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# WAR DIARY

## German Naval Staff Operations Division

PART A      VOLUME 47

DECLASSIFIED BY POD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:  
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

JULY 1943

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Editorial Note:

The translation of this German War Diary was made in London, England, under the guidance of Commander S.R. Sanders, USNR. When his London Office was closed and the translation project was discontinued, much unfinished material was sent to Naval History Division (Op-29). Volumes of these diaries have been periodically distributed as funds and other conditions permitted.

The translations and stencils have not been checked by Naval History Division for accuracy of interpretation, phraseology, and spelling of officers' names or geographical names. Distribution under these conditions seems justified because of the excellent reputation of the London personnel and because translators are not available in Naval History Division. Research to correct possible inconsistencies did not warrant the time involved.

The War Diaries of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Naval History Division  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1958

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By Officer only!

WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF

(Operations Division)

Chief, Naval Staff:	Great Admiral Doenitz
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Vice Admiral Meisel
Head of Naval Staff, Operations Division:	Rear Admiral Wagner

Volume 47

beginning:	1 July 1943
closed:	31 July 1943



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Items of Political Importance

In a speech at the Guildhall on 30 Jun., Churchill predicted heavy fighting in the Mediterranean and elsewhere "before the fall of the leaf". He further stated amongst other things, that during May more than 30 submarines were destroyed in the Atlantic while in the month of June, the Allied Nations had produced seven to ten times as many new ships as had been lost by enemy action. Since the middle of May, hardly a single merchantman had been sunk in the entire North Atlantic. Referring to the bombing of the Ruhr area, Churchill declared that there would be no industry or military target in Germany that would not be exposed to the utmost to the forces of destruction as soon as the nights became longer and the U.S. Air Forces more numerous. A detailed excerpt of the speech is contained in the "Foreign Press Report" of 10 July. The speech is especially noteworthy because it deals, in apparently carefully chosen words, with the relations between the British Empire or Commonwealth and the USA.

According to Reuter, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy Knox has told high-ranking Army and Navy officers that the USA and the Allies will have to face a long and serious war which may still last for 3 - 4 years.

Special Items

I. It was proposed, subject to anticipated approval by the Italians, that the Italian submarines "BRIN" and "DANDOLO" now being converted into transports in Italy be loaded for outward passage at the German submarine base at Toulon. See order 1/Sk1 I ga 1843/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

II. Chief, Naval Staff has returned from visiting the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. His notes are entered in War Diary, Part C, Vol. Apa (Personal reports).

Situation 1 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a Chilean report, about 20 (!) tankers per week are said to have transited the Magellan Straits in both directions between January and March.

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It is reported from India that large quantities of trucks, ammunition and artillery were unloaded in Karachi, Bombay, Colombo and Kochin from U.S. ships which had been brought in convoys via St. Helena - Mauritius.

According to a report from a British agency, the Swiss government has ascertained that the British steamer NANKIN was captured by the Japanese on her way from Sidney to India. The crew of 150 men and 112 passengers who had already been given up are all well in Japan.

The NANKIN was captured by Ship "10" on 15 May 1942 and taken to Japan as a prize. It is strange that the British should have had no information on the ship so long after her arrival in Japan.

On the evening of 30 Jun., Radio Intelligence intercepted an incomplete QQQ-message from an unidentified US steamer in about 30° S, 100° E, repeated by Kilindini. This is probably connected with our own operations, (Ship "28").

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff transmitted the above-mentioned QQQ-report from Kilindini to Ship "28" by radiogram 0315 and, in radiogram 1155, added its assumption that this emergency call was a result of the activities of Ship "28". Naval Staff has no information as to the size and type of the US steamer "Kpbv".

Naval Staff's request to Armed Forces, High Command, Intelligence Division, Counter Intelligence Section concerning the date of completion of the blockade runners (removal of the top-masts etc.) was forwarded by letter 1/Skl I K 18583/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation in the West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were detected in the Bay of Biscay. Our air reconnaissance reported one destroyer 120 miles southwest of Finisterre at 2355 on 30 Jun.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:



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One ELM/J-mine was cleared off Lorient and another off La Pallice and one ELM/A-mine was cleared off Brest. On 30 Jun., there were 232 fishing vessels at sea in the northern part of the Bay of Biscay and 77 in the southern part. A French fishing boat was attacked six or eight times by 2 British fighters in BF 1974. Two fishermen were killed and four injured. On 29 Jun., French fishermen rescued two US airmen in a rubber boat 30 miles west of Quessant.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla was joined at 0825 by submarine U "180" and another submarine in BF 7653. Three enemy planes were shadowing the formation. Our covering planes reported that a third submarine joined the group which was reported at 2300 to be in BF 8612.

Channel Coast:

Escort and patrol services were carried out as scheduled. Nothing to report.

In regard to "Gute Hoffnung", Group West reports that 5 Jul. is not a date for the departure from Kiel and suggests postponement to about 2 Aug. in the next full moon period. The reason given is that the planned operation would be even more difficult than moving submarines to the west one at a time so that careful preparation is necessary. Furthermore, during the last part of the trip, the moon would be nearly full. It is not possible to submerge at Dunkirk or Boulogne though the boats can lie on the sea bottom at Le Havre and Cherbourg.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division, has postponed special operation "Gute Hoffnung" to the beginning of August (see teletype 1910).

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Torpedo Boats T "2", "5" and "18" of 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are transferring from Hook van Holland to Wesermuende. Torpedo boats T "24" and "25" of 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla have started for the west. In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic, five ELM/J-mines were cleared off the East Frisian Islands. Mine Exploding vessel "11" was damaged while clearing mines 18 miles south of Heligoland and put in to Cuxhaven under her own power. About noon, one of our convoys was bombed and strafed by 17 enemy fighters off Hook. The Swedish steamer BERNICIA was hit by a bomb and had to be beached. On the other ships only slight damage and some casualties occurred (15 severely wounded). Six of the attacking planes were probably shot down by the ships' anti-aircraft fire.

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Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

On the Arctic Coast there was one Russian submarine. Ten planes were detected in operation in the North Sea area. At 2200 on 30 Jun. reconnaissance planes sighted a convoy consisting of 1 transport and 14 merchantmen with 20 escort vessels in the Pentland Firth area on course 340°, and, in the forenoon of 1 Jul., 1 steamer of 4,000 BRT on a southerly course, 20 miles north of Soglufjord.

2. Own Situation:

During the evening and night of 29 Jun., Russian batteries fired a total of 57 rounds on the steamer RUIJA, the harbor area at Linahamari, the Cape Romanov battery and the entrance of Petsamofjord. The Cape Romanov battery returned fire with 13 rounds.

On 30 Jun., two more Russian anti-submarine in ertia-contact mines were cut in the Kvaenangenfjord.

The convoy service forces escorted 27 steamers and 1 submarine to the north and 14 steamers to the south.

Only minor enemy air activity was reported on 30 Jun. from the Vardoe-Banak and Kristiansand South area. Section I of Mine Barrage NW 30 was laid by the RCLM.D on 28 Jun. according to plan.

The destroyers Z "27" and "30" arrived at Narvik at 2330 on 30 Jun. At 1200 on 1 Jul., together with store ship DITMARSCHEN, they will transfer to Alta via Tjeldsund, by way of the fleet channel.

On 29 Jun., Group North/Fleet again repeated its request for a total of 9 boats as reinforcement for the submarines in Northern Waters since only 3 boats had so far been assigned. Of the remaining 6 boats required, Naval Staff, Submarine Division, allotted 4 on 30 Jun. (See War Diary 30 Jun.). Further assignments will be decided by Chief, Naval Staff upon the report of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, after 5 July.

For relative teletypes # 1/Skl 1856 and 1871/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

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The mineships OSTMARK, ELSASS and BRUMMER moved from Kristiansand South to Kiel. One ELM/J-mine was cleared near Helsingoer and one off Middelgrund. The Danish steamer KRONBORG (481 BRT) sank south of Copenhagen after striking a mine.

Escort service was carried out without incident throughout the Baltic Sea area. The sailing school ship DEUTSCHLAND anchored in the Duenamuende roads. Anti-submarine Kite UD "5", with armed fishing vessels of the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla, is at sea in the Gulf of Riga for location practice.

A new oil trace was attacked between Revalstein and Vaindlo.

An enemy dug-out in the Voranka sector was wiped out.

During the night, our batteries opened fire on shipping traffic in the Gulf of Kronstadt. The enemy returned 400 rounds. The "Bluecher" and "Korkuli" batteries were hit and suffered slight losses.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

On 27 Jun., in KR 48, submarine U "511", which is being delivered to Japan, sank the newly built steamer SEVASTIANO BARMINO (7,000 BRT) out of Suez in ballast.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 196 planes - mostly fighters - in operation in the west area and 3 planes in the Mediterranean. Near Cape Ortegal, 6 JU 88 planes unsuccessfully attacked 1 Halifax.

During daylight, attacks by enemy fighter formations in the West area were mainly directed against traffic installations. Four locomotives were destroyed. In the night of 1 - 2 Jul., the waters around Ameland - Terschelling and off the Atlantic coast were apparently mined.

Mediterranean Theater:

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Our air forces continued their reconnaissance activities. Enemy light bombers attacked an airfield in Sicily without results.

Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The NELSON, and 4 destroyers left Gibraltar between 1450 - 1840 and apparently carried out exercises east of the harbor.

At 2045, one of our submarines reported a fast westbound transport convoy (strength unspecified) 40 miles northeast of Alboran. Another westbound convoy of 16 vessels was reported at 1940 by our air reconnaissance 12 miles northeast of Bone. The big convoy movement to the east seems to have been completed.

From 0845 to 0900, our fighters on reconnaissance reported a formation of 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 6 cruisers and 2 detached torpedo boats travelling at high speed on a southerly course in the area 30 miles west of La Galite; at the same time there was a group of 2 - 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers sailing east about 20 miles north of Bizerta and 6 eastbound PT boats east of La Galite.

Twenty-five big freighters were anchored in the roads of Bizerta at 0845. At 1047, a convoy of 12 steamers with 9 escort vessels was sighted 25 miles east of Derna on course 110°.

One submarine was reported 50 miles southwest of Genoa and another on the southwest coast of Crete.

According to Radio Intelligence, air raid alarms were underway for three convoys, one in the Alexandria, one in the Tobruk and one in the Malta areas.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

During an enemy air attack on Cagliari from 0045 to 0150, the PT boats remained undamaged.

As, according to air reconnaissance, the enemy heavy combat group was still in the waters northeast of Bone in the afternoon and

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evening, 3rd and 7th PT boat Flotillas were kept at immediate readiness as from 1900. At 2000, 4 boats of 7th PT boat Flotilla left Cagliari to attack the enemy formation. One boat returned to port prematurely. Further reports are awaited.

Motor ships BRANDENBURG and POMMERN were sighted and reported by enemy aircraft in the night of 1 - 2 Jul. while moving from Naples to Maddalena.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

According to a report from Commanding General, Armed Forces South, the Italian steamer BOLZANETO was sunk by an enemy submarine near Punta Musco on 29 Jun.

No special reports were received on 1 Jul.

4. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean Sea:

At 0130, the motor ship KATHARINA reported an enemy submarine 28 miles southeast of Piraeus.

The BULGARIA, together with 1 Italian destroyer and 1 submarine chaser, completed the mine task near Rhodes. For Barrage Area near Rhodes, see teletype 1130.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean reports that, at the request of the Italian Admiralty, the coastal waters of Corfu will not be mined as he had planned but the south coast of Zante and the west coast of the Peloponnese will be mined instead.

Black Sea:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla was in operation on the night of 30 Jun. north of Tenrjuk without sighting the enemy. The patrol line in Tenrjuk Bay reported strong enemy air activity and bombs dropped near the boats during the same night.

No other special reports were received.

Group South reports:

"The increased transport requirements of the Army and the progressive building up of Sevastopol and, on the other hand, the increasing activity of the Russian Air Force, make it urgent for

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the Sevastopol anti-aircraft defense to be strengthened. Otherwise the success of our long and toilsome construction work will be compromised and irreplaceable shipping jeopardized. Therefore, for the reasons already reported, it is again urgently requested that the Navy take over the anti-aircraft defense of Sevastopol and that 2 naval anti-aircraft divisions be assigned. If the manning of the anti-aircraft divisions presents difficulties, it is suggested that only the specialists and key personnel be sent. The establishment could be completed on the spot by personnel transfers and volunteers."

The matter will be followed up by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

No reports have been received from Naval Attaché Tokyo on the landing of American units on Rendova Island (New Georgia group) as announced in the press. The Japanese have reported the sinking of 6 enemy transports, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer. Also, more than 31 enemy planes are said to have been shot down in fierce air battles. Japanese Army formations, in close cooperation with the Navy, are attacking the landed enemy forces, details of whose strength are not yet known.

The harbor of Rendova on the island of that name is situated only 8 miles south of the Japanese air base at Munda, on the main island of New Georgia.

According to American reports, however, only 1 transport was lost near the coast. One hundred and one Japanese planes are said to have been shot down with a loss of 17 American planes.

The press quotes Secretary Knox as stating that the landing at Rendova is the beginning of an offensive in the Pacific.

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Items of Political Importance

No reports of naval significance have been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. During the Situation report made by Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch, Chief, Naval Staff raised the question of what could be done to combat the enemy's anti-submarine

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forces which are able to maintain permanent control of the border areas of the Bay of Biscay and the identified submarine routes practically unhindered. From this point of view, retention of 8th Destroyer Flotilla in the West area acquired new importance. A request for an increased allotment of destroyers would be unavoidable. Group West must be ordered to investigate the matter.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division submitted the checked results of enemy merchant shipping losses in Jun. 1943. For Copy as per 1/Skl 19796/43 geheim see War Diary File "Enemy shipping losses 1943."

There is no comment to be made on the low figures, due to current circumstances, except to express the confident hope that this regrettable set-back is only of a temporary nature and will be speedily remedied as soon as all the measures now underway for augmenting the fighting strength of the submarines have been put into effect.

III. Chief, Naval Staff is most disappointed by Admiral Riccardis' refusal to release the two modern Italian transport submarines, ROMOLO and REMO, to act as rubber transports from Japan and he intends to call this to the attention of the Italian Commanding Admiral Submarines, Admiral Legnani, who arrived in Berlin today. Riccardis' letter as per 1/Skl 19091/43 Gkdos is filed in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX. No reply will be made until after the conference with the Italian Commanding Admiral, Submarines. The request for release of these two boats was made at the suggestion of Captain Grossi who, on his part, had strongly recommended the idea to the Italian Admiralty.

According to the information of Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Admiral Legnani will probably also raise the questions of closer cooperation between German and Italian officers and of the Italian program for building a series of small 80 - 100 ton submarines.

IV. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division reports that the Japanese recently informed our Naval Attaché in Tokyo that instead of the high-grade Diesel oil required for our submarines in the Indian Ocean, and in spite of their previous definite assurances, they can furnish only low-grade oil such as is used for their own less delicate submarine engines. As this fuel oil cannot be used by our submarines, the Japanese have been informed that German submarine operations in the Indian Ocean will have to be cancelled if the proper oil cannot be provided.

Special Items:

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I. A summary of Vice Admiral Weichold's reports as of the end of Jun. 1943 is filed under 1/Skl I op 1907/43 Gkdos. Chefs. For copy, see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

II. After consultations between Chief of Staff, Naval Command, East, Naval Staff, Operations Division, and Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Naval Command East proposes that the patrol forces and the coastal defense flotillas in the Baltic Sea from the Skagerrak to Memel be combined under Commanding Admiral Defenses Baltic as Commanding Admiral, Naval Forces. For copy of the relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 18830/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

The matter will be examined by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

III. A summary of data on the enemy obtained by Radio Deciphering and Radio Intelligence from 21-27 Jun. is given in Radio Monitoring Report No. 26/43.

Situation on 2 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has informed Ship "28" by radiogram as per 1/Skl I k 1894/43 Gkdos. Chefs. that a Japanese submarine - code name "Flieder" - left Penang on 27 Jun. and will pass a point 3° 30' to the north and 1° to the east of "Besancon" on 9 Jul.

The ship was also informed by radiogram 2346 that, on 27 Jun. in KR 48, our submarine MARCO POLO sank a newly constructed ship of 7,000 tons sailing from Suez to an unknown destination, and that on 1 Jul. the submarine was in KG 69.

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN has been informed by radiogram 2257 of the award of iron crosses in recognition of her good performance in supplying submarines.

Naval Staff plans to release information on the visit of Ship "10" to Japan for propaganda purposes. Naval Attaché, Tokyo has been instructed to obtain the paid approval of the Japanese Admiralty, after which, and upon agreement between the propaganda



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authorities of both countries, the information will be published. The Japanese Naval Attaché, Berlin will be advised accordingly by Naval Staff. Telegram 1300 and letter 1/Skl I k 18711/43 Gkdos. are filed in 1/Skl I k / VI.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to our air reconnaissance, 1 heavy cruiser and 1 light cruiser were in BF 4872 on course 320°, at high speed, at 1000. Reconnaissance flights in the Bay of Biscay were made by 33 planes several of which were detected in the area northwest of Cape Villano. One British vessel was observed in BF 4438 at 1845, one in BE 6650 at 1900 and one in BE 4190 at 2006.

The German motor ship BALTIC (300 BRT), which left Bilbao with a Spanish crew on 23 Jun. with a cargo of ore for Bayonne and did not reach its destination, has been taken to Gibraltar. It is alleged that the crew of 8 was over whelmed by 4 men on leaving the harbor. The Spanish crew has been taken to Algeciras.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla has submitted its report on the bringing-in of submarines U "180", "518" and "530". For copy, see teletype 1945. The flotilla suggests that future rendezvous be fixed for one hour after dawn in order to avoid risk of the vessels missing each other. The flotilla and the 3 submarines entered Royan at 1830. It is planned to move the submarines to Bordeaux on the morning high tide. As from 1500 on 3 Jul., the flotilla will be at immediate readiness for further submarine escort duty.

Channel Coast:

Due to bad weather the patrol positions were not taken up. Two Ate-mines were cleared south of Boulogne. Part of the route between Cherbourg and Brest was closed due to suspected mines. Torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" put into Dunkirk enroute from Hook of Holland to Boulogne. During the night, 4th PT Boat Flotilla took a cargo of mines from Peterport to Cherbourg and returned.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

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North Sea:

Escort and patrol services were carried out according to plan in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North. One ELM-mine was cleared north of Terschelling and another north of Vlieland. The steamer BERNICIA, which had been beached, has been towed to Rotterdam.

Special Items:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, has submitted detailed suggestions for his area in regard to operation "Gute Hoffnung". In order to avoid the submarines being detected in the North Sea by daylight reconnaissance, the passage from Borkum to the area boundary must be made at night only and, if necessary, in two or three stages. In order to pass through the area as quickly as possible, delay due to mine escort must be avoided. Type 35 minesweepers with a cruising speed of 15 knots will therefore be used as protection. For security reasons, entrance into ports or river mouths will be avoided. Instead of laying the boats on the sea-bottom in the harbors during daylight as suggested by Naval Staff, Commanding Admiral, Defenses North advocates their lying on the bottom in the open sea at given points near the route which would have to be constantly checked for ground-mines. This, on the assumption that prevailing current conditions permit the submarines to lie on the bottom. Reinforcement of protection, in PT boat danger areas, by units of 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, is also desirable.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Two Russian submarines were detected off the Arctic coast of Norway. Seventeen planes were observed operating over the North Sea and 3 planes in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. According to photographic reconnaissance, 1 destroyer, 1 torpedo boat, 10 submarines and 1 steamer were at Polarnoje on 1 Jul. In Motorski Bay 2 steamers and 1 warship were observed coming in and in Motka Bay, 1 PT boat, 1 patrol boat and 3 coastal vessels were sighted, all stationary. There were 2 steamers in the western entrance of Pulonga.

2. Own Situation:

Six enemy reconnaissance planes were over the Bardoe area on the night of 30 Jun. and on 1 Jul. Another reconnaissance plane was reported from the Kongsfjord area. In the forenoon of 2 Jul. a Mosquito flew in via Aalesund. At noon, a

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Hudson was reported to be approaching a southbound convoy near Stadlandet, but it turned off when a patrol boat opened fire.

Twenty-nine steamers were escorted to the north and 41 to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay, a destroyer on firing practice was observed in the forenoon. From 1200 to 2000, Peterhof and the coastal sector were kept under constant fire. At 2000, it was observed that heavy smoke screens were being put up at Kronstadt and Lisi Nos. The usual patrol boat traffic near Lavensar was noted.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic.

On 1 Jul., a Danish fishing cutter struck a mine near Moen but did not sink. On 2 Jul., the tug STURM sank 10 miles northeast of Swinemuende after striking a mine. A fishing vessel, east of Swinemuende, reported the explosion in its net of allegedly, 4 mines.

No special reports have come in from the area of Commander, Minesweepers East. Convoy and transport traffic throughout the Baltic area were carried out according to plan and without incident.

V. Merchant Shipping:

A survey of the tonnage capacity of big German ships in the Mediterranean shows that 50,000 BRT are operational in the Western Mediterranean and 51 ships for about 112,000 BRT in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. For copy of the survey and explanatory remarks, dated 3 Jul., see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Tanker U "462" assigned to supply Group "Monsoon", was again forced to turn back having been hit by a bomb in the Bay of Biscay.

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Naval Staff, Submarine Division, has submitted operational orders for mine missions "Delaware", "Port Lyautey", "Norfolk" (twice); "Kingston", "Jamaica", "Jacksonville", "Charleston", "Lagos", "Rabat# and "Takoradi". In regard to mine operation "Delaware", Naval Staff, Submarine Division was advised that, since mines were last laid in the entrance to Delaware Bay, the port of Philadelphia has been declared open for neutral Spanish, Portuguese and Swiss shipping sailing in European interests, and that we must therefore refrain from mining those waters. Naval Staff, Operations Division had no comment on the other orders.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 158 planes in operation in the West area and 5 planes in the Mediterranean. It has so far been impossible to re-detect the convoy in the Pentland Firth. During the day, several locomotives in the West area were destroyed by strafing from enemy fighter-bombers. Further damage to traffic installations was also reported.

Mediterranean Theater:

Operations by our Air Force were restricted to intensified reconnaissance. The enemy Air Force made a strong attack on Palermo during the night of 1 Jul., but caused no damage. During the day, airfields in Sicily and southern Italy were attacked. Major damage was sustained at Groltaglie and Lecce, minor damage at San Pancrazio and no damage at Castelvetrano. For details, see Daily Situation. Our fighters shot down 12 Liberators and 9 other types, making a total of 21 enemy planes.

Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1630, a ship of the ILLUSTRICUS class accompanied by 5 destroyers left Gibraltar for the east and, at 1730, 9 destroyers left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. Our air reconnaissance reported 11 PT boats sailing east at high speed, 22 miles west-northwest of Bizerta at 1130 and, at 1135, 1 battleship and 4 destroyers 17 miles west-northwest of Bizerta, also sailing east, at medium speed.

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2. Own Situation: Mediterranean:

The 7th PT boat Flotilla made no contact with the enemy during its operations in the night of 1 Jul. The 3 boats of the flotilla put into Porto Vesme (Sardinia). Mine ships POMMERN and BRANDENBURG have arrived at Maddalena.

German Naval Command, Italy states in its weekly report that the protection of the southwest sector has been strengthened by the BRANDENBURG/POMMERN mine operation and that further operations depend on the shipment of mines. Little progress has been made with the Sicily barrage since the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was withdrawn. The report describes the situation as follows:

"By a dislocation of landing facilities in the Bizerta - Tripoli - Malta area, it would still be possible for 4-5 Task Forces to attack the Italian islands in the new-moon period. The presence of a cruiser formation, possibly with 2 battleships and an aircraft carrier, in the La Galite area, and the great air activity over Sicilian airfields, indicate imminent enemy operations. Stocks on the islands are hardly adequate. If an enemy landing makes big ship traffic impossible, adequate supplying by small vessels cannot be guaranteed in view of the shortage of naval ferry barges and Siebel ferries. On the other hand, the general effect of the enemy air attack is not as strong as might be expected on the eve of a large scale offensive. Reinforcement of our own Air Force has alleviated the situation to a certain extent. The morale and attitude of the Italians have improved. The general situation is serious but far more hopeful than at the end of the Tunisian "campaign."

In order to improve the supply traffic to Sicily, landing places are being enlarged, and five, on each side of the Straits of Messina, are so far ready for service. Harbor installations on Sardinia and Corsica are being improved. The construction of landing places depends on the arrival of Todt Organization personnel and of material. Several alternative mooring places are available for naval ferry barges and Siebel ferries. Unloading capacity is increasing due to reinforcement of the port companies. For copy, of the Weekly Report, see teletype 0115.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

No special information was reported on 2 Jul.

The German Naval Command, Italy reported on 26 Jun., as already noted, that it is inadvisable to ship German supplies on Italian

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ships because the latter's turn-around time is much slower than that of the German vessels and the Germans are entitled to only 15% of the total cargo space. German Naval Command, Italy had calculated that for the three islands, the German Army would require a total of 41,650 tons in a first simple supply operation and monthly supplies of 32,700 tons while the monthly requirement for the Italian Army and the civilian population was estimated at 260,000 tons.

With reference to this statement, Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy reported on 1 Jul. to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch that no transfer of ships to the Aegean, by either the Germans or the Italians, is possible at present since the tonnage on hand is barely sufficient to equip and supply the three islands. In this connection account must be taken of the fact that a comparatively large number of ships is undergoing long-term repair, that dockyard capacity has been reduced by enemy air attack and that the turn-about of Italian ships can be speeded up only if all the vessels are combined and put under the leadership or control of the German Navy. As this cannot be done at present, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division Shipping and Transport Branch considers it impossible to transfer any shipping space to the Aegean at present.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

According to Italian reports, an enemy submarine was sighted near Rhodes at 0550. Submarine hunting is underway.

After completing the mine operation in the Dodecanese, the BULGARIA and the escort vessels entered Leros. The tank-transport from Salonika of 11 naval ferry barges with 1 submarine chaser, has reached Rhodes. Other transport traffic went according to plan.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean reports that Alimnia Bay has been closed by an anti-torpedo barrage. (See teletype 1230). For announcements of other declared mine areas and shipping lanes in the Aegean, see teletypes 0905 and 0810.

Special Items:

In regard to the question of bases in the Aegean, Naval Staff, Operations Division has informed Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch that Salonika, Suda, Kalamata and Patras

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have been designated as PT boat bases with torpedo stocks and torpedo regulating equipment, and Argostoli, Prevesa and Navarino as bases with fuel dumps only. Construction work is to begin immediately by groups or one after the other according to circumstances. The order of precedence is to be established in cooperation with Group South. Naval Staff, Operations Division again emphasized that the Aegean bases should not be regarded as secondary to those in the Western Mediterranean but as of equal importance. The selection of a main base, with stocks of spare parts and repair shops, which would have to be equipped for the boats of 7th and 3rd PT Boat Flotillas is left to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Operations by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla off Myshakov on the night of 1 Jul. produced no results. On the way out, South of Anapa, 2 enemy PT boats were sighted for a short time, but no contact was made. Operations by 4 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla on reconnaissance patrol in the outer Temriuk Bay likewise produced no results. At 0430, 2 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla were unsuccessfully attacked by 3 enemy bombers while returning from the patrol line east of Theodosia. The enemy was driven off and pursued by our fighters. One of the 3 aircraft was shot down. A minesweeping aircraft cleared one mine north-northwest of Kerch.

Attacks by small enemy air forces on Yalta and Anapa on 1 Jul. had no serious effects.

Supply ferry and transport traffic were carried out according to plan.

In addition to soldiers, vehicles and guns, a total of 97,368 tons of supplies were transported to the Gonenkopf position during the month of June. Of this total, 65,027 tons were carried by the Navy.

IX. Situation East Asia:

On the basis of information from the Japanese Naval Staff,

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Naval Attaché Tokyo reports:

U. S. Troops landed on the island of Rendova and at several places on the south coast of New Georgia early on 30 Jun. On New Georgia the enemy was repulsed in most cases. About one division landed at Rendova. The objective of the landing was evidently the capture of the Japanese intermediate landing field at Munda.

Japanese air forces attacked the transport fleet. Up to now, 31 planes have been shot down in heavy air combat. As the fleet put out, 2 light cruisers and 1 destroyer were sunk and 1 destroyer damaged, and 6 transports were sunk or damaged.

The fighting continues. Munda is occupied by strong Japanese forces. Reconnaissance has so far revealed no other transport groups.

Simultaneously, approximately one regiment of Australian troops were put ashore by landing boats south of Salamaua and are presently engaged in battle with Japanese troops.

Allied Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific report that the areas of Tobriant and Woodlak have been occupied without encountering enemy resistance, whereas the troops landed on New Guinea and the Rendova islands are fighting against the Japanese defense lines. The entire operation is under the command of the Commander in Chief, General MacArthur.

According to information issued by the U.S. Navy Department, 65 enemy planes were destroyed during the air battles at Rendova for a loss of 17 American planes. One U.S. transport was damaged by a Japanese torpedo plane and was later sunk by a Japanese submarine without loss of life. The harbor of Viru on the Island of Wau was captured by combined U.S. forces on 1 Jul.

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Items of Political Importance:

Transocean reports that a Finnish - American Association has been founded at Helsinki.

Reuter reports that, in a statement from Cairo, the Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile demanded that East Prussia and Danzig should be placed under Polish control after the war.

According to American press reports, there are indications in



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Moscow that the Soviet government is dissatisfied at the delay in the Western Allies' military plans. An invasion of Europe could be regarded as successful only if Germany were forced to withdraw at least 60 divisions from the Eastern Front.

According to Reuter, the French political scene in Algiers is still characterized by dissension and conflict. How far this will affect military operations in the Mediterranean remains to be seen.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. Army Situation:

The unusually large number of troop transports at Port Said claims increased attention in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of the total transport tonnage of 619,000 BRT detected in the entire Mediterranean, 365,000 BRT are in Egyptian ports, 106,000 BRT in Gibraltar and the rest in the Oran/Algiers area. Of the total amount of about 2,400,000 BRT of shipping in the Mediterranean, 748,000 BRT are in Egypt.

II. According to information from the Admiral attached to Fuehrer Headquarters, the Fuehrer has expressed dissatisfaction with the alleged inactivity of our naval forces in the Black Sea. The Admiral attached to Fuehrer Headquarters will be brought up to date on the actual results achieved by our few light forces and submarines.

III. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division:

a. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast has asked for sea-borne anti-aircraft protection for the flying boats on the Atlantic coast. Group West has been ordered to investigate the matter.

b. There are at present about 18 towed cylinder gears (Tr.N. Hohstabgeraet is unknown, probably mistaken for Hohlstabgeraet) in the West area. Group West is receiving 2 gears per month out of a monthly total supply of 6 for the entire area.

c. All the Navy's available net material has now been dispatched for the protection of the river dams in Germany. Chief, Naval Staff has approved the termination of this task.

d. Report on the status of the barge program and on the dispatch of naval landing craft and of the 12th and 11th Minesweeper Flotillas to the Mediterranean, according to report of Group West. For copy as per l/Skl 18938/43 Gkdos., see teletype 1545.

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e. It is possible for the Navy to supply 4 cm. shells to the Spaniards as replacement for the ammunition destroyed at Ferrol in case such action is requested.

f. The only batteries capable of taking action against enemy convoy traffic in the Channel are the "Todt" and "Lindemann" batteries which are equipped with liners. (?) However, the allotment of ammunition is insufficient. The guns of the "Friedrich August" battery cannot be interchanged; those of the "Grosser Kurfuerst" battery can be replaced by available naval guns. However, the question of whether these 28 centimeter guns have sufficient range must be investigated.

IV. Report by Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval Ordnance Division, Artillery Branch: The demands for the equipment of front-line submarines with twin mounts will be fulfilled according to schedule. The first 40 units will be ready for installation on 15 July. Full acknowledgement is due to the firms engaged on this work. Sixty-nine twin mounts will be ready in Aug., 200 in Sept., and 1,100 by the end of the year. It is calculated that a total of 500 submarines will be equipped with 20 twin mounts each. The equipment of other naval forces must be postponed for a time.

The production of automatic mechanisms will be increased from 840 to 1,440 units by Sept.

The Admiral attached to Fuehrer Headquarters has so far been unsuccessful in the matter of the 2 cm. ammunition. The demand for 1.5 million rounds for Jul. is very moderate. When the twin mounts are in use, the demand for submarines alone will increase by Nov. to 19 million rounds.

V. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division reports that the material worth salvaging from submarine U "167" comprises 1 torpedo with Pi 2 and 1 radar location set, and proposes to accept the Spanish offer of divers to work under German supervision.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

In a highly restricted circle:

VI. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch:

a. Group North Fleet asked for allotment and preparation of mines for the barrage operation planned for the end of Sept.

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beginning of October with a view to reinforcement of the West-wall (Barrage 25 in continuation of barrages 18 a, 20 a and 22 b which have already have been laid). Barrage 25 had already been in the winter but was postponed in view of the fuel situation at that time. It was suggested that a provisional allotment be made as requested but that the decision as to execution of the mission be conditioned on the development of the situation and the position in regard to fuel and forces, and be postponed until Sept.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. The relative directives have been issued by order 1/Skl I E 18248/43 Gkdos.

b. With reference to the intended submarine operations on the northern sea route, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has ascertained that, west of the Wilkitzki Narrows, there are unlikely to be any attack targets such as to offer prospects of results capable of affecting the overall situation of the U.S.S.R. to any notable extent. There are about 60 - 70 ships of about 100,000 tons capacity. On the other hand, an attack on the escorting ice breakers would be definitely worthwhile and would affect the entire Arctic Sea traffic. The presence of the big ice breakers in the Kara Sea up to the middle of August or the beginning of September can be counted on.

Major traffic centers are off the mouths of the Ob and the Yenissei, off the Novaya Zemlya Straits and - up to mid-August - in the Maltisen Strait. Valuable targets are offered further west by the fuel tanks and shipping at the Belushya Bay base on Novaya Zemlya.

The Commanding Admiral, Task Force suggested that submarine attacks be held off until the LUETZOW starts her operations which it is hoped will achieve surprise.

Naval Staff considered any restriction of attack to be inadvisable. Chief, Naval Staff concurred in this opinion.

Group North raised the question of the participation of destroyers in possible operations by LUETZOW. Naval Staff objected, in view of the ice danger for the light vessels and of the supply difficulties entailed, especially since, in Naval Staff's opinion, the operation will be successful only if it is of some duration. Chief, Naval Staff agreed with this view and also approved the plan to place the submarines involved under the authority of the LUETZOW's commander.

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Meanwhile three Submarines have been made available for the additional mine operations planned east and west of Novaya Zemlya. It remains to decide whether the other 2 boats will be allotted in complete fulfillment of the request of Group North Fleet.

Chief, Naval Staff feels that this decision depends on the progress of the conning tower conversion work. If, without affecting the front-line boats, in the West, so many towers are produced in Germany, that it becomes impossible to convert all the boats at the same time, the Group's suggestion can probably be complied with.

c. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has approved the suggestion concerning the use of 1,500 of the new mine-firing devices per month as from Sept. Approval of Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff must now be obtained.

Chief, Naval Staff concurs.

Special Items:

I. Report by Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament Division, Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch to Chief, Naval Staff on the present position in regard to mines and mine defense.

Chief, Naval Staff was briefly informed on the development of the new firing devices and on further plans.

Lengthy discussions were held on measures to increase the offensive and defensive efficiency of the mine weapons.

With reference to the suggestion of the Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch that the performance of the overworked Mining and Barrage Experimental Command could be effectively increased by the addition of a few (about 25) capable engineers and constructors, Chief, Naval Staff decided that this demand should be combined with the torpedo program in order to avoid a separate request to Armed Forces, High Command which would take considerably longer.

The need for increasing the iron quota for mines, which has been too low in recent months, was recognized and is to be considered by Bureau of Naval Armament; the labor problem is equally important.

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Chief, Naval Staff is inquiring as to whether iron requirements for mines could not be reduced by using other materials, Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch reported that great progress has been made but that there are also certain limitations because the materials are not sufficiently resistant to sea water.

The establishment of the Mining and Barrage Trial Command, already approved in principle last year, has not yet been effected. As the Command is urgently needed for testing new devices, Chief, Naval Staff ordered a thorough examination of the question.

Chief, Naval Staff considers that the defects in the present organization of the front-line formations, which lack central leadership, must be eliminated. This is necessary if only because, at present, each defense force commander issues separate war experience instructions and separate tactical orders of his own and therefore, training, tactical ideas and methods are divergent. (In newly established areas instructions on the latest experiences are completely lacking much to the disadvantage of, for instance, Naval Command, Italy.)

Chief, Naval Staff believes that such a central authority should be in close contact with the front line and should not, therefore, be set up at Berlin. Underwater Obstacles Branch, Naval Staff, Operations Division and Naval Staff Quartermaster Division are to cooperate in following up the matter.

In the course of the report, Chief, Naval Staff repeatedly stressed that mines can make a big contribution to the war on shipping which is especially important particularly in view of the present status of the submarine campaign. The efficiency of this weapon should therefore be maintained and increased.

II. Order 1/Skl I op 18747/43 Gkdos. deals with the distribution of the 11th and 12th Minesweeper Flotillas to be newly established. For copy, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

Situation on 3 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The Intelligence Service reports that, according to information from diplomatic sources in the USA a convoy of 210 ships in three groups under US escort left Bath (Maine) on 20 and 22 June. The convoy is carrying troops allegedly intended for an attack on Scandinavia.

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Six landing operations are said to be planned for the second half of Jul. or the first half of Aug., in Greece, Denmark and Norway concentrating especially on Greece and Norway.

Another report states that a convoy carrying about 18,300 men left Onslow Bay on 21 Jun. probably destined for Egypt - Syria via the Indian Ocean. Also during June, a further 13,000 men were to be assembled at Newport and Onslow Bay and sent to England for an attack on Norway.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division gave a summary report on the enemy situation in the South Atlantic as at 1 Jun. 1943. For copy of 1/Skl 17783/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attaché Tokyo reports:

1. The SCHLIEMANN is not in danger.
2. For the MICHEL's voyage to the Pacific, only short operations in the Indian Ocean have been agreed upon with the Japanese Navy. If this is not sufficient new arrangements will be necessary.
3. Information on the position of Japanese submarines has been promised. Naval Attaché Tokyo also reports:

The Captains of the blockade-runners have unanimously requested that the top-masts be retained because:

1. Early identification of the enemy ship, from the topmast, gives the advantage to the blockade-runner and makes it possible to take evasive measures before recognition by the enemy. If the top-masts are removed the effectiveness of the lookout, which is the blockade-runner's best weapon, will be eliminated or greatly reduced. Up to now, all blockade-runners have sighted the enemy first thanks to the look-out on the top-mast.
2. In areas where an air threat exists, enemy aircraft will still be able to identify the ships' nationality from its silhouette, in spite of removal of the top-masts.
3. Enemy vessels that sight our blockade-runners and wish to establish their nationality will persist in their intention whether the top-masts are there or not.

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4. Construction of telescopic top-masts would make it impossible for at least the first three blockade-runners to sail on schedule.

These objections are extremely forceful and make it necessary to review the matter.

Naval Staff has advised Naval Attache Tokyo that AQUILA 3 has reported that she will not arrive at the rendezvous point before 9 Jul.

Detailed information on enemy ship movements will be forwarded to all vessels in foreign waters by radiogram 2014.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-seven planes were in operation in the Bay of Biscay. One British ship was located in BF 2615 at 1207, one in BE 3693 at 1556 and one in AL 5160 shortly after midnight of 3 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared in Quiberon Bay. The escort service brought in 10 submarines.

It is estimated that submarine U"462", which was damaged by an air attack will be in BF 8496 at 0700 on 5 Jul. Group West plans to use two torpedo boats or else two destroyers to bring her in when the weather is favorable. Close protection by JU 88 planes from 0715 on 5 Jul. onwards and reconnaissance west of the rendezvous point have been requested. Escorting submarine U "160" will return to her position after submarine U "462" has been picked up by the escort ships. (See teletype 1853).

Group West has forwarded to Naval Staff, for information, the order issued to the destroyer and torpedo boat flotillas attached to that Command, as follows:

"The following distribution of destroyers and torpedo boats in the West area is planned for the immediate future during which their main function will be assistance to submarines:

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Brest: 4th Torpedo boat Flotilla - four boats, including 2 from 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, under the command of S.O. 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

La Pallice: 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla - 3 boats and torpedo boat T "19", under the command of S.O. 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. When the MOEWE's cruising overhaul begins, torpedo boat T "14" will join the Pallice group.

Gironde: 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

Bayonne will be the alternative port for occasional berthing of 2 boats of the La Pallice group, and Nantes and Donges will be the alternative ports for the Brest Group."

There are no objections on the part of Naval Staff.

Channel Coast:

Escort and defense services were carried out according to plan. One AT-mine was cleared north of Calais. 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla carried out a special mission northeast of Cherbourg.

With reference to the inquiry of Commanding Admiral, Submarines in regard to moving the ex-channel ferry ship LOTHRINGEN (Tr.N. Kanalfuehrshiff should read Kanalfahrschiff) from Le Havre to Wilhelmshaven, Group West reports:

"As it has been ascertained that the LOTHRINGEN cannot be ready to sail before the second half of Jul., it is planned, in view of the urgency, to bring her home from Le Havre at the end of Jul., regardless of the short nights in the new moon period, under escort of torpedo boats of the Brest Group as far as the area boundaries. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will be in charge of preparations and will report his plans to the Group." (See teletype 1050 and 1632).

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, during Jun., 43 ELM/J-mines, 19 ELM/A-mines, 3 ELM/JA-mines, 38 ELM/-mines, total 103 mines, were cleared. In the same period, there was a total of 25 air raids including 4 large-scale attacks on convoys. Forty-one enemy aircraft were shot down (this was a



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record for the formations of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North). Our own losses were: patrol boat VP "1109", by bomb and aerial torpedo; steamer STADT EMDEN (5,180 BRT) by aerial torpedo, German steamer NARVIK (5,822 BRT) by ELM-mine, one Danish fishing cutter by mine and another Danish fishing cutter by a drifting mine. Casualties: Navy, 46 killed, 15 missing, 49 seriously and 31 slightly wounded. Merchant navy: 3 missing, 2 seriously wounded.

Altogether, in Jun., 349 ships totalling 709,248 BRT were escorted of which 57 ships, of 100,607, BRT were in the Holland convoys. In addition 15 short-distance warship-escort missions were performed, 9 of them with submarines, as well as 49 short-distance escort missions with supply ships.

Escort and patrol services were carried out on 3 Jul. according to plan and without incident.

On 29 Jun., Commanding Admiral Defenses North suggested alterations in the priority list for further barrage projects for the reinforcement of the Westwall as reported on 10 Jun., requesting approval and allotment of mines. Naval Command North approved the suggestion. The suggestion is contained as per l/Skl 1887/43 Gkdos. Chfs., in files of Naval Staff, Operations Division.

In this regard, Naval Staff has decided as follows:

1. The necessity of reinforcing the SW-Wall is in general, acknowledged.
2. In regard to the details of the plan:
  - a. The use of smag lines south of the Black Bank is rejected in view of our own PT boat operations. Commander, PT Boats will be consulted as to the possibility of using them in Barrage 4 C.
  - b. It is impossible to provide the number of mines required by the end of July or by the end of August because of the more urgent requirements in the Mediterranean and Northern Norway. Not more than a monthly allotment of at most, 400 mines can be counted on.
  - c. It is not planned to use mineships for Barrage 4 C because of the strong PT boat threat. Besides, the BRUMMER is due to go into dock and the OSTMARK is in Norway.
  - d. Mine laying beyond the present barrage would appear possible if more minesweepers with UMB mines are

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used as in the previously laid anti-submarine barrages A/K, SW 204 - 209, and the barrage is subdivided into several small sections.

3. For the Southern sectors, Naval Staff considers a slight reinforcement of the present barrage system, as in 2 d, to be adequate and thinks that SW 14, 15 and 16 can be postponed. The northern sector can also be postponed but if Group West and Commander PT Boats can arrange for their PT boats not to use the route northeast of the Black Bank, the early laying of Barrage 4 C with snag lines for protection against enemy PT boats is desirable.

4. Barrage plans will be reviewed accordingly and new suggestions submitted.

At the same time, Group West was asked for its opinion on the planned anti-submarine barrage B with snag lines for the protection of the Netherland convoy route against enemy PT boats between about AN 8225 center and 6886 lower right. It was added that, in the opinion of Naval Staff, it appears reasonable to suspend our PT boat operations in the area northeast of Black Bank.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twelve planes operating in the North Sea were detected by Radio Intelligence.

Our air reconnaissance first reported 2 heavy cruisers on course 240° in 2218 AE at 1520. One of which was described, on the plane's return, as being of the DIDO class. At 1740, a heavy cruiser of the LONDON class was reported in 1739 AE on course 90° at high speed and, at 1810, 6 merchantmen of up to 3,000 BRT with 2 guard ships were sighted and reported on course 90° in 1948 AE. Admiral, Northern Waters, reports that the enemy's intentions are not yet evident from the reports received. Group North Fleet considers it possible that, in both cases, the types of ships may have been mistaken and suggested that the merchantmen may have been fishing vessels. The results of a newly ordered reconnaissance by two FW 200 planes must be awaited.

According to an intelligence report received from London via Spain, a big convoy with war material for Russia has been in preparation in the north of England, chiefly at Scapa Flow, since 4 Jun.,

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and will set out for the northern route after being joined by a section of the convoy expected from Iceland.

As there have been no report on PQ convoys for some time the above report may be intended to tie down or alarm our forces in the northern area or to divert attention from other operations.

2. Own Situation:

At noon on 2 Jul., Russian batteries on the Ribocchi Peninsula fired 115 rounds on the harbor area at Petsamo. Fire was returned. Damage was done to buildings, barracks and telephone lines.

Destroyers Z "27" and "30" entered Kafjord and Langfjord respectively early on 2 Jul.

The escort service conducted 22 ships to the north and 34 ships to the south.

Naval Command, Norway reports that the battle group has decided not to use either of the net enclosures in Bogen Bay. (See teletype 1245.)

Air Force Operations Staff has asked to be advised if and when the Navy intends to establish new weather stations in the Arctic Sea area as, since the withdrawal of "Nussbaum", the 5th Air Force has been having difficulties in regard to weather forecasting (See teletype 1045).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay, 14 guard boats coming from the west and one gun boat entered Kronstadt. Minesweeping activities were observed in the western Kronstadt roads.

According to a Finnish report, there were 2 submarines making for Lavensari in A0 3713 at 0540.

2. Own Situation:

There is nothing special to report from the area of Commanding Admiral Defenses Baltic. The escort service throughout the Baltic Sea area was carried out according to plan and without incident. No special events were reported in the area of Commander, Minesweepers Baltic.

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Gunfire was exchanged in the Woronka sector and strong enemy artillery and trench mortar fire was reported. One of our assault detachments blew up a strong Russian combat pillbox and wiped out the crew. One of our anti-tank guns and two anti-aircraft guns went out of action due to burst barrels.

Special Items:

1. Naval Command, East has advised Naval Staff, for information, that 5th Air Force has been requested to resume fairly regular reconnaissance to the west, in order to keep enemy movements towards the Jutland coast or enemy raids in the Skagerrak under observation. Naval Command East urgently requested resumption of adequate morning and evening reconnaissance of the areas West, South and Northwest of the Skagerrak to the vicinity of the English coast (See Teletype 1302).
2. In regard to the opinion of Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff on the cancelation of the plan to mine Kronstadt Bay (see War Diary 17 Jun.), Naval Command, East reports that it is just as important for operation "Froschlaich" to strike at the enemy supply traffic to the Russian islands and to keep the enemy minesweeping formations busy in this area, as to prevent enemy forces from breaking out into the Baltic Sea. As the Navy has not the means for more active operations in that area, Naval Command East requests that Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, again be asked to order the use of aerial mines and intensified air attacks on the Russian Islands.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

On the east coast of America, submarine U "66" sank a tanker of about 7,000 BRT in DB 62. Submarine U "199" observed great air activity out to sea off Rio. The boat shot down an aircraft and torpedoed a Liberty ship on 27 Jun.

In regard to the bringing-in of the damaged submarine U "462", see Situation in West Area.

Special Items:

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section has compiled a list of submarines as of 1 Jul. 1943 as follows: (last month's figures in parenthesis):

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Front-line boats:	207	(219)
Under submarine acceptance control command	25	( 23)
Engaged in front-line training and preparing for front-line operations:	126	(115)
Training and experimental boats	66	( 63)
Estimated number of new boats to be put into service in July	21	( 25)
Put into service in June	25	( 26)
Join front-line boats in June	11	( 16)
Missing in June	22	( 38)
Put out of service in June	8	( 9)
Total number of boats in service	424	(420)
Percentage of losses:		
a. of the total number of front-line boats to end of June	10.63%	(17.4%)
b. average since beginning of war	5.45%	( 5.34%)
c. average since January 1943	8.32%	( 7.84%)

(Tr.N.: the following passage is in handwriting: Chief of Staff of Naval Staff - According to information from Chief, Naval Staff, losses in the month of June amounted to 17.5% of all front-line submarines at sea during this month.)

#### VI. Aerial Warfare:

##### British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 139 planes in operation in the West Area and 5 planes in the Mediterranean. Three enemy planes were destroyed during the day. Enemy planes made a number of strafing attacks on traffic installations and airfields. No special damage was reported. During the night another large-scale attack was made on the Rhine/Westphalia, the industrial area concentrating on Cologne. Thirty-seven of about 500 reported planes were brought down by anti-aircraft fire and night fighters. For details, see Daily Events.

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Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force continued reconnaissance flights. No special results were obtained. On the night of 2 Jul., the enemy carried out harassing raids on Trapani without causing damage. During the day, many airfields in Sicily and Sardinia were attacked. Six of our planes were destroyed and 17 damaged. Twenty-one enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and fighters. For details, see Daily Situation. During the night of 3 Jul. nuisance raids by single planes on Rome were reported. No bombs were dropped.

Eastern Front:

No special reports have been received from the area of the Eastern Front or from the operational area of 5th Air Force.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Situation: Mediterranean:

On the evening of 2 Jul., 11 freighters with 5 escort vessels and 1 destroyer in tow left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

At 0915, 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE V - class coming from the Mediterranean and 3 destroyers entered the harbor. Thus, at 1300, 4 battleships, 1 DIDO-class cruiser, 1 AURORA-class cruiser, 5 destroyers, 13 corvettes, 1 US auxiliary cruiser, 1 landing platform-transport ship, 7 transports, 6 hospital ships, 48 freighters, 11 tankers, several small landing boats and 209 planes on the airfield were observed. At 1545, a CAIRO-class cruiser with one destroyer put in from the Mediterranean. At 1600, the NELSON, flying the Admiral's flag, the RODNEY and 4 destroyers left port. This formation joined by the ILLUSTRIOUS class carrier which had put out for exercises on 2 Jul. and had been repeatedly reported east of Gibraltar on the evening of 2 Jul and the morning of 3 Jul. According to intelligence reports from Spain, gun fire was observed at 1900 East of Gibraltar. At 2340, the AURORA-class cruiser also left the harbor for the Mediterranean.

At 0300, a convoy of 28 vessels, including a two-funnelled transport was sighted from Ceuta entering the Mediterranean. According to an Italian report the convoy consists of 18 transports, 1 tanker, 2 unidentified units and 6 escort vessels. If this information is correct, the number of transports is unusual. An FR-convoy from the USA is over due since 2 Jul.

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At 0900, 3 more US special vessels with 3 destroyers went through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. They appeared to be landing operation vessels but, according to Spanish reports, they were mine-layers.

Only minor shipping traffic was observed by our air reconnaissance in the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean. Photographic interpretation of Malta as of 2 Jul. revealed only insignificant changes in the number of landing vessels as compared with 29 Jun. Further interpretation of a photograph of Port Said on 2 Jul. revealed a strong concentration of troop transports with many boats on board and 10 LCT.

A submarine was sighted on 2 Jul., 30 miles southwest of Leghorn. Radio Intelligence intercepted several air reconnaissance reports in the Tyrrhenian sea and in the Sardinia and Corsica areas and also an enemy convoy under air alarm in the Bougie area and another enemy convoy reporting an air attack in the Algiers area.

2. Own Situation in the Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines were reported in the operational area. Submarine U "81", returning to Salamis, reported an enemy submarine in CO 2648.

In view of the transfer to Toulon of the majority of our submarines stationed in the Mediterranean, and from the loss of submarine U "303" and the frequent sighting of enemy submarines in this area, Commander, Submarines, Italy believes that the enemy is maintaining continuous submarine waiting positions. Commander Submarines, Italy requests that an efficient submarine-chaser group be transferred to Toulon for the protection of our incoming and outgoing submarines. (See teletype 1205).

On 3 Jul., a naval landing craft with 10 barges left Marseille for Toulon. On 4 Jul., 4 naval landing craft and 3 tank-barges will leave Toulon for Genoa. Since 2 Apr., 18 naval landing craft, 6 motor minesweepers, 53 tank-barges, and 10 tank-lighters have left Toulon for Italy. For further details on the status of the barge program see teletype 1545.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

In the night of 2 Jul., an unsuccessful enemy air attack with bombs and torpedoes was made on the Sardinia - Italy convoy. The steamer COLLEVILLE ran aground near Civitavecchia at 1400 on 3 Jul., while enroute from Spezia to Naples. The remaining transport traffic to the islands was carried out without incident. For details, see teletype 1815.

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4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Submarine chasing south of Leros on the evening of 2 Jul. produced no results. Another enemy submarine was reported 50 miles northwest of Suda on the evening of 3 Jul. On 2 Jul., incursions and bombing by single enemy aircraft were reported from the coastal areas of the Western Peloponnese and the islands of Western Greece. Damage was slight. Two enemy planes were shot down during a bomb and gunfire attack on a dredger near San Maura on the morning of 1 Jul.

It is reported that the Italian torpedo boat SAN MARTINO, assigned to replace the HERMES will be ready to sail on 15 Jul. Transport and convoy traffic in the Aegean was without incident. In connection with the use of the BULGARIA for mine laying operations in the Dodecanese, Naval Staff has asked Group South and Commanding Admiral, Aegean for reports on the general plan and the barrage operations so far carried out in the Dodecanese.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to Radio Intelligence, there was a submarine 35 miles southeast of Theodosia.

Own Situation:

The patrol line in Temriuk Bay reported strong enemy air activity and bombing off the Temriuk Channel (Canal ?) and along the coast.

Four boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla will be operating in the area 30 miles northwest of Tuapse during the night of 3 Jul. Two Italian midget submarines left for the operational area 60 miles southeast of Constantza.

Naval Artillery Lighters "1", "2", and "3" are reported in action status at Mariupol.

The supply traffic to the Gotenkopf position was carried out according to plan.

To an inquiry by Naval Staff as to the probable date of war readiness of the Italian midget submarines and relative operational plans, Group South reports that enemy submarine activity in the Black Sea has apparently shifted to the western part of the



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Crimea. With a view to the main task, the Group considers it inadvisable to withdraw our own submarines to combat them in that area. The Group believes that, as recent operations have shown the disruption and interception of enemy traffic on the Caucasian Coast will become increasingly successful as the Command and officers gain in experience. Nevertheless, the Group intends to use the Italian midget submarines for submarine chasing as they are unsuitable for operations on the Caucasian coast. In the meantime, the boats have become operational and are soon to be transferred to the Crimea. It is planned to use them along the convoy routes in the enemy submarines' waiting areas during darkness.

Naval Staff approved these plans.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

The Anglo-American press estimates that there are 30,000 Japanese troops in the central Solomon Islands and about 25,000 in the Salamaua/Lao area. The papers quote Allied Headquarters to the effect that the present USA offensive is not merely a matter of jumping from one island to the next. The Japanese bases which are now under attack are said to be so important that their capture would make possible a big leap forward without having to touch the islands in between.

The Japanese Headquarters, about 15 kilometers from Munda, is said to be under almost uninterrupted attack by Navy dive bombers. It is stated that, at some places, Japanese resistance in the air has almost completely ceased. The bridgeheads in Nassau Bay in New Guinea have been consolidated and unloading of troops and material reported to be going on without interference. The situation on Salamaua is regarded as hopeless.

No Japanese statements on the situation have been received today.

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Items of Political Importance

No reports of naval significance have been received.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

Report by Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch:

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has prepared a map of the enemy vessels reported in the Bay of Biscay and vicinity during the period 20 Jun. to 3 Jul. 1943. A great number of

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the positions plotted, do not fit in with the movements of convoys. Observations made by submarines lead to the conclusion that anti-submarine groups of light naval forces are present in the western part of large grid square BF. The Observation Service believes that these groups consist at least of destroyers, whereas, according to observations by submarines, they are mainly composed of corvettes. Where their operational range permits, our destroyers should be used to attack these groups: Reliable reconnaissance will be essential if the destroyers are to be used for this purpose.

Chief, Naval Staff concurs. The following directive has been sent to Group West and Naval Staff, Submarine Division and to Commander Submarines, West, for information:

The positions of enemy naval forces in grid squares BF 10, 40 and 70 and in BE 60 and 90, as lately established by Observation Service and by air reconnaissance, indicate the presence in the outer Bay of Biscay of light enemy naval forces which do not seem to be part of the convoy system. Submarine reports on corvettes together with the losses sustained indicate that the enemy is using anti-submarine groups in this area. The main zone of operations is believed to be northwest of Cape Finisterre and, also, the sea area west of Brest. The question of whether the enemy positions in that area form part of the sea-rescue service is still under investigation. It is desirable, if their presence is confirmed, that these submarine chaser groups should be attacked by destroyers. This can only be done on the basis of adequate submarine and air reconnaissance. Group West will issue further orders and will report its plans. Naval Staff, Submarine Division will see that all reports of reconnaissance value from incoming or outgoing submarines, up to at least 15° West, are forwarded to group west.

Chief, Naval Staff also desires that consideration be given, and a systematic plan elaborated, as to the way in which regular protection could be provided for the submarines in the Bay of Biscay by suitable use of the available forces. The possibility of reinforcing them by means of two more destroyers should be investigated. Light forces, submarines with anti-aircraft guns and planes will be chiefly required besides which, it is important to assess the advantages and disadvantages of several submarines sailing in company. The first points to be established are in which areas the boats are most seriously threatened and where protection can be guaranteed.

The following directive was therefore sent to Group West:

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In cooperation with Commander Submarines, West and 3rd Air Force, please submit views and suggestions, based on local conditions, in regard to the establishment of regular protection for submarines entering or leaving the Bay of Biscay, in accordance with the means available. An increase in destroyers and torpedo boats may be necessary. It is planned to use chiefly light forces, submarines, with anti-aircraft guns and air forces. It is important to establish in which area the threat to the submarines is greatest and then to ascertain where protection can be assured. Investigate advantages and disadvantages of submarines sailing in groups. Report results as soon as possible.

For copy of teleprint 1/Skl 18931 and 18992/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Special Items:

I. On 22 Jun. High Command, Navy, Naval Ordnance Division informed Naval Staff of summary of information on the use of technical devices in defence against landing attempts, which had been suggested as a basis for inter-service discussions between High Command, Army and High Command, Air Force, Commander in Chief, Air Force. For copy as per 1/Skl 18021/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

Naval Staff, Operations Division suggests that Naval Ordnance Division should make this summary available to the Naval Group Commands and Commanding Admirals as it contains a great deal of information of interest to Commanding Officers in charge of coastal defense.

II. The following agreement was reached on 31 May between Chief, Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division and the Special Representative of Commander in Chief, Navy, Vice Admiral Weichold, in regard to special operations in Iceland.

1. An agent will be sent to Iceland by Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section via German Intelligence Substation, Oslo, by means of a Navy vessel (submarine), to carry out the sabotage missions desired by Naval Staff. The agent will go as an independent operator having no connection with or knowledge of other operations.

2. Division "Brandenburg" will provide one operational detachment from its commando battalion to which Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section will attach combat interpreters. The

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division will try to select commandoes with sea-going experience and navigational training for this purpose. The Navy will handle transportation in both directions. (Fishing smacks or similar vessels).

Group North Fleet will be in charge of the Navy's part of the operation. For copy of the directive 1/Skl I op 1760/43 Gkdos Chfs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

Situation on 4 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation in the West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. At 2217, a British ship was located in BF 4847.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared off Lorient and one off St. Nazaire. Seventy-five vessels totalling 36,000 BRT were escorted in the Bay of Biscay between 16 and 30 Jun. Amongst other things, 9,200 tons of ore were thus imported from Spain.

The MOEWE and the JAGUAR left La Pallice at 1500 for submarine assistance (see War Diary 3 Jul.).

Between 1140 and 1355, La Pallice was attacked by 20 - 40 enemy planes at an altitude of 4,000 meters. The attack was concentrated on the outer harbor and the dockyards. Two motor boats were sunk in the outer harbor. In the dockyards, mine exploding vessel "16" was heavily damaged, a 300-ton crane capsized, a big floating crane was heavily damaged and the big dock-gate destroyed by a direct hit. Destroyer Z "23" floated out into the big dock undamaged but will be unable to leave until the dock gate is moved. Torpedo boat T "23", by the north wharf was also undamaged. The KONDOR suffered damage and casualties. For further results of the attack, see teletype 2005, 2140, 2355 and 0200.

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According to reports so far received, 4 of the attacking planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, a fifth by fighters and a sixth by anti-aircraft fire and fighters. Eighteen US soldiers bailed out and were taken prisoner.

At Ile de Re, a defense post was wiped out by a direct hit. Another attack was made on Mantes by 120 planes which dropped 200 high explosive bombs from 6300 - 7600 meters altitude. The Heinkel works were heavily damaged. A drop in production of 80% is likely.

Channel Coast:

Between 2350 and 0030, on the night of 3 Jul., several enemy targets were located in the Calais area. Flares and searchlights revealed nothing. The same night, heavy explosions far out to sea were reported from Boulogne, Dieppe and Cherbourg. Torpedo boats T "24" and "25" did not proceed from Dunkirk to Boulogne as planned because of the enemy locations and suspected mine laying.

In the afternoon, 150 - 200 four-engine enemy bombers flew over the Le Treport - Cherbourg area without dropping bombs.

Torpedo operations on the south coast are planned for 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas during the night of 4 Jul. depending on reconnaissance results.

North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

In the night of 3 Jul., single enemy planes flew in near Flushing and probably laid mines north of Borkum. Transport installations in the Netherlands were strafed.

Four ELM/J-mines were cleared ahead of convoys near Vlieland, Ameland and Terschelling. Casualties occurred during an attack by 2 enemy fighters on 2 patrol boats north of Norderney. Otherwise escort and patrol services in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North was carried out without incident.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-four planes were observed in operation over the North Sea. No enemy forces were sighted during night

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reconnaissance off the east coast of Iceland and in the eastern Denmark Straits. At 1725, 12 merchantmen with 3 guard vessels were sailing south 140 miles southeast of Iceland. Group North Fleet believe that this was a returning Iceland-Scotland supply convoy or an American convoy only touching at Iceland. Further reconnaissance for the naval forces reported on 3 Jul. was flown in the afternoon.

According to an intelligence report of 3 Jul. from an agent in England, the US cruisers ALABAMA, SOUTH DAKOTA and 5 destroyers have joined the Home Fleet and will probably leave with it for the north about 8 Jul.

An intelligence report from diplomatic sources in Portugal states that a large convoy was ready to sail at Halifax on 24 Jun., and comprised of several steamers of the EMPRESS class and the steamers MONTCALM and MONTREAL. Departure for England is expected to take place in several groups starting on 8 Jul. War material stored at ports in the Halifax area includes mountain artillery and there are also 2500 motor sleighs, a large number of skis, snow-shoes, cases of electrically-heated uniforms and runners for aircraft ready for shipment. It is therefore suspected that the troops and material leaving this port are intended for operations in the Far North. Another intelligence report from Portugal states that a convoy carrying 35,000 men is scheduled to leave Halifax for England on 5 Jul. Escort vessels are waiting in the St. Johns area.

2. Own Situation:

In the afternoon of 3 Jul., enemy air formations of 7 - 8 planes each were sighted near Aalesound and between Florocøy and Askevold. Our fighters made no contact with the enemy. Anti-aircraft fire produced no results.

At 1010, submarine U "586" was unsuccessfully attacked by a fan of 3 torpedoes, which missed, and later by gunfire, from a British submarine in AB 3647.

The four submarines of group "Monson" which, on 3 Jul., had moved their operational area about 30 miles to the north because of the receding ice boundary, have now moved 30 miles in direction 250° to avoid the enemy submarine.

The four submarines newly assigned to Commander, Submarines, Norway are expected at Narvik on the morning of 6 Jul. on their way from Bergen to the north.

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The escort service of Naval Command Norway accompanied 45 north bound and 23 south bound ships. In the area of the Arctic Coast, 8 ships are held up due to lack of pilots.

With reference to an inquiry from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff in regard to the weather service (see War Diary 3 Jul.), Naval Staff has advised Chief of Operations Branch (Navy) as follows:

"Extensive plans are being made by Chief, Navy Meteorological Service, in cooperation with Chief, Air Force Meteorological Service for the establishment of a weather observation network in the northern area.

The following stations are planned:

Radiosonde stations in Eastern Greenland, North Spitzbergen and Alexandra land.

Meteorological buoys at 73°N. and 8°E., Bear Island, in the central Barent Sea and off the northwest coast of Novaya Zemlya.

Preparatory considerations: Previous experience has shown that considerable risk, much time and many difficulties are involved in setting up the stations by ships. It is therefore necessary to submit an immediate request for one or two cargo flying boats to be made available on the grounds that Holzauge was brought back successfully. The French 70-ton flying boats now becoming ready would appear to be especially suitable. Landing is possible everywhere. The request must be submitted to Operations Staff and inquiry made of the Director General, Air Force Equipment, as to when the flying boats are expected to be ready.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt roads mine clearing operations were continued. 13 Guard boats and 1 patrol boat were sighted in the Lavensari area. At 0300, there were 9 minesweepers and 2 submarines sailing southwest at a speed of 11 - 17 knots in AO 3379.

2. Own Situation:

One ground-mine was cleared near Middelgrund. East of Falshoeft a mine explosion was observed. The tanker DIEDENHOFEN was damaged by striking a mine near Maerket, west of the

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Aaland islands, but is trying to reach Germany. An investigation will be held as to why the ship went through that area which has been closed since the beginning of the war.

No other special incidents have been reported from the Baltic Area.

V. Merchant Shipping:

Due to unusually mild weather, a record was reached in shipments from Lulea during the month of May. Seven hundred and eighty thousand tons, which amounted to 59% of the total Swedish ore-shipment quota for this month, were shipped as compared with 98% for the same month last year (sic.).

Shipments from Narvik of 282,000 tons in May 1943 also reached the highest figure since the occupation of Norway (21.2% of the total shipments as against 14.8% in May 1942.)

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "420" was heavily damaged by depth charges dropped by an enemy plane in AJ 15, and is returning to port. This leaves only two submarines in the North Atlantic to carry on decoy radio service.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

For the air attack on La Pallice and Nantes, see "Situation West Area." Besides attacking Nantes, the formations that entered the Cherbourg area carried out attacks in groups on Le Mans (motor works). Twenty-three of the attacking planes were brought down. Attacks on transport installations in the Amiens area cost the enemy 3 more spitfires, so that the day's score in the West Area including La Pallice, amounted to 32 planes.

During the night, five harassing flights were made into the Oberhausen-Muehlheim area and 30 incursions into Western France, including 20 mine-carrying planes in the Gironde estuary, were reported.



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There have been no reports of activities by our air forces in the West Area.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force intensified its reconnaissance activities. Enemy attacks on Trapani during the night of 3 Jul. caused only insignificant military damage. Several bombs were dropped on Ostia harbor but no damage was done. During daylight, air fields in Sicily were repeatedly attacked. Heavy damage was caused at Catania where 5 of our planes were destroyed. At Comiso, 5 Me 109 planes were slightly damaged. During these attacks, 5 enemy planes were brought down by anti-aircraft fire and 20 by fighters in aerial combat, with a loss of 6 of our own planes.

Eastern Front:

One enemy plane was shot down by fighters during an incursion by 9 enemy planes into the Trondheim/Kristiansund area.

Of 30-35 enemy planes (Hamptons with Russian crews) which from 2100 to 2200 unsuccessfully attacked one of our convoys near Vardoe with aerial torpedoes, 19 were shot down by the convoy's covering planes.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

The CAIRO-class cruiser which entered Gibraltar in the afternoon of 3 Jul. had not come from the Mediterranean but from the Atlantic, and left for the Mediterranean in the evening of the same day followed by the AURORA-class cruiser. Shortly after midnight on 4 Jul., a big eastbound convoy was reported from Tangiers. Information on its strength is contradictory. According to Italian reports between 0630 and 0730, 18 steamers, 1 transport and 6 escort vessels passed Ceuta sailing east, while, during the same period, 2 big transports with planes on deck, 7 freighters and 4 escort vessels put into Gibraltar. According to another report, the convoy apparently consisted of 1 converted aircraft carrier, 8 big troop- or material-transports, 5 big tankers, 27 medium freighters and 15 light vessels. The number of war-ships in Gibraltar at noon was unchanged from the day before. Both of the KING GEORGE V-class units were therefore still in port.

The convoy of 28 ships which entered the Mediterranean early on 3 Jul. was identified by one of our submarines at 2140 on 3 Jul. in CH 8295.

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According to air reconnaissance, at 0810, there was a big west-bound convoy consisting of 26 ships with destroyers and planes north northwest of Cape Tenes, and a convoy of 25 merchantmen with an aircraft carrier and 3 warships - one of which was reported by our fighters to be a battleship - 10 miles north of Cape Serat. Otherwise, only minor shipping traffic was observed off the Algerian and Tunisian coasts.

Submarines were reported on 3 Jul. south of Salerno and on 4 Jul. south of Civitavecchia, southeast of Elba and north of Messina.

At 0138, an unidentified ship of medium size bombarded the coast near Syracuse.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, according to an Italian report at 0857, there were 14 medium-sized steamers and 5 small warships 40 miles northwest of Alexandria. The course was not given.

According to an intelligence report, there are 35 English and American transports in Alexandria and 15 in Port Said which is not going to be unloaded. Concentration of a total of 180,000 men is reported from Derna, Tobruk, Marsa Matruk. In these ports there are said to be 500 landing vessels with a capacity of 300 men or 9 tanks each and 40 tank-transport ships with a capacity of 20 tanks each. Three thousand planes are said to be assembled in the area between Derna and Alexandria. The attack on Greece, Crete and the Aegean islands, for which all these preparations have been made, is expected to start on 15 July.

The report was forwarded by the Intelligence Service with reservations.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Four boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla moved from Porto Vesme to Cagliari. The mineships POMMERN and BRANDENBURG moved from Maddalena to Leghorn in the night of 2 Jul. after having completed the mine operation as scheduled. The damaged torpedo boat TA "9" arrived at Toulon in the afternoon of 3 Jul.

At 2140, submarine U "375" probably sank a steamer of 8,000 BRT in an eastbound convoy in CH 8295 with a Pi 2 torpedo. The submarines sent out against the enemy battleships in the Western Mediterranean reported their positions as CG 9613 off the Spanish coast and CH 7757 off the African coast.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the first mine-barrage section off the probable landing places in Sardinia has been

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completed from Cagliari to Oristano. It is planned to expedite the work. The mining of landing places on the Sicilian coast is possible only between Trapani and Mazzara because the Italian minelayers have a speed of only 5 knots. German Naval Command Italy again urgently requests the provisional assignment of the next 3 motor minesweepers and of motor minesweeper R "38" (see teletype 1015).

In a personal telegram to Commander in Chief, Navy, Commanding General, South requests support for the new Siebel ferry construction program. (See teletype 2310).

Group West reports that, in the area of 6th Defense Flotilla in the Mediterranean, 15 warships and 66 merchantmen for 76,000 BRT, including 16 merchantmen for 16,000 BRT in the Spain traffic, were escorted between 16 and 30 Jun.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The steamer SABBIA, on the supply-run to the islands, was torpedoed by an enemy submarine south of Civitavecchia but was towed in. The steamer COLLEVILLE which ran aground on 3 Jul., also entered Civitavecchia. Other supply traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean has forwarded to High Command Navy, Naval Staff his observations in regard to the delays to shipping in the Aegean supply traffic made during a flight from Piraeus to Bari. He requests that German Naval Command Italy intervene so that the German ships that are being held back may receive immediate sailing orders. Furthermore he requests that to prepare for all eventualities, a German liaison officer be appointed at Corfu to act simultaneously as liaison officer with Commanding Admiral, Aegean, and that the limitation of Commanding Admiral, Aegean's responsibility to Patras be reviewed and the possibility of extending his jurisdiction to Corfu and Valona considered.

Naval Staff has asked for the opinion of Group South, German Naval Command, Italy and Commanding Admiral, Aegean in regard to these requests. For copy of teletype 1/Skl 18986/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

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On 2 Jul., an enemy submarine sank a Greek sailing vessel by gunfire west of Rhodes. At 0108 on 4 Jul., the steamer VESTA (3,351 BRT), in convoy from Leros to Syra, was torpedoed by an enemy submarine west of Leros, but was towed in to port.

Group South reports that, during the month of June, 33 steamers of 98,013 BRT were escorted in the Aegean and 59 steamers of 69,964 BRT sailed without escort.

The turn-around in the Aegean ports amounted to a total of 105,959 tons of which 51,078 tons were handled in Piraeus alone, 21,366 tons at Salonika and 12,977 tons in the ports of Crete. Eight auxiliary sailing vessels were sunk and 1 auxiliary sailing vessel deserted to Turkey.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 3 Jul., the 1st PT Boat Flotilla was forced to break off operations on the Caucasian coast owing to bad weather. Operations by 1st and 11th PT Boat Flotillas also had to be cancelled on the night of 4 Jul. The patrol positions in Temriuk Bay were taken up according to plan.

