

XPOD
1923-148

In reply refer to initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-12S
S.C. 210-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

24 October, 1923.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To : War Portfolio Distribution List.
SUBJECT: Lecture by Captain F. H. Schofield,
U. S. Navy, "Some Effects of the Wash-
ington Conference on American Naval
Strategy".
Enclosure: One.

1. Forwarded herewith for information is
one copy of the above noted lecture given by Captain
F. H. Schofield at the Army War College on 22 Septem-
ber, 1923.

E. W. Eberle

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
ARCHIVES
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1923

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 30

.SOME EFFECTS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
ON
AMERICAN NAVAL STRATEGY.

By

Captain F. H. Schofield, U. S. Navy.

Lecture delivered at
The Army War College,
Washington Barracks, D. C.,
September 22, 1923.

SOME EFFECTS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN NAVAL STRATEGY.

I desire at the beginning to state that the views I may express are my views and are offered with no other authority behind them unless I specifically so state. It will be possible for me to touch only a few of the more prominent naval problems arising out of the Treaty.

There is one general topic to which I would like specially to invite your attention, that is the necessity for a more complete, more constant, more spontaneous support of the needs of each service by the other service - of the Army by the Navy, and of the Navy by the Army. We are two arms of the Government with a single mission - to support American policies and to guard America everywhere. Neither service can accomplish this alone, each needs the other to help if the job is man's size. Neither service is expert in the needs or technique of the other service, so a basic rule of action in applying support should be to push the authorized policy of the sister service. I know very little about technical needs of the Army but I am willing to accept Army judgment on those needs every time. So, too, you cannot be expected to judge the technical needs of the Navy but we hope you will not go far wrong if you accept and support our judgment in these respects. We are not rivals, but cooperators. It will be my object to tell you of some of our problems and it will be my hope that your influence and effort will aid in their solution.

I know that it is well understood throughout the Army that the Army's whole ability to act outside our continental limits - except in Canada and Mexico - is dependent on the Navy's ability to guard the Army's passage over seas. Without an efficient and a powerful navy the American Army can never act beyond the limits of the American continent. It is well to keep this fact very prominently in mind. You are, therefore, bound to be directly concerned in the strength and the readiness of the Navy.

As you all know, the Treaty limited:-

The size and total tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers.

The calibre of guns on capital ships.

The number and calibre of guns on aircraft carriers.

The maximum size of other vessels of war but not their numbers.

The maximum calibre of guns carried by such other vessels of war but not the number of guns.

The naval bases and fortifications within certain prescribed areas.

The modifications that may be made to existing ships.

The Treaty found us very strong in capital ships. It left us weaker than the next strongest power. We were already weak in cruisers. It did not strengthen us in cruisers, its real effect was to make us still weaker in cruisers. It found us strong in destroyers, it did not change that. Sea Power is not made of ships, or of ships and men, but of ships and men and bases far and wide. Ships without outlying bases are almost helpless - will be helpless unless they conquer bases and yet the Treaty took from us every possibility of an outlying base in the Pacific except one; we gave our new capital ships and our right to build bases for a better international feeling - but no one gave us anything.

Manifestly the provisions of the Treaty presented a naval problem of the first magnitude that demanded immediate solution. A new policy had to be formulated which would make the best possible use of the new conditions. The work of formulating this policy was undertaken as soon as the Treaty

was signed and engaged the attention of the General Board of the Navy and of many officers in the Department for several months. The result of their deliberations and studies is contained on the sheet which is labeled, "United States Naval Policy" which I have brought with me today for your information. I believe that this is the first example of a comprehensive policy being formally adopted by any department of the Government. I am going to leave this sheet with you so that you may study it at your convenience. It will take years to realize this policy, but meanwhile it is a goal, a definite aim, a coordinator. That policy was the first effect of the Washington Conference on American naval strategy.

I think that I can best discuss the problems that I shall mention under two general heads:

(a) Ships. (b) Bases.

National strategy and naval tactics are very closely linked with both of these subjects.

