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SUMMER CONFERENCE 1913.

QUESTION 1.

WAR AND POLICY.

Prepared By

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This paper is largely made up of extracts from the following:

- Jomini ----- Art of War.
- Clausewitz ----- On War.
- Wilkinson ----- War and Policy.
- Hill ----- Coordination Before and During War.
- Roberts ----- Fallacies and Facts.
- Taylor ----- History of International Law.
- Murray ----- The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxon.
- Latane ----- Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America.
- Moore ----- American Diplomacy.
- Cordonnier ----- The Japanese in Manchuria.
- Lawson ----- Modern War and War Taxes.
- Papers by students at the Naval War College.

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ: DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

SUMMER CONFERENCE, 1913.

QUESTION 1.

Discuss the interrelation of our foreign policies and our military and naval policy.

What steps should be taken to coordinate diplomatic, legislative and military efforts?

Summer Conference, 1913.

WAR AND POLICY.

By Captain J. S. McKean, U. S. Navy.

Mahan in his last lecture on Strategy said "My last word to you then is to master and keep track of the great current events in history contemporary with yourself. Appreciate their meaning. Your profession on its military side, calls of course for your first and closest attention; but you will have time enough to read military history, appreciating its teachings, and you can also keep abreast of international relations to such an extent that when you reach positions of prime responsibility your glance (coup d'oeil) will quickly take in the whole picture of your country's interest in any emergency, whether that be pressing or remote. - You will in Nelson's words be no novice, because you will have been continuously applying the judgment you are then called upon specially to exercise. Remember also that other expression of Nelson's - 'An officer should have political courage'. - Political courage to be well based requires political knowledge.

"That you may more effectually concentrate upon this necessary knowledge, avoid dissipating your energies upon questions interior to the country: questions financial, sociological, economical or what not.

"The sphere of the Navy is International solely! It is this which allies it so closely to that of the statesman. Aim to be yourselves Statesmen as well as Seamen. The biography and history of our profession will give you glorious names who have been both."

POLICY.

The Century Dictionary defines Policy as an object or course of Conduct, or the principle or body of principles to be observed in conduct; specifically, the system of measures or the line of conduct which a ruler, minister, government or party adopts and pursues as best for the interests of the country.

There are various kinds of policies but this discussion is limited to National Policy. National Policies are divided into two general classes, (a) Foreign or External, (b) Domestic or Internal.

The latter Domestic or Internal Policies, are in the domain of Politics - the conflicts between party policies which are settled at the polls by the votes of the citizens of the various states and with which the military services have nothing to do.

The Foreign or External Policies are established by the Government (acting for the people) and are in the domain of International Law and conflicts under them are settled by Diplomacy or War. It is this class of Policies, Foreign or External ones, that may ultimately bring on War, that we are especially studying in an effort to determine the proper relations between War and Policy.

Foreign Policies may be divided into two classes (a) Offensive, those looking toward increasing our territory or interests beyond their present limits and (b) Defensive, those intended to protect our present interests and territory from the aggression of other nations.

Offensive Policies call for Offensive Strategy to enforce them, while Defensive Policies will only require Defensive Strategy for their maintenance. This will serve as an illustration of the close relation if not identity of Foreign Policy and Military Policy, Lord Roberts in "Fallacies and Facts" says: "Foreign Policy and Military Policy are, in fact, only different aspects of the same thing - - the External Policy of a nation.

All modern wars are caused by conflict of National Policies and as Policy determines the political objective, which, in turn, controls the military objective, it becomes absolutely essential that the Naval and Military branches of the government be in touch with, and have an understanding of, the policies announced by the State Department to other nations so that when

Diplomacy proves inadequate War may take its place and the substitution of "battles" for "diplomatic notes" be made without delay.

"An ideal policy would be one with a grand aim and a great force behind it; pursued with consistency from generation to generation, never deviating from its course and utilizing every opportunity to approximate toward its final object.

"The best foreign policy will be the one which indicates most clearly to the world at large what it considers to be its special and indefeasible rights, and at the same time exhibits an adequate military and financial backing for them."

"In democratic states lack of continuity and persistence due to change of officials, make policies weak." - - - An autocratic state possesses three great advantages (1) Greater continuity of Policies, (2) Greater ability to obtain allies (having a permanent government independent of parties can make agreements for longer periods), and (3) More experienced Ministers owing to longer continuance in office.

"The first mark of the competence or efficiency of a Government in relation to an international conflict is the clearness with which it knows its own mind, the facility with which it distinguishes between aims which are vital and must therefore be pursued without hesitation, whether in peace or war, and those which are subordinate and accidental."