Naval Artillery Lighters "5" - "8" will move from Sevastopol to Kerch on 5 Jul.

A minesweeping plane crashed following a mine explosion during an operation west of the northern entrance to Kerch Straits. The crew was rescued.

The supply traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance:

According to Reuter, the British Minister of Supply has stated that England is going to cut down the production of munitions in favor of shipbuilding and the procurement of aircraft as munitions stocks are now adequate.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. Submarine Construction:

The question of whether to build type XXII or type XVII (smaller type of the Walter Submarine) or both is to be settled by Naval Construction Division and Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section. Commanding Admiral, Submarines will participate in the discussion. On technical grounds, Chief Naval Construction Division advocates that work be started on both types.

Another point discussed was whether type XVIII (Walter) or type XXI (Broeking) is preferable. The special advantage of type XXI is that series construction could be started at an early date as the propulsion units have been tested and are already available. However, the extent to which inclusion of both types in the building program will affect the general problems of capacity and completion in regard to Submarine construction and repair remains to be examined.

No final decision will be taken until this investigation has been made.

II. Conference on the Situation:

1. Army Situation:

At 0215, offensive operation "Citadelle" was opened on the Eastern Front. The enemy's defense in the southern sector is extremely strong.

2. With reference to the question of destroyer operations against the enemy anti-submarine groups in the Bay of Biscay (see War Diary 4 Jul.), Chief Naval Staff commented that probably only a single successful action can be expected as, after the first surprise the enemy will strengthen his forces to such an extent that they will be too strong to be attacked by our forces. The advantage would then lie in tying down these increased forces and keeping them engaged. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division called attention to the critical fuel oil situation which would be seriously felt in the intended operations. Chief, Naval Staff, however concurred in Naval Staff's view that the

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plan is fundamentally right and the directives issued to Group West will therefore hold good.

3. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch in regard to the suggestions of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean concerning measures to prevent delay in the Aegean supply traffic, as per memorandum in War Diary of 4 Jul. (Warfare in the Mediterranean, Sea Transport Situation).

4. Chief, Naval Staff approved the draft of a reply to Admiral Riccardi concerning the transport submarines ROMOLO and REMO. The letter, with other documents on the subject, is filed under Vfg. 1/Skl 19091/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

5. The Fuehrer has ordered that the account of Lieutenant (N) Nieger's successful and adventurous return be used for propaganda purposes.

III. Transfer of the 1943 Naval Program to the Reichminister for Armaments and Munitions:

On 3 Jul., a conference was held between representatives of Naval Construction Division and Bureau of Naval Armaments and delegates of the Ministry on the effectuation of the transfer of the 1943 Naval Program to the Ministry, as already agreed upon in principle.

Chief, Naval Construction Division reported on this conference: As an indispensable condition for their acceptance of responsibility, the delegates of the Ministry asked that an independent Central Committee and an independent Ship Building Commission be set up within the Ministry, i.e. detached from High Command Navy. There could be no question, in the view of Chief, Naval Construction Division of appointing a naval officer as head of the Central Committee though, in certain circumstances one might be appointed to head the commission. The commission is to be composed of the most capable constructors, experts and operations officers. It will undertake to design and set up the types as required by High Command, Navy. The Central Committee will then provide the dockyard capacity and will accordingly suggest the distribution of orders to High Command, Navy. For both bodies,

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a considerable part of the organization of Naval Construction Division will be required, about 1/3 of which would have to be detached from High Command, Navy in order to carry out routine work with the Central Committee and the Commission. The remaining third would, according to this suggestion, remain under High Command, Navy. The delegates of the Ministry pointed out that an indispensable condition for acceptance of the task was that the work be turned over completely to the Central Committee and the Commission and that any compromise on that point was impossible.

Admiral Fuchs considered that the establishment of a Commission with the best brains and full powers, as envisaged by the Ministry should be warmly welcomed. He himself had been advocating this repeatedly for two years - unfortunately without success. Very strong objections must, however, be raised to the separation of the Commission from the organization of High Command, Navy. In that case, Commander in Chief, Navy would have no one who would be responsible to him for drafting the designs. The absolutely essential influence of the Military authorities could no longer be exercised as soon as the request of High Command, Navy has passed to the Commission since the Commission was supposed to work in complete independence. Although this might serve as some restraint on the naturally numerous wishes of Naval Staff and might thus help to speed up the construction program, it was nonetheless essential that the fundamental necessity for continuous military supervision of the development and designing of warships be insisted upon. Admiral Fuchs would agree with the suggested arrangement if the Commission were set up as part of Naval Construction Division and with the same amount of authority as it would have as a part of the Ministry.

Commander in Chief, Navy stated first and foremost that discussion of this matter implied no criticism what so ever of Naval Construction Division. He too would like it much better if the Navy were able to carry out the program with its own facilities without depending on outside assistance. As things were today, however, in the fourth year of the war, it was obvious that, even if equipped as Admiral Fuchs would like, the Naval Construction Division could not be as effective as the office which actually controls the availability of all raw materials, capacity and labor. The program could be carried out only with Minister Speer and to work without him would mean to work against him, if legitimate demands made by Naval Armaments Division should be refused. The war had decreed necessary a break with the old organization. The difficulties before us today did not exist in 1939. And they would still increase. It would be all the more important to have applied the strongest methods.

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Chief, Naval Construction Division, Supply and Finance Branch, Rear Admiral Topp, again summed up the demands of the delegates of the Ministry. He did not believe that a compromise could be reached nor did he think - in reply to a question from Commander in Chief, Navy - that the Navy would be able, with its own facilities, to achieve the results that were to be expected from Minister Speer. According to the Ministry's delegates, a similar arrangement regarding armament production for the Army is already running smoothly. As soon as the matter is arranged with the Navy production for the Air Force is also to be taken over by the Ministry. Topp could not help feeling that this information was intended to bring pressure on the Navy. In any case, it must be admitted that the Ministry's functions would be vastly increased if it were in fact to work too intensively for all three services.

Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division was doubtful whether military requirements would receive due consideration if the Navy relinquished the preparation of designs. He was thinking less of the big and fundamental general problems which were undoubtedly involved, than of the many minor needs constantly arising in the operational zones and which should not be overlooked.

Chief, Naval Armaments Division reported that the Ministry intended to disband the Underwater Weapons Commission and to allot the various weapons to existing commissions acting for all three Services, as, for example, those for ammunition, precision-tools etc. As with shipbuilding, weapon production was to be taken out of the hands of the Services and given to organizations independent from the High Commands. The Chiefs of the various armament sections of High Command, Navy considered this intolerable. After other consequences which would arise in regard to armament supply for the Navy had been explained - all technical inspectorates and experimental detachments would have to be ceded by the Navy to the Ministry, with all their sea-borne equipment - Commander in Chief, Navy concurred with the opinion of Chief, Naval Armament Division that such an arrangement in regard to armament production was out of the question. Nevertheless, Commander in Chief, Navy is trying to find a way in which Minister Speer's assistance in the development of weapons can be used more effectively than heretofore.

Vice Admiral v.d. Borne pointed out that the Armament Division of the Army still existed and still had every opportunity of exerting decisive military influence by the examination and approval of the production designs submitted by the ministerial commissions.



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Furthermore, Vice Admiral v.d. Borne held the view that the extensive requests made by the civilian office on 3 Jul. should not be regarded as the Ministry's last word. They were, perhaps, rather an attempt to establish how far the Navy was disposed to go towards accepting the Ministry's desire for power. Minister Speer would undoubtedly be ready to listen to the very important arguments of the military authorities. Besides the objections already mentioned, it should also be pointed out that difficulties would arise in regard to the repair and supply organizations which cannot be separated from the building yards and the production works. It is self-evident that these can only be handled by military authorities.

Naval Construction Division III R, Commander Ritter von Georg, was of the opinion that the only thing to do was to cede production to Minister Speer. But the Commission must be headed by a naval officer. In the present serious situation, the dissolution of the Naval Construction Division was unjustified especially since it could not be guaranteed that Speer's output would actually be better than that of Naval Construction Division.

Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division experienced confidence in Speer's efficiency but, on the other hand, considered that dissolution of offices of Armed Forces High Command was entirely intolerable and that an amalgamation along the lines of the statement of Chief, Naval Armaments Division was necessary.

Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Navy stated that no one could shoulder the responsibility of Commander in Chief, Navy for the success or failure of the 1943 naval program. He regarded it as most dangerous to break up High Command, Navy's own organization at this time and also unnecessary since only the production side of the 1943 program was still to be done, all designing having been already completed by Naval Construction Division.

Commander in Chief, Navy interposed that the design work for the submarine type XXI had not yet been completed and would thus fall to the commission. Otherwise, he said, Rear Admiral Schulte Moenting was right on this point.

Chief, Naval Staff, who was present only during the statement of Chief of Staff of Commander in Chief, Navy, concurred with the latter's views. He thought that Minister Speer was not in a position to realize all the issues involved in a program of warship construction in general and in this unusually large one in particular.

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Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch commented that declarations had been received from representatives of important civilian building yards to the effect that construction of a warship without Naval Construction Division was utterly impossible.

Commander in Chief, Navy closed the conference, again pointing out the constraint of our position and the need to take the road which would lead most surely and directly to the objective. In the present case, that undoubtedly meant working with Speer. The Minister did not yet entirely realize the difficulties of a big warship program. But Commander in Chief, Navy would have to make clear to him that the construction work was his business but the preparation of designs was the business of the Navy - which would obviously welcome his assistance and was prepared to establish ties of organization to make this assistance effective. Our attitude must not be such as to cause Speer to refuse to accept the naval program. Both sides must make concessions.

In the afternoon, the conference between High Command, Navy and the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions on the subject as under III. continued under the chairmanship of Commander in Chief, Navy and the Reich Minister.

A report on the conference and its results will follow.

Situation on 5 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels.

With regard to the repatriation of certain persons from East Asia, Naval Attaché Tokyo was informed, in reply to a request, that it is more urgent to bring home naval officers than the DNB representative who, however, would be of value. Naval Staff suggests that naval officers and the DNB agent be repatriated on "Brake" and a combat submarine or AQUILA in order to avoid the greater risk involved on a blockade-runner. For copy of order 1/Skl I k 18826/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Naval Staff informed Ship "28" by radiogram 2133 that torpedo supplies for PT boats had meantime been shipped on Aquila submarines. The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEHMANN was informed by radiogram 1736 that Naval Attaché Tokyo has reported that she will make for Lillie via Gelb Caesar.

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A letter to High Command, Armed Forces/Foreign Armies III, Naval Staff quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch, Shipping Section (Tr.N.: Qū A I S apparently should read Qu A V I S because IS = PT boat Section gives no sense in this connection) measures for blockade-runners 1/Skl I k 19034/43 Gkdos discusses the question of removing the top masts of the blockade-runners following the objections raised at Tokyo. For copy, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-two planes were observed operating in the Bay of Biscay. One British ship was located 200 miles west of Brest, at 2049, and one 660 miles west-northwest of Cape Villano at 0020 on 7 Jul. The steamer BALTIC, which was taken into Gibraltar, was captured on 24 Jun., shortly before leaving the outer harbor at Bilbao, by a boat with 6 men under a French Commander ~~which~~ came alongside unobserved.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine U "462" was met by our torpedo boats. Her close air escort reported her position at 0811 in BF 8571.

Destroyers Z "24" and "37" moved from Royan to Pauillac.

Channel Coast:

While enroute from Dunkirk to Boulogne the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla was bombarded by British long-range batteries, and the torpedo boat T "24" was slightly damaged by shell fragments. For the short report see Teletype 0010/06. In reply batteries "Todt" and "Lindemann" fired 3 rounds each between 0257 and 0322 and batteries 702, 710 and 713 fired 15 rounds each on targets in harbors on the English coast.

Nothing special to report on the escort and patrol services.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

At 0915, a Dutch fishing smack was sunk off Egnont aan Zee apparently by striking a mine. Otherwise the convoy and patrol activities in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North were carried out without incident.

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Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were observed operating in the North Sea. Strong radio traffic with Russian submarines was observed off the Arctic coast. Our air reconnaissance produced no particular information.

2. Own Situation:

At 2305 on 4 Jul., the two harbor-guard ships off Vardoe were unsuccessfully attacked by a torpedo from an enemy submarine. At 0610, on 5 Jul., a Russian M-class submarine unsuccessfully attacked 2 submarine chasers of the 12th. Anti-submarine Flotilla north of Vardoe and was subsequently definitely sunk by depth charges, gunfire and ramming.

One Russian anti-submarine lead-horned mine was cut south of Arnoey and convoy traffic was stopped.

At 2200 on 4 Jul., one of our eastbound convoys was attacked by 5 Hampdons with 3 fighters south of Ekkerocy. It was observed that three unsuccessful aerial torpedoes were fired. Near Molde, 6 enemy planes firing upon one of our southbound convoys were driven off by gunfire. Naval anti-aircraft artillery fire shot down one enemy plane and fighters brought down another plane during a bombing attack on a wreck southwest of Kristiansund North. Forty-one ships were escorted to the north and 24 ships to the south. Twelve ships were unable to proceed due to lack of escort.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Shipping movements in Kronstadt Bay were much the same as in previous days.

2. Own Situation:

At 0400 on 4 Jul., the steamer DUISBURG was damaged in Aalborg by a demolition charge. Escort and patrol service in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic were carried out without incident.

Four troop transports, 3 leave transports and 4 other steamers were escorted in the Baltic Sea area.

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No special reports were received from the area of Commander Minesweepers, East.

Naval Command, Baltic advised Naval Staff for information that 5th Air Force had replied in the negative to the request for regular reconnaissance flights. For copy, see teletype 1122. Although 5th Air Forces' reasons are only partially acceptable Naval Command will refrain from submitting the matter to the Air Minister and to Commander in Chief, Air Force in view of the situation in regard to fuel and forces.

Naval Staff considers that the demand for reconnaissance should be maintained on principle.

Naval Command Baltic, Operations Staff has requested a decision on its proposal that 5th Minesweeper Group (planes) be reinforced so that prescribed routes may be frequently checked. The planes are under the operational command of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic. Admiral, Denmark, and Coastal Defenses, Commanders, West and Pommerania will be entitled to use the planes for their own operations. (See teletype 2018).

Because of the shortage of ammunition for Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division the captured batteries, in accordance with the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy, that 12-10.5 cm Sk C/32 guns should be made available for reinforcement of the coastal defenses in Kronstadt Bay and set up in 3 batteries of 4 guns each. The 12 guns will have to be taken from the stock provided for rearmament of the batteries in the West area; this will leave only 4 batteries of 4 guns each in stock.

Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries intends to instal 2 of the batteries in the Peterhof/Uritzka area and 1 at Tytters as a replacement for Battery Nettelbeck (two 10.5 cm Polish guns.).

Naval Staff has no objections.

V. Merchant Shipping:

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping estimates shipments during July as follows:

Norway supplies	470,000 tons
Finland supplies	97,000 tons
Baltic Countries Supplies	212,000 tons
German coastal traffic excl. coal	40,000 tons
Coastal coal traffic	221,000 tons of which
from Rotterdam	20,000 tons
Ore shipments from Lulea	700,000 tons
Ore shipments from Oxelosound	100,000 tons

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Altogether this gives an increase of 58,000 tons as compared with Jun. of this year.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "669" sighted 1 battleship and 4 destroyers at high speed on course 55° in BD 6319.

An auxiliary sailing freighter was sunk and a 4,000 ton steamer probably sunk off the Brazilian coast.

On 4 Jul., submarine U "178" sank one Norwegian and one Greek steamer for a total of 7,443 BRT in KE 7471 off the east coast of Africa.

For successes in the Mediterranean, see Own Situation in the Mediterranean.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 84 planes in operation in the West Area and 4 in the Mediterranean.

Throughout the day, the enemy was in operation against traffic installations, radar stations and airfields in the occupied territories. Fifteen of our fighters made no contact with the enemy. A total of 83 incursions into German controlled territory were reported during the night of 5 Jul. Aerial mine-laying was observed off Brest and suspected in the waters Tershelling - Borkum. Naval anti-aircraft guns and night-fighters shot down one enemy plane each.

During the night of 3 Jul., Me 109 planes were employed on night fighting for the first time with good results.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force continued reconnaissance flights. Sometimes heavy enemy air attacks were made on airfields and villages in Sicily. For details, see Daily Situation. Twenty-two planes have so far been reported shot down.

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For the night of 5 Jul., it is planned to send a strong German bomber formation against Bizerta.

Eastern Front:

On 4 Jul., 47 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front with a loss of 4 of our own.

In connection with operation "Citadelle", the 6th and 4th Air Forces flew 4570 missions, during which 432 enemy planes were brought down at a loss of 26 of our own.

Although these figures are most satisfactory they also reveal the very considerable strength of the enemy's operations.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation in the Mediterranean:

At 0715, both KING GEORGE V-class battleships left Gibraltar towards the east together with 5 destroyers. Thus all 6 battleships and both aircraft carriers are in the Western Mediterranean. Photographic reconnaissance at 1600 on 5 Jul. confirmed the presence of 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 cruisers and 2 destroyers at Mers el Kobir.

No reports have been received on the other vessels.

During the day, 4 steamers coming from the Mediterranean and 6 steamers with 2 escort units each coming from the Atlantic entered Gibraltar and 1 net-layer and 1 destroyer left the harbor for an unknown destination.

At 1730 on 4 Jul., our air reconnaissance observed north of Oran the westbound convoy of 36 steamers which had been reported at Tenes in the forenoon and, at 1530, noted 4 eastbound steamers south-southeast of Cape de Gata. The two big convoys which entered the Mediterranean during the night of 3 Jul. were not sighted by our air reconnaissance. One of the convoys was attacked by one of our submarines at 1543 55 miles east-northeast of Algiers.

According to air reconnaissance at noon, 2 big warships were 50 miles northeast of Bougie making for port and, at 1930, a convoy of 15 steamers with several destroyers was 10 miles north of Bougie. The convoy included 5 very big steamers (20,000 BRT each).

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Air reconnaissance also reported 15 merchantmen east of Hammamet at 0230, 4 probably PT boats northeast of Pantelleria at 0430, 9 vessels on a northwesterly course north of Cape Bon at 0945 and 4 eastbound destroyers at 1400.

Further photographic reconnaissance of Mers el Kebir, Oran, Arzeu, Lijelli and Bougie revealed a further considerable reduction in the number of landing vessels, probably due to movements to the east.

On the evening of 4 Jul. one submarine was reported west of Pantelleria, and on 5 Jul. one near Olbia, one off Leghorn and in the afternoon, one each off Catania and Elba.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

No reports have been received on the operations of our PT boats.

At 1543, submarine U "593" sank a ship of 8,000 BRT from an eastbound convoy in CH 9544 with a Pi 2; submarine U "371" reported on her success of 4 Jul. that during the night she sighted remains of the torpedoed freighter burning and abandoned and observed 2 explosions.

Escort service was carried out by our defense forces without incident. For the battle report of submarine chaser "2207" on the torpedoing of the steamer SABBEL see teletype 2200. Attention is called to the unsatisfactory range of the echo-ranging sets in coastal waters.

German Naval Command has reported on the status of the barrages laid by BRANDENEURG and POMMERN on 3 Jul. For copy, see teletype 1855. While carrying out the task, the formation was identified and reported by enemy reconnaissance planes as 1 destroyer with 2 merchantmen.

Special Items:

a. Transfer of Ships to the Aegean:

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch informed Naval Staff, Operations Division on a report from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean to the offices concerned at Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff; High Command, Navy; Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and



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Transport Branch, with copy to German Naval Command Italy, Chief Supply and Transport, Italy and Mediterranean Shipping Company, Rome. The report discusses the status of ship transfers from the Central Mediterranean to the Aegean, the order of Commanding General, South that ships already partially loaded for Sicily and Sardinia be unloaded and transferred during the present new moon period, and the negotiations with German Naval Command, Italy on the matter of escorts. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch considers that - once a transfer is ordered - Commanding General South, Chief, Supply and Transport Italy and German Naval Command should cooperate closely in doing everything to assure its fulfilment and recommends that Naval Staff, Operations Division should instruct German Naval Command accordingly. For copy of the letter of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch as per l/Skl 19070/43 Gkdos, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

d. Delay in Adriatic - Aegean Traffic:

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in Mediterranean has requested that German Naval Liaison Officers to the Italian Navy should be appointed at Valona, Durazzo and Prevesa as at Corfu. The requested views of German Naval Command Italy, Group South and of Admiral Aegean (see War Diary 4 Jul.) should also include this problem.

Meanwhile, the views of Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy and of Group South, and a preliminary report from German Naval Command, Italy have been received. For copy as per l/Skl 19068, 19112 and 19109/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

German Naval Command reports that the hold-up of steamers is due to the Italian troop-transport convoys for which strong escort has to be provided and that 2 steamers left Bari for Greece on 3 Jul.

Group South, in its statement, reaches the conclusion that the worsening of the situation and the defects in the Italian Navy's handling of the supply traffic in the Adriatic - Corfu - Aegean sector underline the need for a centralized control for the whole Aegean area including the west coast. The Group suggests that the possibility be explored of obtaining the Italian Navy's consent to extending Commanding Admiral, Aegean's control to include the Western Greece area as far as the Straits of Otranto.

Group South further advised Naval Staff, for information that Commanding General Southeast had now also intervened in the matter of expediting Aegean supplies and that on 6 Jul., in Rome he would

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personally demand the faster dispatch of ships in Italian harbors. For copy of the corresponding teletype 1/Skl 19111/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

Naval Staff has advised Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy of the statement of Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy and has promised to report its own views after consultation with Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy.

c. 1. Report from German Naval Attaché, Rome:

A report from German Naval Attaché, Rome on a conference with Admiral Giartosio on 1 Jul. indicates that the advice given by Commander in Chief, Navy during his visit to Rome on the efficient organization of coastal defenses in Sardinia has had positive and practical results with the Italian Naval Staff. For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 1913/43 Gkdos, Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Supply traffic to the islands was carried out according to schedule. Enroute from Bastia to Leghorn, a convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine with two torpedoes.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to reports from Group South, an enemy submarine put in to the harbor of Livadia on the island of Serifos, which is occupied by the Italian Navy, from 2330 to at least 0315 on the night of 4 Jul. No details or, more especially, reports of Italian counter-actions have been received from the Italians.

Reuter reports that British landing detachments attacked airfields in Crete during the night of 4 Jul. Detailed circumstances are still unknown.

For the first time, Commanding General South East, reports rebel activities in Euboea.

Own Situation:

In the afternoon of 4 Jul., the BULGARIA discovered an unknown minefield 45 miles southeast of Salonika. The necessary steps have been ordered.

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GA "42" ("Q" ship) and one submarine chaser were sent to Serifos.

Air reconnaissance by 3 Ju 88 planes in the waters West of Creta, Southwest of the Peloponnese and on the west coast of Greece produced no information.

The movements of our own forces were carried out according to plan.

In regard to the salvage of the steamer VESTA torpedoed near Syra, it is reported that submarine chaser "2104" manned the steamer and got up steam with her own crew as all the Italian crew except the officers had left the ship.

Group South has requested the first degree of priority for mine supplies for the Aegean mining plan. The plan will be sent by courier.

At present, the Aegean mining and barrage tasks have first degree priority within the general program. The request can be filled by using the remaining reserves or the Jul. production minus 970 UMB-mines already allotted for the Bonifacio Strait it will therefore not be possible to deliver UMB-mines to Admiral Aegean until the August production is ready.

Directives to this effect have been sent to Group South and to Underwater Obstacles Branch.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0012, off Anapa, two boats were seen which put up smoke screens and made off when fired upon.

Own Situation:

No special incidents have been reported. For the first time, 6 naval landing craft took up patrol positions off the northern exit of the Kerch Straits.

Naval artillery lighters "5" - "8" put in to Yalta owing to bad weather. They will move to Tomriuk via Kerch on 6 Jul. for offensive operations and defense service in the Azov Sea. Naval artillery lighter "4" will move to Mariupol in order to reinforce the group there.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

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Exchange Telegraph reports on the situation in New Guinea:

"The Allied Air Forces have almost complete control of the air. At MacArthur's Headquarters it is estimated that it will take about three weeks to capture Munda, the main Japanese stronghold in the New Georgias. The fleet operations in the Solomons area were carried out by the 7th U.S. Fleet under command of Vice Admiral Carpenter.

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Items of Political Importance:

Foreign Affairs, Intelligence Division has made a study of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and the relations of each of these countries with the USA, in the course of which a great deal of often strongly contradictory information, dating back to the end of Dec. 1942, has been evaluated and the following conclusions reached:

By her victories, Japan has made it almost completely impossible for the enemy to attack her home islands from the sea. Therefore, the Japanese home land can be effectively attacked only from China or Russian East Asia. U. S. attempts to get bases from Stalin for the purpose of making air attacks have so far been unsuccessful. But Japan must undoubtedly count on a combined attack by the Soviet Union and the U. S. from Siberia as soon as the Soviet Union's position in the west is sufficiently eased.

Japan's relations with the Soviet Union are governed by the neutrality agreement. Russia sticks to this agreement because she does not want American supplies to Siberia to be cut off, which would be unavoidable in case of war with Japan, and because she wants to avoid a war on two fronts as long as she is still tied down on her western frontier.

Considering her war commitments, particularly in China, Japan could wage a preventive war against Russia only if she were certain of being able to achieve a quick victory without endangering her campaigns in the other war theatres.

Politically, this also appears to ensure a balance in East Asia since, in respect to the increasing power of the USA in the Pacific, it would not be in the Russian interest for Japan to be completely powerless.

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In this connection, it is noteworthy that recently, Moscow has again been calling for the establishment of a second front in Europe. A Pravda leading article which can always be regarded as semi-official, has pointed out that everything depends on how Russia's allies exploit the favorable situation created after Stalingrad and Tunis for the purpose of establishing a second front on the European continent, since without a second front, victory over Germany is impossible.

On the other hand, there are indications that the Anglo-Americans are in no hurry to fulfil the Russian wish. This reluctance may be due to military reasons of various kinds. But without doubt there must also be political motives involved. This also makes it possible for us to take advantage of this tendency since, in our situation, time is in our favor. In any case, the enforced pause in the battle of the Atlantic may help to increase the latent Anglo-American - Russian tension if it is true that this success has served to strengthen the position of the Anglo-Americans in the coalition of our enemies and make them less dependent on the requirements of their Russian ally.

Conference with Chief, Naval Staff:

A. Report by Bureau of Naval Armament, Torpedo Branch  
on the status of torpedo production:

A monthly output from 1 Jul. of 200 "Zaunkoenig" type torpedoes is assured in spite of considerable difficulties, especially in regard to personnel (shortage of engineers). Seventy-five torpedoes will be delivered for trial within the next days. It is expected that 250 torpedoes per month will be produced as from August and 400 as from January 1944. Completion of the measure tank which would eliminate ranging is a decisive factor. Commander in Chief, Navy has been requested to approach Minister Speer in regard to filling 200 engineer positions. Torpedo Branch considered the risk of serial production to be negligible. It is planned to establish three bases.

Commander in Chief, Navy also asked for Speer's assistance in the production, which must be considerably expedited so that the submarines can operate with Zaunkoenig torpedoes by the end of August. The number of bases is to be increased to six. The construction of measure tanks is to be speeded up in every way.

Torpedo Branch also reported that test firing has demonstrated the usefulness of Fat 3 torpedoes. One hundred torpedoes of this type will be available in Oct., 200 in Nov., and 440 in Jan. The bottleneck is in the supply of angle adjusters.

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Commander in Chief, Navy requires that the Fat 3 and Zaunkoenig torpedoes be used together for the resumption of the submarine campaign. It is therefore a matter of the utmost importance.

B. Report by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section:

a. Conning towers conversion:

By 10 Aug., 78 conning towers will have been delivered for the 74 submarines in dock. The delay in the docking period is only slight. Reconstruction of boats in the West area will not be affected by deliveries to the yards at home.

In view of this favorable situation, Chief, Naval Staff has decided that 2 more boats (without converted conning towers) are to be placed immediately at the disposal of Commander, Submarines Norway by Commanding Admiral, Submarines through Group North Fleet. (For order 1/Skl 19152/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

b. Italian 80-ton Submarines:

Examination of the construction projects submitted by the Italian Commanding Admiral Submarines show that this boat is a very useful type for Mediterranean operations. The question of furnishing German engines is still under consideration. It is not possible to furnish telescopes as requested, as our production capacity is already fully engaged.

Chief, Naval Staff decided that the project should be recommended and given every moral support. But Italian participation in the Walter Submarine project could not be contemplated due to the generally unsettled situation.

The suggestion that 2 more large transport submarines should be built in Manfredonia and the plates for the pressure hulls delivered from Germany should be followed up.

C. Conference on the Situation:

I. Chief Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch: In regard to the renewed request of German Naval Command, Italy for the allotment of 4 motor minesweepers (see War Diary 4 Jul.), Naval Staff decided that for the reasons already explained, it is not possible for the next 3 boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and of motor minesweeper R "38" to be temporarily assigned to mine operations on the Sicilian coast.

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Motor minesweeper R "38" and "211", and the R "178 and "188" which will be ready shortly, are to be transferred to the Aegean as planned. Whether the 4 remaining boats of 12th Motor minesweeper Flotilla which will become ready on 15 Jul. and 22 Jul. can be made available for one or two weeks of operation in the Sicilian area will be decided in accordance with the situation at the time. Developments in the Aegean may necessitate additional transfers of our naval forces from the Italian area to the Aegean. Orders for such movements may be expected at any time although the Italians are not to be advised of this yet.

II. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division:

a. According to a report from Naval Construction Office, Nantes the effect of the enemy bombing of the submarine shelters at St. Nazaire (the steel tie-beams sagged 60 millimeters) indicate that special bombs were used. On the whole the result does not warrant concern.

b. Naval Staff's request that priority be given to the construction of submarine shelters in Norway has been rejected by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. Chief, Naval Staff approved the suggestion that the matter be left in abeyance.

c. The question of sea-borne protection for the Blom and Voss flying boats at Bicarosse was discussed with Commanding Admiral Naval Group West who will take the necessary measures.

d. Agreement was reached at the beginning of Jun., between Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and the Air Force was in regard to the further construction of Siebel ferries. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that Commanding General South, who had again raised this question, (see War Diary 4 Jul.) should be referred to this agreement by way of reply.

e. According to the Todt Organization's plans the time required for the Italian harbor constructions and berths is estimated at probably two months. The idea of building a cable railway over the Straits of Messina has been abandoned. A plan for laying an underwater pipeline for fuel is now under consideration.

f. General von Unruh's interim reports on his investigation of the Navy do not call for any particular measures. They contain no serious criticisms.

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III. Chief, Bureau of Naval Administration reports that the order of Chief, Armed Forces High Command on the provision of labor for the 1943 naval program, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directives, has been received.

In a highly restricted circle:

IV. Report by Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch.

a. Commanding General, South has compiled and submitted an assessment of the situation on the islands of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica as at 30 Jun. Copy for Chief of Staff Naval Staff as per 1/Skl 1909/43 Gkdos. Chofs. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The conclusions of the report may be summarized as follows:

"From the aspect of forces and supplies, it is entirely feasible for the islands of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica to be held against an attack by strong enemy forces. The attitude of the Italian troops however, will be decisive. It is to be hoped that the presence and later, the participation of German troops will suffice to raise the morale of the Italian troops. If the Italian island defenses in general and the Italian soldier in particular are found wanting it is to be expected that the islands will sooner or later be lost as there are not enough German forces to defend the islands alone in the long run."

The report further states that the naval artillery detachment in Sicily will be stationed near Gela. An enemy attack against the southeastern part of Sicily with a subsequent thrust or simultaneous break-through into the Straits of Messina, as anticipated by Commanding General South, would make it very difficult to withdraw our naval forces and merchant ships from the Tyrehenian Sea to the East. This assessment of the situation has been forwarded direct to Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy.

b. The dates of departure for 5 blockade runners in Japan must be fixed now. It is planned to arrange for 3 of the ships to reach Europe in Nov., and 2 in Dec. The voyage alone will take 50 to 54 days in addition to which waiting periods are planned in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the ships have sufficient supplies to enable them to stay at sea, if necessary, until the next new-moon period after the scheduled month of arrival. Chief, Naval Staff has approved.

Special Items:



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I. The German Armistice Commission (Navy) has reported on the negotiations in regard to French ship-building materials which had been undesirably complicated by the evidently fluctuating and pressure demands of Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. The German Armistice Commission considers that a fundamental decision between High Command, Navy and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is necessary before the discussions with the French are resumed. For copy of the teletype 1/Skl 19210/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

II. Upon the basis of captured material Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has compiled a report on a new type of fast landing boat for troops (LCP). For copy as per 1/Skl 20210/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D "Material on the Enemy Situation."

III. Lieutenant Bartels, Commander of the Coastal Defense Formation on the west coast of Norway has submitted some interesting ideas on the use of phantasy (illusion?) as a weapon, making practical suggestions as to how enemy activities in the Norwegian coastal areas could be warded off. Naval Staff has called the attention of the operational stations to this suggestion. For copy of the order as per 1/Skl I op 17637/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation on 6 Jul. 1943:

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attaché Tokyo reports that MARCO POLO is to be met by minelayer HAZUTAKA and a submarine chaser and has forwarded details on the characteristics of these units. Naval Staff, Submarine Division has been informed.

In regard to the question of removing the top masts, Naval Attaché, Tokyo has been instructed, by telegram 0215, as follows:

1. The criticisms from Tokyo have been thoroughly considered by this office. Naval Staff regards the striking features of the blockade runners as more dangerous than a reduction of the horizon by removal of the top-masts.

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2. The look-out on the mast-head above the saling on the blockade-runners is usually higher than the enemy look-out on the saling or on the highest part of the bridge as is now usual.

3. In poor visibility, dusk etc, the height of the look-out is of no consequence whereas harmless and usual features are then of the greatest help.

4. The Naval Staff admits the criticisms of the blockade-runner captains to be important for the voyage and the order to remove the top-masts is hereby withdrawn. Naval Staff recommends installation of telescopic top-masts if possible and, if this is not possible, removal of at least one top-mast so as to have masts of different lengths as used on enemy ships. This will make it much more difficult to estimate the ship's position. After thorough examination of the plans reported by Naval Attaché Tokyo for the resumption of the blockade-runner service, the following dates have been fixed for the ships to be in the Southern area ports ready to leave for Europe:

WESERLAND	18 Sept.
BURGENLAND	25 Sept.
RIO GRANDE	30 Sept.
OSORNO	26 Oct.
ALSTERUFER	4 Nov.

Dates of departure from Japan will be fixed accordingly by Naval Attaché Tokyo. For copy of telegram 1/Skl I k 1927/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Naval Staff forwarded further information on the political situation to Ship "28" by radiogram 1325. The message deals with the Iberian Peninsula and Turkey.

German Naval Command, Italy has transmitted the position of the motor ship VULCANIA as 1507 N. 4155 E at 0900 on 4 Jul. (see teletype 1735).

## II. Situation West Area:

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity was normal in the area of the 19th Group. 27 planes were in operation.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

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The submarine U "462" convoy entered the Gironde at 1030. Torpedoe boat MOEWE and JAGUAR entered La Pallice at 1200. In BF 8640 locating signals on the 600 meter band were heard at the same position as those heard by submarine U "462" on her way out immediately prior to an enemy air attack. Search for radio sets on two Spanish fishing steamers in the area produced no results.

Between 0100 and 0200, a mine-laying action 12 miles southwest of Brest was detected by direction finding. Escort and patrol services were carried out off the Atlantic coast according to plan.

Channel Coast:

The operations of the forces of Commanding Admiral Defenses West were carried out without incident. At 2100, a larger number of enemy bombs were dropped on the harbor and town area of Boulogne without causing military damage. 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will move from Boulogne to Le Havre under anti-mine escort of 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla.

According to reports from Group West, frequent heavy explosions a great distance away and in various locations between Boulogne and Cherbourg have been heard since 25 Jun. There is no confirmation for the original assumption that the explosions were due to minesweeping in our own flank barrages. Only one air reconnaissance mission could be made and produced no results. On 2 Jul., the noise of aircraft was picked up in connection with the explosions for the first time. On the evening of 5 Jul., the explosions were so strong that windows in Dieppe were shaken. Group West has asked all Navy and Army offices to give the most exact details possible of location and time in order that the distances may be established. 2nd Coastal Patrol Force has been ordered to request immediate air reconnaissance on every occasion.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

The 11th Training Flotilla shot down an Me-109 plane without recognition signal north of Norderney at 1010. B-Group of 34th Minesweeper Flotilla repulsed an attack by enemy PT-boats west of Den Helder between 0155 and 0210. At 0610, the group was unsuccessfully attacked by 2 enemy fighters and at 1240 by gunfire from 7 enemy planes flying at low level. The boats were slightly damaged.

Five ELM/J mines were cleared off the East Frisian Islands.

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Escort and patrol duties in the area of Commanding Admiral Defenses North were carried out as scheduled. The last 2 boats of 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla moved from Cuxhaven to Rotterdam via the canals and Delfzyl.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nine planes were observed operating in the North Sea and 4 in the area of the Iceland squadrons. Our reconnaissance in the Arctic produced no tactical information. A group of 13 fishing smacks was sighted in the Denmark Strait in the area of Grimsey Island and another group of 6 fishing smacks east of Langanes. There were several coastal vessels on various courses west of Faroes.

2. Own Situation:

On 4 Jul., 20 rounds were fired on the Cape Romanov and Petsamo batteries by two new guns in hidden positions on the Ribachi Peninsula. Minor enemy air activity was observed in the Narvik and Vardoe areas and near Trondheim and Bergen. Twenty ships and 1 submarine were escorted to the north and 20 ships to the south. At 2136 on 5 Jul., an FW 58 plane was shot down by one of our convoys because the recognition signal was not immediately answered. The crew was rescued.

Admiral, Northern Waters reports that the battle group left port as scheduled on the evening of 4 Jul. for training exercises.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Enemy ship movements off Kronstadt Bay and in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland were as usual.

2. Own Situation:

At 2000 on 5 Jul., 2 Danish naval cadets with 2 petty officers and 4 ratings seized a motorboat in the Danish navy yard and deserted to Sweden. It was impossible to prevent their escape due to the superior speed of the boat. (See teletype 1200).

Otherwise, there is nothing special to report from the Baltic Sea Area.

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V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Exchange-report, the British Admiralty has officially confirmed that the "gap" in the Atlantic has been closed by the use of newly-constructed auxiliary aircraft carriers. For ten days, no submarines had been sighted in any part of the Northern Atlantic. The auxiliary aircraft carriers are said to be stationed at fixed positions in the gap and will be replaced at regular intervals.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic, strong enemy air activity was reported from the area of Group "Geier I" (CF 66). Three submarines returning together were bombed in BF 7832 on 5 Jul. One of the three boats, U "535", is probably missing.

U "66" was lightly rammed by the ship she was attacking during a daylight attack off the American east coast in DC 8120. U "777" sank the new Canadian ship JASPERPARK, probably 7,000 BRT, en route from India to Durban in JA 2577 off the east coast of Africa. The ship was sailing with her torpedo nets up.

A success was also reported from the Mediterranean.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has submitted operational order "New York" for U "117" as an alternative to the mine operation in the Straits of Gibraltar.

Naval Staff has no comment.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 139 planes in operation in the West area and 3 in the Mediterranean. During daylight, incursions by strong enemy fighter formations were reported as well as a strafing attack on a freight train in Holland. For the attacks on 34th Minesweeper Flotilla and on Boulogne see "Situation West Area." One enemy plane was shot down by naval anti aircraft fire near Brest. During the night of 6 Jul., 125-130 incursions were made into German-controlled territory, 10 of which were nuisance flights in the Ruhr area. Most of the other planes probably laid mines in the coastal waters of the Bay of Biscay up to the Gironde mouth. Our reconnaissance, carried out by 12 planes for Commander, PT Boat produced no results.

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Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 5 Jul., our heaviest bomber forces attacked ship targets and harbor installations at Bizerta. According to reports so far received, the targets were widely spaced. No direct hits were reported. Thirteen planes failed to return.

No damage was caused by enemy air attacks on three airfields in Sicily in the night of 5 Jul. by about 650 enemy planes of all types. The attacks were continued during the day. For damage sustained, see Daily Situation. Seven of the attacking planes were shot down by our anti aircraft fire. During the night of 6 Jul., about 100 high explosive bombs were dropped on Palermo. Here, too, 1 enemy plane was brought down by AA fire. Our fighters have not yet reported their score for the day.

Eastern Front:

On 6 Jul., 205 enemy planes were shot down on the army front and 15 of our own planes were lost.

Photographic reconnaissance of the Black Sea area was flown in the area of the 4th Air Force. For the reconnaissance results of 5th Air Force, see Situation in Northern Waters.

Special Items:

The use by the British Air Force of small rescue motor-boats which can be dropped by parachute from sea-rescue planes was mentioned for the first time in the Times of 30 Jun. For further details, see News Evaluation by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 20132/43 gch. in War Diary, Part D, "Material on the Enemy Situation." One of these boats is said to have been dropped over the North Sea from a height of 304 meters and to have given a successful performance.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

A convoy of 44 vessels including 35 freighters and 6 LST carrying troops passed Tangiers at 2200 on 5 Jul., and was reported from Tres Forcas on an easterly course at 1510 on 6 Jul. in the forenoon of the same day, a convoy of 37 ships coming from the Mediterranean passed the Straits of Gibraltar Strait to the west. In addition 11 steamers put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean and 5 steamers and 2 tankers with US auxiliary cruiser and 1 US destroyer left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. Neither battleships, aircraft carriers nor cruisers were observed in Gibraltar at noon.

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Our air reconnaissance reported at 0445, 20-25 ships with 1 cruiser; on course 260°, 30 miles north-northeast of La Galite; at 0900, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers on an easterly course, 45 miles northwest of Bougie, at 1910, 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier and several small units on a westerly course, at high speed, 30 miles north-northwest of Bougie.

On the afternoon of 5 Jul., according to photographic reconnaissance there were 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 6 PT boats, 12 auxiliary warships, 23 merchant ships, 4 tankers and 1 LCT at Bone, 2 DIDO class cruisers, 11 destroyers, 15 PT boats, 31 auxiliary warships, 18 auxiliary minesweepers, 35 freighters, 2 tankers, 6 LSI, 40 LST, 119 LCT, 28 LCJ and 16 LCM in the harbor and roads of Bizerta and Ferryville. This indicates a considerable increase in light naval forces and landing vessels as compared with 29 Jun.

Single small warships were sighted in the eastern exits of the Sicilian Channel.

At 1005, a large westbound convoy of about 20 ships was located and attacked in CO 5121 in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Submarines were observed 45 miles west of Oristano, 34 miles southwest of Leghorn and 20 miles west of the southern tip of Corfu.

A report by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division on the extension of the port of Algiers as per l/Skl 19974/43 gch. is filed in War Diary, Part D "Material on the Enemy Situation."

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The POMMERN and the BRANDENBURG are engaged in transporting troops from Leghorn to Bastia. At 0101 a convoy from Bastia to Leghorn was unsuccessfully attacked by three torpedoes from an enemy submarine, 34 miles southwest of Leghorn. Motor Minesweeper R "6" attacked the submarine.

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area.

At 1005, submarine U "453" made a 4-fan torpedo attack on, and probably sank an 8,000 BRT steamer in a westbound convoy in CO 5721. Seventy-five depth charges were dropped on the submarine which suffered some damage.

Commanding General South has reported to Armed Forces, High Command his plans for the transfer of ships to the Aegean with information copy to Naval Staff. It is planned for the steamer

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RUSS to sail from Catania and the steamer OLBLI from Naples on 6 Jul. The steamer NIKOLAUS is scheduled to leave Bastia on 7 Jul. The withdrawal of the escort forces required for the transfer to the Aegean will greatly reduce the protection of our island transports. (See teletype 2045).

Commanding General, South has also commented on the report of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping (see War Diary 5 Jul.) and corrected several points in the report. For copy of teletype 1/Skl 19174/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part E, Vol. XI.

German Naval Command, Italy urgently requires 400 cutting floats and 1600 explosive buoys for the new barrage project and has requested that they be prepared and dispatched. Naval Staff has ordered that the cutting floats and about 1000 explosive buoys be allotted to the Italian Navy. More explosive buoys can not be provided as production was stopped in favor of cutting floats at the beginning of 1942.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The Island supply service was carried out according to plan. Except for the unsuccessful submarine attack on the Bastia - Leghorn convoy, no incidents have been reported.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

The reported entrance of an enemy submarine into the harbor at Livadia is apparently not confirmed. The report was originated by an Italian Army patrol which presumably made a mistaken observation.

Two of our submarine chasers left Piraeus and 1 destroyer and 1 torpedoboat left Rhodes to escort the tanker WILHELMSBURG off the Dardanelles. Convoy and transport traffic in the Aegean was carried out as scheduled.

According to a report from German Air Force Command, Southeast, six flights by enemy planes across the Peloponnese in the direction of Ioannina for the purpose of supplying the rebels were observed during the night of 5 Jul.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance a merchantman with 3 escort vessels, on a southeasterly course, was 12 miles south-east of Adler at 0615. A photograph showed 8 submarines, 9



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minesweepers and 2 steamers at Ochmchiry in the morning. In the forenoon, in the Azov Sea 4 motor minesweepers and 70 other boats were sighted at Pimorsko, 40 boats at Satki and 55 boats along the coast between Primorsko and Yeisk.

Own Situation:

In the night of 5 Jul., 1st PT Boat Flotilla torpedoed and sank 3 lighters of 800 BRT, 500 BRT and 400 BRT respectively from an escorted lighter formation 30 miles northeast of Tuapse. No damage was caused by the escort vessels counter action. On the way back, a brief engagement took place with a passing enemy motor gun boat in the course of which several hits were observed on the enemy vessel. PT boat S "47" had her engine put temporarily out of action by a hit.

An enemy submarine reported at 0400 by out planes 34 miles west of Eupatoria was attacked with four depth charges. A hit on the bow was observed.

At 1200, submarine U "19" began her return trip to Theodosia.

A supplementary report states that 25 shells were fired from the sea on Mariupol during the night of 3 Jul. No damage was caused.

The Danube estuary is still closed to traffic because of suspected mines.

Patrol boats off Mariupol, in Temriuk Bay, in the northern exit of the Kerch Straits and east of Theodosia sighted no enemy forces during the night of 5 Jul.

Group South has asked for an immediate allotment of 80 TMB-mines for submarine operations.

As, since 15 Feb. Group South still has 15 TMB-mines as operational reserve for submarine use, Naval Staff has ordered that enough mines be allotted to make up the difference. The Group's attention has been called to the fact that the precious TM-mines which are specially made to fit the torpedo firing gear, should be used by submarines only, and other uses such as protection against landings as planned by Group South in spite of Naval Staff's repeated protests should be restricted to exceptional cases such as withdrawals. LM-mines are available for PT boat operations and RM-, LM-mines for other types of mine carriers and for defensive barrages.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

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According to a report from Japanese Imperial Headquarters, Japanese Army and Navy forces attacked the enemy bridgehead at Rendova on 2 Jul. and destroyed 9 enemy planes, 1 transport and a number of small ships. Furthermore, 1 enemy torpedo boat was sunk and others heavily damaged. During an air attack on Rendova on 4 Jul., 5 transports and 10 landing boats were sunk and 23 enemy planes shot down with the loss of 9 Japanese planes.

The U. S. Navy Department has announced that an encounter took place between U. S. and Japanese naval forces in the Gulf of Kula on the evening of 5 Jul.

According to a Swedish press report from London, the Japanese Admiral Kaya has, in the South Sea, 10 - 12 battleships including 2 of the latest type of 43,000 BRT each, 5 - 6 aircraft carriers and 70 submarines as well as a considerable number of cruisers and destroyers.

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Items of Political Importance:

According to Exchange Telegraph and Radio Morocco, Martinique has gone over completely to the French Liberation Committee following the resignation of Admiral Robert.

A statement by the Brazilian Ambassador in London on his country's contribution to the war has been published by Reuter. It says, amongst other things, that 9 destroyers and 12 corvettes have been built in the dock-yards at Rio de Janeiro.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

No special reports or decisions.

Chief, Naval Staff left to report at Fuehrer Headquarters.

Special Items:

I, Naval Staff has made a thorough and detailed investigation of the already mentioned incident arising from the report, made upon arrival, by the commander of submarine U "564", in regard to the alleged delay in the operational orders of destroyers Z "24" and "32", sent to his assistance. Naval Group West's exhaustive report of 1 Jul., together with earlier reports from all offices concerned, has cleared up the matter sufficiently for a final decision to be reached. The decision has been laid down in order

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1/Skl Ia 18808/43 Gkdos of 6 Jul. and forwarded to Group West with information copy to 8th Destroyer Flotilla. By the same order Group North/Fleet; Commander, Destroyers; Commander Submarines West; 1st Submarine Flotilla, and, Naval Staff, Submarine Division, for information, have been advised of the occurrence and its settlement. The order has been filed, with the above-mentioned report from Group West as per 1/Skl 19627/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol V. In his final report to Chief, Naval Staff, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff calls attention to the fact that the thorough investigation of this case will serve as an example to all offices concerned to act similarly and, above all, with the required energy, in the future.

II. In Special Information on Wartime Economics No. 282 of 29 Jun. 1943, the Bureau of Naval Armaments discusses the great military importance of increasing the nickel shipments from Petsamo. Unless the supplies from Petsamo are increased in the third quarter of 1943, stocks will be exhausted by the end of this year. At present, the transport problem is troublesome as maintenance of the trucks for the shuttle traffic to Kirkenes is difficult. The report has been filed under 1/Skl 18703/43 Gkdos in the files of Naval War Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Maritime Branch.

III. Naval Construction Division has commented on the question raised by Naval Staff, Operations Division of de-centralizing and transplanting dockyards (see War Diary 26 Jun.) and has also reported on the dock-yard expenses necessary to carry out the new warship building program. Note as per 1/Skl 18666/43 Gkdos is entered in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IV. The present submarine warfare situation and the possibility of using TM-mines with new firing devices (MA 2, DM 1, AA 1) will increase the demand for TMB-mines and TMC-mines. In addition to the production of 100 TMC-mines per month as already ordered, it is necessary to resume production of 100 TMB-mines per month. Naval Staff has advised Underwater Obstacles Branch accordingly and also requesting that these mines, 3 of which could be loaded in each torpedo tube, should be equipped with the combined firing devices. If necessary, a small part of the charge could be dispensed with or reduced life tolerated. This demand for a mine with new firing devices, of a size such as to permit 3 of them to be housed in each torpedo tube, is urgent.

V. Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division has forwarded information from the Foreign Office in regard to the establishment of military formations in Croatia. For Copy as per 1/Skl 20087/43 geh. see War Diary Part B, Vol. V.

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Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division has approved the request of Naval Group South for 6 coastal motor boats to be manned by Croats. The Group is to arrange details with Commander PT Boats who is in charge of the training of all crews for coastal motor boats (torpedo carriers). For copy of the order as per l/Skl 19418/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VI. In regard to the use of sea mines with new firing devices as discussed at the Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 307), it is further understood from a letter from the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff of 25 Jun. that the number of 1500 mines per month can only be laid provided that the situation does not develop in such a way as to necessitate the transfer to another theater of the forces now being reorganized for 3rd Air Force. Commander in Chief, Air Force has suggested the beginning of Sept. 1943 as the date when use of the mines with new firing devices could be started.

This highly qualified promise in regard to a long-planned operation whose success depends on the sudden large-scale use of these mines can only be deplored by Naval Staff. After an exhaustive exposition of the material state of readiness and of operational possibilities and plans, Naval Staff, in agreement with Air Force, Operations Staff suggested to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff that full-scale use of the new firing devices be planned for the end of Aug./beginning of Sept. (new moon period), so as not to have to cope at once with the autumn storms which are equally bad for PT boats and planes, although the forces will probably not be available in strength until Sept. It is planned to use the device only in the convoy routes around England in order to avoid waste and to concentrate all mining forces directly against the British Isles and in the campaign against Anglo-American shipping.

Naval Staff has therefore asked that the new firing devices be released on 25 Aug. 1943 and that orders be issued for mass employment in the convoy routes around the British Isles. For this purpose, timely replacement and reinforcement of the forces of 3rd Air Force was requested, emphasizing that these forces should also be capable of mining the ports on the west coast of England and in Northern Ireland (Bristol Channel, Liverpool, Clyde and Belfast). Flight over the island should be avoided if possible, and technical as well as tactical methods should be sought such as to eliminate or, at least, reduce the danger of firing devices on a shot-down plane falling into the hands of the enemy. The forces at present, available, are, in general, capable of reaching only the eastern ports and therefore will cover only the

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local-distribution traffic of the British homeland. It is necessary, however, to strike above all at the traffic from the Atlantic both off and in the western harbors, thus making an effective contribution to the war against shipping.

Corresponding Order 1/Skl I E 1832/43 Gkdos. Chefs. is in the files of Naval Staff, Operations Division Mine Warfare Section.

VII. A summary of data on the enemy obtained by Radio Deciphering and Radio Intelligence from 28 Jun. - 4 Jul. is given by radio report No. 27/43.

Situation on 7 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

No reports have been received from our own vessels.

Information on the enemy situation was forwarded to all vessels in foreign waters by radiogram 1907.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Normal reconnaissance activity by 32 planes was observed in the area of 19th Group. The operations covered the outer Bay of Biscay up to 13°W. and were temporarily intensified between 2100 and 0400. At 0700, a radio-guard ship with an unidentified convoy was detected in the area of 51°30' - 52°00'N, 17 - 21° W. An escort plane of convoy SC "135" was in the area of 53°30' - 55°00' N, 17° - 17°W.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report. It is planned to send 2 torpedo boats to escort 2 submarines leaving Brest on 8 Jul.

Channel Coast:

The 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla moved from Boulogne to Le Havre. Owing to stormy weather, there was no convoy traffic. During a raid by an enemy air formation on Le Havre, there were 11 impacts in the harbor area but no explosions. As the planes were flying very high, Group West considers there is no reason to suspect mine-laying.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Minesweeping operations were cancelled due to bad weather. At Den Helder, 1 enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft artillery.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-five planes were noted on normal reconnaissance flights in the North Sea.

At 2112, a BV 138-plane reported 2 heavy cruisers, 1 destroyer and 1 patrol boat on course 100° and 4 other patrol boats on course 70° at the north-eastern end of Iceland.

2. Own Situation:

On 5 Jul., enemy batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula fired 25 rounds on our traffic in the Fjord approaches. The Ristiniemi battery returned 7 rounds and one shell was seen to hit the enemy observation post.

On 6 Jul., a very rusty inertia-contact mine of Russian origin was cut in the Rolvsoey Fjord. The area was closed to traffic.

Only minor enemy air activity was observed in the area of the west coast. An FW 190 plane crashed in Boemalen Fjord.

Seventeen northbound, 30 southbound vessels and 1 submarine were accompanied by the escort service.

The battle group carried out training exercises as planned and returned to Kaafjord, via LoppHAVET, at 2200 on 6 Jul. A plane from the TIRPITZ made an emergency landing and was scuttled. The crew was rescued.

The enemy group reported at 2112 northeast of Iceland is probably a first indication of the enemy's reaction to the movements of our formation.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 6 Jul., Kronstadt was completely covered by smoke screens. During the day, heavy traffic of tugs

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and patrol boats was observed in Kranstadt Bay. Twenty vessels were anchored east of Lavansari.

2. Own Situation:

No special reports have been received from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic.

On the occasion of Danish "Army Day", clashes occurred at Copenhagen between the Danish populace and Danish SS personnel and later extended also to German Army and Air Force personnel. The Navy was not involved.

Admiral, Denmark has reported further details on the escape of the Danish Navy motorboat from Copenhagen to Sweden. (See War Diary 6 Jul.). For copy of the report, see Teletype 1840.

At 2355, mine exploding vessel "165" sank east of Gjedser Odde after being seriously damaged by a mine. Eighteen men are missing.

Naval Command, Baltic has relaxed the order regarding anti-ground-mine escort in the area of Coastal Defense Commander, West. For details, see teletype 1024.

No special incidents have been reported from Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic.

In the area of Admiral, Baltic Countries both sides carried out very heavy bombardments. On the evening of 7 Jul., enemy bombardment caused material damage to the Peterhof command post and the Strelna and Koenigsberg batteries. On 7 Jul., the newly-arrived heavy battery "Prinz Heinrich" bombarded batteries and dockyards at Leningrad for the first time with 25 rounds and 4 hits were observed. The target put up smoke screens after 8 salvos. The fire was returned by 900 rounds from Kronstadt, Carelia and Leningrad. Bearing Post East of the "Prinz Heinrich" Battery sustained a direct hit.

There was great air activity on both sides in the area of the islands. Our forces bombed Seiskaari, Lavensari and Peninsari and vessels east of Seiskaari. Enemy bombs caused slight damage to the buildings at our Glinki command post.

V. Submarine Warfare:

A notable success is reported by U "185" from the north coast of South America where 4 steamers and 1 tanker totalling

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35,000 BRT were sunk in two attacks, on a protected convoy in FC 7179 and FB 9396 respectively.

U "198" sank, on 6 Jul., the Greek steamer HYDRICS (4,470 BRT) in the Indian Ocean and, on 7 Jul., the British ship LEINA (4,742 BRT) in an artillery duel.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 93 planes in operation in the West area and 4 in the Mediterranean. During air battles in the Bay of Biscay 2 enemy planes and a third probably shot down. During the day, enemy forces of medium strength made strafing attacks on traffic installations in occupied territory, including one on a vessel in the canal north-northeast of Grent.

Weak harassing activities were reported from the Rhineland area in the night of 7 Jul.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force continued reconnaissance flights in the sea areas Algiers - Cagliari - Trapani - Malta - Sfax, although hampered by unfavorable weather. It was impossible to fly photographic reconnaissance for targets results at Bizerta. Aerial photographs show 54 freight-carrying gliders on two airfields south of Sousse. The movement of airborne units into the Tunisian area is thus confirmed.

Enemy air forces made harassing flights over Sicily and Sardinia in the night of 6 Jul., and attacked Palermo without causing military damage.

During daylight, attacks on airfields in Sicily were continued by light, heavy and very heavy bombers, sometimes in mixed formations. During the night of 7 Jul., Messina and San Giovanni were attacked once and Catania twice. For details, see Daily Situation. Altogether 12 enemy planes were brought down and 5 of our planes were destroyed on the airfields.

It is noticeable that, in the systematic attack on the airfields several, in the neighborhood of harbors or which are suitable as landing places, have not been attacked for several days. Landings from the air can therefore be expected at these fields.

Eastern Front:



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Sixty-six enemy planes were shot down on the army front.

No other reports have been received.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

On the evening of 6 Jul., and on the forenoon of 7 Jul., 1 transport and 6 freighters left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

According to an Intelligence report, 2 battleships including the WARSPITE, 1 aircraft carrier and several destroyers left Algiers on 30 Jun.

Air reconnaissance reported a convoy of 2 transports, 6 freighters of up to 20,000 BRT and 5 freighters of up to 10,000 BRT with 6 escort ships on course 120°, 40 miles northwest of Bougie, at 0900 on 7 Jul. At 0300, our Air Force located several vessels north of Cape Bon. According to photographic reconnaissance, only 2 coastal vessels and 1 apparently damaged LCT were at Pantelleria on 6 Jul. This place is therefore not being used as a base at present.

According to Italian reports; at 2105, a formation of 2 LCT, 6 freighters of 8,000 BRT each, 2 tankers of 10,000 BRT each, with 8 escort units, 2 of them with barrage balloons, was 30 miles north of Bone sailing east. Several destroyers and other war vessels (?) were reported off Liccata.

At 1245, one of our planes reported a convoy of 19 steamers with 1 cruiser and 9 escort vessels sailing west in the Eastern Mediterranean, 25 miles west-northwest of Derna.

According to radio intelligence, one convoy was under air alarm in the Marsa Matruk area, one in the Bengasi area and one in the Apollonia area.

The Foreign Office has forwarded an agent's report from the Embassy at Ankara according to which the attack against Crete will start on 15 Jul., from Derna, Tobruk and Marsa Matruk. The agent is allegedly the same person who predicted almost the exact date of the attack on El Alamein and Morocco.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Seven boats of the 3rd PT boat Flotilla were sent

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out against the enemy formation reported off Licata. Results have not yet been reported. Combat Groups Augusta and Trapani have been alerted.

The POMMERN and BRANDENBURG are to transfer from Ajaccio to Toulon.

Torpedo boat T. "10" and motor minesweeper R "211" are on convoy escort duty between Messina and Corinth.

On the afternoon of 6 Jul., the PT boat S "59" was sunk by a bomb during an enemy air attack on Empedocle. The other boats were not damaged.

An unspecified number of moored mines was located 10 miles northwest of Corfu.

The German Armistice Commission (Navy) has reported on the Italian efforts to expedite work on the ex-French warships at Toulon. For details, see teletype 1130.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

At 1000 on 6 Jul., the steamer "Tripoli" (1,166 BRT) was sunk by an enemy submarine while en route from Bastia to Elba. Supply traffic to Sardinia and Sicily was carried out to schedule on 7 Jul. The steamer "P.L.M. 12" is to transfer from Messina to Greece.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

During the night of 4 Jul., systematic sabotage actions, probably under British direction, were carried out in Crete mainly in the Heraklion area. For details and reprisal measures, see teletype 1250.

At 2105 on 6 Jul., there was an enemy submarine off the southern tip of Nicaria island, according to an Italian report.

Thirteen mines have so far been cleared or destroyed by gunfire in the mined area discovered by the Motorship EULGARIA south of Salonika on 4 Jul. One mine was towed in to Salonika for examination. Coastal guardboat HM "53" struck a mine during the locating operations and sank. An alternative lane has been fixed.

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In spite of strong escort by 1 destroyer, 1 torpedo boat, 2 submarine chasers and 2 planes, the tanker WILHELMSBURG (7,020 BRT) was attacked by an enemy submarine at 0807 after leaving the Dardanelles, and sank at 0930.

The loss of the tanker is particularly regrettable in view of the shipping situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Special Items:

Group South has advised Naval Staff for information, that it has requested German Naval Command, Italy to present to the Italian Navy and to support the Group's views on the plan to use Italian PT boats from Rhodes against the Marmarica coast. For teletype 1/Skl 1945/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the area northwest of Tuapse there were 2 convoys, totalling 7 vessels, sailing north.

Own Situation:

Operations by 4 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla in the area 20 miles northwest of Tuapse produced no results during the night of 6 Jul. The landing place was not attacked because of coastal fog and searchlight barrages.

In the night of 7 Jul., a total of 9 boats from 1st PT Boat Flotilla and 3rd Motor minesweeper Flotilla are to operate in three groups off the Caucasian coast. 3 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla will operate east of Theodosia.

Submarine U "19" entered Theodosia.

At 1400, a plane bombed an enemy submarine 15 miles south-south-east of Sevastopol. An underwater explosion was observed.

At 0321, a convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine west of Eupatoria. Attacks on the submarine were also unsuccessful. The same convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by 4 enemy planes at 0703. Three of the attacking planes were destroyed by the Roumanian fighter escort.

Further enemy air attacks were made on Yalta and on the Anapa

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transport. At Yalta, 1 naval ferry barge was heavily damaged, 1 steamer slightly damaged and 1 fishing smack sunk. Anti-aircraft defense was unsuccessful. In the 134th Anapa Transport, 2 naval ferry barges were slightly damaged by bomb fragments and 1 naval ferry barge was hit by three 8 kg. bombs. Our fighter escort was unable to prevent the attack.

Otherwise, convoy and supply traffic was carried out according to plan.

Special Items:

Group South has advised Naval Staff for information of the Directive to Admiral Black Sea and Naval Liaison Staff, Roumania concerning anti-mine defense for traffic in the outer Danube estuary. For copy see teletype 1445.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

The U. S. Navy Department has announced that, in the night of 4 Jul., the destroyer STRONG was torpedoed and sunk while bombarding Japanese positions in New Guinea. In the early hours of 6 Jul., the 6th U. S. Squadron engaged Japanese surface forces in the Gulf of Kula (New Georgia). Both sides suffered losses.

No Japanese report on this action has yet been received.

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Items of Political Importance:

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

I. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has proposed that the militarized personnel for manning be classified as "essential". Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division disapproved the suggestion.

In a highly restricted circle:

II. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch:

- a. Plans of Commander, Submarine, Italy for submarine

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operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is planned to send 1 boat to Cyrenaica and 2 boats to the sea area of Cyprus. Commander, Submarine Italy considers the dispatch of more submarines inadvisable in view of the small number of boats available and the strained situation in the Western Mediterranean.

b. Mine tasks for submarines in accordance with memoranda from Naval Staff, Submarine Division.

c. Finnish request for the return of 14 ships legally taken over before the outbreak of war with Russia. For details, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division:

Admiral Bertoldi has submitted a request from the Italian Admiralty that the sailing of the last two transport submarines to become ready at Bordeaux on 18 Jul. be cancelled as of the 9 boats originally destined for this work, 5 have already been lost.

The facts are as follows:

AQUILA VII and VIII were lost before conversion.

AQUILA I is missing

AQUILA V left on 18 Jun. and is also missing.

AQUILA III left on 11 May and is scheduled to be met by the Japanese north of the Malacca Strait on 9 Jul.

AQUILA VI left on 18 Jun. and is now in ES 97.

AQUILA IV and IX will probably become operational on 18 Jul.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff is of the opinion that the Italian request merits no consideration. Italy is as urgently interested as Germany in the obtaining of rubber and tin. The matter must be left to the decision of Chief, Naval Staff.

Special Items:

I. A survey of losses and damage caused to our shipping by enemy action in Jun. 1943 (for copy of 1/Skl IE 19281/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part D "Own Shipping Losses") indicates

1. that the heavy air attacks on our convoys in the Holland area have resulted in the loss of only one steamer, thanks to effective convoy protection. The strength of the attack is evinced by the numerous escort vessels damaged.

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2. The danger from ground-mines in the Baltic and North Seas has decreased due to the reduction in the number of enemy incursions.

3. The heaviest losses of the month were caused by submarines on the coasts of Sicily and Calabria. This was probably due to our shortage of locating equipment, inadequate anti-submarine defense by our submarine chasers and planes and the good radar equipment of the enemy boats which act in close co-operation with their Air Forces.

II. Group North Fleet has submitted a copy of the statement sent to the 5th Air Force on the problem of air operations against convoys, with the request that Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff be persuaded to lift the ban on reconnaissance flights by bombers as soon as possible.

The group's comments are most pertinent and well calculated to convince Air Force, Operations Staff along the lines suggested. Naval Staff's approval of the letter to 5th Air Force was given by telephone on 1 Jul. to Chief of Staff, Group North by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division.

III. Naval Staff has advised Group West in regard to the special operation against enemy shipping traffic in the Gibraltar area. Copy of order 1/Skl I op 1933/43 Gkdos. Chofs. is entered in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IV. During a conference between the Commanding Admiral and Commander in Chief, Navy, Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, North Sea suggested the construction of PT boat-destroyers. Naval Staff, Operations Division has already dealt with this question and gave definite reasons for its rejection on 24 Nov. 1942. 1/Skl III a 29791/42 Gkdos. in the files of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Surface Vessel Constructional Planning Branch.)

Naval Command, North Sea was nevertheless instructed to submit the relevant proposals.

Situation on 8 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the Spanish intelligence service, 6 freighters and 2 destroyers, sailing north, were sighted between

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Gran Canaria and Fuerteventura at noon on 7 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has informed Ship "28" by teletype 2009, that there are 2 Japanese submarines north of 20° S., west of 90° E. and, by teletype 2027, that a U.S. steamer issued an SSSS call on a submarine attack in 27°22' S 10°22' E which was repeated from Colombo at 1516.

No reports have been received from our units.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-seven planes were noted in operation in the outer Bay of Biscay up to Cape Ortegal and about 14°W. One British vessel in each case was located at

1348 in BE 2980  
1349 in AL 1528  
1638 in BF 7180  
2250 in AL 6327 and  
at 2300 in AL 6250.

Air reconnaissance in the afternoon, off Falmouth Bay, reported 10 merchantmen sailing northeast which were later again noted off Plymouth.

According to intelligence reports from Lisbon, a convoy, of which several ships are expected to arrive at Lisbon between 16 and 18 Jul., is said to have left Liverpool on 5 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four ELM/J-mines were cleared off Lorient and Brest. The GREIF and the FALKE left at 0815 to escort submarines. Destroyers Z "24" and "37" have been standing by at Pauillac since 2300 to render assistance to submarine U "267" which is unable to submerge. They can reach the vicinity of BF 85 by 1200 on 9 Jul., provided the sea gets no rougher.

Channel Coast:

4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla continued its special

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task northeast of Cherbourg. Torpedo boats T "24" and "25" will move from Cherbourg to St. Malo during the night of 8 Jul.

Torpedo operations by 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas are planned in Lyme Bay for the same night.

At 2242, 6 - 7 enemy planes strafed and dropped 11 bombs on patrol boats "1501" and "1516" off Dunkirk mole. One of the attacking aircraft was shot down. Both boats suffered slight damage, and casualties. For short-report, see teletype 0740/09.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

Group West will approve barrage C 4 as planned by Commanding Admiral, Defenses North if it is fitted with time setting set for the end of Oct. at the latest. The Group also suggested that the barrage be laid closer to the route in order to give more freedom of movement to Commander, PT Boats and to make it more effective.

As it is probably impossible at this time to lay a barrage with time setting, due to the lack of material, Naval Staff has asked Commanding Admiral Defenses North to submit suggestions.

2. Norway, North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The formation of 2 heavy cruisers and 1 destroyer of the JAVELIN class which was reported at 2112 on 7 Jul., was again sighted on 8 Jul., at 0742, sailing east in AE 3755 and, at 1820, on a southwesterly mean-course in AE 3677, at a speed of about 15 knots. The formation was reported for the last time at 2120 in AE 3841 on a course 220° apparently sailing on and off (Tr.N. literal translation of the German sentence which is not clear).

Further sightings: at 2333 on 7 Jul. 1 probable battleship and 1 destroyer in AN 1341 on course 310°; at 0255 on 8 Jul., 2 destroyers on a westerly course, at low speed, in AN 1237; at 0550, 1 destroyer and 1 merchant ship with a balloon barrage on course 340° in AE 9915; at 0930, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 auxiliary cruisers and 2 destroyers on course 60° in AF 7831. Neither this formation nor the battleship were observed again during the day. But



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at 1550, a formation of 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers and 9 destroyers was sighted on an easterly course in AF 7957, which may have been identical with the group reported at 0930. Our shadowing plane was shot down about 1700 and its replacement was unable to re-locate the formation owing to bad weather.

According to Radio Intelligence, at 1128, one reconnaissance plane in AB 8485 and another in AB 8293 reported: "No enemy sighted." The radio-guard ship and the convoy "Encore" reported to Scapa at 1607: "Shadower near subdivision "Encore I"; position at 1559 AF 79 course 10° speed 18 knots."

Group North Fleet considers that a clear interpretation of the enemy position is not yet possible and that operations against the coast or perhaps a mine blockade and air attacks are not unlikely. The enemy's disregard for concealment may also indicate a planned diversion for the purpose of tying down our forces in the area. For copy of corresponding teletype 1/Skl 19377/43, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Naval Staff has forwarded the situation assessment of Group North Fleet to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff and High Command, Army General Staff of the Army, with the comment that Naval Staff concurs but that a connection with the exercises of the battle group which was at sea from 4 - 6 Jul., is not to be excluded. Copy of the relevant teletype 1/Skl 19328/43 Gkdos. is noted in War Diary Part C, Vol. II a.

Own Situation:

Due to the enemy situation as above, coastal alarm has been ordered in the area of Admirals, North and West Coast and in Oslo Fjord. Convoys in the West and North coast areas have been stopped.

The battle group has been ordered to stand by at 3 hours readiness.

Three submarines have been stationed off the Westfjord as "Group Grau", 3 boats as "Group La Baume" off Trondheim and a seventh boat has been stationed off Bergen.

On 7 Jul., small forces of enemy planes were reported over the areas of Vardoe, Aalesund, Bodo, Krakenes, Stavanger and Egersund.

Escort services comprised 41 northbound ships, 42 southbound ships and 1 submarine. Nine ships were held up awaiting escort.

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Meteorological gear was installed on the north coast of Bear Island by submarine U "629".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

There was the usual considerable shipping activity in Kronstadt Bay and around the islands. According to a Finnish report, a submarine which had probably been damaged during our air attack on Lavensari on 7 Jul., was in the convoy from Lavensari to Kronstadt. Another Finnish report states that a barge sank south of Tolbuchin at noon on 5 Jul., probably during magnetic-minesweeping operations.

2. Own Situation:

No special incidents have been reported from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defences Baltic.

One ELM/J-mine was cleared north of Svinemuende.

Escort and transport service throughout the Baltic Sea area was carried out according to plan and without incident.

1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla continued sweeping the submarine training area off Memel.

Both bed plates of the "Prinz Heinrich" Battery have sunk into the marshy subsoil. Provisional raising will take 8 days.

Special Items:

On 17 Jun., Naval Command, Baltic Sea submitted a statement of its views on the question of coastal defense in its area in accordance with Fuehrer Order No. 40. Armed Forces High Command, Army commented on this statement on 29 Jun. Naval Staff Operations Division handed the statement, for final processing, to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division whose office is competent in the matter, at the same time setting forth its own views on the suggestions of Naval Command, Baltic Sea in respect to the statement of General Naval Administration Bureau, Recruitment Division.

For copy of the three letters with the Order 1/Skl I op 17635/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

V. Submarine Warfare:

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1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Anti-submarine activity by enemy fighters has considerably increased in the operational area of Group "Geier" and in the Bay of Biscay. Radio Intelligence intercepted 6 attack reports. Air attack reports have been received from 3 of our boats. Two boats were slightly damaged. The third prevented accurate bombing by opening fire; a hit was observed and, while the boat was submerging, a parachute was seen near the attacking plane.

