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ACCESSION NO. 1916/242.

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Major G.C. Thorpe, U.S.M.C.

SUBJECT: Cooperation between Army and Navy. (Reports - majority
and minority - of Committee.)

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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
Newport, Rhode Island.

May 29, 1916.

FROM: Senior Member of Committee,
TO: President Naval War College.

SUBJECT: Co-operation between Army and Navy.

Enclosures: Report of Committee on above subject.
Minority report by Lt. Col. John P. Hains, C.A.C.
" " " Major Geo. C. Thorpe, USMC.

1. There is submitted herewith a paper on the above subject prepared by this Committee in accordance with your order 633-2 of May 21, 1916.

2. Colonel H.C. Davis, C.A.C. being unable to serve, his place on the Committee was filled by Lieut. Col. John P. Hains, C.A.C.

3. The report of the Committee is signed by three members. Two other members, Lieut. Col. Hains and Major Thorpe, agree to all essential points of the report except that both favor placing the Coast Artillery under the Navy Department. Minority reports by those officers are appended to the majority report.

(SGD.) C. S. WILLIAMS.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY.

Majority Report of a Board appointed by Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N., President of the Naval War College to consider the subject of Co-operation Between The Army and The Navy, and to prepare a paper that shall serve as a basis for discussion in a Joint Conference of Army and Navy Officers at the Naval War College.

COOPERATION BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY.

1. Its Manifest Necessity.

No argument is necessary to prove that to deserve success in war every element of the national strength should be so coordinated as to facilitate cooperation of all its parts to the attainment of the end in view.

We have grown to consider wars as an exceptional manifestation of national activity, and in some countries, notably our own country, the idea of war is so abhorrent that the tendency has been to decline to consider its probability rather than to take all needful precautions to prevent its visitation, or to lessen its ravages by a due foresightedness in preparation.

Consequently we fail to find any effort at coordination of the national strength, except insofar as the authorization of an Army and Navy is concerned and the appropriation of necessary funds from the national treasury to support and maintain those two elements of military strength.

In the Army and Navy is therefore reposed the responsibility for the successful protection and furtherance of our vital national interests.

To meet that great responsibility with the hope of successful issue there can be no plainer military duty confronting both arms of the military service than that of intimate cooperation in every line of endeavor having as its ultimate aim success in war.

Each service, the Army and the Navy, has its particular and peculiar field of activity, differing in the medium in which it operates, differing in the character of weapons used, differing in the technique of operations, but inseparably bound together in the common mission of guarding our national life.

2. The Ideal Organization to Secure Cooperation.

It is an axiom of war that all operations of forces both naval and military should be confined within the frame of a joint plan of operations, well conceived and definite in its scope. This of course implies a control higher than that of the individual commander of the naval forces and commander of the military forces -- a control properly vested in a Great General Staff composed of officers of both services and acting as the advisors to the highest executive authority of the Nation.

It is therefore the mission of a Great General Staff in effect to direct the operations ashore and afloat. Such Staff should therefore be properly composed of officers of the Army and Navy. It is of the utmost importance that such officers should be able fully to understand each other. This requires a comparatively thorough knowledge of the methods of warfare of both branches of the Service. The officers for this purpose must therefore be most carefully chosen. The most competent and intelligent naval officer will not properly fill his place on such staff unless he is familiar with the conceptions of warfare on land, nor would the most competent and intelligent Army officer properly fill his place on such staff unless he were familiar with the conceptions of warfare on the sea.

3. The Question of the Control of Coast Fortifications.

In broad general terms the Navy's mission lies on the sea, and the Army's mission lies on the shore. On that point there is no dispute. But there is a zone, which is on the border line between the sea and the hinterland on shore, wherein the question of control is a matter of dispute, not as between Army and Navy, but as between military students of both services, each having advocates on either side of the question.