"Under a despotic ruler one head alone settles the policy of the state and directs the strategy during war. Under democratic rule Statesmen and Politicians, representing parties, frame the foreign policy and a different set of men, the military leaders, plan and carry out the war. This brings about the difficulty of insuring harmony and cooperation between Policy and Strategy".

It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy, if we regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes diplomatic negotiations, sometimes war nego-

tiations, as circumstances require to obtain the political object.

It is a mistake to suppose that when diplomatic negotiations between two states cease and war breaks out, therefore the political negotiations cease, for they do not cease, they are continued in another form - - that of war. The Statesman still retains control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike as well as for the peaceful policy of the nation. The statesman is therefore bound to study War as he does his other instrument - - Diplomacy. This means only the general principles of war, the means, resources, and forces required to attain the object of the War,- viz: the submission of the enemy.

The political object of a war is determined beforehand by policy, which orders the war; determines the type of war it is to be; with what means, resources and expenditures it is to be carried on; when its object has been attained, and when it is to cease. In fact Policy prepares for, leads up to, orders, supports, guides and stops the war.

Clausewitz said "All the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet - - that is by a political, not a military functionary." For this reason War being subordinate to, and a part of Policy, the Statesman must study war and the Strategist Policy.

"The director of a nation's affairs whether he is a despotic monarch or the chairman of a committee, must be supposed before he begins to correspond on a contentious subject with the government of another power, to determine as well as he can whether the purpose he proposes to himself is vital for the nation which he represents so that it must be pursued at all costs, and also whether the opposite purpose of the other government is regarded by that government as indispensable. If both sides take the matter seriously a trial of strength is

inevitable."

Clausewitz says: "Before formulating a policy see that your means to enforce it are prepared and completely ready for instant action to support it". - formulating is here used to mean "announcing" - or formulate, prepare, then announce!

In a Democratic State it is most important that the people should study war and take an interest in National Policies - - for upon the strength with which they grasp the central idea of the Policy will depend its strength and continuity through successive changes of Administrations.

Mahan says, referring particularly to our own country- "Public Opinion in operation constitutes National Policy."

Our Policy is formulated by the President and his Cabinet, and, as all are civilians, Policy and Strategy cannot be considered together. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have their expert advisers, but by the time the advice gets to the Cabinet it is second hand and liable to be more or less damaged. It would be much better, from this point of view, if the Secretaries were officers of the Services they represent.

A logical order of procedure would be:-

- (1) The Government decides on a Policy.
- (2) The General Staff of the Army and the General Board of the Navy estimate the situation and calculate how much of an Army and Navy will be necessary for success and also the probable duration of the war.
- (3) Policy then works out a balance sheet of profit and loss and decides whether it is worth while to pursue the object proposed.

Then when the wish has become the will

- (4) The government, sets to work to give Strategy, the Army and Navy, the means that the latter has demanded for the execution of Policy's purpose.

- (5) The Government educates the Nation so that it

realizes its responsibilities, and prepares itself to meet them in case of war.

"The political regenerator of Japan was Prince Ito - the Japanese Bismarck, as we may call him. It was under his guidance that Policy prepared for two wars - first, the Chinese, then the Russian, and to him fell the duty of repressing the insurrections that occurred when Japan was compelled by Europe to renounce the advantages the Treaty of Shimonoseki as signed by China, had given her. The task that confronted Ito and the other ministers, who between 1895 and 1904 prepared for the Guerre de Revanche was extremely difficult. In 1895 they had to teach this young nation that he who is not the stronger must be the more resigned. They had to canalize the current of popular indignation to set it towards a future war of revenge, and to obtain from this indignation the sacrifices necessitated by the preparations for the war."

"Everywhere, in fact, Public Opinion clamors for the results and refuses the money."

"In Japan, popular as was the idea of war, four Cabinets fell in three years because they demanded the money to prepare for it. - Apropos of that comes the natural question for us - Is not this history repeating itself to-day?"

A Government that knows its purpose will be quick to detect the beginning of a quarrel upon a vital issue, it will divine opposition in the distance, and long before there is any palpable sign of the coming struggle will have analyzed all its possibilities, have thought of every difficulty, and made ready for every emergency.