U "267" is unable to submerge, following a chase, and is sailing from CG 2212 close in to the coast. For assistance operation by destroyers see Situation West Area. The boat has been ordered to put in to Ferrol if necessary.

The boats of Group "Geier" which are equipped with only one 38mm machine gun have been given permission to withdraw if enemy air patrols in that area become too strong.

A submarine successfully warded off a low-flying attack with bombs and gunfire in DD 9475.

No reports have come in today on the sinking of enemy ships.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 83 planes in operation in the West area and 7 in the Mediterranean.

In the Bay of Biscay, a Liberator was forced by 8 JU 88 planes to make an emergency landing on the water.

Enemy air activity in the West Area was only slight during the day and was limited to gunfire attacks.

In the night of 8 Jul., another heavy large-scale raid was made on Cologne. According to reports so far received, only 6 of the 200 - 300 attacking planes were shot down by night fighters.

Mines are again suspected in the Gironde mouth and the Brest Area.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

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Our Air Force continued reconnaissance flights in spite of bad weather and strong enemy defense.

The Italian Air Force sent out torpedo planes against an east-bound convoy on the North African coast and probably sank 2 steamers totalling 13,000 BRT.

During daylight, the enemy continued to attack airfields in Sicily losing 5 planes by anti-aircraft fire and 12 by our fighter defense. Catania was attacked twice during daylight and a third time in the night of 8 Jul. For details, see Daily Situation.

The systematic operations against Sicilian airfields definitely indicate that the island will be the first target of a probably imminent attack.

3. Eastern Front:

Strong air forces were engaged in support of the Army operation "Citadelle". On 7 Jul., 115 enemy tanks were destroyed by the German Air Force and 194 enemy planes were shot down at a loss of 13 of our own.

No other important reports have been received.

Results of reconnaissance by 5th Air Force in Northern Waters are to be found under Enemy Situation, Northern Waters.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an Intelligence report from a so far untried source in Tangiers, a convoy of 56 ships, carrying mainly aircraft, left Baltimore for Casablanca and the Mediterranean on 14 Jun. The escort consists of 50 warships including an aircraft carrier.

On the evening of 7 Jul., 4 destroyers entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

At 0230 on 8 Jul., Tangiers reported 18 ships, including 11 big troop transports sailing towards the Straits. According to reports from Ceuta, the formation apparently entered directly into the Mediterranean.

The departure of 3 hospital ships from Gibraltar to the Mediterranean and the arrival of another hospital ship from the Atlantic

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can be regarded as a further indication of an early start of enemy operations.

Our air reconnaissance in the Western Mediterranean reported, at 1415, a passenger ship of 12,000 BRT sailing east, 28 miles northeast of Bougie; at 1425, 20 - 30 ships on a southeasterly course north of Cape Bon; and at 1950, 10 ships sailing east near Cape Serret.

In the morning, 1 submarine was reported south of Cagliari and 1 near Cape Ferro. Three other submarine positions were identified in the afternoon, west and southwest of Alghero and west of Milazzo.

No sighting reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

According to Radio Intelligence, a section of a convoy or a formation was under air alarm in the Tunis area at 1620. In the afternoon, Commanding Admiral, Mediterranean Fleet was probably at sea.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

All vessels of 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla entered Empedocle early in the morning. No enemy contact was made during a thrust up to 6 miles southeast of Licata but strong enemy air activity continued.

At 1945 low flying fighter-bombers made a heavy attack with bombs and gunfire on the flotilla barracks at Empedocle. No losses were sustained but the transfer of the flotilla is under consideration.

The BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN entered Toulon.

No special reports were received on the activities of our submarines.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The steamer VALVIORITA (3400 BRT), enroute from Taranto via Messina to Salerno, was sunk by an enemy submarine near Cape Milazzo.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

According to a report from Submarine Chaser 2105 escorting the BULGARIA and the steamer LOULOUES from Salonika to Piraeus, the LOULOUES was damaged by a mine 70 miles south-

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southeast of Salonika at 0430 and is being towed to Oreos Bay.

The Trikeri channel has been closed. 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will move from Salonika to Trikeri to confirm and clear the newly identified barrage.

At 0720, "Q"-ship GA "41" had an artillery battle with an enemy submarine 20 miles north of the Doro passage. Both vessels were damaged. It is uncertain whether the enemy ship submerged or was sunk.

At 1740, another enemy submarine bombarded the coast in Orshahi Bay near the Statoni mine.

Otherwise, convoy and transport service in the Aegean was carried out according to plan and undisturbed.

Group South has asked for the immediate assignment of a tanker of 8-10,000 BRT which is most urgently needed to replace the tanker WILHELMSBURG in the Aegean supply service. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has supplied a list of the tanker tonnage available for the Aegean (see teletype 1025 and 1310).

In reply to an inquiry from Naval Staff, Group South reports that the appointment of German liaison officers at Valona, Durazzo and Prevesa in addition to the officer at Corfu, would be useful.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

In the night of 7 Jul., a group of 1 PT boat and 2 Motor minesweepers operating off Myshakov made contact with the enemy. A salvo of two torpedoes was fired unsuccessfully against a convoy sailing northeast. Simultaneously, the motor minesweepers fired on landing stages. Opposition was put up by 10 guard ships off the coast and by fire from the land. On their way back, the PT boat S "40" and motor minesweeper R "33" collided and were slightly damaged.

No special events occurred at the 2nd Group's waiting position 20 miles northwest of Tuapse. But on the way back, PT boat S "102" struck a mine in the southern exit of the Kerch Straits and was lost with 8 men.

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Neither 3rd Group nor 11th PT Boat Flotilla reported any particular incidents.

During the night of 8 Jul., the Mariupol patrol position will be taken up by naval artillery lighters "1"- "3" as scheduled. Naval artillery lighters "8"- "11" and motor minesweeper R "166" left Kerch to bombard the fishing harbor of Achuyev.

Enemy planes attacked Theodosia at 1700 on 7 Jul. One coastal guard ship was sunk, 1 landing craft and 1 submarine chaser were heavily damaged and 1 PT boat was slightly damaged. On 8 Jul., unsuccessful air attacks were made on Ivanbaba and transport vessels near Mariupol and south of the Kerch Strait.

All the other convoy and supply traffic was carried out without incident.

#### VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to Domei, it was announced at Headquarters that, on the morning of 5 Jul., 3 enemy warships of unspecified type were sunk in the area of Kula Gulf. In the night of 5 Jul., a Japanese destroyer flotilla attacked a strong enemy formation sinking 1 cruiser and damaging another.

On the other hand, Allied Headquarters reported that 6 Japanese vessels were probably sunk in Kula Bay and 4 others damaged. A Japanese destroyer was reported beached near Sambera. The light cruiser HELENA was lost. Heavy air battles were also reported.

On the evening of 6 Jul., U. S. surface forces bombarded Kiska.

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#### Items of Political Importance:

According to Reuter, the commandant of the French Battleship RICHELIEU will assume command of the ships lying in the French West Indies as soon as the French Liberation Committee begins to administrate these areas.

#### Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. Chief, Naval Staff has returned from Fuehrer Headquarters after reporting to the Fuehrer. For his notes on the conference, see l.Sk1 2164 Gkdos. Chfs. in war Diary Part C Vol. VII.

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In a highly restricted circle:

II. Upon a report from Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division concerning Italian rubber-transport boats (see War Diary 8 Jul.), Chief, Naval Staff agreed with Naval Staff's opinion that the request for the departure of the last 2 boats to be cancelled cannot be complied with. Our common interest in the operation must be made clear to the Italians and their attention must be called to the fact that no early improvement in the transport submarines situation can be expected.

III. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported that the long delay in repair work in the Aegean area was due mainly to the fact that no foreign exchange was available for buying the material at hand. The Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters was instructed to bring this situation to the knowledge of Commander in Chief Armed Forces, High Command or the Fuehrer if necessary, in order that an increased allotment of financial means may be provided.

Special Items:

I. Mine requirements, amounting to almost 60,000 mines in the 4th year of the war, are nearly twice those of the 3rd year of the war and nearly three times those of the 1st and 2nd years of the war. The main reason is the large demand for the Mediterranean area and our change-over to the strategic and tactical defensive on all the other coasts of Europe as well. Consequently reserve stocks are now completely exhausted. Front line requirements can now only be met in accordance with current production. This, however, is limited by the labor situation, raw-material quotas and industrial capacity, and cannot be quickly increased.

Naval Staff has therefore informed the Group Commands, Naval Commands and German Naval Command, Italy that, in view of this situation, it is no longer justifiable to earmark large quantities of mines for long-range barrage plans or to stock them in foreign countries. Exceptions can be made only for areas with particularly unfavorable and complicated transport connections. Since maintenance of the mines, and especially of non-contact mines is difficult in foreign territories, the various commands will first use the stocks and reserve stocks in their areas, for their next requirements. A list of all mines stored in the area allotted by Naval Staff as of 15 Jul., 1943 will be submitted to Naval Staff by 1 Aug. in order that "frozen" stocks may be released. In addition, estimated mine requirements for the 5th year of the war will also be reported by 1 Aug.



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II. Naval Staff, Operations Division has commented on the suggestions made by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean with a view to avoiding delay in Aegean supplies (see War Diary 5 and 7 Jul.) and forwarded the statement to Naval Staff, Quarter-master Division. For copy of this statement 1/Skl I m 19369/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

Naval Staff, Operations Division agreed to the appointment of liaison officers to act simultaneously as liaison officer to Admiral, Aegean at Corfu, Valona, Durazzo and Prevesa. Extension of the authority of Admiral, Aegean to Corfu and Valona would endanger the chain of command in case of attack which had been established at some points in the Aegean, and would not on the other hand, bring about any material improvement in the shipping turn-around between Italy and Greece as there are even fewer German than Italian forces available for escort.

Situation on 9 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report received via Ostrov, Canada is taking direct and full advantage of the pause in our submarine activities in the Atlantic to expedite shipments. Any shipping space that can be laid hands on is being hurriedly put to sea. The agent thought there was no doubt that a considerable number of the outgoing ships were being sent unaccompanied especially since the whole area appears to be adequately covered by air patrols. Military assistance was being provided in Canadian and U. S. ports to speed up loading operations. For details on the shipments see teletype 1812.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has informed Ship "28" by radiogram 1141, on the situation in the Southwest Pacific and the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN, by radiogram 1907, on the successes of the submarines to which she has furnished supplies.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Sixteen planes were detected in the area of 19th Group. At 0900, the convoy Savage reported 4 German planes near

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Cape St. Vincent and at 0945, that they had made an attack. At 2148, a British ship was located in BE 9490. According to our air reconnaissance, there were 2 destroyers at high speed on course 20° in BE 6670 at 0810. At 0845, a convoy of approximately 70 vessels, including merchant men of up to 10,000 BRT, was sailing at medium speed on course 20° in BE 6710.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

After leaving Pojak, destroyers Z "24" and Z "37" anchored near Buoy "20" at 0115 and stood by with minesweepers at  $\frac{1}{2}$ -hour readiness to assist submarine U "267". As this boat, in the course of the day, reported that she was again able to submerge the two destroyers returned at 1945. The GREIF and the FALKE returned to Brest at 0800 from submarine escort duty. The submarine convoy was apparently not detected by enemy air reconnaissance.

In accordance with instructions Group West has submitted a report on operations against enemy anti-submarine forces in the Bay of Biscay. Copy of the teletype 1/SK1 19495/43 Gkdos is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb. The Group plans to use destroyers as soon as regular enemy anti-submarine force positions, definitely within the destroyers' radius of action, have been identified. It is then planned to ask Air Commander, Atlantic to provide continuous reconnaissance particularly in map square 70 BF, and to use our camouflaged fishing boats. Furthermore, when regular submarine convoys have been established the Group plans to send out destroyers as far as 100 miles west of the outer points, as required, if anti-submarine forces are reported while the destroyers are at sea.

Channel Area:

Escort and patrol services were carried out according to schedule. A low-level attack was made by a mixed enemy formation on the 2nd PT boat Blotilla as it was entering Lezardieux. One enemy fighter was shot down. Slight damage and casualties were caused on some of the boats strafing. For short battle report, see teletype 2040.

One plane was shot down during the air attack on the patrol boats VP "1501" and "1516" off Dunkirk (see War Diary 8 Jul.) The operation planned for 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas in Lyme Bay was cancelled due to bad weather. Torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" moved from Cherbourg to St. Malo and left St. Malo for Brest at 2200.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Four ELM/J-mines were cleared near Ameland, Terschelling and Schiermonnikoog. Escort and convoy service was carried out as scheduled. During the night of 9 Jul., minesweeping had to be cancelled and the patrol positions were not taken up because of bad weather. Motor minesweeper R "190" and R "191" moved from Flushing to Calais.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The carrier group reported on 8 Jul., was not located again by our air reconnaissance. The group of 2 heavy cruisers and 1 destroyer was last reported at 0450 in AE 2850 on a westerly course.

At 1050, our mooring positions near Kaafjord were definitely sighted by enemy planes.

Photographic reconnaissance of Scapa, at an unspecified time, revealed the presence of 3 battleships, 1 carrier, 2 (apparently) dummy battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 4 (apparently) light cruisers, 9 destroyers and other vessels. One British ship was located in AE 7690 at 0221. Only moderate activity by 16 planes was observed over the North Sea and only one plane was detected operating in the area of the Iceland squadrons. One torpedo boat and 2 merchant men as well as 2 patrol boats were in the Seydisfjord.

Group North Fleet now believes that the enemy measures were a reaction to the movement of our battle group although the composition and undisguised movements of the enemy formation do not appear to indicate a definite intention to engage our forces. Possibly, however, other formations may have been at sea without having been detected. In any case, it should be noted that the enemy remained close to the German-occupied coast for a long time, apparently without expecting serious counter-action, which is further a evidence of his exact knowledge of the strength and distribution of our forces. Accurate assessment of the enemy position during 8 Jul. was difficult because, due to bad weather and technical disturbances, only a few shadowing-reports on the group were received and, even on the afternoon of 9 Jul., it is still uncertain what formations were - or still are - in the area between the Shetlands and Norway.

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2. Own Situation:

Group North has detached the submarines from the assembly areas to their former duties and is putting the battle group of Commanding Admiral, Task Force at six hours readiness for transfer. One enemy submarine was reported in the southern part of the Oslofjord. Nine boats of the harbor defense flotilla were sent out on submarine chase. The submarine report seems uncertain.

Twenty-two ships and 3 submarines were escorted to the north and 20 ships to the south. Due to lack of escort forces, 11 ships are waiting in the area of Admiral, Arctic Coast.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the forenoon, a destroyer was observed on gunnery practice in the commercial port of Kronstadt. In the afternoon, 11 planes of unspecified type landed at Seiskari. Tug-traffic between Kronstadt and Leningrad and patrol service in the waters around the island were normal.

2. Own Situation:

There is nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic. Due to a suspected submarine in the Oslofjord, the motorship ROLAND convoy was held at Horten. An auxiliary sailing vessel struck a mine and sank off the harbor entrance of Tars.

Investigations made by Naval Command, Baltic show that mine-exploding vessel "165" was exactly on the prescribed route when she struck the mine. The place where the ship was lost has been swept 30 times with K.R.F.G. and G.B.T sweeps, and 10 times by mine-exploding vessels escorting and 2174 steamers have passed the spot since 28 Apr., the date of the last mine raids. It is assumed that it must have been a special mine for use against mine-exploding vessels. For brief report see teletype 1430.

No special reports have been received from the areas of Commander Minesweepers Baltic and Admiral Baltic Countries.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

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According to observations by U "513" coastal traffic off Rio de Janeiro follows the 20 meter line, while over-seas traffic runs between the 40 and 200 meter lines. Many small vessels but only a few ships were observed between Rio and Santos. A convoy of 3 ships with 1 destroyer, 1 corvette and -during daylight- radar-equipped air escort was detected by U "508" off the Gold Coast.

2. Own Situation:

U "513" sank 2 steamers totalling 10,000 BRT on the Brazilian coast.

U "618 and U "508" sank 3 steamers totalling 25,000 BRT half way down the coast of Africa.

Three of our submarines were attacked by enemy planes in the North Atlantic and suffered some damage. In regard to U "267" see Situation West Area.

According to a report from Naval Attaché, Madrid, 3 British destroyers were sighted west of Cape Finisterre on the evening of 8 Jul., and 1 destroyer off the approaches to Ferrol on the evening of 9 Jul. It is possible that this is the anti-submarine group which chased and attacked U "267".

Five submarines in the Atlantic have been ordered to new operational areas in ED, EP and FB. Two more submarines must be presumed lost while returning through the Bay of Biscay.

Following the defection of the Antilles from Vichy, the Directives concerning the exemption from attack of French naval forces and merchant ships in the Antilles have become obsolete. Naval Staff, Submarine Division will therefore immediately permit full use of weapons. For copy of order 1/Skl I cc 19355/43 Gkdos., see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 110 planes in operation in the West area and 5 in the Mediterranean.

In the Channel area and over the Netherlands, 4 enemy planes were shot down during the day.

In the afternoon, 8 Do 217 planes made a harassing raid on London dropping bombs on the southern outskirts of the town.

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For reconnaissance results, see Enemy Situation West Area and Northern Waters.

Three enemy merchant men were attacked by 5 FW 200 planes near St. Vincent. One ship was slightly damaged. One Hudson of the strong air escort was shot down. We lost one plane.

A large number of enemy bomber formations under fighter protection flew over Belgium and Northern France but made only a few attacks.

During the night, the enemy made a large scale attack on the Ruhr district concentrating, this time, on Bochum. Only 5 of the 200-300 attacking planes were shot down. For details of damages, see Daily Situation.

#### Mediterranean Theater:

During the day, the enemy made numerous attacks on the Sicilian airfields at Trapani, Sciacca, San Pietro, Catania, and Gerbini as well as on Porto Empedocle and Taormina. Fifteen enemy planes were shot down by our defenses. At Taormina, the German Air Force telephone central amongst other things was destroyed.

2nd Air Corps command station was attacked by fighter-bombers and 4-engined planes at 1230, 1615, and 1800, and was destroyed.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, 23 Liberators attacked Malenos airfield on Crete, at 1533, without serious effects. Three of the attacking planes were shot down.

Our own planes continued reconnaissance. About 1630, they noted the approach of strong landing formations from the Malta - Pantelleria area and reported 5 convoys north of Malta totalling 150 - 180 vessels including 2 (probable) battleships on a north-northwesterly course. Further numerous reconnaissance reports from 2nd Air Force between 1810 and 2220, confirm the first impression that the enemy is launching a large-scale landing operation against Sicily.

#### Eastern Front:

On 8 Jul., 119 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front as against 8 of our own. For reconnaissance activities of 5th Air Force see Situation in Northern Waters. There was no battle activity.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

In the central Mediterranean, our air reconnaissance observed the approach of very strong landing formations from the Malta area and Tunisian ports apparently making for Sicily. In addition to the already-mentioned formations of 150-180 ships north of Malta, at 1925, a group of 40 ships was reported in CN 3441 on course 340° with 3 cruisers ahead and 2 cruisers astern and a remote escort of 4 probable battleships on the east flank. Furthermore, a formation with 3 cruisers heading a convoy of 45 ships followed by 3 large vessels possibly carriers was reported off the north end of Grosso. All these formations were sailing north-northwest. The exactitude of these reports is still uncertain. In many cases, the observations were made by fighter pilots inexperienced in reconnaissance. Destruction of the telephone connections and of the 2nd Air Force command station have made it difficult to form an immediate picture of the new situation.

At 1950, a convoy of 7 freighters, 8 tankers and 2 destroyers was reported leaving Bone in the direction of Sicily. At 2010, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 25 (apparently) LCT and 2 freighters were reported north of Tabarca. At 2220, Syracuse was bombarded from the sea. At 2350, parachute landings near the San Pedro airfield and the destruction of the radar location set at Cape Passero were reported. At 2400 it was reported that a large convoy was approaching the southern coast of Sicily 15 miles south of Licata and that a smaller formation was close into the coast between Vittoria and Gela.

All the reports sent by 2nd Air Force to Commanding General, Southeast, and via German Naval Command, Italy to Naval Staff, confirm the impression that the enemy has begun an extensive invasion of Sicily. There are so far no indications of simultaneous operations against other objectives. From the ship movements so far observed between Malta, Tunisia, and Sicily, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division estimates that about 50 LST and 150 LCZ or LCJ are taking part. This would be enough to carry a first wave of about 8 U. S. landing divisions or about 5½ British landing divisions. The number of LSJ involved is unknown. About 70 LST and 350 LCT or LCJ are still available for other operations. This means that there are still enough landing facilities available for another operation.

The only information that has reached Naval Staff in regard to defense measures by the Italian Navy is that orders have been given to blow up the harbor facilities at Empedocle and Licata.

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Seven boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla put out from Empedocle at 2245 for a breakthrough towards the east to Augusta. The flotilla was ordered to take action against enemy forces. 7th PT Boat Flotilla is still in Cagliari at immediate readiness. Torpedo boat T. "10" has left Corfu for Catania at 0930.

At the end of the day it is still hard to form a clear picture of the enemy's detailed intentions. However, the outstanding objections are the coasts in the Syracuse - Cape Passero and Gela - Licata areas. There are no special indications of an attack on the western coasts of the island.

Naval Staff has briefly advised Group South, Admiral Aegean and Groups North and West on the situation.

(Tr. N.: the following passage is added in hand writing: Note of Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: Enemy movements at sea and preliminary air attacks indicated that the enemy would land on the south and southeast coasts of Sicily. It is not known whether the Army took steps to move troops from Central Sicily on that account, but it must be presumed that they did so.)

At last the situation is clarified and the enemy's plans in the Mediterranean revealed. Although the weekly report of 7 Jul., from German Naval Command, Italy indicated that the supply situation in Sicily was inadequate and the mine defense of the island little improved, nevertheless the battle which is now beginning holds infinite possibilities. If the landing were successfully opposed or if capture of the island could be prevented for a long period with all the consequent risks for the troops and their supplies, the operations would acquire an importance far in excess of their purely local value. Although the main burden of the fighting will lie with the Army and the Air Force, there will be ample opportunity for the Italian Fleet and the - unfortunately - weak German naval forces to contribute most effectively towards a general success by an all-out effort. The steps just taken by Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy to ensure the supply of the island are an essential condition of the building-up and maintenance of its defensive power. They will now be tested in the most difficult circumstances. The offensive spirit of submarines and PT boats must be aroused to the utmost. Their efforts will be rewarded by success in battle and the example they set to the allied Italian Navy. Naval Staff is resolved to achieve the utmost with the forces available.



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2. Enemy Situation elsewhere in Mediterranean:

At 2300, a convoy of 19 freighters with 2 destroyers and 3 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the west.

According to an intelligence report from Greece dated 7 Jul., the further postponement of the landing attack has greatly shaken the confidence of many Greek officers in the British. Prince Peter, who was sent for the purpose by the King of Greece has stated that the attack will be made at the end of Jul. and will not be postponed again.

This report is of importance only in that it refers to the possibility of landings in the Greek area.

According to other intelligence reports of 7 Jul., from Cairo via Athens, 2 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier arrived at Alexandria on 6 Jul. More information is being obtained.

An Intelligence report from de Gaullist sources in Marseille states that the leader of the resistance movement in the Department Alpes - Maritimes has ordered all chiefs to hold themselves in readiness for the Anglo-American attack which will take place between 10 and 15 Jul. (See teletype 0100).

The Japanese Naval Attaché reported at noon that, according to a reliable Japanese source, 4 U. S. battleships, including one of 45,000 BRT and 3 carriers with several light units have left various bases in the USA for the Mediterranean. The fleet's mission is to perform new operations in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, no times are specified.

In the Eastern Mediterranean one of our planes reported at 0105 that it had located several ships 60 miles north-northwest of Alexandria.

3. Own Situation elsewhere in the Mediterranean:

Naval Attaché, Rome has reported as of 7 Jul on a conference held at Rome on 21 Jun., at the invitation of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, at which the question of procuring transport tonnage for military purposes in the Italian area was discussed. The Reich Commissioner's Deputy for German Sea Transportation summarized the opinions expressed by the participants, as follows:

Forthcoming transport tasks in the Mediterranean will have to be performed by the big ships available in the Mediterranean.

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It is impossible to bring in ships from outside. Furthermore there is a Fuehrer order that 400,000 tons of French shipping is to be turned over to Italy. One hundred and thirty-five thousand tons of this shipping is still in France. Commanding General, South's request that the German supply service to the Italian islands be performed exclusively by German ships, even after increasing the number of German troops to be transported to the islands, can best be complied with under the following conditions:

1. Italian and German supply traffic and therefore, Italian and German shipping to be handled as a single unit.

2. Transport to Sicily of civilian supplies to be reduced by evacuating the population as far as possible.

3. The supply requirements of the recently increased number of German divisions on the island can not be filled by the German shipping on hand.

4. The possibility of improving the supply service by taking over more Italian small shipping must be examined. In 1938 there were 2,300 small ships of 50-500 tons of which, as far as we know, 500 have so far been requisitioned by the Italian Navy.

In Naval Staff's opinion, it is unlikely that Point 1. can be complied with.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping came to the following decision:

The transport demand must be adapted to existing transport facilities. It is to be assumed that after a few weeks of intensive enemy air attacks, we shall no longer be able to handle the German supply service to the islands with the German ships on hand. The total tonnage can be increased by taking administrative and technical steps to expedite the repair of about 300,000 tons of shipping now in the Italian dockyards. Therefore, in view of the present transport situation,

1. no more ships will move to the Eastern Mediterranean. Ships now en route to the Aegean will proceed to their destination.

2. The Reich Commissioner will try to obtain a Fuehrer order suspending the delivery of French ships to Italy.

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3. Ways and means of speeding up the repair of the 300,000 tons of shipping in Italian dock-yards must be investigated.

Point 1. is already superseded. The report on the conference was delayed because the minutes promised by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping did not reach Naval Attache, Rome until 3 Jul.

German Naval Command, Italy weekly report 1-7 Jul., states in part: Unloading in Sicily 10,000 tons, daily average 1,200 tons, maximum for one day 4,220 tons. Mostly fuel. Ferry traffic included 9,712 men, 1,300 motor vehicles, 40 tanks, 50 guns. By setting up 14 landing places on each side, traffic with boats of all lengths ran smoothly. No damage or casualties were caused by air attacks. The train ferry carried 1200 tons per day.

Nearly all convoys were detected by enemy air reconnaissance. The cooperation between attacking planes and submarines is noteworthy. Considerable submarine danger exists in the area between Corsica, Elba and the mainland. The lack of submarine-chasers is strongly felt.

Of the original 16 vessels of 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla, 6 were lost between 6 Mar. and 23 Jun. 1943, four by submarine attack and two by air attack.

Only a small number of Italian corvettes is ready for action.

The supply service to Corsica was good, to Sardinia satisfactory and to Sicily inadequate. Railroads in Sardinia are short of coal. As no trains have arrived, the fuel situation is serious in Sicily and unsatisfactory in Sardinia. The turn-around of Italian ships is much slower than that of German ships due to slow discharge. Italian troop transports Brindisi - Patras so far undisturbed. Harbor performance has been declining since the evening of 6 Jul. due to bad weather. Lack of coastal vessels, particularly in Italy. Shortage elsewhere of tugs, barges, dredgers, cranes. Unloading squads at ports must be increased. "Seeschlange Palau" (Tr.N. a type of floating conveyor belt for unloading) proved extremely useful. A daily unloading performance of 910 tons was reached. Two or three more "Seeschlange" are required. At Orosei, naval landing craft and TKP (Tr.N. tanker-barges?) were unloaded for the first time. Improvements are being made.

The German defense forces are ready. Four fast escort vessels,

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2 torpedo boats, 4 submarine chasers, 5 motor minesweepers of Italian origin are in service mostly in the Greece supply traffic. No big ships have come from the repair shops. Their number has decreased due to the Aegean transfers. Replacement by small vessels is inadequate. Naval artillery lighters without guns proved useful in the Massina Straits ferry traffic. A large number of barges and lighters are still at Marseille and Toulon due to lack of crews or repairs.

On the western coast of Sardinia mine defense has been improved, in Sicily, only slightly. (See teletype 2035).

German Naval Command, Italy asked for the allotment of 410 EMC-mines from Toulon to reinforce the barrages in Cagliari Bay. Naval Staff has advised that no more mines can be delivered before the end of Aug. as stocks at home are exhausted or destined for the Aegean. Therefore the necessity to reinforce the barrages in Cagliari Bay should be carefully reexamined.

It is most regrettable that our materiel position compels such restrictions at this critical moment.

4. Sea Transport Situation:

Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

5. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

With reference to the artillery duel between GA "41" and an enemy submarine a further report states that 15 - 8.8 cm hits and many hits by anti-aircraft guns were scored on the enemy boat whose conning tower and guns were destroyed and set on fire. Destruction of the submarine is questionable. Four ships and 4 planes were sent out on submarine hunt.

On 8 Jul., an auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine north of Skyros. At 0124 and 0315 on 9 Jul., air reconnaissance reported an enemy submarine west of Lemnos. According to an Italian report, an enemy submarine was sighted east of Syra at 0310.

The report that the steamer LOULOUEDES struck a mine may be mistaken, as a torpedo track is alleged to have been observed. Minesweeping at the spot by 4 boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla has so far been unsuccessful.

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The mine project for the Aegean, announced by Group South, has now been received. Priority "1" is assigned to the barrages east of Crete and on the west coast of Greece from Corfu to the southern end of the Peloponnese. Reinforcement of the defense of Patras and three barrages off Gythion, the reinforcement of Nauplia, defense of the Gulf of Mirabella barrages in the northern Sporades, the barrage project south of Lemnos and the new barrage G 10 are given Priority "2".

Priority "3" is provided for the reinforcement of the defenses of the Gulf of Athens, the defenses of Porto Kufo and the outer Gulf of Salonika. Priority "4" is assigned to the barrage projects off the south coast of Macedonia, reinforcement of the East-West Line, and mining of the Dardanelles in case of emergency.

Naval Staff has approved in principle the plans for Priority "1". The reason for use of EMF-mines in barrages G 71 and 72 is not clear. The mines required have been allotted; the EMC, EMF, EMR and UMA mines will be delivered within July; the UMB-mines will be delivered in two monthly instalments starting in mid-August.

Assessment of the overall barrage plan is difficult, due to lack of detail on the intended depth-settings. Group South has been ordered to furnish a supplementary report on this subject. Other details in regard to mine types, priorities, etc. will be settled by verbal discussion. The execution of the plans can be regarded only as a long-term project as the allotment of mines is dependent on new production. After the Priority "1" mines have been delivered, monthly deliveries may be estimated as follows:

Up to 300 EMC-mines  
250 EMF-mines  
150 EMR-mines  
200 UMB-mines  
100 UMA-mines

In reply to an inquiry, Admiral Aegean reports that it is planned for DRACHE and BULGARIA to lay a double-line angle-patterned minefield off the approach to Argostole probably on 10 Jul.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, dated

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12 Jun., from a new agent in Madrid, diplomatic circles believe that a big Anglo-American naval operation is planned towards the Black Sea in the direction of Roumania - Bulgaria. The following naval forces are said to be concentrated for that purpose in the Eastern Mediterranean: 5 battleships, including 2 U. S. battleships which entered the Mediterranean at the beginning of Jun., 8 aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers and 50 destroyers.

The landing of Anglo-American forces would be supported by Russian troops from Baku.

This report certainly requires investigation. Such an operation would necessitate prior clarification of Turkey's attitude.

Own Situation:

During the night of 8 Jul., Atchujev was bombarded by Naval Artillery Lighters "8"- "11". The vessels will be out of operation for several days due to engine and gun damage.

According to a report from the port captain at Novorossisk, 8 enemy vessels were driven off by gun fire at 2200 on 7 Jul. An explosion was observed during the action and, on 8 Jul., a wreck, probably caused by a mine in the barrage south of Sutchuk was found southeast of the landing place.

Submarine U "19" started from Theodosia on her way back to Constantza.

Four AT-mines, type M 26, were cleared in the Kertch Straits at the spot where PT boat S "102" was sunk.

The Anapa transports were carried out under minesweeper escort. The supply and convoy traffic went according to schedule.

Operations by 4 boats of 1st PT boat Flotilla against enemy supply traffic between Idokopas and Tuapse are planned for the night of 9 Jul.

The Black Sea ship-building program submitted by Group South (see War Diary 29 Jun.) has been examined by Naval Staff Operations Division. The request for continued construction of armed fishing vessels has been approved. Construction of these vessels, which was begun by High Command, Navy, Naval Construction Division, must be advanced by all means. As steps taken

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so far have not produced any visible effect, other more effective ways and means must be found particularly of achieving speedy and safe deliveries of material.

In regard to minesweeper construction, Naval Staff, Operations Division considers that, in view of the increasing threat to building yards on the German and European coasts, minesweeper construction in the Southeast area should also be developed by all possible means.

The fitting-out of more war freighters as submarine chasers is inadvisable in view of the lack of transport shipping. It appears necessary to reconsider Group South's previous requests to build more transport tonnage in the form of war freighters. The request for 8 armed fishing vessels of larger size with a speed of 12 knots, stronger armament and increased sea-worthiness has been approved. If engine production permits, all present types should be replaced by the larger type.

The group's other requests in regard to allotment of 18 PT boats and 20 motor minesweepers as well as 18 naval artillery ferry barges cannot at present be met as all possibilities are exhausted. Nor is it possible to alter in Group South's favor the distribution of new ships coming into service between now and autumn, as it is only possible to fulfil the most urgent requirements in all areas.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will be advised of this statement by Naval Staff, Operations Division and requested to instruct Group South accordingly, if necessary by provisional directive, if the matter is found to require prolonged examination.

#### VIII. Situation East Asia:

Naval Attaché, Tokyo has submitted the following information:

On 1 July, the enemy landed first 15 and, later, 9 more heavy guns at Rendova and is bombarding Munda with them. The landing at Viru (southern part of the main island of New Georgia) on 30 Jun. was also successful. An American airfield is under construction there.

During the night of 4 Jul., the Japanese tried to land from destroyers on the southern end of Kulebangara. The landing attempt was given up. During the battle, the American destroyer

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STRONG was sunk. The operation was repeated with 10 destroyers on the night of 5 Jul., and an engagement took place with 3 American cruisers and 10 destroyers in the Gulf of Kula. The HELENA and 1 destroyer were sunk. One Japanese destroyer ran ashore and a second was heavily damaged. The landing was entirely successful.

About 4,000 Americans from Rendova have landed about 20 kilometers east of Munda. A large jungle area lies between them and Munda.

Both sides have lost many men due to fever. Every effort will be made to hold Munda. If unsuccessful, the troops will fall back on Bougainville which as a keystone of the advanced defenses, is fortified as strongly as Rabaul.

Naval Attache, Tokyo has submitted an exhaustive report on the statements made by prisoners from the U.S. submarine GRENADIER. An interesting point is that U.S. submarines are able to release oil, spars and pieces of cloth through torpedo tubes for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. The east coast of Japan from Shanghai to Hokkaido is divided into ten zones of operation each of which is patrolled as continuously as possible by one submarine.

U. S. submarines are usually in operation for 80 days between leaving and returning to port. On the GRENADIER, 7 officers and two-thirds of the crew had had submarine training courses while one officer and one-third of the crew had not.

Submarine losses are higher than have been admitted and are thought to amount to certainly over 30 boats. Routine overhaul of the boats is done on the west coast every 15 months. Firing is done, if possible, by periscope observation, but, if necessary, can be done by hydrophone location. As torpedoes are fired with a depth setting 2 - 3 feet below the presumed draft of the target, magnetic ignition is likely.

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Items of Political Importance:

According to an Exchange-Telegraph report, a joint statement by the British and U.S. Governments has been published in London and Washington on the future methods to be adopted in reporting on submarine warfare.



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Roosevelt and Churchill are said to be concerned at the great number of statements made by public officials on the anti-submarine campaign. By putting together parts of these statements, the enemy would be able to assemble more information than was desirable. It has therefore been agreed that a statement approved by Roosevelt and Churchill will be issued on the 10th of each month. The first monthly statement, for the month of June, states, amongst other things, that:

1. In June, losses of Allied and neutral shipping due to submarines were the lowest since the USA entered the war.

2. The number of axis submarines sunk was considerable and satisfactory.

3. As a result of German submarine losses in May, the main trans-atlantic convoys have been practically unmolested.

4. There has been a big net increase in Allied merchant ship tonnage each month during this year. Anti-submarine planes and ships have been continuously coming into service.

According to Reuter, British aircraft production has been concentrating on heavy bombers, fighters and the so-called "tank crackers". Heavy bomber production was trebled during last year. The Minister for Aircraft Production, Cripps, has announced an intensification of British aerial warfare which may begin at any moment.

According to the Exchange Telegraph, Mr. Hull has announced that the State Department will shortly issue a statement on the new regime in Martinique. The Martinique problem will be dealt with in relation to recognition of the French Liberation Committee. Giraud's visit to Washington is said to be of a purely military nature.

Reuter reports that on 9 Jul. military circles in Washington have stated that diversionary operations, within the framework of the Allied strategic plan, would be launched in about 30 days for the purpose of weakening the German offensive in Russia. The Allied Supreme Command felt it necessary to give the Russians a practical demonstration of the principle of war coalition by opening a "secondary front" in the Mediterranean or in Norway. Some kind of bridgehead would undoubtedly be established in one or other of these areas.

The Swedish press reports that President Ramirez has categorically denied that Argentina intends to break off diplomatic

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relations with the Axis.

Official reports have been published in the Anglo-American press on the landing in Sicily in which British, U.S.A., and Canadian but no French troops are said to be taking part. General Eisenhower has issued a proclamation to the French, Greek, and Yugoslav peoples, stating that, with the attack on Sicily, the first step has been taken towards their liberation. Further events should be awaited calmly.

Political commentaries underline the importance of the invasion now beginning on the European continent. Appreciation and approval are also voiced in the Russian press.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

In connection with the situation report on the enemy landing in Sicily, the question of operations by our own PT boats and submarines, in accordance with Naval Staff's statement as in War Diary 9 Jul. was raised. As far as the situation can be judged at Naval Staff, operations by these boats in the area of the Sicilian east coast appear advisable. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy and Commander, Submarines Italy will be informed accordingly by teletype. For copy of teletype 1/Skl 19567/43, Gkdos see teletype 1300. In present circumstances, the fear of operational vessels being cut off from a retreat to the Aegean need not yet be considered. It would seem highly advisable, however, for torpedo boat TA "10", which is still east of the Straits of Messina en route from Corfu to Taranto, to be transferred to the Aegean immediately. Chief, Naval Staff, decided accordingly. For directive 1/Skl I op 19545/43 Gkdos to German Naval Command, Italy, with copy to Group South and Admiral Aegean see teletype 1311.

Chief, Naval Staff also ordered that German Naval Command, Italy should furnish a description of the possibilities offered by the present situation. This should comprise a continuous and clear survey of the distribution and readiness of our own forces. The moment has now come for the Italian Fleet when its action can no longer be postponed and will bring good results. The plans of the Italian Admiralty must be inquired into and reported upon. Furthermore, Chief, Naval Staff pointed out the importance of tying down enemy forces in the north by the presence and movements of our fleet detachments, as demonstrated by the reaction to the two-day training cruise of Commanding Admiral, Task Force from 4 - 6 Jul. Here, too, the distressing shortage of fuel unfortunately a serious embarrassment. In any case, it is necessary for the time being to leave the submarines

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engaged in the northern area where they are.

II. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch reported on the assessment of enemy intentions in the Mediterranean submitted on 9 Jul., before the enemy action had become known by Supreme Command, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff to Commanding General South and Commanding General Southeast, with copy to Naval Staff and Commander in Chief, German Air Force. For relative teletype see 1/Skl 1974/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. The enemy's first objective was expected to be the occupation of Sicily and Sardinia and then of Corsica. While an attack on Calabria, for the purpose of cutting the supply route to Sicily, was expected in combination with the Sicilian operation, a subsequent large-scale landing on the Italian mainland was regarded as less likely than one on the Greek mainland which would also have the political effect on Hungary and Roumania and the elimination of the Roumanian oil fields in its favor. Armed Forces High Command considers that there is a greater threat to the Epirus than to the Peloponnese. A landing in central or northern Italy or on the French Mediterranean coast was considered highly improbable in the near future. The conclusions derived from this assessment have been issued in an order which has so far not reached Naval Staff.

III. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch reported on an investigation of merchant tonnage in the Baltic Sea with a view to possible assignments to shipping traffic. The result was negative, also in the opinion of the representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping who participated in the investigation. In this connection, Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division pointed out that the matter of barracks construction is an almost insuperable obstacle to the release of accommodation ships.

In a highly restricted circle:

IV. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch:

a. It is evident from the war diary of the Penang Etappe that the Japanese are setting about the preparations for establishing this station with praiseworthy diligence and on a generous scale.

With reference to the status of Japanese transport-submarines, Naval Attaché, Tokyo reports that at the moment there are 10 large units of this kind under construction which will be ready

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in April 1944. They are of 2,600 tons. They are to be used for supplying the troops in the Melanesian area which is becoming increasingly difficult to do with surface ships. In view of the great importance of this area as an out-post of the Greater East Asia defenses, it is unlikely that even one of these submarines can be made available to supply our boats. Moreover, the submarines are primarily designed to supply food and ammunition to troops in the jungle. Aircraft gasoline is carried in barrels. They have no tanks for delivering oil. Of the cruiser-submarines J "1"- "8" so far employed, only one is still useable.

Chief, Naval Staff nevertheless desires that our efforts be continued.

The Japanese Liaison Officer reported on 5 Jul. that the Imperial Japanese Navy was aware of the Fuehrer's great interest in the new Japanese battleships. Pictures so far published in the press do not show the newest type. On 16 Jul., the German Naval Attaché, Vice Admiral Wenneker, will visit the new battleship YAMATO. He will be the only Attaché to whom the ship's construction and armament will be shown without security restrictions. The German Navy would then be informed by the Attaché. The Japanese Navy is particularly anxious that no other navy, especially, the Italian Navy, should come to know of this inspection and the relative reports.

The Fuehrer will probably be advised of the above arrangement by the Japanese Ambassador via the German Foreign Minister.

b. Group North Fleet has asked to be furnished with the relative information and the names of suitable seagoing personnel for the planned sabotage operations in Iceland (see War Diary 4 Jul.). Special fishing smacks might be used for transport or perhaps personnel might be landed by parachute and picked up by ship. The Group suggests that, if no suitable targets are found in Iceland, commando raids could be made on the coast of Spitzbergen and perhaps also on Jan Mayen and Greenland. Naval Staff concurred and ordered Naval Command Norway to prepare the necessary vessels. For further details see order 1/Skl I op 1944/43 Gkdos. Chofs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa. At the same time, Group North Fleet advised Naval Staff, for information, of a request to 5th Air Force for systematic reconnaissance in connection with the plan to neutralize the very troublesome enemy bases which are suspected on the west and south coast of Spitzbergen, and of a directive to Admiral, Northern Waters to assign a submarine to make continuous reconnaissance of the fjords on the west coast of Spitzbergen, check enemy movements and attack naval traffic south of

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78°30'N, in cooperation with the reconnaissance of 5th Air Force,

Chief, Naval Staff approved.

The requested maps were dispatched by Naval Staff, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division to Group North Fleet on 29 Jun. The Group has been informed by Naval Staff, Operations Division that from previous experience, ships coming from the west reach the Kara Sea around the middle of July at the earliest, and that ships from the east pass Vilkitski Straits around 10 Aug. The last ships return from the Ob and Yenisei to the west in the second half of Oct., and from Dickson to the east, in about the first ten days of Sept.

c. Group West has reported the preliminary results of the investigations and conferences on submarine protection in the Biscay area, held in accordance with instructions of Naval Staff. For copy of the relative teletype 1/3kl 19506/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b. The plan is for the submarines always to sail in companies of 4 to 6, with escort by mine-sweepers and destroyers or torpedo boats to the outer points and for the next 100 miles, by destroyers or torpedo boats, and then close escort by Ju 88 planes. After parting company, the submarines will proceed in pairs without escort. Outward escort would be combined with the bringing in of one or two returning submarines. Escort beyond 6° - 7.5° W would be provided only in exceptional cases or for submarine assistance. The measures planned thus provide protection in the main danger area between 8° and 12° W. They will, however, shorten the route through the danger area. The measures necessitate reinforcement of the destroyers and torpedo boats by 5 more ships. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast intends to renew his request for the strength of the Ju 88 formations to be increased from 50 to 300 planes. The difficulty lies in the fuel oil situation, the air threat at the mooring places and the enemy action which must be expected as long as our own air reconnaissance is inadequate. Our anti-aircraft submarines can only be used in the area between 8° and 12° West.

Naval Staff's comments will follow. In view of the difficulties already mentioned by Group West, the provision of escort in the least dangerous, area appears questionable. Furthermore, sailing in company will involve considerable loss of time to the submarines.

The statement on the question of action against enemy anti-submarine groups off the Bay of Biscay, requested from Group West, has not yet been received.

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Special Items:

I. In Brief Reports on the Enemy Situation Nos. 13 and 14/43, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reports on enemy auxiliary aircraft carriers, escort vessels and submarine chasers, and on new enemy weapons (rocket devices), anti submarine weapons, mine warfare, battleship building and losses, and other subjects. Copies as per l/Skl 20557 and 20731/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D "Material on the Enemy Situation."

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has also issued two new maps showing shipping routes, navigable channels and mine fields on the north and west coasts of Scotland. For copy as per l/Skl 19716/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

II. A summary of data on the enemy obtained by Radio Deciphering and Radio Intelligence Services from 28 Jun. to 4 Jul. is given in Radio Monitoring Report No 27/43 by Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Communications Division, Intercept Reports (Communications Intelligence Branch).

Attention is called to page 12 concerning concentration of U.S. naval forces in the Southwest Pacific which indicates the beginning of a major offensive against the Japanese island positions threatening Australia from the north.

Attention is also called to Enclosure 4 containing a list of artillery detachments and batteries identified in the west and their positions in the coastal area of the North Sea.

Situation on 10 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the forenoon, 17 planes were observed in the Bay of Biscay up to 140 W but only one plane was observed after 1400. Enemy forces were located at 0717 in BF 7684, at 1030 in BF 7274, and at 2145 in BE 9699.

Our air reconnaissance sighted 1 cruiser on course 200° in BF 7589 at 1920 and 4 destroyers coming from the south and 1 cruiser on course 350° in BE 7584 (northeast of Ferrol) at 1935. All

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the vessels were travelling at high speed.

It remains to be established whether this is a regular or occasional patrol or whether the ships were merely passing through the area.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

The steamer BORDSEE (959 BRT) struck a mine in BF 6897 at 0345 and is putting into Royan. Torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" moved to Brest. On contact with the enemy, see "Channel Coast."

The ELM/J-mines were cleared off the Gironde and two off St. Nazaire. Minesweeper M "4451" struck a mine in BF 9651 and sank. Three Mark III-mines were cut at the place where the ship sunk. There is believed to be a dense barrage across the route. Route "Herz" has been closed up to 44°N, owing to suspected AT-mines.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has advised Naval Staff, Operations Division, for information, of its request to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast that special attention be devoted during reconnaissance, escort and fighter operations to the sighting of enemy submarine-chasers and that, if possible, reports thereon be transmitted immediately by the planes so that our naval forces may take action as quickly as possible and our submarines may be warned. The main center of the enemy anti-submarine blockade area is probably in the waters around Cape Finisterre and in grid squares BF 17, 18, 41, 42. For copy of the relative teletype 1/Skl I op 1978/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Channel Coast:

The patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up due to stormy weather.

Five boats of 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla under the command of the Flotilla Commander made contact with at least 5 enemy destroyers and 6 - 8 SGB in two groups, in BF 2863 between 0255 and 0320. The destruction of 1 destroyer of the JERVIS-type and 2 SGB was confirmed by several visual observations. Many hits were scored on other enemy vessels. Some of our boats suffered considerable damages. Minesweeper M "84" was secured by torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" and escorted close in to shore. The fate of

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minesweeper M "153" which was left heavily damaged, is still unknown. Except on minesweeper M "153", casualties were light.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

One enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire at Tershelling. In the waters north of Ameland mine laying by enemy planes is suspected. Commanding Admiral, Defenses North had nothing to report.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The main photographic reconnaissance report on Scapa Flow and Lang Hope as on 9 Jul. (see teletype 1141) does not differ in any essential points from the preliminary report. For detailed report by 5th Air Force on the results of the reconnaissance on 9 Jul., see teletype 1445. In the West Area, there is no new information beyond the warship movements reported on 9 Jul. In the Baltic Area, photographic reconnaissance of Molotovsk on 8 Jul. revealed 8 merchantmen (42,800 BRT), 1 motor minesweeper, 2 destroyers under construction. Seven steamers totalling 25,000 BRT were sighted at Archangelsk, and 2 "S" class torpedo boats, 2 minesweepers and 2 merchantmen at Jokonga.

At 0550, one British vessel was located in AM 4770.

Twenty planes were observed operating in the area of 18th Group, 12 planes in the area of 15th Group and no planes in the area of the Iceland squadrons.

2. Own Situation:

On 8 Jul., a landing boat in Petsamo fjord was fired upon by an enemy battery. On 9 Jul., the batteries of both sides exchanged fire in the Petsamo area. Between 0630 and 0700, Coastal Anti-Submarine Listening Station Nurmansaetti West observed submarine noises at 335°.

During an enemy air attack on Kiberg, 2 cutters were sunk. Other enemy air activity was on a reduced scale. Two of our FW 190 planes tried unsuccessfully to engage a Mosquito near Bergen.

Thirty-four northbound ships and 21 southbound ships were escorted by the Escort Service.



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Group North Fleet has approved the decision of Commander, Submarines Norway to withdraw all submarines from the patrol positions to the Norwegian coast.

Group North has also informed Chief, Naval Meteorological Service that the Bear Island meteorological gear has been installed. (See teletype 1513).

Commander Submarines, Norway has been using the submarines assigned for regular or special duties for defensive purposes along the northern and western coasts. In the opinion of Group North Fleet this jeopardizes the original plan which was for these boats to undertake offensive actions as the occasion arose. The Group, therefore, suggests that boats leaving home bases should assemble and wait at Kristiansund South or Bergen in Groups of at least three, and should not sail until the next 3 boats have arrived. The postponement of one Atlantic operation should be allowed for. If this is approved, the Group requests permission to use the three boats that will always be standing by in case of enemy attack. (See teletype 1220).

The matter will be examined in cooperation with Naval Staff, Submarine Division.

Commander Submarines, Norway has advised Naval Staff, Operations Division, for information, of his report to Group North Fleet, 5th Air Force on the use of submarines U "601" and U "255" for refueling Blom and Voss seaplanes. For copy of the report see teletype 1910.

Group North Fleet has submitted, under date of 4 Jul., the operational plans for a repeat of "Wunderland" with the request for approval. The plan provides for:

1. Four submarines to be sent to the Kara Sea in mid-July with the primary task of attacking shipping traffic and the secondary task of making reconnaissance for the LUETZOW.

2. The LUETZOW will be ready for the operation (code word "Husar") as from 1 Aug. The commandant will be authorized to attack at his own discretion according to the information he receives, provided the attack position and ice conditions are favorable and that there is a reasonable chance of success.

Naval Staff approved the operational plan on 7 Jul. Corresponding order 1/Skl I op 1910/43 Gkdos. Chefs. is filed in 1/Skl I op "Wunderland II."

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

One ELM/J-mine was cleared north of Svinemuende (AO 8572) near the place where tug STURM was wrecked.

No other important reports have been received from the entire area.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

On 7 and 8 Jul., a number of our submarines was attacked by enemy planes in the North Atlantic. Some of the attacks were repulsed. One Liberator was shot down in BF 4584. Two boats had to put back and one was lost.

Successes reported are: One sailing freight vessel sunk by gunfire and 2 freighters totalling 13,000 BRT sunk from a convoy by submarine U "759" in the Caribbean Sea; on the Brazilian coast, submarine U 510" sank a transport of 10,000 BRT and 2 freighters totalling 11,000 BRT from a convoy. For another success in the Mediterranean, see "Own Situation, Mediterranean."

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has advised all offices concerned of Chief, Naval Staff's order to the effect that it is not planned to execute operation "Gute Hoffnung" until the new moon period at the end of Aug./Sept.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division also submitted the operational orders for submarine U "218" for mining the deep fairway in the Straits of Gibraltar, and, as an alternative task, the mining of the northern approach to the Gulf of Paria. Naval Staff, Operations Division has no comments.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

In the West Area, there was strong enemy air activity by several bomber formations which attacked airfields. Seven enemy

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planes were shot down. Only slight damage was caused to military installations.

Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 9 Jul., the German Air Force had 107 bombers in operation in the Augusta area, in the Sicilian campaign. One cruiser and 4 transports were hit. Impacts were observed among the landing boats. Eighteen enemy planes were shot down during the day in the sea area south of Sicily. In addition, our Air Force carried out reconnaissance of the battle area. A photographic report for the period between 1348 and 1840, covering the area and the coast between Licata and Syracuse, revealed 94 freighters for a total of 774,000 BRT, a tanker of about 10,000 BRT, 160 large and 248 small landing boats, 42 LST, and 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 18 destroyers and 3 gunboats. Many landing boats and some patrol boats were sighted in the harbor of Augusta. About 100 - 200 vessels including 20 - 30 large ships were anchored in the bay between Augusta and Syracuse. Landing boat shuttle traffic between the coast and the ships was noted. In the harbor of Syracuse and off the coast 100 - 150 vessels including about 20 large ones were counted. At 2240, 12 burning ships and big explosions were reported south of Syracuse. For further details of the reconnaissance, see Daily Situation.

During the day, the enemy continued to attack airfields in Sicily. Heavy damage was reported only from Trapani. Anti-aircraft guns brought down 5 enemy planes. In the night of 10 Jul., Trapani was again attacked and 2 Bostons were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. In the eastern Mediterranean, an attacking plane was shot down during an enemy air attack on Italian PT boats in the Crete area.

Eastern Front:

On 9 Jul., 119 enemy planes were again shot down on the Army front.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Intelligence Section reports that Russian aviation personnel have noticeably increased since March of this year. The arrival of new forces is especially noticeable in the area southeast of Kharkov and between Kharkov and Kursk where altogether 1400 additional planes arrived. At the beginning of Jul., there were about 12,500 frontline planes on the Eastern European Front, of which 800 - 900 would be constantly operational. The corresponding figure for March was estimated at about 3,600.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

According to an agent's report, 300 vessels with invasion troops for Sicily left Algiers under fleet escort at 1600 on 9 Jul., and 100 vessels left Tunis also under fleet escort. At 0115 on 10 Jul., Catania was bombarded by heavy naval artillery. In the early morning hours, the enemy launched a large-scale landing on a long front in the southeastern part of Sicily from Licata to Syracuse. Many transports, landing ships and landing boats were noted in this area by our air reconnaissance. The main center of the landing operation is in the Syracuse area, near Cape Passero, the bay near Gela, and near and west of Licata. Heavy units bombarded Licata from the sea at 1200 and the coast southeast of Licata at 1236. A heavy battle group of 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 7 cruisers and many destroyers was repeatedly reported in the Syracuse area during the forenoon. The landing on the south coast was apparently also protected by one or two heavy battle groups of 1 - 2 battleships or monitors with cruisers and destroyers. According to a report from our Air Force, a landing attempt at Augusta was repulsed at 0823. At 1120 there were no enemy forces in that harbor. This report contradicts another Air Force observation (time unspecified), that numerous landing boats and some patrol boats were sighted in the harbor of Augusta.

At 1158, the combat group Empedocle reported that the Italian vessels had left their positions and were withdrawing. According to the Italian Admiralty's communique of 9 Jul., the naval teleprint station at Empedocle had been completely destroyed at 0552 and had been transferred. At 0951, the pier at Augusta was blown up and the PT boat base was abandoned.

From here it is difficult to judge whether these measures by the Italian command were necessary. However, the impression prevails that the positions were given up before being overwhelmed or even seriously attacked.

According to reports so far received, the enemy Air Force apparently did not take part in the landing battle but confined itself to attacks by comparatively small forces on railways, roads in the rear area and a few airfields. The situation report of Commanding General, South, states that the harbor and the southern part of Syracuse were taken by the enemy during the evening. Today also there are no reports of attacks on the western part of the island.

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The landing group in the Licata - Gela sector apparently consists of 3 U.S. landing divisions under the command of General Patton and has more than 180 transports and 300 landing vessels at its disposal. The Cape Passero - Syracuse landing group is estimated at about 4 landing divisions probably under British command. About 110 transports and 300 landing vessels were counted in this group. One U.S. cruiser of the BROOKLYN class was identified in the covering group off the east coast. The QUEEN EMMA and PRINCESS BERTRIX were identified among the landing transports. The enemy made especially great use of PT and motor gunboats. 3rd PT Boat Flotilla which was sent out against the enemy from Empedocle on the evening of 9 Jul., met a strong, superior group of enemy motor gunboats and withdrew to the west. Seven boats of the flotilla entered Palermo at 0830 on 10 Jul. German Naval Command, Italy had planned to use the flotilla for defense against enemy landing attempts on the west coast of Sicily. But, apparently as a consequence of Naval Staff's directive that PT boats and submarines were to be sent into action on the east coast of Sicily the flotilla was ordered to sail immediately for the Straits of Messina for operations off Syracuse, and in the evening, 6 boats left Palermo, 2 of which had later to be released because of damaged steering gear.

German Naval Command, Italy has reported on the distribution and state of readiness of our naval forces as at 1600. For copy see teletype 0015. The report states that at that time, 5 boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla were ready for action at Palermo and 2 in limited operational status while 3 boats at Toulon were non-operational. Five boats of 7th PT Boat Flotilla were ready for action at Cagliari and 3 boats non-operational at Toulon.

Due to engine trouble, torpedo boat TA "10" put in to Taranto on the evening of 9 Jul. Torpedo boat TA "9" is ready for action at Toulon and torpedo boat TA "11" is ready for action at Naples.

The mine ships POMMERN and BRANDENBURG are ready for action at Maddalena.

The patrol and escort forces and 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are on protection duty.

One boat of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is en route from Nettunia to Civitavecchia and 2 boats are en route from Marseille to Leghorn.

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According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy, the Italian fleet is standing by to sail at Spezia as from 1500. Detailed plans are not known.

In the afternoon, about 1700, an enemy convoy was reported assembling off Bizerta. It consisted of 20 tank transports, 8 LCTs, 5 steamers and 1 tanker. Another convoy of 2 transports, 10 steamers and escort vessels was, at the same time, on an easterly course north of Bone. Evidently as cover for these movements, there were two warship formations, one of 2 cruisers with 8 destroyers reported at 1400 forty-five miles east of Bizerta and the other, of 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, and 3 destroyers, reported at 1700, sailing east, south of La Galite.

Submarine U "371" probably sank one steamer of 8,000 BRT and one tanker of 10,000 BRT from a westbound convoy 45 miles northeast of Bougie at 1241.

Commander Submarines, Italy reports that enemy operations so far provide opportunities for submarine attack mainly south and east of Sicily but that operational conditions are very difficult because of the mine and air situations. Enemy movements in the Western Mediterranean have so far been detected only east of Bone. There is no apparent threat to Sardinia or West Sicily.

In the Western Mediterranean there are 4 German and 10 Italian submarines and in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1 German and 4 Italian submarines. One German submarine is in the Straits of Messina and 2 more are at Toulon ready for sailing today. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Commander Submarines plans to send the submarines that have been operating to date off the Cyrenaica coast to the area west of Malta, to send a submarine now passing through the Straits of Messina Strait to the area southeast of Syracuse, and to send the boats leaving Toulon to its support. In the Western Mediterranean, it is planned to leave where they are the two boats east of Gibraltar which have only a few days of endurance left. It is also planned to station 2 submarines in the area south of 38°N west of 7°E. Italian submarines are north and east of this area.

Chief, Naval Staff has approved these plans. Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has been informed in regard to submarine distribution in the Mediterranean.

In connection with the enemy landing in Sicily it may be noted that a report from the French General Consul at Tangier, dated 3 Jul., and forwarded by the Foreign Office, alleges that the naval forces in the Western Mediterranean on 30 Jun. consisted of 9 British battleships, 4 aircraft carriers and 5 auxiliary aircraft carriers.

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These figures do not check with previous information. They may possibly already include the USA naval forces which are expected to arrive.

2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the Mediterranean:

The number of ships in Gibraltar is substantially unchanged. Besides 1 landing craft transport ship, about 12 destroyers, 11 corvettes, 15 escort vessels, 1 transport, 43 freighters, 9 tankers and altogether 185 planes were sighted.

No reconnaissance reports have come in from the Eastern Mediterranean. An Intelligence report states that on 5 Jul., 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers, 4 submarines, 8 motor torpedo boats and a number of small merchantmen were at Polis on Cyprus. According to another report dated 2 Jul., there are large concentrations of landing troops in Marsa Matruk undergoing intensive training with tugs and landing boats. The non-commissioned officers are said to be equipped with maps of the west coast of Greece.

3. Own Situation in other parts of the Mediterranean:

The POMMERN and the BRANDENBURG left Maddalena at 1850 for mine operations on the south coast of Sardinia. The ships were picked up several times by enemy air reconnaissance. 7th PT Boat Flotilla was unable to operate because of bad weather.

Naval Attache, Rome has forwarded a report on a conference with Admiral Riccardi at which the Admiral reviewed the military situation with special reference to the most probable place for an enemy landing in the Italian area. As developments have meanwhile shown, Admiral Riccardi was right in concluding from the nearly completed enemy preparations that a landing would be made in Sicily. He was then very confident that, with the present status of defenses the landing attempt could be expected to fail so that Italy could await the future with good heart. Riccardi said (on 4 Jul.) that it was especially fortunate that the German High Command regarded the Mediterranean as the main war theatre, an opinion confirmed by the fact that no German offensive had been undertaken in the East!

For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 1936/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

4. Sea Transport Situation:

The supply service to the islands was carried out without incident. Steamers destined for Syracuse were redirected to Messina.

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In regard to Group South's suggestion for the Italy-Greece traffic, (see War Diary 5, 7, and 9 July), both German Naval Command Italy and Naval Staff are of the opinion that the Italian Admiralty will not give up the control of this traffic. The step might even be inadvisable, as escort forces could not be turned over to Marinorea from the area of German Naval Command. In cooperation with Admiral Aegean, Marinorea would have to make sure that the Italian Admiralty is kept informed on the escort facilities of the Aegean forces. In the V-case there could be no further convoys and Admiral Aegean could be given unrestricted authority.

\* Italian Naval Command, Morea?

5. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

At 2015 on 9 Jul., an enemy submarine entered the harbor of Castron, on Chios; from the south and bombarded the harbor with about 20 rounds, sinking 4 ships and damaging others. Several harbor and military installations on land were also damaged. A 3.7 cm gun fired on the boat but it was undamaged and put out again to the south. At 1800, one of our planes sighted an enemy submarine 30 miles northwest of Suda. A submarine hunt by Italian forces is under way. From 1533 to 1609, 23 Liberators bombed Malenes airfield in western Crete. Our defenses dispersed the enemy formation so that only one bomb fell on the runway. One enemy plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and two by fighters.

Minesweeping by 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla off the Trikeri barrage continued unsuccessful and has been abandoned. Passage is again open to traffic.

The damaged steamer LOULOUDES has been towed to Chalkis. Otherwise, transport traffic in the Aegean was without incident.

With reference to Group South's request for a replacement for the tanker WILHELMSEURG the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean has informed Naval Staff that the tanker JOHN KNUDSEN will probably be moved from Trieste to the Aegean on 15 Jul. No other tankers are expected to be available in the near future. For details see teletype 1330.

At the request of Naval Group South (see war Diary 7 Jul.)



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German Naval Command, Italy has established that the Italian Admiralty has given only one instruction to Italian Naval Command, Southeast that, as Italian Chief of Staff, he is responsible for keeping Admiral Aegean informed. Therefore, Admiral Aegean is responsible, through Italian Naval Command, Southeast, for execution of the tasks in question. German Naval Command confirms that Group South's views conform with those of the Italian Admiralty. For copy of the relative teletype 1/Skl 19505/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

At 2315 on 9 Jul., there were three (apparently) motor gun boats 4 miles southwest of Anapa which turned out to sea after being fired on by 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns. At 0020 on 10 Jul., a surfaced submarine was sighted in the Eupatoria area and was attacked with depth charges by 2 of our naval landing craft. The result could not be ascertained.

Own Situation:

Naval Artillery Lighters "8", "9", "10", and "11" and motor minesweeper R "166", under command of Commander 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, carried out a bombardment of Atchuyev for about one hour during the night of 8 Jul. as already reported. The report on results states that, of 10 vessels close inshore, 3 were sunk and 3 others completely shot up and forced ashore. The vessels destroyed included 2 motor gun boats. Five large fires with heavy explosions were observed on land. The fires were confirmed by air reconnaissance. The enemy responded with remarkably well-aimed fire from 4.5 cm and one or two 8.8 cm batteries. Our casualties were light. All the boats are slightly damaged but in operational condition. For brief report see teletype 0625.

During the night of 9 Jul., 1 PT Boat Flotilla fired a torpedo, which missed, at a small guardship in the waters northwest of Tuapse. Otherwise, no enemy forces were sighted in this reconnaissance area either by this flotilla or by 11th PT Boat Flotilla. Operations by 1st and 11th PT Boat Flotillas had to be cancelled in the night of 10 - 11 Jul. owing to bad weather.

Submarine U "18" entered Constantza. Two Italian midget submarines put out on submarine hunting south-southeast of Constantza.

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During an enemy air attack on the Anapa transport, two of the attacking planes were shot down. One naval landing craft was slightly damaged. Minesweeping escort vessels of the Anapa transport cut two M 26 type mines southeast of the Kertch Strait.

According to a report from Group South, sea transport performance in the Black Sea was again increased during Jun. 1943 although the Danube, Dnjepr and Bug were closed for some time due to mine danger because the bridge west of Kertch was destroyed. A total of 212,727 tons was shipped. The steamer BIRGIT 1,971 BRT, the freight train ferry VITEZ, two lighters and one naval landing craft (LFB) were lost.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance:

No reports of interest to Naval Staff have been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. In reply to a question by Chief, Naval Staff as to the status of the new radar interception sets, the representative of Naval Staff, Chief of Communication Division reported that only test samples are ready at present and that the sets are not in production. Two sets would be ready in July and about 50 by the end of Oct. Chief, Naval Staff called for 20 sets by the beginning of Aug. as the submarines will then be equipped with the other new weapons for starting the convoy campaign and only the radar interception equipment would still be missing.

Naval Staff, Chief Naval Communication Division reported that everything will be done to meet this demand and recommended that Chief, Naval Staff should also directly approach Minister Speer on the subject.

II. On a report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch on the Mediterranean Situation, Chief, Naval Staff commented:

a. "It is now perfectly clear that a large-scale landing operation with very strong forces is under way on the southeast

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and south coasts of Sicily. All forces must be thrown in there, particularly the 7th PT Boat Flotilla from Cagliari, and 3rd PT Boat Flotilla must also go to Messina."

Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division reported that views on this subject were being exchanged with German Naval Command, Italy. A decision should be made on 11 Jul. Chief, Naval Staff ordered that German Naval Command, Italy be advised in writing of Naval Staff's opinion. Operations on the east coast of Sicily are also necessary because if the situation should develop unfavorably, it will still be possible for our forces to evade the east.

b. It is now proved that Italian submarine strategy was wrong, as it has produced nothing and is now completely upset. In comparison to the successes of the few German Submarines which have produced continuous, and lately, very important results, it can only be said that the potential of the few German submarines is much higher than that of the many Italian submarines.

III. At the suggestion of Naval Staff, Chief Naval Staff gave a ruling on the distribution of destroyers and torpedo boats as they become ready for action:

Torpedo boat T "26" belonging to 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, will join her flotilla in West area. Because of the smaller draft, the movement is easier than in the case of destroyers. Destroyers Z "29" and "33" will join the battle group of Commanding Admiral Task Force at Alta although reinforcement of the destroyers in West Area is also desirable. But for the time being, even the destroyers already there are short of fuel and above all it is almost impossible to move destroyers through the Channel during the summer months. The question of reinforcing the destroyers in the West Area will be examined in the autumn when more units will become ready for action. For the relative directive 1/Skl I op 1985/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

Special Items:

I. Armed Forces, High Command, Intelligence Division, Counter Intelligence Section reports that, after difficult negotiations, the Japanese Navy has promised to deliver 3000 tons of Navy-quality fuel for the BRAKE within the desired time. The oil has to be especially refined. The Japanese Navy, however, refused to set up reserves of Navy-quality fuel at Penang because of its own oil shortage, but undertook that supplies of Navy-quality would be provided there in good time, if required, as the submarines are always found to remain in that base for some time.

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It is true that the military director at Tokyo has been unable to extract a binding promise, but, so far, the Japanese have never let us down in regard to fuel. There will be even less danger of this if the submarines operations are successful.

II. Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West has submitted as of 30 Jun. a fundamental statement on the memorandum of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands in regard to coastal defense, as requested by Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. For copy as per 1/Skl 18973/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West considers it necessary for the present defense system to be reviewed and sets out the following as basic requirements from the point of view of the Navy:

1. The basic objective of defense tactics is to combat invading ships and boats.
2. The use of fortification-building capacity should be centrally controlled.
3. The effect of enemy naval artillery in preparatory "drum fire" should not be over-estimated. The danger to the ships is greater than that to the coastal batteries under bombardment.
4. All arms assigned or suitable to be used from the shore and the waters off shore must be more or less concentrated along the coast regardless of the hoped for distribution in depth of the forces for the land battle.

Naval Staff, Operations Division will follow up this matter in cooperation with Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

III. Naval Staff, Operations Division approved the request of Admiral Landing Craft and Bases, recommended by Naval Group West to move the office of Admiral Landing Craft and Bases from Antwerp. It is unnecessary for it to remain in the Belgian - Dutch area. As the Baltic Sea is coming into increasing use as a training area for submarines and light naval forces, Naval Staff, Operations Division suggested to Quartermaster Division that Admiral Landing Craft and Bases and all his training units, section by section, be transferred to Jutland, where Limfjord is particularly suitable for preliminary nautical training while the Skagerrak offers opportunities for mine laying.

IV. Armed Forces, High Command, Armaments Division gave a short account of the execution of Commander in Chief, Navy's order of

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20 May in regard to expediting the installation of 2 centimeter quadruple-mount guns on all submarines over and above those already planned. Letter as per 1/Skl 19612/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

V. Commander, 29th Submarine Flotilla submitted a memorandum suggesting that 300-ton submarines of the old type be built in series for use in the Mediterranean. In view of the plans for other types and materials and of the building capacity situation, Commander in Chief, Navy, rejected the suggestion.

Situation on 11 Jul. 1943

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have come in from our ships.

Naval Staff has continued to keep Ship "28" informed on the political situation. Radiogram 0846 dealt with South America and British - American relations. For copy of radiogram 0846 see War Diary, Part D "Collection of Telephone calls and radio messages."

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Only five planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British ship was located at 1736 in CG 5150 and one at 1935 in CG 4620. The convoy "Faith" reported a contact plane at 2140 in CF 3630 and an attack by three planes at 2200.

Air reconnaissance by 3rd Air Force reported on 10 Jul.:

At 1910, one cruiser in BF 7589 (60 miles northwest of Ferrol) on course 200° speed 15 knots; at 1926, one destroyer in BF 7583, course 200°, speed 20 knots. At 2100, the cruiser and the destroyer were on course 200° and 180° respectively.

In reply to inquiry by Naval Staff, Group West stated that the report on the cruiser was regarded as reliable. According to further details from Air Commander, Atlantic Coast, the cruiser

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probably belongs to the C - or D - class. The Group thought it possible that the cruiser serves as support for destroyers on anti-submarine duty, and refers in this connection to the sighting by submarines of one heavy and one light cruiser in BF 4872, at 1000 on 2 Jul. and of a destroyer in BF 7738 on 9 Jul. as well as the recent constant locations in the same waters.

At 2120 on 11 Jul., our reconnaissance reported a convoy of 3 steamers with 3 escort vessels on course 190° at medium speed in CF 3634.

According to an intelligence report of 10 Jul. from Portugal (Faro), since our repeated air attacks on British steamers off the south coast of Portugal, strong air reconnaissance of British fighters by day and by night, has been observed along the Algarve coast from Vila Real de S. Antonio to Sagres.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J-mine was cleared north of St. Jean de luz. Escort and patrol services were carried out without incident.

Channel Coast:

The patrol positions were not occupied due to the stormy weather. Escort service in the Channel was also cancelled. Escort of Channel Islands traffic was carried out as scheduled.

In regard to the engagement on the coast of northern Brittany during the night of 9 Jul., it is reported that Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" also made contact with two enemy destroyers at a distance of about 5.3 km. (Tran. Nt.: 53 km seems to be given erroneously for 53 hm). Torpedo boat T "25" was damaged by shell fragments. No hits were scored on either side. The flotilla later searched unsuccessfully for minesweeper M "153" but picked up minesweeper M "84" and escorted it back to its own formation. For Brief report, see teletype 0020.

Minesweeper M "153" capsized and sank in very bad weather after 11 hours had been spent in trying to salvage her. The majority of the crew was rescued. For battle report of Commander, 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, see teletype 0710. The report explains the Flotilla Commander's decision not to return to look for M "153" after the engagement and also suggests that a common ultra-short wave-length should be established for the transmission of orders during joint operations when formations of

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different kinds are temporarily combined as, in this case, 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla and 4th Torpedo boat Flotilla. Also, the lack of a Second Doctor was again felt.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Minesweeping and patrols were cancelled due to bad weather. Nothing else was reported.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance reported comparatively active traffic of merchant and fishing vessels northeast and north of Iceland on 9, 10, and 11 Jul. For details see teletype 0806 and 1355. Naval Staff thinks it possible that bases are being constructed also on the northern coast of Iceland. Group North Fleet has been ordered to assign one submarine to maintain a constant patrol in this area, during which any opportunity to attack can be exploited.

