc., on both sides are given in chronological order of time of dispatch. References in the text ordinarily will be to time of dispatch. All times are G.M.T.)

TABLE II

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes.
1431	Radio	ELBING to C-in-C. Enemy Battle Cruiser in sight, W by N, 1431. <u>Note:</u> Actually the light cruiser GALATEA as intercepted by the Germans misread to mean that enemy fleet of 24 to 26 battleships in sight. This message also was intercepted by the British direction-finding system which plotted and reported to C-in-C 40 minutes later an enemy light cruiser at 1431, 13 miles to NE of actual position of ELBING at 1431. This message was reported to Jellicoe by the INDOMITABLE (with British main body) as very loud Telefunken signal.
1434	Radio	ELBING to C-in-C. Am under fire 1434.
1434	RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. ENEMY SHIPS REPORTED IN MY 1420 ARE TWO DESTROYERS. AM CHASING 1430. <u>NOTE:</u> INTERCEPTED BY IRON DUKE.
1434	RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. ONE CRUISER PROBABLY HOSTILE BEARING E STEERING SSE. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 20' N. LONG 5° 19' W 1430. <u>NOTE:</u> INTERCEPTED BY IRON DUKE.
1435	Radio	LUTZOW (leader of Battle Cruisers) to C-in-C. Smoke of several enemy craft in sight in 164y. Signed Commander Scouting Forces 1427.
1436	Radio	B-109 to REGENSEBURG (1st Leader of Destroyers) Recognition signal of enemy is "P.L." Signed Fourth Half Flotilla 1435.
1438	Radio	LUTZOW to C-in-C. Scouting Division I is in 031e, course SSW. 1436.

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TABLE III

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes.
1439	RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. HAVE SIGHTED LARGE AMOUNT OF SMOKE AS THOUGH FROM A FLEET BEARING ENE. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 50' N; LONG. 5° 19' E. 1435. <u>NOTE:</u> INTERCEPTED BY IRON DUKE. THIS WAS THE SMOKE OF THE GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS.
1445	S.L.	GALATEA TO LION. ENEMY APPARENTLY TURNED NORTH 1445. <u>NOTE:</u> NOT CLEAR BUT PROBABLY REFERS TO THE SMOKE OF THE GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS.
1451	RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. MY 1435. SMOKE SEEMS TO BE SEVEN VESSELS BESIDES DESTROY- ERS AND CRUISERS. THEY HAVE TURNED NORTH. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 52' N; LONG. 5° 33' E. 1445.
1445	Radio	FRANKFURT to C-in-C. 047-D. Not Battle Cruisers but four light cruisers CALAIOPE class on course NE. Signed SDII 1450. <u>NOTE:</u> Reporting all of first LCS. This mes- sage corrects the ELBING's dispatch (1431) reporting enemy battleships.
1459	Radio	ELBING to LUTZOW. Four enemy cruisers ARETHUS A class in sight. 1426.
1505	SL VIA LCS	GALATEA TO LION. SEVERAL CRUISERS AND DES- TROYERS BEARING EAST STEERING VARIOUS COURSES. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 54' N; LONG. 5° 21' E. AM KEEPING TOUCH, COURSE NORTH- 25 KNOTS. ENEMY CRUISERS HAVE ALTERED TO NW. 1505. <u>NOTE:</u> THIS MESSAGE REFERS TO THE CONCENTRA- TION OF THREE GERMAN LCS, FRANKFURT, PILLAU, ELBING, WITH DESTROYERS.

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TABLE III (Continued)

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes.
1505	RADIO	FALMOUTH TO LION. URGENT. THREE CRUISERS PROBABLY HOSTILE IN SIGHT BEARING EAST, COURSE NORTH. MY POSITION 56° 59' N; LONG. 5° 31' E. 1500 <u>NOTE:</u> AT THIS TIME THE FALMOUTH WAS ACTUALLY FIVE MILES SOUTH OF GALATEA WHO WAS UNDER FIRE FROM THESE SAME THREE CRUISERS. NOTE DISCREPANCY IN DEAD-RECKONING POSITIONS.
1508	RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. ENEMY SHIPS REPORTED HAVE ALTERED NW. MY COURSE IS NNW. MY POSITION 56° 59' N; LONG. 5° 27½' E. 1507.
1512	Visual	ELBING to SHIPS PRESENT. Four modern enemy cruisers in sight to the Westward, 5th and 6th coming in sight distant 1630. <u>Note:</u> The cruisers in sight were all of the First LCS; those coming in sight were two of the Third LCS.
1515	Radio	LUTZOW to C-in-C. Only four enemy light cruisers in sight. Position SD-I 022e, course NNW. 1450. <u>Note:</u> This message was sent on receipt of report from FRANKFURT (1455), confirmed by ELBING (1459). Apparently slight discrepancy between times of SD-I and SD-II. LUTZOW could not see to report the four enemy cruisers distant 19 to 20 miles.
1515	Radio	ELBING to C-in-C. Scattered enemy forces in 152y IV steering NNW. <u>Note:</u> A combination of two simultaneous messages; refers to light cruisers of Third LCs closing the First LCs.

