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Contents Coordination before and during war.

(Lecture delivered at U.S. Naval War College, 1911.)

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COORDINATION BEFORE AND DURING WAR

Lecture by Commander F.K.Hill, U.S.N.

U. S. Naval War College

Newport, R.I.

1911

COORDINATION BEFORE AND DURING WAR.

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This paper will endeavor to show that war is usually caused by a policy pursued by one nation, which policy produces antagonism in another nation or nations; that war being the result of the enforcement of a policy, must be conducted to obtain the object sought by the policy and that the treaty which ends the war must be drawn to safeguard that policy, if the nation which was enforcing it is successful, or must definitely withdraw that policy if that nation should be defeated.

Having established the truth of the above statements, a deduction will be made from them to show that a war will be properly carried on when the statesmen, who control the steps preceding and subsequent to war, work with and sustain the two military branches in harmonious plans during war, which plans are drawn to further the policies which caused the war; and further that it is necessary for the military commanders to study and broadly comprehend the policies of governments so that their plans will fit the ends to be attained.

Finally a plan will be suggested by which both the preparation for war and the conduct of war will be coordinated.

Every great country has certain policies which are adapted to the needs of that country and these policies are used as guides in the conduct of its affairs with other countries.

These policies are usually developed by the necessities of the country adopting them either to protect the country itself or else to further its interests so that the people of that country may derive the greatest benefits therefrom.

The United States has at the present time two Great Policies: 1st, The Monroe Doctrine, which was originally drawn up as a defensive measure against the Holy Alliance and by which the integrity of the United States was guaranteed against European encroachments, and, 2nd, The Open Door, which is a recent development calculated to give equal opportunity to all nations in the markets now being developed in the Far East. The aim of both these policies is to enhance the power of the United States in political and commercial fields.

The policies of a nation are almost of necessity an-

tagonistic to the people of some other nation or nations, for they are usually based on the aggrandizement or protection of the nation adopting them. If a policy gives certain advantages to the citizens of a state, necessarily the citizens of some other state are placed at a disadvantage; and the friction developed by the struggle for advantage will if sufficiently great either produce war or one of the nations involved must submit its will to the other because it is less strong or not well prepared to prosecute a war.

The Monroe doctrine has frequently in the past caused considerable friction between the United States and European countries, and there was a direct threat made by the United States against England in the Venezuelan case which, if England had not acknowledged the right of the United States, would have resulted in war. Again, the Open Door policy in the Far East has also caused considerable friction. Although at the present time most of the great Powers have declared in favor of the Open Door, yet nevertheless time may develop a condition in which one or more of these countries may think it advantageous to bring forward or revive the policy of "Sphere of Influence" and do away with

the Open Door. England, Germany and Japan are the great rivals of the United States in manufactures and as they all claim Spheres of Influence in China, it is probable that, if in the race for supremacy any one of these countries finds that it is being outdistanced by a rival, then that country would endeavor by a change from the "Open Door" to the "Sphere of Influence" policy to regain the lost ground.

Japan being already partially established in Manchuria and also being geographically near to China could pass most readily to the "Sphere of Influence" policy if she thought that thereby she might gain an advantage over her rivals in trade.

The decision as to what policies a republic is to pursue rests primarily with the people and is expressed by their agents temporarily in control of the Government. In the United States the President, Secretary of State, and the Houses of Congress, (more especially the Senate) are the custodians or the directors of the policies of the people and they must decide what policies shall be carried through in spite of all opposition by foreign countries. This brings it directly to the President and his assistants to decide

which policies the country is able to carry through, and in reaching this decision he must consult the Naval and Military Authorities in order to get their expert advice as to the power of the United States to enforce its will on foreign states. It would be useless or inexpedient to put forward a policy as one for which the United States would fight if at the time its naval and military forces could not expect to cope successfully with the probable enemy. If, after consultation, the President finds that certain policies, which would bring on friction with special foreign states, are not capable of being carried through with the present naval and military forces and yet the policies are of such vital importance to the growth of the country that they are considered essential, then the naval and military advisors should be called on to state what additional forces are necessary in order that these policies may be forced through to a successful issue. If this method was pursued the United States would never find itself in the undignified position of having advocated a certain policy and when this policy was opposed would have to back down because it did not have adequate forces to carry on the war successfully. It certainly would be more dignified as a nation not to assert anything which could not be

carried out.

After the President had ascertained from his naval and military advisors what forces were necessary to enforce policies it would then be his duty to call attention of Congress to the necessary appropriations to this end, and Congress would then make these appropriations, based on technical advice or assume the responsibility either for doing away with the policy or for the defeat of United States forces in event of war.