Our Radio Intelligence detected 16 planes on reconnaissance flights over the North Sea in the Shetland-Facross area and the home squadrons of the Atlantic Group observed 11 planes in their area. Russian planes reported one of our convoys at 1730 on course 300° in the Berlevaag area.

At 2351 on 8 Jul., a Russian submarine was sighted off Kongsfjord by one of our planes and attacked with depth charges. On 9 Jul., the coastal A/S listening station at Nurmansaetti picked up submarine noises at 170°, i.e. inside the fjord, from 0700 till 0900. At 0945, air reconnaissance confirmed that an enemy submarine had been sighted leaving Petsamo fjord. From 1250 on 9 Jul., the Russian batteries "208" and "209" fired 35 rounds on the steamer RUIJA and working boats in the Petsamofjord. 11 rounds were fired in return.

2. Own Situation:

At 1914 on 10 Jul., the submarine supply ship UNITAS was attacked with bombs and gunfire by 8 British planes near Hellisoy. Living quarters on the quarter-deck were destroyed by fire. The ship was towed in. One of the attacking planes was shot down by the UNITAS. Seven of our own FW 190 planes were unable to engage the enemy.

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Thirty-one ships were escorted to the north and 27 to the south.

Eight steamers are awaiting escort in the area of the Arctic coast.

Admiral, North Coast reports that mine layer SKAGERRAK and naval landing craft have laid the mine-barrages NW 52 and 53 according to plan. For the barrage report, see teletype 1510.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the forenoon, enemy artillery put up ineffective harassing fire, sometimes of heavy calibre, against the coastal areas in Kronstadt Bay. Otherwise the situation was generally unchanged. For details, see Daily Situation.

2. Own Situation:

No special reports have been received from the area of Commanding Admiral Defenses, Baltic. A Danish fishing cutter struck a mine and sank in the Langeland belt. A mine exploded 1000 meters behind a convoy 12 miles south of Moen. No other important events were reported.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

On 10 Jul., U "510" sank the Swedish steamer SCANDINAVIA (2,475 BRT) off the Brazilian coast in EP 2984, after the crew had left the ship.

On 9 Jul., U "533" was chased by 2 enemy destroyers in BF 7738. The suspicion that systematic submarine hunting is being carried out in that area is increasingly confirmed (see Situation West Area).

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:



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3rd Air Force had 45 planes in operation in West Area and 18 in the Mediterranean. During the day, the enemy's activity was confined to isolated strafing attacks and one attack by a small force on an industrial plant near Bethune. At 1530, one enemy plane was shot down near Ghent.

Six FW 200 planes of 3rd Group, 40th Bomber Wing bombed a south-bound enemy convoy of 3 ships 320 miles west of Oporto and set fire to 2 big steamers, one of them of 20,000 BRT.

Mediterranean Theater:

On 11 Jul., strong enemy air forces attacked our troops and a number of airfields in Sicily and Calabria. The troops suffered considerable casualties. At the airfields, some of the runways were heavily damaged.

German bomber formations gave continuous and successful support to the offensive of the "Hermann Goering" tank division and heavy bomber formations attacked shipping and landing targets near Gela in the morning hours and during the day.

The Italian Air Force used heavy, light and torpedo aircraft for attacks in the southeastern part of Sicily.

German Air Force successes since the evening of 10 Jul.:

Sunk or hit: 20 ships for about 100,000 BRT, one battleship, two cruisers and an unspecified number of other small landing craft. For details, see Daily Situation.

During the night of 11 Jul., Reggio and San Giovanni were attacked by small enemy air forces. On 11 Jul., a total of 4 enemy planes was shot down.

Situation reports from 2nd Air Force give a comparatively favorable picture of the operations of the "Hermann Goering" Tank Division. Besides supporting that division, 2nd Air Force is using its bomber formations to hinder the supplying of the enemy forces in the bay south of Syracuse and south of Gela.

The large amount of reconnaissance information from 2nd Air Force is listed under Warfare in the Mediterranean No. 1.

Our air force losses are not reported.

Eastern Front:

On 10 Jul., 85 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front.

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Nothing of importance was reported from the areas of 4th and 5th Air Forces.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy landing in Sicily:

During the night of 10 Jul., active shipping traffic was again observed in the coastal area between Catania and Licata. Landing activity increased on the evening of 10 Jul. especially near Gela. More transports, freighters and warships are approaching from the Western Mediterranean as already noted and reported in detail on 10 Jul.

At 0018 on 11 Jul., 5 big ships and 50 - 100 landing boats were reported off Augusta. Otherwise, in the early morning there were no important changes in the landing area at the southeastern end of the island. German Naval Command, Italy reported at 0900:

"Off Syracuse; many ships of all types and many landing vessels. Between Avola and Cape Passero, about 100 ships. Sector Cape Passero - Pozzallo, 150 ships along the coast and with warships behind them. Sector Pozzalla - Gela, only a few landing vessels. Sector 6 miles east of Gela to 16 miles west of Gela, concentration of ships (60 ships in one line were sighted). In the same area, an approaching convoy of 20 ships. In the Licata area, 50 - 60 ships."

Second evaluation of photographic air reconnaissance of the area from Empedocle to Augusta on 10 Jul. reveals:

6 cruisers, 22 destroyers, 14 escort vessels, 2 minesweepers, 2 corvettes, 11 artillery boats, 1 PT boat, 2 motor boats, 9 auxiliary war vessels, 109 LST, 93 LCT of 350 tons, 4 LCT of 250 tons, 56 LCT of 120 tons, 4 LSG, 84 LCI, 8 LSF, 147 LCM, 189 LCT, 66 LCA, 2 LSJ for a total of 14,265 BRT, 2 freighters and passenger/cargo steamers totalling 15,000 BRT, 65 freighters totalling 406,000 BRT.

The eastbound convoy of 10 steamers reported north of Bone at 1720 on 10 Jul. was again confirmed on an easterly course north-east of Cape Serrat at 0145.

From 1730 on 10 Jul. till noon of 11 Jul., 10 enemy submarine positions were reported in the direct vicinity of Sicily and Sardinia. One of the boats was south of Toulon and a second one near Elba.

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During the night of 10 Jul., 4 boats of 3rd PT boat Flotilla made a thrust into the southern part of the Straits of Messina, unfortunately without contacting the enemy, passed Messina at 0200, on its way back and, it received no radio order to enter Messina, put in to Naples at noon to refuel and take on torpedoes and for a short engine repair. German Naval Command, Italy intends to dispatch the flotilla for operations off Cape Passero in the night of 12 Jul. Operations by the Italian PT boats were also unsuccessful last night.

With such an extraordinary accumulation of objectives, it should be possible for these boats to gain successes, if properly employed, even in the short summer nights. Undoubtedly the absence of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla - due to an accident - is felt. His replacement by an experienced PT boat commandant is urgently necessary and steps are underway to assign Operations Officer of Commander PT Boats to the post.

In accordance with a directive from Chief, Naval Staff, the following order has been issued to German Naval Command, Italy with copy to Commander Submarines, Italy:

1. PT Boat Flotilla to be ordered into the battle for Sicily,
2. if the situation should necessitate a withdrawal, a base for 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas must be provided in southern Italy east of the Messina Strait. (Crotona, Taranto). For copy of the relevant order 1/Skl I op 19636/43 Gkdos. see teletype 1718.

The distribution and state of readiness of the Italian naval forces is reported by German Naval Command, Italy in teletypes 2015 and 2317. Two battleships ready for action, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers at Spezia, 3 light cruisers and 2 destroyers at Genoa, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer at Taranto. The other 2 destroyers and 24 torpedo boats are distributed in the harbors of the Tyrrhenian and Aegean Seas or are engaged on escort service. The vessels have had steam up since 10 Jul. It is planned to use them only if the enemy is not superior in strength and they therefore are not expected in the Sicilian area at present.

Naval Staff fears that Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command Italy is right in this forecast and regrets it exceedingly. For the Italian Fleet the moment has now come for which it has been so carefully preserved. There is no excuse for failing to make use of the strong fighting power of the ships in a situation in which the gravest

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decisions are at stake. Nor is it to be expected that a future opportunity will offer for operations against an inferior enemy. It is rather to be feared that the opportunity for effective operation is now being offered for the last time.

Of the 13 operational Italian submarines, (in which no immediate increase will be forthcoming) 3 are on the Algerian coast between Cape de Fer and Tabarca, 1 northwest of Trapani, 1 northwest of Palermo, 5 on the east coast of Sicily between Cape Passero and Catania, 3 en route from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the east coast of Sicily via the Strait of Messina. By night, 12-13 submarines will be on position.

Of our own submarines U "407" has been ordered to the attack area southwest of latitude of CN 3282, U "453" is permitted free lance operations in map squares 26, 31 and 34 CN.

Situation Report No. 967 of 10 Jul. by Army General Staff, Foreign Armies, West states, among other things, that parts of three British, one Canadian and three USA divisions are participating in the landing and that these forces are divided into one western and one eastern landing group. The enemy has succeeded in establishing the following bridgeheads on the island: Near Licata, about 5 km wide; at Gela, about 10 km wide; at Cape Passero, across entire southern tip of Sicily; at Avola, there is apparently only a small bridgehead. Near Syracuse, the Maddalena peninsula southeast of the town was apparently occupied by landings from the air and from the sea, and territory west of the town was taken by air-borne troops. Glider landings were reported at the mouth of the Anapo River, near Syracuse and on the Maddalena Peninsula, and parachute landings at San Pietro and - according to unconfirmed reports - also near Syracuse and east of Comiso.

The main point of the attack is clearly the southeastern sector of the island. The first objective is probably to gain a line approximately between Gela and Catania. In view of the strength of the forces still available in North Africa, it is possible that the tactical aim is to draw off strong German forces from the western part of the island in order to make further landings there. It is regarded as most serious that reports from landed enemy troops - intercepted by reliable sources - give the impression that the resistance of our forces on the coast is not particularly strong. Army General Staff considers that operations against Sardinia and in the eastern Mediterranean (Aegean area) are still possible in view of the strong enemy forces still

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available and great amount of shipping space.

Until the evening of 10 Jul., according to information received by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, 110 LST and 337 LCT or LCJ were operating between Licata and Syracuse and 35 LST and 18 ICT or LCJ were approaching from northern Tunisia. Thus the following forces are engaged in the Sicilian operation: 145 LST = 95% of the presumed total in the Mediterranean and 355 LCT and LCJ = 70% of the total in the Mediterranean. Of the remaining vessels of this kind, one-third is in the Eastern Mediterranean and two-thirds in the jumping-off bases between Oran and Tunis.

At least 105 freighters have been noted in the operations against Sicily and 60 en route to that theatre. Thus, 165 freighters are engaged, totalling at least 1,000,000 BRT = 50% of the total known to be in the Mediterranean. Twelve transports are engaged and 6 are en route to Sicily. Therefore, altogether 18 transports for about 210,000 BRT = 20% of the total tonnage are participating in the operation.

Of the remaining 50 per cent of freighter tonnage one-fifth is in Gibraltar, two-fifths in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rest in the jumping off harbors. One-third of the transports is in the Eastern Mediterranean and two-thirds in the jumping-off harbors with the exception of two ships which are at Gibraltar.

Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West, Group South, Group West and German Naval Command, Italy have been informed accordingly. For copy of this instruction as per 1/Skl 19656/43 Gkdos. see teletype 1010.

It should be kept in mind that, due to the comparatively short run from Sicily to the Tunisian coast, landing vessels can be quickly returned so that landing craft for new operations can be speedily made ready.. The same applies to freighters and transports.

2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the Mediterranean:

Little incoming or outgoing steamer traffic was observed at Gibraltar. Reports on the ships in the harbor were incomplete due to bad visibility.

An Intelligence report of 2 Jul. from London via Portugal states that Anglo-American troops are preparing for an attack on the

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center of the Italian coast between Piombino and Port Ercole and that a simultaneous attack will be made on Corsica by Anglo-American fleet formations together with the remainder of the French fleet. French soldiers now training in Tunis would be used as parachutists against that island. Sardinia is indicated as another objective. In regard to the date, it is stated literally: "In the days after the big Russian offensive."

3. Own Situation in other parts of the Mediterranean:

Naval Staff has instructed German Naval Command, Italy, with copy to Group South, Admiral Aegean, to transfer the boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Aegean according to plan, as they become ready.

The mine layers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN with the Italian destroyer VIVALDI completed the mine-task on the south coast of Sardinia as scheduled and, on their way back, were attacked by 6 torpedo planes off the east coast of Sardinia at 1430. Five or six torpedoes were avoided. Three planes were shot down. Casualties were caused by gun fire from the planes. The commanding officer of the BRANDENBURG was killed. Both ships are in operational condition at Maddalena.

Group West reports that mine task H 3 B has been carried out according to plan.

Three boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla moved from Marseille to Leghorn.

4. Sea Transport Situation:

While escorting two steamers from Naples to Palermo the fast escort vessel SG "13" was hit by a torpedo 83 miles south of Naples but apparently remained afloat. In the Sardinia-traffic, the steamer TELL (1,349 BRT), escorted by the fast escort vessel SG "11", was sunk by an enemy submarine east of Corsica. Other traffic was carried out without incident.

5. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Algeciras, of 10 Jul., a Royal Air Force officer stated that a landing in

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the Balkans was imminent.

Own Situation:

Four boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla put in to Salamis from the Trikeri barrage.

During an enemy air attack on Paloechora (Peloponnese) at noon on 10 Jul., a low flying plane caused damage and casualties on an Italian PT boat. One of the attacking planes was shot down. Two Arado planes were sent out to hunt an enemy submarine sighted 45 miles west of Lemnos in the afternoon of 11 Jul. A Greek manned dredger sank in the Corinth Canal. Shipping traffic is not obstructed.

In regard to the submarine attack in the harbor of Castron on Chios, it has been additionally reported that a torpedo fired in the direction of the Army mine-dump was prematurely exploded by striking a rock below the surface. Five motor sailing vessels were destroyed and one was damaged.

Convoy and transport traffic was carried out without incident.

For the battle report by Flotilla Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla on the engagement between Q-ship G "41" and an enemy submarine on 8 Jul., see teletype 1300. According to the report, the submarine was very heavily damaged, if not destroyed.

Group South has advised Naval Staff, for information, that it has again been indicated to German Naval Command, Italy that this is the last opportunity to send supplies via the Adriatic as possible developments of the situation in the Sicilian area may stop the traffic perhaps almost immediately even before actual operations against the Greek area begin. (See teletype 1850).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

PT boats were not in operation because of bad weather.

Submarine U "20" left Constantza for operations against the enemy.

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The minesweeper escort of the 138th Anapa transport cleared two more mines in the Kertch Strait. It is reported as of 0108 on 9 Jul. that two vessels bombarded the oil refinery plant at Berdjansk and then made off. Naval artillery lighters "1"- "3" are at Mariupol, naval artillery lighters "4", "8", "9", and "10" are at Temriuk and naval artillery lighter "11" at Kertch.

Ferry traffic across the Kertch Straits was hindered by bad weather. Supply transports and tug convoys along the Crimean Coast were cancelled.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance:

According to Reuter, the U.S. Secretary for War, Stimson, has arrived in London for a conference. This has led the foreign press into speculations on Allied plans for new operations.

The Turkish - Syrian frontier has again been closed.

A report from the U.S. Navy Department states that, in the first half of 1943, American shipyards built more than 6,000 warships, or 250% more than in the same period in 1942. The War Department has announced that more than 9,000 planes were built for the fleet during the first half of 1943. This figure was equal to the whole year's production in 1942. The total number of U.S. Navy casualties since the outbreak of war are given as 27,079 men comprising 8,235 killed, 4,736 wounded, 10,523 missing and 3,585 taken prisoner.

Radio Algier announced on 11 Jul. that contact has been established between the Allied Supreme Command and the resistance movement in France. At the same time that the "Second Front" was opened on the continent, the "Secret Front" in France was given detailed instructions by the Allied Supreme Command.

Conference with Chief, Naval Staff:

A. Raw material quotas:



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Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament asked for a decision from Commander in Chief, Navy as to whether a further request should be made to the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions for the extra iron required for the 3rd quarter of 1943 (20,000 tons for artillery ammunition, 10,000 tons for mines, depth charges and nets). Commander in Chief, Navy was at first of the opinion that these quantities could be requisitioned without difficulty from the ship-building steel stocked in the Dutch area. The quotas to be assigned by the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition under the 1943 naval building program could be correspondingly cut. In the opinion of Naval (Ship) Construction Division this would cause no difficulties. It would, however, be equally feasible to avoid this detour and achieve the same end by a direct request as the ministry felt itself just as responsible for providing material for weapons as for ship building.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided that the latter method should be adopted.

Furthermore, Commander in Chief, Navy decided that the system of special-purpose quotas should be maintained for naval requirements not comprised in the 1943 naval construction program. The distribution of these raw materials would thus remain in the hands of the Navy. This arrangement is in accordance with the agreement stipulated between Commander in Chief, Navy and Reich Minister Speer.

B. Protection of submarine under constructions and repair:

Naval (Ship) Construction Division stated that present plans for concrete shelters over the docks are not sufficient even for half of the submarines under construction. Nor could the situation be adequately remedied by withdrawal to the eastern area.

Naval Shore Construction Division submitted a suggestion for the construction of an entirely new submarine building yard, to be completely covered by concrete shelters and organized in accordance with the principles of the most modern serial production. Yearly output would be at least 52 boats and building time would be 18 weeks from the laying of the keel until leaving the yard.

Naval Construction Division, Supply and Finance Branch pointed out that, although this project would in the long run yield better results than the immediate measures suggested, the main

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thing at the moment is to achieve speedy results.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided that both programs should be started as urgent measures and that the industrial capacity required for protected submarine building on a large scale should be requested.

C. Situation:

I. Situation of the Army:

There are no important changes in the Operation "Citadelle." No great progress has been possible against the very strong enemy. In the northern part of the battle front, a regrouping of our forces has become necessary.

II. Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the status of enemy landing vessels and tonnage in connection with the landing operation in Sicily, according to the statement in War Diary of 11 Jul.

Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division remarked that, according to information so far received, the situation in Sicily appeared to be developing not unfavorably. Parts of the "Hermann Goering" tank division have reached the coast near Gela. The battle is beginning.

In a highly restricted circle:

III. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch, on the distribution and state of readiness of our own and Italian naval forces as per statement in War Diary of 11 Jul.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that the transfer of the operations officer of Commander PT Boats to 3rd PT Boat Flotilla to replace the Flotilla Commander who is out of action, should be expedited in every way.

After scrutinizing the question of our own and Italian operations, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that the following directive be sent to German Naval Command, Italy:

"The following is to be transmitted immediately to Admiral Riccardi as a telegram from Commander in Chief, Navy:

According to our information, it may be presumed that the enemy

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attack in Sicily is being made with such strong forces that further large-scale operations in other places are not to be expected before the end of the Sicilian campaign.

A successful defense against this attack is, therefore, of decisive importance to Italy and to the whole conduct of the war.

In my opinion it is of the utmost importance for the success of our troops that the naval forces, besides maintaining our supply traffic, should above all attack the enemy's rear communications on which the existence of the invading forces depends.

I have therefore ordered all German PT boats to be used in the defense of Sicily since I expect good results from their operations against the massed enemy targets on the Sicilian coast.

But as I see the situation, operations by Italian light surface forces, especially at night would be even more successful.

Furthermore, I also think it advisable to move the Italian battleships closer to the battle area in order that they may be ready to act in this decisive situation.

With friendly greetings, yours most respectfully

Doenitz, Grand - Admiral."

IV. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division reported that, for the submarine mining operations with the new firing devices, 250 TMB-mines will be ready by the end of August and 600 TMC-mines from September. In order for this firing to function properly, care must be taken that the mine is not prematurely activated by heavy seas. It is not planned to use the new firing device in SMA-mines as these can only be used as ground-mines.

Chief, Naval Staff approved these plans.

Special Items:

I. In the evening, the following reply to Commander in Chief, Navy's personal teletype to Admiral Riccardi was received from Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy:

"Riccardi will submit the teletype to the Duce and will then reply. Yesterday the Duce gave orders that the battleships

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were not to be used for the present because continuous enemy air reconnaissance makes surprise operations impossible and the numerical weakness of our sea and air forces makes combat with a fore-warned enemy hopeless. All PT boats and submarines have been ordered into action. The situation on land is serious. Both on land and at sea the trouble lies in the weakness of the Axis air force which would have to be trebled in order to gain some measure of success."

For order 1/Skl 1989/43 Gkdos. Chefs. and the message received as per 1/Skl 1995/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Comment will follow after submission to Chief, Naval Staff.

II. The results of the discussion held on 5 Jul. between Commander in Chief, Navy and Reich Minister Speer on the performance of the 1943 naval construction program (see War Diary 5 Jul.) are, briefly, as follows:

1. Commander in Chief, Navy pointed out that, (at this stage) in 1943, only the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition was in a position to carry out so extensive a project as the 1903 naval construction program. Reich Minister Speer declared that he was prepared to carry out the program and to assume responsibility for it. The purpose of the discussion was to arrange for cooperation and for distribution of tasks.

2. Commander in Chief, Navy explained that the bulk of the research and development work would have to remain under the Navy for the following reasons: many years' military experience, strategic and tactical requirements, use of weapons, ships' readiness for action, leak repair service, sea and weather conditions, the questions of manning, supervision and inspection, space on board, consultations with operational units, and the coordination and adjustment of operational views which must be done by High Command, Navy which is correspondingly staffed. The commission must be headed by a naval officer.

Result: Establishment of a "Central Commission for Shipbuilding." The task of the commission is to develop ship types according to military and technical requirements and experience of armament production, and to prepare the designs and final drafts. Commander in Chief, Navy will assign a naval officer as director of the commission as well as the naval members. Reich Minister Speer will provide the production specialists,

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constructors and scientists. If the Central Commission should be unable to reach agreement, the decision will rest with Commander in Chief, Navy. The development of special weapons will also remain under the Navy but, from the outstart, with the participation and support of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition.

3. The production and the responsibility therefor will be assumed by Reich Minister Speer and his commissions. A new "Central Committee for Shipbuilding", with special committees and working committees, will be formed under the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition. General Director Merker is being considered for the post of director. Merchant ship building will also be handled by the Central Committee. A separate special committee for ship machinery construction will continue to exist within the Central Committee but it is planned to exclude engines and to combine them all (vehicle-, tank-, ship-, and aircraft engines) in a special "Central Committee for Engines." It is planned to dissolve the present "Central Committee for naval underwater weapons" and to attach the various special committees to the central committees for the similar production.

The committees will be responsible for the control of production, i.e., new construction as well as maintenance and repair, for employment of firms, and for execution and supervision of the orders within the specified times. High Command Navy will issue the orders, control acceptances, including those now current, by the Naval Construction Supervisors and will handle the accounts.

For copy of the relevant report by Chief, Bureau of Naval Armaments see War Diary Part B, Vol. V.

III. In accordance with Chief, Naval Staff's decision on the Italian request that the departure from Bordeaux of the last two rubber-transport submarines now being placed in readiness, be cancelled, (see War Diary, 8 and 9 Jul), Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has sent the following letter to the Italian Admiral attached to Naval Staff:

"The question of whether it is at the moment, advisable for the two AQUILA boats (Finzi and Bagnolini) still in Bordeaux, to sail at an early date, has been closely studied by Naval Staff. In order to reinforce their anti-aircraft defense, Naval Staff has provided one 2 cm quadruple mount anti-aircraft gun for each boat. The boats' departure was postponed until these new anti-aircraft weapons were installed. Naval Staff believes

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that this step will greatly improve the conditions for the submarines' departure from the Bay of Biscay and that when the installation is completed, there is no further need to postpone the submarines' departure on tactical grounds.

The supply situation of the Axis powers, as set out by Commander in Chief, Navy in his letter to His Excellency Riccardi, makes it advisable, in the opinion of Naval Staff, to expedite the dispatch of the two AQUILA boats as much as possible and to emphasize once more the great importance for the general war effort, of using the remaining AQUILA submarines and, possibly, other Italian transport submarines to fetch raw caoutchouc."

IV. Due to the incidents reported in connection with the bringing-in of submarine U "564", Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West, by order of Naval Staff, has issued a basic directive to the destroyer and torpedo boat flotillas attached to the group concerning the "Dispersal of boats sailing in company in the war zone." Information copies of the directive were sent to Commander, Destroyers, Commanding Admiral, Defenses West, Group North Fleet and High Command Navy, Naval Staff.

For copy as per 1/Skl 19701/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

V. On the instructions of Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Commanding General, South has commented on Naval Staff's suggestion in regard to the use of commando troops on the North African coast and the establishment of a "Brigade Sued" (see War Diary 14 Jun.), and has advised Supreme Command, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, German Intelligence Service in Foreign Countries and High Command, Navy, Naval Staff of his views. In the opinion of Commanding General, South the present combat duties of our naval and air forces do not permit of frequent and extensive operations for the transport of commando units. It is therefore impossible to create diversions on the desired scale.

Commanding General, South will, nevertheless, try to exploit the few available possibilities for isolated operations and again requests that he be assigned units of the Brandenburg Division suitable for this purpose. It is particularly desirable that the groups concerned should already have had some parachute training and should also have been trained for

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sabotage missions. The unit of the Brandenburg Division now in Sardinia is fully engaged on special missions; none of these forces could be withdrawn without detriment to these operations.

Naval Staff concludes from this that Commanding General, did not fully comprehend the import of Naval Staff's original suggestion. Furthermore, as the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force were strongly in favor of the "Brigade Sued", on the occasion of the visit of Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, it would be most regrettable if the unfavorable views of Commanding General South, should lead to rejection of the plan by the Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff.

Naval Staff therefore hastened to submit to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff its own comments on the statement by Commanding General South and, after explaining that the latter's objections are apparently based solely on the difficulty of execution arising from the present war situation, continued as follows:

"These objections, however, may be countered by the argument that an apparent reduction of combat activities may produce effects in other places which will ultimately influence the comparative strengths more favorably than the direct action of the air and naval forces which, in the present war situation, is largely neutralized by the enemy's defenses.

Even if the performance of the action is regarded as being entirely dependent on the possibility of using our naval and air forces for the transport of the commando troops, there may be periods in which our forces will not be so heavily involved so that the planned operations may be possible in the future. But the establishment of a suitable organization and the assembling and training of a troop takes time, and might be impossible to accomplish quickly enough at later date when a favorable opportunity might perhaps arise.

The present somewhat uncertain situation in the Mediterranean makes it particularly necessary to watch for all possible changes and to be prepared for any future operation which may offer any chance of success.

Therefore, having examined the statement of Commanding General, South, Naval Staff does not consider that the possibility of operations behind the enemy front in Africa has been disproved, and repeats herewith its suggestion.

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It should, however, be pointed out that occasional, small-scale sabotage operations, under camouflage, as planned by Commanding General, South, will hardly have the effect of compelling the enemy to employ more forces in protection and defense. Such isolated actions would have no connection with the operational plan on which Naval Staff's suggestion is based.

VI. A report dated 18 Jun, on the special task of Chief, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division, Navigation Branch for "Holzauge" as per OKM Skl H 1260/43 Gkdos. is attached to War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. On the basis of this report, Chief Hydrographic and Meteorological Division decided on 12 Jun. (Jul.?) that the "Holzauge" station should be disbanded for the time being without replacement and that the remaining crew should be picked up by a Do 26 plane after destroying the ship and the equipment. This has meanwhile been done by a submarine.

VII. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has issued a map survey of the coastal convoys detected in the main traffic centers of the waters around England during the month of Jun. 1943. For copy as per 1/Skl 21110/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D, "Convoy traffic in English Waters." Due to lack of adequate information as to numbers, it is impossible to obtain a clear picture of the strength of this convoy traffic during the period covered by the report. The rhythm of the traffic has not changed as compared with our previous information. The apparent increase in traffic between the Thames and Portsmouth is worth noting.

Examination of the zone limits for aerial mine operations along the coasts of England in connection with the planned large-scale use of mines with new firing devices, showed that:

a. Because of our own mine fields and the radar location and superior defenses of the enemy, the narrower Channel areas can no longer be used by our PT boats. Therefore the sea areas between a line from Ramsgate southeastwards to  $51^{\circ}12'N$ ,  $1^{\circ}39'E$  and a line along the longitude of Brighton are released by the Navy for unrestricted aerial mine operations by the German Air Force.

b. North of the Humber mouth, the convoy route can be reached by PT boats up to the latitude of Flamborough Head. It therefore seems advisable to release these waters on both sides of the convoy route for PT boat operations and to revise



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the previously arranged limits.

Naval Staff has submitted a corresponding proposal to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff requesting approval and the amendment or amplification of the basic order of Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff of 30 Jun. 1942 with maps. (See War Diary 13 Jun. 1942). At the same time Naval Staff stated that of the new firing devices, only the DM 1 gear can be released for Air Force use in the "yellow" areas. Use in the "yellow" areas of the new all-acoustic or combined-acoustic devices is prohibited because of the danger to our PT boats operating in those waters.

Situation on 12 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has informed Ship "28" by radiogram 2251, that, according to information from our Naval Attaché, Tokyo, two Japanese submarines are operating against merchant shipping north of 20°S and west of 90°E.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-nine planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. A British ship in the operational area near Cape Ortegal reported eight of our planes flying west in BF 7187 at 1540 and two contact planes near a convoy in BF 7184 at 1640. From 2005 to 2050, reports from British ships on an air attack on the "Faith" convoy were intercepted.

One British ship was located at 0612 in AL 9760, one at 0730 in the area between 51°45' to 52°19' north and 22° to 24°00' west, one at 1202 in BF 7730 and one at 2006 in BF 7350.

Reconnaissance planes of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reported at 0710, 4 destroyers in CG 2221 on a course 320°, at 0750, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 ship of unspecified tonnage on a northerly course, at high speed, in BF 7858; at 1540, 1 destroyer, 4 patrol boats on a northerly course in BF 7519 (uncertain); at 1825, a patrol vessel sailing south in CG 4249; and at 1925, 1 merchantman and 1 destroyer with a plane also on course 180° in CG 4752.

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The British Admiralty has announced that in the engagement off the coast of Brittany on 10 Jul., out of the German force of 3 torpedo boats with PT boat escort, 1 torpedo boat and 1 PT boat were probably sunk. All Allied ships were said to have returned to port. Casualties were light.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared off Biarritz, one off the Gironde and one off Brest. The approach and the roads of La Pallice have been closed because of suspected ground-mines. Mine-laying by planes was observed at the northern end of Ile de Croix.

Destroyers Z "32", Z"24" and Z "37" of 8th Destroyer Flotilla left for Royan roads; the MOEVE, the JAGUAR, and torpedo boat T "19" left for Le Verdon. Torpedo firing practice by 8th Destroyer Flotilla in the cleared training area outside the 200 m line near Steppe point is planned for 13 and 14 Jul. Except during the exercise, the ships will stand off in the deep water to the west.

In regard to the views reported by Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West on the defense of incoming and outgoing submarines and on operations against enemy anti-submarine forces in the Bay of Biscay, (see War Diary 9 and 10 Jul.), Naval Staff has forwarded the following views and instructions to the Group:

1. Regular destroyer or torpedo boat escort for the submarines as far as 7.5° or 6° does provide the required security as this method will not furnish protection in the main danger area. On the other hand, the extremely difficult situation in regard to fuel oil excludes the possibility of any great immediate increase in the oil allotments which are already inadequate for regular operations by the destroyers and torpedo boats available in West Area. Likewise, the difficulties of assembling the submarines in company, as required, can hardly be solved unless the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West are considerably reinforced, which, however, cannot be done at present. The air threat in Atlantic coast berths, and the enemy counter action to be expected, must be taken into account. Regular destroyer or torpedo boat escort up to 100 miles beyond the outer point is therefore ruled out. Destroyers and torpedo boats will be used as before only for assistance to submarines and for escort in special cases. The plan to use anti-aircraft submarines between about

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80 - 120 is approved. Otherwise, some protection for the submarines can, as heretofore, be provided only by means of increased activity by our air forces. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has again promised to investigate the status of air strength on the Atlantic Coast.

2. Naval Staff concurs with the Groups' views in regard to the use of destroyers and/or torpedo boats against enemy submarine chasers. The steps already underway in regard to air reconnaissance to locate the enemy anti-submarine forces are approved. Favorable opportunities for using destroyers or torpedo boats already at sea against enemy submarine chasers are to be exploited.

For copy of teletype 1/Skl I op 19585/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up because of the bad weather. Only Channel Island convoys were running.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

At 0410, minesweeper M "203" struck a mine in AN 8581 and her bow was blown off. She is being towed to Fjmuiden. At 1935, two British fighters made a low-level strafing attack on the tow of Ymuiden. Minesweepers M "203" and M "204" suffered casualties.

Two ELM/J mines were cleared north of Terschelling. No other events of importance were reported.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Eighteen planes were detected over the North Sea and no enemy aircraft in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. Air reconnaissance by 5th Air Force produced no tactical results.

2. Own Situation:

A submarine hunt by two BV 138 planes in the northern entrance to Petsamo fjord produced no results. According to a report from the Air Force General Staff, one of our convoys was attacked by 25 enemy planes near Vardoe from 0046 - 0125. Seven planes were shot down by the alerted fighter protection.

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Mine barrage NW 41 - 43 was laid according to plan by mine-layer SKAGERRAK and one naval landing craft. For barrage report see teletype 0120.

Forty-five ships were escorted to the north and 35 ships to the south. Eleven ships in the Arctic Coast area and 7 ships in the North Coast area had to discontinue or delay their voyage due to lack of escort.

The battle group reports that, during exercises it was found that the maximum speed of the TIRPITZ on 7 Jul. was three knots under the result obtained by New Construction Trials Command. Reason: Increased draft, foul bottom and minor engine defects. For details, see teleprint 2100.

These consequences of prolonged docking are probably unavoidable.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the afternoon, very strong air activity was observed over Kronstadt Bay. Altogether 31 patrol boats and PT boats and one submarine were observed at Lavansari. A convoy of 6 patrol boats, 1 PT boat, 4 tugs, and 6 barges entered the harbor from the east. At 1950, 6 planes attacked our minesweepers in Narva Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Seventeen vessels and minesweeping planes made route checks in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic.

Admiral, Denmark has reported on Danish measures against further attempts to desert to Sweden which he regards as adequate and satisfactory. For copy of the report, see teletype 1959.

Minesweeping in the submarine training area off Memel and off the Bay of Ahrensburg was completed without any mines being cleared.

German light planes bombed the landing stage at Lavnsari during the day.

Transport and escort traffic throughout the Baltic Sea area was carried out without incident. The cruiser ADMIRAL SCHEER was escorted out on her way from Swinemuende to the east.

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V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Anti-aircraft submarine U "441" had a heavy engagement with three enemy planes in BF 4894 and sustained casualties by strafing. The submarine turned back to port because the captain was wounded. No other reports have been received.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day, enemy planes made strafing attacks on traffic installations in West Area. Several locomotives were damaged. One enemy plane was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery in the Abbeville area.

For reconnaissance results of Air Commander, Atlantic see Enemy Situation, West Area.

For details of the attack on the convoy in the St. Vincent area on 11 Jul., see "Daily Situation" and teletype 1420. Two enemy planes were shot down by Ju 88 planes 400 - 500 miles west of Bordeaux. The total result reported was one passenger ship of 18 - 20,000 BRT probably sunk and one passenger ship of 15,000 BRT heavily damaged. We suffered no losses.

During the night of 12 Jul., strong enemy air formations were reported flying through North Italy. The main target of attack was Turin. One plane was shot down over Milan. Off the northern coast of the Bay of Biscay, one plane was shot down near St. Pol.

Last night, 32 of our bombers attacked Grimsby, nine fighter-bombers attacked London and four fighter bombers attacked Ramsgate.

Mediterranean Theater:

In Sicily, German and Italian bomber formations kept up

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a continuous attack in cooperation with the land troops and especially in support of the "Hermann Goering" Tank Division. Heavy bomber formations and torpedo planes (the report does not specify whether they were German or Italian) made several attacks on ships and landing facilities with good results.

Light and heavy enemy bomber formations repeatedly attacked our troops, as well as several airfields, in Sicily with increasing violence, causing considerable losses to our troops in personnel and equipment. Runways at some of the airfields were heavily damaged. Another attack was made by extremely strong forces on Messina and Reggio. It is impossible to land at the airfield. Low level air attacks were directed mainly against supply traffic in the Canicatti area. One Liberator and 12 fighters were shot down. For further details, see Daily Situation. During our bombing operations in the night of 11 Jul., one tanker was sunk and hits were scored on 16 merchantmen and transports as well as on one anti-aircraft cruiser in the Gela area, two transports and one ammunition steamer were sunk, eleven freighters and transports were damaged, some of them heavily and several landing boats were hit in the Avola - Cape Passero area.

Eastern Front:

On 11 Jul., 70 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front. No special reports have been received from 4th Air Force. For the successful defense by 5th Air Force in the escort service in the Vardoe area, see Situation Norway.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy landing in Sicily:

In regard to the position on land, Commanding General, South reports that, during the morning, the situation had become precarious due to attacks launched from the main landing points by strong enemy forces, but the attacks were repulsed and German forces brought up to patrol the gaps between the various German battle groups, and by evening, the situation could again be regarded as stabilized. Enemy pressure is at present strongest round Canicatti.

On the afternoon of 11 Jul., the enemy made new landings at Licata and to the west of that port. In the coastal area between Licata and Augusta, a total of 40 LST and 109 LCI and LCT as well as 74 freighters totalling about 500,000 BRT were

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counted. Six LST and 30 freighters for about 150,000 BRT were reported approaching the southeast coast of Sicily. Thus about half of the LST and almost two-thirds of the LCI and LCT used in the landing have already been withdrawn, whether for reloading or for other operations remains to be seen. No great withdrawal of freighter tonnage from the landing places is yet noticeable.

From 0200, Trapani was bombarded by heavy units 16 kms out to sea. Launching of landing boats is also said to have been observed. But no landings were made in the Trapani area and the formation departed. A battleship and a cruiser bombarded Siculiana, 6 miles northwest of Empedocle, at 1018 and Empedocle itself at 1040. In the afternoon, the coast between Augusta and Catania was heavily bombarded from the sea by seven heavy units including a battleship. According to Italian reports, enemy assault boats landed at Augusta and south of Augusta at 1435. At 1500, enemy torpedo boats were sighted in the harbor of Augusta. According to further Italian reports, there were 6 cruisers, 10 miles north-northeast of Catania at 1840.

At 0720, our air reconnaissance reported 4 destroyers or torpedo boats on easterly courses off the north coast of the island, 20 miles northwest of Palermo.

It has been confirmed by photographic reconnaissance that Malta is being used as a supply base. On the afternoon of 11 Jul., there were 2 destroyers, 9 submarines, 30 PT boats including 15 motor gun boats and about 30,000 BRT of merchant shipping tonnage at La Valetta.

In the night of 10 Jul., an Italian submarine sank an enemy cruiser off Syracuse by four torpedoes. 7th PT Boat Flotilla left Cagliari at 2030 on 11 Jul. for operations against the enemy formation reported off Trapani, but was unable to locate it. Only a submerging submarine was sighted 25 miles north of Trapani. The flotilla put in to Mondello, north of Palermo, during the morning of 12 Jul. During the day, 3 boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla and 4 boats of 7th PT Boat Flotilla moved to Messina. From there, they are to operate off the east coast of the island during the night of 12 Jul.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that Salerno has been assigned as the new base for 3rd PT Boat Flotilla and Reggio for 7th PT Boat Flotilla. Permission will be requested of the Italian Admiralty for the flotillas to operate out of Messina, Crotona, Trapani or Taranto, as the situation demands.

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While en route to her operational area in CN 26, submarine U "561" was engaged by 3 enemy PT boats off Messina and was sunk by a torpedo. Submarine U "375" will occupy CN 31 and U "453" will go to CN 34.

Naval Staff has issued the following directive to German Naval Command, Italy, and Commander Submarines, Italy, with copy to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff and High Command, Army, General Staff of the Army:

1. Evaluation of photographic reconnaissance on the afternoon of 10 Jul. reveals that of the total transport tonnage in the Mediterranean, the following amount is being used in the landing operation in Sicily: LST, about 95%, LCT and LCI, about 70%, Transports, about 20%, Freighters, about 50%. Therefore it may now be certainly assumed that, for the time being, the enemy has all his forces concentrated in the Sicilian operation and that further landings at other places need not be expected in the near future.

2. As the enemy has succeeded in establishing bridgeheads in Sicily, every effort must now be made to prevent their reinforcement. Accordingly, the PT boats will operate mainly out of the Messina Straits off the south-east coast of Sicily. Operational plans for German and Italian submarines already conform with this arrangement and are approved.

3. Besides this, it is extremely important that our own supplies should be safeguarded to the greatest possible extent. Defense of the Straits of Messina is thus essential, and maximum employment of PT boats for this purpose.

In regard to Naval Staff's directive of 11 Jul. transferring the whole of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Aegean German Naval Command, Italy reports:

"The outcome of the battle of Sicily will probably decide Italy's future attitude. The German Army and Air Force are bringing up more forces into action. Supply requirements are increasing. The enemy Air Force is attacking powerfully. There is a chronic lack of escort vessels. The withdrawal of the first group of motor minesweepers has weakened the defense of Sicily as the Gela barrages could not be laid. Further withdrawals of boats which are specially suited for escort service would, at the present stage, palpable weaken our protection and seriously affect the reputation of the Navy."



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Naval Staff has therefore decided as follows:

"After evaluation of reconnaissance results up to the evening of 10 Jul., Naval Staff is now convinced that at this time the enemy is concentrating all forces on the Sicilian operation and that therefore a landing in the Greek area is very unlikely before the end of the Sicilian operations. Concern for Greece can therefore be put aside in favor of the defense of Sicily which is now without doubt our main task. In cancellation of order 1/Skl 19633/43 Gkdos., Naval Staff therefore orders:

The 7 boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla which have not yet left for the Aegean will remain for the time being at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy."

The following report of the afternoon of 11 Jul., forwarded by Commanding General, South, from the Commanding Officer of Brigade Schmalz is regarded with the utmost concern:

1. No enemy attack has been made on Augusta up to now. The British have never entered Augusta. Nevertheless, the Italian garrison has blown up all guns and ammunition and set fire to a big fuel dump which is still burning on the afternoon of 11 Jul. The anti-aircraft artillery units at Augusta and Priolo have fired all their ammunition into the sea and blown up their guns.

2. On the afternoon of 11 Jul., not a single Italian soldier was still under any kind of command in the area of Brigade Schmalz. All the officers had already left their troops during the morning and had taken themselves off by car or bicycle to Catania and beyond. Italian soldiers are wandering about the streets and the countryside on their own or in small groups of up to five men. Many have thrown away their weapons and some have discarded their uniforms and put on blue overalls.

It is earnestly hoped that these are only isolated incidents. But if such disgraceful events are possible, it is to be feared that the Italian defense force in Sicily falls below expectations in every way.

2. Other reports on the enemy situation in the Mediterranean:

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At 0230, a convoy of 6 freighters left Gibraltar for an unknown destination. At 1950, 4 U. S. freighters with 3 U. S. submarine chasers arrived from the Atlantic.

At 0900, our air reconnaissance reported 30 ships sailing southeast, 20 miles north of Bizerte. Two battleships were seen at Bone in the evening. A convoy of 6 freighters on an easterly course, southeast of Cape Spartivento, fired a valid German recognition signal when our plane flew over it.

In the afternoon and evening of 11 Jul., submarines were detected near Cape Vaticano and 20 miles south of Toulon.

Up to midnight, radio intelligence continuously intercepted air reconnaissance reports from the Tyrrhenian Sea and from the area west of Corsica. Several air attacks were ordered consequent to many sighting reports on our convoys.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, uninterrupted reconnaissance by our planes from Bengasi to Port Said detected only one convoy of 3 small ships east of Sidi Barani.

According to an intelligence report received via Naval Information Office, Istanbul, transport vessels have been assembling at Port Said and Alexandria since 5 Jul. British circles anticipate an attack on the Dodecanese or Crete.

According to an Intelligence Report from Mellila on 11 Jul., the British are planning a landing in southeast France for which 100,000 troops are being held in readiness. It is said that preparations are being made with France by agents, and that arms are being sent by submarines.

3. Other reports on our own situation in the Mediterranean:

The anti-aircraft corvette SG "13" which was damaged by aerial torpedo south of Naples on 11 Jul., has had to be beached.

Mine layers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN have moved from Maddalena to Toulon.

Submarine U "565" is returning slowly to Toulon from the Western Mediterranean.

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4. Sea Transport Situation:

No reports have been received.

5. Area of Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

The DRACHE and the BULGARIA, together with 4 motor minesweepers, left Piraeus for Patras for mine operations. From 2000 to 2030 on 11 Jul., an enemy submarine bombarded two villages in the Gulf of Salonika and sank 12 auxiliary sailing vessels and one steam-tug. A torpedo (which ran ashore) was recovered. Two naval landing craft and planes were sent out on a submarine hunt. Group South has called the attention of Commanding General, Southeast to the possibility of using this incident for propaganda purposes.

Group South has advised Naval Staff, for information, of its request to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans; Group West; Naval Command, North and High Command, Navy, General Naval Administration Bureau that the transportation of the batteries dispatched to Salonika be expedited in every possible way as they are urgently required in view of the development of the situation. For copy, see teletype 1505.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 11 Jul., three Russian planes were sighted in the area off Constantza.

Own Situation:

Due to bad weather, our naval forces were not in operation. Patrol positions were taken up according to schedule. Seven mines were cleared during check sweeps south of the Taman coast. Except to Temrjuk, no supply traffic was carried out due to weather conditions.

Admiral, Black Sea reports that the total supplies transported from 1 - 10 Jul., 1943 amounted to 36,266 tons, of which 21,019 were carried by the Navy.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has advised Naval Staff, for information, of the directive to 4th Air Force that the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Minesweeper Group be reinforced by three more minesweeping planes in excess of establishment, as it is necessary to increase the anti-aerial mine patrols in the Danube estuary and the western coastal areas of the Black sea.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance:

No special reports have been received.

Conference on the situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. A discussion was held on the attitude of the Italian Navy in the light of Admiral Riccardi's answer forwarded by Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy (see War Diary 12 Jul.). The reply did not touch on Chief, Naval Staff's suggestion that the Italian light naval forces be used for night operations against the enemy landing formations. Apparently it is considered that the destroyers are indispensable for the defense of the big battleships and that, like the latter, they must therefore be preserved. If the general policy of the Italians is to continue undeviatingly along the lines so far laid down by the Duce, it is hard to understand how there can be any restraint in regard to the use of their fleet at this decisive moment, or how considerations of the risk of facing superior enemy strength can bear any weight.

In regard to the question as to what Germany should do to gain control of the situation, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff alluded to the importance, from a strictly military point of view of a diversion on the Iberian Peninsula. The disadvantages to ourselves of such a step should not be ignored. It was a matter, however, of vital urgency to relieve and divide the pressure on the south flank of our European position at the point of highest tension. The defense of this position both in Italy and in the Balkans also confronts us with difficult military problems so long as the extraordinary tension of the Russian flank prevails. The first essential is to take quick and fundamental decisions calculated to avert the imminent danger of an enemy break-through in Italy. Italian defensive power has, unfortunately, proved to be even weaker than expected, apparently mainly due to bad leadership. The question is whether we are to help the Italians by all means still possible to hold their country against the enemy and if so whether we are in a position to bring up the necessary German troops quickly enough or whether, if this is not possible, we should attempt to improve the prospects of defense by trying to make German leadership effective also in the Italian forces - along the lines of the command arrangements made in May of this year by Chief, Naval Staff, for the supply traffic and escort service to Tunisia. This might, perhaps, at the last moment, induce the more willing Italian officers to make an effort such as to avert disaster, which

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in itself, would suffice to create a new situation.

Naval Staff, Operations Division will draft a proposal along these lines to be submitted by Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer.

Fuehrer's directive of 25 Jun. 1943, on operational command in Italy, was intended to ensure that German influence in the conduct of the war in the Italian theatre should keep pace with the increased amount of German troops sent, with a view to using the German forces to the best advantage. For copy as per l/Skl 19620/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. The directive was issued at a time when the Mediterranean situation had not yet become so serious. It does not, therefore, take into account Naval Staff's views, as outlined above, in regard to the strongest possible injection of German influence into the operational command.

Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported as the result of an investigation of the Italian Navy's fuel oil situation, stocks on 1 Jul. are estimated as having been 60,000 cubic meters. As German Naval Command, Italy has an additional reserve of 8,000 cubic meters, lack of action by the Italian Fleet could not be attributed to lack of fuel.

Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division also reported that Radio Intelligence had identified a special enemy air formation which has so far been observed only once, shortly before the attack against the dams in western Germany. All offices concerned have been informed.

Third Naval Landing Division is to be established by 1 Oct.

In a highly restricted circle:

III. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch: Naval attaché, Tokyo reports:

1. The Japanese fuel position is still very strained. The increased requirements can be met only by a reduction in quality. Even the Japanese submarines have for a long time been using oil of lower grade than "Kirschbluete."

The Naval Staff has advised that the promising Japanese Fleet operation that had been planned with the aim of cutting off sections of the U. S. fleet near Attu has had to be cancelled because of the fuel shortage.

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2. Total Japanese requirements amount to 9 million tons, of which, 4.5 million tons are needed for the Navy alone, including 0.5 million tons of aircraft gasoline. Heaviest consumption is by the supply fleet for the Army.

3. Total production is at present only 6.6 million tons comprising 3.0 million tons at Palembang (Sumatra) and Balikpapan (south Borneo) plus 3.6 million tons brought by tankers to be refined in Japan. By the middle of 1944, it is planned to increase production up to 10 million tons by building 300,000 tons of tanker space and by enlarging the refineries in the south.

4. When the Army and Navy air programs, which provide for construction of 25,000 planes by the end of 1944, are completed, gasoline consumption will go up to about 2.5 million tons.

5. Production in northern Borneo and in Burma is so far insignificant.

IV. In regard to the distribution of our naval forces in the Italian area, Chief, Naval Staff reiterated that offensive operations against the landing forces and their cover and protection of our supply lines to the island will remain the chief task as long as the fighting in this area lasts. Withdrawal of the units in the Aegean area is not yet necessary. However, this possibility, which may suddenly arise, must be kept continually in mind.

Special Items:

I. At the evening situation report of 12 Jul., Admiral, Fuhrer Headquarters was briefed as follows in regard to the use of the new mine-firing devices in the Mediterranean:

I. Use of the new device in the Sicilian landing area is inadvisable as its water depth limit is only 25 meters (?) and because

1. on the east coast, only a very small strip is of suitable depth.

2. on the south coast, where there is shallow coastal water, the big landing vessels move only at very low speed or are moored, so that the pressure box or acoustic firing device would lose much of its effect. Pressure boxes are unlikely to be effective against landing craft.

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3. our naval forces cannot reach the waters in question.

4. Use by the Air Force would greatly endanger security as the shallow coastal waters are too narrow and there would be a risk of the mines falling on land or being recovered from the water.

II. In the jumping off areas in North Africa use of the new firing devices is not advocated because

1. suitable target areas with the required depth of water are to be found only in the immediate vicinity of ports and up to 5 miles seawards from La Goulette.

2. these areas can be reached only by the Air Force.

3. in view of the strong defense, the security threat is very great (planes shot down over land or recovery of the mines by divers in the clear water).

III. Use of the firing devices off ports in our own zone of influence as protection against landings is dangerous, as we have still no means of clearing these mines, besides which their operational possibilities are greatly restricted because of the steep coasts.

IV. Summing up: The Grand Admiral strongly disadvised use of the new firing devices in the Mediterranean since their effectiveness in that area would be very limited and the success of their large-scale use against England might be compromised. Moreover, it would involve too great a threat to security with the resulting risk that the new weapon might soon be turned against ourselves. There is no objection to the use of the older firing devices, including the A 105 by the Air Force.

According to information from Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer abandoned the plan to use these mines on the basis of this report.

II. On 10 Jul., Commander in Chief, Navy issued an order for the execution of the 1943 naval construction program and expressed the hope that in view of the serious situation, all offices concerned in the new arrangement will spare no effort in the fulfilment of their duties. In cooperation with Reich Minister Speer, the Navy's task which difficult conditions

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render increasingly heavy, must be accomplished, also in the field of warship construction.

For Copy of the order as per 1/Skl 19952/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. As part of the progress report on improvements in weapons and equipment for naval warfare ordered by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, Underwater Obstacles Branch has compiled a survey of the development of mining and barrage equipment during this war up to 1 Jul. 1943. For copy of 1/Skl 19520/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

IV. Since the beginning of Jul. 1943, the Quartermaster Division of the German Navy has been negotiating with the Royal Italian Navy through Naval Attache, Rome on the delivery of torpedoes, reserve engines, spare parts etc. for the Italian PT boats taken over by the German Navy in the Black Sea. These negotiations have so far led to no positive results because, for example, the Italian Navy made the requested torpedo supply upon a corresponding reduction in current deliveries of Italian aerial torpedoes to Germany.

Naval Staff has requested, through the Italian Liaison Staff that the Italian Admiralty should intervene with the Italian naval offices concerned in favor of Naval Staff's demands. For copy of the relative letter 1/Skl I m 19326/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

V. The Japanese have expressed special concern in regard to the protection of the FLIEDER's berth against air attack. Investigation at Bordeaux has revealed that the shelter is only 102 meters long as compared with the boat's length of 108 meters, while 110 meters had been originally reckoned with.

Tokyo has expressed the hope that, if the shelter is not long enough, the German Navy may build an extension to it, which would be worth doing as the FLIEDER would not be the last boat to be expected from Japan.

As it is planned to get the Japanese to participate in the transport submarine operations it is desirable to dispel these fears.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has asked Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Submarine Section for the necessary details.



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For copy of letter 1/Skl I. opa 2003/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

VI. Naval Command, Baltic has submitted a detailed situation following the recent tour of inspection by A I East - Ops Staff - to the Leningrad area, Gulf of Finland, in the course of which thorough discussions and exchange of views were held with Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, Admiral, Baltic Countries Army High Command 18 and 1st Air Force and with the Finnish Naval Staff on the situation and the conduct of the war in the Gulf of Finland. For copy as per 1/Skl 1848/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Chief, Naval Staff discussed the strategic parts of the report in his last report to the Fuehrer so that revision and dissemination to Supreme Command Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff and General Staff of the Army is superfluous.

VII. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has evaluated an article by a well-known naval expert published in the Daily Telegraph on 1 May 1943 on the increasing importance of the British small-warship formations. For copy as per 1/Skl 20880/43 get. see War Diary, Part D, Volume "Evaluation of Information on Foreign Navies." The report shows the method and energy with which the British are adapting themselves to both the offensive and defensive problems raised by this war in the widespread coastal waters from Norway to Quessant, in the Mediterranean, in West Africa and in East Asia.

Situation on 13 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Further information on the situation in the Southwest Pacific was forwarded to Ship "28" by radiogram 0858 and all ships in foreign waters were informed on the movements of enemy steamers by radiogram 0923.

Naval Staff has informed Naval Attaché, Tokyo that the arrival of the second AQUILA boat at the rendezvous point is unpredictable. Probably like the AQUILA V, she has been lost, so that the AQUILA VI - still in the Atlantic - is probably travelling alone. (see telegram 1045).

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No reports have been received from our ships.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night of 12 Jul., strong air activity was observed along the entire Atlantic coast, apparently for mine laying operations. The shooting down of one plane near St. Pol was already reported on 12 Jul. At 2310, a suspicious rowing boat was sighted near the Pauillac floating dock. It succeeded in evading our careful search. At 0949 on 13 Jul., Radio Intelligence detected a vessel, probably a submarine, 150 miles west of La Pallice. This was later confirmed by a salvo of six torpedoes, which fortunately missed their target fired against one of our submarines in the same area.

Our air reconnaissance reported, at 0811, 5 vessels including 1 cruiser, and 1 destroyer on varying courses, at medium speed, 20 miles west of Finisterre and, at 2015, 6 ships, presumably warships, with one plane on course 190° at medium speed in BF 7522 (northeast of Ferrol). If both these were the same formation and were identical with the ships sighted on 12 Jul. in the same waters, the presence of anti-submarine groups of cruisers, destroyers and guard ships with planes would definitely be confirmed.

At 0905, two destroyers were on varying courses in BE 6735.

In the area of 19th Air Group, 59 planes were observed over the outer Bay of Biscay up to 14° W.

Group West reports that radar activity by the same British ships in the big grid square BF 70 has been observed three times in May, four times in Jun. and five to seven times between 1 and 12 Jul. and gives a list of sightings of light British forces in this area reported between 9 and 12 Jul. The Group concludes from this that these forces are presumably on submarine patrol or submarine chasing and reports: "It remains to be seen whether this is, in fact, a regular submarine hunt or whether it is merely a matter of escort forces or destroyers on transfer from England to Gibraltar that have been ordered to hunt submarines in this area en route. If submarine hunting is the force's main assignment the cruisers must be intended as systematic support for the destroyers. Operations by our surface forces are not yet advisable until more information is available. The matter will be followed up."

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Information received on the evening of 12 Jul. and on 13 Jul. was not considered in this statement. It will probably contribute strongly to confirming the above suspicion.

According to unconfirmed intelligence reports from Portugal, six large British warships passed Viano di Castello towards the south at 0430.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Enemy planes attacked Brest North airfield from 0644 to 0758. Four FW 190 planes certainly shot down 7 out of 17 Halifaxes on their return flight, 120 miles west of Brest, and probably shot down an eighth. Our success in bringing down enemy planes was limited by lack of fuel and ammunition.

Because of new mine danger, the departure for exercises of 8th Destroyer Flotilla and 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla was delayed till 2300. Escort and patrol services were carried out without incident.

Channel Coast:

Escort and patrol services were carried out according to schedule.

Group West has forwarded excerpts from the battle report of minesweeper M "153" of 10 Jul. For copy, see teletype 1925. The possibility mentioned in the report that the boat was fired on for a time by torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" will be investigated by Commanding Admiral, Defenses West on 14 Jul.

Group West also reported plans for convoy "Lothringen" from 25 to 29 Jul. Torpedo boat escort is not contemplated in view of the increase in enemy counter-action. For copy see teletype 0005/14.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Escort and patrol services were carried out only on a limited scale due to stormy weather.

No other important reports have been received.

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Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-eight planes were detected over the North Sea and no planes in the area of the Iceland Squadrons.

2. Own Situation:

On 11 Jul., the Ristiniemi Battery fired eleven rounds against trucks on the Ribachi Peninsula. On 12 Jul., a hunt by an He 195 plane for a sighted enemy submarine had to be abandoned because of the bad weather.

During an enemy air attack on 2 minesweepers and 2 motor minesweepers near Vardoe at 0055 on 12 Jul., four men of the motor minesweepers were slightly wounded. The shooting down of 8 of the 12 attacking planes by fighters which had received warning of the attack, has already been reported. From 0057 to 0101, 12 enemy planes attacked the Kiberg Battery where slight material damage was done. The Battery reported one plane shot down. The pilots of two of our fighters which crashed near Kiberg were picked up by motor minesweepers.

Minesweeping pinnaces from the large minesweeper PARIS cut two very rusty Russian anti-submarine inertia contact mines in the Breisound.

During a raid of the Kirkenes Harbor Protection Flotilla at Kongsfjord, small quantities of dry provisions and wireless parts were discovered.

Escort was provided for 23 northbound and 24 southbound ships. There are 10 ships in the Arctic Coast area awaiting escort.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has approved in principle the suggestion of Group North Fleet in regard to assembling the outgoing submarines into successive groups at Kristiansand South or Bergen (see War Diary 11 Jul.). For details, see teletype 1000.

On 10 Jul. Group North Fleet asked that the mining of the northern and southern approaches to Port Dickson be approved as a first submarine mine operation in connection with the repeat of "Wunderland" by the most experienced submarine commandants.

Naval Staff granted basic approval with the comment that

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unless the mines can be laid during surface navigation in the dark, a minimum depth of 18 meters is necessary.

Group North Fleet consequently postponed the operation until the second half of August when prospects will be better than at present as the area is not yet free of ice and war material transports will not be going through before August.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

The enemy carried out a heavy bombardment in Kronstadt Bay at noon during which ten direct hits were made on the Peterhof cathedral. Bomber and fighter formations in the coastal area bombed and strafed the Strelna dockyards and the coastal batteries. There was limited air activity over Tytters. Twelve tugs, 10 barges, 2 small freighters and 8 patrol boats left Kronstadt for the west.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic one ELM/J mine was cleared near Middelgrund.

Three leave transports, 8 troop transports, 2 tankers and 1 steamer were escorted in the Baltic Sea area.

Minesweeping in the Frben Narrows was continued.

V. Merchant Shipping:

Bureau of Naval Armament has prepared survey maps on Germany's cargo traffic with foreign countries and on cargo traffic between German seaports, including the Netherlands, during 1942. For copy, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

An enemy submarine in BF 5872 fired six torpedoes at U "592" which evaded the attack. This is the first submarine attack on the approach route for about eight months.

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It is possible that two other boats, of which no news has been received, have also been sunk by submarines.

An enemy plane which attacked U "333" was driven off after being hit by gunfire.

U "172" sank the steamer AFRICAN STAR (8,200 BRT) in GB 5466. No action reports have been received from the other theatres.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 147 planes in operation in the West Area. During the day, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 4 planes off the Atlantic coast. For fighter successes at sea west of Brest, see Situation West Area.

During the day, 6 fighter formations with about 90 planes were reported to have flown into Belgium and northern France without attacking. In the forenoon, 35 planes were observed flying into the coastal areas of western France and several others apparently on their way to Italy.

In the night of 13 Jul., the enemy made a large-scale attack concentrating on Aachen. Heavy damage was caused. For details, see Daily Situation. Twenty-one planes were reported shot down, one of them by anti-aircraft artillery.

Fifty-one bombers of 3rd Air Force were sent out against Hull and 10 bombers on harassing raids against the south coast of England.

Mediterranean Theater:

Throughout 13 Jul., the enemy air campaign in the land fighting in Sicily was continued with undiminished vigor. No enemy air activity was reported from the Italian area and from the islands of Corsica and Sardinia. An enemy torpedo plane attack on Palau in the night of 12 Jul. was unsuccessful. In attacks on Sicilian airfields, 4 Me 109 planes, 6 He 111 planes and 8 freight gliders were heavily damaged. Three of the attacking planes were shot down. Shortly after noon, Messina was attacked in four waves. Two-hundred explosive bombs were dropped. The attack was repeated less effectively during the night of 13 Jul. Three enemy planes were shot down by ships' anti-aircraft during a daylight attack on a convoy to Maddalena.

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Our bomber formations were in constant action against naval and land targets. During the night of 12 Jul. and on 13 Jul. 7 freighters for 30,000 BRT, were sunk and 10 freighters for 38,000 BRT heavily damaged. Hits were scored on 22 ships totalling 77,000 BRT as well as on 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer or light cruiser. The cruiser was hit by a torpedo. A landing boat of 250 tons was also sunk.

Since the beginning of the invasion up to 2400 on 12 Jul. our Air Force has sent out 745 bombers, heavy fighters and ground attack planes against enemy landing fleet. Thirteen ships for 77,500 BRT and 3 landing boats have been sunk, 10 ships for 58,000 BRT and 6 landing boats probably sunk. Seventy-six ships for 332,000 BRT, 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser and a large number of landing boats have been damaged. Three hundred and thirty-six of our fighters were in action and shot down 49 enemy planes and anti-aircraft guns have brought down 14 enemy planes. Bombers, heavy fighters and ground attack planes have destroyed 11 enemy planes.

Eastern Front:

On 12 Jul., 105 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front. No important reports have been received from 4th and 5th Air Forces.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy landing in Sicily:

According to an intelligence report of 11 Jul. from the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, the operation in Sicily is not the main thrust and further operations at other points are to be expected shortly. The report cannot be checked and is submitted with reservations.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that no further landings have been observed. During the night the enemy landing forces stand off to sea away from the coast. Photographic reconnaissance confirms that the number of landing vessels off the coast has decreased considerably. The focus of enemy operations has shifted to the Straits of Messina.

Air reconnaissance observed: at 0738, 2 battleships, one of them doubtful, and 20 large transports off Gela; at 0900, 30 ships off Muro di Porco; at 1140, 30 ships entering Augusta; at 1630, 2 battleships off Syracuse; at 1841, 1 battleship,

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2 cruisers, 1 destroyer off Empedocle; at 1942, 1 battleship at Bizerta. As no reconnaissance was made of Bone where 2 battleships had been reported on 12 Jul., and as the battleships off Gela and Empedocle may be these same units, it is impossible to make a definite statement as to the actual number of battleships in operation.

At 0915, 2 battleships or cruisers bombarded the coast near Augusta. An Italian dive bomber scored a hit on one of these vessels at noon.

From 1200 to 1600, the coast near Empedocle was bombarded by 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and 1 destroyer.

The damage caused by the enemy air attacks on Reggio and Messina on 12 Jul. has not affected our supply traffic.

Air attacks on 13 Jul. were directed against ports in the Straits of Messina and against Trapani.

Submarine U "407" reports that at midnight on 12 Jul. it fired four torpedoes against a light cruiser without success and at 0416 a salvo of two torpedoes against a destroyer and was then attacked with depth charges. An explosion was heard. An Italian submarine reported two explosions after firing three torpedoes against three destroyers southeast of Syracuse, at 2155 on 12 Jul. Another Italian submarine torpedoed and probably sank a steamer of 15,000 BRT north of Bone, at 0115 on 13 Jul.

During the night of 12 Jul., 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas with a total of 7 boats were in operation along the east coast of Sicily as far as Cape Passero outside coastal waters. Italian PT boats were in operation in the coastal zone. The flotillas did not leave Messina until 2230 and were delayed by motor gun boats so that they had to turn back at 0300 off Syracuse without contacting the enemy. On the way back the flotillas had an engagement with two groups of motor gun boats and three PT boats south of Messina at 0515. The enemy fired our own recognition signals and was hit many times. Two of our PT boats were hit. The flotillas put into Salerno where all seven vessels are at present out of action due to hits or engine trouble.

PT boat operations from the narrow Straits of Messina have not much chance of success while the nights are so short. It would be advisable to transfer the jump-off bases to the south coast of Calabria.



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Naval Staff has advised High Command Army, Operations Staff op Navy; Air Force, Operations Staff, Chief of Operations Branch Navy and General Staff of the Army, Naval Liaison Officer of the unsuccessful PT boat operations. For copy, see teletype 1855.

2. Other reports on the enemy situation in the Mediterranean:

According to Italian reports, 12 unidentified vessels entered the Mediterranean via the Straits of Gibraltar at 0030. Exact observation was impossible due to bad visibility.

Submarines were reported at positions northwest of Nettuno, north of Palermo, 40 miles west of Cape Passero, 30 miles south of Taranto and 65 miles west of Cephalonia.

In the Western Mediterranean, 15 freighters, and 5 landing boats with 12 escort vessels were reported sailing east, 30 miles northwest of Bizerta and, in the evening, 7 freighters making for Bizerta harbor, were reported.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, our air reconnaissance sighted 3 passenger ships of 8,000 BRT each and 8,000 BRT each and 8 freighters of 3,500 to 8,000 BRT with 2 destroyers and 4 escort vessels on a southeasterly course, 30 miles east of Derna at 1630.

3. Other reports on our own situation in the Mediterranean and sea transport situation:

Nine motor minesweepers, the fast escort vessel SG "10", 1 submarine chaser and 5 Italian torpedo boats were on escort service to Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. Two steamers were escorted to Sicily and 3 steamers back from Sicily. Traffic to the other islands comprised 10 steamers and 2 tankers. On her way from Palermo to Naples the steamer COSENZA (1,471 BRT) was sunk at 1800 by enemy torpedo planes 50 miles south of Naples. According to a report from Group West, 2 of our freight gliders broke away from the plane south of Port de Buc. The crews were picked up by a sea-rescue boat.

Between 2 Apr. and 9 Jul. a total of 22 naval landing craft, 9 motor minesweepers, 60 tanker barges and 3 tanker lighters left Toulon for Italy. On 12 Jul. 2 tanker barges and 2 tanker-cutters left for Savona.

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4. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

The DRACHE and BULGARLA with 4 motor minesweepers have completed the mine operation in the Gulf of Petras according to plan. In the night of 11 Jul. several planes were reported flying into the Peleponnese and back from the area west of Crete apparently with supplies for partisans. No other reports have been received.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Active small vessel traffic was observed along the Caucasus coast.

Own Situation:

During the night of 12 Jul., minor enemy air activity was observed on the patrol line off Temriuk. Shortly before midnight on the same night, the coast west of Taganrok was bombarded haphazardly probably by 5.7 cm guns. The source of the attack was not identified. At 1100 on 13 Jul. 5 (Tr.N.: or 7; the figure is not clear owing to a correction made) enemy planes strafed the 140th Anapa transport. Minor damage was sustained. Three men were wounded. Supply traffic to the Goten bridgehead was resumed on schedule.

During the night of 13 Jul., 3 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla have been assigned to operate in the waters northwest of Tuapse and 3 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla in the reconnaissance sector east of Theodosia.

IX. Situation East Asia:

According to an Allied Headquarters communique, Allied war ships have near the New Georgias sunk 1 Japanese cruiser and 3 destroyers and probably sunk 2 more destroyers. Allied heavy bombers bombed airfields on New Guinea and New Britain and Japanese positions in the Salamaua area. The air attacks in the Buin-Munda area was also continued.

According to a report from the U.S. (?) Department, USA planes sank a Japanese ship near Attu on 10 Jul. One ship was left sinking and two others were damaged. On 11 Jul., surface forces bombarded Japanese positions on Kiska.

No Japanese reports on these actions have been received.

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Items of Political Importance:

According to Reuter, Knox has declared that he regards the forth-coming submarine campaign as a serious matter. While it was true that the figures on shipping losses for June and the month before were favorable, "we nevertheless are fighting an enemy who has a great many resources at his disposal." The enemy was better trained in the conduct of submarine warfare than any other nation. He himself did not doubt that submarine activity would break out afresh in other areas. Among the reasons for the favorable situation in the North Atlantic were: the use of small aircraft carriers which provided an "air screen" over the entire Atlantic, and also the increased and more skilful use of improved anti-submarine equipment.

It is officially announced in Washington that Admiral Robert, the French High Commissioner in Martinique, has resigned from office. Henry Hoppenot, a member of the French military mission in Washington, is mentioned as his successor. Hoppenot's arrival in Martinique, the USA would re-establish relations with the French island. Hoppenot is said to have declared that the resources of the French Antilles would be mobilized against the Axis and that all French war and merchant ships in that area would be placed at the disposal of the Allies. According to reports received by Naval Staff, the carrier BEARN was beached with flooded engines. Her 40 planes were destroyed some time ago. The mine cruiser EMILE BERTIN was rendered unuseable by removing parts of the engines. The school ship JEAN D'ARC and the auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR are operational. Of 6 tankers, 2 are intact and 4 have had engine parts destroyed.

Conference on the situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. In the course of the situation report, Chief Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch stated that the results of air reconnaissance and radio interception in the West area confirm that enemy light naval forces, including cruisers, maintain a fairly regular patrol in the vicinity of Cape Ortegal. Chief, Naval Staff pointed out that it was up to Group West to judge the reliability of the reconnaissance pilots of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast in naval observation: if the reported observations are found to be correct, the plan to use our destroyers against these forces will have to be abandoned.

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II. As PT boat operations on the night of 12 Jul. were again unsuccessful, Chief, Naval Staff phoned Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy, in order to discuss the causes and new measures to be taken. The enemy reaction makes it impossible for PT boats to operate out of the Straits of Messina to the desired extent. Valuable targets will probably continue to be present off the southeast coast of Sicily in the immediate future, and should be easier to contact from the east and by avoiding the narrow Straits of Messina. The jump-off bases should therefore be transferred as quickly as possible to harbors south or east of the Straits of Messina. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy will make a summary report on PT boat activities from 9 Jul. to date.

In a highly restricted circle:

III. The Fuehrer has issued the following directives for the future conduct of the campaign in Sicily:

1. The bulk of the Italian forces in the attack area having collapsed, the German forces alone, even if combined into groups, are no longer strong enough to push the invading enemy back into the sea. Further enemy landings in the west of the island must also be reckoned with.
2. The immediate task is to delay the enemy advance as much as possible and to halt it before Etna at a strong position on the approximate line S. Stefano - Adrona - Catania (along sections of the river and covering the main roads). Supplies west and south of this line are to be evacuated by every means and as fast as possible.
3. General Command XIV. Tank Corps will move at once to Sicily in order to reconnoiter and to prepare for the occupation of this line. Command and sections will be arranged as to insert the remaining Italian forces into the German formations. Detailed instructions will follow.
4. As reinforcements, only the 1st Infantry Parachute Division will be sent for the present. The transfer of the 29th Armored Infantry Division will depend on the amount of German supplies available at the bridgehead, which is to be investigated by General Command of XIV. Tank Corps and reported through Commanding General, South. It will also depend on whether traffic across the Straits of Messina Strait can continue to be maintained with safety. The 29th Armored

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Infantry Division will first be brought into the Reggio area where it will be prepared for transfer.

5. Besides bringing 2nd Air Force up to immediate refilling of the establishment forthwith, Commander in Chief, German Air Force will reinforce it by two groups of 100-Bomber Wing and one fast bomber group (night) planes from the West as well as by one fighter and one bomber group from the southeast.

IV. The German General attached to Italian Armed Forces Headquarters called on the Duce on the evening of 12 Jul. to convey to him the Fuehrer's views on the failure of the Naval Commandant at Augusta, Admiral Leonardi. In the subsequent discussion of the situation in Sicily, the Duce stated:

After their successful landing, the British had already established themselves so strongly in the southeast of the island that they had already announced, today, the occupation of Syracuse and the area southwest of the town. This showed that they already felt their hold to be secure. Unless they could be expelled from the island within the next few days it would be too late. It was most unfortunate that the attack by the "Hermann Goering" Division and of the Italian "Livorno" Division against the Americans at Gela on 11 Jul. had been indecisive. A success against the Americans, whose fighting qualities were not yet very high, would have had great moral effect. The British had learned quite a lot during the North African campaign and were much better now than they were three years ago.