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TABLE III (Continued)

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes.
1521	RADIO	LION TO SOS. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 48' N; LONG. 5° 17' E., COURSE NE, SPEED 23 KNOTS.
1522	SL & RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. AM LEADING ENEMY TO NW. THEY APPEAR TO BE FOLLOWING. MY POSITION LAT. 57° 02' W; LONG. 5° 23' E. 1520.
1524	RADIO	NOTTINGHAM TO LION AND IRON DUKE. URGENT. HAVE SIGHTED SMOKE BEARING ENE FIVE COLUMNS. MY POSITION LAT. 56° 46' N; LONG. 5° 14' E. 1522. <u>NOTE:</u> THE NOTTINGHAM AT THIS TIME WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE LION. MESSAGE REFERS TO GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS. NOTTINGHAM MADE SAME RE- PORT BY SL TO HIS SQUADRON COMMANDER. PRE- VIOUSLY AT 1515 THE NEW ZEALAND "SIGHTED FIVE ENEMY SHIPS ON STARBOARD BOW" BUT DID NOT REPORT AS SEEMINGLY UNNECESSARY.
1525	RADIO	GALATEA TO LION. URGENT. HAVE SIGHTED SMOKE ON BEARING ESE, APPARENTLY SQUADRON ASTERN OF CRUISERS STEERING WNW BEARING ESE. <u>NOTE:</u> INTERCEPTED BY IRON DUKE.
1525	REMARKS	LION. ENEMY IN SIGHT STARBOARD BOW.
1526	Radio	LUTZOW to ALL. SD-II close SD-I strong enemy force in sight of 151y 1629.

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TABLE IV.

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes
1527	RADIO	C-IN-C TO S.O.-B.C.F. MY POSITION AT 1515, 57-50 N., 4-15 E. COURSE SE BY S, SPEED 19.
1540	RADIO	S.O.B.C.F. TO C-IN-C (JELlicOE). URGENT. ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS, 5 IN NUMBER, BEARING NE. DESTROYERS LARGE NUMBER BEARING NE, COURSE UNKNOWN. POSITION OF REPORTING SHIP LAT. 56-53 N., LONG. 5-28 E. 1535. <u>NOTE:</u> SENT WHEN IT APPEARED BATTLE COURSE WOULD BE NW TOWARD JELlicOE. HIPPER ORDERED COURSE SE AT THE EXACT MOMENT THIS DESPATCH WAS DRAFTED. SEE NEXT DESPATCH.
1544	RADIO	FALMOUTH (ADMIRAL NAPIER) TO SO., B.C.F. & C-IN-C. URGENT. ENEMY BEARS E BY S FROM ME DISTANCE UNKNOWN. COURSE SE, SPEED 21, TO 25 KNOTS. MY POSITION LAT. 57-10 N., LONG. 5-14 E. <u>NOTE:</u> REFERS TO THE GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS APPROXIMATELY 18 MILES DISTANT.
1545	RADIO	S.O.B.C.F. TO C-IN-C. URGENT. COURSE OF ENEMY S. 55° E. MY POSITION LAT. 56-53 N., LONG. 5-33 E
1550	S.L.	GALATEA TO SO. 3D LCS. (COMMO.SINCLAIR) (COMMO.NAPIER) DO YOU KNOW RELATIVE POSITION COURSE AND SPEED OF OUR BATTLE CRUISERS? AM I RIGHT IN TRYING TO LEAD ENEMY? NO REPLY RECORDED. <u>NOTE:</u> APPARENTLY SOME DOUBT IN COMMODORE SINCLAIR'S MIND AS TO JUSTIFICATION FOR HIS COURSE OF ACTION.