It seems axiomatic that Congress is unable to decide technical questions of defense or attack, but Congress may decide what policies are necessary and what policies may be abandoned and finally what forces they will provide, and having made the decision it is then incumbent upon Congress to assume the responsibility for the lack of preparation if such condition is not due to the advice of the Experts. On the other hand, it is equally the duty of the naval and military advisors to assume all responsibility for bad conduct of war when adequate facilities had been given to them by Congress based on their own recommendation.

We thus see that a definite responsibility can and ought to be fixed, first, for the decision as to what the policies of the Government will be; 2nd, for the recommendation con-

cerning the forces necessary to carry out the policies; 3rd, for the appropriations necessary to provide these forces; and, 4th, for the right use of these forces by the military and naval commanders after they have been provided. The people of the United States who delegate power to carry on the government should be thoroughly informed as to the various responsibilities so that the credit for success, or odium for failure, should rest where it belongs.

At present it seems to be a popular idea that statesmen control up to and including the time when the solution of difficulties between nations is impossible except by resort to arms, that after that they call in the naval and military forces to cut the Gordian knot which they have been unable to disentangle, and that the making of war has little connection with the cause of the war. These are very false ideas.

War being the result of policies enforced should be based on strategic plans to gain certain definite ends. For instance, if the United States had a policy of extension of territory by absorption of Canada, the war would be directed so as to gain military control of that territory, and if the war ended successfully for the United States, the treaty would probably

cede to them such territory as was held under military control at the end of the war.

It is thus seen that the strategic objective of a war must rightly comprehend a knowledge of the policies which preceded war and contemplate the treaty which is to conclude the war.

In order to make war successfully it is not only necessary to have properly conceived strategic plans which endeavor to carry out policies, but these policies must be based on the moral convictions of the people that, not only are the results of the policies beneficial to the country but also that they are ethically correct. The moral force of the nation must be behind the policy and this moral force must be developed in the people so that every ounce of the strength of the nation will be exerted throughout the war. All wars gather strength from the intensity with which the people enter into the spirit of unholding the policy adopted. A war waged in a lukewarm spirit is worse than useless, and it would be better not to enter into war unless it is known that the fight will have the backing of the people to the bitter end.

A most striking illustration of a policy carried forward aggressively and with the backing of the people is that of

Germany in her industrial expansion at the present time. She has put her hand to the plough and has systematically developed her Navy, merchant marine and industries to the end that nothing shall impede her progress in this direction. The people are imbued with the spirit of the thing or otherwise it would never have been possible to impose the taxes to raise the money for carrying out those projects which are the adjuncts of the main object.

So we see that policies make war; that war is conducted to further policies, and that treaties carry forward these policies when war decides in their favor.

It has been mentioned above that the President in reaching a decision as to which policies the country is able to carry through must consult the Naval and Military Authorities. At this time in order to make a proper decision these experts must, having due regard to a policy to be enforced, lay out in conjunction plans of campaign. This work is done by the Naval and Army War Colleges and their separate deductions are harmonized by the Joint Board. It is to be regretted that in the development of these plans the two colleges are not more

intimately connected, but especially is it to be regretted that an authoritative representative (a State Department Official) is not assigned to duty on the Joint Board. The harmony of the essential parts of the military plans will follow when the two colleges work more closely together, but the harmony of the full campaign to the end to be attained will be greater if Executive representation is combined with the Military.

Since these Naval and Military experts must base their campaigns on strategic objectives to carry out the policy, they necessarily must make studies of foreign policies and have intimate knowledge of the existing relations of their home to all foreign countries. On this knowledge the campaign must be founded and during the progress of the war no action must be taken which is opposed to the existing diplomatic conditions. Hence the Commanders of both branches must be conversant with international conditions as well as military plans.

Admiral Mahan says, in regard to the Commander-in-Chief, as follows:-

"While a government is responsible for its choice of the chief naval commander, it must depend upon him for the en-

forcement of discipline and for the choice of measures at once practicable and adequate to compass the ends of the war. Upon him more than upon any other must fall the responsibility of failure; for he knows or should know better than the government, what the fleet can be made to do, what the state of discipline really is, and what his own capacity to carry out the one and support the other. Only through him can the government act. When it disregards or over-rides without displacing him mischief ensues; but the correlative of the generous, confident, and hearty support it owes him are on his part unceasing intense effort, or resignation."

No better exposition from a purely Naval point of view could be given than the above, but it is respectfully submitted that to carry out what is required will necessitate a complete understanding of diplomatic conditions, which conditions must be the basis of the plans.

The plans, therefore, should be developed after discussion between representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments. The first understanding the conditions and the two latter the methods of carrying out the conditions. The war following the plans should ever have in mind the conditions which formed the basis of the plans.

The three greatest authorities on the Art of War are Jomini, Clausewitz, and Von Der Goltz. The following quotations are given to show their opinions on the points as outlined in this paper.

Von Der Goltz says: "Upon policy the whole condition, the feeling, the constitution, and the moral and physical affairs of a state depend; and upon these depends, again, the waging of war.