Much has been written on both sides of the question, -- Shall the Coast Fortifications and the Coast Artillery Corps be retained under Army Control or be transferred to Navy Control? The main arguments put forth by the advocates of a transfer to Navy control, are:-

1. That in nearly all other countries the control of coast fortifications is in the Navy.
2. That since all legitimate operations of coast fortifications will be against forces afloat, the coast fortification might well be considered as an immobile battleship and the personnel should be particularly schooled in the technique of naval operations.

There is, however, much to be said on the other side of the question.

The fact that other countries have found it expedient to place coast fortifications under Navy control needs to be examined in the light of conditions that affect such dispositions.

In the case of Germany which is quite typical of other continental European powers that have placed coast fortifications under Navy control, her land frontiers are common with those of several other powers and far more extensive and more immediately vital to her than is her sea frontier. Germany's army is her main reliance and its effort must be exerted on or beyond her land frontiers. It is her principal offensive arm, and in order to free it so that it may act in its maximum strength without delay it seems perfectly natural that she should have turned over the coast defenses to Navy control.

With England it is different. The principal offensive arm of English power is her Navy, and that is freed from any direct control of coast fortifications, which in Great Britain are under the control of the Royal Artillery.

In our country, likewise, the Navy is the main offensive arm. Whatever its mission may become, its operations must be

offensive. It should never be tied down to local defense so long as it has power to act offensively.

This offensive spirit of the Navy would surely, in the end, become vitiated if a large portion of its organization were assigned the role of relatively passive local defense.

It is true that the operations of coast fortifications will be likely to be exclusively against forces afloat, and that as at present organized they perhaps lack knowledge of the technique of operations of such forces. They could be schooled in that as well as in anything else, and it would seem to be a much more rational thing to do to cover this deficiency by assigning competent naval officers to the Staffs of the Commanders of the Coast Fortifications for the purpose of technical advice and instruction, than it would be to turn over the whole establishment of the Coast Artillery Corps to the Navy.

The transfer of the Coast defenses and personnel thereof to the Navy Department will secure better cooperation of forces of the Navy and coast fortifications but the gain that will result from such transfer will be small in comparison with the loss due to rupture of the existing close relations between the Coast Artillery forces and those of the mobile army.

With efficient personnel manning well placed and well designed coast defenses the danger of serious direct attack is remote. Without land defenses to protect the rear of our fortified places the danger of attack from that direction amounts to a practical certainty. Landings upon undefended beaches for attack and capture of fortified harbors can be prevented only by mobile forces acting in the closest harmony and cooperation with the coast defense troops at the points threatened. The problem thus presented is extremely important if not the most important that may arise in defense against invasion, and is so serious as to demand immediate and thorough treatment.

The proposed transfer would remove the present fixed and well defined dividing line between military and naval administration and authority, which is the Coast line, and substitute therefor a dividing line that could not be defined and the location of which would depend upon circumstances. The difficult problems of military and naval cooperation would therefore become more involved than at present.

Simplicity and sound military doctrine and procedure require that all of the land forces employed in defending the Coast line be controlled and directed by one authority and that should be the Army.

The functions of Coast fortification and all other elements of Coast Defense at present under the control of the Coast Artillery Corps are so intimately concerned with the broad question of Coast Defense in its general sense, wherein the Navy plays so important a part, that in the interest of proper cooperation in national defense, it is imperative that all questions concerning the location and characteristics of coast fortifications should be determined and decided upon after joint consultation of a Board of Army and Navy officers.

In the ideal organization such decision would be a function of a Great General Staff composed of officers of both services.

4. General Principles Governing Cooperation of Land and Sea Forces.

Cooperation may be defined as having two general characteristics -- strategic and tactical.

Strategical cooperation between land and sea forces is continuous and should never cease; whereas tactical cooperation is possible only temporarily and plays its part in local coast operations.