An illustration of the concrete declaration of a Policy is given in the Czar's message to Alexieff in 1904 --- "This struggle must definitely assure the Preponderance of Russia on the coast of the Pacific. To attain this end it is indispensable to conquer Japan completely, to force her to submit definitely, and to deprive her of the desire for embarking on dangerous military enterprises for several years to come. If



we do not do this, we shall lose all our prestige in the East. The present war is summed up in the question, - "Who will have the supremacy on the Asiatic Coasts of the Pacific - Russia or Japan? To share and agree is impossible." Surely a splendid Policy definitely expressed but which failed for two reasons -- Russia had not prepared to enforce it and Japan had been preparing every day for ten years to defeat it.

Russia's Policy outstripped her Strategy, - her forces were not in position to impose her wishes should they lead to conflict with Japan. - As a result, the great northern power paid the usual penalty for unpreparedness, bad organization, and unsound distribution of forces.

It is a military platitude that the soldier is the servant of the politician and it is, therefore, the duty of the statesman to ensure by foresight that he, the soldier, shall not start a war with the odds against him, - "Policy is the mistress; war, the servant."

"Success or failure of a state's Policy depends on the amount of armed force behind it, for upon this depends the greater or less amount of resistance-friction that it will meet from other nations. If the armed force be small, it will be checked, foiled and bullied by its neighbors, till at last it is goaded into a war which could have been avoided if its prestige, its armed force, had been greater. On the other hand a National Policy supported by a great armed force finds its opponents much more reasonable and inclined to fair compromise. So that the greater the armed force behind the policy of the nation, the greater will be its prestige, and the more likely is it that all its negotiations will be settled by peaceful compromise, and the longer will it enjoy peace."

There are two ways of utilizing Armies and Navies:

- (1) In peace, by their potential force represented by numbers and efficiency to prevent war;
- (2) In war, by their dynamic force to overcome the enemy.

Balfour, when Prime Minister in 1905, said "Diplomacy, however successful, diplomatic arrangements, however admirable, may subserve and will subserve the cause of peace: but, in the long run, it is, after all, upon the might of Britain that the right of Britain depends."

Corbett points out that often those events which do not transpire are more important than those that do. That wars prevented mean more toward national progress than those successfully waged.

"When a statesman has discovered that the question he is about to raise may possibly lead to the use of force, he will, if he be prudent, avoid raising it until he has satisfied himself that for the war which he may have to conduct, he has secured as far as human foresight can secure anything, the certainty of success. He may safely assume that the other side, fighting for an object of vital importance will exert itself to the utmost of its resources. He will, therefore, take the full measure of those resources and compare it with the forces which he can bring to bear against them. If the comparison shows in his own hand such a preponderance, as making due allowance for accidents and miscalculations, give a reasonable probability of success, he will raise his contentions question; but if the calculation shows the slightest doubt either as to the readiness or the superiority of his forces, he will use his utmost efforts to avoid a dispute until such time as his preparations are completed and the certainty of ultimate success has been practically assured."

A nation ought to have an Army and Navy suited to its policies and its policies suited to its Army and Navy. The reduction of a nation's armament should logically be followed by a reduction of her ambitions either as to territory, influence in world politics, or a greater share of world trade. An increase in her ambitions in either of these directions entails a corresponding increase in her armament - that is

"means for attaining her ambitions."

The Art of War is governed by one great principle - to secure at the outset every possible advantage of time, place, armament, numbers and morale. In modern war more depends upon what has been accomplished before the commencement of hostilities than upon what is done after the first shot is fired - and this preparation rests with the Statesman, not with the military leaders. In these days, that nation which is beaten in Preparation for War is already half beaten in the War itself.

Captain Sorb of the French Navy says: "It is not at the moment of strained diplomatic relations that the President of the Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs should call on the General-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces to ascertain from them if they are ready to act in the event of such and such a contingency."

"Mistakes made in the original assembling of armies, can scarcely be made good during the subsequent course of the campaign" (Von Moltke); Such mistakes are usually due to the incapacity of a Government to judge rightly the time when the assembling should begin.

The value of preparation is shown in another quotation from Von Moltke, "It is the sword alone that now keeps the sword in the scabbard." It is the great armies of the Continent and their complete preparation, in combination with the British Fleet, that have kept the peace of Europe for the past forty years, and are preventing a general war today.

History shows that in practically every war, that nation has been successful whose rulers have recognized that a policy is useless unless the means of carrying it out are provided.

