

The President,
Army War College,

Sir:-

1. In obedience to your instructions the Joint Committee, convened by Memorandum Order, dated February 2, 1907, from the Office of the President, Army War College, submits the following recommendations pertaining to the character and control of advance base material.

2. The approval of the Chief of ~~the~~ Staff of the Army, and of the General Board of the Navy, has been given to the ^{proposition} ~~idea~~ that each service should have two or more identical sets of advanced base material. This, therefore, is the foundation of any further conclusions to be reached.

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3. The scope of the defense does not appear to have been closely defined anywhere in the correspondence regarding advanced bases, and the Committee therefore offers the following as its understanding in this particular. ^(insert from 4/11/07) The defense must be quickly installed; this prevents the use as advanced base material of guns so heavy that they can not be transported with comparative ease, and also prevents the use of guns that demand platforms of permanent nature requiring considerable time for their construction. The 6 inch gun is believed to be the largest gun that can be used, and, as a matter of fact, the Navy has settled upon the 5 ^{inch} ~~m.~~ gun as the largest caliber to be mounted for this purpose. Accepting this limitation, it follows that an advanced base gun defense can not avail against armored ships, and can only be considered effective against unarmored ships. But it is possible by the aid of mines to prevent the entrance of armored ships, and for the gun protection of the mine fields 5 inch guns and smaller are sufficient under the circumstances. For the further protection of mine fields search-

lights are necessary. In certain cases a mine defense will be impracticable because of great depths or strong currents, in which case automobile torpedoes will be needed. A boom will be a great protection against torpedo craft. A wireless telegraph outfit and day and night signaling outfits will be required for communication with the fleet, ^{and telegraph and telephone lines for communication between the elements of the defense.} The main elements of

the material defense on the side of the sea will thus consist of:--

(a) guns (not heavier than 6 inch) 5-inch and smaller,

(b) submarine mines,

(c) search-lights,

(d) automobile torpedoes,

(e) boom

(f) wireless telegraph and signaling outfits, ^{and telegraph and telephone lines.}

5. Such a defense can only keep out armored ships as long as the mine fields remain intact. It can keep out unarmored ships by the use of guns and the mine fields. Attack by torpedo craft can be met by guns, mines and the boom. If mines be impracticable, automobile torpedoes will take their place to a certain extent, and will be useful in any event.

6. On the land side there should be guns ^{for covering} ~~capable of commanding~~ possible landing places and the approaches to the emplacements of the heavier fixed guns. A certain ^{number of field ^{and machine} guns is therefore essential.} ~~amount of mobile field artillery is thus desirable.~~

~~6. Such a defense as is outlined can only be considered sufficient~~

(Insert after word "particular" par. 3 no sep. par.)
The immediate defense of the base need only be strong enough to withstand ^a ~~attacks~~ of the raid by the enemy for the reason that ~~against raids~~. The safety of the advanced base must depend finally upon the fleet, which will either be close enough at hand to guarantee its safety; or if at a distance will be keeping the fleet of the enemy so occupied that no serious attack can be made by him. ~~The immediate defense of the base should be strong enough to care for any enterprise possible to the enemy under the circumstances.~~ ~~The attack~~

7. The sequence of events in the acquisition of an advanced base would seem to be as follows. The Navy, unaided by the Army, will seize and fortify the base, garrisoning it with the expeditionary force of marines, carried in their own transports, ~~with or immediately behind the fleet~~. After a longer or shorter time the Army will relieve the Navy at the defenses of the base, releasing the expeditionary force of marines for such further duty as the naval commander-in-chief may have for them and taking over the material installed. ~~The Army should bring with it its own outfit of advanced base material, which should then become subject to the order of the Navy.~~ *Take out modifications*
This will involve simply the exchange ^{of identical} ~~of one outfit of material afloat for the one installed on shore.~~ The convenience of having identical outfits is very apparent in this connection.

and in conformity with the principle enunciated in par. 2,
8. In view of the foregoing, the Committee has the honor to submit to the War College as a basis for further work on advanced base material the following recommendations:

(a) 1st. That the War and Navy Departments shall each procure and maintain, separately packed, and stored ^{marked} ~~and~~ in readiness for immediate use, two complete, identical advanced base outfits (four in all), each Department to keep one on the Atlantic coast and one in the ~~Philippines.~~ ^{Pacific.}

(b) 2nd. That the heaviest guns of position shall be 5 ^{inch} 50 caliber Navy guns as soon as such can be obtained for this purpose, and that meantime no gun heavier than 6 inch be temporarily adopted.

(c) 3rd. That ^{guns} of smaller caliber be also of Navy type, ~~including~~ ~~field guns for use on the land side of the defense.~~

(d) 4th. That the mounts, ammunition, equipment and accessories of ^{the} guns be of the Navy type. ~~for the guns to be used.~~

(e) 5th. That field and machine guns shall be ^{part of the equipment of} ~~brought into the troops of~~ ^{the} garrisoning the defenses.