The biggest threat was to the area south of Catania as undoubtedly the British objective was to gain possession of the Straits of Messina as soon as possible. The British were making clever propaganda by taking back prisoners to Tunisia but letting Sicilians return to their homes if they were situated in the zone already occupied.

The invading forces were being continually reinforced and supplied from the sea. It was most regrettable that it was not possible for the Air Force to take stronger action against the seaborne supply traffic. Although the Air Force's success in attacking ships and landing craft was fully acknowledged, it was unfortunately, numerically inadequate. The enemy, on the other hand, had today attacked Reggio and the airfields at the southern end of Calabria with about 300 planes. Since August of last year we had been in continuous heed of 500 more planes, particularly fighters, and therein

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lay the cause of all our troubles. Even today the numerical strength of the German-Italian Air Force was inadequate. He had therefore ordered General Ambrosio to remind the German Armed Forces High Command once again of this situation and to request reinforcements for the German Air Force. The Air Force would play a decisive part in this struggle.

According to this report, received from Naval Attaché Rome, the Duce is shifting responsibility for future developments largely onto German shoulders, which is yet another reason why assistance should not be delayed. This should consist of increasing the number of German officers in the Italian command, if an open assumption of overall command is impossible. The disgraceful effect of the enemy propaganda on the Italian soldiers would be out of the question if there were German officers on all staffs and commands.

V. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division:

Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff has issued the following directive:

1. Maintenance of sea communications across the Straits of Messina is of the utmost importance. It is threatened by the enemy Air Force and also from the sea as enemy PT boat operations in this sea area have already shown. The Italian coast defenses alone cannot be relied upon to fulfil this task.

2. The Fuehrer has therefore ordered:

a. Italian coastal batteries on both sides of the Straits of Messina, whose materiel is adequate, are to be manned by German personnel. German supporting detachments may also be sent to reinforce the batteries with Italian crews. Commanding General, South will have to prevail upon the Italians to comply with this German demand which is essential for prosecution of the Sicilian campaign.

b. For this purpose, the Navy will make available the personnel assembled in France for "Gisela" (1723 men - 10 batteries). The present essential guard duties of these battery crews will be taken over immediately by Army forces of Commanding General, West.

c. Commanding General, South will call for this naval personnel on the basis of the investigation now being made by Admiral Voss on the materiel condition of the Italian batteries.

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d. Commanding General, South will report to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff on the measures taken.

The documents were made available to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division through Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters.

Chief, Naval Staff wishes to be kept informed on the progress made.

VI. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has submitted the following draft compiled by Naval Staff, Operations Division, Deputy Chief of Operations Branch for Chief, Naval Staff's teletype to the Fuehrer:

"Events in Sicily have shown that, although a fighting spirit exists in many parts of the Italian armed Forces, the leadership has obviously completely failed. It is inconceivable how two naval harbors well equipped as Augusta and Empedocle could be made useless and practically abandoned before the enemy had even attacked if there were any kind of effective leadership. The problem of adequate defense, both on the Italian coast and in the Balkans which is largely held by Italian troops is assuming increasing importance. The Italian Command alone is not adequate for this task. Only an extensive interspersion of German leadership can, in my opinion, still justify the engagement of valuable German forces in the areas in question."

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff had already instructed Captain Junge by phone on 13 Jul. to advise the Fuehrer of his concern in regard to the intractable and, at this time, especially disastrous operational command of the Italian Navy and to report that Chief, Naval Staff had expressly recommended the employment of light naval forces to Admiral Riccardi. If the Fuehrer considered it necessary and practicable, he was ready personally to assume command of the Italian Navy immediately in an attempt to rally the loyal, and especially the younger Italian officers. It might thus be possible to get at least the destroyers and submarines to take the resolute action which is now essential. As soon as Rear Admiral Voss returns from his tour of inspection in South Italy, Chief, Naval Staff plans to go with him to the Fuehrer in order to be available for the important decisions that the situation demands.

During the ensuing detailed discussion of the questions already dealt with on 13 Jul., Naval Staff, Operations Division

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expressed the opinion that the next practical step should be to secure the defenses on the coast of southern Italy. For this, the cooperation of the Italian forces was indispensable. Consequently, the chief concern must be to ensure that the Italian troops and naval forces should be commanded in accordance with the above outline in order to forestall a breakdown in the Italian powers of resistance.

Chief, Naval Staff closed the discussion, stating that nothing more could be done before the return of Rear Admiral Voss. He intends to take the draft of the teletype to the Fuehrer Headquarters.

Special Items:

I. According to a report from Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval (Ship) Construction Division to Commander in Chief, Navy, the dates of completion of types XXII And S VII of the Walter-series submarines will be postponed by three months due to difficulties in the engine construction. It has also been found that type XVII must lay to for nine hours in order to charge the batteries. In subsequent series, it will be possible to reduce this to  $4\frac{1}{4}$  hours. In type XXII these charging difficulties are already almost overcome. Commander in Chief, Navy decided that type XVII should be built in spite of its known defects and limited performance, in order that large-scale serial construction, based on experience with the experimental series, may be started as soon as possible.

II. For the release of the LMF-mines, Underwater Obstacles Inspectorate has requested permission to lay an operational trial barrage, by ship, at a depth of 50 - 100 meters in the Skagerrak.

Naval Staff has concurred. Naval Command, Baltic Sea has been instructed to include the barrage in the general barrage plan for the Skagerrak and to issue the necessary orders. Naval Staff also called the attention of Bureau of Naval Armament, Underwater Obstacles Branch to the fact that apart from this operational trial barrage planned by Underwater Obstacles Inspectorate, the LMF-mines are also now released for operational use by PT boats and pointed out that, in view of the intensification of the Air Force's mine-laying campaign against England to be started at the end of August, it would be even more important to release the LMF-mines for aircraft use than for surface force operations.

III. Short Reports on the Situation in the East No. 2/43 by



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Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, reports on the following items:

1. Transfer of submarines to the Arctic Ocean.
2. Warship building in the Black Sea.
3. Employment of the Black Sea Fleet submarine tenders.
4. New PT boats of British origin for the Black Sea Fleet.
5. Partisan supply in the Crimea by D- and L-boats.
6. Naval base in the Shopi River mouth.
7. 11th Naval Guard Brigade.
8. Tank and anti-aircraft reinforcements for the "Oktiabrskaya Revolutsia."
9. Seafaring personnel in the Soviet army and women in inland navigation.
10. Harbor facilities at Vladivostok.

For copy as per 1/Skl 21112/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Documents on the Enemy Situation."

IV. A summary of data on the enemy obtained by radio decyphering and radio interception from 5 - 11 Jul. is given in radio Monitoring report No. 28/43.

Attention is called to: page 4, submarine hunting operations by enemy light naval forces in the Bay of Biscay; page 6-9, location of German formations by the Dover radio net; enclosure 4, distribution of British trawlers and auxiliary vessels in June 1943.

Situation on 14 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The Commander in Chief of the Hawaiian Maritime Front

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issued a warning to Allied merchantmen in the Central and South Pacific on 30 Jun. that a submarine had been sighted in 0006 S 151 06 W.

The destroyers MARGFORD, OWIN, and FARENHOLT were identified in convoy operations in the Southwest Pacific.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our own vessels.

Naval Staff has informed Ship "28" by radiogram 0924, that the blockade runner captains in Japan have unanimously requested retention of the top masts for purposes of observation. Naval Staff considers that ships in the Atlantic with top masts erected are particularly endangered because of their striking appearance and regards the reduction of sight-range due to removal of the top masts as less serious. Orders have therefore been given to instal telescopic top masts. If this is impossible, at least one top mast should be removed so that the unequal mast lengths as commonly used on enemy ships, will make it more difficult to estimate the ship's position. Ship "28" has been instructed to take the necessary steps at its own discretion.

Ship "28" was also briefly informed, by radiogram 1305, on the military situation in Sicily and on the Eastern Front.

Information on the enemy situation was transmitted by radiogram 1412.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-three planes were observed over the Bay of Biscay up to 18° W, mainly between 0900 - 1100. British vessels were located in BF 7565 at 0835 and in BF 8155 at 1025.

At 2025 on 13 Jul., our air reconnaissance reported 5 ships sailing south in BF 7522. According to later investigation, they were probably destroyers or guard ships.

The suspicious rowing boat reported on the evening of 12 Jul. at Pauillac, was found, after more than 24 hours of intensive investigation, to be one of our own patrol boats.

2. Own Situation:

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Atlantic Coast:

Three ELM/J mines were cleared off Lorient and one off the Gironde. The closing of the roads and the approach to La Pallice was lifted. While sweeping channels in the waters off Brest, a group of minesweepers was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes. Minesweeper M "399" scored a hit on one of the attacking planes.

Exercises by 8th and 5th Destroyer Flotillas have so far been carried out undisturbed.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up due to bad weather. Convoys were cancelled with the exception of traffic to the Channel Islands. A tug was attacked and damaged by British fighter-bombers off Ile de Bas. North of Ostend, a Belgian fishing boat struck a mine and sank.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

A total of 7 ELM/J mines was cleared near Scheveningen and south west of Heligoland including one cleared by the steamer KORSOER in an eastbound convoy. The steamer put in to Hook van Holland. The convoy proceeded.

No other reports of any importance have been received.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty planes were observed over the North Sea but no planes were detected operating in the area of the Iceland squadrons. Our reconnaissance produced no tactical results either in the west or the east of the area of 5th Air Force. At 0123 on 12 Jul., a submarine was sighted near Kvalneset by three of our planes and attacked, without results being observed.

2. Own Situation:

On 13 Jul., the Ristiniemi Battery bombarded the Russian Battery "205" with 25 rounds from 1435 to 1512 and observed hits. Fire was returned by 4 rounds. At 2118 another

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exchange of fire began between the batteries of both sides, lasting for about an hour. The raids in Kongsfjord were carried on. More articles, some of Russian origin were discovered. A compromising Norwegian diary was seized. Two parachutists were observed near Vardoe in the Syltefjord. They were taken in by boat.

Forty-six ships were escorted to the north and 21 ships to the south. Sixteen ships had to discontinue their voyage due to lack of escort.

Group North Fleet considers special operations in Iceland by coastal commandos of the "Brandenburg" Division inadvisable during the light period insofar as the use of special vessels, such as fishing steamers is concerned. The use of submarines for such raids is also out of the question at this season, according to Group North Fleet. Group North Fleet will therefore approach German Intelligence Service and Naval Command, Norway with a view to performing a prior operation against the enemy stations on Spitzbergen with assault groups to be prepared by the Intelligence Service. Such an operation can be carried out during the light period and may be supported by submarines or even destroyers, according to the enemy situation as revealed by reconnaissance.

Naval Staff has forwarded its approval to Group North Fleet.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

The coastal anti-submarine listening station at Skagen was put into service on 9 Jul. One ELM/J-mine was cleared north of Fehmarn.

No other reports have come in.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from submarine U "181", there were 3 medium-sized steamers at Port Louis (Mauritius) on 1 Jul., two of which left on 2 Jul. On the same day, a 3-stacked cruiser entered the harbor and left again on 3 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

U "181" sank the steamer HOIHOW (2,798 BRT) near Mauritius. (see Enemy Situation)

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In the Bay of Biscay, U "607" was attacked by an enemy plane while submerging and was probably lost. Two other submarines successfully repulsed enemy planes, U "953" fired a salvo of four torpedoes against destroyers in BE 9259. U "608" sighted an unidentified submarine in BF.

No reports of interest have been received from other theatres.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

In the forenoon, the enemy made simultaneous attacks with strong forces, sometimes escorted by fighters, on airfields in the Western France area. The strongest attack was directed against Le Bourget. Damage to airfield installations and losses of planes were considerable at some places. For details, see Daily Situation. Defense forces shot down 15 fortresses, 4 spitfires and two thunderbolts.

During the night of 14 Jul., harassing flights by minor forces were reported, mostly from Northern Germany.

Special Items:

The strength of the enemy air forces in the area of Great Britian is estimated by Commander in Chief, German Air Force, Operations Staff, Foreign Affairs Section as follows:

Aircraft available at home:

1. British aircraft:

- a. 1,400 daylight fighters  
700 night fighters
- b. for night operations: 1350 bombers, of which 970 are four-engined and 500 more bombers from training formations.
- c. for short-range daylight operations: 250 bombers
- d. for Army cooperation: 380 short-range reconnaissance planes, fighters and artillery spotting planes and 500 planes for transport of parachutists and for towing freight gliders
- e. for naval purposes: 1130 planes, including 150 four-engined, and 150 flying boats.

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2. U.S.A. Aircraft:

- a. 770 bombers, 670 of them four-engined  
300 - 400 fighters

3. In Iceland, there are about 100 planes, chiefly fighters and long-range reconnaissance aircraft.

Total: about 7,400 planes.

Mediterranean Theater:

The enemy Air Force made no flights over Corsica, Sardinia or Italy, but confined itself to support of the land fighting in Sicily, continuing the attack on the Straits of Messina. The harbor installations and the town of Messina were attacked four times during the day by altogether 275 four-engined planes. Nine planes were reported shot down.

During the night of 14 Jul., the town and the harbor of Naples, as well as airfields were attacked by small forces. Four Ju 52 planes were put out of action. In-effective nuisance raids were directed against Palermo.

The German Air Force reported that among other results obtained by our heavy bomber formations on the night of 13 Jul., hits were scored on 17 vessels of which 6 freighters and 1 LCT, totalling 16,000 BRT, were probably sunk. It was also reported that two destroyers were hit by bombs and that the new German torpedo-carrying group, which came into operation on 13 Jul., hit a cruiser with a torpedo.

Other attacks were made during the day on the enemy-occupied airfield at Comiso, the port of Syracuse, and on landing boats and motor traffic.

Special Items:

According to information from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Foreign Affairs Section, the Allied air forces in Northwest Africa consist of 3340 planes including 1150 bomber and reconnaissance planes, and in the Lybia-Egypt area, of 1380 planes including 620 bomber and reconnaissance planes.

Furthermore, about 17,500 parachute troops (15,700 parachutists) and about 14,750 airborne troops are being assembled in eastern Algeria and Tunisia.

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Eastern Front:

Two hundred and thirty-four enemy planes were shot down on the Army front.

No reports of any importance have been received from 4th and 5th Air Force.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy landing in Sicily:

Up to midday no new reports on the situation in the landing areas had reached German Naval Command, Italy. On 13 Jul., the enemy continued the attack on our right flank and in the afternoon also invested our left flank with strong infantry and tank forces, followed by air borne troops and parachute landings. The position on land is very serious especially since new landings in our rear are to be expected. Our lines were again withdrawn a little to the north on the evening of 13 Jul.

Photographic reconnaissance of 13 Jul. confirmed a considerable reduction in the number of landing vessels and transports. The bulk of the enemy landing divisions seem to have been disembarked. There is no proof as to where the landing vessels withdrawn from Sicily now are, but they are assumed to have gone to the Tunisia - Malta area. A clear picture of the actual and presumed changes in the strength and distribution of landing and other transport vessels throughout the Mediterranean is given in the daily reports by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division in War Diary, Part D, "Material on the Enemy Situation." These indicate that, from 12 Jul. to 13 Jul., 46 LST and 53 LCT or LCI were withdrawn from the Sicilian area. Therefore only 13% of the LST and 21% of the LCT/LCI are still in the Licata - Syracuse area, i.e., about 17% of all the landing vessels presumed to be in the Mediterranean. Other transport tonnage in this area is stated to amount to about 24% of the total merchant shipping tonnage presumed to be in the Mediterranean. The opinion of Commanding General, South that other landings may be expected seems, therefore, quite reasonable.

In the course of the day, the enemy pressure increased, particularly in the Straits of Messina. Considerable quantities of the munitions were destroyed during a heavy air attack on Messina. The steamer *PaTRIA* was sunk. Air-borne troops and parachute landings near Gerbini created a threat to Catania.

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However, some of these troops were annihilated. Great concern is felt at the report that one of our unloading stages at Molini (north of Catania) has been destroyed by the Italian civilian population in spite of the Italian guards, and that the Italian coast defence forces have been withdrawn from Molini.

Commanding General, South has issued the following orders for the defense of the Straits of Messina:

1. In order to secure a unified command in the defense of the Straits of Messina, the position of German Commandant, Straits of Messina has been established. Colonel Baade has been assigned to this post subordinate to the Commandant of the German Armed Forces in Sicily. Commandant, Straits of Messina will be in command of: the fighting troops of that area, emergency units, anti-aircraft artillery groups, Naval Artillery Regiment 616. Transport and supply services will be placed under his command only in case of direct enemy attack.

2. German anti-aircraft batteries have been ordered to attack targets at sea. In case of simultaneous air attack, sea targets will have priority over air defence. An effort will be made to get similar orders issued to the Italian anti-aircraft guns.

3. German Naval Command will establish an advanced patrol service off the Straits by means of artillery lighters, Siebel battle ferries, and motor minesweepers.

4. German offices and units have been ordered to prevent destruction of batteries by the Italian crews when not justified by the enemy situation, and, if necessary, to man the batteries themselves.

German Naval Command, Italy, has ordered the re-arming of two naval artillery lighters and the conversion of further Siebel ferries into battle ferries for the Straits of Messina. The 1st Battery, Naval Artillery Regiment 616 is to take up a provisional firing position south of Reggio. Our supply base in western Sicily has been ordered to evacuate.

Our air reconnaissance detected 15 small vessels, presumably in waiting positions, off the southern coast 25 miles southwest of Licata at 0725, and 12 transports 10 miles south-southwest of Licata making for Empedocle at 1035. Off the southeast



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coast, there were 30 transports and several landing vessels east of Catania, 8 freighters and 15 landing vessels in Augusta and five destroyers were cruising off the port. Twenty-two freighters were at Syracuse and 8 PT boats and 4 destroyers off the harbor.

At 0725, 1 (apparently) aircraft carrier, 1 big transport and 17 freighters (135,000 BRT) were sighted north of La Valetta, and five transports (75,000 BRT), 7 freighters (53,000 BRT), 1 destroyer, 14 LST, some carrying motor vehicles and 5 big landing boats were seen southeast of La Valetta. There were 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer, 3 escort vessels and 1 freighter of 15,000 BRT at Marsa Scirocco.

According to a sighting report, there were 3 big transports, 21 LST, 2 tankers, 16 LST, 40 landing boats and 2 destroyers at Bizerta at 0735.

At Bone at 1510, there were 5 transports, 3 freighters, 21 LST and 14 small vessels, and in the roads, 14 freighters, 7 LST and 2 landing boats. Neither of the two battleships was sighted again.

Supplies for the invasion troops in Sicily therefore seem to come from the Bizerta area via Malta.

No action reports have been received from our own or the Italian submarines. An Italian PT boat reported sinking an enemy destroyer off Augusta, no time being specified.

A summary of the activities of 3rd, 7th PT Boat Flotillas since 9 Jul. by German Naval Command, Italy reports:

"9 Jul., 3rd PT Boat Flotilla unable to penetrate from Empedocle to the east through several cardons of MGBs in spite of trying for two hours. The main landing area is not yet clear.

10 Jul., 5rd PT Boat Flotilla was greatly delayed by sea damage, engine trouble, and rudder failures and was only able to get to about the level of Catania. After that boats were out of action.

11 Jul., 7th PT Boat Flotilla, en route from Cagliari to Sicily, went in search of the formation that bombarded Trapani, but it was too late to make contact.

12 Jul., type S 151 had persistant engine trouble, so that it

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was not until 2230 that seven boats left Messina for a thrust into the reconnaissance lines at intervals of two miles, speed 24 knots, making a wide sweep towards east, course 200° up to CN 3255. Several stops off Augusta to let MGB Groups pass. Thereafter speed of 15 knots. No large ships were sighted, no enemy activity observed. At 0300, turn about. Two engagements with MGBs which were hit many times. As present sighting range is 5 to 6 miles, it is impossible to approach unobserved to within firing range. Today, only one boat is operational.

15 Jul. operations are planned for four boats of 7th PT Boat Flotilla and three boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla."

2. Other Reports on the Enemy Situation in the Mediterranean:

at 1800 on 13 Jul., a convoy of 11 freighters entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. At 2000, 3 French freighters left the harbor towards the east. They were sighted at 1705 on 14 Jul. near Cape Tres Forcas. At 2030 on 14 Jul., a convoy of 32 loaded freighters entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

No other sighting reports on shipping traffic have been received from the Western or Eastern Mediterranean.

On the evening of 13 Jul. and on 14 Jul., submarine positions were reported near Leghorn, Ostia, Cape Vaticano, north of Cape Camino (Sardinia), east of Porto Vecchio, south-southwest of Cagliari, 70 miles south of Taranto and south of Durazzo in the Adriatic.

According to our Radio Intelligence the center of enemy air reconnaissance was in the Tyrrhenian Sea around Sardinia. Our convoys were repeatedly attacked.

3. Other Reports on our own Situation in the Mediterranean Sea:

Transport Situation:

The following vessels were engaged in escort service to the islands: 2 anti-aircraft corvettes, 1 aviso, 3 submarine chasers, 4 motor minesweepers, 3 auxiliary motor minesweepers, and 3 Italian torpedo boats. Altogether 2 tankers and 7 steamers were escorted, 2 of them from Sicily

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to Italy. Of these the steamer SAN FRANCISCO (6,013 BRT) was sunk by an aerial torpedo attack. At 1713, the steamer CPT. DE DLBAT (3,107 BRT) was also sunk by aerial torpedo between Elba and Maddalena. Our submarine chasers were slightly damaged and suffered casualties. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.

4. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

The DRACHE, BULGARLI, and BARLETTA completed the mine operations according to plan and transferred from Patras to Piraeus.

The tugs and auxiliary sailing vessels sunk by enemy submarine fire in the Bay of Salonika will be recovered. The damaged steamer VESTA has been brought into Piraeus.

According to reports from Army Group Southeast, the railway bridge near Lannia was blown up by rebels and one of our ammunition trains was ambushed and largely destroyed.

Navy ammunition is not involved.

Black Sea:

One of our boats reported an engagement with an unidentified enemy vessel on the Temriuk patrol route from 0110 to 0115, no results having been observed. Ten more mines were cleared in the barrage southeast of the Straits of Kertch. No other reports have been received.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to Japanese and Allied reports, a battle took place between light naval forces of both sides in the Gulf of Kula during the night of 12 Jul. The Japanese report that two Allied cruisers were sunk and a third set on fire and admit heavy damage to one of their own cruisers. The Allies report that one Japanese light cruiser and three destroyers were sunk and two other destroyers probably sunk.

According to DNB reports, military circles in Tokyo have stated that the enemy is trying to encircle the Japanese base at Munda from the south and from the north and that troops were also recently landed in Rice Bay and on the Bai Kolo coast for that purpose. Heavy fighting is reported to be going on for the possession of Munda. The situation at this base is said to be critical.

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Items of Political Importance:

During a debate in the House of Commons on the shipping policy of the British Government, a representative of the Board of Trade revealed that there had been two occasions when the British shipping position was so critical as to jeopardize the entire course of the war. The first crisis was in the spring of 1941, the second in the spring of 1942 when Japan had entered the war and the Allies had lost more ships than they were able to build. During the summer of 1942, Great Britain was again in an extremely serious position. Undoubtedly, he said, the possibility of losses again rising to a dangerous level must be taken into account. Canada was at present building about the same amount of merchant tonnage as Great Britain. American ship building this year would come to about 20 million tons capacity.

According to Reuter, it has been authoritatively stated in both Washington and London that recognition of the French Committee in Algiers as the Government of France was not at present feasible. In a message to the French people on the occasion of 14 Jul., Eden declared that he would like to be able to make announcements which would bring the uncertainty in France to an end but that he could not do so without jeopardizing the secrecy of military operations.

Mr. Eden further informed the House of Commons that the additional press reporters sent to North Africa were to be recalled. It had never been intended for them to be there for more than a limited period.

The Argentine Government has ordered the activities of the Association of German Welfare Organizations and Cultural Clubs to be discontinued. At the same time, several organizations of the "Allied Assistance" are said to have been closed.

The alleged aims of Anglo-American strategy are the subject of an article by Walter Lippmann in the "New York Herald Tribune." These are, according to Lippmann, the acquisition of new bases in the Mediterranean area and in Scandinavia for the prosecution of the campaign in the air, the tying down of German reserves by landings in the Mediterranean area, and the preparation by these diversions of a landing in northern Europe which without such preliminaries, would be impossible to carry out from England. The rapid advance in Sicily, where resistance has been found to be weak, offers hope for an acceleration of these plans.

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For a detailed summary, to be issued by Supreme Command, Armed Forces, High Command, Intelligence Division, see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Naval Attaché, Tokyo reports on talks with Japanese naval officers in regard to the situation in Japan, as follows:

1. "Kiska" is to be gradually evacuated and the "Kuriles" to be speedily fortified instead.
2. Developments in relations with Russia are the main problems at the moment. For well-known reasons, Japan is still seeking to avoid bringing matters to a head at least until the beginning of winter, when Valdivostok will be practically the only place from which Japan can be threatened from the air. It is, moreover, still widely hoped that Germany may seek to settle the war with Russia by political channels, a development which would become impossible in case of a Japanese - Russian conflict. According to Japanese observations, Russia too is trying to postpone the inevitable breaking off of relations as long as possible, if only in order to avoid the loss of the supply route via Vladivostok. On the other hand, the existing tension is quite apparent, especially since two Soviet freighters were detained at Hakodate. The Russians refuse to grant visas for Siberia and are being troublesome about the oil concessions in Sachalin. In Tokyo the employees of the Soviet Embassy are kept under strictest surveillance. The unobserved establishment of American bomber bases is greatly feared in Japan. For that reason too the Japanese Army in Manchuria amounting to over one million men is kept at constant readiness. There have again, recently, been many rumors of the replacement of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow by "Todo", "Hirota" or even "Matsuoka".
3. In China, attempts to reach an agreement with Chungking had admittedly made no progress and are realized to be hopeless. Only a few generals have been won over.
4. The most serious bottleneck is still the lack of shipping. New constructions amounts to only 60,000 tons per month as against a monthly loss of 120,000 tons. Three quarters of the losses occur in the Melanesian area. Losses have so far been slight in the Bay of Bengal.
5. In the domestic field the influence of radical elements, whose activities have never been entirely curbed in spite of the strongest measures, has increased since the dissolution of the Comintern to the detriment of armament production. But the Armed Forces also complain bitterly about the

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general populace, which is not influenced by these tendencies, and about certain leading intellectuals, whom it has so far been impossible to instil with a proper understanding of the importance of the struggle. This is mainly due to the fact that the people have still hardly been touched by the war.

6. In case "Tojo", who, in the eyes of many, has already been too long in office, relinquishes his post, Admiral "Toyoda", Commanding Admiral at Yokosuka, and Suzuki, Head of the Planning Department are first on the list of possible successors.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

1. Naval Staff considers that Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff should be informed of the temporary retention of the seven boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla in the Italian area and suggested that the following teletype be sent to the Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy:

The transfer of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla from the Italian area to the Aegean, as ordered by Naval Staff, was carried out to the extent that five boats are now operating in the Aegean. Of the remaining seven boats, three are still being reconditioned at Marseille. Since the Army, the Air Force, and thus, also the German transports are still being reinforced, and due to the necessity of defending the Straits of Messina as expressly ordered by Commanding General, South, the boats of 12th Minesweeper Flotilla still in the Italian area have been temporarily placed at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy.

Simultaneously, German Naval Command, Italy, Group South and Commanding Admiral Aegean, should be instructed as follows:

In regard to the boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla temporarily placed at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy, it should be kept in mind that it is still intended to transfer the whole of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Aegean. Completion of the transfer is postponed only because this does not seem to be an appropriate moment in view of the situation in the Italian area. A situation may arise in which German Naval Command, Italy will have, on its own initiative, to detach some or all of the boats and order the transfer of the Greek area.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. For order 1/Skl I a 20001/43 Gkdos, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

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II. German Naval Command, Italy reported to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division on 13 Jul.:

3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotilla have received the following instructions:

Salerno will be the base for 3rd PT Boat Flotilla and Taranto, will be prepared by 7th PT Boat Flotilla, after approval by the Italian Navy, as an alternative base for boats which may be dispersed to the east. In addition to Trapani, Palermo etc., a suitable operational base is to be prepared on the continental side of the Straits of Messina, if possible near Reggio. Crotona in the Gulf of Taranto will also be used. The fitting-out of Viareggio as a base for 7th PT Boat Flotilla has been temporarily postponed.

Chief, Naval Staff wishes Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy to be instructed that Salerno is not suitable as a base. The PT boats should not return there after their next operation. There would have to be a brief postponement of operations while a base south or east of the Straits of Messina is set up.

III. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported: With reference to the evacuation of bases in western Sicily which has been ordered, naval establishments at present in Sicily comprise about 100 officers and 2,500 petty officers and men.

In a highly restricted circle:

IV. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch reported that AQUILA III has arrived in Singapore and MARCO POLO will be at the rendezvous position shortly.

V. Concerning the order of Supreme Command, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff on the coast defense of the Straits of Messina (see War Diary 14 Jul.), Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reported that a preliminary order has already been issued by the Quartermaster Division. For copy as per 1/Skl see War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

VI. In connection with Naval Attaché, Tokyo's report on the situation in Japan, (see Items of Political Importance), the question of an outbreak of war between Japan and Russia was discussed. The German opinion up to now has been that such a conflict would be unfavorable, as the Japanese need all their forces in China, and particularly in the south west Pacific,

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to fight and hold the Anglo-Americans. This opinion was largely based on considerations of the strategic consequences that the successful accomplishment of our Suez operation would have had on German - Japanese cooperation against the Britain's life-line, the sea route to India. The question is whether this opinion still corresponds to the development of the general war situation. However desirable a relief on the Eastern Front might be, it remains to consider whether a probable Japanese set-back in the Pacific would not relieve the Anglo-Americans too much. Besides it is by no means certain that the Japanese would gain a speedy success against the Russians in Manchukuo, as the opposing forces must be almost equal in strength. A protracted war would, on the other hand, put a heavy strain on the situation in China and in the south-west Pacific, especially since the Japanese war potential and transport facilities in particular are rather limited. Finally the political interest of the fact that the only way of making a political-diplomatic approach to Moscow, with a view towards easing the present military situation, is undoubtedly through Tokyo, should not be underestimated. The decision, therefore, depends largely on how the Japanese - Russian prospects in case of war are assessed. Even if the Japanese were to gain swift successes at the outset, the vastness of the area remains a dangerous obstacle to the final attainment of the objective. Vestigia terrent! In favor of an attack on Russia is the consideration that a Russian victory in Europe would put Japan in a hopeless position and that it would, therefore, be Japan's most important task to prevent this happening and also the uncertainty as to whether and for how long Russia will hold firm against ceding air bases to the Anglo-Americans in her Pacific coastal provinces. In the present state of affairs, the political possibilities offered in the East and the Far East acquire the greatest importance from the German point of view.

Special Items:

I. Under date of 6 Jul., Group North Fleet has submitted its views on the organization of the battlegroup in the Fall of this year. It states as follows:

As no convoys have been detected, the battlegroup has so far not gone into action. Nevertheless, Group Command North Fleet Command believes that the long break in convoy traffic between England and Russia is a result of the battle group's presence in northern Norway. Due to the heavy commitment elsewhere of the enemy naval forces and merchant shipping, and with the



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and with the present comparative strengths in Northern Norway, a convoy to Russia would require considerable commitment of forces of which the enemy would fill the lack at other, at present more important places. The Group Command believes that without the battle group, the enemy would have been much more tempted to carry on traffic with Russia with the much smaller forces than required and would probably have done so. It is to be expected that this traffic will be resumed by Fall at the latest, taking advantage of the long nights. Group Command North Fleet Command is therefore of the opinion that it would strongly influence the course of the war at sea and also offer good prospects of success if the surface forces provided for combat operations in northern Norway were allowed to remain there beyond the autumn. It is therefore requested that immediate consideration be given to the question of how the battle group should be organized after this Fall so that it may be able to perform these missions, while allowing time for repairs. In this regard the Group Command is of the following opinion:

1. A dockyard period at home for the battleship TIRPITZ is unavoidable. In case of emergency, and not without reluctance, this can perhaps be postponed until the Spring, though this would considerably impair her war readiness. The decision on this matter must largely depend, in our opinion, on the time of year at which the battleship, TIRPITZ can best be spared. The Group Command would prefer if the period chosen for docking at home were the dark season so that the battleship might be ready for action in the northern area during the light season which is more suitable for her tactical operation. During the dark season, the responsibility for operations against convoys falls in our opinion, on the light forces.

2. The withdrawal of the LUETZOW and also the probable temporary withdrawal of the TIRPITZ would mean that for about six months the SCHARNHORST alone would be the mainstay of the battle group. In these circumstances, Group North Fleet suggests that the cruiser PRINZ EUGEN be assigned to the battle group to remain as third ship of the group also after the return of TIRPITZ. Although lacking certain qualities of the LUETZOW, the PRINZ EUGEN would increase the total fighting value of the battle group and make it a homogeneous fighting formation. She would also provide good support for short raids or attacks by destroyers against light forces. Although the transfer of the PRINZ EUGEN does not have to be decided upon right away, it should be pointed out that preparations must be started early in order to be able to put any sudden decision into effect

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without delay. The withdrawing of the PRINCE EUGEN from the training formation and the reorganization of her crew and materiel for the new task will take about four months. At the same time, the cadet-training function of PRINZ EUGEN will have to be transferred to another vessel (LUETZOW).

3. In the opinion of the Group Command, Commanding Admiral, Cruisers must always have at least ten operational destroyers at his disposal. Assuming that about four destroyers are continually in dock, on their way out or back, or temporarily out of action etc., it would mean that there must be fourteen destroyers in the formation of Commanding Admiral, Cruisers. Especially in the dark season, it will be important to keep the number of operational destroyers as high as possible because, apart from the reduced number of big ships, the dark season is particularly favorable for destroyer operations.

4. As further developments cannot be foreseen and as the intended increase in the number of cadets for next year will in any case make it necessary to use GNEISENAU and the HIPPER as training hulks, the Group Command suggests that these vessels be brought up to a higher readiness status than heretofore so as to shorten the time required to put them into full operational status and make free decisions possible.

In any case, it appears advisable not to break up these ships but, on the contrary, to repair them and increase their personnel establishment and to hold them in a higher degree of readiness than has so far been customary with ships placed out of service.

Naval Staff approved this statement in principle. However, according to the investigations of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, it is not possible to send the PRINZ EUGEN to reinforce the battle group in the autumn because the ship is indispensable at home for cadet training. Furthermore the matter of fuel oil must be examined.

The question of putting the GNEISENAU and the HIPPER into service as training hulks and improving their degree of readiness will be further investigated by Quartermaster Division.

A corresponding order was sent to Group North Fleet on 15 Jul.

II. For the opinion of Naval Staff, Operations Division on the allocation of the 17 KM-boats under construction or rebuilding, and the directive to Naval Staff, Quartermaster

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Division, see Order 1/Skl I op 19217/43 Gkdos. For copy, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

III. Naval Staff, Submarine Division advised Naval Staff, for information of the directive to Commander Submarines, West and to the submarine flotillas concerning the operational use of G 7 ES (Zaunkoenig). As a first allotment 80 torpedoes will be made available at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Gdynia respectively between 1 and 8 Aug. Four torpedoes are provided for each boat. Completion at the dockyards is to be speeded up so that the boats will be in sailing readiness by 11 Aug. and the boats at home, by 8 Aug. Two short training courses will be held at the end of Jul. at Gdynia for commandants, engineer officers and engineer mechanics. Abbreviations for Zaunkoenig - TV, for warhead - KE, for warhead - pistol = P i 4 with Torpedo Firing Device 5 (TZ 5).

Situation on 15 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has informed Ship "28" by radiogram 0046, of enemy merchant ship movements according to Radio Intelligence.

No reports have been received on our own ships in foreign waters.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-eight planes were detected over the outer Bay of Biscay up to 14<sup>00</sup>W. One British ship was located in each of the following positions: at 1249 in BF 1620, at 1532 in BF 1430 and at 1535 in BF 1490.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J-mine was cleared off St. Nazaire, one off Gironde and one off Brest.

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8th Destroyer Flotilla entered Lorient at 1720 after completing exercises according to schedule.

5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla entered Bayonne.

Torpedo boat T "24", the GREIF and the FALKE left Brest at 2000 in order to bring in two submarines with reduced diving capacity.

Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla has reported details on the torpedo firing exercises. For copy, see teletype 2340.

After refuelling destroyer Z "24" will be kept at 6 hours readiness for transfer to Bordeaux, destroyers Z "32", Z "37" at 3 hours readiness for transfer to Pauillac.

Channel Area:

Due to the stormy weather, the only convoys carried out were the Channel Islands traffic. The convoy route off Ostend was closed owing to suspected mines.

Two patrol positions were not taken up.

In regard to the readiness of PT boats, Group West reports that, in the Cherbourg area five to six boats will be operational by the end of Jul. and about ten boats in August; in the Holland area four to six boats by the end of July and about eleven boats in August. The small number is due to increased rearmament and current repairs in preparation for operations in the Fall. Naval Group West also advised Naval Staff, Operations Division for information of the order postponing the transfer of the LOTHRINGEN to the end of Aug./beginning of Sept.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Four ELM/J-mines were cleared north of Tershelling, and three south of Heligoland. During this sweep, mine-exploding vessel "10" was struck by a mine in AN 9566 and is sailing under her own power to Hamburg.

Otherwise, escort service and channel sweeping were carried out according to plan.

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Naval Chief Command, North has warned naval forces that the southern section of the Weswall declared area has been extended eastwards. For copy, see teletype 1926.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Nine planes were detected in operation over the North Sea and one plane in the area of the Iceland squadrons. Limited air activity, without attacks, was observed in Vrangerfjord, the Petsamo area, and the Bardoe area.

Our air reconnaissance produced no tactical results.

One fishing boat and one corvette were sighted in the Denmark Strait on 14 Jul.

According to photographs, there were 1 auxiliary minesweeper, 1 (apparently) aircraft recovery ship and 7 fishing smacks in Thorshaven. Single fishing cutters and the two Swedish ships were sighted on a westerly course.

Own Situation:

On 13 Jul., eight Army demolition chambers in the harbor of Utsira were detonated by a thunder clap. Part of the quay wall was destroyed.

At 0311 on 14 Jul., the Russian Battery "209" fired two rounds at a combined operations landing boat. The Ristiniemi Battery returned fire with one round.

Thirty-six ships were escorted to the north and 39 ships to the south. Eighteen ships are held up in the Arctic Coast and western coast areas for lack of escort. The delay is considerable in some cases.

Group North Fleet had reported on 8 Jul., that the transfers to the northern area of the PRINZ EUGEN, FRANKEN, and destroyers "29" and "33" were inter-dependent. The FRANKEN will probably be ready for transfer in the first week of Aug. and destroyers "29" and "33" at the same time, after a short period of training. If it were decided not to transfer PRINZ EUGEN, Group North suggested that the destroyers be transferred alone and the transfer of the FRANKEN be postponed until autumn.

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As, in the meantime, Chief, Naval Staff has decided that the PRINZ EUGEN is to remain in the training formation for the time being, Group North Fleet has been instructed to postpone the transfer of the FRANKEN to the autumn and to move the destroyer Z "29" and "33" independently to the northern area as soon as they are ready.

IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Normal shipping traffic was observed in Kronstadt Bay. Ten pontoons and one M-class submarine were also identified. At 2200, 20 vessels of unidentified type were sighted on a westerly course east of Seiskari. Fifteen bombs were dropped on Tytters causing only slight material damage.

2. Own Situation:

Large minesweeper "11" will be sent to make a gap in the east sector of the Skagerrak barrage.

Between 1520 and 1540, a Swedish flying boat flew around our ships several times at low level, at a distance of 50 meters, taking photographs.

Due to bad sighting conditions in the southern part of the Sound, our minesweeping plane probably flew over Swedish territory. Swedish medium anti-aircraft guns near Falsterbo Rew, fired about 10 rounds at the plane. Sea-rescue searches for two of our planes which had crashed in Dantzig Bay were unsuccessful.

No important events were reported from the areas of Commander Minesweepers Baltic and Admiral, Baltic Countries.

Three tankers were escorted in the eastern Baltic Sea and four transports, four tankers, four steamers, the weather ship COBURG and the mine transport ship RHEIN were escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic.

V. Merchant Shipping:

1. Group South reports that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Black Sea will assume responsibility for the organization, management, loading and unloading of all supply tonnage in the Black Sea as from 15 Jul. The Navy will continue to be responsible for the organization of shipping space east of

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Sevastopol and in the Kertch Straits and the Azov Sea.

For Copy of the relative report as per l/Skl 21138/43 geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

2. In regard to the wishes expressed by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping concerning ship transfers from western France to the North Sea, Naval Staff, Operations Division has pointed out to the Reich Commissioner that such movements are considered to involve great risk, particularly in the case of large ships, but that, under certain conditions, it might be advisable to accept the risk in view of the air threat to ships in the harbors of western France and the military disadvantages of ship concentrations there. The transfer movements, which presumably could start at the beginning of October, would have to be spread over a long period as they are always dependent on the fulfilment of certain prerequisites. Any return transfer from the North Sea to Western French ports, for example to supplement the tonnage requirements in that area, would be out of the question due to the difficulties involved. Finally, Naval Staff pointed out that it would be necessary to take measures and to conceal the plans from the crews as the transfer of every single ship is a major operation.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

A big two-funnel steamer was sighted in EF 6363 on course 120° at high speed.

2. Own Situation:

A new success has been reported from the Indian Ocean.

Submarine U "181" sank a steamer of 2,852 BRT enroute from Durban to Aden in KF 9166.

Our submarines were repeatedly attacked by planes in the sea area west of Spain and west of the Canary Islands. All attacks were repulsed and the boats were not damaged.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

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The enemy continued his attacks on airfields in northern and western France with air forces of medium strength. During the attacks on 14 Jul., altogether 62 of our planes including 49 FW 190s were destroyed on the airfields. These serious losses are most regrettable. On 15 Jul., 10 enemy planes were shot down during the defense against the attacks.

During the night of 15 Jul., 24 enemy planes flew into Reich territory. Twenty of these flew across the Reich territory via Friedrichshafen - Munich without dropping bombs and successfully attacked the Peugeot Works and Montbéliard. Besides these, about 230 planes were reported crossing western France towards Italy.

Eight of our bombers made a nuisance raid on London during last night.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the night of 14 Jul., about 25 enemy bombers attacked the town and port of Naples. The attack was repeated at noon by strong forces. Strong forces also attacked our airfields in the Foggia area during the afternoon and evening. In the afternoon, 7 Ju 88 planes were destroyed and 9 damaged. In the railroad station at Foggia an ammunition train, a fuel train with 700,000 liters, and a freight train with all the guns for one 8.8 cm and one 2 cm anti-aircraft batteries were completely destroyed.

Our planes continued their reconnaissance activity in the Sicilian area.

During the night of 14 Jul., 120 bombers were in operation against ship targets in the Syracuse area. Twelve vessels for a total of 53,000 BRT were damaged so heavily that the Air Force considers them lost. Fourteen more vessels for 37,000 BRT, 1 cruiser, 1 light cruiser and 2 destroyers were damaged by hits.

3. Eastern Area:

On 14 Jul., 70 enemy planes were reported to have been shot down on the Army front.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy landing in Sicily:



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The enemy pressure towards Catania was maintained with undiminished strength. German parachutists were landed on the Catania airfield without enemy opposition. On the afternoon of 14 Jul. the enemy opened a strong infantry and tank attack on the left flank of the main German line. Our forces were forced to withdraw. The greater part of the "General Goering" tank division was sent in to clear up the situation and relieve the left flank. All enemy attacks on the new main battle line were repulsed. The enemy air force took part in the land fighting with strong bomber, fighter-bomber and dive bomber formations. Steps have been taken to occupy the bridgehead position as ordered.

Situation at Sea:

In the night of 14 Jul., enemy commando troops were landed on the coast north of Catania. In the early morning hours, our air reconnaissance detected about 100 ships off Avola, 50 vessels in the harbor and roads of Augusta and 50 in the harbor and roads of Syracuse. At noon, south of Catania, several enemy warships were sighted sailing north; they bombarded the coast south of Taormina.

At 1725, a formation of 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 5 destroyers and 15 merchantmen totalling up to 20,000 BRT were sailing west 60 miles east of Syracuse.

The locations of the other battleships were not identified.

On 14 Jul., enemy air reconnaissance erroneously reported one of our convoys, 50 miles south of La Spezia, as two battleships. The strong enemy air reconnaissance and air activity in the northern Tyrrhenia was probably due to this false report.

At 0700, 24 freighters, 10 LST, 38 landing boats and 9 escort boats were reported near Cape Passero, 5 freighters 20 miles southeast of Cape Passero and 25 freighters unloading 12 miles southeast of Cape Passero.

There were 23 freighters, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 6 destroyers, 68 landing boats and 2 guard boats in Gela harbor. There were no ships were in port at Licata.

At 1520, there were 80 warships south of Empedocle sailing west.

At 2245, Messina was simultaneously attacked by surface and air forces.

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In the enemy air attack on Messina on 14 Jul., the harbor area was heavily damaged and the steamer VENEZIA and several auxiliary vessels were sunk. No serious damage was caused by the enemy air attack on Palermo during the night of 14 Jul. Another attack on the evening of 15 Jul., put a radio station out of action.

At 1300, 4 boats of 7th PT Boat Flotilla and one boat of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla left for night operations in the Augusta - Syracuse area. At 2235, the flotilla reported unidentified stationary vessels 6 miles south of Messina, and engaged them briefly. These were presumably the ships that bombarded Messina.

No other reports have yet been received from the flotilla.

According to Radio Intelligence, the Commander of a British formation reported contact with 6 PT Boats off Reggio at 2304.

Naval Staff has issued the following directive to German Naval Command, Italy:

The latest PT boat thrusts have proved that it is not possible to operate to the desired extent from the Straits of Messina because of enemy counter-action. On the other hand, there will continue to be valuable PT boat targets in the sea area off the southeast coast of Sicily which can probably more easily be reached by starting from the east and avoiding the enemy light naval forces operating against the Straits of Messina. Moreover, it is important that, in case the Straits of Messina are closed, 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas should be available in the Ionian Sea and the Greek area. It is therefore better for the PT boats to start operating at once from harbors south or east of the Straits of Messina. Naval Staff considers that they should be transferred to Crotona or Taranto as soon as their next operation is completed. It is realized that operations will have to be suspended for a brief period until supplies and equipment are delivered. Report plans.

No action reports have been received from the Italian or our own submarines. Submarine U "81" is to be assigned to the operation area south of Sicily between the longitudes of CN 3515 and 3147.

The railway ferry across the Straits of Messina was periodically in service on 14 Jul. Our ferry traffic on 14 and 15 Jul. was normal in spite of very strong air attacks.

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2. Enemy Situation in other parts of the Mediterranean:

The number of ships in Gibraltar was substantially unchanged. According to an Italian report, 11 freighters and 4 tankers from the 41-ship convoy which entered Gibraltar on 14 Jul. were escorted to the Mediterranean.

The number of ships in Bizerta has risen since 14 Jul. A 7,000 ton steamer was sunk by Italian torpedo planes during the night of 14 Jul. At 1027, our air reconnaissance reported 5 freighters and 3 PT boats on a westerly course, north of Bizerta. At 1837, 6 merchantmen and 6 guard ships were reported on an east-northeasterly course 10 miles north of Jijelli.

At 1910, 3 big passenger ships with 4 - 5 destroyers and fighter protection were sailing west, 15 miles north of Tabarca.

3. Own Situation in other parts of the Mediterranean:

Sea Transport Situation:

The number of planes shot down during the attack on the steamers AQUITANIA and CPT. LE DIABAT has increased to three. The forces which were escorting the steamers that were sunk entered Civitavecchia during the morning. Submarine chaser "2203" and motor minesweeper R "178" are damaged.

One anti-aircraft corvette, 3 submarine chasers, 6 motor minesweepers and 2 Italian torpedo boats were operating on escort service. Five steamers and 3 tugs were escorted between Italy, Corsica and Sardinia. No reports have been received on traffic with Sicily.

4. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

Shortly after midnight, an enemy submarine was sighted off Castron harbor. Submarine hunting by Arado planes produced no results.

Six planes were reported to have flown into the western Peloponnese apparently to supply insurgents.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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Own Situation:

1st and 11th PT Boat Flotillas made no contact with the enemy during operations on the night of 14 Jul. The PT Boat Flotilla in the reconnaissance line east of Theodosia was attacked by 21 bombers at 2055 and 2122 on 14 Jul. No damage was sustained.

Owing to bad weather and the phase of the moon, PT boat operations for the night of 15 Jul. were cancelled.

At 2200 on 14 Jul. the convoy Theodosia - Yalta was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs southeast of Sudak.

Five AT-mines were again cleared in the southeastern part of the Kertch Straits.

Operations by minesweeping planes over the Danube estuary produced no results.

Supply and ferry traffic, as well as the Kertch-convoys, were carried out according to plan and without incident.

Special Items:

At the request of Naval Staff, Group South has submitted a list of the successes of our naval forces in the Black Sea since 12 Jun. 1941. For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 21181/43 geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

Naval Attaché Tokyo reports: In the night of 12 Jul., an encounter took place between a Japanese formation of several light cruisers and 4 destroyers and a USA formation off Colonbangara. Two enemy cruisers were certainly sunk by torpedoes and gun fire, and 2 heavily damaged, one of which apparently sank later. It was said that on the Japanese side, 1 cruiser of 5500 tons, which was put out of action by gunfire, must be considered lost.

After the battle on 6 Jul., prisoners from the U.S. cruisers HELENA and SANTA FE, and from the destroyer STRONG were picked up. This appears to confirm the sinking of two cruisers as reported by the Japanese. Japanese destroyers have taken supplies and reinforcements to Munda where there are 10,000 Japanese troops under Navy command; there are only small Army contingents.

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The strength of the invading USA troops is estimated at 5,000 men. The enemy has the air superiority.

The Japanese estimate the strength of the Soviets in the Far East as follows:

Army: 750,000 men, 1,000 planes of which 100 are long-range bombers, 1,000 tanks.

Navy: 1 large cruiser, 10 destroyers, 110 submarines, 2 submarine parent ships, 6 torpedo boats, 5 mine-layers, 150 planes including 30 long-range bombers, and 45,000 men in coast defense.

The Japanese Naval Staff has closed the Lombok Strait presumably because of submarine danger.

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Items of Political Importance:

No reports of naval interest have been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division:

a. The new 2 cm ammunition with increased explosive charge has given extremely good results. Instead of the 1.5 million cartridges requested of Armed Forces High Command, the Navy is to get only 1 million and that at the expense of the Air Force. Discussions are under way with the Air Force in regard to delivery by installments. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will settle the matter with Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

b. According to our figures on the amount of fuel oil delivered to Italy, 38,000 tons of Roumanian deliveries cannot be traced in Italy. It is feared that these supplies have somehow been set aside but in any case they have not yet reached the Italian Navy.

Within a highly restricted circle:

II. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division:

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The Japanese Liaison Officer reported on 10 Jul., that the Japanese Naval Attaché, Berlin had received advice from Tokyo that the Japanese Navy regrets that it is unable to furnish any transport submarines within a reasonable period. The Japanese Navy will not be in a position to assign any boats to the traffic to Germany until some new ones are placed into service. From further discussion with the Liaison Officer it was understood that the Japanese Naval Attaché was dissatisfied with this decision and has again called Tokyo's attention to the urgency of the problem and hopes to get an affirmative answer after all. Naval Staff is considering whether the Japanese offer to exchange a blockade runner for a transport submarine or cruiser would be advantageous. Such an exchange could, of course, only be considered if it would serve to effect an early increase in the submarine rubber shipments. It is planned to ask Naval Attaché, Tokyo for his opinion on the matter. Chief of Naval Staff has concurred.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that two batteries have now been detached by Commanding General, Armed Forces South from the "Alarich" and "Gisela" allotments for the coastal reinforcement of Southern Italy. One is a 15 cm battery of 4 guns with crew and the other a 10.5 cm battery also with 4 guns and crew.

IV. Chief, Naval Staff again referred to the suggestion of Naval Staff, Operations Division in regard to strengthening German influence in the command of the Italian Armed Forces. Chief, Naval Staff supported the view that defense could best be carried out on the coast and that the cooperation of Italian troops was indispensable in view of the extent of the coast. Our position in the Italian Peninsula must be held as it is of decisive importance also for the maintenance of our position in the Balkans. Chief, Naval Staff has decided to report this opinion to the Fuehrer.

Subsequently, the discussion of the question of a change in Japan's attitude towards Russia was resumed. Chief, Naval Staff considers that the development of the situation undoubtedly calls for modification of previously held opinions. The question is whether Japan is strong enough to make an effective attack on the Russians without unduly weakening her position in the southern area. Bureau of Naval Armament is to investigate how much transport tonnage would have to be withdrawn from the southern area for an operation in Manchukuo. Of the Russian naval forces, only the 110 submarines need be considered. Another problem is the question of timing. According to information

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from Naval Attaché, Tokyo, an operation of this kind in the north could not be contemplated before the beginning of the winter. Chief, Naval Staff plans to discuss this subject also with the Fuehrer when occasion arises.

V. Naval Liaison Officer attached to High Command, Army has reported, by letter, to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on the status of operation "Citadelle". North of Bjelgorod the enemy has been badly smashed and has suffered serious losses in tanks but it will not be possible to advance further. The attack south of Orel on the other hand, was brought to a standstill in a strongly fortified mountain area and has turned into a serious defense battle during which the enemy has succeeded in making several strong penetrations and even in breaking through our old main line of defense. Our losses have been heavy and amounted to about 30,000 men during the first 3 days. Tank losses of tanks are not too heavy.

Naval Liaison Officer attached to High Command, Army further suggested that a conference of the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the three services be held for the purpose making as accurate an assessment as possible of the enemy situation in relation to further developments in the Mediterranean. On the basis of this conference, the proper distribution of land, air and sea forces in the southern and western areas could be decided and the repercussions on the eastern front established. The matter of a suitable command organization in the south would also have to be re-examined. The letter as per l/Skl 2039/43 Gkdos. Chfs. is attached to War Diary, Part C, Vol. a.

Chief, Naval Staff commented that the result of his conference with the Fuehrer must first be awaited. Rear Admiral Voss was expected in Berlin this evening to report to Chief, Naval Staff. Chief, Naval Staff would go to Fuehrer Headquarters on the morning of 17 Jul.

Special Items:

I. By order of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch, dated 14 Jul., 1st and 2nd Transport Flotillas (Tr.Fl.) will be established as from 1 Aug. The flotillas will be assigned to sea transport duties in the Mediterranean area. The flotillas will be formed from vessels of the barge program, with militarized crews, assembled in groups of 20 vessels each which will be under the operational and administrative (detached) command of 2nd Landing Division (Chief, Supply and Transport Italy). Commander PT Boats will be in command up to time of detachment.

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At the request of Commander, PT Boats, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization & Mobilization Branch has established 1st PT Boat Force, effective immediately, which will be under the operational and administrative (detached) authority of German Naval Command, Italy. Commander PT Boats will be in command up to the time of detachment. 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas and their bases will be subordinated thereto.

This measure, which was strongly advocated by Naval Staff, Operations Division, meets an urgent need arising from the deterioration of the Mediterranean Situation, as, with the increasingly difficult operational conditions, the offensive power of the PT boats can be fully exploited only if all factors are taken into consideration and handled by an authority in close cooperation with the operational commands and by the quickest means of communication. Personnel requirements have been satisfied by the appointment of the former Chief, Operations Branch of Commander PT Boats.

II. On the basis of Admiral Weichold's report on his trip to the Southeast area, and a simultaneous request from Group South, a discussion was held on the question of constructing minesweepers in the Southeast area. Naval Staff, Operations Division has instructed Quartermaster Division to build first, one minesweeper flotilla of eight boats, as the available facilities permit, and then to continue with the construction of another flotilla of the same strength plus four boats per year as replacements. Construction must be comprised within the 1943 naval building program. This increase in minesweeper construction must in no circumstances lead to delay in the new construction planned at home.

III. Enemy Situation Report No. 13/43 of 1 Jul. by Naval Staff Naval Intelligence Division correctly indicated the main center of the enemy's planned offensive in the Mediterranean and reiterated the previously held assumption that two separate major operations were planned to start simultaneously in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean presumably against Sardinia (and Corsica?) and the Peloponnese with contemporaneous feint operations against Sicily and the Dodecanese. The subsequent landing in Sicily has not confirmed that assumption in all details.

Enemy trans-Atlantic convoys, in both directions, during Jun. 1943, comprised 44 convoys with about 1,190 ships. For copy as per 1/Skl 19180/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, file Enemy Situation Reports by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division.



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Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division also issued a report on 1 Jul. on the distribution of the British Fleet as at the end of Jun. For copy as per 1/Skl 19181 gkdos. see War Diary Part D, Vol. "Material on the Enemy Situation."

A report has also been received from Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence on the use of rafts and floating piers for landing troops, vehicles, and materials by the British Navy. For copy as per 1/Skl 21315/43 geh. see War Diary Part D, Vol. "Foreign Navies, Evaluation of Information."

Situation on 16 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Belconnen issued an anti-submarine warning for 15 Jul. in position 3530 south 151° East.

2. Own Situation:

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN arrived in Djakarta on 13 Jul.

Naval Staff advised Ship "28" by radiogram 2130, of the above anti-submarine warning and in radiogram 1131, concluded the report on political relations between England and America. The report ended as follows:

1. America will make every effort to regain the Burma Road in the autumn, and will not agree to a decisive large-scale invasion in Europe which would tie down the available Allied forces. However, small-scale landing operations in Europe can soon be expected.

2. The decisive invasion will be made in such a way that Europe can, at the same time, be protected against Russia. The main offensive will therefore come via the Balkans. It may be supplemented by an operation in northern Norway or Finland.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

35 planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located in AM 01 east of Rockall Bank at 1831.

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Naval Staff, Submarine Division, Commanding Admiral Submarines has informed the German Liaison Officer attached to the Italian Commanding Admiral, Submarines on the enemy situation in the Bay of Biscay. The report states that there are 2 - 3 submarine chaser groups of 2 - 3 vessels each and at times 1-2 destroyers with 1 - 2 corvettes or trawlers in constant operation within a distance of about 150 miles around Cape Finisterre. North of this area isolated incoming or outgoing groups appear from time to time. Besides this, fast, strongly armed planes may be expected in this area. Submarines have again recently put in an appearance hard under the coast. In view of this situation, Italian and German submarines have been recommended to hug the Spanish coast.

According to an Intelligence Report of 15 Jul. received via Portugal from a particularly reliable source, the suspension of leave in the Services, travel restrictions and the closing of entire areas on the south coast of England, requisition of all motor cars in south and southwest England not previously seized, and the establishment of new hospitals all go to indicate that a large-scale operation from that area is imminent. No assembling of transport ships has been observed. Landing boats are available there only in small numbers. However, new landing boats, presumably of American origin, are being brought in, and destroyers and small vessels are being transferred from the north to the south coast. Whether all these measures are in connection with a new operation or for supplying the Mediterranean cannot be ascertained.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Eight ELM/J mines were swept off the Gironde and La Pallice.

Destroyers Z "24" and "32" moved from Royan to Bordeaux and destroyer Z "37" moved to Pauillac. Torpedo boat T "24" "Falke" and "Greif" carried out submarine rescue for two boats and returned to Brest.

By order of Chief, Naval Staff, the submarine group U "117", "459" and "461" will be escorted by destroyers and the group of submarine U "462" and two Italian Aquila boats, by torpedo boats as far westwards as possible. Air escort to be provided. The submarines are to proceed separately after leaving the escort.

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Channel Coast:

Due to bad weather, the patrol positions were not taken up. There was no convoy traffic. Only the Channel Island traffic and some channel sweeps were carried out. Nothing else has been reported.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

At 0320, the harbor protection group at Ymuiden had a brief engagement with three enemy PT boats, 6 miles southeast of Ymuiden. One enemy vessel was probably sunk.

At 0657, convoy 450 was unsuccessfully attacked by eight enemy planes.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty planes were detected operating over the North Sea but no planes were observed in the area of the Iceland squadrons. Reconnaissance was probably flown during this time of the Shetland Narrows area. Our own air reconnaissance produced no tactical results.

2. Own Situation:

On the afternoon of 15 Jul., four patrol boats and one plane carried out a submarine hunt near Sogneksen after previous acoustic location. Convoy traffic in the area of suspected submarines is procedure with reinforced protection. At 0200 on 16 Jul. an enemy plane crashed west of Kvittingsoey. The Canadian crew was picked up by a minesweeper.

Forty-five ships were escorted to the north and 44 ships to the south.

Eight ships were held up owing to lack of escort vessels.

Commander, Submarines Norway has reported the plan for the submarine commitment in Northern Waters in connection with the forthcoming operations: A total of six boats will perform the minelaying operations. Action date will be the last 10 days in Jul. to the beginning of August. The following code words have been set for the operation: Belushya - Aster; Jugor Strait - Nelke; Jermak Bank - Gladoile; Petchora - Tulpe; Sengeiski - Veilchen and Rose.

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Submarine U "601" will leave as the first boat for operation Aster and will subsequently be available for refuelling BV 138, after replenishing her torpedo supply.

Three boats are provided for the operation in the Kara Sea. They will take up the positions as ordered on 26 and 29 Jul. and 2 Aug. respectively. Submarine U "255" will have to arrive on 25 Jul. at a position at the northern end of Novaya Semlya, and submarine U "601" on 30 Jul., in order to refuel BV 138.

The first meteorological apparatus was taken to Bear Island by submarine U "629" on 9 Jul. On about 20 Jul., submarine U "703" will lay a weather buoy. One or 2 of the submarines at Bear Island will always be ready for further tasks. Commander Submarines Norway reckons with seven boats at a time for the positions in the Bear Island/Spitzbergen area. One of these boats will also make a reconnaissance of the west coast of Spitzbergen on about 16 Jul., as a special assignment.

Group North Fleet has reported that the codewords for the repeat of operation "Wunderland" are "Husar", "Suedwind" and "Dudelsack".

Naval Staff Hydrographic and Meteorological Division has issued a directive to Group North Fleet on the establishment of weather observation stations in the northern area. Four separate operations are planned with the code words "Bassgeiger", "Einsiedler", "Kreuzritter" and "Schatzgraeber". Operation "Bassgeiger" provides for one winter station and two alternative stations in Greenland. Weather ship 3 "C. J. Busch" will serve as transport. Operations "Einsiedler" and "Kreuzritter" will be carried out by the weather ship "6" "Kaedinger." Operation "Einsiedler" is to consist of a thrust as far to the west as possible along the Greenland coast. "Kreuzritter" comprises the establishment of permanent stations in the northern Spitzbergen. Details of operation "Schatzgraeber" will be issued later. These operations should, if possible, include the establishment of a weather station in Alexandra-Land north of Spitzbergen or on Victoria Island.

#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

There was some artillery activity in Kronstadt Bay during the day and great air activity. Shipping traffic between

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Kronstadt and Leningrad was intense particularly during the night. According to an aerial photograph on the evening of 15 Jul., there were 45 guard ships, PT boats, and motor boats, 3 tugs, 4 barges and 1 small freighter at Lavensari. Three PT boats were cruising east of Seiskari. In the evening of 16 Jul., several planes attacked Tyters.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty vessels and 2 minesweeping planes were on channel clearance duties in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. One ELM/J mine was cleared 9 miles south-east of Skagen. Three troop transports, 1 tanker, 2 steamers, the mine transport "Rhein", and 1 new mine exploding vessel were escorted.

The administration hut of the unoccupied anti-aircraft position at Gammelby was set on fire by sabotage and completely destroyed.

Four tankers and 3 leave transports were escorted in the eastern Baltic Sea.

Minesweeping in the Joben Strait was discontinued because of bad weather. The anti-submarine net and barrage patrols in the Gulf of Finland were carried out according to plan by 34 vessels. An oil trace near Vaindlo was attacked with depth charges. A first-aid kit was found.

After reconditioning the foundations, the "Prinz Heinrich" battery reopened fire on the dockyards in Kronstadt Bay and observed 3 hits in buildings.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Four more submarines must be presumed lost in the Bay of Biscay.

Five submarines are to be combined into a group in the Freetown area in order to attack the regular convoy traffic up to Logos. Three other boats will remain in independent positions off Freetown.

New reports have been received of successes in the Indian Ocean. Three steamers and one tanker for a total of 25,000 BRT were sunk.

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Besides, one steamer of 4,558 BRT was sunk 520 miles east of Rio de Janeiro.

With the delivery of the first Zaunkoenig torpedoes to the flotillas in the West Area, the equipment of the boats with quadruple and twin mount anti-aircraft guns and the armoring of the conning towers, the measures necessary for resumption of the campaign against convoys in the North Atlantic are barely completed. Naval Staff Submarine Division intends to reopen these operations in the period of new moon at the end of August/beginning of September.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day, only minor enemy air activity was reported from the occupied western territories. Traffic installations were attacked in the Abbeville area. Three Spitfires were shot down. In the night of 16 Jul., about 30 planes were reported flying over to and from Italy. Besides this, 108 planes were observed flying into German controlled territory, 27 of which were flying towards Germany. In southwest Germany, 20 planes got as far as Munich and dropped four high explosive bombs on a railway station.

Mediterranean Area:

The enemy continued the attack on our airfields with strong forces. Twenty-five of our planes were destroyed and 34 damaged. At noon, strong forces attacked San Giovanni. Two of the attacking planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Late in the evening, an air attack was made on Catania where 8 enemy planes were shot down, and leaflets containing an appeal from Roosevelt and Churchill to the Italian people to renounce Fascism were dropped, over Rome.

Planes flying from England to northern Italy dropped a few bombs near Milan and La Spezia. No military damage was done.

Only a few air reconnaissance reports have so far been received from our planes.

Eastern Front:

On 15 Jul., 49 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front.

The 5th Air Force reported a raid by 8 Blenheims which sank

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one of our submarine chasers near Herdla at 0430. No report on this has yet been received from Navy sources.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

Enemy Landing In Sicily:

Situation on land: On the left flank of the "Hermann Goering" tank division the enemy continued to attack with strong infantry and tank forces supported by flanking fire from heavy naval guns. After a fluctuating battle, Group Schmalz had to withdraw behind the Lunga section. Strong enemy parachute units again landed in the area northwest of Catania - Paterno - Biancabilla. Commanding General Armed Forces South expects the enemy to launch a decisive attack on the left flank in order to break through towards Messina.

Situation at sea: Five boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla returned from operations in the early morning and put in to Paradiso. From 2240 - 2307 on the preceding evening, the formation had an artillery duel with 4 motor gun-boats, 20 miles south of Messina during which two motor gun-boats were set on fire by shells and 1 was probably sunk. At 2330, the flotilla made a detour to the east to avoid other motor gun-boats and advanced in the reconnaissance section up to 5 miles northeast of Syracuse. A combined torpedo attack on a tanker or LST with two escort vessels on a westerly course was unsuccessful due to a phosphorescent bubble track. No ships were sighted off Syracuse and Augusta. At 0348 the flotilla turned back from 8 miles southeast of Augusta making a wide detour to the east. Between 0517 and 0600, the flotilla was heavily engaged by a superior force of 8 motor gun-boats and PT boats. PT boat 3-156 was unable to move for some time because all her engines went out of action. Hits on the enemy were observed. Only one man was wounded on our side. Four boats are out of action because of hits and engine trouble. At 1930, the boats put in to Salerno. German Naval Command Italy plans no further operations until the big boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla are ready for action and 3rd PT Boat Flotilla has moved to Crotona so as to avoid the motor gun-boat line. Furthermore, German Naval Command, Italy reports that the boats of 7th PT Boat Flotilla of type S-151 are very unreliable and, in spite of the new engines, can make only 28 knots maximum speed, and barely 24 knots cruising speed. German Naval Command suggests that the 7th PT Boat Flotilla be left in the western area of Italy and Sardinia - Corsica.

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In the afternoon, 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers were sighted off Catania and further landings were observed on the east coast. Twenty freighters, 40 landing boats, 6 destroyers, 11 PT boats and smaller vessels were reported near Cape Passero. At 2227, our air reconnaissance reported several unidentified units 20 miles east of Crotona.

In the night of 15 Jul., an Italian plane reported a torpedo hit on a large transport or aircraft carrier near Cape Passero.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division presented maps of the transport routes used by the enemy forces operating against Sicily. Whereas all the U. S. forces started from northern Tunisia, only part of the British divisions came from that area while one division came from the Bougie area, one from Philippeville and one from Egypt. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division also showed a map giving the disposition of the landing boats and freighter tonnage in the Mediterranean. For copy as per 1/Skl 21121 and 21221/43 gch see War Diary Part D, "Material on the Enemy Situation."

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

At 1300, a cruiser of the Dido-class entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic and a convoy of 12 big transports, some with troops, entered from the Atlantic at 1930, escorted by six destroyers and two corvettes.

According to our air reconnaissance, at 1615, a formation of 30 ships including warships was sailing east, 25 miles north of Bone. In Bizerta and off the port a reduction in landing vessels and an increase in freighters was observed. At 1600, about 70 large and small vessels were counted there.

Submarines were reported near Elba, near Cape Melazzo and northeast of Brindisi.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, several convoys of 4 - 7 small vessels and a bigger convoy of 10 medium-sized freighters with 8 escort vessels on a northwesterly course were detected in the afternoon between Alexandria and Tobruk.

According to an Intelligence Report from Spain, from a diplomatic source in Madrid, a completely equipped operational army is assembled at Benghazi and in Syria where the main offensive is to be expected.



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3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

Torpedo boat TA "11", 1 anti-aircraft corvette, 1 aviso, 5 motor minesweepers, 2 Italian torpedo boats and 2 Italian corvettes are operating in the escort service. One tanker, 1 steamer, and 2 tugs were escorted in the Sicilian traffic and 5 steamers in the Corsica traffic. A motor ship en route from Genoa to Maddalena put in to Leghorn at 1600 because of sighting the enemy.

"Brandenburg" and "Pommern" have been ordered to move from Toulon to Maddalena. The harbor of Toulon has been temporarily closed because of suspected mines.

In regard to a new method of attack adopted by enemy torpedo planes, German Naval Command, Italy reports that 6 - 8 independent planes attack at an acute angle from ahead or behind and drop surface-runner torpedoes 100 meters in front of the target whereas the main group waits across the course some distance away. Naval Staff has forwarded this information to all operational stations without delay. (See teletype 1717).

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

On 15 Jul., the tanker "Celeno", in Piraeus, was sabotaged by the explosion of a blasting charge. The ship had to be docked because of leaks. The convoy of the steamer SINFRA had to change course from Salonica to Piraeus because of engine trouble. Other convoy traffic proceeded according to plan.

Army Group, Southeast reports that insurgents activities have suddenly started in Crete. Weapons and explosives have been found.

Special Items:

Naval Staff has called the attention of Armed Forces, High Command, Supply and Transportation Office for Armed Forces Overseas and Armed Forces Operations Staff op, and of Naval Group South and German Naval Command, Italy, for information to the urgency of transferring the supply traffic from Greece that is still using the western route, to the eastern route since, in view of current developments, it may be expected that the Adriatic will be cut off in the near future. Naval

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Staff has suggested that no more ships arriving from the Adriatic in Piraeus be returned as, in view of the length of the voyage, it is unlikely that another round trip could be completed and the ships would then be missed in the Aegean. For copy of order 1/Skl II 19967/43 Gkdos, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

One steamer, one guard ship, one minesweeper and two motor minesweepers were sighted on a northwesterly course southeast of Tuapse. Two ships in tow and one motor minesweeper were sighted northwest of Tuapse.

Own Situation:

In the night of 16 Jul., the PT boats were not sent out because of the phase of the moon. The patrol positions were taken in as scheduled. Enemy planes attacked the 142nd Anapa transport with bombs and gun fire at 1415 southwest of the Kerch Strait. Minor casualties were sustained. Six of the attacking planes were shot down by fighters. Two more mines were cut in the enemy barrage southeast of Kerch Strait.

On 14 Jul. six planes were observed laying mines in the Danube estuary between Topalul and Dunera. All shipping was cancelled. On 15 Jul., further mines were reportedly dropped in the Danube estuary near Sulina. Minesweeping is underway.

The supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to schedule and without incident.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

I. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that the dispatch of the "Gneisenau" railway battery from Sete to southern Italy will be expedited. Further steps will be taken upon orders of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster General also reported on a conference held at the German Foreign Office on the question of inflation in Greece. No way has been found of enabling the Navy to buy the repair materials required at the dock-yards. It is a grotesque situation when one of the services is unable to obtain the essential material which is available in a conquered and occupied territory because the control of finance is insufficient to overcome inflationary tendencies. The simultaneous occupation of the country by the Germans and the Italians is largely responsible for this state of affairs.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that the information be given to the Admiral attached to the Fuehrer Headquarters who will report it to Armed Forces, High Command or to the Fuehrer.

II. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the call issued by Roosevelt and Churchill to the Italian people, by broadcast and leaflet, and on the reaction of the Italian press. For details, see Report on the Foreign Press.

III. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that Quartermaster Division is investigating how German support may be provided for the defense of Toulon in case of need. The establishment of a new Naval Artillery Detachment is contemplated. Replacement of the Sete Battery is not considered necessary.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters is to be advised of this matter also. Chief, Naval Staff will be briefed of the subject at Fuehrer Headquarters by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

Special Items:

I, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reported on

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the use of radio location in landing operations. According to a note in the Times, the American radio location device Radar ("radio detection and range") was used most successfully during the landing at Attu. It was only by means of this device that the transport vessels could be brought to the right positions and the landing troops to the pre-established landing points. Without the device, it would have been impossible to carry out the operations according to plan and on schedule.