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TABLE IV (Continued)

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes
1554	Radio	LUTZOW to All. Six enemy battle cruisers, light enemy forces in 15ly, course SE, S.D.I. in 004e, course SSE, 18 knots. Am engaged in battle with 6 battle cruisers. Report position own main body signed Comdr., Scouting Forces, 1548. <u>NOTE:</u> He does not know of Evan-Thomas' presence.
1555	RADIO	S.O.-BCF. TO C-IN-C. URGENT. AM ENGAGING ENEMY. MY POSITION LAT. 56-53 N., LONG., 5-31 E. 1550.
1600		WARSPITE. REMARKS: OPENED FIRE. (ON LIGHT CRUISERS OF 3D II. NO GERMAN REPORT AS YET OF THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR QUEEN ELIZABETHS.)
1605	Radio	C-in-C (Scheer) to Fleet; Comdr. Sco.Forces- Own main body position 4 p.m. 043e center, course NW, speed 15 knots.
1617	RADIO	C-IN-C (JELLICOE) TO SO. 5TH B.S. ARE YOU IN COMPANY WITH SO. - B.C.F.? REPLY - YES, I AM ENGAGING ENEMY.
1620	Radio	FRANKFURT to LUTZOW. Enemy main body 15ly English Second Battle Squadron 5 ships. Reported enemy force steering S.E. 1612. <u>NOTE:</u> The FRANKFURT at this time was under fire of the 5th Battle Squadron, while in position 8 miles to the Northward and in rear of Hipper. The 5 ships were the British 5th B.S. plus the light cruiser destroyer leader FEARLESS and not the 2nd B.S. This is the first report of Evan-Thomas and was intercepted by Scheer.

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TABLE IV (Continued)

Time of Despatch	System	Message and Notes
1628	Visual	From STETTIN (leading light cruiser Scout with Scheer's Main Body) to FLEET. Gun-fire to NNW $\frac{1}{2}$ W. distant about 4 miles. <u>NOTE:</u> 4 miles is greatly in error.
1630	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO C-IN-C. S.O.-B.C.F. URGENT. ONE ENEMY CRUISER BEARING S.E. STEERING N.E. MY POSITION LAT. 56-38 N., LONG 6-07 E. 1630. <u>NOTE:</u> VESSEL SIGHTED WAS THE STETTIN.
1633	S.L.	SOUTHAMPTON TO S.O.-B.C.F. BATTLESHIPS SOUTHEAST.
1635		SOUTHAMPTON. REMARKS: CHALLENGED FOUR FUNNELLED CRUISER BEARING S.E. NO REPLY. <u>NOTE:</u> THE SOUTHAMPTON, COMMODORE GOOD-ENOUGH, CHALLENGED THE STETTIN.
1636	Visual	STETTIN to FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE (Flagship of C-in-C) Scouting Division II in sight NNW, $\frac{1}{2}$ W. <u>NOTE:</u> This is the bearing of Commodore Goodenough's 2nd L.C.S. at this time. The STETTIN mistook this British Squadron of light cruisers in advance of Beatty for Boedicker's S.D. II and so reported.
1638	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO C-IN-C. S.C.-B.C.F. <u>URGENT PRIORITY.</u> HAVE SIGHTED ENEMY BATTLE FLEET BEARING APPROXIMATELY SE. COURSE OF ENEMY N. MY POSITION LAT. 56-34 N; LONG. 6-20 E. 1638. <u>NOTE:</u> SOUTHAMPTON WAS REALLY 13-1/4 MILES TO WESTWARD OF THIS D.R. POSITION.

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12-30

TABLE IV (Continued).