First as to ships. The eighteen capital ships we now have left must serve us until 1934 and the newest of them must continue in service until 1942. It is, therefore, necessary that those ships be prepared to meet the battle conditions of the period so far as the treaty permits. They should all be oil-burning. Their battery should permit firing at the maximum range regardless of what is done abroad. They should be protected against torpedo attack by blister construction. Some of them need additional anti-aircraft armor. All of these changes have been recommended to Congress and are highly important. Money is not yet available for them.

I am not going to argue the necessity for keeping ships up-to-date - that goes without argument, but I do want to point out some important changes in naval conditions that have taken place since many of our ships were built, and to show the relation of those changes to our strategy of preparation under the conditions imposed upon us by the Treaty. We are compelled to seek superiority in every legitimate way. If we failed to do this we would be recreant in our duty.

Modern navies use oil as fuel almost exclusively. Any navy that has to use coal-burning ships in its formation will be distinctly handicapped tactically, and will also be handicapped strategically. Oil as fuel permits a longer radius of action, higher sustained speed, better under-water protection against torpedoes, and permits refueling at sea which may become a very important factor in areas where bases do not exist. Tactically, oil fuel permits the use of smoke screens which may have decisive influence at critical stages of a sea engagement. The classic example of the use of smoke screens was at the Battle of Jutland when the German fleet changed its course 180° by the use of a smoke screen without the maneuver being divined or interfered with by the British. At present six of our retained capital ships still burn coal. They should be converted to oil burners.

Thirteen of our capital ships were designed and built at a time when airplane spotting was not seriously considered. In consequence the angle of elevation of their guns is limited to ranges around 20,000 yards except in the newer ships. It is well established that effective firing can be done with airplane spotting at ranges in excess of 30,000 yards. It is, therefore, to our interest to see that all of our guns are capable of an elevation sufficient to fire at these extreme ranges. As it is at present we would have to open the action at extreme range with only five ships out of eighteen firing - less than one-third of our strength. We would have to close to about 20,000 yards before all of our ships could fire effectively. Everything in war, as elsewhere, is compar-

ative so it is interesting to note that, at what even now may be considered medium battle ranges, twenty to twenty-four thousand yards, the British fleet which is supposedly equal to our own, actually has a gunnery superiority in the proportion of eleven to eight, assuming that firing begins at these ranges. If firing begins at the larger range it is a different story and British advantage is increased very much. At and below 20,000 yards we believe our gunnery factor is superior to that of the gunnery factor of the British fleet. I do not however, mention this comparison as conclusive as to what should be done to our fleet in the matter of elevating the guns. The basis of comparison should be what can be done; not what others have done. We can increase the effectiveness of our fleet at ranges beyond 20,000 yards by 200 per cent and this without any violation of the letter or spirit of the Treaty for Limitation of Armament. It seems to me absurd that any American should raise his voice against such a proposal particularly when the total cost of thus increasing the efficiency of the fleet is less than one-sixth the cost of one new battleship.

There is a popular idea that the Treaty did away with naval competition. This is not the fact. It did away with competition along certain specified lines and left the door completely open to competition along all other lines. No one participating in the conference supposed that the science or the art of naval warfare would stand still during the next twelve years. Everyone supposed that each power would do all it could to improve its own service both from a material and a personnel standpoint so far as it did not transgress, in so doing, the letter and spirit of the Treaty. If we continue to stand still while others advance we shall lose every semblance of the commanding naval position we occupied when the conference assembled.

The next point of weakness in our capital ships is their under-water protection against torpedoes. You can realize how serious a question this is when you consider that there are only eighteen of these ships and that for each of the eighteen ships there exists in the world over twenty destroyers, not to mention close to 200 submarines, that may be hostile and that on each of those destroyers there are from four to twelve torpedoes, any two of which would be sufficient to disable one of our ships in its present condition. This great excess of torpedo craft in the navies of the world was produced during the World War as an anti-submarine measure but its post-war effects are to be seen in every design of warships. Under-water protection is an essential yet but five ships of our eighteen have suitable under-water protection. When you compare this number with the situation abroad, we are at a colossal disadvantage. This question, but for the Treaty, would have been taken care of in the greatly improved design of our new ships which are now being scrapped. The accepted method of remedying this defect is to build outer bottoms to the old ships.