"Policy, again, regulates the relations not merely of those States immediately concerned, but also those of such as are indirectly interested in the final issue. There favour or disfavour may be of very great significance, impeding the course of events, or promoting them. Politics, again, as a rule, determine the moment for the outbreak of hostilities, upon the happy choice of which much depends. They, in short, create the general situation, in which the State enters into the struggle, and this will be of material influence upon the decisions and attitude of the commander-in-chief, and even upon the general esprit of the army.

"In the face of the great weight of warlike events in our modern times, politics retreat more and more into the background, so soon as the cannon thunder.

"Politics regain their influence only so soon as it is felt, that, in the case of one of the belligerents, the desire for peace begins to prevail over his desire for continuing the struggle, and that all hope of the success of his arms is dying away. It will then be for politics to bring about a rapprochement under which both parties can arrive at an understanding respecting the end of the struggle. The influence of third Powers, too, must not be lost sight of. It frequently determines how far the victor may proceed in his demands, and how far and to what extent the vanquished must give way.

"In the last stages of a war, when the issue and decision by arms is no longer doubtful, the military element naturally makes way more and more for the political. The effect of politics frequently makes itself immediately felt in the decisions of the commander-in-chief. Political considerations may, under certain circumstances, bring about a battle which, although no longer necessary from a purely military point of view, is regarded on the one side as a last attempt, and on the other as final means of coercion. One of the belligerents, perchance, does not desire this final decision for its own sake. A weak Government requires it in order to explain to its own

people the necessity for peace, even when it had no longer hopes of victory. What marvellous fruits the interference of politics at the end of a war may bring forth, was seen in 1871, when an armistice was concluded, whilst on another part of the theater of war the struggle was still being carried on; just like two fencers who have been separated before their courage has cooled down.

"War serves politics both before and after. War waged only for annihilation and destruction is in these days inconceivable. An end and aim that is of permanent value to the state, be it only a question of ascendancy, must be existent; and this can only arise from political considerations.

"The object of a war is of such importance and will be of such lasting effect upon the exertions which nations make to attain it, that we ought, almost on that account alone, to place policy first among conditions of success. Now, as we have here pointed out, many motives are also attendant, and thus we may without hesitation lay down a maxim that without a good policy a successful war is not probable.

"War will, on that account, be in no way degraded in importance nor restricted in its independence, if only the com-

mander-in-chief and the leading statesmen are both clear that war, under all circumstances, serves politics best by completely defeating the enemy. By attention paid to this maxim, not only is the greatest liberty assured to politics, but, at the same time, the widest scope is allowed in the employment of the combative forces.

"How heartily politics and war ought to co-operate is manifest."

Clausewitz says:- "Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration, viz; the political object of the War. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product.

"Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.

"Now, if we reflect that war has its root in a political object, then naturally this original motive which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct. Still, the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective, the latter always retains a prior right to consideration. Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit.

"We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of War in general and the Commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may re-act on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view

is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

"We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how Wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.

"Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and General exercise is rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most comprehensive, of all strategical questions.

"War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, com-

posed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.

"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the General and his Army; the third, more the Government. The passions which break forth in War must already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range which the display of courage and talents shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the General and his Army, but the political objects belong to the Government alone."

THE ART OF WAR.

Jomini says:- "The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches: - viz: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed Diplomacy in its relation to War. Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable

to every general commanding an army; it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it should have a place in a work like this.

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:-

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering, -- the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor tactics."

STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.

"Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war."

"War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised

in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case."

"To these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general."

CONCLUSIONS.

War is not independent of political considerations, but must be outlined and carried on with due regard to these considerations. That to properly outline the war the three branches of the Government (State, War and Navy Departments) should act in conjunction, and that peace preparation in anticipation of war should be the joint action of Congress, the War and the Navy Departments.

Finally both the peace preparations and war will best be carried out by a National Board for War comprised of units representing both branches of Congress and the Departments of State, War and Navy.

The following is recommended as the composition of the National Board for War.

Secretary of State.

Secretary of War.

Secretary of the Navy.

1 Permanent
Secretary

Chairman of Senate and House
Military Committees.

Chairman of Senate and House
Naval Committees.

Civilian under
State Department.

Chief of Staff, Army.

President of Army War College.

Naval Aid of Operations.

President of Naval War College.

For the information of this Board it is necessary to have as its head the Secretary of State, who knows about the Diplomatic relations which may precipitate war; it is necessary to have the Legislative members so that they may decide on the policies to be carried out and the expenditures required to prepare for war, and it is necessary to have the military branches which will furnish technical information as to preparation for war and from the discussion of the Board will understand the policies to be enforced in the prosecution of war.