The most important duty of the statesman is to provide the necessary means for carrying into effect the policies adopted. As our statesmen do not have any practical military training and do not live in a military or naval atmosphere, it is all the more important that they should supply the practical defi-

ciency by theoretical study of the principles of war. Our Cabinet and Party system of Government make us, a nation, weak in both "preparing for" and "carrying on" war. There is a lack of harmony between Policy and Strategy and of cooperation between statesmen and military leaders. We lack both the tendency and the machinery to bring about proper coordination and cooperation. Responsible statesmen and military leaders must work together so as to synchronize and maintain in their due relative proportions the policy and strategy of a state. The only effective way to bring this about is by an intelligent grasp by both statesmen and soldiers of the broad principles of Strategy and Policy and their relations to one another. To bring this about Clausewitz says:- "If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views and policy to accommodate itself to the means available for war, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the soldier and statesman are not combined in one person, which is, to make the Commander-in-Chief a member of the Cabinet."

The dependence of Policy upon Preparation and Means is well expressed by Lord Roberts. --- "Whatever the object and character of a nation's foreign policy, the success of the policy is directly dependent upon the actual fighting strength behind it" and in another form by Secretary Meyer when he said: "The Monroe Doctrine is just as strong as our Fleet and no stronger."

"If you wish for Peace prepare for War" is another form of "In time of Peace prepare for War." Our wars have shown the folly of the other method, i.e., "In time of peace prepare for peace and in time of war prepare for war." This latter method increases tenfold the cost in time, money and lives and may lead to national humiliation.

The better the Preparation the shorter the war, the less the cost in both time and money, and the poorer the preparation the longer and more expensive the war.

That the Preparation of Means and Plans for War is not a new idea can be gathered from the following Biblical quotation - - - "What king going to war against another king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand? Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage and desireth conditions of peace."

"The right can often only be maintained by force and the great test of character of nations, as for men, arises when they are confronted by a dilemma which requires them either to risk their existence in a conflict for the support of what they believe to be right, or to commit moral suicide by acquiescence in what they know to be wrong."

This brings us to the definition of war:--- "War is a military solution of an international problem." Charles Sumner said - "War is a public armed contest between nations under the sanction of international law, to establish justice between them." Wilkin-son says: "War is a form of Political Action, the only means by which a nation can assert against challenge its conception of right." Again "War is a part of Policy, the means whereby a nation attempts to enforce its will upon another nation and to obtain its political object by force." Every negotiation implies itself that the pen is in one hand and the sword in the other. The pen and the sword are the two mutually complimentary instruments of State Policy --- Diplomacy and War. As a further illustration "War is merely a means to an end; it is a piece of political action. No statesman in his senses would resort to violence and bloodshed if he saw a way to attain his object without them; still less would any prudent man wish his nation to make the sacrifices and run the risks involved unless he was satisfied of success. One of many definitions of War given by Clausewitz is as follows: "Violence arms itself with the invention of art and science in order to contend against violence. Violence, that is to say, physical force, is therefore the means;

the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. To attain this object fully the enemy must be disarmed --- the real object of hostilities."

"War is not a Science. It may rather be compared to a business for the successful management of which a number of sciences and arts must be mastered."

"The popular belief regards war preeminently as the domain of luck and pluck. The strength and courage of the soldier and the genius of the general are thought to be the essential matters. In a higher view which embraces the whole subject, courage and right leading are consequences rather than causes --- are the result of sound management of a nation's affairs."

It is a generally recognized principle of war, that once war has been declared the method of its conduct should be left to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, who should be given a free hand in carrying out his plans, but unfortunately, time after time, the commander in the field has been interfered with from the seat of government, has had his plans thwarted and been faced with the alternative of either resigning his command or of acting contrary to his best military judgment. Modern systems of communications will increase this tendency and cutting the cables will be of no use in these days of wireless telegraphy. Every war we have had has shown numerous examples of this interference.

Behind the General is the Government and the best of leaders will be embarrassed and perplexed whenever, either in the preparation for, or during the course of, a war, his government fails to know its mind -- that is, fails to have a well understood Policy.

The above discussion of Policy and its relations to the War which may follow its enforcement shows, the necessity of, First, -- A Definite well considered Policy. Second, Thorough and complete Plans to be followed in enforcing the adopted Policy. Third, Supplying the Means to carry out the Plans,

and Fourth, The absolute necessity of some governmental organization to bring Policy, Plans, and Means into harmonious cooperations toward the common objective --- the purpose of the Policy.

In an absolute monarchy this coordination in effort is simple as all the elements --- Policy, Strategy and Preparation are under one head, the Monarch, who is often Commander-in-Chief as well. This simplifies difficulties and leads, under an able head, to great efficiency.