A fleet, for example, which pursues its own ends solely, which only fights a duel with hostile ships in which both parties may perhaps meet with annihilation, or which, without

regard to the general plan of war, turns its activity against hostile ports, or considers its sole mission the injury of hostile commerce, may accomplish results useful in themselves inasmuch as they harm the adversary, but if such operations are not directly in furtherance of the general plan, not co-operative, in other words, they become more or less haphazard and eccentric and fail of obtaining the maximum military result for the expenditure of force.

In most cases what would control cooperation of military and naval forces would be the mission assigned by higher authority -- according to the ideal, through the medium of the Great General Staff.

Direct cooperation of military and naval forces is exceptional because, generally speaking, each body is confined to its own element. That does not mean that joint operations are exceptional but it does mean that unity of tactical command is impracticable except in cases of restricted local defense.

It would be a serious mistake to issue detailed orders for the fleet from ashore or for forces on shore from the fleet.

5. Elements of Coast Defense and General Principles Governing their Control.

Coast Defense in its broad sense may be considered as being constituted of the following elements.

1. Mobile Sea Defense -- The Navy.
2. Mobile Land Defense -- The Army.
3. Immobile Land Defense -- The Army -- Coast Artillery.
4. Immobile Sea Defense -- The Army -- Mines, Channel Obstruction, etc.
5. Local Mobile Sea Defense -- Naval accessories for Local Defense.

In consideration of Coast Defense in a general sense, the Navy is the first line of that defense. Its function is offensive -- to meet and defeat the enemy before he gains his objective on the coast. Failing that its mission does not change

and should never fall into the category of local defense.

The mission of the Navy is to gain the command of the sea; or if not strong enough to secure command, to dispute the command and deny it to the enemy.

No consideration of local defense should operate to restrict the initiative or the activities of the Navy so long as it is possible for naval forces to operate offensively outside of the range of coast fortifications.

Land defense, local and general, that is, defense on shore as distinguished from sea defense, is the Army mission. Therefore all that pertains thereto should be under Army control.

In defense on shore within the range of coast fortifications and field operations the Navy's role is accessory and secondary and therefore the responsibility and command in such defense should not reside in the Navy but should reside in the Army.

6. Cooperation in Coast Defense (General).

It is not believed that the fleet should ever take as its immediate mission -- To secure the command of the sea. That may be its main or general mission, in the execution of which there would be in any given situation in war some immediate mission imposed. That immediate mission might well be -- To prevent a hostile landing on the coast -- and if the effort of the enemy should become clearly localized and the fleet has a reasonable expectation of success it should take the offensive, not because of local defense but in furtherance of its general or main mission -- to gain command of the sea.

If we assume the defending fleet to be much weaker than the attacking fleet, the mission of the defending fleet should be to dispute the command of the sea. In the furtherance of that mission the defending fleet should operate on the offensive-defensive not for local defense but with a view to its larger mission of denying to the enemy the command of the sea.

It would only be in case the defending fleet was so reduced in its efforts to deny command of the sea to the enemy as to lose entirely the character of an offensive fleet that it could be assumed that its mission might become one of local defense.

If the immediate mission should be one to prevent a hostile landing on the coast, it is difficult to see how any situation could so shape itself as to make it possible to exercise effectively unity of command in tactical cooperation of forces ashore with those afloat.

The fleet in the execution of its mission would have to take the sea and its operations would most probably be beyond the range of any support of land forces, mobile or immobile, and no rules could possibly be laid down to govern cooperation in such a situation, except the general rule of confining operations within the frame of a joint plan.

If the defending fleet is so weak or so reduced incident to contact with the attacking fleet seeking to establish command of the sea and is forced into a defended harbor, then the only rule to govern cooperation of the land and sea forces would be one that should impose joint council on the part of the Army and Navy commanders.

The Commander of the naval forces so circumstanced would preserve his individual authority and command so long as his forces are able to act on the offensive beyond the areas covered by the coast fortifications. When such action is no longer possible or profitable the naval forces must act in direct tactical cooperation with the land forces and under the rules that follow governing cooperation in Local Coast Defense.