Extracts from various authorities bearing on the subject
of the lecture:

Spenser Wilkinson, - THE BRAIN OF AN ARMY.
(Page 22)

Col.G.F.R.Henderson,C.B., - THE SCIENCE OF WAR.
(Page 23-30)

Rear Admiral Mahan, - Lecture delivered at Naval
War College, 1910.
(Page 31-36)

Darrieus, - WAR ON THE SEA, - General Policy of Nations;
Its close Connection with Strategy.
(Page 37-39)

Darrieus, - WAR ON THE SEA, - Commander-in-Chief not to
be interfered with during War.
(Page 40-44)

Captain Bellati di Saint Pierre, Italian Navy,
NAUTICAE RES.
(Page 45-47)

Hamley's -- OPERATION OF WAR,
(Page 48-49)

Spenser Wilkinson.

The Brain of an Army.

"The Emperor unites the supreme military with the supreme political control. This combination is intended to secure the first of all conditions for success in war, harmony between the political and the military direction. It is impossible to overrate the importance of accord between strategy and policy. The soldier is at all times the servant of the statesman; a relationship the loyal recognition of which implies that the soldier abstains from prescribing ends to the statesman, the statesman from interfering with the soldier in the choice of means. An exhaustive discussion of the relations between the army and the government -- that is, between war and policy -- lies beyond the scope of this work. But it is relevant to say that the successful conduct of a state in war, as in peace, depends very largely upon the clearness with which the sovereign power conceives its political ends, and the resolution with which they are pursued. No perfection of the military organization can compensate for the failure of the statesman to frame a clear conception of his aims, or for his timidity or hesitation in the effort to attain them."

Col. G. F. R. Henderson, C.B.

The Science of War.

"It is hardly necessary to observe that no civilian minister, however deeply he might have studied the art of war, could be expected to solve for himself the strategic problems which come before him. In default of practical knowledge, it would be as impossible for him to decide where garrisons should be stationed, what fortifications were necessary, what roads should be constructed, or how the lines of communication should be projected, as to frame a plan of campaign for the invasion of a hostile state. His foresight, his prevision of the accidents inevitable in war, would necessarily be far inferior to those of men who had spent their lives in applying strategical principles to concrete cases; and it is exceedingly unlikely that he would be as prolific of strategical expedients as those familiar with their employment. Nevertheless, although he would be more or less bound by expert advice, and although he might be aware that the attempt to control military operations, even so far as regards the preliminaries of a campaign, is a most dangerous proceeding, yet a knowledge of war could hardly fail to serve him in good stead. Arnold, in his 'Lectures on Modern History', puts the matter clearly:

'There must be a point up to which an unprofessional judgment on a professional subject may not only be competent, but of high authority, although beyond that point it cannot venture without presumption and folly. The distinction seems to lie originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing, and that of perceiving whether it is well done or not. "He who lives in the house," says Aristotle, "is a better judge of its being a good or bad one than the builder of it. He can tell not only whether the house is good or bad, but wherein its defects consist; he can say to the builder, 'This chimney smokes, or has a bad draught'; or 'This arrangement of the rooms is inconvenient,' and yet he may be quite unable to cure the chimney, or to draw out a plan for his rooms which should suit him better. Nay, sometimes he can even see where the fault is which has caused the mischief, and yet he may not practically know how to remedy it." Following up this principle, it would appear that what we understand least in the profession of another is the detail of his practice. We may appreciate his object, we may see where he has missed it, or where he is pursuing it ill, nay, may understand generally the method of setting about, it, but we fail in the minute de-

tails. . . . But in proportion as we recede from those details to more general points, first, as to what is generally called strategy, that is to say, the directing the movements of an army with a view to the accomplishment of the object of the campaign, in that proportion general knowledge and power of mind come into play, and an unprofessional person may, without blame, speak or write on military subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently.'

Applying this wise rule to statecraft, the point where civilian control of military operations becomes presumptuous, as well as the extent of that control, may be easily defined. In the first place, to frame a sound strategical plan, whether for defense or invasion, requires not only an intimate acquaintance with innumerable details of which only a professional soldier can really judge, such as methods of supply and transport, the use of fortifications, the effects of climate, the maintenance of the lines of communication, the value of positions, the management of marches, the moral, armament, organization, tactics, and resources of the opposing forces, but an intimate acquaintance with the principles and strategems of war. It is here that the amateur strategist fails. He may have read enough to give him a good knowledge of principles, but he has

no knowledge of the practical difficulties of war, and his criticism, as a general rule, is consequently of little value. All war is simple, but the simple is most difficult, and how difficult only those who have made it, who have witnessed with their own eyes the turmoil, the confusion, the friction, which, even in the best armies, attend the most ordinary operation, are in a position to understand. Even a theoretical acquaintance, derived from historical study of the practical difficulties, is insufficient. Unless he who prepares a strategical plan has before his mind's eye a clear picture of all military operations, of marching, quartering, supply, entraining, and detraining, embarkation, and debarkation, and a personal knowledge of the difficulties which attend on war, his work will be of little value. It is essential too that he should have a thorough knowledge of both officers and men, of the peculiar characteristics of the army, and of the system on which it works, of its strong points and its weak.