In our country the various elements are in different hands --- Policy in the hands of the President and his Cabinet; Strategy in the hands of the military and naval experts; the providing of the Means or Preparation in the hands of Congress; and to be successful each of these elements Policy, Strategy, and Means, must, in a general way, be known to and approved by the people to assure proper support. There is at present no organization by which cooperation, coordination; in short, unity of purpose and unity of action can be brought about.

There are two methods suggested for correcting this weakness of our government.

First: To fill the offices of the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War by carefully selected officers of Navy and Army respectively. This would harmonize Policy and Strategy in the Cabinet by bring the Secretary of State, representing Policy, in touch with Strategy and the Military Secretaries in touch with Policy; but is defective in that, while it might determine the Means necessary, the Secretaries would not be in such direct contact with Congress as to assure that these necessary means would be provided. There is also the fundamental objection of our people to having military officers form a part of the Civil Government. A second and more popular method of overcoming our difficulties is by the formation of a Committee of National Defence made up of the Cabinet Members representing Policy and Strategy; of Army and Navy experts representing

Strategy; and of influential members of both Houses of Congress to represent Means for Preparation. This plan is now before Congress in the form of a bill to organize a Council of National Defense.

This Committee has the President as Chairman ex-officio. It is not to meet in time of war and will therefore not interfere with Strategy. It is suggested that the bill should be further amended so that the Military and Naval Members form a joint Board of advisers to the President during the war. He must have such advisers and if selected during peace to make plans for war, for the success of which they will be responsible, the President will get much more valuable advice than from any voluntary or impromptu board he may be forced to rely on, if no legal one be provided.

In the absence of the Council of National Defense, a somewhat extended and increased Joint Board of the Army and Navy seems the best substitute.

Here it may be well to state what the Army and Navy are doing and to suggest what more they can do to bring about coordination and cooperation within and between the two services.

First then is the Joint Board of the two services and at each of the War Colleges officers of all branches of the service, except Chaplains, are being educated and trained to know the difficulties of War and the approved methods of meeting them.

The War Colleges are sending their graduates to the sister college, both as students and advisers to or members of the Faculty, and each service is thus educating and training a few officers to understand the language and the difficulties of the sister service and fitting them to act as interpreters between their respective commanding officers in combined operations.

To bring about the necessary coordination of effort between the various organizations of the Navy engaged in the Preparation of the Fleet for War, the Aid for Operations, the General Board, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College, or



to give the duties rather than the titles, the Chief of Staff, the War Plans Section, the Information Section and the Educational Section should be housed in one building in Washington under the direction of a single head - the Aid for Operations or Chief of Staff. To coordinate the two services the two colleges should be physically connected by an auditorium, where both colleges would meet to solve combined problems and discuss combined operations theoretically in Peace as the two services will solve combined problems practically in War. This would also make available to each service the mass of valuable information in the Archives and Libraries of both.

A suggestion I have heard as to how to bring about efficient coordination and therefore intelligent cooperation in both Peace and War was made by Major Jadwin, Engineer Corps, U. S. Army, that we go back to a single Department of National Defense headed by a Secretary for National Defense with the Army Section headed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Navy Section by the Aid for Operations. This would provide for joint effort under a single control, would prevent duplication of effort and expense, would increase efficiency and would result in the President and Council of National Defense getting advice from a single source and the Congress being asked for a single appropriation to cover a combined budget for National Defense and would inevitably bring about a better balance and proportion between the various parts, --- the Fleet, the Marine Corps, the Coast Defense and the Mobile Army, for, each would be developed scientifically to meet the most probable enemy in the enforcement of each of our National Policies and all would be educated and trained to cooperate intelligently and efficiently in accordance with a single Doctrine of War.

Even with one of the above plans in operation we have no scheme for the education of the people so that the whole country would understand and support the Government in carrying out any of our policies. This cannot, under a system of party govern-

ment, well be carried out by any official organization but must be left to voluntary societies such as the Navy and Army Leagues should receive direct encouragement and sympathetic aid from the government. Such voluntary organizations have their greatest use in time of peace --- that is, during the time in which we must prepare for War.

We have several well recognized Policies which in the course of time have come to be generally accepted by the people and by both political parties either of which may, under certain conditions, directly or indirectly, cause War.

Our well established National Policies are as follows:

First. "No Entangling Alliances." This was given its first formal expression in Washington's Farewell Address and has been referred to in many State papers since. It grew out of the difficulties with France during Washington's Administration.