7. Cooperation in Local Coast Defense and Rules

that should Govern such Cooperation.

The following general rules are presented to govern co-

operation in war of land and sea forces in purely local coast defense.

The naval accessories to the defense should be controlled by the senior naval officer in command in accordance with plans jointly considered by the Army and Navy Commanders.

So far as present Naval Districts and Coast Defense Commands are concerned, the administration and command should continue as at present in times of peace; but there should be closer relations established between the Naval Commandant of a District and the Military Commanders of the Coast Defense Commands that may be embraced within that Naval District.

This relationship should be established by the assignment to the Staff of the Military Commander of a naval officer whose duty it will be to advise the Military Commander, and to be the medium of cooperation between the Naval and Military Commanders in the use of naval accessories to the defense.

The assistance to be expected from the Navy in local defense can never be more than that which can be contributed by vessels no longer fit for operating at large with the fleet, by auxiliaries, and by vessels especially designed to assist in local defense.

This assistance will consist mainly in the service of information, covered by sea craft (scouts) and in tactical offensive operations by such vessels assigned to local defense as are capable of being used in a local offensive.

The Navy's function therefore in respect to local coast defense can be no more than contributory and secondary.

If it is not a question of local defense, and the fleet is simply based within a fortified area for the furtherance of an offensive against an enemy at sea, tactical cooperation is not imposed and the fleet maintains its independent command and control.

It is reasonable to expect and probable that resistance to any operations of major importance by an enemy directed towards a region of our coast, assuming our fleet to be absent for any reason, will be controlled direct from headquarters -- the Navy Department and War Department cooperating.

The Navy Department would issue the necessary orders to the forces under its control for off-shore operations and the War Department would issue its orders to the forces under its control for in-shore operations.

Should off-shore operations be no longer possible or profitable and naval operations in consequence become so restricted that they could be employed only in close tactical operations with the fixed defenses of the locality within the range of the Coast Fortifications, the cooperation would then become so intimate that it could not be successfully controlled by more than one Department and that one should be the War Department.

If the enemy operation be a minor affair or if the situation be such that the land and naval forces in the region threatened had full power and initiative without direction from central authority, the same principle should govern and we would arrive at the rule which follows --

In local coast defense the responsibility, command and authority for the operation of naval units assigned to assist in local defense must rest with the Naval Commander in full cooperation with the Military Commander, until such time as those units are driven in and have lost their power to act offensively beyond the range of the coast fortifications.

When the tactical field has become so narrowed that the Navy's operations are confined to a radius within the areas covered by the shore fortifications the tactical control of all the elements of the defense, naval as well as fixed must then pass definitely into the hands and under the orders of the Mili-

tary commander; but the Naval Commander shall retain the right of vetoing any operations of the Naval forces ordered by the Army Commander, that in his judgment are technically impracticable. The Naval Commander shall, however, be held responsible for the exercise of this right.

In general terms so long as a naval force is not tied down to a passive local defense, it is perfectly free to act independently within the scope of a plan jointly considered by the Naval and Military Commanders. If it is tied down to passive local defense, unity of command is imposed and must be exercised by the military commander, with a veto power remaining with the Naval Commander over operations of the naval forces that in his judgment are technically impracticable.

All immobile sea defense, such as mine fields covered by shore defenses, harbor obstructions, etc., should be under the control of the Army, just as are all other features of the fixed defense.

Frictions and misunderstandings may arise in any case of joint operations, but if the responsibility and authority are definitely fixed, friction should disappear. If it does nevertheless exist, then the only remedy is a change in the personnel of command.