A German, suddenly placed in command of British soldiers, would be much at sea, and vice versa. Every army has an individuality of its own. It is a living organism of a very sensitive temper, and it can neither be properly controlled nor effi-

iently directed except by those who are in full sympathy with its every impulse.

It would appear, then, that while a statesman may be competent to appreciate the general principles of the projects of operations laid before him, he should never attempt to frame a project for himself. Still less, when once he has approved of a plan of campaign, should he attempt to limit the number of troops to be employed, or to assign the position of the necessary detachments. Nevertheless, a knowledge of war may still be exceedingly useful to him. A minister of war cannot divest himself of his responsibility for the conduct of military operations. In the first place, he is directly responsible for plans of campaign to meet every possible contingency being worked out in time of peace. In the second place, he is directly responsible for the advice on which he acts being the best procurable. It is essential, therefore, that he should be capable of forming an independent opinion on the merits of the military projects which may be submitted to him, and also on the merits of those who have to execute them. Pitt knew enough of war and men to select Wolfe for the command in Canada. Canning and Castlereagh, in spite of the opposition of the King, sent Wellington, one of the youngest of the lieutenant-generals, to hold Portugal against the French. The French Directory had

sufficient sense to accept Napoleon's project for the campaign of Italy in 1796. In the third place, strategy cannot move altogether untrammelled by politics and finance.

But political and financial considerations may not present themselves in quite the same light to the soldier as to the statesman, and the latter is bound to make certain that they have received due attention. If, however, modifications are necessary, they should be made before the plan of campaign is finally approved; and in any case the purely military considerations should be most carefully weighed. It should be remembered that an unfavourable political situation is best redeemed by a decisive victory, while a reverse will do more to shake confidence in the Government than even the temporary surrender of some portion of the national domains. 'Be sure before striking' and 'reculer pour mieux sauter' are both admirable maxims; but their practical application requires a thorough appreciation of the true principles of war, and a very large degree of moral courage, both in the soldier who suggests and in the statesman who approves. If, however, the soldier and the statesman are supported by an enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realise that patience is to be preferred to precipitation; that retreat, though inglorious, is not necessarily humiliating, their task is very considera-

ably lightened.

Nothing is more significant than a comparison between the Paris press in 1870 and the Confederate press in 1864. In the one case, even after the disastrous results of the first encounters had proved the superior strength and readiness of the enemy, the French people, with all the heat of presumptuous ignorance, cried out for more battles, for an immediate offensive, for a desperate defence of the frontier provinces. So fierce was their clamour that both the generals and the Government hesitated, until it was too late, to advise the retreat of Bazaine's army; and, when that army had been cut off at Metz, the pressure of public opinion was so great that the last reserve of France was despatched to Sedan on one of the maddest enterprises ever undertaken by a civilised state. In 1864, on the other hand, while Lee in Virginia and Johnston in the West were retreating from position to position, and the huge hosts of the Union were gradually converging on the very heart of the Confederacy, the Southern press, aware that every backward step made the Federal task more difficult, had nothing but praise for the caution which controlled the movements of their armies. But the Southern press, in three crowded years of conflict, had learned something of war.

In 1866 and 1870 the German press was so carefully muzzled that, even had there been occasion, it could have done nothing to prejudice public opinion. Thus both the sovereign and the generals were backed by the popular support they so richly merited; but, it may be remarked, the relations between the army and the Government were characterised by a harmony which has been seldom seen. The old King, in his dual capacity as head of the state and commander-in-chief, had the last word to say, not only in the selection of the superior officers, but in approving every important operation. With an adviser like Moltke at his elbow, it might appear that these were mere matters of form. Moltke, however, assures us that the King was by no means a figurehead. Although most careful not to assert his authority in a way that would embarrass his chief of staff, and always ready to yield his own judgment to sound reasons, he expressed, nevertheless, a perfectly independent opinion on every proposal placed before him, and on very many occasions made most useful suggestions. At the same time, while systematically refraining from all interference after operations had begun, he never permitted military considerations to override the demands of policy."

Rear Admiral Mahan.

(Lecture delivered at Naval War College, 1910)

In concluding, I wish to draw your attention pointedly to one remark of Corbett's. I expect to use from him several illustrative incidents in due place; but the remark I here quote bears upon a necessary element of naval strategic thought, which used to be not only ignored but actually discredited and decried. I mean the appreciation of political conditions as an essential factor in all military plans. I will cite an instance, immediately under our eyes. When Germany shall have finished the ships contemplated in the Naval Programme which she has formally adopted, she will have a navy much superior to that of the United States, unless we change our present rate of building, and also provide more extensive plants. Where then will be the Monroe Doctrine? and where the security of the Panama Canal? The enforcement of both these depends upon the fleet.