I am passing over the necessity for anti-aircraft armor protection by merely mentioning it. Anyone who has witnessed bombing tests on our discarded battleships does not have to be convinced anew of the necessity for this measure. A total of \$30,000,000 would modernize our capital ships - probably double their value for war, restore to us something of what we lost by the Treaty.

Cruisers.

The total modern cruiser strength of the United States is 76,500 tons in ten vessels. The total cruiser strength of the Japanese Navy amounts to 178,900 tons, of which six vessels are still to be built, the total number of

vessels being twenty-eight. If we should lay down to-day enough cruisers to meet this program of the Japanese on the 5:3 ratio, we would have to lay down 223,000 tons in 23 vessels. The money has not yet been appropriated for a single one of these cruisers and yet next to battleships, the strategic control of the Pacific depends as much upon cruiser action as upon the action of any other type of vessel. All will remember the great concern which was caused to the British by the ten German cruisers that were adrift at the outbreak of the World War. It required over one hundred vessels of the British Navy finally to run those cruisers to earth. Before this could be done, one of them, the EMDEN, succeeded in sinking 68,000 tons of British commerce; another one, the MOEWE, succeeded in sinking about 154,000 tons of British commerce. This was accomplished by those vessels without the support of any base but acting solely on their own in distant quarters of the globe. Compare their then success with what would happen if we found ourselves at war in the Pacific with lines of military and commercial communications extending across that ocean exposed to the attack of twenty-eight modern cruisers with home bases to which they had ready access. Suppose further, that we had in our Navy at that time but 10 vessels, other than destroyers, capable of catching and engaging even the slowest of these vessels. You have in that statement of conditions the reason why the Navy Department is pressing very strongly for a cruiser program. There are additional reasons. During the World War we were able to guard our convoys against surface vessels by means of obsolete and semi-obsolete battleships and armored cruisers. Most of these vessels are to be scrapped so that we must depend, for convoy, upon vessels yet to be constructed. Do you want to send your troops in transports across the sea unguarded? It is doubtless true that some will get across, but others won't. The Army needs these cruisers as badly as the Navy needs them.

The submarine had a great effect on men's minds during and for a considerable period after the late war. Its accomplishments were the spectacular accomplishments of the war. This was so because German and Austrian surface vessels were unable to go to sea. In any war of the future in which we may be engaged on one side singlehanded, surface vessels - cruisers - are bound to have access to the sea, because the navies of neither side can be blockaded completely by the other. Both surface and submarine vessels will be free to put to sea almost at pleasure. It is, therefore, necessary that our strategy of peace provide vessels which can overtake and destroy any surface vessels of the enemy which may attempt to raid our sea communications. These requirements of overtaking and destroying emphasize two points in design of new vessels. These are speed and gun power. Since the size of cruisers is limited to ten thousand tons, it will probably be necessary in our new designs to forsake nearly all attempt at passive defense of these vessels - armor - in order to have weight available for the full development of speed, steaming radius and gun power. I think it is fundamental that once an American cruiser comes in contact with an enemy cruiser its gun power must be superior to the gun power of that enemy cruiser and its speed sufficient to keep its guns within range, no matter what sacrifices in protection have to be made to achieve these superiorities. To visualize fully the soundness of this view, you have only to consider the situation of the captain of a cruiser, who has been sent to run down an enemy raider. Some fine morning after a search of a few thousand miles he sights that raider at dawn - just out of gun range. The raider doesn't want to fight. He wants to capture and sink merchant ships and transports; that is his mission so he shows his heels. At that moment what does the cruiser captain want most of all? He would give his kingdom for speed to catch the raider. Suppose he catches him - brings him within range - what next? Fire superiority of course. If the speed is not there

he is sure to fail. If fire superiority is not there, he is likely to fail. If he fails because of inferiority in these respects, it will be a failure of the peace strategy that built the wrong type of ship for the job.