While undoubtedly the oldest, and probably, most generally accepted policy, its importance in relation to Strategy and Means has not been appreciated. This policy, in its consequences, logically bars us from having the support of Allies and, with equal logic, calls for such Plans and Preparations as will enable us to protect ourselves and our Policies as against any other power or powers that may oppose them.

The next policy in point of time --- "The Monroe Doctrine" was first formally announced by President Monroe in his message to Congress Dec. 2, 1823. This policy grew out of two distinct situations. Russia in Alaska and the plan of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, Prussia) as expressed in the "Treaty of the Holy Alliance" Art 1. of which announced their intention to "Put an end to the system of representative governments in whatever country it may exist in Europe and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known" --- The country referred to was Spain and the plans included the Spanish Colonies in America which were then in revolt.

The two parts of the Monroe Doctrine appear in separate paragraphs in the Message. The first part forms the concluding sentence of the paragraph referring to Russia's proposal for a settlement of the dispute between England, Russia, and the United States, as to the boundaries between Alaska, British Columbia and the Oregon Territory; it is --- "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

The 2nd paragraph refers to the threat of "The Holy Alliance" to reestablish the Spanish Monarchy in the revolted Colonies whose independence the United States had recognized. The substance of this part of the doctrine was expressed as follows: --- "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

The doctrine as expressed in President Monroe's Message has from time to time been explained and extended by various state papers.

The latest addition to the Monroe Doctrine, the Lodge

Resolution, prohibits the acquirement and control by foreign steamship companies, etc., of coaling stations which might later be used by foreign governments as Naval Advance Bases.

The third of our National Policies is the so-called "Open Door" Policy. In effect this guarantees "equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

Note - Open Door. The only reason the "Open Door" Policy has been permitted to become a dead letter, as it has become, is because other powers do not feel the necessity of opposing Japan and Russia (the Allies of England and France) and we who are most decidedly and vitally affected have not provided an adequate Army and Navy to enforce it by ourselves.

The fourth policy "Asiatic Exclusion" has only lately met with acceptance by the whole country. This policy is considered essential for the protection of American labor in the Pacific Coast States and the rest of the country have accepted it as a National Policy.

The latest policy is "The Exclusive Military and Commercial Control of the Panama Canal." After a prolonged discussion Congress finally decided to fortify the Canal and passed laws permitting our coasting trade to use the canal free of tolls, while placing our vessels in foreign trade on the same footing as foreign vessels.

In addition to familiarity with our own policies and the supplying of the Means to carry them out we should study the Policies of other nations, both announced and secret.

Each of our policies outlined above calls for particular Plans and Means to carry it out, although, the Plans and Means provided for one might serve perfectly in the enforcement of one, or more, of the others. In fact, were full and complete Plans made and adequate Means provided to insure the carrying

out of our first and oldest Policy that of "No Entangling Alliances" or in slang "Playing a Lone Hand against the World" we would be splendidly equipped to carry out each or all of the others.

Having provided through the Committee of National Defense to bring the Policy, Strategy and Means together our remaining task is to insure the Education and Training of our Naval and Military Officers to make the best plans, to select the best means and methods with which to carry out these Plans, and, most important to educate the people to understand and therefore to support the Administration in its Policies; the Congress in providing the Means; our Commander-in-Chief in the Execution of the Plans.

This will insure proper Preparation: which will, with a Nation in Arms, insure success in War should it come; but will, if well done, serve its higher purpose, that of keeping the Peace.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

on Papers Submitted by Members of

the Summer Conference on Question 1.

Summer Conference, 1913.

QUESTION 1.

(a) Discuss the Interrelation of our Foreign Policies and our Military and Naval Policies.

(b) What steps should be taken to coordinate Diplomatic, Legislative and Military Efforts?

Summer Conference, 1913.

QUESTION 1

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

The question will be discussed as written - viz.: under sub-heads (a) and (b).

There were six very interesting and thoughtful papers submitted, each of which shows that the purpose of the faculty in posing the question had been served. This purpose was of course the detailed study of the question in so far as the time available permitted.

Each of the six papers approach the subject from slightly different points of view - The Historical Method; The "Estimate of the Situation" Method; and the method of the General Essay combining the other two. Under sub-head (a), Interrelation of Foreign, Military and Naval Policies, there is a very complete study of the various writers with much original comment and illustration, and if it were still necessary to prove that this interrelation does exist and to a large degree, any one of the papers would do to submit as a brief on the question.

Some quotations from the various papers will show the line of thought and arguments used.