The question, if merely one of military force, would be simple; the superior fleet dominates, if the margin of superiority be sufficient. It is the question of political relations which introduces perplexing factors; and the military adviser of a government is not competent to his task, unless, by knowledge of conditions, and practice in weighing them, he can fairly estimate how far inferior numbers may be reinforced

by the pressure which other considerations may bring to bear on a possible enemy. Every naval officer should order his study, and his attention to contemporary events, abroad and at home, by the reflection that he may some day be on a General Staff, and in any case may beneficially affect events by his correct judgment of world-wide conditions.

I have just stated a principle, viz: the necessity of including political -- international -- conditions in military projects. An illustration, the complement of the principle, is the contemporary historical relations of Germany and of the United States to other nations. For instance, there is the solidarity of action between Germany and Austria, just shown by the pressure of Germany upon Russia to ignore Great Britain and France, and to recognize the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These incidents are not six months old. I cannot, of course, enter now into an elaborate analysis of all that this German action means, but I can indicate the, to us, important question involved, which is this: How far do Germany's relations with other European states permit her embarking her fleet in a trans-Atlantic adventure? If we had no fleet, doubtless she could afford to do so. If we have nine ships to her ten she probably could not so afford; because the

fight we could put up, whatever the issue, would leave her without a navy to confront Europe. On the other hand, should our Pacific coast citizens precipitate us into a war, or even into seriously strained relations, with Japan, that pressure upon us would add to the force of the German fleet. In our long contention with Great Britain, based on the Monroe Doctrine, we made continuous progress up to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of a half dozen years ago, which registered the final triumph of the Monroe Doctrine. During all this period our navy was hopelessly inferior to the British; sometimes ludicrously so, yet we won out. Why did we? and are we in similarly good condition for a possible contention with the new Sea Power? Where ought Great Britain to stand, in case we have trouble with Germany? and where ought we to stand, in the reverse case?

Corbett's remark is, that in the Seven Years War, the strength of the British action lay in the fact that one great man, the first Pitt, controlled the naval, the military, and the diplomatic action. The several conditions were thus weighed, and were harmonized into a common action, to which each contributed its utmost influence in mutual support. The desirability of the result must fix our eyes upon the fact that, in our country at least, it will never be attained through one man,

but only by the co-operation of several. Those several will be statesmen, military men, and naval men; and, in order that their co-operation may be adequate, each must understand the conditions by which the others are controlled. The often failure of conjoint military and naval operations has been due less to mean jealousy than to lack of such mutual understandings; and for a due grasp of preparation for war, and for planning war, military men of both services need to be imbued with knowledge of international relations. Those relations do affect the amount of force available in various quarters, by the several opponents. Thus Darrieus says correctly: "Every naval project which takes account neither of the foreign relations of a great nation, nor of the material limit fixed by its resources, rests upon a weak and unstable base. Foreign policy and strategy are bound together by an indestructible link;" and in this connection he quotes the German, Von der Goltze: "Whoever writes on Strategy and tactics ought not in his theories to neglect the point of view of his own people. He should give us a national strategy, a national tactics." Now the Monroe Doctrine is a point of view of the American people; and no scheme of strategy -- such as the numbers and constitution of the fleet -- is sound if it neglect this

consideration. The remark applies to statesmen as well as to officers.

My last word to you, then, in these preliminary remarks, is to master, and keep track of, the great current events in history contemporary with yourself. Appreciate their meaning. Your own profession, on its military side, calls of course for your first and closest attention; but you all will have time enough to read military history, appreciating its teachings, and you can also keep abreast of international relations, to such an extent that when you reach positions of prime responsibility, your glance, your coup d'oeil, to repeat the French idiom, will quickly take in the whole picture of your country's interests in any emergency, whether that be pressing or remote. To repeat Nelson's phrase, you will be no novice; and you will not, because, you, in your career, as he in his, will have been continually applying the judgment you are now called specially to exercise. That you may more effectually do this, banish from your mind all concern about questions interior to the country; questions financial, sociological, economical, or what not. The sphere of the Navy is international solely; and it is this which allies it so closely to that of the statesman. Be yourselves statesmen as well as seamen. The biography and history of our profession will give you glorious names who

have been both. I trust the future may show many such among the sons of this College.

"DARRIEUS"

WAR ON THE SEA.General Policy of Nations; Its Close Connection
with Strategy.