The increased necessity for cruisers is a direct effect of the Treaty which shifted much of the burden of naval defense at sea from capital ships in which we had the world beaten, to cruisers in which even third-rate powers had us beaten.

Submarines.

Immediately after the conclusions of the Washington Conference the Japanese Government changed its policy concerning both cruisers and submarines by increasing the size of both so that they might have longer radius of action. This is stated in no spirit of criticism but rather one of commendation. It showed that the Japanese were fully alive to the strategic necessities of the Pacific, that having been denied outlying bases, and having denied to us outlying bases, radius of action became one of the fundamental requirements of naval warfare in the Pacific. We may expect, therefore, that all future submarine developments in this country and in Japan will be in the direction of larger units with a greater variety of capabilities. We shall look to the submarine to scout, to lay mines, and to fire guns and to fire torpedoes, and to stay at sea in enemy waters for long periods. Of course, the submarine treaty was intended to limit the use of the submarine against commerce but the declarations, since the Treaty, of those in high authority abroad, indicate that that benevolent intention will not be realized in any future war, because each power must of necessity, to guard its interests, act with as much freedom as any other power acts. I, therefore, expect that the submarine in future wars will act against commerce with the same freedom and under the same laws as other vessels of war. I do not believe that any order or act of an official of the American Government will ever provoke unlimited submarine warfare.

The American Navy is well below the 5:3 ratio in submarines as compared with the Japanese Navy. We hope for some appropriations in the near future in order that we may develop two classes of submarines not yet developed in our Navy, namely, the scout submarine and the cruiser submarine. The cruiser submarine is specially useful as a scout because of the extremely long radius of action and because it can maintain itself on distant station in enemy-infested waters with comparative safety, where a surface scout would be wholly useless. The cruiser submarine can see and not be seen and can report successfully by radio over very long distances. These are developments of the recent past. When we consider that it will be necessary to get practically all of our information of sea events in the Western Pacific in war from scouting vessels, it is easily seen that submarine scouts are the type best suited to this purpose and that the building of them now in considerable numbers is an urgent naval necessity. Incidentally, it is reported that the newest Japanese submarine can visit our Pacific Coast, operate and return home without refuelling.

Aircraft.

Neither the Army nor the Navy Aviation Service is backward in making known the needs of these services. It is, therefore, hardly necessary for me to go into the subject deeply, but should I fail to state my views, the friends of aviation might consider that I regarded ships alone necessary for the Navy. This, of course, is not true. All naval officers of the present day recognize the extreme importance of aviation to the Navy. Congress has by law and in accordance with the will of the Navy itself, directed the principal aviation

effort of the Navy towards working with the Fleet and in support of fleet activities. By fleet, I mean all naval forces afloat. Tactically that part of naval aviation which is of the highest importance to the Navy is aviation afloat, that is, carried on ships with the Fleet wherever it goes. These are the aviation units which will assist in the tactical decision of battle. No other units either of the Army or of the Navy can be counted upon surely for this purpose. So far as peace time arrangements are concerned we are limited in the number of aircraft that we can take to sea with the Fleet. The five airplane carriers which will be permitted to us under the Treaty cannot carry a total of over 300 aircraft of all kinds. The vessels of the Fleet itself cannot carry more than 100 additional aircraft. Of course, in time of war this number could be greatly augmented by the conversion of merchant ships into auxiliary aircraft carriers.

Aircraft at sea with the Fleet have four functions and all of them are tactical. First, scouting in the near vicinity of the Fleet to determine the position of the enemy Fleet, its course and formation. A great many officers believe that aircraft are capable of distant scouting at sea, two or three hundred miles from the Fleet, but I am of the opinion that at present the development of the art is not sufficiently far advanced to justify such action except upon the strong presumption of the presence of the enemy fleet. Second, spotting gun fire. In the early stages of a naval engagement this will be a very important function of aircraft. The Navy has already achieved marked success at long range firing when the firing was directed entirely by aircraft. Third, bombing and torpedo and combat attack of enemy formations of ships and aircraft. Fourth, defense of our own ships by combat planes. The Navy will not be content until all of these functions are provided for and men and material are supplied in sufficient numbers to fill and to keep filled the entire authorized aviation complement of the Fleet afloat.