8. Combined Over-sea Operations.

In combined over-sea operations the general principle that should govern the relations between naval and military commanders should be covered by a rule that the authority and responsibility of the Naval Commander in all matters affecting the safety of the transports, as well as their course, speed and disposition, should be paramount from the time the transports carrying the troops and war material are loaded until the time when the troops are landed.

In any large expedition, the combined force should leave

with instructions as to destination decided upon by higher authority in furtherance of a plan of action fully determined upon.

Whether or not there may be any discretion vested in the military commander of the expedition, no instructions should be issued that would in any degree impair the exercise of the initiative of the naval commander of the expedition, in regard to meeting emergencies of which he shall be the sole judge.

If the control of the sea is not absolute, but is to any degree in dispute, the mission assigned to a naval commander to conduct an expedition across the sea to any definite point would be almost sure to suffer modification incident to enemy operations against his force, the nature and strength of which it will be impossible to forecast or to foresee.

He should therefore have full liberty to exercise his judgment in meeting situations that arise and his initiative should in no wise be impaired.

This responsibility and authority should reside in the Naval Commander alone, whether the movement be one of a large military force under convoy of a naval force or a large naval force with smaller troop detachments.

The military commander should be in a position to confer freely with the naval commander and should if practicable sail on the flagship of the Naval Commander.

When the location is reached where the landing is to be made, the question of the exact point of disembarkation should be determined after a joint conference of the naval and military commanders. The decision as to the point where the landing is to be made rests with the military commander; after consulting with the naval commander with regard to the hydrographic and meteorological conditions at the point selected.

After the landing has been effected in accordance with the order of landing that must be prescribed by the Army commander,

each force is operating in its own element and the only rule in regard to cooperation is one that has in view the success of the plan and it would be fatal to trust to any scheme of operation or effort at unity of command that would tend to restrict the initiative of either the land or the sea forces.

The danger of friction is naturally greater where joint tactical operations are imposed than where strategical cooperation is sought. This points to the necessity of exercising special care in the selection of the proper persons who are to be the mediums of effective cooperation. A combination of ability, knowledge and tact should be the characteristics sought for in the respective commands.

General von Jansen in his treatise on strategical and tactical cooperation of the Army and Navy says -- "An intelligent and thoroughly trained naval officer will know that the degree of his infantry training does not enable him to lead an attack on land and vice versa an army officer will know that he should leave the dispositions concerning landing boats to the Navy, and still more, that it is not for him to issue orders as to how ships are to cooperate in a battle on shore."

Further he states what seems to be a truism in respect to the whole subject of cooperation.

"Every possible combination cannot be foreseen, and still less can rules be laid down therefor. The main point is for both factors of national defense ever to strive towards mutual support and for the Commander-in-chief and commanders of divisions to lend themselves resolutely to cooperation without fear of responsibility." and further,

"All must moreover be thoroughly convinced that any feeling of jealousy in such a position is not only foolish but contrary to duty and that the army and navy have no separate objects, but only the one joint mission of defeating the enemy, no matter where or by whom the final decision is brought about."

The following changes in regulations governing naval conyoy of military expeditions should be made:

Article 3821, U.S.Navy Regulations and Paragraph 121 (1) Field Service Regulations U.S.A. 1914 -- Add the following paragraph:-

"No vessel shall be purchased or chartered as an auxiliary or transport for the Army until it shall have been inspected and favorably passed upon by a joint board of Army and Navy Officers."

Article 3822, U.S.Navy Regulations and Paragraph 121 (2) Field Service Regulations U.S.A. 1914, seem to be entirely unnecessary and should be eliminated.

Article 3826, U.S.Navy Regulations, Paragraph 1, and Paragraph 121 (6) (a) Field Service Regulations U.S.A. 1914, Change to read as follows:

"The orders as to the destination of convoy and time of sailing shall be issued by the War Department, after consultation with the Navy Department, to the Army Commander.

"The Navy Department shall issue identical orders to the Naval convoy commander.