In the Mediterranean, a radar set (lattice tower) was observed on the bridge of a 250 ton LCT.

It may undoubtedly be assumed that the command boats of the landing flotillas are equipped with these devices, so that landings are possible under the especially effective protection of poor visibility at night and in fog.

For report as per l/Skl 21223/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D, Evaluation of Reports on "Foreign Navies."

II. When the transfer of the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla from the Seine to the Saone is accomplished, all current projects of this kind will have been completed. Naval Staff, Operations Division has therefore been investigating whether any other vessels can be moved to the Mediterranean and, as a result, has ordered Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, that, no vessels (either naval landing craft, motor minesweepers or PT boats) are to be transported by this route until further orders. For copy of order l/Skl I op 20012/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol.d.

III. On the occasion of a visit to the PT boat Flotillas in the West Area, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that an experienced PT boat officer be detached immediately to Supreme Command, in order to handle the affairs of Commander PT Boats and act as his representative with the Supreme Command. Commander PT Boats has suggested that this could be done within the organization of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and that the liaison officer should hold a simultaneous office in Naval Staff, Operations Division.

Naval Staff, Operations Division approved the inclusion of the officer in Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division but considered the rest of the suggestion too comprehensive. The essential thing is the officer's influence on the other divisions from his position in Naval Staff, Quartermaster

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Division, Fleet Branch. In case the cooperation of this officer should become necessary during the discussion of such questions with Naval Staff, Operations Division should require this officer's cooperation on any given question, he can be called in as an expert without need for a part time detachment. This point of view has been forwarded to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch.

Situation on 17 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The German Consulate at Lourenco Marques reported on 14 Jul. that, according to the statements of Portugese working at the harbor, three British Army formations are standing by on the Persian frontier near Baker in order to secure the oil fields in case of a separate peace with Russia (!).

According to the same report, an agent states that an aircraft carrier recently left Cape Town for Mombassa and that on 9 Jul. a convoy of 14 ships with planes and troops left for India. Two passenger steamers will shortly bring troops and evacuees to Egypt. Owing to the danger from submarines, the shipping route has been shifted to 130 miles south of Madagascar.

On 6 Jul., the "Charlotte Schliemann" sighted one (apparently) transport on course  $340^{\circ}$  in  $16^{\circ}10' S 88^{\circ}30' E$ .

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attache, Tokyo reports that the "Marco Polo" was met at 1145 on 15 Jul. and arrived at Penang on 16 Jul.

Naval Staff advised Shir "28" by radiogram 1632, of the arrival of the SCHLIEMANN at Djakarta and of the AQUILA at Singapore on 13 Jul., the closing of the Lombok Strait by the Japanese Naval Staff and on the above sighting report from the SCHLIEMANN.

During the past three weeks our radio intelligence has intercepted several reports of submarine sightings in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Naval Staff has informed Naval Attache, Tokyo and instructed him that details as to how many Japanese submarines are operating in that area are required

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in order to come to conclusions about the enemy patrols.

The same question was forwarded to Tokyo by the Japanese Liaison Officer on 10 Jul. The answer is still awaited. According to the Japanese Captain Emi, who arrived with Submarine U "180", one or two Japanese submarines are operating in the Gulf of Arabia.

Naval Staff has approved the suggestions forwarded by Naval Attaché, Tokyo in regard to the rigging of the various blockade runners. (See teletype 1145). Naval Staff further informed Naval Attaché, Tokyo that the fate of the Aquila boat which, according to dead reckoning should have arrived at the rendezvous point on 22 Jul., is uncertain as she has not reported since 6 Jun. (See teletype 2200).

## II. Situation West Area:

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-one planes were detected in the Bay of Biscay. The greatest activity was noticed between 1200 and 1500. At 2350, one British unit was in BE 3110 according to dead reckoning.

The Intelligence Service reports from a so-far unreliable communist source at Calais that an attack on the French Channel coast is expected on 17 Jul.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines were cleared off Brest and off Lorient. Another ELM/J mine exploded in a fishing net near Concarneau. Destroyer Z "32" will probably dock at Pauillac on 18 Jul. in order to change its propeller.

In its report on torpedo night-firing practice, 8th Destroyer Flotilla stated that two unidentified planes had flown over. (See War Diary 15 Jul. teletype 2340.) The flotilla now reports that it has been established that, one of these was a German experimental plane while the other was apparently an enemy torpedo bomber because acoustic observation made by destroyer Z "24" of two fast running torpedoes tallied exactly with the sighting observation of destroyer Z "37". In these circumstances, the flotilla rightly considers that only night attack exercises without torpedo-firing are suitable at night.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

On 16 Jul., one ELM/J-mine was cleared by a minesweeping plane near Heligoland. Casualties were caused among the crew of minelayer M "203" when a bomb hit the boat's shelter at Amsterdam.

An enemy bomber formation that, during the forenoon, penetrated north of Heligoland, turned northwest without attacking the coast, presumably because of the ceiling.

Convoy and escort services were carried out according to schedule in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North Sea.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-one planes were observed in operation over the North Sea and fourteen planes in the area of 15th Group. At 0154 Radio Intelligence intercepted the following report from the Russian guard boat "408": "Fighting against four enemy vessels. Position 16°07' North".

According to air reconnaissance on the morning of 16 Jul., one merchantman of 1,000 BRT was on course 270° in An 8635. Photographic interpretation of 16 Jul. showed 6 coastal freighters totalling 2,265 BRT at Belushya, several small barges at Krassin, 1 barge of 1500 BRT and 1 tug-steamer at Shonia, 4 paddle-steamers and one barge (2,000 BRT) in the Petshora mouth and at Naryan Maar, 1 small freighter, 2 barges in Motka Bay.

2. Own Situation:

At 0337 on 15 Jul., the battery and village of Kiberg were attacked by eight enemy planes with bombs and gunfire. One plane was shot down. On the same day, German and Russian batteries exchanged fire. At 0120 on 16 Jul., Russian batteries bombarded a Petsamo convoy without causing any damage.

At 0135 on 17 Jul., the mine formation "Ostmark", escorted by two minesweepers and one BV 138 was attacked by an enemy submarine. Mine layer M "346" sank after being hit by two

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torpedoes. Thirty-two men are missing. The "Ostmark" was able to evade three torpedoes. Submarine chaser UJ "1705" was sunk near Sogneøksen during a bomb and gun fire attack by six enemy planes. At 0632 our reconnaissance sighted a submerging enemy submarine in AN 31029'. Two minesweepers and one plane have been sent out on submarine hunt.

On 16 Jul., one BF 109 was shot down during an air attack with bombs and gun fire on a Petsamo convoy. The pilot was rescued.

Eighteen ships were escorted to the north and 24 ships to the south. Three ships are held up due to lack of escort.

At 0100 submarine U "601" and U "625" left Tromsø for mine operations "Aster" and "Nelke".

Group North reports that the turbines of destroyer Z "28" have to be removed and suggests that the boat be released for docking at Trondheim. (See teletype 0019).

Naval Staff has informed Group North Fleet that it will not be necessary to withdraw torpedo boats T "20" and "21" for use as torpedo recovery vessels before the arrival of destroyer Z "29" and "33" because Commanding Admiral submarines has agreed to the request for four torpedo recovery vessels being only partly fulfilled for the time being.

Following Naval Staff's approval of the operational plan for the repeat of "Wunderland", complete understanding has been reached between Group North Fleet and Commanding Admiral, Task Force and Admiral Northern Waters respectively on the question of the freedom of attack for the commandant of the "Luetzow". In this regard, Group North has ordered that the final operational order be formulated as follows:

"As soon as the "Luetzow" reaches her waiting position, the commandant is free to attack at his own discretion in accordance with information received, provided the attacking position and ice conditions are favorable and the action offers reasonable prospects of success."

The above authorities also came to an agreement concerning the action to be taken upon encountering the enemy and the breaking-off of the operation. The relative teletype correspondence which was forwarded for the attention of Naval Staff, Operations Division, is in the files of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Fleet Operations Section.



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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Strong enemy artillery activity against our coastal area and the rear positions was observed in the Kronstadt Bay during the day. Tugs and guard-boat traffic was only light. There were 3 small freighters and 28 guard boats and PT boats in Lavansari, according to our own and Finnish air reconnaissance. Northwest of Schepel there were 3 minesweepers. Isolated guard ships were in positions in the island area.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have come in from the areas of Commanding Admiral, Defenses East and Admiral, Denmark.

Patrol and mine operations in the area of Commander, Minesweepers Baltic were carried out according to plan.

The "Prinz Heinrich" battery is out of action for 3 - 4 weeks because the foundations have again subsided badly.

V. Merchant Shipping:

A survey by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch of the sea transport capacity of the German Navy in May 1943 is filed as per 1/Sk1 21504.43 geh, in War Diary Part C, Vol. XI.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Finisterre, U "558" drove off a low-flying Liberator which attacked with extremely heavy fire and light bombs, without suffering any damage.

The tanker submarine U "487" which had sailed to supply the Monsoon-boats, is missing and must be presumed lost. This loss is a heavy blow. The Monsoon-boats will now have to be supplied by taking two IX C-boats out of active operation

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and by the boats dividing up their fuel amongst themselves. The two IX C-boats will subsequently have to refuel on the way back from a tanker at sea.

Submarine U "306" sank four ships for a total of 27,000 BRT and probably sank another 5,000 BRT out of a convoy of 9 steamers and 5 destroyers under air escort off the West African coast in EK. Submarine U "572" sank 2 freighters in EO and submarine U "508" sank a steamer of 7369 BRT in EV 9933.

On 10 Jul., the "Marco Polo" sank a steamer of 7,000 BRT in the Indian Ocean southwest of the southern end of Madagascar.

Two more boats have been designated for conversion into anti-aircraft boats.

#### VII. Aerial Warfare:

##### British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 125 planes in operation in the west and 11 planes in the Mediterranean. An attack by about 200 four-engined bombers against the coastal area of northern Germany was not carried through presumably due to the bad weather. In the forenoon, Amsterdam was attacked by strong forces. Considerable damage was done to the town. The Focker works and a dockyard which were presumably the target of attack, were undamaged.

Six enemy planes were shot down by our fighters with a loss of five planes on our side.

During the night of 17 Jul., harassing flights without attacks were observed in German controlled territory.

##### Mediterranean Area:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights. As a partial result of the dawn attack on naval targets off Syracuse on the night of 15 Jul., it is reported that 1 ship of 1500 BRT was sunk and 7 ships for 28,000 BRT were damaged. Other hits were scored by light bombers on ships entering Augusta. At 2155 on 17 Jul., a destroyer was set on fire by anti-aircraft fire north of Catania. Another hit was scored on a cruiser.

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In the afternoon, Naples was attacked by strong enemy air forces, in five waves, with fighter protection. Railway installations and Army supply dumps were damaged. Five of the attacking planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. In the night of 17 Jul., our airfield at Pomigliano was attacked. No reports on damage have yet come in.

Eastern Front:

Eighty enemy planes were shot down on 16 Jul. on the Army front.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on land:

Enemy pressure is increasing all along the front. Further landings on the east coast of Sicily have been confirmed.

Situation at Sea:

At 0220, 20 vessels were sighted 10 miles north-east of Catania and 6 merchantmen on a southeasterly course 19 miles southeast of that port. At the same time there were 1 battleship and 2 heavy cruisers between Syracuse and Cape Passero. At 0242, 15-20 vessels were reported south of Cape Passero and 5 merchantmen and 2 destroyers to the east. The battleship and the two cruisers were observed again at 1930 five miles southeast of Catania. At 1825 7 big merchantmen and 8 escort vessels were sailing northeast 20 miles northeast of Malta.

In the night of 15 Jul., an Italian submarine torpedoed a battleship in the sea area Syracuse and observed an explosion. Another Italian submarine scored two hits on a destroyer. The Italian cruiser SCIPIONE AFRICANO en route from Naples to Taranto during the night of 16 Jul. had an engagement with 4 MGBs and sank one of them.

No action reports have been received from our own submarines. 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas were not in operation because preparation for action has been delayed by the enemy air attacks on the dockyards. PT Boat S "154" and "157" will leave Salerno for Toulon in the evening. According to a report

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from German Naval Command, the last German naval establishments will leave the Trapani area on 18 Jul. Captain von Kamptz has been assigned by German Naval Command as Commander Defenses Messina Straits under the direct control of German Naval Command. His task is to protect the ferry traffic against light enemy forces. Fast escort command boat SG "14" and 7 motor minesweepers have been placed under his operational command. Furthermore, Commander Transports Messina Straits will provide him with naval artillery lighters, combat barges and naval landing craft as required.

At the request of German Naval Command Italy, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division has approved the establishment of Commander, Sea Transport for Messina Strait and Sardinia - Corsica. The posts will be filled by the German Chiefs of Staff at Messina and Maddalena.

According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered that 8 - 21cm guns of Army Group North are to be delivered to the Navy for the Straits of Messina. The guns will be replaced by other means. Army General Staff has been requested to deliver the guns with ammunition to the Naples area where the Navy will take them over and man them with naval personnel. It is planned to allot more guns to the Navy from the new production of June and July 1943.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean

The convoy of 12 big transports which entered Gibraltar on the evening of 16 Jul. from the Mediterranean, and not from the Atlantic as reported by the Italians, left for the Atlantic on 17 Jul. It was escorted by 1 Dido-class cruiser, 2 destroyers and 3 frigates.

No shipping traffic was observed in the Western or the Eastern Mediterranean. According to an agent's report, a convoy will leave Oran on 18 Jul. and will enter Bone in the night of 20 Jul.

Submarines were reported 30 miles north of Corsica and 38 miles west-southwest of Civitavecchia. According to Radio Intelligence there was strong reconnaissance activity in the Sicilian area and in the Tyrrhenian Sea, concentrating on the Straits of Messina.

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3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

"Brandenburg" and "Pommern" left Toulon for Maddalena at 2300. Torpedo boat TA "11", fast escort SG "14", 5 motor minesweepers, 1 Italian torpedo boat and 3 corvettes were engaged in escort service. One steamer, 1 tanker and 2 tugs were escorted in the Sicilian traffic and 5 steamers in the other island traffic. German Naval Command, Italy has forwarded the brief battle report of the mine ship "Pommern" on the torpedo planes attack of 11 Jul. For copy see teletype 1900.

According to the weekly report of German Naval Command, Italy for 8 - 14 Jul., the supply for Sicily including traffic across the Straits is assured for the time being during good weather. The number of small vessels with reliable engines is short for the increased demand. The supply situation for Corsica and Sardinia is regarded as good.

Mine operation H 6 D was completed by 6th Defense Flotilla.

The "Gneisenau" Battery will leave Sete for Italy on 18 Jul.

4. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence Report of 16 Jul. from Athens, Greek ex-officers expect a British landing operation to take place near Prevesa, in the Gulf of Arta and near Caterina in the Gulf of Salonika.

Submarines were reported on 16 Jul. south of Sphakia (Crete), on 17 Jul., at noon, north of Itaklion and Heraklien, and in the afternoon, east-southeast of Sphakia.

Own Situation:

Three more mines were cleared from an enemy barrage southeast of Salonika. No other events of any importance.

Group South has again called attention to the strong inadvisability of leaving the control of Corfu-Patras convoys in

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the hands of the Italian Navy in view of the development of the situation in the Ionian Sea. The Group is trying to increase its influence by assigning Naval liaison officers to the Italian offices at Patras, Prevesa and Corfu to safeguard German interests. (See teletype 2040).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

At 0445, the Theodosia convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine near Cape Clauda. The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy was also unsuccessfully attacked by two enemy planes early on 16 Jul. Four enemy planes attacked Yalta on the afternoon of 16 Jul. No naval damage was done. In regard to the attack on the Anapa transport in the southeastern part of the Kerch Strait it has been additionally reported that an old combined operations boat in tow was lost and that, besides, minor casualties were sustained. The naval landing craft shot down two enemy planes certainly and a third probably. Six more enemy planes were shot down by fighters.

At 1936, submarine U "18" sank a freighter of about 2,000 BRT 20 miles southeast of Tuapse. The boat was attacked with depth charges and aircraft bombs and turned back to Theodosia. Submarine U "23" put into Sevastopol for a short repair. During the night of 17 Jul., 1st Minesweeper Flotilla will operate in the sea area south of Anapa in order to keep off enemy mine layers.

Supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

According to Allied reports, the U.S. destroyer "Gwin" which was damaged on 13 Jul. in Kula Bay, has since sunk.

Another Allied report states that fort Mubo in New Guinea has been captured by Allied troops. The advance on Munda continues.

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Items of Political Importance:

Nothing to report.

Special Items:

I. On 13 Jul., Naval Staff, Operations Division informed the Naval Groups, Naval Commands Norway, Baltic Sea and North on the decision taken by Naval Staff in regard to the requests received for the torpedo barrage batteries. The decision follows the lines of the statement submitted to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division as per memorandum in War Diary of 24 Jun. In addition, at the request of Group South it was decided that a group of torpedo tubes will be allotted for a battery to be set up in the Aegean, and two twin-tube sets will be made available for the Black Sea. Installation must be done by locally available means.

Since the first trials with recoil-torpedoes have been successful, Naval Staff has ordered that their development be continued with a view to early operational employment. As soon as this torpedo is ready for use, the matter of underwater batteries with tubes on the coast can also be tackled again.

II. Naval Staff has forwarded, by teletype, to all operational stations concerned with coastal defense information on the use of radar devices on LCTs in the Mediterranean and on the radar device used in the landing on Attu. (See War Diary 17 Jul.). For teletype 1/Skl I op 21560/43 geh. see War Diary Part B Vol. V.

Situation on 18 Jul. 1943

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The German Foreign Office has received information from Stockholm that a big convoy carrying war material will leave the USA for England, with air escort, on 17 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received on our own vessels.

All ships in foreign waters have been informed on the enemy position by radiogram 0829.

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II. West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-five planes were detected over the outer Bay of Biscay up to Cape Villano and 15°W. A British vessel was located in AL 5850 at 1240 and another in AL 6740 at 1243.

According to air reconnaissance, there was a convoy of 14 vessels on course 345° in CG 4578 (off Lisbon) at 2020. At 2045 Radio Intelligence intercepted a report on an attack by an FW 200 on the convoy "Manicure", evidently from the same formation.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J-mines were swept off Lorient and one off Bayonne. In the evening, destroyer Z "32" went into dock at Pauillac.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Two ELM/J-mines were cleared north of Ameland and Vlieland.

Group A of 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla had an engagement with enemy PT boats at 0210. Three attacks were repulsed and one boat was set on fire. At 0220, Group A of 34th Minesweeper Flotilla was bombed without damage. At 0520, 4 British fighters unsuccessfully attacked the convoy of the steamer KATJA LAU off Hook van Holland.

Convoy 1153 from Hook to the Elbe entered Helder at noon. During an attack by 6 Mustangs, 3 of the enemy planes were shot down by our fighter escort. At 1500, 60 British planes approaching the convoy at Helder were driven off over the sea by our fighter escort. When the convoy left Helder again after 2030, 40 planes again approached and attacked with bombs and gunfire. At least 5 enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. We suffered no damage. For details, see teletype 2211.



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No other reports of importance have been received.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were detected over the North Sea but no planes were observed operating in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. A Russian submarine was detected on the Arctic Coast.

Our air reconnaissance sighted 7 patrol boats on course 270° in the Denmark Strait.

2. Own Situation:

On 16 Jul., the Cape Romanov Battery came under fire from the enemy batteries on the Tibachi Peninsula. No damage was caused. At 1700 on 17 Jul., the Vardoe Battery fired on surface forces which had been located at a distance of about 12 kilometers but was unable to sight them. At 2015, one of our convoys was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine with three torpedoes in the Basfjord. On the evening of 16 Jul., submarine chaser UJ "1209" was unsuccessfully attacked in the Basfjord by a plane with two torpedoes. About the same time, the Norwegian motorship RAMSTER (235 BRT) struck a mine and sank in the Vestfjord declared area.

The escort service escorted 41 ships to the north and 27 ships to the south. Eight ships were held up due to lack of escort or lack of pilots.

Naval Command, Norway has forwarded a report from Admiral, Arctic Coast to the effect that, during a submarine attack on our patrol boat "6103" three torpedoes fired from the open sea were diverted by depth charges dropped by one of our planes and thus missed their target.

Admiral, Arctic Coast has reported further details on the raid in the Kongsfjord. For copy, see teletype 1610. Admiral Arctic Coast plans to carry out a large-scale operation throughout the Nordkyn/Vardoe area in cooperation with the Security Service, the Intelligence Division, Army and Air Force, as soon as the vessel situation permits.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

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1. Enemy Situation:

No important changes were observed in Kronstadt Bay.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses East, 17 vessels were engaged in channel sweeping. Two troop transports, 3 submarines, and 4 steamers were escorted. The large minesweeper "11" cleared 5 UMS-mines from the eastern end of the Skagen barrage.

In the area of Admiral, Baltic Countries, the "Koenigsberg" Battery sustained a direct hit on the fire control station and suffered casualties.

Commander, Minesweepers East reports that minesweeping has been continued in the Irben Narrows but no mines have been cleared. Two tankers, 3 troop transports and 1 hospital ship were escorted in the central and eastern Baltic Sea.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

The U.S. Navy Department has announced that 2 submarines were certainly sunk, 4 very probably, and 4 more fairly probably by planes from a U.S. aircraft carrier, co-operating with U.S. destroyers in defense of two convoys in the Atlantic. Forty-one members of the crews of three of our submarines were rescued.

This apparently refers to the convoy operation in May of this year.

2. Own Situation:

A submarine sank a steamer of 7,369 BRT south of Lagos. No other reports have been received.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

In the area of the 3rd Air Force, 110 planes were in

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operation in the west and 6 planes in the Mediterranean. Only a few enemy planes were observed entering occupied western territories during the day. In regard to the attacks on our convoy near Den Helder, see Situation North Sea. In the afternoon, a few bombs were dropped in the Abbeville area. In the night of 18 Jul., the enemy made 11 nuisance raids in western Germany strafing locomotives and an express train near Hannover.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our air force made photographic reconnaissances of Malta and Port Said on 17 Jul. and of the coast from Licata to Augusta on 18 Jul. It is reported that 1 destroyer and two ships for 11,000 BRT were sunk and 10 ships for 49,000 BRT seriously damaged or probably sunk as a result of our attacks in the Syracuse area on the night of 16 Jul. Reports so far received state that 2 ships totalling 10,000 BRT were damaged during the night operation of 17 Jul.

No reports on enemy attacks in the Italian area have been received.

Eastern Front:

On 17 Jul., 120 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front. Nothing else to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

The enemy pressure on the eastern flank of our position continues. Enemy thrusts against the central part of our front were repulsed. The western flank has withdrawn according to plan. Enemy landing activities continues to concentrate on the eastern coast of the island. The airfields at Gela and Licata are strongly occupied, and are being further improved.

Situation at Sea:

Photographic interpretation of 17 Jul. shows a large number of ships in port at Augusta and Syracuse. Two cruisers, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 3 destroyers, 27 big landing boats and 6 freighters were at Augusta and 9 other landing

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boats off the harbor. Two big troop transports, one of them apparently damaged, 4 LST with motor vehicles on board, 1 tanker, 34 big landing boats, 10 (apparently) LCTs and 8 freighters were identified at Syracuse and 6 LST off the harbor. In the early morning hours of 18 Jul., 8 merchantmen and 10 destroyers on course 330° and 2 merchantmen and 2 destroyers on a northerly course were sighted in the sea area off Syracuse. There were 3 more destroyers on a northerly course northeast of Cape Passero. Naval targets in the Syracuse area were attacked by strong German air formations during the night of 17 Jul. One battleship, probably the MALAYA, 2 cruisers, 20 destroyers and 12 - 15 freighters were identified southeast of Catania.

According to photographic interpretation, the following ships were in port at La Valetta on the evening of 17 Jul: RODNEY and NELSON, 2 aircraft carriers of the ILLUSTRIOUS type, 3 monitors; 4 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 1 escort boat, 8 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 transport, 7 LSTs carrying motor vehicles, 25 LCI, 29 big landing boats etc. One WARSPITE-class ship was in the Marsa Scirocco Bay. Two big troop transports, 2 LST and 9 big landing boats as well as other vessels were observed off La Valetta. Thus, the heavy vessels of Task Force H, 4 battleships and 2 aircraft carriers were identified. No new reports have come in on the whereabouts of the 2 KING GEORGE-class battleships last observed at Bone on 12 Jul.

According to information received by the Japanese Military Attaché, Rome from a Swedish source, there are 4 - 5 U.S. battleships, including one of the newest type, in the Mediterranean. Two of them came via the Suez Canal. The number of British naval forces was given as 6 battleships, 8 carriers, 16 A-type cruisers and 28 B-type cruisers.

No new information was obtained on the morning of 18 Jul. In the afternoon, about 25 ships including 10 large ones, were sighted 15 miles south-southeast of Augusta and 8 warships sailing north 25 miles southeast of Catania. Furthermore, 1 cruiser and 7 destroyers sailing north were sighted 8 miles south of Cape Spartivento presumably as protection against Taranto.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the Italian cruiser SCIPIONE AFRICANO is transferring to Taranto in order to form a group of light forces. Orders have also been issued to put the two CAVOUR-Class battleships into service to reinforce the Taranto defenses. Naval Staff had so far not heard that these

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vessels had been put out of service. It had only been advised some time ago, of an exchange of crews between the heavy ships and the destroyer formations.

As only two PT boats will be operational in time, German Naval Command, Italy plans for the next operation and subsequent transfer to Cotone to take place not before 19 Jul.

In regard to the supply of Sicily, Commanding General, Armed Forces South reported to Supreme Command, Armed Forces, Chief of Ops. Staff that the total daily transport performance of up to 2,000 tons considerably exceeds requirements and could be used for piling up stocks. Group South considers, however, that in order to maintain the ferry traffic in the Straits of Messina and the railroad traffic on the Calabrian coast as well as to protect the small-vessel coastal traffic, it is urgently necessary for the air defense to be strongly reinforced, for the coast defenses in the Straits of Messina and on the east and west coasts of Calabria to be reinforced by German coastal batteries, by assembly of German emergency forces in Calabria, the provision of large size truck space and the dispatch of road construction battalions and railway maintenance companies. Commanding Admiral, Armed Forces South believes that the supply of the Sicily bridgehead can probably be continuously ensured if the above measures are quickly and comprehensively effected but that there is no guarantee that the supply performance will meet the demand because of the enemy's superiority at sea and, at the moment, also in the air. For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 20220/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

At 0315, a convoy of 38 freighters and 2 tankers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. Between 0430 and 0600 a convoy of 55 ships including about 9 escort vessels, was passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. Seven U.S. steamers from this formation put in to Gibraltar. A large convoy of 94 freighters and 1 tanker with 4 destroyers and 6 corvettes, on an easterly course, were reported from Cape Tres Forcas at 1900. This was apparently the two above-mentioned convoys combined. This means that another 332,000 BRT of freight space has been brought into the Mediterranean. As about 20,000 BRT is reported to have left, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division estimates the total transport space in the Mediterranean at 655 ships totalling 3,830,000 BRT including 61 troop transports for 846,000 BRT; 57 tankers for 375,000 BRT and 537 freighters for 2,609,000 BRT, 2 landing boat transports which entered Gibraltar from the

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Mediterranean in the forenoon left again for the east in the evening together with 2 destroyers. According to an Intelligence report from Gibraltar, British battalions, including about 1,000 commando troops are waiting there to embark for Sicily.

According to a sighting report of 17 Jul., the number of ships at Bizerta has dropped considerably.

On the afternoon of 17 Jul., submarines were reported west of Civitavecchia and northeast of Bastia, on 18 Jul., southeast of Crotona, west of Leghorn and north of Cape Comino (Sardinia).

On the evening of 17 Jul., strong traffic was observed, in the Eastern Mediterranean, off the Nile delta. At 1745, 11 outgoing merchantmen including some large ones, were reported off Alexandria. This convoy was detected on a northwesterly course north west of Benghai on the afternoon of 18 Jul.

According to photographic reconnaissance, there were 1 Greek armored ship, 2 escort boats, 18 small war vessels, 1 hospital ship, 4 troop transports, 3 tankers and 24 freighters in Port Said at noon of 18 Jul. A big reduction in freighter and transport space as compared with 2 Jul. is evident. This apparently confirms the view of German Naval Command, Italy that shipments for Sicily have also been coming from the east.

According to the Swedish information received by the Japanese Military Attaché, Rome, as mentioned above, two Polish divisions have been transferred from Iran to northern Syria and fifteen Indian divisions are to be brought from India to the Mediterranean theater. One British and one mixed Greek/Yugoslav division are said to be in Cyprus.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of Mediterranean. Sea Transport Situation:

An enemy air attack on Naples in the afternoon of 17 Jul. caused heavy damage to railway installations and supply facilities. The town was again attacked during the night of 17 Jul. and on 18 Jul.

Torpedo boat T. "11", 5 motor minesweepers and 2 corvettes were on duty in the escort service. Two steamers were escorted in the Sardinian traffic and 1 steamer in the Sicilian traffic.

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Group West reports that A to A is planned for the 19th mine operation. Two naval landing craft left Toulon for Bastia together with 3 barges. The transfer of the Naval Artillery Battalion 687 from the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces South began on 17 Jul. and will be completed by 19 Jul.

The removal of the "Gneisenau" Battery was begun at 0515.

Rear Admiral Weichold has suggested the formation of a partisan organization in the Italian territories which might perhaps be occupied by the enemy in the course of future developments. As this would be a matter for Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Division, it is planned to make a report to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff.

4. Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report from Swiss diplomatic circles, the landing in Sicily is of only secondary importance. The main attack is expected to be made soon on Crete, Rhodes and the southwest coast of Greece. There are alleged to be very strong British Air Forces concentrated between Bengai and Bardia and several hundred airfields in operational condition. According to an Italian report, there was a submarine 5 miles west of Naxos.

Own Situation:

The BARLETTA and the MOROSINI left Piraeus for Taranto by order of the Italian Naval Staff. Naval Staff has no further information on this move. Otherwise there is nothing to report.

Operations Staff, Armed Forces Quartermaster Division has instructed Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas to examine Naval Staff's suggestion in regard to switching the supply traffic from Greece to the eastern route, in order to establish to what extent the switch over from the Adriatic to the eastern route is practicable with special consideration of the limit to which the Varna-Dardanelles traffic can be increased, the

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the establishment of a Trieste-Valona traffic line and the transport of bauxite.

Black Sea:

1st PT Boat Flotilla made no enemy sightings during operations south of Anapa in the night of 17 Jul. but noted strong enemy air activity. In bombing attack which took her by surprise, PT boat S "72" was slightly damaged by fragments.

Naval artillery lighter MAL "8" was repeatedly engaged by enemy motor gun boats in the patrol section Temrjuk Bay. No details are yet available. For the night of 18 Jul., it is planned for 3 boats of 1st PT boat Flotilla to operate in the Azov Sea and 3 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla east of Theodosia.

At 2223 on 18 Jul., submarine U"18" unsuccessfully attacked an enemy submarine 24 miles southwest of Yalta with a salvo of three torpedoes. The reason for the miss is not known.

The Constantza-Sevastopol convoy was repeatedly attacked by enemy planes off the coast of the Crimea. Other air attacks were made in the evening of 17 Jul. on Mariupol without causing damage. In the morning of 17 Jul., the fishing harbor, dock yards and town of Taganrog were bombarded by the enemy. Minelaying by an enemy plane was observed in the Danube area.

Supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.



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Items of Political Importance.

No information of naval interest have been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Naval Staff:

Within a Highly Restricted Circle:

I. Position of the Army:

In the northern sector of the operation "Citadelle" area, our forces have withdrawn practically to their original line. A defensive battle on a large scale has developed in the Orel area. The enemy has also extended the offensive to the Donez and Mius sectors. The enemy's losses in materiel and personnel are so great that it may be hoped that the purpose of the operation may yet be achieved. Moreover, at the suggestion of Minister Speer, the Fuehrer has ordered that the eastern fortification line is to be built up in concrete for the winter. Army General Staff was of the opinion that field positions were preferable since, apart from difficulties in regard to materials and transport, we would not have sufficient forces to man large permanent positions covering the entire area.

II. Chief, Naval Staff has forwarded his warmest congratulations to the Italian Commanding Admiral, Submarines, Admiral Legnani on the recent important successes of the Italian submarines.

III. Chief, Naval Staff reported on the course and the results of the conferences with the Fuehrer at Fuehrer Headquarters in accordance with memorandum as per l/Skl. Gkdos Chefs, in War Diary Part C, Vol. VII.

In regard to the Italian problem, our own suggestion for organization of the command coincided with similar step by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. The Fuehrer has meanwhile gone to Northern Italy in order to discuss this extremely delicate matter in person with the Duce. Chief, Naval Staff has summoned Captain Grossi to Berlin. He is anxious, if possible, to form a picture of certain leading personalities of the Italian Navy who might possibly come to bear in the case that the Fuehrer's talk with the Duce leads to a change in the command of the Italian Armed Forces. Chief Naval Staff is personally very much afraid that the deterioration in the general Italian attitude has already gone too far; in any case, the situation must be regarded as extremely grave.

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The Fuehrer's discussion with the Duce is therefore of great historic importance. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Italian High Command now systematically rejects all blame and criticism and attributes all failures to the inadequacy of German support. Even the Duce's reply to Commander-in-Chief Navy's suggestion regarding the employment of the Italian naval forces was already along these lines.

After discussion of the Spanish and Japanese questions, Chief Naval Staff obtained the Fuehrer's approval to the mines with new firing devices being used simultaneously by the Air Force and the Navy. The Fuehrer raised the objection that, if the Air Force use these mines, some may be dropped on land and fall into the hands of the enemy, and this unsweepable type of mine might then seen be used against ourselves. A corresponding order has meanwhile been issued by High Command, Army.

Special Items:

I. On 19 and 20 Jul., a meeting of Navy Inspectors will be held at Supreme Command, at which, after hearing the Inspectors reports on 20 Jul., Commander-in-Chief will speak on the general situation.

II. In accordance with the directive of Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 16 Jul.). Bureau of Naval Armement and Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division will be asked for a statement on the following questions:

1. To what extent is the Japanese Kwantung Army capable of supplying itself from the available hinterland (Manchukuo, Korea, North China) in case operational warfare is opened against Soviet Russia (Siberia)?

2. What supplies must necessarily be transported by sea and what is the minimum shipping space required for this purpose?

III. Enemy Situation Report No. 14/43 of 15 Jul., compiled by Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division contains no new information. For Copy as per 1/Skl 20348/43, Gkdos see War Diary, File "Reports of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division on the Enemy Situation."

IV. Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division,

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Secret Intelligence Section, Naval Liaison submitted an extremely valuable report obtained by an agent, assigned by Intelligence Division, Secret Intelligence Station Bergen, from an expert source, on new British anti-submarine devices. Naval Staff, Submarine Division is going into the matter as practical counter-measures must be taken immediately. It concerns an invention by the Norwegian engineer Dahl and the American Merrill. Eight frigates were equipped with the new device in mid-Jun. 1943 at a dockyard on the Tyne, after it had already been installed in eight or ten Grimsby trawlers. Twenty-seven or twenty-eight of our submarines are said to have been sunk in Jun. by means of this apparatus. Using a radio-bearing device which by means of a quartz crystal oscillator, indicates the depth and the synchronous radiation recording size of the mass. Dahl, in cooperation with Merrill, has developed a measuring apparatus which will perform the same function under water and record the depth and distance of a submarine. On the basis of the measurement obtained, a second device - known as "Sprengschweber" (transl. note: German translation of an unknown English word. Explosive float?) - is then approached under water to the detected submarine until it comes within its magnetic field and is thus finally drawn on to the target and exploded.

Situation on 19 Jul. 1943:

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

A submarine warning was issued on 17 Jul. for the area 21°56' south 177°12' west.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels in foreign waters.

All German ships in foreign waters have been informed on the enemy situation by radiogram 1327.

II. Situation in the West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

No less than seventy-two planes were detected

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over the Bay of Biscay up to 15°30' west. This number is unusually high, if it is assumed that, as is usually the case, our stations picked up about 50% of the actual number in operation.

British vessels were detected at 1250 in BF 7440, at 1313 in CF 3678, at 1317 in CF 3810, at 1917 in BF 6761/62, and shortly after midnight in BD 3420. Our air reconnaissance reported, at 1030, 13 merchantmen and 4 escort vessels, on course 290° in CF 6222. At 0716, Radio Intelligence intercepted an urgent operational signal transmitted on the wave length of the British Fleet by an unidentified British command station via Gibraltar to the Admiralty and to four unidentified relay stations. The signal probably indicates a position in the eastern Atlantic and was answered by the Admiralty at 0822 by a short signal of like priority on two fleet wave lengths and by broadcast.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J-mine was cleared off the Gironde. A plane was observed to drop one mine off Lorient. Motor minesweeper M "4023" was fired on off Lorient probably by our own anti-aircraft guns, and sprang a leak. She is being towed in. Destroyer Z "32" has gone into dock at Pauillac to change her propeller. Work should be completed in two to four days.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has instructed Commander, Submarines West to request Air Commander Atlantic to observe the light enemy forces detected in BF 71 - 76 during the first half of Jul. and, if possible, to check that area for several days as far to the west as possible, in order to establish whether the enemy makes a regular patrol or whether it was only a passing formation, and how strong the enemy forces are. (See teletype 2245).

Channel Coast:

Escort and patrol services were carried out according to plan. No special reports have been received.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Seven ELM/J-mines were cleared off the western and eastern Frisian islands. At 0456, the Swedish steamer VIDAR

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was damaged by a mine explosion in AN 8317. The steamer was beached near Terschelling. At 1510, patrol boat "1417" and tug BS "12", sent out to assist the ship were set on fire by British planes and suffered heavy damage and casualties. Group B of 34th Minesweeper Flotilla put out for rescue work and brought both vessels in to Den Helder. Apart from this, escort and patrol services were carried out without incident.

Norway. Northern Waters:1. Enemy Situation:

Radio Intelligence has, for the first time, identified the Russian submarines S "14" and S "15", apparently newly built vessels whose appearance must be reckoned with in the near future. Twenty-four planes were detected over the North Sea but no planes was observed operating in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. Our air reconnaissance sighted 8 merchantmen on a northerly course and 4 merchantmen on a southerly course shortly before midnight of 18 Jul. off the east coast of Scotland.

At 1700, a FW 200 reported a light cruiser, on course 10°, at high speed, 35 miles northeast of Grimsby.

2. Own Situation:

At noon on 17 Jul., two of our patrol boats were attacked by 8 enemy planes near Makkaua. Four men were wounded on one of the patrol boats. On 18 Jul., submarine warning was reported at 1332 for the approach to Fensfjord and up to Sogneoksen and at 2204 near Kvittingsoey. Anti-submarine hunt was started in both areas. At 0640 on 19 Jul., a submerged submarine was bombed by two Arados west of Ryvarden, without results being observed. Our FW-190 planes failed to make contact with isolated planes of unidentified nationality which flew into the Bergen and Sola areas at noon on 18 Jul.

Nineteen ships were escorted to the north and 29 ships to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:1. Enemy Situation:

No important changes have been reported from

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Kronstadt Bay. Near Vaindlo, three explosions were heard in the morning and one in the afternoon, and engine noises were picked up by a listening set. The presence of a submarine is not unlikely.

2. Own Situation:

Seventeen planes were employed on channel sweeps in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic. Six troop transports and 1 steamer were escorted. North of Fehmarn, a mine was swept by KRFG-device at a depth of 28 meters. A coastal-defense boat was damaged during this operation. The large minesweeper "11" continued clearance work in the Skagen barrage.

Three tankers were escorted in the Baltic Sea as well as the cruiser EMDEN to Swinemuende. Minesweeping in the Irben Narrows was continued without success. The anti-submarine net and barrage patrol in the Gulf of Finland were performed by 34 vessels, as before. In the evening the Peterhof command station was bombarded from Kronstadt. Our batteries fired on a tug with a barge being escorted from Kronstadt to Lissi Noss and 3 artillery carriers sighted between Leningrad and Kronstadt. No further observations could be made because smoke screens were put up immediately. In the afternoon, our formations were unsuccessfully attacked first by eight and then by four enemy planes near Tytters island.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In CF 7939 submarine U "373" sighted a 3-funnelled steamer on course 270° at a speed of 20 knots. Submarine U "667" had to fight off a Liberator which attacked her with extra-heavy guns, bombs and one torpedo. This is the first time a torpedo attack on a submarine has been observed.

Submarine U "262" had twice to repulse an enemy attack, in EP 57 and 81 respectively, but remained undamaged.

Submarine U "134" in the Florida Straits, was attacked at night by an airship and shot it down. Later, the boat was attacked by an enemy plane. On both occasions, she sustained damage.

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VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 48 planes in operation in the West area and 3 in the Mediterranean. The attack by five FW 200 on the convoy of 13 merchantmen reported near Lisbon, was unsuccessful.

There were few enemy raids into the West area during the day and none during the night.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force attacked shipping targets in the Augusta area during the night of 18 Jul., sinking 1 freighter of 10,000 BRT and damaging 4 freighters and 1 transport. During the night of 17 Jul., the Italian Air Force damaged 1 cruiser and 1 freighter and sank 1 merchantmen of 12,000 BRT. It also reported heavy damage to a freighter of 10,000 BRT and a freighter of 5,000 BRT as well as hits on two other merchantmen totalling 15,000 BRT on the night of 18 Jul. Italian planes also started large fires on the Gela airfield.

From 1134 to 1330, about 400 enemy planes attacked Rome in six successive waves. At two airfields, 10 of our planes were destroyed and 22 damaged. Further damage was caused to the railroad stations and in the eastern suburbs as well as to the university district of the Eternal City. In the night of 19 Jul., two airfields in the Rome area were attacked. No other enemy raids were reported in the Italian area.

Eastern Front:

On 18 Jul., 76 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front. No reports have been received from the 4th or 5th Air Forces.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Position on Land:

Agrigents and Empedocle were occupied by the enemy on 16 Jul. Since noon of 18 Jul., enemy artillery activity along the whole front has increased considerably.

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The main defense line runs south of Catania - Leon Forte - Alimena - Santa Catarine - west of Liculia. Strong tank thrusts on the center of the front were repulsed. At 0900 an enemy air attack was made on the town and the harbor of Ionea near Catania. Indications are that the enemy plans to make a large-scale attack in order to break through to Catania, at the same time engaging our forces by an attack towards Paterno. Commanding General, Armed Forces South considers that landing operations by parachutists against the deep left flank are probable.

General Staff, XIV Tank Corps assumed the command of the German formations in Sicily on 18 Jul.

Position at Sea:

At 1215, southeast of Catania; landing boats were noted taking on cargo from large vessels. At 0300, 7 vessels were sighted off Licata and 20 - 25 vessels 27 miles south of Licata on an unspecified course. In the night of 18 Jul., there were 3 motor gun boats in the Straits of Messina. One of them was set on fire by our anti-aircraft guns.

According to a report from Naval Attache, Rome, the Italian Navy Ministry states that, in the disgraceful evacuation of Catania, 196 torpedoes, including 112 Eto-type, fell into the hands of the enemy - apparently intact.

Italian PT boats report a torpedo hit on a steamer of 10,000 BRT off Augusta on the night of 17 Jul.

3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotilla left Salerno with six boats for operations off the east coast of Sicily and subsequently transferred to Crotona.

According to photographic reconnaissance, at 1840, there were 1 monitor, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 big transports, 19 freighters, 5 escort vessels, 1 minesweeper and about 40 landing boats at Augusta. Fifty miles southwest of Licata, 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers and allegedly 3 aircraft carriers were sighted at 1750 on a westerly course. At the same time, another aircraft carrier and 2 battleships as well as several cruisers and destroyers were noted at La Valetta.

No action reports have come in from our own or the Italian submarines.



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2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

In Gibraltar at 1300, 7 destroyers, 9 corvettes, 4 transports, 44 freighters, 12 tankers and many small vessels were visible.

No further reports have been received on the big convoy sighted on the evening of 18 Jul. near Tres Forcas. Oran and Algiers are assumed to be the ports of destination. In the forenoon, there were 5 freighters off Bone and 2 destroyers were on a westerly course 20 miles northwest of Bizerta.

Radio Intelligence observed strong reconnaissance activity over the Tyrrhenia Sea up to the Gulf of Genoa and intercepted numerous reconnaissance reports from the Corsica - Mainland area. On 18 Jul., a submarine was sighted west of Nettunia. On 19 Jul., submarine positions were reported between 0735 and 1530 southeast of Maddalena, west-southwest of Civitavecchia, south-southwest of La Spezia and 12 miles north of Porto Vecchio.

In the eastern Mediterranean, 22 steamers, 3 destroyers and 8 guard vessels, sailing west 20 miles north of Sidi Barani, were detected by our reconnaissance.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean - Sea Transport Situation:

An enemy air attack on Rome from 1110 to 1410 caused heavy damage to the Littorio and Ciampino airfields and minor damage to the railway stations. At 1845 an enemy air attack was made on Bastia causing considerable damage to buildings near the harbor.

Torpedo boat Ta "11", 5 motor minesweepers, 2 Italian torpedo boats and 2 corvettes were engaged in escort traffic. Three steamers were escorted including one from Sicily to Italy. The transport submarines Romolo and Remo are engaged in carrying supplies to Sicily.

The execution of mine task H'6 a was postponed by twenty-four hours because of bad weather.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

According to an Intelligence report of 17 Jul., from an unchecked Turkish source, an action against the

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Dodecanese, or Crete or both is imminent. Traffic between Cyprus and Syria is said to have increased greatly since 17 Jul. General Monkis is to assume command of the partisans in Crete and will land on the island by parachute.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

In the night of 18 Jul., neither the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in the Azov Sea nor the 11th PT Boat Flotilla east of Theodosia made contact with the enemy. The latter flotilla took unsuccessful action against an enemy submarine reported by submarine U "18" south of Theodosia Bay. For the night of 19 Jul., it is planned for 3 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla to operate in the area southeast of Ivanbaba and 3 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla east of Theodosia. A weather observation buoy will be placed 43°55' North 36°20' East.

Two mines were cleared during minesweeping in the lower Danube. The dropping of five mines was again observed in the night of 18 - 19 Jul. Shipping traffic is still forbidden.

Supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

According to information received from a pro-Axis diplomatic source, statements by the Argentine Foreign Minister leave little doubt that relations with the Axis powers will be broken off.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. Add to 19 Jul.:

In regard to Naval Staff's directive for a submarine to be assigned to check on the heavy shipping traffic northeast and north of Iceland, (see War Diary 11 Jul.), Group North Fleet suggested that, in view of the difficulty of the mission during the bright summer nights and also on the limited reconnaissance possibilities, and in order to avoid long approaches, outgoing boats of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with commanders experienced in anti-convoy operations in areas of air threat, should be assigned to this task whenever opportunity offered.

Chief, Naval Staff instructed that the operation as ordered must be adhered to as it is important to obtain a clear picture of enemy ship movements and possible enemy plans in the area north and northeast of Iceland by continuous reconnaissance over a long period.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division was asked to examine the possibility of additional reconnaissance to be made by outgoing and incoming submarines.

Corresponding instructions have been issued to Group North Fleet and Naval Staff, Submarine Division.

II. On 16 Jul., Admiral Riccardi forwarded a detailed reply via Admiral Bertoldi to the letter of Commander in Chief Navy of 12 Jul. He stood by the decision to use the fleet as soon as even the slightest chance of success should offer. At the moment, however, he did not consider that such a possibility existed either for the battleship fleet or for the light forces.

In regard to Chief, Naval Staff's reply to this letter, the German Naval Liaison Officer attached to Italian Commander, Submarines Bordeaux has forwarded a request from the Italian Commanding Admiral Submarines, Admiral Legnani, that the following items should also be dealt with if possible.

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- a. Construction of small submarines for the Mediterranean campaign.
- b. The participation of German experts in the tests of these small submarines.
- c. German help in supplying engines.

In agreement with Admiral Legnani, the German Naval Liaison Officer suggested that the letter be delivered personally by Captain Grossi in Rome.

The Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Italian Commander Submarines, Bordeaux also reported that Admiral Legnani is entirely persuaded of the importance of our request for Romolo and Remo and has fully admitted that responsibility for the solution of the rubber transport problem lies at present largely with the Italian Navy. Legnani is also prepared to demand immediate construction of two transport submarines for Germany at the Monfalcone ship-yards for which Germany would have to supply only the constructional steel. Furthermore, Admiral Legnani intends to get the conversion of the Dandolo and Brin started as soon as he returns to Rome.

The letter of reply, which is to be delivered by Captain Grossi as suggested comprises another clear statement of the views of Commander in Chief, Navy in regard to the use of the Italian Fleet and also deals with the questions suggested by Admiral Legnani.

The texts of the two letters and of the reports from Naval Liaison Officer attached to Italian Commander Submarines, Bordeaux are attached to War Diary, Part C., Vol. XIV with Order of Naval Staff, Operations Division I B 2059/43 Gkdos, Chefsache.

Special Items:

I. Vice Admiral Abe forwarded the following answer from the Naval Staff, Tokyo as of 16 Jul., in regard to the use of Japanese transport submarines.

"The Imperial Japanese Navy also recognizes the necessity of using transport submarines for the vital traffic between Europe and East Asia. For some time it has been investigating the possibility of Japan also employing her submarines for this purpose but regrets that, owing to the present war situation

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and due to the lack of first-line submarines it is still not in a position to undertake the conversion or construction of submarines for this purpose.

However, as soon as the war situation permits, it is planned to put this idea into practice and it would be appreciated if the German Navy would furnish the essential experience reports and other information in connection with transport submarines.

Group South submitted a memorandum from the Italian Navy concerning the conference between Admiral, Patras and Naval Group South, on 15 May 1943 together with a statement of the Group's own opinion. For letters as per l/Skl 2046/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see files of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Situation Maps and Files Section.

Naval Staff fully concurs with the statement of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group South. Of particular importance is Group South's warning that any alteration in the disposition of the Italian naval forces, which are almost entirely located in the Tyrrhenian Sea and the western areas of Italy, will become practically impossible, if, by advancing in Sicily, the enemy is able to render the Straits of Messina impassable. In this case, while the enemy threat to the Adriatic - Aegean traffic will be greatly increased from this position, it will no longer be possible to assign additional naval forces to strengthen the traffic's defense.

III. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has analyzed new information on British landing craft. In addition to the types already known, there is also an auxiliary landing boat (LCS) of a new design and an artillery landing boat (LCH). For copy of the report as per l/Skl 21617/43 geh. see War Diary Part D: "Evaluation of Information Foreign Navies."

Situation on 20 Jul. 1943:

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Intelligence reports state that a convoy of allegedly 30,000 men and war material is to leave Freetown between 18 and 20 Jul. It was reported from British India, via Ostrow, as of 29 Jun. that the motor ship KANIMBLA, which arrived in Bombay on 25 Jun., is the first troop transport to transit the Mediterranean.

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Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has made a detailed report on the enemy position in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean Sea. For copy of the report as per 1/Skl 19807/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C., Vol. I.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has informed Ship 28, by radiogram 0031 on the arrival at Penang of the MARCO POLO on 16 Jul. and of this submarine's successful action in LY on 9 Jul. Naval Staff has also informed Naval Attaché, Tokyo by teletype 0107, that between 1 Jan and 18 Jul, our submarines in the Indian Ocean have sank 40 ships for 221,000 BRT of which 12 ships for 56,000 BRT were sunk between 1 and 18 Jul.

Naval Staff has forwarded details of the submarine successes in the Indian Ocean from 2 - 17 Jul. to all ships in foreign waters. For copy see radiogram 1321. All ships in foreign waters have also been informed, by radiogram 1005, on the warning to Allied merchantmen issued by Anapolis on 3 Jul, concerning the approach of Allied planes in the area 1200 miles around Balboa.

Naval Attaché, Tokyo reports that the AQUILA 3 went into dock on 16 Jul., that the repairs will take longer than the time required for loading and that her date of readiness for sailing is provisionally estimated as mid-August. Throughout the boat's voyage the weather was very bad and the Italians have therefore suggested that refuelling should not be done in the Indian Ocean as the boats are too heavily loaded for rounding the Cape in a heavy sea, but that instead the ballast tanks which take 40 tons of rubber be filled with oil and refuelling done in the South Atlantic. Etappe, Tokyo will try to load rubber on the superstructure deck if diving trial prove successful. Naval Attaché, Tokyo comments that it is not possible to supply the submarines in the South Atlantic by the BOGOTA and requests a decision in regard to the Italian suggestion. For copy of the teletype from Tokyo 2060/43 Gkdos. Chofs. Jul. see War Diary Part C, Vol. IX.

Naval Attaché, Tokyo has been informed by Naval Staff's teletype 0025 as to the points of reference for the voyage of the ALSTERUFER, the OSORNO and the HAVELLAND.

II. Situation in the West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

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Today, 29 planes were detected in the Bay of Biscay mainly in the area between 45° and 47° N and 07° and 12° W.

One British unit was located at 1055 in AM 4810 and one at 1740 in AM 7120.

One of our planes sighted a diving submarine, probably an enemy boat, at 1614 on 19 Jul. in BF 9533 (off the Gironde).

According to an intelligence report from a reliable source in Paris, a British Intelligence Service agent who was landed in the Nantes area in the week 11-17 Jul. is said to have stated that a landing will be made near Dunkirk on 23 Jul. The Intelligence Division has received several reports from other sources of imminent landings near Dunkirk on dates given as 20 or 23 Jul. or other dates up to the end of Jul. An intelligence report of 8 Jul. received via Ostrow, states that there were at least 11 destroyers and several other small vessels in Falmouth on 6 Jul. The number of invasion vessels on the South Coast has certainly been increased, apparently by reinforcements from America. Otherwise, there are no special indications of an imminent major operation from the southwestern area of England.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines were swept off Lorient. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla left Bayonne with the MOEVE and torpedo boat "19" in order to bring in submarine U 558 which is reported to be completely unable to submerge. The flotilla has orders to be in BF 5725 at 0600 on 21 Jul.

Naval Group West has submitted, for information, the operational order to 8th Destroyer Flotilla for the escort of three submarines from Royan to 11° West. For copy as per 1/Skl 2050/43 Gkdos., Chfs., see War Diary Part C, Vol. II b. In spite of the doubts in Chief, Naval Staff, Submarine Division, as to the adequacy of the escort up to 11° West as planned, and of the request that it be extended as far as 16° West, Chief, Naval Staff decided that no further extension beyond 11° West could be considered.

In view of the date at which destroyer Z "32" will leave dock

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Group West has postponed the start of the operation to 1200 on 22 Jul. so as to be able to dispatch three destroyers if possible.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

While acting as anti-aircraft protection for the Swedish steamer VIDAR which was beached near Terschelling, our patrol boat VP "805" struck a mine and sank at 1528 with heavy casualties among the crew. Salvage of the VIDAR has been abandoned because of the mine danger and since the results were in any case dubious. Nine ELM/J mines were cleared in the Terschelling area and one near Schiermonikoog.

Minesweeping and patrol service were hindered by the weather. No other important events have been reported.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Sixteen planes were detected over the North Sea by Radio Intelligence but no activity was noticed in the area of Iceland squadrons.

Group North, Fleet sees no special significance in the sighting of a light cruiser in the afternoon of 19 Jul. on course 10° in AE 2727.

2. Own Situation:

At 0153, radar sets located for the first time a number of a light and several bigger naval targets east of Kiberg and south of Vardoe. The locations continued up to 0830. Owing to misty weather, the targets were not sighted either from land or by our air reconnaissance. The Defensive fire by our batteries was based exclusively on the radar locations. The enemy did not return fire. Naval Command, Norway believes it to have been an enemy mining operation or a raid on our coastal battery positions. The area has been closed due to suspected mines. For the battle report of 3rd



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Naval Artillery Battalion 513, see teletype 1425.

The raid in the Kongsfjord revealed that the dismantled radio station discovered at the north western exit was probably moved further inland. The material found indicate the existence of an extensive espionage organization.

The LODY left TRONDHEIM for Alta on 19 Jul. and destroyer Z "28" left Alta for Trondheim on 20 Jul.

Thirty-nine ships were escorted to the north and 23 to the south. Seven ships were held up by lack of escort.

In the forenoon of 19 Jul., patrol boat NKJ 09 was sunk near Nordkyn by a torpedo from an enemy submarine. Twenty-one men are missing.

Naval Command, Norway has asked that the request of Group North Fleet for destroyer Z "28" to be repaired at Trondheim be disapproved as it would delay the repair of coastal vessels. Naval Command Norway announced that it was contemplating making a request for expansion and increase of personnel at Trondheim in case it were planned to keep the dockyards continually occupied with destroyer repairs. (See teletype 1850).

As, after consultation with High Command, Navy, Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval Construction Division, it is planned to ignore this somewhat surprising objection on the part of Naval Command Norway, there is no need for Naval Staff to intervene.

#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

Lively shipping traffic was observed in the Kronstadt Bay. There was intense air activity in the area of the islands.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Motor minesweeper MR "11" has completed mine-sweeping on the eastern flank of the Skagerrak barrage. A Danish boat cleared a mine in the Samsøe belt. Patrol boat VP "1014" struck a mine north of Laaland and sank, with a loss of seven men. One submarine, 3 troop transports, 1 tanker, 2 steamers, mine transport ship "Otter" and the motor ships BRUMMER and SKAGERRAK were escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses East. Destroyers Z "29" and "33" put out from the Baltic for the northern area.

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One ELM/J mine was cleared east of Fehmarn and two near Darsser Ort. One Polish MO 8 mine was recovered near Oxhoeft.

Two tankers and 4 steamers were escorted in the Baltic Sea and 3 troop transports and 3 leave transport operations were carried out.

Minesweeping in the Irben Street was continued. Enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked our formations west of Hochland. An incursion by twenty enemy planes was reported at Hungerburg but no attack was made. Minor damage was caused by bomb fragments during an attack on the Heavy Gun Carrier-West. Several bombs fell on Tuctters. North of Kronstadt, Naval Artillery Battalion 530 shelled a tug with a barge. One hit was observed and the vessel burned for a long time.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to sighting reports from our submarines, there was a big two-funnelled steamer with a destroyer on course 40° in DU 4387, and a group of several steamers in ED 8559 on a presumably southerly course.

2. Own Situation:

In the Bay of Biscay, our submarines U "193" and "195" are presumed lost, following repeated enemy air attacks. At noon, U "558" reported that she was unable to submerge following an air attack. The boat has made no further signals. U "415" drove off an air attack in EE 84 and 85, and U "662" had an engagement with a Catalina lasting one hour.

U "532" and "533" waited in vain for 36 hours at the rendezvous point to get supplies from U "160". As this unit, which was to supply the Monsoon-boats, is also lost, one of the Monsoon-boats themselves - U "516" - will have to take its place.

A report from a Spanish steamer, received via Teneriffe, to the effect that a big aircraft carrier was sighted on 11 Jul. in DG 99, presumably on anti-submarine duty, may help to explain the recent submarine losses in that area.

A convoy of seven ships leaving Lisbon at 2200 was attacked by submarine U "445" with five torpedoes in CG 5832 shortly after midnight. Two explosions were heard. No other results were observed.

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VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

No reports of interest have been received.

Mediterranean:

Close interpretation of the photographic reconnaissance of the afternoon of 19 Jul. had revealed 2 battleships each at La Valetta and Marsa Shirocco as well as 2 aircraft carriers, 6 cruisers (one of them in dock), 12 destroyers, 3 big tankers, 14 freighters, 1 big transport, 11 LST and many landing boats at La Valetta. In the night of 19 Jul., 56 bombers were sent out against these targets. Besides impacts and fires in the harbor, our planes heavily damaged 2 steamers (18,000 BRT) and slightly damaged 2 other steamers (15,00 BRT).

The Italian Air Force reports the following preliminary total results from 10 to 17 Jul.:

Sunk: 8 units for 55,000 BRT and 1 destroyer; Probably sunk: 8 vessels for 51,000 BRT and one cruiser. Damages: 24 vessels for 145,000 BRT, 1 battleship, 10 cruisers, 5 destroyers and 3 other warships.

Of the 817 Italian planes participating in the operations, 30 were lost.

During the night of 19 Jul. the enemy attacked the airfield at Aquino; 21 of our planes were destroyed, 33 heavily damaged and 3 slightly damaged.

During the day, the airfields at Monte Corvino (near Salerno) and Vibo Valentia and two airfields in southern Sardinia were attacked. So far, the loss of four more of our planes has been reported. Another attack was directed against our small shipping traffic in the Straits of Messina during which 2 ferries carrying ammunition north of Catania were destroyed. In the night of 20 Jul., Naples was attacked by small forces.

Eastern Front:

Fifty-eight enemy planes were shot down on the Army front on 19 Jul.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

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1. Enemy Situation:

Situation on Land:

Due to threatened encirclement of the right flank, 15th Motorized Division was withdrawn during the night of 19 Jul. The enemy followed up only with small forces. During the forenoon, all attacks against the "Hermann Goering" Division were repulsed. A new defensive battle was still underway in the evening. The enemy has not yet launched the decisive attack on Catania.

Situation at Sea:

Photographs of Marsa Shirocco on the evening of 19 Jul. revealed 7 light cruisers (some probably destroyers), 1 LST, 2 LCT, 1 small tanker, and 1 steamer in addition to the 2 battleships already mentioned. At 1839, 1 battleship was sailing on a southerly course, 12 miles north of Augusta. In addition, heavy shipping traffic was reported on the east coast of Sicily.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses Messina Straits, with four motor minesweepers had a brief engagement with four MGBs at 0107 in the southeastern exit of the Strait.

Commander PT Boat Force, who left Salerno with six boats at 1320 on 19 Jul., advanced as far as Syracuse, after passing Messina at 2100 and making a wide detour to the east. From 0032 - 0140 he attacked in broad formation a convoy of 3 steamers and 2 LST with 3 destroyers and 1 corvette coming from the south and making for Syracuse. Two destroyers and 1 steamer of 3000 BRT were sunk and 1 steamer (8,000 BRT) was hit by a torpedo. PT boat S "61" was hit several times. One man was killed. The formation turned back to Crotona at 0140 as all ammunition was exhausted. From 0300 - 0451 an enemy contact plane shadowed the formation which put in to Crotona at 0845. For brief report, see teletype 2330.

This highly satisfactory first success by the newly established 1st PT Boat Force was apparently the reason for a heavy enemy offensive against the new base at Crotona which had been detected by air reconnaissance. At 2230, an enemy formation of several vessels was located 12 miles north of Punta Stilo, on a northerly course which, at 0150 on 21 Jul. bombarded Crotona harbor. 1st PT Boat Force was warned shortly after the first sighting report and left port before the bombardment.

On the afternoon of 20 Jul., our air reconnaissance reported

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1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 9 destroyers, 18 large boats and 9 merchantmen as well as other small vessels off the coast north of Avola. At 1700, 3 vessels shelled the coast near Catania. According to photographs, 1 cruiser, 1 monitor, 16 freighters (125,000 BRT), 2 destroyers, and 25 landing boats were at Augusta and 12 freighters (20,000 BRT), 1 tanker, 12 LST and 44 landing boats were at Syracuse. At 1925 (apparently) warships were sailing south east of Augusta and, at 1935, 12 freighters and 1 cruiser were apparently lying stopped 5 miles east of Avola. At the same time, 6 freighters (12,000 BRT), 5 LCT and 17 small landing boats were reported at Empedocle as well as 1 big freighter (14,000 BRT) and other small vessels were reported off Empedocle.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has made a summary of the preliminary information gained on enemy methods during the landing operations in Sicily, partly based on material from Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West, and has forwarded the report to the Groups, Naval Commands North and East, as well as to German Naval Command Italy and to Commanding General, Armed Forces South, Operations Staff I a Navy. For copy as per L/Sk. 20440/43 Gkdos see War Diary Part C Vol. XIV. This information on enemy methods merits careful attention in every respect.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

A convoy of 7 freighters entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic. The big convoy of 94 freighters which passed Tres Forcas at 1900 on 18 Jul, sailing east, has not been detected again. It is assumed that it put in to Oran or Algiers.

According to the calculations of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, the distribution of shipping throughout the Mediterranean is as follows:

At Gibraltar: 60 ships for 357,000 BRT. Other parts of the Mediterranean: 584 ships for 3,423,000 BRT. Total: 644 ships for 3,780,000 BRT. From these figures the following can be subtracted for the period 1-18 Jul.:

Losses: 47 ships for 250,000 BRT. Withdrawn via the Red Sea: 11 ships with 65,000 BRT. Presently in the Mediterranean: 586 ships for 3,465,000 BRT.

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Of these, 55 are transports for 756,000 BRT, 488 are freighters for 2,360,000 BRT and 54 tankers for 349,000 BRT.

According to Radio Intelligence, enemy air reconnaissance covered the area from Tunisia to the Gulf of Genoa, most reports on our convoys and single ships coming from the area around Elba.

No sighting reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

According to an intelligence report based on information dated 14 Jul. from an agent in England, a special Mediterranean squadron has been established with central command at Gibraltar and operational area Gibraltar and Malta. The squadron's mission is convoy protection. Composition: 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer flotillas, 1 submarine flotilla. The latter includes 6 Dutch submarines. The squadron is reported to be in action in the Mediterranean at the moment.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

No reports have yet been received on the execution of the mine laying task of the DOMMERI and BRANDENBURG near Sardinia. The ships are on their way back from Maddalena to Toulon.

Torpedo boat TA "10", which transferred from Taranto to Bari after having been replaced in operational status, 2 submarine chasers, 1 Italian destroyer, 2 torpedo boats and 1 Italian torpedo boat were on duty in the escort service. Five steamers were escorted in the island traffic. Torpedo boat TA "10" escorted 1 steamer from Bari to Piraeus.

Mine operation H 6 a was temporarily postponed because of bad weather.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has forwarded to Commanding General Armed Forces Southeast the intelligence report on an immediately imminent enemy operation against the Dodecanese or Crete or both (see War Diary 19 Jul.)

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adding that Crete and the High Command must be warned and inquiring "What does German/Italian air reconnaissance towards Cyprus and Syria indicate?" Naval Staff has informed Naval Group South, Admiral Aegean and German Naval Command, Italy. For Order 1/Skl 20417/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C Vol. XIV.

According to another Intelligence Report of 20 Jul., received via Naval Information Station, Istanbul, the departure for Cyprus of further troop and tank reinforcements at the beginning of Jul. has also been reported from other sources. An Intelligence report from Lyon of 16 Jul., quotes a Spanish officer as stating on 15 Jul. that an Anglo-American attack on Crete is to be expected on 25 Jul. or by the end of Jul. at the latest. The report is based on a photostatic copy of the operational order signed by Lord Mountbatten.

At 1820 on 19 Jul., a submerged submarine was sighted by planes 20 miles east of Carigo.

Own Situation:

At 1300 on 19 Jul., enemy air forces attacked the sea-plane base at Prevesa with bombs and gunfire. Three Italian planes were damaged. The Q-ship GA "42" put in to Piraeus with engine trouble. Air Force Command Southeast reports that 9 enemy planes flew into the northwestern Peloponnese during the night of 18 Jul. for the purpose of supplying the insurgents.

Convoy traffic in the Aegean was carried out as scheduled and without incident.

Special Items:

Naval Group South has submitted a well substantiated request for reinforcement of the naval forces in the Aegean. For copy as per 1/Skl 20436/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

The request is fully justified. Unfortunately, however, it can be fulfilled to only a very small extent. The matter will be followed up by Naval Staff, Quarter-master Division.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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Own Situation:

On 19 Jul. motor minesweeper R "33" was lost by a direct bomb hit during an enemy air attack on Yalta. Group South has urgently requested its speedy replacement by a vessel from Germany. At 2306 on 18 Jul., two enemy vessels were sighted five miles off Anapa. No engagement took place. At 2230 on 19 Jul., 2 enemy planes were observed to lay 4 mines in the Danube estuary near mile indicator 34.

1st PT Boat Flotilla laid a weather buoy during the night of 19 Jul. as planned. 1st and 11th PT Boat Flotillas made no contact with the enemy during operations last night. It is planned to send out 1st PT Boat Flotilla in two groups of three boats each on the night of 20 Jul. off the Caucasus coast.

Submarine U "23" has put in to Constantza.

Submarine U "18" is en route from Theodosia to Constantza.

Supply and convoy traffic off the Crimean coast was carried out according to plan.

In order to relieve the Army front it has been planned to carry out surprise bombardments at 2300 on 20 Jul. as follows: On the Mius-front, east of Varenovka by Naval artillery lighter MAL "1" and "2" and motor minesweeper RA "56"; at Yeisk by naval artillery lighter MAL "3" and motor minesweeper RA "51"; at Primorske Akhtarski by naval artillery lighter MAL "8" and "9" and motor minesweeper R "36" and at Archuyer by naval artillery lighters MAL "9" and "10" with motor minesweeper R "30". Action reports have not yet been received.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Japanese Headquarters announces that several islands in the Solomons area were shelled by Japanese fleet units and that 58 enemy planes were shot down during an enemy air attack on Buin. It is also announced that an enemy torpedo boat flotilla was dispersed during an attempted landing on New Georgia.

The Allied communique reports that 1 Japanese destroyer was probably sunk and 3 others were damaged during engagements on the west coast of Colombanra Island. It is also stated that 1 Japanese merchantman was sunk and 2 destroyers and 1 merchantman damaged in the Bruin area and 33 Japanese fighters shot down with a loss of 4 Allied planes. The attack against the airfield at Munda is said to have advanced to the defense positions of the airfield itself.



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Items of Political Importance:

The English press comments on the fact that so far no mention has been made in the Russian press concerning the landing in Sicily and only a little official information has been published.

According to Reuter, Knox has issued a warning against premature public optimism which would only result in slowing down war production. The attack on the European fortress had not yet begun. Only a few preliminary military successes had so far been gained. It was nonsense to talk about winning the war so long as Hitler still ruled over the people and natural resources of the whole of Europe.

The foreign press comments on the meeting between the Fuehrer and the Duce with the usual speculations, and stresses the unusual form of the official communique which reveals little satisfaction on either side.

Conference with Chief, Naval Staff:

A. Report of Chief, Bureau of Naval Administration, Naval Ordnance Division, Torpedo Branch:

a. The question of torpedo tubes for the Walther submarines must be settled. The newly established dates of readiness are no longer dependent on torpedo tube production.

After considering all advantages and disadvantages, Torpedo Branch suggested that the Walther boats be equipped with non-piston firing tubes even if splash has not yet been entirely eliminated and the tubes cannot be used for mine laying. For the VII C-boats, however, non-piston firing cannot be recommended until splash is completely eliminated.

Chief of Bureau of Naval Administration, Naval Ordnance Division will go into the matter of whether it is quite impossible to launch mines with the new tubes or whether it is only impossible to do so without causing splash. The decision of Commander in Chief, Navy will be postponed until completion of this investigation.

b. The question of torpedoes for the Walther submarines must also be settled. Torpedo Branch suggested that 2,500 5-meter Ingolin torpedoes be provided for type XXII and the production of the 7-meter Ingolin torpedo for type XVIII be increased at the expense of G 7a production. Commander in Chief Navy concurred.

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c. Chief, Torpedo Branch reported that tests of the Italian war pistol for G 7 a torpedoes had been completed after 370 trial shots and recommended that it be declared ready for operational use. The pistol is slightly less sensitive than our Pi 2 and can also be used in the G 7 a Fat. The firing-depth corresponds approximately to that of the Pi 2. As it is planned to remove the weather restrictions in regard to the use of non-contact firing, the previous disadvantage of having to withdrawing the torpedo in order to change the type of firing is eliminated. The introduction of magnetic firing also for the G 7 a, can therefore only be advantageous. The only defect of the Italian pistol is depth detonation after sinking which has not yet been entirely completely overcome, but which Torpedo Experimental Section hopes to eliminate. Objections on the part of Naval Staff, Submarine Division concerning this defect have been refuted by Torpedo Branch.

Commander in Chief Navy approved the declaration of operational readiness.

B. Conference on the Situation:

I. During the Black Sea situation report by Naval Staff, Operations Division I a, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that his appreciation of the increase in our naval activity in that area be conveyed to all concerned as occasion arises.

II. Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that the new battery near Bergen is ready for action. The 21 cm guns ceded by Army Group North to the Navy for coastal defense in southern Italy will reach the Naples area by 26-27 Jul. They are unlikely to be very useful against sea targets due to their low rate of fire (one round per minute). The present allotment of ammunition must also be increased.

Within a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas has now issued directives by which the main responsibility for supplying Greece is transferred to the Black Sea-Dardanelles traffic. Thus, only four ships will go via Trieste in August. Shipping traffic between Trieste and Peraeus will be organized so that about 50% of the ships will always be north of the Otranto Straits and 50% south thereof. For copy of the directive as per l/Skl 20669/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XV.

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IV. Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division supported the suggestion of Commander Submarines West that the Japanese submarine FLIEDER be taken in to Brest instead of Bordeaux.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

V. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff again raised the subject of the employment of the fleet this autumn and opened a discussion as to whether a way could be found to avoid all units afloat at home bases being used exclusively for training purposes without the possibility of bringing their fighting value to bear at this particularly critical moment. It should be investigated whether the training of cadets - insofar as warships were essential thereto - could not be done with the battle formations in Norway.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster General commented that the 1943 naval construction program necessitates training on a very large scale.

Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division considers it most desirable to have another battle worthy ship, in addition to the SCHARNHORST, in the northern area in winter also, but is doubtful of the training possibilities even with the fleet.