Of course it is impossible for naval aviation to perform all its strictly naval duties from floating bases, carriers and tenders. Centers of naval activity will of necessity have shore naval aviation bases from which the forces afloat will be reenforced, from which wastage will be replaced and from which naval scouting, convoy, and attack, operations will be projected in furtherance of the operations of the fleet - the forces afloat.

To summarize:-

The Treaty compels us to one of two alternatives:-

First:

To modernize our capital ships.

To build many cruisers and many submarines.

To push naval aviation.

Or Second:

To sink to a bad second and, possibly, a third rate naval position where neither the American Navy nor the American Army will be able to guard American interests beyond the limits of the continent of North America.

Bases.

The Treaty makes it impossible for America to develop bases west of the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1936 and then only in case the Treaty is denounced. This limitation of bases is a feature extremely unfavorable to American naval action in the Far East. Under present and expected conditions in the Pacific there will be no real naval base nearer the Philippines than San Francisco. There will be docks and shops at Pearl Harbor but no great protected harbor for

a fleet. If the fleet mobilizes or bases there for a time, a large part of it will lie in open roadsteads where nothing but mines and its own activity can protect it and where serious repairs cannot be undertaken. There is a fine harbor at Manila which we can use, provided Manila is held until the Navy with reinforcements arrives. And here we touch the real key to the problem of naval action in the Far East. Unless there is a harbor in readiness to receive the fleet in the Far East in time of war, the arrival of the fleet in the war area will be indefinitely delayed. I know of no way to do the fleet and its operations in the Western Pacific more injury than to deprive it of a base from which it may operate in those distant waters. I believe it to be an essential of our peace strategy that every effort be made to retain possession of Manila Bay under all circumstances. I do not mean by this that should Manila Bay fall its recapture will become necessarily the first great step in a campaign in the Far East. Some other harbor might then be chosen.

Without a secure harbor in the Far East, the superiority of capital ships which we now possess under the treaty may disappear in seizing and occupying a harbor. It would be sound strategy for Japan in case of war to use every effort to make us fight her Army, which is great, with our ships, which are few, in order to get such a harbor, and thus to wipe out our superiority in ships. If she occupies the harbors to which those ships must go, there is no alternative to the unequal contest.

I doubt if all fully realize how urgent this necessity for a base is in naval operations. In the old days a small harbor defended by a few guns could be called a base but the fleets of the present day require harbors of the first magnitude. Take for example the fleet left to us by the Treaty; at sea in cruising formation in hostile waters that fleet will occupy 1,200 square miles of water. If it is disposed in a circular area, the diameter of the circle will be 40 miles. If the entire fleet is together accompanied by its train, the number of vessels will be not less than 600. You will readily see from this that a primary concern of the Commander-in-Chief of that fleet, when he is going to the Far East, is a harbor to which to take it, where it can refuel and get ready for the next move. If he has to fight for that harbor, it isn't difficult to picture many disasters that may occur to that multitude of ships and transports before any harbor can be entered and made secure. I will not labor the point but only repeat that the retention of Manila Bay is an essential of our Far Eastern strategy. The problem of how to retain it is your problem and mine.