Time of		
Despatch	System	Message and Notes
1638	RADIO	CHAMPION, LIGHT CRUISER LEADER OF DESTROYERS (13TH FLOTILLA) WITH BEATTY; TO S.C.-B.C.F. COURSE OF ENEMY BATTLE FLEET IS ENE, SINGLE LINE AHEAD. VAN DREADNAUGHTS. BEARING OF CENTRE S.E. MY POSITION LAT. 56-51 N; LONG. 5-46 E. <u>NOTE:</u> CHAMPION WAS REALLY 12 MILES SOUTH OF THIS D.R. POSITION.
1640	FLAGS	S.O.-B.C.F. TO GENERAL. ALTER COURSE IN SUCCESSION 16 POINTS TO STARBOARD.
1642	LION	REMARKS: SIGHTED ENEMY BATTLE FLEET AHEAD. <u>NOTE:</u> THE TURN TO NORTH WAS NOT MADE UNTIL THE ENEMY BATTLESHIPS WERE RECOGNIZED ON THE BRIDGE OF THE LION.
1645	RADIO	S.O.-B.C.F. TO C-IN-C VIA PRINCESS ROYAL. <u>URGENT PRIORITY.</u> HAVE SIGHTED ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET BEARING S.E. MY POSITION LAT. 56-36 N. LONG 6-04 E. <u>NOTE:</u> LION DIRECTED PRINCESS ROYAL BY SEMAPHORE TO SEND THIS DISPATCH AS LION'S RADIO WAS SHOT AWAY. THIS MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED BY C-IN-C AS 26-30 BATTLESHIPS, PROBABLY HOSTILE BEARING SSE <u>STEERING SE.</u> POSITION OF LION RECEIVED CORRECTLY. NOTE NO COURSE AND SPEED GIVEN IN MESSAGE AS DRAFTED.
1647	SEMAPHORE	C-IN-C (JELlicoe) TO GENERAL ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET IS COMING NORTH. 1645. <u>NOTE:</u> THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED AT THE TIME THE GARBLED REPORT WAS <u>SENT</u> FROM THE PRINCESS ROYAL REPORTING ENEMY FLEET COURSE SE AND IS BASED ON THE SOUTHAMPTON'S PREVIOUS REPORT (1638). CONFIRMED IN PART BY THE CHAMPIONS (1638)

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12-30

TABLE IV (Continued)

Time of		
Despatch	System	Message and Notes
1648	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO C-IN-C. S.O.-B.C.F. <u>URGENT</u> <u>PRIORITY</u> . COURSE OF ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET N. SINGLE LINE AHEAD. COMPOSITION OF VAN KAISER CLASS. BEARING OF CENTRE E. DESTROYERS ON BOTH WINGS AND AHEAD. ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS JOINING BATTLE FLEET FROM NORTHWARD. MY POSITION LAT. 56-29 N., LONG 6-14 E. 1646.
1648	FLAGS	S.O.B.C.F. TO 5TH B.S. ALTER COURSE IN SUCCESSION 16 POINTS TO STARBOARD. <u>NOTE</u> : AT THIS TIME THE LION WAS PASSING THE 5TH B.S. ON OPPOSITE COURSE.
1651	RADIO	C-IN-C (JELlicoe) TO ADMIRALTY. URGENT. FLEET ACTION IS IMMINENT.
1655	Visual	LUTZOW to S.D.I. Course North.

Time of Despatch	System	Messages and Notes
1700	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO S.O.B.C.F. ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET IS STEERING NORTH BEARING FROM ME E. 10 TO 11 MILES DISTANT. POSITION LAT. 56-33 N., LONG. 6-00.
1716	RADIO	COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO S.O.B.C.F. MY POSITION LAT. 57-25 N., LONG. 5-12 E., STEERING S.E. BY S., SPEED 20 KNOTS. 1713.
1736	S.L.	FALMOUTH TO BLACK PRINCE. BATTLE CRUISERS ENGAGED TO S.S.W. OF ME.
1740	S.L.	MINOTAUR TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. REPORT OF GUNS HEARD SOUTH.
1740	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO C-IN-C. S.O.B.C.F. URGENT PRIORITY: THE ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET HAVE ALTERED COURSE N.N.W. MY POSITION LAT. 56-46, LONG. 5-40 E. 1740.
1742	RADIO	BLACK PRINCE TO C-IN-C. S.O. 2ND C.S. ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS BEARING S. 5 MILES. MY POSITION LAT. 56-59 N., LONG. 5-24 E. 1740.
1745	RADIO	ADMIRALTY TO C-IN-C. ENEMY MAIN FORCE AT 4:30 PM. 56-31 N., 6-5E., STEERING NORTH, 15 KNOTS. 1745. (NOTE: RECEIVED IN IRON DUKE 5:53 P.M.)
1746	RADIO & S.L.	S.O., 1ST C.S. (DEFENCE) TO C-IN-C, S.O. 2ND S.C. SHIPS IN ACTION BEARING S.S.W. STEERING N.E. MY POSITION LAT. 57-07, LONG. 5-38 E. 1745.