One paper gives a historical sketch showing when, how and why each of our National Policies became Policies. This sketch covers in a few words - the history of our policies from Washington's "No Entangling Alliances" through the "Monroe Doctrine" up to our latest adopted policies "Asiatic Exclusion" and "The Lodge Resolution."

One paper following the method of the Estimate of the Situation shows very clearly how interrelated, how dependent one upon the other are our Foreign and Military Policies. - Under "Opposing Forces" he considers - "What these forces are likely to be": What nations may oppose the Policy? Why, how,



and to what extent? Will they oppose it from a Political, Commercial, or Military standpoint?

Includes in each case a statement of the temper of the people; the state of preparedness for war, including a statement of financial and material resources; the state of the coast defenses, the size and efficiency of the Army and Navy; the time required to mobilize; the amount of the Merchant Marine adapted to and available for military uses, etc., and the courses of action open to each possible enemy.

With the same completeness is considered our own forces or to put it shortly, this essayist has, by the method of the Estimate of the Situation, shown the necessity for, and the general contents of, a War Portfolio based on a Policy.

Another paper accents the reciprocal relation of Foreign and Military Policies and calls attention to the necessity for a reduction of national ambitions in case of a reduction of armaments and of an increase of armaments to correspond to an increase of ambitions or international responsibilities, e.g. such an increase in responsibilities for us brought about by the Spanish War. The Army and Navy which would have been adequate before, had we had it, would have been entirely inadequate to meet our increased responsibilities - The same will be true before and after the opening of the Canal.

The distinct advantage, even necessity, of having an adequate military force behind diplomatic action for it to be successful is brought out in several of the papers and supported by quotations from various authorities.

The value of these same adequate military forces in preventing war - preserving the peace - is shown by all in a way that should convert the most strenuous, but still intelligent, "Peace Propagandist" to seeing the necessity of an adequate and efficient Army and Navy.

One of the papers shows the economy of a consistent foreign

policy in that it does not call for expensive changes in military preparation, the objective and most probable enemy remaining the same.

The same paper shows the economy of coordination of Diplomats and Military Authorities. - "Expenditures to be profitable must be undertaken under a correct view of our needs and this can only be reached by the closest association of those who make our policies and those who carry them out."

In a consideration of the Monroe Doctrine one paper makes the following statement: "The Monroe Doctrine was inaugurated at a time when all other republics in America were newly organized and weak in power. This condition no longer exists. Three of these - Brazil, Argentine and Chili, now have considerable populations and resources: their governments have been stable for some time, and it is probable that they would resent and oppose our interference in their affairs". - This indirectly suggests a modification or limitation of the Monroe Doctrine to the weak and helpless of the Latin American Republics - or that the Monroe Doctrine is purely altruistic - unselfish. - It was and remains a measure for self-protection and while I should dislike seeing it limited in any way, I do think our Diplomats might succeed in showing those interested that its purpose is primarily "protective", not "directive" and persuade the various republics, as they grow up and feel less need of the protection for themselves, to join us and aid in the protection of the "little sister" republics who have not yet gained strength enough to "go it alone in world Policies."

The assistance of the fleets of Brazil, Argentine and Chili might be of great, even vital, importance to us, in the Caribbean or the South Atlantic although I do not suggest that their support should modify our building program materially.

This paper further deduces from our geographical position, the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door Policy and "Asiatic Exclusion" that our most probable enemies are Germany in the Atlantic and

Japan in the Pacific, and from a consideration of these last two probable enemies combined with our responsibilities in Mexico, Cuba, Haiti and San Domingo, arrives at the conclusion that we have no military policy; at what our Military Policy should be; and that our present Army, Navy and Reserves are entirely inadequate, and "are today, as in the past, the results of temporary conditions and of haphazard legislation."

All the papers insist on the importance of the Education of the People to understand our Policies and to appreciate what forces and preparations are necessary to carry out these policies and in this connection the advisability of publicity as to military methods and decisions affecting military policy with clearly stated reasons therefor are insisted upon. As one paper puts it: "It must be clearly and distinctly understood that in our country the strength, prestige and position of the military forces depends finally not on governmental (meaning administration) support, Congressional action, or logical reasons, but entirely and solely on the interest taken by the people at large."

One paper shows by a quotation from a speech before Congress that at least one of our legislators appreciates our position in the Pacific and the possibilities of trouble due to that position. The quotation is "Occupying Pearl Harbor, the most strategic point in the world; occupying Panama, the next most strategic point in the world, both over seas from us - occupying the Philippines that we must protect whether we set them free or not; having Alaska, a great treasure house: all these in the Pacific Ocean where two great races are meeting; where a centralized and expanding monarchy is coming into contact with a decentralized Republic."