The inquiry is frequently made by officers of the Army - How long would it take the Navy to get command of the sea in the Far East. That is not a correct question. The question should be - How long would it take the Army and the Navy to get command of the sea in the Far East, because the Navy alone cannot get that command of the sea. It must have the Army to hold its shore bases and to preserve those bases in every respect free from enemy land and air attack. A part of the Army will have to go with the Navy in its very first move to the Western Pacific. The Army will have to share the hazards of a sea voyage towards hostile shores and depend for its safety en route on the adequacy and soundness of the naval preparations in ships, munitions and men that will have been made in time of peace. If I were asked what steps should be taken now to guarantee to us the retention of Manila Bay, I should say first, the strengthening of the garrison; second, the constant readiness of the Navy; third, the organization and holding in constant readiness of an expeditionary

a fleet. If the fleet mobilizes or bases there for a time, a large part of it will lie in open roadsteads where nothing but mines and its own activity can protect it and where serious repairs cannot be undertaken. There is a fine harbor at Manila which we can use, provided Manila is held until the Navy with reinforcements arrives. And here we touch the real key to the problem of naval action in the Far East. Unless there is a harbor in readiness to receive the fleet in the Far East in time of war, the arrival of the fleet in the war area will be indefinitely delayed. I know of no way to do the fleet and its operations in the Western Pacific more injury than to deprive it of a base from which it may operate in those distant waters. I believe it to be an essential of our peace strategy that every effort be made to retain possession of Manila Bay under all circumstances. I do not mean by this that should Manila Bay fall its recapture will become necessarily the first great step in a campaign in the Far East. Some other harbor might then be chosen.

Without a secure harbor in the Far East, the superiority of capital ships which we now possess under the treaty may disappear in seizing and occupying a harbor. It would be sound strategy for Japan in case of war to use every effort to make us fight her Army, which is great, with our ships, which are few, in order to get such a harbor, and thus to wipe out our superiority in ships. If she occupies the harbors to which those ships must go, there is no alternative to the unequal contest.

I doubt if all fully realize how urgent this necessity for a base is in naval operations. In the old days a small harbor defended by a few guns could be called a base but the fleets of the present day require harbors of the first magnitude. Take for example the fleet left to us by the Treaty; at sea in cruising formation in hostile waters that fleet will occupy 1,200 square miles of water. If it is disposed in a circular area, the diameter of the circle will be 40 miles. If the entire fleet is together accompanied by its train, the number of vessels will be not less than 600. You will readily see from this that a primary concern of the Commander-in-Chief of that fleet, when he is going to the Far East, is a harbor to which to take it, where it can refuel and get ready for the next move. If he has to fight for that harbor, it isn't difficult to picture many disasters that may occur to that multitude of ships and transports before any harbor can be entered and made secure. I will not labor the point but only repeat that the retention of Manila Bay is an essential of our Far Eastern strategy. The problem of how to retain it is your problem and mine.

The inquiry is frequently made by officers of the Army - How long would it take the Navy to get command of the sea in the Far East. That is not a correct question. The question should be - How long would it take the Army and the Navy to get command of the sea in the Far East, because the Navy alone cannot get that command of the sea. It must have the Army to hold its shore bases and to preserve those bases in every respect free from enemy land and air attack. A part of the Army will have to go with the Navy in its very first move to the Western Pacific. The Army will have to share the hazards of a sea voyage towards hostile shores and depend for its safety en route on the adequacy and soundness of the naval preparations in ships, munitions and men that will have been made in time of peace. If I were asked what steps should be taken now to guarantee to us the retention of Manila Bay, I should say first, the strengthening of the garrison; second, the constant readiness of the Navy; third, the organization and holding in constant readiness of an expeditionary

force within the Army that could embark for overseas on 48 hours' notice. I would make this expeditionary force of sufficient strength in men adequately to reenforce the garrisons of Manila Bay. Even with the organization of such a force, I believe that the situation would not be sufficiently sound unless the equipment of that force, its artillery, munitions and stores were assembled during time of peace at Corregidor, and further that the force at Manila were at all times able to hold Manila Bay for two months after war was declared. With these conditions existing the question of transportation of the first expedition would simply be one of mobilizing and transporting men, a much simpler question than that of mobilizing and of transporting men and munitions both.

Manila Bay can be held permanently against hostile attack only by the very swiftest possible action on the part of the Army and Navy and the Marine Corps. Any failure in time of peace or during mobilization of the first expedition to gain time to the utmost may be sufficient to prolong what might otherwise be a brief war, to one of indefinite and exhausting duration.