"The naval convoy commander shall be responsible for the safety of the convoy and shall have complete authority to control its movements. Should interference by enemy forces afloat make it impracticable for him to escort the transports to the destination ordered, he shall so inform the Army commander. Should it be impracticable to communicate with higher authority the Army Commander may then decide upon another destination and this decision shall be accepted by the naval convoy commander unless or until the naval situation in his judgment renders it impracticable.

"Should, during the voyage, the Army Commander desire for military reasons to change the destination of the expedition and should it not be practicable to communicate with higher

authority he shall have the authority to designate a new destination provided that the naval situation makes such a change practicable. Of this practicability the naval commander shall be the judge."

Article 3828, U.S.Navy Regulations and Paragraph 121 (8) Field Service Regulations U.S.A. 1914 -- change to read as follows:

"The place, the time of landing, and the order of landing shall be decided upon by the Army Commander after consultation with the Navy Commander with regard to the hydrographic and meteorological conditions.

"The Army Commander shall consult with the Naval Commander as to Naval assistance, such as the covering and protection of the landing by the guns of the ships, and the use of naval boats. This assistance the Naval Commander shall render to the utmost extent practicable and with the sole object in view of assisting to the utmost the plan of campaign of the Army Commander.

"After the order of landing is made known to him, the naval commander in accordance therewith shall control the placing of the transports and supply vessels for disembarking the troops, animals, munitions and stores and will control the loading and unloading of boats and have control over such area of the beach as may be necessary for the proper execution of the above. The naval commander shall also control the withdrawal of transports when discharged to the harbor and anchorage selected. In case of re-embarkation under naval convoy the same general procedure shall govern."

It is further recommended that the following Article be added to the Regulations governing Combined Over-Sea Operations:-

"In case the expedition is a naval expedition accompanied by military forces designed to seize and hold a base for the use of the fleet, the entire authority, responsibility and command in all matters affecting the expedition shall be exclusively vested in the Naval Commander."

In such a case the interests of the naval service are so predominant that the Naval Commander should have power to decide all matters relative to destination, time and place of landing according to the circumstances in which he finds himself.

Signed:

Captain C.S.Williams, U.S.Navy,
Colonel J.W.Ruckman, U.S.Army,
Comdr. C.T.Vogelgesang, U.S.Navy.

(5/27/16.)

MINORITY REPORT.

The undersigned member of the board concurs in the foregoing conclusions except in reference to the control of the coast fortifications and the manner of their coordination with other branches of the Nation's fighting forces in which conclusions he does not concur and for which he offers the following conclusions and reasons therefor:

There should be unity of command to the maximum extent consistent with the nature of the employment.

In examining the nature of the duties involved in coast defense it appears:

(1) That a fleet would probably be employed to deny the invader freedom of sea communications and thus prevent his reaching our coasts.

(2) That coast fortifications and their armament would be employed to deny the enemy's sea operations within the radii of such armaments if the fleet fails to sufficiently control the enemy's sea communications.

(3) That all territory between coast fortifications must be defended by the mobile army.

(See Maj. W.G.Haan, C.A.C., in Journal of U.S.Art., September-October, 1908, p.148.)

(4) That the coast fortification personnel and said mobile army forces are necessarily independent of each other because the former "is essentially a stationary defensive force", and the latter "while temporarily assigned to defensive operations is essentially a mobile force, and expected to take the offensive whenever practicable. It must make an active or mobile defense, not a passive or stationary one as must necessarily be that of the personnel for coast forts whose main armament is stationary and must be constantly manner."

(See Haan, id., p.148.)

(5) That the personnel for coast fortifications theoretically is sub-divided into:

- (a) Coast artillery proper, employing fixed defenses;
- (b) Coast artillery supports, employing a small force of mobile troops with field guns, machine guns, land mines, and other characteristically land-warfare weapons.

(See Haan, id., p.148.)