(f) 6th. That submarine mines, wiring and accessories be of the type in use in the Army.

(g) 7th. That automobile torpedoes ^{and accessories} be of the type in use in the Navy.

(h) 8th. That the portable search lights and generators be of the Army type.

(i) 9th. That wireless telegraph ^{and telephone} outfits be of the portable ^{Army} type ~~used~~ by the Army.

(k) 10th. That heliographs be of the Army type.

(l) 11th. That the flags (International and Navy Codes) be of size No. 1 ^{or No. 2} as used in the Navy.

(m) ~~13th~~. That other signal gear be of the types now used by both services.

(Wig wag and torch, Army type; Ards^{ois} and semaphore; Navy type).

(n) ~~14th~~. That the material for the construction of a boom shall follow a design to be prepared by the Navy.

(o) ~~15th~~. That all material, not of standard type, such as transporting carriages, derricks, ~~portable railway material~~, material for magazines, ^{portable} railways, etc., be provided on the same specifications, to be agreed on in consultation by the War and Navy Departments.

(p) ~~16th~~. Where the Army relieves the Navy at an advanced base it shall take over from the Navy the outfit installed, and shall give over to the Navy in exchange its own outfit, which shall, as far as circumstances permit, be delivered to the custody of the Navy at such time and place as the Naval ^{authority} ~~Commander-in-Chief~~ may elect. Proper receipts will be given in detail if time permits; otherwise ^{blanket receipts,} ~~en bloc~~, subject to inventory and survey. (Note: ^{should} The reverse case, ^{arise,} the Navy relieving the Army, ~~does not~~ appear to be probable. ~~Should it happen~~ the procedure would be ^{similar to} ~~guided by~~ that outlined above.)

(q) ~~17th~~. Each outfit shall ^{be determined, after the above} consist of the following articles (Note: To ^{be decided after the general principles are agreed upon}:-
^{the composition of} ^{the studies recommended in the following paragraph have} ^{been made.}
(Insert here list from p 7)

10. It has occurred to the Committee that, for ^{many} ~~some~~ reasons, an arrangement whereby the Navy should own and control all advanced base material ^{would} ~~might~~ be preferable. The seizure of one harbor for an advanced

base is a very probable operation; the ~~purpose~~ ^{later on of other} seizure of harbors for such a purpose would depend upon circumstances. In almost any circumstances the Navy will be present when a base is seized, and the argument is strong that the Navy should control the material until it is installed and the Army personnel can come to undertake the defense of the base. It is almost equally certain, on the other hand, that the Army will not, and can not, be present at the seizure of a base; the material for its defense will not come into the hands of the Army until it is installed. It is recognized that reasons of expediency, such as securing the necessary appropriations, and of accountability, ~~perhaps, though this latter does not seem sufficient,~~ ^{favor of the principle that} ~~may~~ have ~~not~~ weight in bringing about the original determination to ~~have~~ ^{be} each service provided with identical sets of material; but doubts are felt in the Committee that any military necessity therefor exists.

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9. The Committee recommends further that a study be made at each College of ^{several} ~~two or three~~ typical harbors to determine what number of guns, mines, torpedoes, ^{and etc.} ~~and~~ searchlights will be needed at each, so that the minimum ^{necessary} amount of these ~~necessary~~ articles may be known as a basis for lists of advanced base material. The ^{minimum} length of boom defense ^{necessary} should also be determined. ^{in a similar way.}

11. There is one matter in connection with advanced base work to which the Committee feels that the early attention of the Colleges and of proper superior authority should be invited. When the Army garrisons an advanced base, the garrison should consist in part of men trained in ^{fixed} ~~heavy~~ artillery, mine, torpedo, and search-light work; in other words of coast artillermen. The problem of furnishing these men is one to be solved beforehand. ^{On} ^{thought} ~~At~~ first ~~blush~~ it might seem that the marines are the troops for this function, and the circumstances of a war might possibly be such that the marines could be left at the base during the entire course of the war. This contingency is improbable, however, and the Committee believes it to be wrong in principle to formulate any scheme that will ~~immobilize~~ ~~the marines for any great length of time.~~ They ~~from the amphibious force~~ ~~at the disposal of the government, and to~~ ^{of the marines for any great} ^{length of} ~~confine their~~ activities to the ~~land as a permanent garrison for a fortified place, would~~ ~~deprive~~ ~~them~~ ~~of~~ ~~half~~ ~~their~~ ~~usefulness.~~ Hence, as has been assumed through-

out this paper, the Army will come to relieve the Marines at as early a moment as possible. When it comes, the trained coast artillerymen must be a considerable part of the detachment.

12. ^{Following} ~~Appended to~~ this ^{report} ~~paper~~ will be found a ^{appendix} ~~memorandum~~ outlining the history of the movement toward getting identical advanced base material for the two services.

Col. ~~Crum~~

Comdr. Keuff

St. Comdr. Jewell

Major ~~Truher~~