There is a theory that the military and naval approach to the Far East should be made in a step-by-step mopping-up process by which all the islands en route would be taken and occupied in passing. I do not belong to that school of thought but I realize that both the Navy and the Army may be forced into the plan if both services do not take, during peace, the obvious steps to make swift action possible.

I find nothing in the Treaty that prevents us from having submarines and aircraft in unlimited numbers in the Philippines. I hope that no occasion will be lost to increase gradually the strength of these two arms in the Philippines. The arrival of army reinforcements and of the fleet at Manila Bay of course is only the first step of the naval campaign in the Far East. The question very properly arises, what would be the nature of the subsequent steps. Operations of the Navy are always directed toward the severance of the enemy's sea communications and this type of operations would be particularly applicable in a Pacific campaign. Our ability to defeat Japan depends upon our ability to shut her off from the outside world.

Our own great weakness in the Far East, aside from the absence of bases, is the extreme length of our lines of communication. The duties of guarding those lines will be very difficult. Any method by which we can hasten action will lessen this great handicap.

Singapore Base.

A consideration of the naval problems of the Western Pacific cannot fail to include Singapore, the strategic center of the British Empire east of Suez. The passing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance gave renewed emphasis to this position because it was necessary to the British fleet if that fleet were ever to operate in war in the Western Pacific. The First Lord of the Admiralty stated in parliamentary debate that Singapore "is not (directed) against any great power any more than Malta and Gibraltar can be considered as a menace against France or Germany. They are required by our navy, which must be mobile and free to act right across the world." I wish to call your particular attention to that last clause of the First Lord's statement - "Our navy must be mobile and free to act right across the world." In that clause is concentrated the essential doctrine of sea power - mobility and freedom to act - everywhere. A fleet without outlying bases is not a sea-power fleet - it is a hobbled fleet - a fleet

that may defend home shores from invasion but one not properly able to defend and maintain that vast network of national interests that stretch across all the seas.

The abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance through the medium of the Washington Treaty probably did not interrupt seriously the very cordial understandings existing between Great Britain and Japan, yet did cause Great Britain to look far into the future and to see that a great fleet based securely on Singapore protected all British interests to the west and south of Singapore. No Asiatic fleet could ever pass Singapore towards Australia or towards the Indian Ocean if a British fleet of equal or superior strength were based or could be based on Singapore and suitably supported by that base. I look upon the Singapore enterprise as a measure of precaution taken by the British Empire to make its future reasonably secure against any hostile acts emanating from any Asiatic power. I do not regard Singapore as in any sense a threat against the Philippines because the answer to such a threat is not in the Pacific. The enterprise has a second aspect that confirms and exemplifies anew a long-standing British strategic policy - the policy of controlling narrow waters throughout the world, of controlling the convergent points of commerce. The security of the British Empire is built on the foundation of its worldwide system of naval bases - not only the security of the Empire but world leadership rests in part on that foundation. It is unnecessary for me to point out to this audience the completeness with which this world policy has been followed. Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Colombo, Cape of Good Hope, Singapore, Falkland Islands, Esquimault, Bermuda, Kingston and, more recently, the Dardanelles all are examples. Of course emphasis is placed on the essential bases only, but all the positions are held in readiness for development to meet the needs of current world conditions. You will note that wherever the British cannot control narrow waters completely, they will press towards an international control, and then control the international commission. Tangier is an example of the moment. The policy is permanent.

The diplomatic treatment of Singapore is an example of how well British statesmen support British naval strategy. In June, 1921, the determination was made by the Admiralty Staff to develop Singapore. This was before the meeting of the Arms Conference. No proposal was ever discussed at the Washington Conference that would extend the status quo to Singapore, yet it fell well within the principle embodied in Article XIX of the Treaty. British strategy required that it be left untouched. British statesmen saw to it that it was left untouched.

In conclusion, I see no better staff for our limping Pacific strategy to lean on than a loyal, hearty, cooperation of the two services towards a definite end clearly understood - swift action with strong forces for specific accomplishment.

Hjb