Chief, Naval Staff recalled that the war at sea centered on the submarine campaign which is entirely dependent on the standard of training. The younger the commanders and the more inexperienced the crews of the submarines, the more strongly does this apply. If their training were turned over to the fleet formations it would certainly have an adverse effect. On the other hand it is highly undesirable to leave the SCHARNHORST alone in the northern area. The whole problem must be re-examined. The most suitable vessel to transfer to Norway would be the SCHEER, in view of the fuel situation and the qualifications of her commander, although the difficulties of engineer training at home would almost be insurmountable.

As a first step it will now be examined to what extent the position could be relieved by accommodative recruits in the Fleet flotillas.

Special Items:

I. A memorandum on the conference between Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Rear Admiral Abe on 19 Jul. was made as per Order of 1/Skl ops. 2058/43 Gkdos. Chfs. For copy see War Diary Part C Vol. XV. It consists mainly of information on

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our assessment of the situation in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front. Rear Admiral Abe was also advised of our plan to start submarines operations in the northern Indian Ocean about the beginning of October, and of our interest in the extent, results and experiences of Japanese submarine operations in that area.

II. Following the Japanese Naval Staff's negative reply in regard to the cession of Japanese transport submarines (see War Diary 20 Jul.), Naval Staff has again approached the Japanese Navy with a request for cession of two Japanese transport submarines, or large submarines suitable for transport purposes for the transport of caoutchouc. The lack of raw caoutchouc supplies can so seriously affect the whole course of the war that all the available resources of the Tripartite Pact will have to be used in order to avert the threatened emergency and to bridge the gap until the German transport submarines under construction can take over the task at the end of 1944.

For copy of the corresponding letter l/Skl I ops 2051/43 Gkdos. Chefs. to Rear Admiral Abe see War-Diary Part C, Vol. IX.

III. Naval Staff, Submarine Division and Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval Ordnance Division Torpedo Branch have disapproved the development of a "One-man torpedo" as submitted for consideration by FEP (Research - Invention - Patents Department). Approval would be granted only on such terms as to make further development by the Navy practically impossible. Naval Staff, Operations Division made the following statement on this matter: Our naval war is at a stage in which it forced more than ever on to the defensive. Although, for the time being, it will not be possible to undertake large offensives - except in the submarine campaign - it is nonetheless necessary to retain the initiative, even in our present defensive position, by sorties calculated to harrass the enemy and keep him in a continuous state of unrest. In certain circumstances it will be possible to deal heavy blows by destroying important installations and specially valuable ships, thereby disrupting and frustrating the enemy preparations for operations. For these isolated actions special weapons are required which are still to be devised. They must be capable of achieving big results with a comparatively small investment of material and personnel. This will be possible only if - in addition to other things - the explosive can be approached quickly and unobtrusively to the target. A device that can travel under water would appear the most suitable for this purpose." Naval Staff, Operations Division, by order of Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has asked Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division to design a "midget submarine" or "one-man torpedo" such as to meet the following requirements:

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1. Unobserved approach of the explosive to the target (ship, harbor installations etc).
2. Speed of 2 up to at least 15 knots.
3. Range of submerged navigation 200 miles. If starting from a parent submarine and returning thereto, the range may be correspondingly reduced.
4. Crew of 1 - 3 men.
5. Possibility of escape for the crew after leaving the explosive.

In order to facilitate and to expedite construction, any information that may be available on Italian and possibly also on Japanese weapons of this kind should be used as much as possible.

IV. Effective 7 Jul., the following functions were transferred from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to the Reich Minister for Armaments and Amunition:

1. Information on the effect of enemy military action on our war economy.
2. Registration and classification of undertakings of war interest for purposes of air defense.
3. Air raid protection for industries.
4. Civilian and police protection for industries.
5. Counter intelligence in industries of war interest.
6. Visits by foreigners to industries of war interest.
7. Patents and licences.
8. Patent legislation
9. Denunciation and black-listing of firms.
10. Requests to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Operations Staff for Reich Labor Service forces to be used in the armament industries.

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The respective orders of Armed Forces High Command so far in force on these matters will be taken over and maintained by the Reichsminister for Armaments and Ammunition. The personnel presently handling these matters will be placed at the disposal of the Reichsminister for Armaments and Ammunition Armaments Department by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

V. Radio intercept report No. 29/43 contains a summary of data on the enemy obtained by Radio Decoding and Radio Intelligence for the period 12-18 Jul.

Attention is called to:

- page 4/5 - Submarine hunting in the Bay of Biscay.
- page 7 - Operations by 18th and 19th Groups of the Royal Air Force.

Situation on 21 Jul. 1943

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

From loading orders issued on 6 Jul. from Cape-town to London and Cairo, it is evident that steamers loading in South African ports go home via Suez. The corresponding orders were as follows:

1. Due to the lack of cargo, especially copper at Lourenso Marques and Beira, all steamers now starting to load and going home via Suez will take on copper and other cargo.
2. Steamers from the Middle East, which can bring homebound cargo, will go to Eira or Lourenso Marques and load there before going north.
3. Not much cargo except sugar will be available at ports in the Union of South Africa during the next few months. Two or three steamers returning to England via the Atlantic will probably be sufficient for the program.

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has been instructed to make an estimate of the effect on the Cape Town and South Atlantic Shipping traffic if the Mediterranean route were brought back into full use.

2. Own Situation:

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The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN reports via Tokyo that our submarines will not need more supplies until mid-October.

Naval Attaché, Tokyo reports that the home-mail for Ship "10" and for the crew of the UCKERMARK is overdue. Naval Staff has advised Naval Attaché, Tokyo, for information of Ship "28", by radiogram 1287, of the reasons for the non-arrival of the mail in Japan.

The Japanese Naval Staff has approved the plan to release news on the visit of the auxiliary cruiser Ship "10" (THOR) for publication in Japan.

Executive Office of the Commander in Chief Navy Administrative Staff, has been asked to arrange the subject matter and time of publication with the Japanese Naval Attaché.

General reports and pictures on the auxiliary cruiser's visit to Japan may be published. Operational details and dates are to be suppressed.

## II. Situation West Area:

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-five planes were detected over the outer Bay of Biscay up to Cape Ortegal. British vessels were detected at 0948 in BE 3250 and between 1927 and 2157 in BE 3180, 3510, 3560, and 3879 as well as one USA vessel at 1743 in AL 6750.

Our air reconnaissance reported, at 0820, one SOUTHAMPTON-class cruiser sailing north at a high speed, 220 miles west of Brest and, at 2055, a convoy of 14 merchantmen with 5 destroyers, 3 guard ships and 1 flying boat, on a southerly course at a speed of 11-17 knots in 25 W / 6044 (430 miles west of Brest).

According to an intelligence report from London via Madrid, the preparations observed in South Wales are for maneuvers which are to begin within the next days and are not indicative of immediate offensive plans.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J-mines were cleared off Lorient. A

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submarine which was unable to submerge was escorted by three minesweepers from the outer point Kern to Brest. Submarine U "558" has not reported since noon on 20 Jul. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla turned back from BF 5744 at 1000 without performing its mission. Both torpedo boats anchored at La Pallice at 0200 on 22 Jul. Submarine U "558" must be presumed lost.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Nothing special was reported except the clearing of two ELM/J-mines north of Tershelling. Escort and patrol services were carried out according to plan.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio Intelligence detected 19 planes over the North Sea but no operating planes in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. It also detected the Russian submarine M "200" at sea for the first time, presumably on a trial run.

According to photographic interpretation, there were 3 destroyers, 1 torpedo boat, 2 submarines, 2 tankers, 10 freighters at Kolski Bay on 20 Jul. and 8 submarines in the Polyarnoye naval port. Four destroyers were leaving the Kurabelnoye-mouth. There were 20 freighters and 1 tanker at Archangelsk and 8 freighters and 1 destroyer at Molotovsk.

According to an intelligence report a big cruiser put in to Hvalfjord at about 1000 on 20 Jul. A convoy of 4 steamers in ballast together with 1 escort boat and 1 corvette left Reykjavik at 1800 on 20 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

No particular observations were made in the coastal waters off Vardoe after visibility improved, such as to give any indication of the alleged enemy operation reported on 20 Jul.

An enemy submarine unsuccessfully fired four torpedoes at one



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of our convoys of 5 steamers, strongly protected by 5 patrol boats and 5 submarine chasers, off the Kongsfjord at 1430. At 1918 and 1928 the convoy, moored in the Bussefjord, was repeatedly attacked by six fighter bombers. At 2225, four enemy planes again attacked the convoy in the Bussefjord with bombs and gunfire. Casualties were caused on two of the submarine chasers. No other damage was done.

With reference to these attacks, the 5th Air Force reports that, in spite of fighter protection and bad visibility, they were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. (See teletype 2230).

The escort service convoyed 32 ships to the north and 21 ships to the south as well as 22 northbound smoke carriers. Delay was again caused by lack of escort.

Destroyer Z "28" is en route from Harstadt to Trondheim and the LODY en route through the skerries between Tromsø and Alta escorted by motor minesweeper R "89".

Commander Submarines, Norway has forwarded, for information the operational order for submarine U "169" regarding the patrol mission north and northeast of Iceland. The boat will leave Hammerfest on 22 Jul. and has been ordered to report approximately every week on the traffic situation in AA 98 and to give immediate advise by short signal of naval forces from cruisers upwards, convoys, and heavy traffic of single vessels.

Submarines U "601" and "625" have reported by short signal completion of mine laying off Belushiya Bay and Yugor Straits. Submarine U "586" and "629" have put out as scheduled for mine laying operations. U "255" to supply the BV 138 on the east coast of Novaya Zemlya, and U "711" for operations in the Kara Sea.

U "355" was fired upon from the shore by artillery of small calibre while reconnoitering off the west coast of Spitzbergen near Advent Bay. U "355" was shelled by small caliber guns on shore. The boat blew up a radio mast at Calypso Bay.

#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Mine clearance vessel "11" has cleared a total of 49 UMA mines in the Skagen barrage. A fishing smack of Admiral Denmark sank in the southern exit of the Sound after a mine explosion. One ELM/J was cleared southwest of Anholt.

Convoy and transport traffic throughout the Baltic Sea area

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was carried out to schedule and without incident.

In an encounter between Finnish PT boats and Russian guard-boats north of Lavansaari during the night of 20 Jul., one Russian boat was set on fire. Minesweeping in the Irben Narrows was continued. There was strong enemy air activity. The Dubnia Battery and the harbor of Peipia were unsuccessfully attacked in the forenoon and one of our formations was attacked in the afternoon south of Tueters, casualties being caused on SAT "Helene".

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Submarine U "190" reports traffic of fast unaccompanied ships on the southern edge of CA, on courses 20° and 200°, and also outgoing and incoming convoys on constantly changing routes. A convoy coming in on 26 Jun. had strong night air protection.

2. Own Situation:

Of the convoy of 7 steamers which sailed from Lisbon and was attacked by submarine U "455" entered Gibraltar, so that one ship may be presumed sunk. U "190" which had been presumed missing has fortunately reported again.

In DN 36, U "66" pursued a U.S. tanker which disappeared from sight with an increasing list.

U "664" drove off repeated air attacks in the Bay of Biscay. U "558" must unfortunately be presumed lost.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

Except for the reconnaissance reports of Air Commander Atlantic (see Enemy Situation West Area), no special reports have been received.

Mediterranean Area:

During the night of 20 Jul., 56 of our planes were sent out against shipping targets in the Augusta area. One tanker was sunk, 1 steamer probably sunk and 3 freighters were damaged. Two of our planes were lost. At noon, the enemy made a heavy attack on Grosseto and during the night of 21 Jul.,

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small forces attacked Naples with bombs and gunfire. Two enemy planes were reported shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

Eastern Front:

Apart from the success of the 5th Air Force fighters near Vardoe (see Situation in the Northern Waters), no special events have been reported.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

On 20 Jul., Enna was occupied by the enemy. On 21 Jul., it was generally quiet on the fronts of both divisions.

Situation at Sea:

Our air reconnaissance was limited and no new information on the Sicilian area was obtained. Supplies are being disembarked in the harbors at night, while, during the day, the enemy naval forces apparently stand far off to sea. From 0150 on, Crotone was bombarded by six enemy vessels. 1st PT Boat Formation had been warned and had been able to move to Taranto earlier. Operations from there will depend on the arrival of torpedoes from the former base at Salerno. For the brief report of Commanding Officer, Messina Strait Defenses on the encounter with the enemy at 0102 on 20 Jul., see teletype 0835. The enemy sheered off after hits had been scored. No damage was done to our four minesweepers.

Submarine U "81" penetrated the harbor of Syracuse and torpedoed a troop transport of 12,000 BRT which was apparently grounded. Two torpedoes exploded in the net barrage.

No action reports have been received from the Italian submarines. In the enemy air attack on Ionia on 20 Jul., 2 naval landing craft were destroyed.

During the night of 19 Jul., Italian torpedo planes reported a probable hit on a vessel of 4 - 5,000 BRT.

According to submarine reports, there were about 60 ships 35 miles southeast of Cape Passero at 1325 on 21 Jul. No further details were given.

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According to second evaluation of photographic reconnaissance, the battleship that was north of Augusta on 19 Jul. was probably of the TEXAS class.

In the lack of air reconnaissance, it is not possible to get a clear picture of the location of the enemy landing forces. There are therefore no clues as to the likelihood of further enemy landings in west or north Sicily or in other areas of the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. This is one result of the enemy's strong aerial superiority which is the main characteristic of the whole Mediterranean situation.. It is this above all that enables the enemy to exploit his almost unchallenged control of the sea. The combination of these two factors offer an illustration of modern sea - and aerial warfare in connection with large-scale landing operations which, looking back on our own position in the summer of 1940 and the difficulties opposing our "Seeloewe" plan, is highly instructive.

The loss of one of our submarines in the Straits of Messina and the continuously expected penetration of this area by enemy naval forces and submarines necessitate special protective measures for our shipping - and supply-traffic. Naval Staff has instructed German Naval Command Italy, and Commander Submarines, Italy for information that, besides enforcing the exchange of ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore recognition signals between all German and Italian forces in the area, other steps must be instituted for the protection of our submarines such as compulsory convoy and the establishment of time schedules for passing given points. A report is to be submitted on what other similar measures can be taken and are contemplated. For copy of the directive 1/Skl I m 20467/43 Gkdos see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff op has forwarded the experience reports of Commanding General Armed Forces South dated 13 Jul., on the latest fighting in Sicily. Amongst other things, emphasis is laid on the effectiveness of naval artillery against land targets, which acquires special importance in regard to the fighting throughout the Italian area. Also of importance is the practical experience that opposition to the landings themselves calls for the strongest possible concentration of defense in which part of the Reserve artillery must also be employed, as Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West had already requested some time ago. The use of sea- and land-mines off the landing places should also be increased. Naval Staff has passed on these items to Group South and Admiral Aegean, and, for information to Groups North

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and West and Naval Commands Norway, East and North by Order 1/Skl 21302/43 geh. For copy see War Diary Part C, Vol. X. Naval Staff has forwarded a Mediterranean Situation report to Groups North Fleet, West and South and German Naval Command, Italy, in which it is stated that further developments depend mainly on the possibility of defending northeastern Sicily with new German troops, on controlling the Straits of Messina and on the air defense of the Italian mainland. There are no indications as to where new landings are being prepared. For the full text as per Order 1/Skl 20504/43 Gkdos see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

According to an Intelligence report from Spain, 12 transports which left Gibraltar on 17 Jul. to the west had on board about 10,000 French and Algerian troops as well as wounded, prisoners and refugees destined for England. According to another Intelligence report of 13 Jul. from London via Madrid, 11 boats of 11th Submarine Flotilla put to sea on 6 Jul. from bases in the Isle of Wight area for Gibraltar or the Eastern Mediterranean. The boats were completed between January and May in shipyards at Hull. The smallest type is of 690 tons displacement. They are said to be intended for patrolling the Adriatic.

At 1800 on 20 Jul. our air reconnaissance reported a convoy of 16 freighters with 9 defense vessels on a westerly course 50 miles north-northwest of Sidi Barani. German Naval Command, Italy believes they are destined for Malta, which would confirm the fact that further supplies for Sicily are being brought from the east.

Submarines were reported at positions north-northeast of Bastia, north of Ajaccio, east of Bastia and south of Taranto.

No other important sighting reports were received on 21 Jul. from the Western or Eastern Mediterranean.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

The BRANDENBURG and the POMERN have completed their minelaying according to schedule and put in to Toulon. Two freight barges left Toulon for Genoa and a third left for Savona. Thus the first freight barges have taken up their functions.

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At 1530 on 19 Jul., tank-barges MARIA and PAULA were attacked by gunfire from an enemy submarine north of Porto Vecchio. The MARIA was sunk and the PAULA damaged.

At 1510, on 21 Jul., motor ship ORSINI, escorted by a corvette, was torpedoed by an enemy submarine 18 miles east-northeast of Bastia and is to be towed in to Porto Ferrajo. Early on 21 Jul., one of our convoys on the Sardinia route was unsuccessfully attacked by eleven enemy planes southwest of Elba. The convoy entered Bastia in the afternoon. No reports have been received on the transport submarines ROMOLO and REMO which are enroute from Naples to Messina, or on the convoy of steamer INGEBORG with torpedo boat TA "10" en route from Bari to Piraeus.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report of 20 Jul. from Athens, the British are setting up bases or observation posts at various strategic points in the Greek area for the purpose of making and maintaining contact with submarines, gaining information on our positions and measures and, if necessary, giving guidance to landing vessels. Such points have been identified at, among other places, Khalkidike in the Gulf of Salonika, the Gulf of Volos, the Maliakos Bay, four places in Euboea and four places in the Peloponnese. For more exact location see teletype 1815.

Another Intelligence report of 15 Jul. from Tobruk states that Greek troops are being equipped at Tobruk for landing operations in the Greek area. (See teletype 1816.)

During the night of 19 Jul., 3 planes flew into Nish (Serbia) area to supply the insurgents.

Own Situation:

Four motor minesweepers have been moved to the Gulf of Salonika to re-check the enemy mine barrage. The torpedoed steamer LOULOUES has been towed into Piraeus. Convoy traffic was carried out without incident.

During Jun., 54 steamers for 143,654 BRT were escorted in the Aegean. One hundred and thirty-three steamers for 111,936 BRT and 1,940 auxiliary sailing vessels for 63,804 BRT sailed without escort. Thirteen auxiliary sailing vessels were lost by

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air attacks, 8 by submarines, 1 by sea damage and 1 by desertion to Turkey.

Group South reports:

1. The development of the situation in Sicily and the preparation of Anglo-American forces in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean for further offensive operations, call for strategic reconnaissance of the enemy's assembly area.

2. The concentration, date and probable direction of the enemy offensive can be established only by reliable strategic reconnaissance. The Air Force must cover all the jumping-off areas concerned. Where enemy operations can be observed by other means (as, for example, in Sicily), long distance reconnaissance will not be necessary.

3. The probable jumping-off area of the enemy stretches from Sicily to Syria and Cyprus.

The material available to Air Force Command, Southeast for long-range reconnaissance and particularly for photographic reconnaissance is so limited that strategic reconnaissance cannot be done on the scale required for assessing the status of enemy preparations.

4. In the present situation, tactical reconnaissance off our coasts is of lesser importance.

5. Closest cooperation between Admiral Aegean and Air Force Command Southeast is assured. In spite of efforts to concentrate on strategic reconnaissance, the forces of Air Force Command Southeast are entirely inadequate for the purpose.

6. In order to prevent strategic surprise in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in view of the weak defense forces in the Aegean area, reinforcement of suitable means for strategic reconnaissance is urgently required by Air Force Command Southeast also with a view to defense duties of the Navy.

Naval Staff has informed Air Force Operations Staff I attached to Navy and asked that a report be made to Chief, Air Force General Staff. Air Force Operations Staff is fully aware of the problem but is able to do little about it, due to the shortage of forces.

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Black Sea:

1st PT Boat Flotilla transferred its operations on the night of 20 Jul. from the area off Vulantal to the Myshako landing bridgehead as the flotilla had been detected by an enemy contact plane. At 1945, while outward bound 80 miles west of Tuapse the flotilla was unsuccessfully attacked with six bombs. No attacks were made on 2 - 3 submarine chasers and 5 - 6 PT boats sighted south of Novorossisk, because of the bright moon light. No supply traffic was observed. The flotilla returned without incident to Ivanbaba.

The bombardment of the enemy land front was carried out as planned by the assigned naval artillery lighters and motor minesweepers. (See War Diary 20 Jul.). For results and details, see "Daily Situation" or Situation Reports of Admiral Black Sea in teletypes 1320 and 2125. The group off Primorsko Akhtary had a successful engagement with enemy motor gunboats. Motor minesweeper R "166" was hit and suffered damage and casualties.

The operation is regarded as a complete success.

It is planned for the same formation to repeat the bombardment east of Varenovka on the night of 21 Jul. and the operation has already begun.

The transfer of two Italian CB-boats from Constanza to Sevastopol is planned for 22 Jul.

During an unsuccessful air attack on 146th Anapa-transport in the southeastern part of the Kerck Strait at 1625, 1 of the 11 enemy planes was shot down by ships' anti-aircraft guns and 4 by the escorting fighters. Otherwise, the convoy- and ferry-traffic and the supply service were carried out without special events.

219 ships for 148,595 BRT were escorted in the Black Sea during the month of June. Five unsuccessful submarine attacks were made on convoys and altogether ten unsuccessful attacks on naval landing craft (transp rts).

The steamer BIRGIT (1,972 BRT) and 2 lighters were lost by enemy air action, 1 naval landing craft, 1 lighter and 1 minesweeper by mines, and the railway ferry boat VITEZ was lost by fire.



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Seventeen FZ-mines and 29 other mines were cleared and 10 mines were blown up.

Our PT boats destroyed 1 coastal vessel and 1 lighter during the month of Jun. and the submarines sank 1 escort vessel, 1 freighter and 1 lighter.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance:

There has been no news of naval interest.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

Naval Staff, Quartermaster General reported that the transport situation between Salonika and Athens continues to be bad. Traffic to Italy has also been blocked during the last few days. The GNEISENAU Battery is still held up at the Italian frontier. Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff has already been approached on this subject.

No other special reports or decisions were made.

Special Items:

In view of both the external and internal threats to the Balkan area, the Fuehrer has decided to send another Army Group to the southeast. It is therefore planned for General Field-Marshal Rommel, as Commanding General, Army Group B, to take over command in Greece, Crete and the Aegean Islands, - excluding the Aegean Army area - with provisional headquarters at Salonika.

Colonel General Loehr, as Commanding General of Army Group E, will retain command in the other German-occupied parts of the southeastern area, with headquarters at Belgrade. The designation of C.I.C. Southeast will be abolished.

For copy of the corresponding directive by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff as per 1/Skl 20580/43 Gkdos see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

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From information on developments in the Balkans and on the enemy concentration in the Eastern Mediterranean, it appears increasingly possible that the enemy will soon start operations in the Greek area. The command in this area has been reorganized in accordance with a recently announced order of the Fuehrer. For the conduct of the war at sea, the old directive under which, upon receipt of the key-work 'Victoria', Naval Group South will assume command also of the Italian C.O.s and fighting forces, remains in force.

As the situation is becoming increasingly serious, it appears necessary to put the 'Victoria' orders into force now.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff op stated that Operations Staff had been preparing an order on this subject which, however, had been pigeon-holed in view of the outcome of the Fuehrer's conference with the Duce. Naval Staff, Operations Division has urged Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch to push the matter. The first step can be taken by Commander Reiche of the Organization and Mobilization Branch, who is going to Headquarters on 23 Jul. for conferences with Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division, and can discuss Naval Staff's demands with Operations Staff op (Navy). The result of this meeting must be awaited.

In this connection, Captain Junge stated it will be quite agreeable to Operations Staff if the Navy continues its efforts to penetrate the command area of Italian Naval Command, Morea without awaiting an official settlement.

Situation on 22 Jul, 1943:

-I. Warfare in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Laurenco Marques has forwarded an interrogation report on a ship wrecked Norwegian sailor. The man stated that 28,000 tons of oil were being shipped daily from Abadan to Australia and New Zealand, especially for submarines at Freemantle. There are said to be 15 submarines stationed at Freemantle and 7 at Sidney, each of 2,200 tons. One tanker (generally Norwegian) leaves Abadan almost daily with Diesel oil and gasoline for South Africa and one British tanker a week with 15,000 tons of oil for Capetown. Every week two convoys of about 20 ships pass Durban going north.

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2. Own Situation:

As no further reports have been received since the QQQQ report of 30 Jun., Naval Staff assumes that Ship "28" is on her way to the Pacific Ocean and has perhaps reached the operational area by now. Ship "28" has been advised of this assumption by radiogram 0020 and it was added that confirmation or correction is not necessary.

All ships in foreign waters have been informed of the enemy situation by radiogram 0148 or 2134.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifty-two planes were detected operating in the area of 19th Group. Locations were made from 0555 to 2123 in BD 6330, AL 96 and 9930; BE 9250, 9180, and BD 4420.

The southbound convoy reported at 2055 on 21 Jul. in BE 3454 was again observed by our air reconnaissance at 1330 in BE 5675. Also reported:

At 1015, a merchantman, escort vessels, 1 destroyer and 1 aircraft carrier sailing south in BE 6942 and, at 1520, 3 destroyers at high speed on course 200° in BF 7534. None of these movements will affect the bringing out of our submarines by 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Secret Intelligence Branch has received the following reports from two reliable agents in Bordeaux on 17 and 19 Jul.:

1. Preparations for an extensive invasion of France are completed and a landing may therefore be expected any day. As landing places, Brittany was mentioned and St. Nazaire for certain.

2. The British preparations for invasion are so far advanced that under pressure from Moscow, major or minor landing operations along the whole of the Atlantic front, may be counted on within the next few weeks.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared off Lorient and one off St. Nazaire.

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The MOEWE and torpedo boat T "19" entered La Pallice at 0830. The GREIF and the FALKE left Brest at 0800 on submarine escort; and 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with destroyers Z "24", "32", "37" left Royan at 1200 for escort duties. One of the three boats to be escorted turned back because of damage. Air Commander Atlantic has provided strong convoy escort forces which will subsequently attack the southbound convoy.

On 21 Jul., submarine chaser UJ "1423" hit an obstacle (wreck) below the surface at ebb tide in the Arsenal harbor at Lorient and capsized. There were no casualties.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Northern Waters, Norway:

1. North Sea:

Anti-mine escort service was hindered to some extent by the weather (mist).

Convoy 1155 Hoek-Elbe sailed at 1300. It consists of 8 steamers (10,828 BRT), 3 boats of 30th Minesweeper Flotilla and 2 boats of 20th Minesweeper Flotilla on transfer to the Baltic Sea. Escort consists of 3 boats of 13th Patrol Flotilla and 3 boats of 11th Patrol Flotilla. Minefields escort will be provided by 5 boats of 1st Minesweeper Flotilla up to Helder and by 27th Minesweeper Flotilla from Helder onward.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Radio Intelligence detected 19 planes over the North Sea but no planes operating in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. Reconnaissance by the 5th Air Force produced no tactical results. A convoy was sighted at 1355 on a southerly course southeast of Scapa close under the coast.

Own Situation:

At noon of 21 Jul., the Russian Battery 209 fired five rounds on one of our motor boats. The Petsamo Battery returned fire with seven rounds.

Forty-four enemy planes took part in the attacks on our convoy near Vardoe on 20 Jul.; 15 of them were shot down by fighters and shore anti-aircraft.

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Destroyer Z "28" put in to Trondheim at 0745. Destroyers Z "29" and "35" passed Kristiansand South, going north at 2145. Thirty-eight ships were escorted to the north and 25 ships to the south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

No new information of any value was obtained by our air reconnaissance in Kronstadt Bay and the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.

The Finns report an engagement between 3 Finnish PT boats and 2 Russian guard ships north of Poninsaari during the night of 21 Jul., and a thrust by 6 Russian PT boats up to north of Sommeri presumably to lay mines.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty-two vessels and 4 minesweeping planes were out on check sweeps in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses East. Two tankers and 3 steamers were escorted. At 0500 on 20 Jul., the German fishing smack HORNSRIFF hit a mine near Skagen and sank.

Admiral Denmark reports an incursion on the night of 22 Jul. by 2 enemy planes up to Randers and Odensefjord, presumably to land agents and lay mines.

The loss of patrol boat Vp "1014" near Laaland on 20 Jul. is ascribed to the explosion of a (presumably) ELM/A "blunt" mine under the bow. One officer and twenty-four men are missing.

One ELM/J mine was cleared near Darsser Ort. Three tankers were escorted in the Baltic Sea.

No special reports have been received from the area of Commander, Minesweepers East. In the forenoon, our formations near Tytters were unsuccessfully attacked by 8 enemy planes.

The NARGOEN Battery is being removed and is reported out of action.

V. Submarine Warfare:

No reports have come in from the Atlantic.

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VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day, only small enemy air forces entered the west area attacking locomotives and railway stations in the Dutch and Belgian area. An enemy reconnaissance plane flew into the Baltic Sea Entrances as far as 40 miles west of Bornholm. In the afternoon, 2 reconnaissance planes were over the Ruhr area. During the night of 22 Jul., about 20 planes entered the area Le Havre - Gironde mouth. No attacks were reported.

2. Mediterranean Area:

Attacks by 47 of our planes on naval targets between Sicily and Malta had only minor results. Three steamers were damaged. The enemy attacked airfields and villages in Sardinia during the day. At 1030, a tanker off Ostia was set on fire by strafing. At about the same time, Foggia and Salerno were attacked by strong forces with corresponding fighter protection. Late in the evening, the aerodrome at Pratica di Mare was attacked. The enemy also made isolated nuisance raids during the day in the area of the Greek Islands.

3. East Front:

Ninety-eight enemy planes were shot down on the Army front on 20 Jul. and 56 on 21 Jul.

At Stavanger, a Ju 88 was attacked while landing by gun fire from a Beaufighter. During an attack by five FW 190 on 2 PT boats south of Eina Bay, 1 of the boats was destroyed by a direct SC 500 hit.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

The enemy pressure towards the north continues. According to an Intelligence report of 20 Jul., the enemy plans to make a combined Navy/Air Force landing in northern Sicily in the San Stefano di Camstra sector immediately after the capture of Catania. U.S. and Canadian troops are standing by for this operation at Bizerta, with transport ships and landing vessels.

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Situation at Sea:

On 21 Jul. photographic reconnaissance of Bizerte showed a large increase in the number of vessels present which comprised 1 transport, 44 freighters (totalling about 200,000 BRT), 1 tanker, 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 94 landing vessels, 3 landing stages and other small vessels. According to evaluation of photographs of 21 Jul., more enemy forces including LST and landing vessels have arrived on the south coast of Sicily. For details of ships at Empedocle, Licata and Gela, see teletype 0610. The harbors in eastern Sicily were also very full on 21 Jul. In addition to landing boats, 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 28 other war vessels were in Augusta in the afternoon. Seven freighters were on the way out. No further reports have been received on a formation of several unidentified units reported by the Italians at 2230 on 21 Jul. to be south of Cape Spartivento on course 450. About 2300 on 21 Jul., large concentrations of shipping were reported in the area of Cape Passero as well as near Empedocle and south of Granitola.

It is impossible to gain a clear picture of the enemy's current intentions from the number of ships observed in the ports and their movements. It can only be assumed that they maintain the supply service from Bizerta and Malta.

The transfer of the torpedoes to Taranto has unfortunately been so delayed by transportation difficulties that 1st PT Boat Force was again unable to operate on 21 Jul.

At 1714, submarine U "81" torpedoed a southbound steamer of 5,000 BRT in CN 3282 (15 miles southeast of Syracuse). The steamer did not sink in spite of a finishing shot. The boat has used all her torpedoes and has turned back to Pola.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

During the day, a DIDO-class cruiser with 1 destroyer entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic and another DIDO-class cruiser, which was immediately docked, and a convoy of 7 freighters with 3 escort vessels arrived from the Mediterranean. At 1530, a convoy of 3 tankers and 6 freighters with 1 destroyer and 3 escort vessels left for the Mediterranean. At 0840, an eastbound convoy of 6 freighters with 3 destroyers passed Tangiers coming from the Atlantic.

From the Western Mediterranean, only one report on a westbound convoy of 3 steamers Near Cape Ferrat, has been received. At

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0145 on 21 Jul., a convoy of 1 (probable) cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 escort and transport was sailing west 12 miles north of Serrat. This formation was not observed again on 22 Jul. At 1830 there were 6 unidentified vessels northwest of Bizerta.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, 8 steamers with 2 destroyers and 1 escort vessel were sighted and reported at 1800 on 21 Jul., 40 miles east-northeast of Derna on course 285°. These were presumably a part of the convoy, observed at 1800 on 20 Jul. near Sidi Barrani, which had not put in to Tobruk.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

No final reports have come in on the damage caused by the air raids on Naples and Salerno.

The following ships were employed on convoy escort:

SG "11, motor minesweepers R "61", "12", "13", "16", submarine chaser UJ "2207", 4 Italian torpedo boats, 1 destroyer. The steamer CHAMPAGNER was unsuccessfully bombed on her way back from Bastia to Leghorn. Six steamers and 1 tanker were engaged in the Sardinia traffic. The enemy made continuous but unsuccessful air attacks on a convoy of 2 steamers, 1 tanker and 4 motor minesweepers west of Elba. The ORLINI has been towed to Porto Ferrajo. In the Sicily supply traffic, 1 motor ship with 2 torpedo boats arrived at Milazzo from Naples.

No reports have been received from ROMOLO and REMO en route from Messina to Naples.

Up to 22 Jul. inclusive, a total of 26 neutral ships (94,803 BRT) and 127 French ships (453,116 BRT) have been transferred from France to Italy. No ship of this kind are out at present, at sea.

Group West has reported the plan for minelaying tasks T 1a and T 1b to be carried out by the POMERN and BRANDENBURG on 23 Jul. The operation started from Toulon at 2000. In regard to the small-vessel situation, German Naval Command, Italy reports:

1. German Vessels:

a. In operational status in the Sicilian area: 33 naval landing craft, 9 Siebel-ferries, 3 combat ferries, 2 naval artillery lighters, 5 patrol boats, 11 landing boats, 71 infantry landing craft, 26 tank barges, 2 "See-loewe" barges.

b. In operational status in the area



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Corsica-Sardinia: 5 landing craft, 4 Siebel-ferries, 1 patrol boat, 5 landing craft, 7 infantry landing craft, 9 tank barges, 1 tank lighter, 11 tank freight barges.

c. Estimated increase by completion of repairs: by 31 Jul.: 10 naval landing craft, 3 Siebel-ferries, 3 tank barges; by 15 Aug.: 3 naval landing craft, 1 combat ferry, 4 infantry boats, 1 tank lighter.

d. Estimated increase by new construction: by 31 Jul.: 1 naval landing craft, 5 infantry boats, 15 tank barges; 15 Aug.: 13 naval landing craft, 5 infantry boats, 19 tank barges, 9 freight barges, 11 "Seeloewe" barges and 13 auxiliary sailing vessels.

e. Italian vessels: 20 naval landing craft, are operating in the Sicilian area, 10 in the area Sardinia/Corsica, 18 are out of action, 2 are under construction, date of completion unknown.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

The DRACHE has transferred from Piraeus to Salonika. The troop transport steamer RE ALESSANDRO under escort of 2 torpedo boats put in to Salonika from Mudros and returned to Mudros in the afternoon, in order to take troops to Rhodes on 23 Jul. Submarine chaser UJ "2104" was sent from Mudros to Piraeus to reinforce the escort.

Torpedo boat TA "20" (foreign build) arrived from Bari at Patras with the steamer INGEBORG and proceeded alone to Piraeus.

On 21 Jul., enemy air attacks were made on Paros island in western Greece.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the evening of 21 Jul., a submarine was detected by location 30 miles west of Poti. Nine planes unsuccessfully attacked our Crimean convoy near Cape Meganon in the afternoon of 21 Jul.

At midnight 2 - 3 motor gun boats made an artillery attack

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on our patrol boats off Temrjuk. A short exchange of fire had no result on either side.

Own Situation:

The repeat bombardment of the Mius front near Varenovka by naval artillery lighters, 1 and 2 and motor minesweeper R "156" was carried out according to plan, and large fires were observed. Defensive fire by heavy land batteries scored no hits.

On the night of 22 Jul., 3 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla were in operation in the patrol area west of Novorossisk.

The tanker OSSAG, protected by 4 motor fishing vessels, is en route from the Bosphorus to Burgas.

Minesweeping planes successfully cleared two mines in the Danube.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to Allied reports, a Japanese supply force of 3 light cruisers, 6 destroyers and 2 transports in Vella Bay was attacked by bombers throughout the night. Allegedly, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers were sunk and 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer damaged.

U. S. Navy Department also announced that 2 U.S. ships bombarded Japanese installations on Kiska on 20 Jul.

Reuter gives Japanese warship losses from 1 - 21 Jul. as follows: Sunk: 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 1 submarine chaser, 1 tanker, 1 freighter: Probably sunk: 5 destroyers: Damaged: 4 freighters. According to Domei\*, planes of the Japanese Naval Air Force attacked Colombo and Trincomali during the night of 17 Jul.

A German agency report from Tokyo states that the Japanese have refloated the 50,000 ton floating dock at the naval harbor of Seletar, which had been sunk by the British in 1941.

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Items of Political Importance:

Nothing to report.

The conference on the situation with the Chief, Naval Staff was not held. Chief, Naval Staff is attending a conference on warship types to which he had been invited by Reichminister Speer.

Special Items:

I. Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division has forwarded the following report of 12 Jul. from an agent who has so far proved very reliable:

"On the basis of statements made by the British Under-Secretary of State Law, several conversations with Air Vice Marshal Harrison, and many observations of my own, the following opinion on Mr. Stimson's visit to England is submitted:

The conferences with Stimson have nothing to do with current operations in Sicily. Everything goes to indicate that the two main subjects of discussion are:

1. An Allied operation in Norway, to be executed mainly by Americans.

2. Talks with the relative British Army and Air Force authorities on the use of the American Air Force, including, in particular, the establishment of an American Invasion Air Force.

In regard to point 1., it is noted that troop movements to the north continue. One complete Army Corps has been transferred to northern England and Scotland and a second one is on the way. Furthermore, Harrison has reported on the transfer of British bomber formations to northern England and the re-equipment of Scottish airfields with formations of Bomber Command. The decisive point however appears to be that both the U.S. and the British formations in Iceland have been strongly reinforced. Exact figures on numbers of planes and personnel of the Royal Air Force and the U.S. squadrons will be furnished later. As to the direction of a possible Allied attack, it is considered probable that the objective will be central Norway (Trondheim) since as may be concluded from Law's statements, this area would be the most advantageous also from the political point of view.

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In regard to point 2., the formation of a U.S. Tactical Air Force in Great Britain has already been reported. Thus, parallel British and American air forces are now being set up for use in a large-scale invasion."

II. In accordance with the directives of Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division has arranged the distribution of the 17 coastal motor boats (torpedo-carriers) in the Aegean and in the Black Sea. Two flotillas of eight boats each will be set up. The seventeenth boat will remain, for the time being, with the PT Boat Training Flotilla as training boat. For copy of order as per 1/Skl 20721/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

III. A directive issued by Chief of Armed Forces, High Command on 23 Jun. 1943 supplementing order of 12 Feb. 1943 concerning the exercise of the executive authority in the operational area is attached to War Diary Part B, Vol. V. as per 1/Skl 21997/43 geh.

IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division has reported to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff op on the status of readiness of the preparations for ALARICH and KONSTANTIN. For copy as per 1/Skl 20662/43 Gkdos see War Diary Part C, Vol. X.

Situation on 23 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

No particular reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attaché, Tokyo reports that, in reply to a call from the ERITREA, AQUILA II has announced that she will reach the rendezvous point on 27 Jul.

The assumed loss of this boat which had not reported since 17 Jun., is thus, fortunately, proved mistaken.

In reply to a query from Naval Attaché, Tokyo as to what was to be done with the torpedoes from MARCO POLO, Naval Staff has advised, by telegram 0136, that they are for the Japanese Navy. The place of delivery was not specified by Naval Staff

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and is to be fixed with the Japanese.

Naval Staff has also informed Naval Attaché, Tokyo on the status of the negotiations in regard to the cession of Japanese submarines for the rubber transport. For copy of telegram 1/Skl I opa 2074/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. IX.

Information on the enemy situation has been forwarded to all our ships in foreign waters by radiograms 1347, 1934 and 2048.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-three planes were detected in the area of 19th Group.

One British vessel each was detected at: 0938 in BF 4410; 1256 in BE 6652; 1344 in CF 2850; 2106 in BE 66.

Radio Intelligence also detected an escort plane of the convoy MANGLE at 2349 in BE 5354 and at 0020 on 24 Jul. in BE 3874.

Our air reconnaissance reported: at 0825, in BE 6394, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 destroyers, course 210°; at 0950 in BE 6631, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 destroyers, course 200°; at 1005, in BE 6399, 1 hospital ship, course 360°, medium speed; at 1441, in BE 6632, 2 destroyers, course 300°, high speed; at 1515, in BE 6645, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, northerly course; medium speed; at 1603, in BE 6672, 2 destroyers, course 90°, high speed, escorted by 3 fighters.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On 22 Jul., two ELM/J mines were cleared off the Gironde, one off Brest and one off Quiberon. The French deep-sea fishing sailing vessel LS "2311" with a crew of seven men is overdue since 20 Jul. It has probably either been captured or fled to England. Minesweeper M "152" sank near buoy "3" in the Gironde at 1513, after heavily striking a mine. The route had recently been swept particularly carefully. It is thought that the mine was an ELM/J with very high clicker- or delay-setting.

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The convoy of the GREIF and the FALKE, together with submarines U "91" and U "218", returned to Brest at 1400.

No reports have been received from the submarine convoy escorted by 8th Destroyer Flotilla. Group West therefore assumes that they are proceeding according to plan in spite of reported sighting of the enemy and the locations made.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance at about 2000 there were 15-20 ships on a northerly course, east-northeast of Cromer and 5 ships - course unspecified - 20 miles east of Great Yarmouth.

2. Own Situation:

On 22 Jul., ten ELM/J-mines were cleared north of Ameland and northwest of Terschelling and Borkum. The fishing vessel KB "158" sank between Ymuiden and Den Helder following an underwater explosion.

9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was attached to convoy "1155" as far as Ymuiden, as additional protection.

An attack by 12 enemy PT boats on convoy 1155 15 miles southwest of Ymuiden between 0054 and 0307, was repulsed by 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla covering force and 1st Minesweeper Flotilla mine-field escort after a close combat in which hand grenades were also used. Several PT boats were set on fire, three of them probably destroyed. Motor minesweepers R "107", "103", and "87" were heavily damaged. Motor minesweeper "107" was towed in. The other boats and the minesweeper M "37" suffered minor damage. Station ROM participated in the engagement. There was a short exchange of gunfire without damage to our motor minesweepers. The PT boats put up smoke screens and sheered off. From 0205 to 0240 in AN 531, 6 PT boats attacked 34th Minesweeper Flotilla. Hits were observed on all the PT boats. One PT boat was set on fire and probably sank. The enemy sheered off

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after setting up smoke screens. At 0325, station ROM engaged 2 PT boats. Hits were observed. Casualties: 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, 2 killed, 16 seriously and 5 slightly wounded; 1st Minesweeper Flotilla, 1 seriously and 4 slightly wounded; 34th Minesweeper Flotilla and 11th PT Boat Flotilla, 2 slightly wounded each.

According to Radio Intelligence, a British warship reported to Yarmouth at 0814: "I have MTB "222" in tow."

Convoy "1155" anchored undamaged in the roads off Helder and resumed passage to the east at 2100.

The PT Boats S "79", "81", "136" moved from Wesermuende to Ymuiden.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio Intelligence picked up normal air activity by 15 planes over the North Sea and one plane operating in the area of the Iceland Squadrons. It was also established that our convoys near Berlevaag, in Basfjord and near Nord Kyn were detected and reported by Russian air reconnaissance.

Photographic reconnaissance of Scapa on 22 Jul. revealed 1 battleship of the KING GEORGE V-class, 1 of the RENOWN-class, 1 heavy cruiser, 5 destroyers, 2 (apparently) corvettes, 1 work-shop ship, 1 net-layer, 1 floating dock, 6 freighters and the ex-German battle cruiser DERFFLINGER. Cover was not complete. In the Holmsund, Watersund, and Hundasund, dam barrages seem to have been constructed in addition to the ship barrages.

At 1150, on 23 Jul., air reconnaissance sighted a merchantman of about 1000 BRT, 150 miles north of Jan Mayen on course 70°. This was possibly a supply ship or a weather ship.

2. Own Situation:

At 2200, on 22 Jul., the mineship formation KAISER-OSTMARK was unsuccessfully attacked by torpedo planes near Tanahorn. Two of the attacking planes were shot down by fighters. On 23 Jul., the formation laid barrage NW "32" part 1 (flank-barrage near Vardoe) according to plan. The Kongsfjord raid has brought to light further material. The search is being made by 2 naval landing craft, and 2 harbor

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protection boats. Air activity on 22 Jul. on the north and west coasts was slight. Our fighters were in operation but made no contact with the enemy.

Thirty-one ships were escorted to the north and 30 ships to the south. Ten steamers were held up at Kristiansand South because of lack of escort. For the same reason, shipping is considerable delayed in the area of Admiral, Northern Coast.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division states that additional reconnaissance can occasionally be carried out north and east of Iceland by Atlantic boats which, according to ice conditions, sometimes go north of Iceland. He will include corresponding instructions in the operational orders of submarines going out on that route.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Eight motor minesweepers, 12 guard boats, 1 minesweeper, 3 tugs and 4 barges entered Kronstadt about 0400 coming from the west. This was apparently the convoy of 22 vessels already reported by the Finns.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses East, 10 vessels and 4 minesweeping planes were engaged on channel sweeping. One ground mine was cleared 11 miles west of Kullen.

Transport and convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident throughout the Baltic Sea.

At 0320, mine clearance ship "12" anchored north of Pissen was attacked, in bad visibility, by a four engined plane with one torpedo. In spite of the ship's draught (5.6 meters) and a water-depth of 9 meters, the torpedo passed under the ship. She was moved to Windau.

V. Submarine Warfare:

On 16 Jul., submarine U "43", in BF 4495, successfully ward off a Sunderland for 30 minutes and on 19 Jul. in BE 6455, she shot down a Liberator.

On 22 Jul., in EU 9686, U "571" was damaged and forced to turn back by a low-flying Wellington. Hits were scored on



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the enemy plane. Further enemy air attacks were reported by submarines U "600" and "664". U "527" has so far failed to reply to a request for a position report after a warning for a flying boat. No reports on successes in the Atlantic have been received.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 70 planes in operation in the West area and 19 planes in the Mediterranean.

Enemy air activities during the day were limited in north and west France but stronger in Belgium and the Netherlands. Attacks were again made on traffic and supply installations. For details, see Daily Situation. No other reports of importance have been received.

Mediterranean Theatre:

The enemy air forces were active, particularly against airfields in southern Italy and Crete. Ten of our planes were destroyed on the airfield at Aquino. Anti-aircraft guns on Crete shot down 15 enemy planes.

Two more ships were reported damaged by our own bombing attacks on the night of 21 Jul. During the night of 22 Jul., 47 bombers were sent out against shipping targets at Augusta. A steamer of 2,000 BRT was sunk and 6 steamers totalling 14,000 BRT were damaged.

Eastern Front:

On 22 Jul., 105 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front. No special reports have come in from 4th and 5th Air Forces.

VII. War in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

I. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

In western Sicily, U.S. forces have advanced close to the east and southeast of Palermo. According to radio intelligence, U.S. troops had already entered Palermo

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by about 1000 on 22 Jul. Termini has been occupied by the enemy. In east Sicily, the main thrust of the enemy offensive is still against the sector of the 15th Armored Division whereas the enemy has withdrawn slightly from our main defense line in the sector of the "Hermann Goering" Tank Division. 14th Tank Corps plans to withdraw the main defense to the line Spailladora Hills - north of Leonforte - Agira. In order to open a passage for the forces withdrawing from Palermo; it is planned to make a thrust from Cefalu towards Termini. There is a total of 53 tanks operational, including three "Tigers" in the two tank divisions.

Situation at Sea:

One-third of the enemy's landing craft transport space is still engaged in the Sicilian operation. The location of more than half of the landing boats is unknown. The freighter and transport space of about 750,000 BRT engaged in the Sicilian operation, remains practically unchanged. Losses by sinking have been made up by replacements.

According to air reconnaissance, there were 5 ships on a westerly course 45 miles east-southeast of Cape Passero at 0315, and 9 more ships on a northwesterly course in the same area at 0340. At 1240, a convoy of 25 big merchantmen was in the roads at La Valetta. One aircraft carrier and 1 battleship were leaving the harbor. At the same time, there were 6 medium sized warships southeast of the island on course 330°. It is not clear whether they were joining an outgoing convoy or whether they were coming in from the Eastern Mediterranean. Second evaluation of the photographic reconnaissance of 21 Jul. revealed the following ships at La Valetta: RODNEY, NELSON, 2 ILLUSTRIOUS-class ships, 5 cruisers including one in dock; 1 MANXMAN-class ship, 19 destroyers, including one in dock, 7 submarines, 2 escort boats, 2 gunboats, including one in dock; 14 motor gunboats, 20 PT boats, 13 LST, 42 landing vessels, 1 special ship, 1 LSI, 4 transports, 7 freighters, 2 tankers, and 6 other merchantmen as well as other small vessels.

The number of motor gunboats and of other PT boats is high.

According to air reconnaissance on 23 Jul., there was a battleship 18 miles east of Bizerta, at 1250. On this day, the enemy invasion traffic was heaviest at Syracuse, Augusta and Licata. In the port of Palermo, large fires were observed apparently caused by our own demolition work. In a heavy air attack on Salerno, a naval materiel depot and the autovehicle servicing station were buried; there were no casualties.

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Submarine U "407" reports a hit, probably on a light cruiser, in CN 3254.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

A convoy of 4 transports, 5 tankers, and 9 freighters with 8-10 U.S. destroyers passed Ceuta in the forenoon towards the Atlantic. Seven more freighters put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. Among the ships that arrived in the evening of 22 Jul. one was a landing craft transport ship of the DEWDALE-type.

In the afternoon, a convoy of 9 freighters and 1 tanker with 5 escort vessels entered the Mediterranean. In the evening another convoy of 15 loaded and 1 empty freighters with 7 escort vessels left the harbor for the Atlantic. A destroyer without guns was being towed by a deep sea tug.

No reports on shipping have been received from the Western Mediterranean.

At 1852, there were 14 ships on an easterly course near Cape Bougaroni. Photographs showed 14,900 BRT of freighter space and 1,500 BRT tanker space as well as 1 PT boat, 1 minesweeper, 3 auxiliary warships, 1 LST and 42 landing boats at Tunis and the La Goulette roads.

Submarines were reported southeast of Port Vendres, west of Cape Vaticano and west of Civitavecchia.

In the Eastern Mediterranean at 1710 there was a tanker northeast of Tobruk, making for the harbor. No other sighting reports were received.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

The Italian minelayer DURAZZO was sunk at 0900 on 22 Jul., by an enemy submarine 8 miles east-northeast of Porto Vecchio.

At 1037, an unsuccessful enemy air attack was made on the convoy of the steamers COLLEVILLE and ADERNO accompanied by (foreign built) torpedo boat TA "11", submarine chaser UJ "2203", "2208" and one Italian torpedo boat, en route from Naples to Civitavecchia. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. At 1954 the steamer ADERNO in this convoy was sunk by an enemy submarine 3 miles west of Civitavecchia.

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About 1000, 2 naval landing craft, run aground at St. Stefano during an enemy air attack. Three planes were shot down. Two more planes were shot down by 2 Siebel ferries and a submarine near Ionia.

The fast escort boats SG "10" and "11", the (foreign-built) torpedo boat TA "11", 6 motor minesweepers, 3 submarine chasers, 1 Italian torpedo boat and 1 corvette were on escort duty. Altogether 2 tankers, 4 steamers and 1 motor ship were escorted in the island traffic. While sailing from Bastia to Elba, the steamer MONT AGEL was sunk by an enemy aerial torpedo.

It is stated by the Italian Admiralty, through Vice Admiral Bertoldi, that the submarines ROMOLO and REMO have probably been lost in the Ionian Sea during their transfer.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report from Cairo, an important secret session was held at Headquarters on 20 Jul. at which the King of Greece, Lord Moyne, General Wilson, Air Marshal Douglas, General Brooke and Admiral Cunningham were present. It was not possible to establish whether General Eisenhower was in Cairo as had been alleged.

Own Situation:

Torpedo boat TA "10" has arrived at Piraeus. Transport and escort traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident. At 1050, an enemy submarine was reported by a plane 30 miles south of Salonika. The harbor and sea plane base at Prevesa were attacked by enemy planes on 22 Jul. One Italian plane was damaged. On 23 Jul. Heraklion was attacked. Naval Shore Commander, Attica, Captain Leithaeuser, failed to return from a reconnaissance flight over Corfu.

Group South ordered Naval Shore Commander, Salonika to assume the functions of Naval Shore Commander Attica. The duties of Naval Shore Commander, Salonika will be taken over as additional duty by Naval Liaison Officer with Army Group E.

Black Sea:

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11th PT Boat Flotilla made no enemy contact during operations off Cape Utrish in the night of 22 Jul. During the night of 23 Jul., 6 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla were assigned to carry out an operation, in cooperation with the Army and the Air Force, against the landing place at Myshakov. The attack was made at 2245, as planned. No further details are yet known.

The Tanager-Mariupol convoy was attacked by a plane during the night of 22 Jul. Three men were wounded on (foreign built) motor minesweeper R. "56". It is further reported as of 21 Jul., that a darting flame was seen to break out on a combined operations ferry boat carrying ammunition which exploded and sank off Taman. The crew was rescued.

The Italian midget submarines CB "1" and "2" put in to Sulina because of bad weather. PT boat S "49" entered Ivanbaba from Constantza.

The tanker OSSAG convoy entered Burgas on the evening of 22 Jul. and proceeded to Varna on 23 Jul. On 22 Jul., 3 enemy planes were observed laying mines in the Area Sulina-Ismail.

Convoy and ferry traffic was carried out according to schedule and without disturbances.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

No reports have been received.

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Items of Political Importance:

No special information has been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

I. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported, as a result of the ordered investigation, that the reopening of the Mediterranean shipping route, would reduce traffic in the Capetown area to 53%, i.e. from 11 to 6 ships per day. A traffic reduction of about 50% would also be likely on the Natal-Freetown and Freetown-Capetown routes.

These figures show the direct influence of the loss of Tunis on the submarine anti-merchant ship campaign.

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In a highly restricted circle:

II. In connection with the report by Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief of Operations Branch on the setting up of Italian coastal artillery in the Greek area, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that the question of occupying Corfu with strong German forces be investigated.

Naval Staff, Operations Division, Chief, Mine Warfare Section reported on the possibility of using ground mines in the Mediterranean. Depth conditions are unfavorable almost everywhere. The only suitable place is a stretch of water about 25 miles wide off the Nile delta. Taranto is out of the question because deep water comes directly up to the outer harbor.

III. Report by Naval Staff, Chief, Naval Communications Division on the general status of the radar services. It is required that, within three months, every submarine putting to sea be equipped with "Netzhemd", wave-length indicator and "Aphrodite" or "Thetis".

IV. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters reported on the Fuehrer's conference with the Duce at Villa Feltre. According to this statement, the Duce agreed with the Fuehrer's ideas in regard to drastic changes in the positions of command, but did not plan to consider putting them into practice until some later date. In view of this indirect refusal, it is understandable that the meeting was not satisfactory to the Fuehrer. The willingness shown by General Ambrosio in regard to the demands put forward by Chief, Armed Forces High Command concerning German command in Sicily, Greece and Southern Italy, reinforcement of Italian troops and Italian transport and supply services is almost shocking. The Fuehrer, in any case, expects the Italian Armed Forces to break down sooner or later and does not believe that Ambrosio's promises will be kept. It seems that there is already a certain amount of Italian sabotage in the transport service. It is the Fuehrer's plan to hold Italy, as far as possible, with German forces, possibly assisted by some loyal Italian divisions. The Fuehrer is particularly concerned about Crete. He instructed that Chief, Naval Staff be asked whether submarine operations in the Aegean are feasible.

Chief, Naval Staff has already given consideration to this question. It would necessitate sending 3-4 more submarines to the Mediterranean. Experience shows that with the present

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standard of anti-aircraft and anti-location defense on submarines, a breakthrough at Gibraltar is not justifiable. Three out of the last four boats sent were lost in the Straits. The fourth boat was soon destroyed in the Mediterranean without achieving a single success. The situation will be much more favorable within a couple of months. Chief of Naval Staff postponed his decision. He later decided that three boats should again be assigned to the Mediterranean.

Special Items:

In a personal letter to Commander in Chief, Navy dated 19 Jul., the Japanese Naval Attaché, Berlin gives a list of all the weapons, equipment and drawings handed over by the Japanese Navy as a contribution to the common war effort, in addition to those already given to the German Navy. He again requests that, in the interests of security, only the highest and most limited naval circles be informed and that, in no circumstances, should any of the data be published or given to a third power.

The information includes:

1. construction plans of the special submarine, 92 pages.
2. construction plans of a submarine, type B, 121 pages.
3. construction plans of an auxiliary aircraft carrier, 10 pages.
4. general construction plan of the newest cruiser, 10 pages.
5. drawing of the newest coastal guard boat, 1 page
6. drawing of the 10 meter telescope for submarines
7. construction plan of the double-acting (dual-action?) two-stroke Diesel engine for submarines.
8. drawing of the scavenge-air bellows of the dual-action two-stroke Diesel-engine for submarines.
9. drawing of the exhaust pipe of the dual-action two-stroke Diesel engine for submarines.
10. construction plan for exhaust valves of the Diesel-engine.
11. construction plan of the removable clutch of the Diesel-engine for submarines.
12. drawing for the evaporating plant for submarines.
13. description and drawing of the echo detection gear.
14. description of the American mine for submarines.

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Chief, Naval Staff, on behalf of Commander in Chief, Navy has expressed the Navy's appreciation and promised that security will be maintained as requested. The matter will be followed up by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

Situation on 24 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report of 7 Jul. from the USA, received from a very reliable Ostrov agent, a troop convoy of about 60 freighters and transports sailed from Wilmington, Charleston, Baltimore and Philadelphia between 22 and 24 Jun., escorted by 40 - 50 warships including the battleship WASHINGTON, several cruisers and at least 4 new destroyer escorts. There were also at least 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, known to include the GLACIER and the NASSAU. Among the troop transports were large vessels such as the MAURITANIA which entered Cheasapeake Bay at the end of Apr. from the Panama Canal, as well as the BERENGARIA, AQUITANIA, GEORGIC, WEST POINT, QUEEN ELIZABETH etc. It has been learned that this convoy, with the same (or similar) ships, is to sail again between 17 and 20 Jul., so that it must be expected to be back between 13 and 15 Jul. The freighters in the convoy are all new, fast ships of the C III-class. Strong British defense forces have been awaiting the convoy out to sea. All the transports are heavily loaded some being unusually so. It is believed that this convoy travels at an average speed of 15-16 knots and will take a very northerly route. Unloading time in England will be unusually short due to specially careful organizational preparations in the English west coast ports.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attaché, Tokyo cables that 5 Japanese submarines are now operating in the area west of 90° and north of 0° and that there will be 7 submarines there from Sept. onward.

It will be necessary to come to an agreement in regard to "Monsoon" operational area so that the Japanese may make their arrangements in time.

Naval Staff has confirmed receipt of the courier mail and the war diary of Ship "28" to Naval Attaché, Tokyo. (See telegram 1957).



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II. Situation West Area:1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, at 0911, there were 1 aircraft carrier and 5 destroyers, on course 210°, at low speed, in BE 6883. Group West assumes that this is the same group as the similar one observed on 22 Jul. and on 23 Jul. The cruiser reported in BE 6645 at 1515 on 23 Jul. is believed to have been a mistaken observation of a destroyer. Group West believes that the aircraft carrier group is the easterly long-range defense in the BE 60 area for the southbound convoy observed in BE 5676 on 22 Jul. as well as for other convoys which may not have been detected. In any case, the Group does not think it likely that the carrier group's main mission is anti-submarine action. The planes sighted were too antiquated for this purpose. In fact from the type of plane it might even be presumed that the ships were auxiliary aircraft carriers.

From the fact that, on 23 Jul., our planes did not again sight the southbound convoy observed on 22 Jul., Group West concludes that — apparently due to the successful operations of the FW 200 — planes on 12/13 Jul. — the convoy route has been moved further to the west.

Apart from the 3 destroyers sighted on 22 Jul. in BF 7534, no naval forces have been recently observed in spite of repeated reconnaissance. Group West is therefore of the opinion that the previous assumption of a fixed anti-submarine position is not confirmed.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

On 22 Jul., one ELM/J-mine was cleared off Lorient by a minesweeping plane and, on 23 Jul., one ELM/A-mine was cleared off the Gironde by a mine-exploding vessel. One ELM/J-mine was cleared off St. Nazaire.

8th Destroyer Flotilla returned to Royan and Le Verdon at 2330 after completing its submarine escort trip as scheduled. Commander of 8th Destroyer Flotilla will transfer with destroyer Z "24" to Bordeaux on 25 Jul. for urgent repairs. The two operational destroyers, Z "32" and Z "37" will move to Pauillac on 25 or 26 Jul.

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Group West plans to escort submarines U "461" and "462" with 4 boats of 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla up to 8° West, so that the submarines can be dismissed at nightfall. Escort for the Italian submarines on about 2 Aug. by 4 torpedo boats up to 8° West is also planned. In view of the fuel situation and the strain on our air forces, the Group requests that the submarine convoys should be increased in size, as possibilities permit. (See radiogram 2225). This request was simultaneously submitted to Submarine Division which is mainly concerned.

Group West again called attention to the difficult personnel situation in the area of Commanding Admiral Defenses West, in particular in regard to the mine exploding vessels, and suggested that the situation at the dockyards might be ameliorated if all the remaining vessels of Store Ship Unit West, not required for special tasks, were put out of service as the Group sees no possibility of using them within any foreseeable period and the immobilization of large crews of first-class personnel who could be usefully employed in the dockyards is no longer justified. The group also suggested that the construction of the big new freighters O 11 and K 11 at St. Nazaire and of the 4 new tankers at Rouen be discontinued and that conversion of the accommodation ship USARAMO at Bordeaux and completion of the ships TENERIFE and OLINDA at St. Nazaire be abandoned. This request will first be examined by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. For copy see teletype 1955.

#### Channel Coast:

In the Channel, 10 vessels in 5 convoys escorted by 18 escort vessels were observed. Four boats of 6th PT Boat Flotilla left Ostend at 2245 to investigate a barrage gap apparently made by the British. After an unsuccessful search, the boats returned at 0300 on 25 Jul. PT boats S "77" and "60" left Boulogne for Ostend at 2245. PT boat S "77" sank at 0015 on 25 Jul., west of Ostend, after a brief engagement with 4 MGBs. Some of the crew were picked up by the enemy. PT boat S "68" reached Ostend undamaged. Commander 6th PT Boat Flotilla left with five boats to search for survivors but returned without fulfilling his mission.

#### III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

##### North Sea:

Convoy "1155" continued its voyage from Helder to the Elbe at 2100 on 23 Jul. Convoy "452", of 2 steamers under

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escort of 6 patrol boats, left the Elbe at 1100 for Hook van Holland. Three minesweepers and 1 submarine chaser are going with the convoys which will be piloted through the minefields up to Helder by 7th Minesweeper Flotilla. No other special reports have been received from the areas of Commanding Admiral, Defenses West or Naval Command North.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Radio Intelligence air activity over the North Sea was normal. Twenty-three planes were detected. Our air reconnaissance reported at 0940 3 merchantmen and 3 guard boats on course 350° north of Cape Gorodetzki and, at 1035, a convoy of 3 merchantmen with 3 escort vessels, 2 destroyers, and 1 plane on course 300° in AC 8920 (north of Murmansk). According to a report from submarine U "601" 1 guard boat was observed standing off and on in AT 7261 (north-west coast of Novaya Zemlya).

At 1645, air reconnaissance sighted 3 PT boats and 1 minesweeper at high speed on an easterly course about 50 miles east of the Shetlands. The Russians have officially denied the German report of a landing attempt near Vardoe in northern Norway on 19 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

At 1400, about 50 U.S. planes attacked the dockyards and the naval depot at Trondheim. Almost all of these unprotected buildings and dockyard stores as well as the workshops were more or less affected or destroyed. The depot's permanent stores were completely burned out and the communications store was destroyed by direct hit.

Submarine U "622" was sunk without casualties; the submarine dock-yard was heavily damaged. The ship building and engine building sections were put completely out of action as well as part of the torpedo and artillery sections. Submarine U "354" left hurriedly for Narvik. No detailed reports have yet been received on destroyer Z "28".

Another stronger enemy bomber formation attacked war-industry installations in the area Kristiansand South. The saltpeter works and piers at Herosa were severely damaged.

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Also during the night of 23 Jul. and during the early morning, the enemy developed strong air activity in the Bergen and Stadlandet area. At 0846, one of our southbound convoys was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs in that area.

The intensification of the enemy air offensive in the Norwegian area may - amongst other things - serve as a preparation for a future Allied landing.

Thirty ships were escorted to the north and 28 ships to the south. Twelve ships are held up in the Arctic Coast area due to lack of escort. For the preliminary report from mine clearance ship KAISER on the performance of the mine operation and a previous enemy air attack, see teletype 1215.

Naval Staff has informed Group North Fleet, Commanding Admiral Cruisers, Admiral, Northern Waters and Commander, Submarines Norway of observations concerning the activity of Russian torpedo recovery vessels in the waters of Novaya Zemlya. For copy of teletype 1/Skl. I op 22153/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C, Vol. II a.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

No reports have come in.

V. Submarine Warfare:

U "197" torpedoed a big tanker in KQ 4770.

U "183", "188", and "168" have been supplied by U "155".

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has submitted the operational order "Panama Canal" for submarine U "214". It calls for no comment by Naval Staff, Operations Division.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 110 planes in operation in the West area and 10 planes in the Mediterranean.

During the day, fighter-bombers and fighters attacked traffic installations in the occupied Western territories with gunfire and bombs.

Long-range reconnaissance planes were observed in the Bielefeld

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and Bremen areas as well as in Denmark. During the night of 24 Jul., 51 of our bombers were sent out to mine the Humber. The enemy made a heavy attack on Hamburg with very strong forces. Very considerable damage was done. The dockyards were also strongly affected. Only a small number of planes -- 13 in all -- were shot down.

Mediterranean Theater:

Photographic reconnaissance was made of Bougie, Jijelli and Philippeville. In the forenoon, strong enemy forces attacked Bologna where an ammunition train in the station was hit. Furthermore, all the guns of a 12.8 cm railway battery were destroyed and great damage was done to the town. In the night of 24 Jul., Leghorn was attacked by 60-80 planes which returned to England via France.

Eastern Front:

The strong enemy air activity in the area of 5th Air Force has already been reported under Situation in Norway, Northern Waters. In spite of effective hits observed, no enemy planes were shot down by our fighters.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

In West Sicily, strong enemy forces advanced up to the coast northwest of Palermo on 23 Jul. Trapani was occupied by the enemy. In front of the bridgehead, the enemy's main thrust has shifted towards the right wing of our central front. A thrust by a German group towards Palermo was stopped east of Termini by flanking artillery fire from land and sea and had to be given up.

Situation at Sea:

During the night of 22 Jul., the coastal road Termini - Cape Cefalu was bombarded from the sea. Enemy landing traffic continued to be concentrated on the southern coast of the Island. At 0245, 7 ships were sighted sailing north, 35 miles southwest of Trapani. Possible ports of destination are Trapani or Palermo. At 0250, air reconnaissance reported 7 more ships 70 miles east of Cape Passero and, at

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O407, a destroyer sailing northeast in the southern exit of the Messina Strait. At 1020, an enemy submarine was located 14 miles west of Cape Milazzo.

No reports of successes by our own or the Italian submarines have been received.

PT boats S "60" and "154" moved from Salerno to Taranto. The extensive destruction of Italian traffic installations in Calabria has delayed the torpedo transport still further. The PT boats will be unable to operate until the night of 26 Jul. at the earliest.

For the night of 24 Jul., fast escort vessel SG "14" is to operate with 4 motor minesweepers in the southern exit of the Straits of Messina.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Theatre:

Together with the convoy which left Gibraltar on the evening of 23 Jul., a landing craft transport vessel of the DEWDHAL-type also left port. On the evening of 24 Jul. 2 transports and 2 destroyers entered the harbor from the Mediterranean. In the forenoon, a convoy of 6 transports with 1 DIDO-class cruiser and 1 destroyer, as well as 6 escort boats left the harbor for the west. According to Intelligence reports, 2 of the transports were carrying prisoners from Sicily as well as soldiers on leave and civilians from Gibraltar. All the other ships were empty.

No shipping traffic was observed in the Western Mediterranean, and there were no enemy forces in the sea areas between Sardinia, Sicily and Cape Bon during the forenoon.

The reconnaissance photographs of Bougie, Jijelli and Philippeville furnished little new information. A number of landing vessels were seen at Bougie and Jijelli. Sighting reconnaissance of Bone and Bizerte likewise produced no particular results. No indications were obtained as to the location of naval forces.

According to an Intelligence report from an agent of untested reliability, French naval officers are of the opinion that the main offensive planned against Sardinia and Corsica has been only temporarily delayed by the unexpectedly strong resistance in Sicily. The operational purpose of capturing the islands, would be to reach northern Italy and southern France

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from the sea, which is regarded as a less dangerous route than via Sicily - southern Italy. In addition, the northern islands are expected to offer air bases for operations against the industrial area of northern Italy and against southern France and for the purpose of paralyzing the sea and railway traffic between northern and southern Italy. It is also hoped that occupation of the islands will have political influence in Spain. The operation is expected to take place at the end of the month.

According to another Intelligence Report, 15 transports with Moroccan troops in U.S. uniforms are to leave Casablanca for the Mediterranean on the night of 26 Jul.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Theater, Sea Transport Situation:

The Italian steamer SANTA LUCIA (8,000 BRT) was sunk by a torpedo plane 35 miles west of Naples at 1010. One Italian corvette was sunk by enemy planes at 1400 in the Straits of Messina and a second was damaged. Furthermore, one torpedo boat was heavily damaged and another suffered slight damage.

Two Italian torpedo boats, 1 corvette, 2 motor minesweepers and 1 submarine chaser were on escort duty. One motorboat and 1 steamer are en route from Sicily to Naples. One steamer was escorted along the western coast of Italy. No reports concerning Corsica - Sardinia traffic have been received.

German Naval Command, Italy has forwarded the battle-report on the attack made on the convoy of the steamer COLLEVILLE and ADERNO on 23 Jul. For copy see teletype 2030.

In Weekly Report, 15 - 21 Jul., German Naval Command, Italy states that the enemy continues to patrol the whole of the Tyrrhenian Sea so that nearly every German convoy is detected and attacked. The only means by which the convoys can avoid attack is by dividing the route into short subsections. Convoys have been ordered to put in to the nearest port as soon as the enemy is sighted. The supply of Sardinia and Corsica has been affected by the sinkings of the past week. In Sicily only Milazzo can now be used by supply steamers. Evacuation of the Palermo area by naval landing craft, is unfeasible due to the development of the land situation. Our large-ship space is heavily strained by sinkings. Ships over, 5,000 BRT can no longer be used. All supplies are being carried by small vessels. Traffic difficulties are delaying supply shipments to such an extent that nearly 2,000 tons of shipping had to await loading for several days. Fast escort vessel SG "14" has been withdrawn from escort duties for combat operations in

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the Messina Strait. Italian minelayers have laid more barrages off Trapani. Motor minesweepers have been used only once so far for defense of the Messina Strait.

The mine-ships POMMERN and BRANDENBURG left Toulon at 2000 with the Commander, 3rd Escort Flotilla, for minelaying operations "Hans I a" up to "Dora".

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Unescorted small-ship traffic in the area of Naval Shore Command, Salonika was suspended on 23 Jul. because of a submarine sighting. The German sea-plane in which Naval Shore Commandant, Attica lost his life near Corfu, was shot down by ships' guns. Further details are still awaited.

On 8 Jul., Group South reported on anti-submarine defense measures in the Aegean area which are greatly hampered by the lack of unified command. Operationally, the Aegean and the southern Peloponnese belong to three different command areas. In addition, the means of defense are inadequate. This increases the importance of obtaining a clear picture of the enemy's submarine situation in order that our defense forces may be used at the right place and at the right moment. The problem can only be solved by having unified command throughout the Aegean. The group therefore requests that the submarine-reporting network be reorganized and supplemented to include all vessels at sea and all observation posts on land as well as the Air Force. The prerequisites are a well organized and uniform observation service, and a closely centralized reporting network to be used exclusively for anti-submarine defense if possible. It is desirable to establish, at the office of Commanding Admiral, Aegean, a central anti-submarine defense authority with German and Italian personnel and with a special reporting network, so that the overall anti-submarine campaign of Commanding Admiral, Aegean may be organized in accordance with convoy movements. Commanding Admiral, Aegean has been instructed to get into early touch with the neighboring Italian areas with a view to effecting this.

Naval Staff has ordered Chief, Naval Communications Division that the required reporting network be set up at once and the advisability examined of sending a fully-empowered officer from Chief, Naval Communication Division immediately to the Aegean area in order to carry out and assist in the task.



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German Naval Command, Italy was ordered by Naval Staff on 18 Jul., with copy to Group South, Commanding Admiral, Aegean to forward the following letter to the Italian Admiralty:

"The increased numbers of enemy submarines and the anticipated further aggravation of the submarine situation in the Aegean call for energetic steps to improve anti-submarine defenses in that area. It must, for example, be avoided that, in spite of enemy submarines having been repeatedly observed off Leros in the Dodecanese, an important convoy of steamers and tankers is dispatched without anti-submarine escort upon orders from Rhodes and is successfully attacked by an enemy submarine; although, two hours later, a convoy of naval landing craft, with two German submarine-chasers is taking the same route and a third German submarine-chaser is present with a convoy in the same area and at the same time.