It is chiefly in taking up this chapter that I feel all the difficulties of my task. In the short space at my disposal, I ought to pass in review all the elements which make up the foreign policy of a great nation, to show how it acts as the motive and regulator of strategy. This magnificent study, too vast for our limited programme, would moreover exceed my ability. And yet it is indispensable for me to show, were it only in a brief statement, the intimate connection which makes military conceptions the natural consequence of political conceptions. There is no study of strategy possible without that. It has become a common saying that: "A nation must have the fleet which corresponds to its policy." To understand the full value of this expression, it suffices to imagine the two extreme possible conclusions of the policy of a given nation: Conflict with England or with the Swiss Confederation. And at once it is clearly apparent, not only that the conduct of the war evidently cannot be the same in the one as in the other case, but furthermore that, between these two limiting cases of an ex-

clusively naval power and another with land forces only, there exists an infinity of mixed solutions in which the relative value of the naval force is more or less great in comparison with the total military force.

The point of departure being thus clearly defined, it results therefrom that the future conduct of the operations of war, depending necessarily upon the composition of the adversary's forces, demands prior knowledge of the political objectives. There is no possible strategy, using the expression in its broadest sense, that is in its relation with preparation for war during peace times as well as in its connection with the direction given to actual operations, unless at the very beginning the probable adversary or adversaries are known. Even more, it is usually from the prior political action that military strategy derives its fundamental premises, knowledge of the enemy, of his weak points as well as of the resources at his disposal, of his moral state as well as of his material situation; in short all the information the utilization of which is the most valuable element in success. Finally, it is through politics alone that the military art can emerge from pure abstraction, wholly speculative, to solve concrete cases; it is politics which makes it fruitful.

The very foundations of the military structure rests then upon the precise designation of the nations with which causes of conflict are permanent or even liable to occur. And it is because the study of strategy would be absolutely sterile without this essential datum that I have undertaken to write this chapter.

"DARRIEUS"

WAR ON THE SEA.

Commander-in-Chief not to be interfered with during War.

We have there seen an admirable chief, full of energy and of wise resolution, having a very clear sense of the fundamental rules of the conduct of war and capable, surely, as he has proved himself, of accomplishing great deeds, if the blundering control of an authority exercised from thousands of miles away had not neutralized these incomparable qualities. Quite like Tourville before him, Courbet suffered from too heavy fetters placed by the government on his military actions.

In striking contrast to this is what will happen ten years later in the same theater. We shall not find then, at the head of the Japanese fleets, admirals of such exceptional worth as to deserve immortality, but on the other hand we shall see a staff already conscious of the impossibility of military improvisations, knowing what it wishes and with a firm will to attain to it, having prepared a plan of operations in conformity with sane principles and carrying it out to the end without weakness. We had "the man", but we neglected preparations for war, as well as war itself; in the contest between China and Japan, the conquerors did not have "the man", but they knew how to prepare methodically for war and to carry on

war. This was an experimental proof that the system to which von Moltke owed his successes in 1870 is as excellent on the sea as on shore.

One other observation is necessary; there are no profitable operations possible in a war the details of which the political power pretends to direct, when the distance of the field of action forbids its determining their relative importance and following their progress.

We have already had occasion to exhibit the productive freedom of action which Nelson of good rights enjoyed, the elasticity of the general orders given to him, wholly contained in the brief and clear formula: to win command of the Mediterranean, which permitted him to follow the enemy's fleet even to the Antilles.

Suffren, he also felt the full value of military independence when he wrote the Minister, de Castries: "The king can be well served in these far off countries only when those in command have great powers and the courage to use them."

Moreover, our illustrious seaman had found a man capable of understanding him in this Minister who wrote to him: "The king has announced to you in your instructions, Sir, that all courageous acts which his generals may do, even though they

fail of the success which their boldness deserves, will be none the less honored of him, and that inaction is the only thing with which he will be displeased."

I have already affirmed under too many circumstances the necessity of building everything upon a system of definite responsibilities for anyone to suppose that I am defending the delegation of powers. It belongs to the national authorities alone to give the initial impulse, to establish what may be called the programme of future hostilities, but if one makes war, of his own accord or because he is forced to, it matters not which, he must know how to make it; once the war has begun, its direction belongs to the military chief. Every other method leads straight to defeat, and if all the conquests of modern progress in the matter of rapidity of communications are to have for a consequence restraint of the indispensable initiative of the supreme commander in the field, all the benefits which they confer will not be sufficient to make up for their evil effects.

That is why I could not let slip the chance of expressing myself frankly on this subject. If there be need of supporting the examples of Suffren and Nelson, we have the great authority of Napoleon, the master of the subject. Treating, in his

Memoirs, of the duties of generals, he expresses himself as follows:

"A general in chief is not relieved of responsibility by an order from a minister or a prince far from the field of operations and knowing badly or not knowing at all the last state of affairs: (1) Every General-in-chief who undertakes to execute a plan which he thinks bad or injurious is criminal; he ought to make representations, to insist upon a change, finally to resign rather than be the instrument of the ruin of his own people; (2) Every general-in-chief, who, in consequence of orders from a superior, delivers battle with a certainty of losing it, is equally criminal; (3) A general-in-chief is the first officer of the military hierarchy. The minister, the prince give directions to which he must conform in his soul and conscience; but these directions are never military orders and do not exact a blind obedience; (4) Even a military order is to be blindly obeyed only when it is given by a superior who, being on the spot at the moment of giving it, knows the state of affairs "

It seems to me well to give these quotations, not only because, with due regard for the proportions of course, they apply to the campaign we have just been considering, but also

because they condemn the unfortunate natural tendency of the central authority, in almost all contemporary wars, in all countries, to meddle with the practical conduct of operations.