One of the essayists quotes from Von Moltke as follows: "today the question is not so much whether a nation is strong enough to make war or whether the government is strong enough to prevent war" - and then goes on to say "War in these days

comes from below, from the anger, passion, or sentiment of the man in the street" and gives this as an especial reason in our country when public opinion has such force and acts so quickly, even rashly at times, why we must be constantly prepared for the worst war that might come. - Our people, he says, when a large part of the population is in sympathy with any course of action "do not ask what the government thinks of it but what they are going to do about it" - viz: they having decided want action - prepared or not, and they will have it - witness the Spanish War.

This essayist also calls our attention to the necessity of informing ourselves, as possible military advisers to the statesmen responsible for Policy, in World Politics and Policies.

As to the effect of lack of proper preparation and the serious reverse that would probably follow it in case of war this paper says "Our national characteristics no less than the protection of our national welfare call for constant and adequate preparation. Given at any time in our National History a serious defeat and the result would inevitably be an access of militarism, an increase in the expenditure of wealth and energy for military purposes such as the world has never seen. Give us as a people a national humiliation such as the loss of an Alsace-Lorraine or a repetition of the invasion of Mexico in 1863, and our reply would be the expenditure of wealth and energy that would dwarf the combined expenditures of all Europe and upset for a generation the commercial balance of the world. As an example of what we as a nation are prepared to do in the execution of our National Will consider the Civil War."

(b) What steps should be taken to coordinate Diplomatic, Legislative and Military Efforts?

All the papers agree on the desirability, even necessity of a "Council of National Defense" and most of them agree in general with the provisions of the Hobson Bill now before Congress.

Modifications and additions are suggested as follows:

An "Investigation Commission" which studies and prepares questions to be submitted to the Council - as in France.

One writer states that the principles of organization involved in the formation of a Council of National Defense are "that the knowledge of the foreign policies and of the military resources and capabilities should be brought together, - the object being to formulate a consistent and continuous national defense policy (to provide the necessary means for enforcing it). - It follows from this that the financial side must be represented and that the military branches be represented as members - not merely as expert witnesses."

As showing the necessity for constant cooperation to bring about coordination of effort, one paper says: "we are, essentially, a commercial and non-military nation with our minds bent on trade and the development of the tremendous natural resources of our country. The military spirit exists only in the comparatively few in whom it has been instilled by training and profession. A few of the minds of this class are the only ones that constantly keep in view the military necessities of the nation. Their intercourse with and recommendations to the lawmaking power, force the mind of the lawmakers to focus spasmodically on military subjects, but when the immediate military questions are disposed of, the general military situation is pigeon-holed in their minds until the next special situation arises. - - As for those in our military services, they are only too prone to grow accustomed to consider only things military, giving no thought to our national obligations and policies in connection either with the development or the conduct of military affairs, until a time of stress. Every military officer, be he in the Army or the Navy, and most particularly those in high office, should have an intelligent comprehension of our foreign relations and policies and should keep informed as to their development."

Another paper makes the following suggestion to help bring

about coordination - "Let us, (meaning military officers) strive to understand the statesman's, the legislator's, point of view as we hope they will understand ours" and further says:

"The building program, viz. the types and numbers of our ships, the location of our fleet; the selection, fortification and equipment of our bases: the character, training, and number of our personnel, are all dependent on our policies - present and future" and further along still says - "All the above (preparation, coordination, etc.) having been done when the time comes to make our demand it may not be necessary to use force; but the country will not be the poorer for wasted money or wasted effort. The mere fact that this concerted effort has been made will make the country stronger and more able to make future concerted efforts. A knowledge of how this coordination is accomplished will cause the country at large to place the responsibility for each step of preparation where it belongs."

One of the points brought out in the papers is the necessity of educating the people to understand both our foreign and military policies and suggestions are made as to how this may be done.

One paper says "Only the leaders of Public Opinion need be educated: this can best be done through the agency of our patriotic societies."

"A closer association of those in the military services with those who provide the means and it will bring each to a better understanding of the other."

One paper suggests the advantage of the British method of members of the Cabinet being members of the Lower House where they can explain and defend their policies.

One paper suggests the progress toward coordination of the two services through the Joint Board and suggests that it be extended somewhat in members and functions until we get the Council of National Defense and that then its members become ex-officio members of the Council in time of Peace and the Joint Strategy Board in time of War.