(6) That Coast Artillery Supports should be under the command of the Coast Artillery commander since they attend to the immediate local defense of forts; they are (in contradistinction to the mobile army) tied to the forts and their role is passive. While the Supports attend to the local defense, the Coast Artillery proper looks to the sea defense.

(7) That the Coast Artillery guns so employed can be aided greatly by certain maritime weapons employed locally, without which latter weapons the Coast Artillery could not be employed certainly or efficiently. These weapons include:

- (a) Torpedo boats to operate, say, against craft attempting to tamper with the mine field.
- (b) Mine layers to lay and maintain mine fields;
- (c) Submarine boats;
- (d) Patrol boats for reconnaissance;
- (e) Hydroaeroplanes.

(8) That coast fortification establishments complement the defense of naval stations.

Confronted with these premises it appears established that:

(1) There is a decided line of demarkation between mobile army forces and coast fortification establishments, and insistence that there shall be independence of command between the two.

(2) The immediate local defense of coast fortifications has no greater need of a land defense than has a navy yard.

(3) The enemy against which coast fortifications would defend is entirely a naval force. In order to intelligently fight an enemy, it is universally taught as a fundamental principle, there must be knowledge of the enemy's capabilities and limitations and of what he may do. In other words the adversary of a fleet must be able to accurately estimate that fleet's capabilities for action: the nature of its possible battle formations, the manner in which it may change formations, the length of time such change will cover, tactical diameters, speeds, all the methods in which a fleet may employ its various weapons, and, therefore, an intimate knowledge of all such weapons; in fact the adversary who does not know what his opponent may do is in a bad position to meet an attack.

(4) The weapons employed and the methods of serving them are almost exclusively like those of the Navy.

(5) The fleet's attempt to deny the enemy's communications will continue from day to day from the time of first contact until the enemy has been turned back, or our naval force destroyed, or our coast so nearly approached as to establish the fact that the enemy will make contact with the coast. The role of the coast fortifications, therefore, merges imperceptibly into the role of the fleet, so that it cannot be foreseen when the one will begin and the other end, or when the one will begin with the need of the closely coordinated help of the other. At this point (of the entry into the operations of the coast fortifications) there must be unity of command, or there will be the strongest likelihood of confusion with the result that one part will not know when it may safely begin operations, the other part when it may withdraw from existing dispositions (by reason of coastal aid) to make new arrangements to aid the shore, or the result may very probably amount to our own ships being the targets of our shore batteries; etc.

(6) On the other hand, there is no such merger of functions of the coast fortifications and the mobile army defending between fortified locations. The mobile army must concentrate upon undefended strategic points; it merely takes cognizance of the existence of the fortified points, but is not in the slightest degree interested in how the fortification personnel is operating. The coast fortifications and mobile army will scarcely need inter-communication, as far as their respective operations are concerned. In fact, the mobile army will be much more nearly allied to the active fleet and its communications therewith should be direct. For example: if the fleet develops the enemy as making course to the northward, say, indicating Salem as its objective, the mobile army must be quickly informed so that it can prepare to concentrate toward Salem; but this new information would not in the least change the dispositions of the coast fortification personnel around New York. The mobile army commanders would have no occasion to confer with the commanders of coast fortifications, so far as the land defense is concerned. But all this time there would be the liveliest community of interest between coast fortifications and the fleet and their operations would be most intimately complementary (if under unity of command).

(7) Since the duties of coast fortification personnel are so much more nearly like those of the navy, than those of the mobile army, the education for such employments should be allied from the beginning to the end.

(8) A very striking consideration that emphasizes the obligation of unity of command is the feature of the quick decision that will be called for, probably, at the point of merger of the various elements of coastal operations. As the invader suddenly appears off the coast, there will be no time for a conference between the fleet and shore commanders, but

someone must have authority to flash an order to all the elements that will be engaged in the battle that will begin within a few minutes.