I am inclined to think, for my part, that the repeated defeats of General Kuropatkin, on the plains of Manchuria, had no other original cause.

Captain Bellati di Saint Pierre, Italian Navy.

"NAUTICAE RES"

When, owing to the unpreparedness of the naval forces, a commander-in-chief fails in his designs, there is a tendency to make of him a scape goat. There are thus forgotten the duties incumbent upon governments, and through them upon the nation, in that they failed to give him the necessary and sufficient means for the object that it was determined to secure. The authority of the commander-in-chief is thus halved from the very beginning. Torrington had the scorn of his own country on account of the defeat at Beachy Head, but it would be unjust not to remember that, a year previously he resigned as head of the administration, because the government refused his requests to reenforce the fleet which he believed unequal to confronting the events that were preparing. In fact he was absolved by the Court Martial.

We have already said that it is certainly not advisable for a commander-in-chief to disobey the orders that he receives; but if the situation on the spot makes it evident that obedience may lead to a failure or to a grave error, it is obligatory upon the commander-in-chief to go ahead with his plans without executing the orders that he receives, assuming the entire responsibility for his acts. Such characters are difficult to find, and for this reason -- we can not too much insist upon it -- commanders-

in-chief must be men of conspicuous moral and military virtue, and of exceptional character. It must be the study of governments to know how to single them out wherever they may be found. In 1866 the man designated should have been Galli della Mantica (allowed to go into anticipated and voluntary retirement) giving no attention to seniority, even as the English selected Nelson; the Japanese, Togo; the Austrians, Tegethoff; Trafalgar, Tsushima, Lissa; what results!

In every war plan the understanding between the Army and the Navy must be provided for long beforehand, and their respective tasks exactly defined. For this reason, with word and pen, we have always maintained that this understanding should be full and complete.

We should exceed the modest limits that we have imposed upon ourselves in this paper, if we should set forth our ideas in this connection. Let it suffice to say that we maintain the necessity of constituting a permanent Board of Defense, with the express purpose of getting together the energies and the intelligence of the military and naval authorities for the study of co-ordinated preparation for war on land and on sea. We content ourselves with referring the readers who desire to go deeply into the question to Lord Esher's work, "National Strategy."

The lack of full and entire understanding between them was the reason for the want of unity between the military and naval authorities at Port Arthur, and the principal cause of the incomplete defense of that fortress. Such a state of things is the cause of interminable delays that redound to the detriment of the defense of the country.

War must have a single direction, and, in the particular case under consideration, a maritime fortress must be under a single command. Let it be naval or military as may be desired, this is a matter of no importance, and we do not wish to consider it here; the essential thing is that a single authority shall command, and that the naval and military divisions shall obey. To do otherwise is to court failure, and perhaps also the dishonor of a hasty surrender without having first developed all the means of defense, as happened at Port Arthur. It avails nothing to say that the result could have been different; the essential thing is that the military honor be unspotted.

The proceedings for the surrender of Port Arthur marked a painful page in the military history of Russia, and the lesson is being pondered.

HAMLEY'SOPERATION OF WAR.

Demanding, then, as this question does, diplomatic as well as military sagacity, it will be most effectually solved when the chief of the State combines the characters of ruler and soldier; and it is not the least of the advantages which a military autocrat, like Frederick or Napoleon, possesses in war, that all the circumstances are apprehended by a single mind, and the decision has all the force and coherence which unity imparts. But when generals are commissioned by their governments to execute warlike enterprises, the questions which depend chiefly on diplomacy must of necessity be solved by statesmen, who, having thus given to the campaign its original impulse and direction, will do well to leave the formation and execution of the military plan in the hands of the general.

In Practice, however, it is often difficult to reconcile military with political considerations. Thus in 1866 the success of von Moltke's plan was seriously endangered by the delay which was forced on him, for political reasons, by the Prussian Government. In 1870 the disaster of Sedan was caused by the French Government insisting, for political reasons, on MacMahon's movement towards Metz. In war ultimate political success must

depend on military success, and the policy which insists on unsound military measures is likely to defeat its own ends.

On the other hand, in framing a plan of campaign a general must make full allowance for political exigencies. The failure of McClellan's operations in 1862 is a warning of the danger a general incurs when he attempts to carry out a plan to which his government accords only a half-hearted support.