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-TABLE V-
(continued)

Time of Despatch	System	Messages and Notes
1748	S.L.	FALMOUTH TO S.O. CRUISERS (DEFENCE). TWO HEAVY ENEMY SHIPS BEARING S.S.E. STEERING N.E. MY POSITION LAT. 57-07 N., LONG. 5-45 E. 1745.
1750	RADIO	CALLIOPE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. HAVE OBSERVED WHAT APPEARS TO BE FLASHES OF GUNS S.S.W.
1750	S.L.	S.O. 1ST B.S. MARLBOROUGH, TO C-IN-C. GUN FLASHES AND HEAVY GUNFIRING ON STAR- BOARD BOW.
1750	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO C-IN-C, S.O.B.C.F. URGENT PRIORITY: ENEMY BATTLE FLEET HAS ALTERED COURSE TO NORTH. ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS BEAR S.W. FROM ENEMY BATTLE FLEET. MY POSITION LAT. 56-50 N., LONG. 5-44 E. 1750.
1755	S.L.	C-IN-C TO MARLBOROUGH. WHAT CAN YOU SEE? REPLY: OUR BATTLE CRUISERS BEAR- ING S.S.W. STEERING EAST. LION LEADING SHIP 1800. FURTHER REPLY FROM THE MARLBOROUGH: 5TH B.S. BEARING S.W. 1805.
1801	S.L. VISUAL	C-IN-C TO SO.B.C.F. WHERE IS ENEMY BATTLE FLEET? NO ANSWER, AND SIGNAL REPEATED AT 1810. REPLY: HAVE SIGHTED ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET BEARING S.S.W. (RECEIVED IN IRON DUKE 6:14 P.M.)

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12-30

-TABLE V-
(continued)

Time of Despatch	System	Messages and Notes
1803	RADIO	SOUTHAMPTON TO C-IN-C, S.O.B.C.F. URGENT: HAVE LOST SIGHT OF ENEMY BATTLE FLEET. AM ENGAGING THE ENEMY'S BATTLE CRUISERS. MY POSITION IS 56-57 N., LONG. 5-43 E. COURSE N.N.E. SPEED 26 KNOTS. 1800.
1806	S.L.	LION TO C-IN-C. ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS BEARING S.E.
1806	RADIO	S.O.B.C.F. TO S.O. 3RD B.C.S. HOOD: MY POSITION IS LAT. 55-53 N., LONG. 5-37 E., COURSE EAST. SPEED 25 KNOTS. 1805.
1810	RADIO & FLAG	BARHAM TO C-IN-C: ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET SSE.
1815	FLAGS & RADIO	C-IN-C TO GENERAL: THE DEPLOYMENT SIGNAL.

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ADMIRAL JELlicoe's LETTER TO THE ADMIRALTY
SHORTLY AFTER ASSUMING COMMAND OF THE GRAND FLEET

No.339/H.F.0034.

"IRON DUKE",
30th October 1914.

Sir,

The experience gained of German methods since the commencement of the war make it possible and very desirable to consider the manner in which these methods are likely to be made use of tactically in a fleet action.

2. The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavour to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority over us in these particular directions.

3. It therefore becomes necessary to consider our own tactical methods in relation to these forms of attack.

4. In the first place, it is evident that the Germans cannot rely with certainty upon having their full complement of submarines and minelayers present in a fleet action, unless the battle is fought in waters selected by them, and in the Southern area of the North Sea. Aircraft, also, could only be brought into action in this locality.

5. My object will therefore be to fight the fleet action in the Northern portion of the North Sea, which position is incidentally nearer our own bases, giving our wounded ships a chance of reaching them, whilst it ensures the final destruction or capture of enemy wounded vessels, and greatly handicaps a night destroyer attack before or after a fleet action. The Northern area is also favorable to a concentration of our cruisers and torpedo craft with the battlefleet; such concentration on the part of the enemy being always possible, since he will choose a time for coming out when all his ships are coaled and ready in all respects to fight.

6. Owing to the necessity that exists for keeping our cruisers at sea, it is probable that many will be short of coal when the opportunity for a fleet action arises, and they might be unable to move far to the Southward for this reason.

7. The presence of a large force of cruisers is most necessary, for observation and for screening the battlefleet, so that the latter may be manoeuvred into any desired position behind the cruiser screen. This is a strong additional reason for fighting in the Northern area.

8. Secondly, it is necessary to consider what may be termed the tactics of the actual battlefield.

The German submarines, if worked as is expected with the battlefleet, can be used in one of two ways:-

- (a) With the cruisers, or possibly with destroyers.
- (b) With the battlefleet.

In the first case the submarines would probably be led by the cruisers to a position favorable for attacking our battlefleet as it advanced to deploy, and in the second case they might be kept in a position in rear, or to the flank, of the enemy's battlefleet, which would move in the direction required to draw our own Fleet into contact with the submarines.

9. The first move at (a) should be defeated by our own cruisers, provided we have a sufficient number present, as they should be able to force the enemy's cruisers to action at a speed which would interfere with submarine tactics.