(9) The importance of this unity of command as to coast defense may be more obvious to some in constructing plans for the defense of such bases as Oahu, Guam, Corregidor, and Culebra. Each base exists as a most intimate part of naval strategy and naval only; the success of that strategy depends upon denying the shores of the island base to the enemy; it is entirely a naval proposition; the mission of the defense should be: "To deny the shore line". A subsidiary mission may be assigned to the mobile army to throw the enemy off the island if he succeeds in getting on, but that is quite subordinate to the main mission of the defenders and will never come into play if the first line defense is properly disposed. This first line defense, to be efficient, must be under unit direction, from the drawing of plans years in advance of the combat to the firing of the last gun that discourages the enemy. That there should be naval command of so intimate an auxiliary of the Navy as one of its important advanced bases is illustrated by the efficiency of the Helgoland and Wilhelmshaven defenses which are entirely under the Navy. Helgoland is quite analagous to Oahu. Its sole reason for existence is to serve the Navy.

10. It is sometimes argued that if the coast fortifications were a part of the naval establishment, such union would tie the fleet to the coast and destroy its offensive power. It is not evident how this result would be produced; it has not been said that navy yards being a part of the naval establishment tie the fleet to the coasts and that therefore navy yards should be under the army, but if navy yards do have any such tendency it would seem that, at least, the fleet could be somewhat

relieved of responsibility for the defense of navy yards if the latter and coast fortification establishments were bound more closely together. The mobile army must be mobile and ready for the offensive, but it is not said that coast fortifications being under the War Department tie the mobile army to them.

Therefore, the coast fortifications and personnel thereof should be a part of the naval establishment.

MSJOF, THORPE.
Member.

(5/29/16.)
W.

MINORITY REPORT.

Although concurring in much that is set forth in the majority report of the board, regarding the question of the control and administration of the coast defenses, the undersigned dissents from the opinion and conclusion expressed, that the immobile coast defenses should not be transferred under the control and administration of the Navy Department.

I am of the opinion that in order to secure the greatest efficiency in coast defense there should be the closest coordination between the mobile and the immobile defenses and that this efficiency will be attained in the greatest degree by unity of direction and command.

That with the mobile defenses under the control and administration of the Navy Department and the immobile defenses under the control and administration of the War Department, as at present, there is practically no coordination and that it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to establish proper coordination.

I therefore believe that a change in the present system of dual control and administration, to a system of single control and administration is desirable and necessary and that this transfer should be taken as the primary step in the direction of increased co-operation and efficiency.

I further believe that this change to single control can best be effected by the transfer of the control and administration of all the immobile coast defenses including its personnel, the Coast Artillery Corps, to the Navy Department. By such transfer unity of direction and command will be established in the Department Head and may then, with comparative ease, be extended in the three branches, the line of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Artillery Corps, as far as proper co-operation may require it.

By this it is not intended that Officers of the Navy will come ashore to take command of Coast Artillery Forts or that Coast Artillery Officers will go aboard our battleships to operate the guns of turrets and batteries. Neither will the enlisted personnel of either service be interchangeable with the other. The services are not to be amalgamated.

It will mean that another branch or bureau will be added to the Navy Department, i.e. that of the Coast Artillery Corps, but nothing added to the line of the Navy proper. This bureau would operate independently of, but alongside of and in co-operation with the other bureaus of the Navy Department and if desirable this co-operation as well as unity of command could be extended to govern the different Commanding Officers of Coast Defenses and Officers of the line of the Navy when acting together in a defensive area in time of peace as well as in time of war.

This is briefly an outline of a system that I believe will probably give the greatest efficiency in sea-coast defense. It is impossible here to give all the arguments in favor of it. I admit there may be many arguments against it. As I see it, there appears a decided preponderance in its favor. A further discussion in conference however is bound to shed more light upon this important subject.

JOHN P. HAINS,
Lieut.Col., C.A.C.
Member of Board.

(5/29/16.)

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