The cruisers must, however, have destroyers in company to assist in dealing with the submarines, and should be well in advance of the battlefleet; hence the necessity for numbers.

10. The second move at (b) can be countered by judicious handling of our battlefleet, but may, and probably will, involve a refusal to comply with the enemy's tactics by moving in the invited direction. If, for instance, the enemy battlefleet were to turn away from an advancing Fleet, I should assume that the

intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn.

11. I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and, indeed, might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped.

12. Such a result would be absolutely repugnant to the feelings of all British Naval Officers and men, but with new and untried methods of warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.

I feel that such tactics, if not understood, may bring odium upon me, but so long as I have the confidence of their Lordships I intend to pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy's battle-fleet, without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism.

13. The situation is a difficult one. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battlefleet might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such attack and be prepared tactically to prevent its success.

14. The safeguard against submarines will consist in moving the battlefleet at very high speed to a flank before deployment takes place or the gun action commences.

This will take us off the ground on which the enemy desires to fight, but it may, of course, result in his refusal to follow me.

If the battlefleets remain within sight of one another, though not near the original area, the limited submerged radius of action and speed of the submarines will prevent the submarines from following without coming to the surface, and I should feel that after an interval of high speed manoeuvring, I could safely close.

15. The object of this letter is to place my views before their Lordships, and to direct their attention to the alterations in pre-conceived ideas of battle tactics which are forced upon us by the anticipated appearance in a fleet action of submarines and minelayers.

16. There can be no doubt that the fullest use will also be made by the enemy of surface torpedo craft.

This point has been referred to in previous letters to their Lordships, and, so long as the whole of the First Fleet Flotillas are with the Fleet, the hostile destroyers will be successfully countered and engaged.

The necessity for attaching some destroyers to Cruiser Squadrons, alluded to in paragraph 9, emphasizes the necessity for the junction of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas with the Fleet before a fleet action takes place.

17. It will, however, be very desirable that all available ships and torpedo craft should be ordered to the position of the fleet action as soon as it is known to be imminent, as the presence of even Third Fleet Vessels after the action or towards its conclusion may prove of great assistance in rendering the victory shattering and complete.

The Channel Fleet should be accompanied by as many destroyers, drawn from the Dover or Coast patrols, as can be spared.

I trust that their Lordships will give the necessary orders on the receipt of information from me of an impending fleet action.

18. In the event of a fleet action being imminent, or, indeed, as soon as the High Sea Fleet is known to be moving Northward, it is most desirable that a considerable number of our oversea submarines should proceed towards the Fleet, getting first on to the line between the Germans and Heligoland in order to intercept them when returning. The German Fleet would probably arrange its movements so as to pass Heligoland at dusk when

coming out and at dawn when returning, in order to minimise submarine risk. The opportunity for submarine attack in the Heligoland Bight would not therefore be very great, and from four to six submarines would be the greatest number that could be usefully employed there. The remainder, accompanied by one or two light cruisers, taken, if necessary, from the Dover patrol, should work up towards the position of the fleet, the light cruisers keeping in wireless touch with me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

The Secretary
of the Admiralty.

Your obedient servant,

J.R. JELICOE,
Admiral.

M. 03177/14

Admiralty,
7th November 1914.

Sir,

I have laid before My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 30th ultimo, No. 339/H.F. 0034, and I am commanded by them to inform you that they approve your views, as stated therein, and desire to assure you of their full confidence in your contemplated conduct of the Fleet in action.

2. My Lords will, as desired, give orders for all available Ships and Torpedo Craft to proceed to the position of the Fleet Action on learning from you that it is imminent.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M. Ships and Vessels,
Home Fleets.




FIG. I.
 CONTACT BETWEEN
 GALATEA BDDs, 109, 110,
 2:15 PM.




FIG. II.
 CONTACT BETWEEN
 BATTLE CRUISER FLEET & SCOUTING DIV I.
 3:25 P.M.




FIG. III.
CONTACT BETWEEN
BATTLE CRUISER FLEET & HIGH SEAS FLEET.
4:42 PM




FIG. IV.
 PLOTTING CHART-IRON DUKE PRIOR TO
 DEPLOYMENT OF GRAND FLEET.



FIG. V.
CONTACT BETWEEN
CHESTER & SCOUTING DIVISION II.
5:45 P.M.



FIG VI.
DEPLOYMENT OF THE GRAND FLEET
6:20 P.M.

100

100

100