In the opinion of Naval Staff, the defects in the anti-submarine defense to date have been:

1. Lack of unified command in submarine hunting throughout the Aegean (including the Italian area).
2. Differences in operational views and organization.
3. Failure to report quickly on enemy submarines and anti-submarine defense measures ordered or planned by the Italian Naval Shore Commandant.
4. Absence of a unified and well-organized special submarine reporting network covering the entire Aegean area for which land observation posts on the islands should be included or set up and comprising all naval and air forces at sea.

In the opinion of Naval Staff, in order that the best possible use may be made of the numerically insufficient anti-submarine forces, it is desirable to set up a central anti-submarine defense command at the office of the Commanding Admiral, Aegean, with German and Italian personnel and with a special anti-submarine defense reporting network and that Commanding Admiral, Aegean should assume control of the whole anti-submarine campaign in the Aegean, including the Italian area, for coordination with the movements of convoys. To this end the central command will have to be authorized to control convoys also in the Italian areas of command and to call on all naval forces available throughout the Aegean area, including the Dodecanese and the southern Peloponnese, but in both cases

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only for purposes of anti-submarine defense.

Naval Staff would appreciate a statement of views on this suggestion and, in case of approval, corresponding directives to the Italian authorities in the Aegean.

Black Sea:

In an enemy air attack on Yalta at noon on 22 Jul. a total of 70 bombs were dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters. No important damage was sustained.

A supplementary report states that the harbor area of Taganrog was shelled from the direction of Morskaya on the evening of 21 Jul. No damage was caused.

Group South reports that execution of the special operation against the landing bridgehead Myshako by 6 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla was hindered by the weather conditions. At 2222, twelve torpedoes were fired against landing places B and C as ordered. At 2300, the Army opened a surprise bombardment of the torpedoed landing places. Air Force participation as arranged was cancelled because of the weather. Simultaneous with the torpedo salvo, the landing stages were shelled by 4 cm. and 2 cm. artillery. After leaving the scene, the Flotilla was fired on from the coast by artillery of 7.5 cm. and heavier calibres.

The Operations by 11th PT Boat Flotilla were cancelled due to the bad weather.

The bombardment of the enemy front at Mius by 3 naval artillery lighters and 1 motor minesweeper was postponed for 24 hours also because of the weather. Nor was the patrol line Temrjuk taken up, during the night of 24 Jul.

The tug HOEFLEIN, in the 53rd Kerch-Temrjuk -transport, sank on her way back 16 miles northwest of Temrjuk after hitting a mine. Eleven men are missing. The route has been closed

At 0855, the convoy PRODOMOS en route from Sevastopol to Constantza was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine 35 miles east-southeast of Sulina. Ship "19" has been sent out to hunt the submarine. Otherwise, the supply and escort traffic went according to plan.

The Supplies carried by the Navy from 11-23 Jul. amounted to 32,998 tons from a total of 51,544 tons.

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VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to Reuter, the loss of the U.S. submarine TRITON in the Southwest Pacific has been officially announced in Washington.

A heavy enemy bombing attack was made on Soerabaya. Reuter reports that the Americans who landed at Nassau Bay in New Guinea have advanced up to the coast of Tampu Bay.

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Items of Political Importance:

In Italy, the internal political situation has suddenly taken an unexpected and serious turn. Mussolini has been induced to surrender his executive powers to the King who has set up a provisional military government under Marshal Badoglio. From the proclamations issued by the King and Badoglio, it is gathered that the war is to continue and that Italy will stand by her pledges. Time will show how far this promise will be kept. It remains to be seen if Badoglio's Government is able to resist the strong internal and external pressure which will be brought to bear and to keep its word. If not, the development of the situation will demand decisive steps on our part. As developments are still uncertain and the situation is wide open, it is indispensable, as a precaution, to prepare for all eventualities.

Chief, Naval Staff has decided to go to Fuehrer Headquarters early on the morning of 26 Jul. together with Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division and Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

Special Items:

I. An order from High Command, Navy, Personnel Division of 19 Jul., regulates the transfer of officers to the submarine arm as from 1 Jan. 1944. For copy of the order as per 1/Skl 20622/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

II. The directive on the use of sea-mines with new firing devices issued by Chief, Armed Forces High Command on 14 Jul. runs as follows:

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1. In accordance with the suggestion of Commander in Chief, Navy, the Fuehrer has decided that the mines with the new firing devices are to be put into sudden, massed operation by the Navy and Air Force simultaneously at the end of Aug. 1943, in the convoy routes around the British Isles. In using them, everything must be done to prevent their falling into the hand of the enemy.

2. Details of the minelaying operations will be arranged by direct agreement between the Navy and Air Force and plans will be reported before the start of operations.

This decision does not comprise any proposal for adequate allotment of forces to the Air Force.

In order to establish the Navy's possibilities and plans for the purpose of making direct arrangements with the Air Force as ordered, Naval Staff, Operations Division compiled a comprehensive statement which has been forwarded to Group West, and Commander PT Boats for detailed comment and to Bureau of Naval Armament, Underwater Obstacles Branch, as a guide for material preparations. For copy of the statement as per 2/Skl I E 2056/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. VI.

Situation on 25 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, Commanding Admiral, 3rd Fleet issued warning to merchantmen on 23 Jul. against submarines sighted on 22 Jul. in 15°27' South 16820 East.

According to Naval Intelligence Division, 17 ships, most of them Liberty freighters, were identified during one month en route from the U.S. via Australia to India - Suez - Persian Gulf. During the same period, 13 tankers traveling between the Persian Gulf and Australia, and 16 freighters on the route Suez - India - Australia were reported.

According to an Intelligence report from Spain, steamers at 0900 on 23 Jul. sighted 4 U.S. destroyers on an easterly course in 34°09' North 08°17' West and, at 1300, 2 French destroyers on patrol service in 33°37' North 08°17' West.

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2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships. Information on the enemy situation has been forwarded by radiogram 1442.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-two planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. According to locations, one British ship was in BF 6590 at 1302 and one in BF 145° at 1844. At 1032, our air reconnaissance observed 5 destroyers on course 170° in BF 7221.

Group West comments that this again confirms that BF 70 is now patrolled by the enemy and that the location at 1302 suggests further activity in BE 60.

According to radio intelligence a British patrol boat reported to Plymouth at 0920 that it had brought in the French fishing vessel MX 2495 with seven men from Morlaix.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/A-mines and three ELM/J-mines were cleared at St. Nazaire and one ELM/J-mine off the Gironde. On 24 Jul. a French fishing boat struck a mine off La Pallice and sank. On 25 Jul., mine exploding vessel "136" was hit by a ground mine off the Gironde.

For the brief report of Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla on the submarine escort mission of 22-24 Jul. see teletype 0135. On 22 and 23 Jul. submerged submarines were located and attacked with depth charges in BF 9239 and BF 4979 respectively. No results were observed. Commander Submarines West confirms that in both cases they were enemy submarines.

PT boats S "124" and S "134" moved from Peter Port to La Pallice,

Group West has misgivings about assigning destroyers for submarine escort on 27 Jul. (for details see in teletype 1425) and plans to use torpedo boats. Chief, Naval Staff has ruled accordingly.

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Channel Coast:

At 0640, the patrol position off Quistreham was attacked by low-flying planes. Harbor defense vessels HS (Tr.N. - HS fl. 64 apparently typist's mistake) 64 and 66 were damaged and towed in. Three killed and ten wounded.

Twelve survivors of PT boat S "77" reached our coast near Dunkirk in a rubber boat. They reported that S "77" was blown up by her crew. The commander and 10 men are missing, including 4 who were probably picked by MTB. The Admiralty has confirmed that a number of survivors were rescued. Secret material was secured.

No other important events were reported.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Eight ELM/J-mines were cleared on the routes along the Frisian Islands.

Elbe-Hook convoy "452" was engaged by 9 enemy motor gun boats and 6 PT boats from 0102 till 0347. One PT boat was sunk and several others were damaged. Patrol boat VP "801" was sunk. The commandant was among the 3 killed and eight missing. One man was killed on minesweeper M "254" and 8 including the commandant, were seriously wounded.

Group Ymuiden of the 34th Minesweeper Flotilla had two engagements with enemy PT boats at 0119 and 0356 off Nordwyk. In each case, 3 torpedos were evaded. One enemy PT boat was sunk. The same group, together with patrol boats VP "1313" and "1310", had another engagement with enemy PT boats southwest of Ymuiden at 0243. This time 2 enemy PT boats were set on fire by gunfire without loss on our side. Convoy "452" reached Hook undamaged.

During the night of 24 Jul. strong enemy air forces flew over the Heligoland Bight towards Hamburg, Luebeck and Kiel. Observation was strongly disturbed and for the most part was not possible except on the coast. Control of anti-aircraft and night-fighter operations was likewise greatly hampered by radio jamming. The disturbance was found to be due to paper strips with metal foil glued onto them which form a location cloud that remains in the air for a long time and seriously upsets radar devices, particularly on the first appearance.

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We developed this same procedure a long time ago. The best defense is training of radar personnel as, with some experience, a distinction can be made between stationary and moving targets. In the afternoon, the Fokker works at Amsterdam were attacked by 15 enemy planes. From 1427 onward, US bomber formations in three groups were reported coming in over the Heligoland Bight. After a battle with our fighters 100 kilometers northwest of Heligoland, the enemy formed into a new grouping. Two groups flew via Cuxhaven to Hamburg and two other groups headed for the Baltic Sea.

Norway, Northern Waters:

Radio Intelligence detected 13 planes over the North Sea. No planes were observed operating in the area of the Iceland Squadrons.

At 0132, our air reconnaissance reported 3 merchantmen with 1 destroyer and 1 guard ship 90 miles west of Kolguyev on course 90° and, at 1545, 3 merchantmen with 4 guard ships, also on a northerly course, west of Kanin Noss, as well as 4 merchantmen with 1 destroyer on course 30°, close east of Kolguyev at 1720. Strong convoy traffic was also observed along the Kola coast on 24 Jul.

The submarine U 625 sighted a flying boat in AT 7277 (west of Belushiya Bay).

At 1455 and at 1517 a submarine was sighted on the surface off the Norwegian west coast, 20 miles west of Floroey; however, this was not confirmed by our air reconnaissance.

Own Situation:

Naval Command Norway has reported further details on the damage to Trondheim dockyards. The following vessels were sunk: 4 tugs, 1 oil-barge, 1 lifting-lighter with leak-box, and the torpedo ship SCHICKSEE. In attacks on Torsgrunn, the steamer IRENE (761 BRT) and 1 Swedish steamer (660 BRT) were sunk.

During the night of 25 Jul., 26 planes attacked one of our convoys near Ekkeroy. Ships' anti-aircraft guns brought down 7 enemy planes. As 5th Air Force has reported an attack on the same convoy during the same night by 35 enemy planes of which 17 were shot down by fighters, this can be regarded as a big defensive success.

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The PT boats reported on 21 Jul. on an easterly course, 150 miles west of Holmengrae, were bombed by a Ju 88 plane at 2155 of the same day. The boats sheered off to the west. In view of the heavy air commitment in Norway, this was possibly a sea-rescue formation. In addition, at 1435, on 24 Jul. the steamer ALK was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes off Arendal.

Fifty-two ships were escorted to the north and 31 ships to the south. Twelve ships were held up due to lack of escort.

The submarine base ship has moved from Narvik to Skjoinenfjord. Admiral Northern Waters and Commander, Submarines, Norway moved with the GRILLE and METEOR to Ankenes.

Destroyer Z "29" reports damage to boilers Nos. "3" and "2" and has been ordered to find out at Trondheim whether they can be repaired at the arsenal or by a repair ship.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Activity in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and in Kronstadt Bay was generally unchanged.

2. Own Situation:

One ELM/J mine was cleared west of Middelgrand. Otherwise there is nothing particular to report on the naval situation in the Baltic Sea.

The enemy air formations which had come in from the North Sea turned back in the vicinity of Darsser Ort returning along the Baltic coast. Sixty planes from the southeast attacked Kiel from an altitude of about 8000 meters. One of the formations that came in over the Elbe estuary also flew into attack Kiel. Bombs fell mainly on the eastern shore, causing damage chiefly in the Howaldt dockyards and the Naval Arsenal. For details, see teletype 2312. Further reports are awaited.

V. Submarine Warfare:

U "199" sank a modern passenger freighter of 1,000 tons on a northwesterly course in GB 4191.

No other reports of successes have been received.



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VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day, strong enemy formations flew into the Baltic and North Sea areas, as well as into the Netherlands, Belgium and Northern France. Besides the attack on the Fokker works at Amsterdam, the airfield at Voensdrecht was attacked. The raids on Kiel and Hamburg have already been reported. According to reports so far received, altogether 31 enemy planes were shot down by fighters and 6 by anti-aircraft artillery. During the night of 25 Jul., another very heavy attack with strong forces was made on Essen. Seven planes were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery and 14 by night fighters. For damage, see Daily Situation.

Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 24 Jul., 99 of our bombers raided the harbor of Syracuse. Hits were made on 17 enemy ships including 1 freighter of 5,000 BRT sunk by an aerial torpedo and 2 freighters for a total of 15,000 BRT sunk by bombs.

Between 17 and 24 Jul., the Italian Air Force sank a total of 4 steamers for 38,000 BRT, and heavily damaged 7 ships for 51,000 BRT and one landing boat while 8 other steamers for 45,000 BRT and one tanker were damaged.

According to photographic reconnaissance, there were 548 enemy planes, including more than 500 single-engined aircraft, in Sicily on 21 and 22 Jul.

Fifty enemy fighters attacked returning German transport planes near Cape Milazzo. Ten Ju 52 planes fell victims to this attack.

It has not yet been established whether the planes were empty or occupied.

Eastern Front:

For the success of our defenses near Vardoe, see Own Situation, Northern Waters.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

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Situation on Land:

The enemy is advancing slowly on the coastal road through Cefalu to the east. Our own rear positions begin 22 kilometers east of Cefalu on the coast. On our left flank, the enemy temporarily withdrew around midday under the pressure of our artillery fire.

Situation at Sea:

At 2345 on 24 Jul., enemy agents were apparently landed by light forces near Melito on the southern coast of Italy. Four boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla, enroute from Vibo Valentia to Taranto temporarily put back to their port of departure on the first news of an alleged enemy landing near Melito. They proceeded to Taranto at 1330. In the night of 23 Jul., an enemy PT boat in the Straits of Messina was set on fire by our anti-aircraft guns. During the night of 24 Jul., 4 motor minesweepers were out in the southern exit of the Straits of Messina but made no contact with the enemy. Fast escort vessel SG "14" did not participate in the operation. Motor minesweepers R "38", "186" and "188" were sent out from Messina to search for the 10 Ju 52 planes which had been shot down. During this mission, motor minesweeper R "186" was sunk at 1530 by fighter-bomber attack. The other boats were slightly damaged. Two enemy planes were shot down. The search for the planes was unsuccessful.

In a heavy air attack on Messina at noon on 24 Jul., the Italian torpedo boat PARTENOPE and the corvette CICOGNA were heavily damaged and had to be beached. No particular damage was caused by an air attack on Leghorn on the night of 24 Jul. 10th Landing Flotilla shot down 1 enemy plane in the Straits of Messina.

On 23 Jul., 4 of our naval landing craft, were damaged by an enemy air attack near Cape Stefano, 50 miles east of Palermo. All boats had to be blown up as salvage was impossible. Another naval landing craft is trying to reach Naples.

In regard to the enemy situation, our air reconnaissance observed 50 ships including 8 large vessels, the others probably landing craft, on an easterly course 20 miles east of Palermo at 1850. The number of ships in the Sicilian harbors was almost unchanged.

German Naval Command, Italy has compiled a list of all enemy

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ships detected by photographic and other reconnaissance on 23 Jul., on the eastern and southern coasts of Sicily. This shows on the east coast, 2 heavy cruisers, 14 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, 2 monitors, 2 gunboats, 8 corvettes, 1 mine-sweeper; 2 boom defense vessels, 10 PT boats, 18 auxiliary vessels, 1 LSI, 4 LST, 1 LCF, 73 LCT, 20 LCI, 13 LCM, 13 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 hospital ship and 1 special ship. On the South coast there were 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 2 PT boats, 4 motor gun boats, 4 small auxiliary vessels, 17 LST, 8 LCT, 20 LCM, and 13 freighters.

In the sea area of Malta on the same day, there were 4 battle ships, 2 aircraft carriers, 4 light cruisers, 20 destroyers, 6 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 net layer, 17 PT boats, 20 motor gunboats, 8 gun boats, 6 submarines, 1 LSI, 11 LST, 1 LCF, 15 LCT, 26 LCI, 2 LCM and 8 passenger ships, 33 freighters, and 3 tankers, altogether totalling about 280,000 BRT of merchant ship tonnage.

In Bizerte, 50 large and medium freighters were observed.

After the experience of Syracuse and Augusta, Naval Staff regards it as out of the question for the defense of sea ports and bases, and especially of those which affect the German war at sea and German supplies, to be left solely in Italian hands. Chief, Naval Staff believes that at the most important places in southern Italy German defense facilities must be incorporated in the Italian coastal defenses and that, in certain cases, the Italian installations should be taken over by Italian personnel. Naval Staff has advised German Naval Command, Italy of this view, with copy to Commanding Admiral, South, and has asked for a statement of opinion and for a report on possible further requirements.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

In the evening of 24 Jul., 7 destroyers entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic. Between midnight of 24 Jul. and 1030 on 25 Jul., 2 landing boats, 2 minesweepers, 5 guard boats, 2 tugs, 1 corvette and 1 cable-layer entered the port from the Mediterranean.

No ship movements were observed in the Western Mediterranean. The first photographic reconnaissance made for some time, of Algiers, did not reveal any great number of ships. Nor was there anything surprising in the number of ships at Bougie, Jijelli, Philippeville and Bone. In Bizerta there were about

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50 large and medium freighters. According to an Intelligence report, 7 damaged ships put in to Algiers and several others arrived at Bizerta and Tunis. Submarines were reported on the afternoon of 24 Jul., east of Maddalena and northeast of Porto Vecchio and, on 25 Jul., south of Cape Vaticano, southwest of Maddalena and west of Elba.

No sighting reports were received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

An Intelligence report gives Crete as well as Sardinia and Corsica as an objective of the next operations. An important convoy carrying Canadian and colored troops was said to be ready to leave from Western Morocco for the Mediterranean. It was also stated that the Duke of Windsor as well as French, British and American Generals arrived at Gibraltar by air on 20 Jul. and continued their flight towards the Mediterranean on 21 Jul.

3. Cwn Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean,  
Naval Transport Situation:

It is additionally reported as of 13 Jul., that 2 tank-barges were beached near Mehehrolo due to an enemy air attack. Three corvettes, fast escort vessel SG "10" and 1 motor minesweeper were engaged in the escort service. One steamer from Bastia entered Leghorn. No reports have been received on the Sardinia traffic. In the Sicilian traffic, the steamer VIMINALE (8,756 BRT), in tow, and 2 other steamers left Messina for Naples on the evening of 24 Jul. At 0300 on 25 Jul., the VIMINALE was sunk by an enemy submarine, 12 miles south of Cape Vaticano. The two other steamers continued their voyage. The steamer TIVOLI and the motor-ship ALFIERI did not leave Milazzo. The tanker ANCONA, which had put out from Leghorn to Naples turned back because of the enemy situation.

POMMERN and BRANDENBURG entered Port Vendres after completing the mine operations Hans I A up to D. Thus all the mine operations so far scheduled off the southern coast of France have been carried out.

4. Area of Naval Group South:

Aegean:

At 2000 on 24 Jul. an enemy submarine was reported

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50 miles southeast of Piraeus.

At 2330 on 24 Jul., the troop convoy RE ALLESSANDRO received submarine alarm 60 miles west of Rhodes due to a location. Depth charges dropped by an escorting torpedo boat were ineffective. The convoy entered Rhodes at 0550. At noon of 24 Jul., enemy planes attacked the airfields at Kalamata and Messini. At 0215 on 25 Jul., two aerial torpedoes were fired unsuccessfully against the Italian steamer BUNCINTORO, 40 miles west-northwest of Rhodes.

The small shipping traffic in the Salonika area has been resumed. Four hundred vessels have so far been checked in the course of control operations in the sea area between the north coast of Evvoia and the mainland.

Naval Staff has confidentially informed Naval Group, South that Armed Forces High Command has expressly sanctioned continuation of the Navy's efforts to gain a foothold, by methods of cooperation, in the area of Italian Naval Command, Morea, while awaiting a definite settlement of the command problem in the southeast area. Efforts to extend the command functions will be continued.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, a submarine was 30 miles south of Sevastopol during the night of 24 Jul. and 96 miles southwest of Sevastopol on the morning of 25 Jul. During the night of 23 Jul., enemy planes were observed entering the area of the Danube estuary and laying mines.

Own Situation:

Our naval forces were not sent out on offensive operations during the night of 24 Jul. because of the bad weather. In the night of 25 Jul. the bombardment the enemy front on the Mius will be repeated by naval artillery lighters MAL "1"- "3" and by motor minesweeper R "56". Submarine U "19" left Constantza for operations. Submarine U "20" is due in on 26 Jul. The Italian midget submarines CB "1" and "2" are en route from Sulina to Sevastopol. One of the two escort submarine chasers that ran aground has been refloated without damage. The tanker OSSAG convoy has arrived at Constantza. Otherwise, escort, transport and ferry traffic was carried out as scheduled and without any particular incidents.

VIII. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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The new Situation in Italy:

Naval Attaché, Rome has reported details of the circumstances of Mussolini's resignation on 25 Jul. The Naval Attaché has had a conversation with Admiral Riccardi, who anticipates a change in the command of the Navy by separation of the positions of Under Secretary of State and Chief, Naval Staff which had so far been combined in the person of Admiral Riccardi. German Naval Command, Italy has confirmed to the Naval Attaché that the new government has ordered the Italian Naval Staff to continue their war functions on the same basis of close cooperation with German Naval Command as heretofore. For copy of the Naval Attaché's report as per l/Skl 20961/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Naval Liaison Officer attached to Italian Commander, Submarines Bordeaux, who is at present in Rome, reported at 1125:

"The expected elimination of the Duce and the Party was accomplished amid violent demonstrations against the former government. Esteem for the Armed Forces is still so high that Grossi had to be rescued from an enthusiastic crowd by an emergency squad. Isolated outbursts against Germany were shouted down. However, it is strongly anticipated that this is a transitional attitude in the hope of obtaining favorable peace terms.

A list of the new cabinet is to appear at noon today."

A further report at 1900 states:

"The trend springing from the overthrow of the government is quickly becoming pronouncedly anti-German. The name of Admiral de Courten, former Naval Attaché, Berlin, is mentioned as probable Minister for the Navy."

Both reports have been forwarded to Fuehrer Headquarters for Chief, Naval Staff.

It is still, in general, too soon to conjecture as to what actual effects the events of 25 Jul. 1943 will have on the future course of the war. The first authoritative enemy statement available, made by Cordell Hull, calls, as before for unconditional surrender. It remains to be seen in what form Churchill, who has announced that he will speak, will bring pressure on the new government in Rome. Nor can calculations be made of the difficulties of internal politics that will ensue when the first "intoxication of liberation"

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has worn off.

In view of the new situation, Armed Forces High Command issued the following directive to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South at 0310:

"Reports on the political changes in Italy necessitate immediate action as follows:

1. Cancellation of further troop transfers to Sicily.
  2. Preparations for the evacuation of German troops from the islands of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, if necessary, abandoning all heavy equipment which, in such case, would have to be destroyed.
  3. Concentration of 16th and 26th Tank Divisions, including the remainder of 29th Armored Division in their quartering areas and cancellation of all movements to the south.
  4. Alerting of 3rd Armored Division which will be reinforced by the parts of 26th Tank Division unloaded in the vicinity. The remaining parts of 26th Tank Division which are still en route will be unloaded in the area of 3rd Armored Division and will be attached thereto.
  5. Unobstrusive call-up of emergency units and preparation for occupation of important traffic junctions.
  6. Preparations for taking over all the air defense in the Italian area and for taking back as much German supplied anti-aircraft equipment as possible.
  7. Correspondive preparatory measures by 2nd Air Force and intensified reconnaissance in the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas.
- The air transport space of 11th Air Corps now in Italy is to be transferred as fast as possible to 11th Air Corps in Southern France. Effective immediately, orders for the 2nd Air Force will be issued only through Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.
8. Protection of supply-bases in northern Italy.
  9. Alerting, assembly and protection of all German service establishments in Rome.

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10. Commanding General, Armed Forces South, will approach the King of Italy and Badoglio as soon as possible in order to clarify the position as to further cooperation.

11. No orders are to be transmitted by telephone, even in code. Orders will be delivered only by couriers, whose written instructions will be coded or by cyphered teleprint and coded radiogram."

For teletype as per 1/Skl 2096/43 Gkdos. Chef. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

Furthermore, all service orders referring to events in Italy are to be transmitted through Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.

At 1850, from Fuehrer Headquarters, Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division forwarded the following directive from Chief, Naval Staff:

I. 1. The Fuehrer plans to defend Italy.

2. Since the naval forces scheduled to be called up have not yet crossed the frontier, they will be provisionally concentrated in the Toulon area in order to use them for occupying Toulon and the Riviera coast.

3. Vessels becoming ready for action in the Marseille-Toulon area will be held there from now on.

II. 1. The possibility of German occupation of harbors on Balkan west coast including the Adriatic, must be anticipated. It is planned to make available personnel from the Channel coast area. The relative decision by Commander in Chief, Navy will follow.

2. Naval Group South and Commanding Admiral, Aegæan are to be informed and asked to report their requirements. Preparations are to be made, for the time being, without any contact with the Italians.

The necessary measures have been ordered by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilisation Branch. For Copy of the relative orders Skl Qu A II 2104 and 2106/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary Part C X, and of Skl Qu A II 2109.43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, of Staff, Naval Staff:



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I. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, Naval Ordnance Division requested instructions in regard to armament and equipment deliveries to Italy. In accordance with the opinion of Armed Forces High Command, all steps calculated to increase the unrest in Italy must be avoided. Nothing should be done precipitately. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff therefore agreed that current supplies should not be discontinued, especially since traffic congestion makes actual delivery practically impossible during the present unsettled and critical situation. For the rest, special cases must be handled according to circumstances.

II. In accordance with a directive from Armed Forces High Command, Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Communications Division was instructed to issue an order on communications traffic with Italy.

III. The dispute between the Navy and the Air Force concerning the 2 cm. anti-aircraft ammunition is still unsettled. Whereas the Navy refused the offer to take over one million rounds in two installments of 500,000 each in Jul. and Aug. Chief, Air Force General Staff has now reduced his offer still further stating that the one million rounds could be delivered in four installments up to Oct. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that a personal teleprint be sent to Chief, Air Force General Staff referring to Commander in Chief, Navy's conference with the Fuehrer on this matter of ammunition.

Special Items:

I. A shipment of 300 of the 1254 UMB-mines allotted to German Naval Command Italy was dispatched by sea on 18 Jul. The present whereabouts of the shipment cannot be established. Traffic through the Brenner is at present so congested that it will be impossible to forward the remaining 954 mines within the foreseeable future. Naval Staff has therefore decided - in view of the present mine shortage - to ship 408 mines to Toulon and send the remaining 546 mines to Group South for Admiral Aogean. The same will be done with the 300 mines already dispatched if they have not yet crossed the Brenner frontier or can still be directed to another destination. Corresponding orders have been issued to Group West, Group South, German Naval Command Italy and Bureau of Naval Armament, Underwater Obstacles Branch.

II. In regard to the directive of Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas concerning the transfer of the bulk of the Greek supply transport to the Black Sea - Dardanelles traffic, the Mediterranean Representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping,

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has stated that the agreement with the Reich Commissioner (for Maritime Shipping) mentioned in the said directive was based on a misunderstanding. The Mediterranean Representative contends that, under present war conditions, the traffic areas Adriatic to the Aegean, Inner Aegean, and Varna/Burgas to Aegean must each be handled independently as the danger of being cut off by disturbances on the Corinth Canal or the Dardanelles may become acute any time. The Mediterranean Representative therefore feels it his duty to see that, in each shipping area, the ships are distributed in such a way as to be able to carry on their tasks even if they are cut off. The Mediterranean Representative therefore demands that 4 more ships for 9,000 BRT be transferred from the Inner Aegean routes to the Adriatic - Aegean route. For copy as per teletype 1/Skl 20871/43 Gkdos see War Diary Part C Vol. XI.

Referring to this suggestion of the Mediterranean Representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Naval Staff advised Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas and Operations Division as well as Quartermaster Division that, on the basis of the current assessment of the situation, a concentration of available shipping space for the anticipated tasks in the Aegean and in the Black Sea seems to be the only possible solution. For copy of the teletype 1/Skl 20959/43 Gkdos. see in War Diary Part C, Vol XI.

III. The Foreign Office has forwarded a telegram from the German Legation at Lisbon dated 24 Jul., stating that the U.S. Military Attaché at Lisbon has made mention of a very important landing operation which is to be achieved at all costs, and will take place within the next few weeks against France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. On the same subject, the German Legation at Sofia forwarded on 24 Jul. a report from the Bulgarian Minister at Lisbon dated 22 Jul., stating that, according to information from the Italian Intelligence Service, the Russians have made strong representations to London and Washington demanding the immediate opening of a second front on the continent as the landing in Sicily had not satisfied the Russians. On these grounds it is said to have been resolved to use every means available to the British and the Americans in an effort to land troops in Belgium and France at the end of Jul. or beginning of August. The same source reports that numerous landing troops are concentrated in England, including 40,000 parachutists. Besides the main operation against France and Belgium, a second landing is said to be planned against Norway.

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IV. Naval Attaché, Istanbul reports as of 16 Jul. on the military preparations of the Allies in the Near East. The Naval Attaché is of the opinion that the enemy will not commit himself in the Eastern Mediterranean until the development of the campaign in Sicily becomes clearer, especially since he must count on the possibility of having to bring up his forces and vessels in the east to support it. For copy of the report as per l/Skl 22045/43 geheim, see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

Situation on 26 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Cairo, Cape Town and Bombay harbors reported on 11 Jul. that the repair situation was unchanged but that heavy strain is anticipated. At Haifa, short repairs can now be handled, but this will not be possible at Mombassa until the end of July at the earliest.

Cairo informed Bombay, Basra and London on 9 Jul. that railroad capacity from the Persian Gulf will soon be completely taken up by Middle East requirements. Freight traffic from India to Turkey via the Persian Gulf will have to be temporarily suspended.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff, Operations Division has forwarded to the Japanese Naval Attaché, Berlin a request that new orders be issued to the Japanese submarine FLIEDER for her voyage in the north Atlantic, in modification of the previous plans and taking account of the increased risk to be faced. For copy of the relative letter l/Skl I opa 2098/43 Gkdos. Chefs see War Diary Part C, Vol. I.

All German ships in foreign waters have been informed on the enemy situation by radiogram 1756.

No reports have come in from our ships.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-two planes were detected, chiefly over the outer Bay of Biscay. Radio Intelligence also picked up at 1912

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and 2019 respectively, reports from British vessels on one of our contact planes and on an attack by our planes on the convoy MANGLE in CG 4218, as well as a report at 2043 from a British ship on a contact plane near a convoy in CG 7433.

British ships were located between 1043 and midnight in AL 6610 and 5463, BF 14, 1730/1810, 1570 and 1580, BE 9820, GH 43/46 and AL 6640.

At 1125, our air reconnaissance sighted in BF 7274 apparently the same five destroyers on a course 215° that were reported in the forenoon of 25 Jul. in BF 7221 in the same area. In addition at 1910, in CG 1878, a convoy of 55 steamers of up to 22,000 BRT with 1 cruiser and 4 corvettes, on course 150°, and at 2030, a convoy of 40 steamers with 15 escort vessels in CF 6992 on course 330° were sighted and reported.

In the Channel our air reconnaissance at 1305 in BF 3328 observed 8 motor minesweepers sailing in double line ahead on a west to northwesterly course. Group West thinks it not unlikely that they were clearing mines in our barrages. A fighter attack was not possible due to lack of forces.

Off Le Havre, between 0252 and 0425, targets were located and fired on by our batteries without observation of results.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Altogether seven ELM/J-mines were cleared off the Gironde, La Pallice and near St. Nazaire. The JAGUAR moved from Bayonne to Royan and PT boats S "124" and "134" moved from La Pallice to Bordeaux.

Channel Coast:

By day and during the night, heavy, dull explosions between Dieppe and Cherbourg were distinctly heard. Their origin has not been traced. They might be connected with clearance of enemy barrages.

On the night of 26 Jul., 9 boats of 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla were sent out on clearance work northwest of Cherbourg. For the brief report on the loss of PT boat S "77" see teletype 0418.

No other events of importance were reported.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

The Ems-Elbe convoy was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs by 16 enemy planes 30 miles southwest of Heligoland. Mine exploding ship "176" shot down one enemy plane 14 miles south of Heligoland.

Eight ELM/J-mines were cleared in the convoy routes north of Tershelling up to southwest of Heligoland.

At least four big U.S. bomber formations were detected over the North Sea between 1000 and 1342. Enemy planes were reported flying towards Hanover. Naval anti-aircraft artillery shot down 1 plane at Norderney.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Eighteen planes were detected operating over the North Sea. A submarine periscope was sighted on 25 Jul. near Soerrey in Gallefjord. According to radio intelligence, the Cape Greben signal station reported to Yugor Strait on 25 Jul. the sinking of a minesweeper. This was apparently the result of an action by one of our submarines.

2. Own Situation:

Destroyer Z "29" anchored in the roads off Trondheim at 2330 on 25 Jul.

Submarine U "703" took aboard the captain of the Russian steamer DEKABBIST from Hope Island. The steamer was torpedoed on 4 Nov. 1942. Three members of the steamer's crew, including a woman, are still on the island.

On 25 Jul., in her assigned operational area AT 72, submarine U "625" was attacked by a flying boat and went back to Hammerfest to take on torpedoes.

Destroyer Z "28" has forwarded a brief report on the air attack on Trondheim on 24 Jul. For copy see T/P 1225. The boat was seriously endangered by two tugs lying alongside which had been set on fire by the bombs, and had to flood her ammunition chambers. 20 men of the crew were wounded. The boat will probably be able to sail with the starboard engine by 31 Jul.

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The degaussing system is out of action as the cables were destroyed by fire.

Fifty ships were escorted to the north and 28 ships to the south. Thirteen ships were held up in the Arctic Coast Area due to lack of escort.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the Gulf of Finland at 0343, a submarine was reported on a westerly course east of Lavansaari. During the night of 25 Jul., air activity was very strong throughout the coastal area. Bombing and strafing caused no damage. Otherwise no new information has been received.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty-two vessels and 3 minesweeping planes were employed on channel sweeping in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic. One ELM/J mine was cleared off Korsov. Heavy losses are reported to have been caused in the Howaldt dockyards during the daylight attack on Kiel on 25 Jul. Considerable damage was also done to the dockyards at Hamburg. The accommodation ship GENERAL ARTIGAS burnt out and capsized. Submarine base-ship TOLLER ORT and accommodation ship DOEDAM received direct hits. The Higher Naval Construction Office was heavily damaged. The Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Inspectorate was put completely out of action.

One mine was cleared near Arcona. Altogether 3 leave-transport and 4 troop-transport were under way in the Baltic Sea area. Besides this, the SCHLESIEN was escorted to Libau, the Nuebnberg and 1 tanker from Swinemunde to the east and 1 tanker from Memel to Pillau.

After completing the work in the Irben Narrows 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is transferring to Tallinn. The Peterhof and Korkuli Batteries were hit during a sharp exchange of fire with the enemy and suffered minor damage and casualties.

Anti-submarine net and barrage patrol was carried out by 34 vessels.

V. Merchant Shipping:

Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division reports on

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the negotiations between the USSR and Japan concerning two Russian merchant ships being held in Japanese ports. For copy as per 1/Skl 20099/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XI.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has informed the Foreign Office pointing out that this case again shows the prudence with which the Japanese handle their relations with the Soviet Union.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

Nothing to report.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 263 planes in operation in the West area and 14 planes in the Mediterranean.

The convoy of 55 steamers observed at 1910 in CG 1878 was attacked by Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. One steamer of 8 - 10,000 BRT was sunk and 2 others were damaged.

During the night of 25 Jul., Hull was attacked by 47 bombers. Four planes failed to return. Ten Me 410-planes were sent out against London on the night of 26 Jul. They attacked at 2300 and 2345 with 1000 kg bombs and returned without losses.

During the day, the enemy made a large number of air raids. Five airfields, as well as traffic installations, were attacked in the areas of Belgium and northern France and our defences brought down 4 of the attacking planes certainly and 2 more probably. Besides this, 1 Wellington was shot down by a Ju "88", 200 miles northwest of Cape Ortegale.

Three groups of 50 - 80 planes coming from the North Sea flew into Reich territory to Hannover and Hamburg/Hessermuende. All three places were attacked and considerable damage was done at Hamburg and Hannover. Twenty-nine of the attacking planes were shot down, 20 of them by fighters. For details, see Daily Situation.

In the night of 26 Jul., 60 enemy planes entered the German-controlled areas. Fifteen of them made nuisance flights into the coastal area of northern Germany. Three bombs were dropped in the Hamburg area. One more enemy plane was shot down in the West area.

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Mediterranean Theatre:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance in the Central Mediterranean, especially of the Sicilian area. In attacks on shipping targets on the north coast of Sicily, 6 enemy vessels were hit and a heavy cruiser received two direct hits.

During the night of 25 Jul., Air Commander, Long-Range Bombers sent out 74 bombers against ship targets at La Valetta. According to preliminary reports, three ships were hit certainly and two probably.

In the same night, the small enemy forces attacked Naples.

Eastern Front:

Seventy-eight planes were shot down on the Army front on 23 Jul., 101 on 24 Jul. and 82 on 25 Jul.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on land:

From the early morning hours onward, the enemy made strong attacks against the northern flank of 15th Armored Division, which, in spite of a counter-attack, was forced to withdraw to the line Castel di Fusa - Pettino - Castel di Lucia. The enemy is also attacking again in the area east of Gangi. On the rest of the front the situation is unchanged.

On the basis of the departure of a 50-ship convoy (see War Diary 25 Jul.) from Palermo to the east, reported on 25 Jul. Commanding Admiral, South anticipates a landing on the north coast of Sicily. 29th Armored Division has assumed command in the northern sector. Considerable losses of motor vehicles were caused again yesterday by continued strong enemy air activity. The Italian High Command reports that officers and men are being affected by clever propaganda leaflets dropped by enemy planes. The "Aosta" and "Assietta" Divisions have lost half their strength.

Commanding Admiral, South reports that paras 1, 4, 5 and 9 of the directive of Armed Forces High Command (see page 508 above and following pages) were already underway or had just been ordered when the directive was received.



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Situation at Sea:

The number of ships in Sicilian ports is substantially unchanged. According to an Italian report, 4 big ships, including a probable battleship, were off Catania at 1300. The 50 ships reported east of Palermo on 25 Jul. have not been detected again. Reports of the sighting of enemy formations in the northern outlet of the Straits of Messina in the night of 25 Jul. have not been confirmed. They were probably our own naval landing craft. Reports on the shipping losses caused by the enemy air attack on Messina on 25 Jul. have been corrected to the effect that one Italian torpedo boat was only damaged and was able to return to Naples under her own power. Furthermore the corvette reported sunk was only damaged and was beached.

No other important reports have been received.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

One DIDO-class cruiser entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic and 1 corvette and 3 gun boats arrived from the Mediterranean. On the afternoon of 25 Jul., a destroyer was reported 65 miles northwest of Algiers and 40 eastbound and 6 small freighters were 40 miles north of Philippeville. No ship movements were observed in the Western Mediterranean on 26 Jul. There were 8 merchantmen with 4 destroyers sailing east, 80 miles north of Tripoli at 1429.

Submarines were reported 30 miles west of Ajaccio and 7 miles south of Spezia.

Reconnaissance off the Cyrenaica coast and off the western Peloponnese yielded no sightings.

According to an Intelligence report of 23 Jul. from Tangiers, French divisions have been standing by since 21 Jul. in the area between Algiers and Oran to embark for operations against Corsica the start of which depends on the progress of the Sicilian campaign.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

The steamer VIMINALE was sunk on the night of 24 Jul. not by a submarine but by enemy PT boats. On the same day, the river motor minesweeper FR "70" was sunk by an enemy submarine west of Elba.

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Torpedo boat TA "11" (foreign built), 2 anti-aircraft corvettes, 3 submarine chasers, 3 motor minesweepers, 1 harbor motor minesweeper, 1 Italian naval landing craft, 2 corvettes and 2 Italian torpedo boats were engaged in the escort service. At 1235, a convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by 7 enemy planes north-northeast of Porto Vecchio. Otherwise, the escort and supply traffic was carried out without incident.

Under the protection of the three remaining boats of 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, a steamer left Marseille for Genoa on the evening of 25 Jul.

The BRANDENBURG is moving from Port Vendres to Toulon and the POMMERN to La Ciotat. On 24 Jul., 3 freight-barges left Toulon for Savona followed on 25 Jul., by 2 tanker-barges.

Commanding Admiral, South reports that Armed Forces, High Command has refused to dispatch parts of the Brandenburg Division for operations on the North African coast, and that the troop situation in the Italian area is so strained that even minor detachments for other purposes cannot be made. (See teletype 0115).

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

On 25 Jul. an enemy submarine was sighted east of Milos and south of Syra. At 0307 on 26 Jul., an Italian destroyer was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes southeast of Leros. No other important events have been reported.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

Own Situation:

In the night of 25 Jul., the 3rd bombardment of the enemy front on the Mius River was carried out according to plan with observed results and without counter-action. A fourth bombardment is planned for the night of 26 Jul.

Submarine U "24" left Constantza for the operational area. The Italian midget submarines "CB 1" and "2" put in to Sevastopol. PT boats S "40", "42", "47" are to move from Ivanhoe

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to Constantza. Two motor minesweepers are on their way from Constantza to the Bosphorus.

A supplementary report on the submarine attack on the Theodosia Yalta convoy states that it is not unlikely that the enemy submarine was damaged by depth charges.

During the attack by 15 enemy planes against the 152nd Anapa-transport on 25 Jul., 10 of the attacking planes were shot down by fighters.

In Istanbul, a magnetic explosive charge attached to the steamer TISBE one meter below the water line was rendered harmless shortly before she was due to sail. The ship is therefore being temporarily held by the Turkish authorities in order to carry out an investigation. Other convoy, supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to schedule and without incident.

#### IX. Situation in East Asia:

Military Attaché, Tokyo reports as of 18 Jul., that the Japanese South Sea defensive is costing heavily in losses of men, shipping, and especially planes. The Japanese Naval Staff believes however, that the enemy offensive to the northwest along the Solomon Islands will come to a standstill at the end of the outer defenses, i.e. near Bougainville. The danger point in the Japanese South Sea defenses is of eastern New Guinea. They will try to hold the Bay of Lae area.

It is believed that the concentrated British/Chinese attack on Burma, expected to take place in the fall, can be warded off. A British landing in the Andaman Islands and in Northern Malaya would be more serious. In any case, Burma and the area south of it also call for strong Japanese defense forces.

In regard to China, it is thought that Chungking could be taken with ten divisions but the capture of this major city would not necessarily mean the downfall of Chiangkai-shek. The dispatch of new Japanese forces to China is not, however, advisable in view of the possible American/Russian threat to Japan from Russian territory in the Far East. An early U.S. attack on Kiska is considered likely. U.S./Russian relations are said to be good. Russia treatment of Japan is almost impudent. The Japanese General Staff is therefore preparing for a possible preventive attack against Russia's Far Eastern territory. About 30 divisions, including three tank divisions, are available for that purpose as well as superior air forces.

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Political leaders and the Navy are trying to avoid a clash with Russia. In view of the war economy situation and the lack of transport space, the decision to attack requires serious consideration.

The Japanese General Staff regards the European war situation as serious both on the Russian south front and in Sicily but was not clear as to German operational plans on either front. This made it difficult to assess the European situation and to reach a decision in regard to East Asia. It would therefore be appreciated if the Military Attaché could be brought up to date by the Chief of the German General Staff. Furthermore, a desire was expressed for a closer form of cooperation between the Japanese and German High Commands. Personal conferences would be desirable if German planes could be used as the Japanese long-range plane had been lost. It was also recommended that the desirability of reducing Russian exports to America be set before the Japanese political leaders and especially the Navy. This question, however, would require the most delicate handling. Furthermore, a German hint to the Japanese political leaders in regard to the elimination of anti-Laval diplomats was suggested.

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The New Situation in Italy:

According to reports from Rome, a new Italian cabinet has been formed which does not include the outspoken Fascists. Guariglia, now Ambassador at Ankara and formerly Ambassador to the Vatican, has been appointed Foreign Minister. The Minister of the Marine Navy is de Courten.

The Military authorities have assumed control of public order. The Fascist Militia has joined the armed forces as the "Voluntary Militia for the Security of the State." Grand Admiral di Revel has been appointed as the new President of the Italian Senate.

An official Italian commentary, forwarded by DNB from Rome, states that the change of government is neither a revolution nor a coup d'etat but a crisis which has been solved by constitutional means. Italian foreign policy will remain unaltered. The war will be continued. Italy will keep her word. Events within the Fascist Grand Council were of an exclusively domestic nature.

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Radio Rome also declared in its English language broadcast, that the war would go on so long as the enemy stood on Italy's threshold. After the failure of the Fascist government only a military government could ensure the concentration of the country's forces.

The surprisingly quick reorganization of the Italian press and the changes in the editorial staffs indicate that the political swing over had been carefully prepared.

Referring to the situation in Italy, Churchill stated in the House of Commons that it was Germany's most natural desire to make Italy a theater of war. If the Germans should get their way, the war against Italy would have to be carried on with the utmost vigor from north and south, from sea and from air and by amphibious landings. So far the Italian Government had made no approach to the British. Reuter's summary of the speech continues "We would be foolish if we were to refuse to come to a general agreement with the Italian nation. We certainly do not aspire to reduce Italian life to a state of chaos and anarchy and then to have no authority with which to negotiate. The heavy task of supplying garrisons and police forces for the country would fall upon us. We do not want to maneuver ourselves into the kind of position into which the Germans have fallen because of their grave mistakes. In the case of Italy, I would not want to take the road which might lead to executions and concentration camps.

We should leave the Italians to stew in their own juice for a while and feed the fire to the utmost in order to speed up the process until we obtain from their government, or from any one endowed with the necessary authority, the indispensable requirements for the prosecution of the war against our main enemy, which is not Italy but Germany.

It is in the interests of both Italy and the Allies, that the Italian capitulation should be complete and not piecemeal. In all these matters we are acting in close understanding with the United States. Our Russian friends will also be kept regularly posted. The armies of England and America are working as if they were the army of a single nation. The two governments are in constant contact."

Thus the British attitude also has been defined. They too are asking for unconditional surrender and already call openly for cancellation of the alliance with Germany. This Anglo-American intransigence works, at the moment, to the interests of Germany. At least it gives

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us some time which can be used for military purposes. Apparently the enemy plans to increase the internal political pressure in Italy so strongly that all their aims will be achieved by this means. It will call for great firmness and ability on the part of the new leaders if their policy is to be successful in the face of the desperate desire for peace of a bitterly disappointed people. In view of the difficulty of the task, it would be unwise for Germany to count with any certainty on its final solution.

Naval Attaché, Rome continues his report on his meeting with Riccardi on 26 Jul.:

"Supplément to Naval Attaché, Rome teleprint Gkdos. 2077/43 of 26 Jul. Ziff. 5. as per l/skl 20961/43 Gkdos in War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

According to Riccardi, a basic political and military decision on the use of the battleships for combat operations has been made. An operational prerequisite, however, is that the battleships should have a chance of getting within firing range of the enemy before being put out of action by the enemy air force. That is why the battleships were not used in Sicily. Fuel supplies are sufficient only for one operation. Riccardi is expecting the next enemy attack to be directed against Sardinia in which case, battleships will be sent out from La Spezia. In case of an attack against southern Italy, the battleships DUILIO and DORIA, now being made ready at Taranto, will be used. They will be operational by the end of Jul. The personnel of the DUILIO and of the DORIA was reduced some time ago because of the shortage of personnel for the Tunisia-transport escort forces. Air reconnaissance is desirable for the successful commitment of the battleships, but they will be used even without adequate air reconnaissance. Although this would be an act of desperation, it would be done in order to uphold the honor of the fleet to posterity. Italy is proud of its Navy which has fought well wherever it has been used. This was proved by the high losses in cruisers, torpedo boat chasers, and submarines. Seventy-two submarines have been lost. Naval Attaché's comment: Riccardi's opinion that Sardinia will probably be the enemy's next target coincides with my own views based both on the enemy's situation to date and on the suitability of the Sardinian air bases for operations against the north Italian industrial area, and especially on the fact that Sardinia's location blocks the enemy's west-east route in case of operations against the Balkans."

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For teleprint as per 1/Skl 2114/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary Part C Vol. XIV.

The directive of Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Communications Division concerning communications traffic with Italy as per 1/Skl 21057/43 Gkdos is attached to War Diary Part C Vol. XIV.

As a precautionary preparation for taking over the defense of that sector of the south coast of France now occupied by the Italians, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch is planning the following organization (from "Gisela" personnel):

1. Admiral Commanding South Coast of France: Rank; Commanding General; Wever with staff. Base to be selected.

2. The present Admiral Commanding South Coast of France to become Naval Shore Commander, Languedoc based on Montpellier. Area, provisionally as before.

3. German Naval Command, Toulon to be changed to Naval Shore Commander, Provence. Artillery Commander with Naval Artillery Battalions "612", "681" and parts of "616" will be attached to Naval Shore Commander, Provence. The necessary port captains and port commandants will be provided by the Naval Control Service.

4. 6th Patrol Flotilla will be expanded into a Patrol Force as soon as the material becomes available.

5. The Senior Communications Officer will be attached to Admiral Commanding South Coast of France. Personnel to be drawn from "Gisela."

For copy as per Skl Qu A II 2110/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see in War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch reported on organizational measures and plans as per notes in War Diary 26 Jul.

No other special reports or decisions.

Special Items:

Among the "Material on the Enemy Situation" received, there is

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a report by the Italian Naval Attache, Nanking which states that the enemy had planned to make a landing in Calabria simultaneously with the landing in Sicily because that this had not been done as the latter was started prematurely. A large number of minesweeping vessels were said to have been prepared for the landing in the Gulf of Taranto.

According to a report from diplomatic sources in Berne, the Anglo-Americans are planning an action against the Straits of Otranto for the purpose of a thrust against the Dalmatian coast.

It is further reported that sabotage operations by enemy parachutists on the south shore of Lake Geneva and on the Italian shore of Lake Maggiore near the Swiss frontier, in connection with the opening of the attack on the Italian mainland, are expected at any minute.

Situation on 27 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attache, Tokyo reports that the AQUILA III is expected to be ready to leave on 10 Aug. and, in view of the uncertainty of the Italian situation requests instructions as to whether the AQUILA boats' schedule should be carried out as planned and whether they should carry courier-mail.

Naval Staff has closely examined the Italian suggestions in regard to fuel supply in the south Atlantic, as forwarded by Naval Attache, Tokyo. The investigation has revealed that refuelling in the south Atlantic is out of the question since it is uneconomical and too dangerous for the supply ship. Naval Attache, Tokyo has been advised accordingly. For copy as per 1/Skl I opa 2060/43 Gkdo's. Chfs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-nine planes were observed over the outer



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Bay of Biscay. British units were located, at 1302, in CG-4760/4840 and at 2030, off Oporto and off Lisbon. At 0733, our air reconnaissance detected the southbound convoy "Mangl". Radio Intelligence intercepted several reports from this convoy on our contact planes and on attacks.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared off Brest. 5th Torpedo boat Flotilla left La Pallice at 1300 with the MOEVE, the KONDOR and with torpedo boat T "19" and joined the JAGUAR and submarines U "461" and "462" off the Gironde in order to escort submarines up to 8° West. Group West has forwarded the relative operational order to 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. For the teletype as per 1/Skl 2093/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. II b.

The dispersal point for the submarines is BF 4981 at 8.5° West. Paragraph of the operational order contains instructions on "Conduct towards the enemy", on which Naval Staff, Operations Division has nothing to remark.

Channel Coast:

4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on mine clearance work northeast of Cherbourg, had an engagement with 5 enemy motor gunboats at 0350 following an enemy air attack. One enemy motor gunboat was sunk certainly and another probably. Two of our motor minesweepers were heavily hit and the other boats suffered slight damage. Casualties were light. For brief report, see teletype 1655.

At 1130, Port Command "655" near Zeebrugge was damaged by enemy air attack. Two ammunition bunkers and one crew dug-out were destroyed.

Three ELM/A-mines and one AT-mine were cleared off Ostend. Group West also reports that the mole-barrage at Zeebrugge has been laid and is operational.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

Four ELM/J-mines were cleared north of the East Frisian Islands. At noon, isolated enemy reconnaissance planes flew

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over the coastal area of the North Sea. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan and without incident in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North.

Commanding Admiral, Naval Establishments, Hamburg has reported on the industrial losses caused by the enemy air attack in the Hamburg area. Dock capacity has been reduced by about 30% due to lack of electric power and the difficulty of transporting the workers to their jobs. The dockyards are at present not in working condition. According to preliminary reports so far received, 69 industrial and armament factories, including the shipyards, 12 military installations, 14 hospitals, as well as the gas, water and power supplies were destroyed or put out of order. Transportation is largely out of action. The number of killed, missing and wounded exceeds 10,000 and the number of those rendered homeless is more than 230,000. The Deutsche Werft dockyard at Finkenwerder is undamaged and in full working order. For further details, see teletype 2030.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio Intelligence detected strong air activity over the Shetlands; 19 planes were in operation.

2. Own Situation:

Destroyer Z "23" arrived in Narvik on the afternoon of 26 Jul. Twenty-five ships were escorted to the north and 40 to the south. Ten ships were held up in the area of Admiral Arctic Coast due to lack of escort. No other important reports have been received.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night of 26 Jul., very active tug and barge traffic was observed in Kronstadt Bay and there was strong enemy air activity along the Carelian coast on the evening of 26 Jul. The coastal area was shelled by artillery from Kronstadt and Oranienbaum during the morning and afternoon of 27 Jul. During the noon hours the bombardment of this area was interspersed with bombing and strafing attacks from planes. There was practically no change to be observed among the ships in the harbors of Lavansaari and Seiskari. On the evening of 26 Jul. there was a convoy of 8 tugs, 3 barges, 12 motorboats, 2 guard boats and 2 PT boats west of Kronstadt on a westerly

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course. Air activity was also strong at Tueters. At 0535 our formations southeast of the island were bombed and strafed by several planes. According to Finnish reports, PT boats made a thrust north of Someri in the night of 26 Jul., but sheered off eastwards behind a smoke screen when fired upon by the Someri Battery. In addition a bombing attack north of Nargoen, presumably against the net barrage, was observed about midnight.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defences Baltic 21 vessels and 4 minesweeping planes were engaged in check sweeping. One ground mine was cleared south of Skagen.

Another ground mine was cleared in the Fehmarn belt. Five troop transports and 2 steamers as well as the target ship ZAEHRINGEN were escorted in the Baltic Sea area.

Large minesweeper "12" was sent out to clear the western part of the Irben Strait. Four Russian mines were cleared north of Someri including one which was recovered together with the anchor. An enemy submarine was attacked by the watch group of 24th Landing Flotilla northeast of Revelstein with probably successful results.

V. Submarine warfare:

U "415" sighted a convoy in EE 7745 on 24 Jul. and reported defensive action based on locations and continuous air attack. On 25 Jul. in the Freetown area, a convoy of 20 ships was detected on course 300° in ET 2586. The submarine was prematurely detected by a destroyer and was prevented from attacking. On 6 Jul., the same submarine sighted a fast convoy off the approach to Freetown.

U "516" supplied 3 "Monsoon" submarines, in place of Tanker "160" which is out of action.

U "509" failed to meet the tanker and, has not reported since.

In FR 1517, U "172" sank the steamer PORT CHITCHIN (6,000 BRT) on course 25°, carrying ore and iron from Rio. Also, a tanker of 6000 BRT was sunk in the waters of Curacao. U "466" suffered casualties in a successful defense against enemy planes in the area EP 48, and had to turn back. IN DM 2925, U "134" was hit by bombs from a fast land plane and had to put back for repairs.

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VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The southbound convoy of 55 ships was attacked by forces of Air Commander; Atlantic Coast. One ship of 6 - 8,000 BRT and another of 6,000 BRT were sunk and one of 5,000 BRT was damaged. During the day, enemy airforces made numerous incursions. Isolated reconnaissance planes were over north-western Germany and the Ruhr District during the noon hours. In the Holland area slight material damage was caused in an attack on the airfield at Woensdrecht. In Belgium and North France railway stations and (as already reported) a Port Command were attack near Zeabrugge. Also, the Triqueville airfield and the German Air Force Station Shipol in the Amsterdam area were attacked. Five enemy planes were shot down in counter actions against these attacks.

During the night of 27 Jul., between 0045 and 0225, at least 500 planes made an extremely heavy attack on Hamburg at first from an altitude of 3 - 4,000 meters and later from 7,000 meters. In the districts west of the Alster and in the port areas of Hamburg and Wilhelmsburg, vast conflagrations and many big fires were caused. The extent of the destruction and the casualties cannot yet be estimated. No reports have been received on the performance of our anti-aircraft guns. Night fighters shot down 12 enemy planes.

In the same night nuisance raids were made by small forces in the Ruhr District and the occupied western territories. A transport train was attacked in the Dinant area.

Mediterranean Theatre:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance of the Sicilian and Malta areas and photographic reconnaissance of Benghazi. Since our attack on 26 Jul., 5 damaged freighters for 34,600 BRT have been observed at Syracuse.

During the day, the enemy attacked air fields in southern Italy. The Italian Air Force Station at Capua was heavily damaged. Two of our own planes were put out of action. No enemy air activity was reported on the night of 27 Jul.

Eastern Front:

No reports have been received.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:Situation on Land:

The enemy hasso far failed to follow up our formations in the North Coast sector which are withdrawing according to plan. Strong enemy attacks were launched on the evening of 26 Jul. in the area east of Gangi. On the rest of the front, the enemy kept up harassing gunfire. The enemy Air Force made continuous attacks in waves on our supply traffic.

Situation at Sea:

On the north coast of Sicily, the enemy is now also using the harbor of Termini. Two coastal freighters were observed there on the afternoon of 26 Jul. At the same time there were 8 PT boats, 1 submarine, 2 minesweepers, 9 motor minesweepers and 1 coastal freighter in Palermo. There were no enemy vessels in the harbors of Trapani, Marsala, Mazzala and Sciacca at that time. No important changes were observed among the ships in the other Sicilian harbors. At 0710, in Valstta 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 cruisers, several destroyers and 5 merchantmen were sighted and, at Marsa Scirocco, 2 battleships, 8 destroyers, 1 LST, 1 small freighter and 1 tanker.

Four boats of 3rd PT Boat Flotilla left Crotona in the afternoon for operations off the east coast of Sicily.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that seaward guns at Taranto, Naples and Brindisi are adequate in number but the defense of the smaller harbors is weak. There are no all-round batteries at all. Camouflage and light anti-aircraft artillery are inadequate. It takes months to bring up and instal guns from other fronts because of the confusion on the railroads. It will probably not be possible to take over the Italian positions completely. In agreement with Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, German Naval Command suggests that the other Naval Artillery forces be used as infantry for the defense of the main batteries so that they may intervene immediately in case the Italian battery crews collapse. It is stated that the first requirement would be 2 Naval Artillery detachments, one for Taranto and one for Naples and adjacent harbors. Good infantry training and anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery equipment are necessary.

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German Naval Command Italy further reports with reference to the relative directive of Naval Staff, Operations Division (see War Diary 21 Jul.), that with the transfer of the fast escort vessel SG "14" and the motor minesweeper to the Straits of Messina, and the appointment of Captain Kamptz as Commander Defenses Messina Straits, all the protective measures that the available means permit, including these for submarines passing the Straits, have been taken. Cooperation, particularly in regard to recognition signals, has been agreed upon with the Italian Admiral. Relations have been clarified. Passing schedules are being fixed. Motor minesweeper escort is being considered.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

Twelve freighters and 1 landing boat transport ship entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean and 30 freighters and 4 tankers arrived in three groups from the Atlantic. Ten Freighters, 1 tanker and 4 destroyers as well as one DIDO-class cruiser left for the Atlantic.

No shipping traffic was observed in the Western Mediterranean. According to air reconnaissance, there were 3 freighters on a westerly course, 30 miles northwest of Bizerta.

Submarines were detected west of Prepezza and northwest of Elba. On 26 Jul., an eastbound convoy of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers and 8 freighters was 128 miles north-northwest of Benghazi. On 27 Jul., no shipping traffic was observed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

According to photographic reconnaissance, there were 1 tanker and 6 freighters as well as isolated escort vessels and 3 LCT in Benghasi.

An Intelligence report states that the loading of the freighters with war materiel at Alexandria was completed on 20 Jul. Four troop transports of the ETTRICK-type are in the harbor as well as -- allegedly -- the battleship WARSPITE. Five divisions are said to be ready for embarkation in the area of Alexandria and Rosetta.

According to an Italian Intelligence report of 21 Jul., there is a total of 28 divisions standing by in the Tunis and Bizerta areas for the invasion of Sardinia. Eight divisions are assigned for the establishment of the first bridgehead. One division is to land south of Cape Ferrato, 2 divisions between Torre Murtas and Cape San Lorenzo and other divisions south and north of Cape Bellauista.

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3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean, Sea Transport Situation:

At noon of 26 Jul., east of Cape Ferro, 7 enemy planes attacked 5 infantry landing boats with only limited success. On 23 Jul. a naval landing craft and a Siebel-ferry each shot up an enemy fighter bomber setting them on fire.

Early on 26 Jul. and again at noon enemy air forces attacked Milazzo while fighter bombers also attacked the ferry traffic and anti-aircraft positions in the Straits of Messina. On the night of 26 Jul., the industrial plants at Naples were attacked. Ferry traffic across the Straits of Messian was carried out according to plan.

The (foreign-built) torpedo boat TA "11", 2 anti-aircraft corvettes, 2 submarine chasers, 6 motor minesweepers, auxiliary motor minesweepers, 6 Italian torpedo boats and 2 corvettes were engaged on escort service. Eight steamers and 1 tanker were escorted in the island traffic, 2 tankers and 2 steamers were escorted off the west coast of Italy as well as 1 steamer from Marseille to Genoa. The tanker ALBERTO FASSIO (2,289 BRT) en route from Velona to Patras sank near Prevesa at 0500 on 26 Jul. following an explosion, probably of a mine.

According to an Italian report forwarded by Commanding Admiral, Aegean, the ALBERTO FASSIO was torpedoed at 0210 on 27 Jul. while en route from Italy to Piraeus via Patras.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

The convoy "Samson" was unsuccessfully attacked by four enemy planes at 0735. One of the attacking planes was probably shot down.

Troop transports and escort service were carried out as scheduled and without incident.

Special Items:

Group South has submitted, as a separate report an assessment of the Situation from its War Diary of 21 Jul. The report is entered as per 1/Skl 2094/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

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In this report, Group South expresses the opinion that enemy operations in the eastern Mediterranean will not begin until the Sicilian operation is completed. The Group regards the present defensive power of the Greek/Aegean area so still inadequate. Some protection is provided by the extensive mine defenses. Coastal artillery defenses are, in comparison, very poor. Finally, the Group believes that, on the basis of his experience in Sicily, the enemy now has also Crete in mind as a target of attack.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No reports have been received.

Own Situation:

In the night of 26 Jul., the 4th bombardment of the enemy front on the Mius was carried out according to plan. The enemy put up ineffective counter-fire but not until after the bombardment.

A thrust by 3 boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla into the area, west of Novorossisk had to be broken off prematurely because of bad weather. An operation by naval artillery lighters MAL "8" - "11" and motor minesweeper R "30" with 5 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla for a special task off Primorsk - Akhtari under command of Commander 3rd Motor minesweeper Flotilla, was also broken off because of the weather. Late in the evening, the 5th bombardment of the Mius front was likewise carried out according to plan.

One mine was cleared by a minesweeping plane in the Danube area.

The steamer TISBE received her sailing permit for the Black Sea.

Escort, transport and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Apparently in compliance with a request, Naval Attaché, Tokyo has forwarded a statement by Admiral Koyima to the effect, that, although the idea of a preventive war against Russia has again come into favor recently with many Army officers the Government and the Navy are trying to prevent it by every possible means. It would be an inestimable blessing not to have to wage such a war, Japan -- only with difficulty holding her Pacific



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position, threatened with a major attack on Burma in the fall, and heavily engaged in China — was in no position to gain a decisive victory against Russia — above all because of her still entirely inadequate Air Force. Moreover, it is strongly felt that such a war would hardly bring any relief for Germany.

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The New Situation in Italy:

A clear picture of developments to date is contained in the following report from Rome by the German Liaison Officer attached to the Italian Commander, Submarines:

From personal impressions and from numerous conversations with responsible and patriotic Italians, mostly officers, I have derived the following overall picture:

1. The situation is absolutely quiet. Badoglio is firmly suppressing all leftist tendencies. Anti-German tendencies, instigated on the first day probably mainly by Marxists, Jews and paid agitators, have subsided.

2. Mussolini's resignation was the result of the decline of the Fascist Party, which has long been evident, and of his own dwindling prestige due to his lack of energy and procrastination, to which the disorder in the war industries is mainly attributable. This was strongly and personally confirmed by the big industrialist Caproni who had constant dealings with Mussolini. The complete decay of the Party was demonstrated in the Fascist Grand Council where most of the leaders headed by Grandi and Farinacci, turned against Mussolini with the aim of forcing him into the background and taking over governmental authority themselves. They overlooked the fact that the Party without Mussolini was nothing but a house of cards. Mussolini was thus overthrown by his own oldest supporters, of whom Grandi is still regarded with favor and respect in military circles while Farinacci is not.

3. In this situation, the only stable factor in state structure was naturally the King who called upon Badoglio because he was held in high esteem by the Italian people. The Fascist Party has gone out of the picture completely and has no noteworthy supporters in military circles.

4. Badoglio is displaying great energy. Amongst officers, I have noted two trends of opinion in regard to his

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ideas for prosecution of the war:

a. One section still believes in the determination to continue the fight to the end provided Germany can furnish the necessary assistance.

b. Another section believes that the present government will try to find an honorable way of ending the war. All, however, are unanimously agreed that Italy can never consider any solution that might warrant an accusation of treachery. It is the general opinion that, if the war were ended dishonorably (treacherously), Italy would have no hopes of ever rising again.

5. All officers and patriotically minded Italians hope that the Badoglio government will be accorded the same support and respect as the former government. Any other treatment of the Badoglio government would increase the danger of the governments succumbing to the pacifist influence of the big industries and popular opinion. It is hoped that Germany will avoid the adoption of any measures or attitudes such as to provide the Badoglio government with an all too simple and possibly not unwelcome pretext for withdrawing from its obligations to Germany with an appearance of righteousness.

6. Most officers hope that the same contact will be maintained with us as heretofore, and that cooperation will continue. A visit from Commander in Chief, Navy, after the most important Navy posts have been filled, would be profitable.

7. Any effort on Germany's part to reestablish Fascism would be absurd and would promote anti-militarist and marxist tendencies and eventually bring them into power. It is in Germany's interest to support Badoglio as perhaps the last bulwark against Bolshevism and the danger of Italy's joining our enemies. Churchill's speech has already had a very sobering effect in patriotic circles and has reacted to our advantage.

8. Admiral Legnani has especially emphasized that the German soldiers should not allow themselves to be drawn into unfriendliness towards all Italians by the unfriendliness of a few incited individuals. He has requested that a statement be made stressing the importance of a friendly attitude on the part of the German soldier at this moment.

The German Liaison Officer attached to Italian Commander, Submarines also reports:

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"The Minister of the Navy has just asked me to call and said: Please tell the Grand Admiral that it is my urgent desire to see him as soon as possible in order to go thoroughly into all questions concerning our common struggle. It is my desire to cooperate closely with Germany in order that things may, if possible, go better than before. Please give no credit to all the current rumors. The Marshal's promise that the war will be continued is not an empty phrase. I have lived long enough in Germany to desire this sincerely."

After informing the Fuehrer through Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Navy, replied:

"The following to be conveyed to the Italian Minister of the Navy: I welcome your desire for an early meeting and shall be very glad of the opportunity to talk to you. I would appreciate it if you would come to Berlin for that purpose."

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

No special reports or decisions.

Special Items:

I. The Intelligence Service reports, from Spanish source in Gibraltar, that the landing in Sicily is not the invasion of Europe and is regarded as of secondary importance. The main objective will rather be the Balkans, which will be approached from Turkey. More than one and a half million men and an enormous quantity of war materiel, which is still constantly being increased via the Persian Gulf and Trans-Jordan, are concentrated in Palestine, Irak and Iran for that purpose. The first target would be the Dardanelles and Greece followed by an attack on Bulgaria and Roumania both by land and from the Black Sea, with the aim of joining forces with Russia.

Besides this, another major operation is said to be planned against France, for which about 1,000,000 men, now on the North African Coast, are to be used. This operation is to be preceded by the conquest of Corsica. It is also said that naval demonstrations and landing attacks will be made on the Balkan coasts for a divisionary purpose.

II. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has investigated the effect of the reopening, by the enemy, of the Mediterranean route on shipping traffic in the Capetown area and the South Atlantic. (See War Diary 24 Jul.). For Copy as per 1/Skl 22520/43 geh. see in War Diary Part D "Material on the Enemy Situation 1943."

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Situation on 28 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Not less than 68 planes were detected over the outer Bay of Biscay. Radio Intelligence intercepted, at 1912, a report from a British convoy ship on two F.1 200 planes near the Convoy "Seaplane" in 42°33' N. At 0330, a British ship sent a signal to Cleethorpes giving as its position 45°03' N 13° W. At 1444, the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla reported an outward bound flying-boat on a northwesterly course in BF 5796. Our air reconnaissance reported, at 1930, a northbound convoy of 47 steamers with 1 destroyer, 5 escort boats and 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier in CF 3931. Further locations were made between 2235 and 2340 in CF 8370, AL 3450 and in BE 8930.

According to an Intelligence report, a French ship of 7,000 BRT was sunk between Dakar and Port Etienne. No details were given.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J-mine was cleared off Brest.

At 2000, the JAGUAR, with submarine U "231", began her return from BF 9149.

Channel Coast:

From 0325 till 0312, off Dieppe gun carriers "1", "3", and "8" had a brush with three enemy PT boats, all three of which were observed to have been hit. One of our carriers was hit several times with little effect.

At 1100, a strong enemy air attack was made on Zeebrugge. The gas works were set on fire. The convoy route off Ostend has been temporarily closed because of mine danger.

Special Items:

Group West has submitted a report on the monthly number of mines required for the plans already approved by Naval Staff and for newly-arisen needs, especially in the Mediterranean, with substantiating details and specification of types.

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In regard to mine requirements for defensive barrages in the Channel, Naval Staff, Operations Division has informed the Group that the numbers so far promised are maximum figures which, in view of the low stocks and the urgent demands for all sea areas, can be supplied only in accordance with the actual amount required at a given time. Some other method of distributing the mines in accordance with the group's wishes will be sought but a difficult bottleneck exists in regard to UMB-mines. An additional monthly delivery of 400 EMC-mines is not at present possible as long as the Mediterranean and Aegean coastal defenses are on the priority list.

The offensive barrage mine requirements of Commander PT boats will have to be met from his reserve stock which, at present, still comprises about 500 UMG and is constantly being refilled.

In regard to mine requirements in the Mediterranean, it is not possible for Group West to have 2000 mines in readiness for an emergency as even Naval Staff has no reserves at its disposal. The use of RMA mines for subsidiary mine fields, as suggested is no longer feasible as RM-production ceased some time and stocks are nearly exhausted. For future requirements, LM-mines will have to be used. Group West will supervise the corresponding LM-mine tests.

It is also planned to use LM-mines for mining our own harbors in case of enemy landings.

For reasons of security, new firing devices will not be used against enemy landings.

### III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

#### North Sea:

Two ELM/J-mines were cleared north of Tershelling.

At 0319, patrol line Rom drove off an attack by 6 enemy PT boats. No successes or losses are reported. At 0400, enemy PT boats were located off the Hook though they failed to contact line Kairo. B-Group of 34th Minesweeper Flotilla, on mine clearance operations, was in continuous sight of PT boats 20 kilometers away. In this case also, no engagement took place.

The two patrol boats VP "1210" and "1211" in cooperation with anti-aircraft battery Wesermuende, shot down an enemy four-engined bomber at 0200.

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During the night of 27 Jul., 4 enemy planes returning from the night attack on Hamburg were observed to be shot down, probably by naval anti-aircraft.

From 0817 on 28 Jul., about 250 enemy planes in several formations, flew in over the Heligoland Bight. Amsterdam was attacked from 0905 to 0930. No naval targets were hit. On their way back, at 1300, the planes dropped 30 to 40 explosive bombs on Schiermonikoog, without causing military damage.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirteen planes were observed operating over the North Sea and 2 over Iceland. At 1918, on 27 Jul., 4 PT boats were sighted on a southwesterly course near Ytteroy light house. At 1150 on 28 Jul., the British MTB "345" was discovered by our patrol boat "5301" camouflaged against a rock near the island of Aspoe in the Bufjord, and was captured by an assault detachment from the boat. The MTB was set on fire and the commander and 6 men were taken prisoner.

On 27 Jul., our air reconnaissance sighted a new hut, 5 kilometers east of Cape Linne in the exit of the Icefjord.

On 28 Jul. our air reconnaissance reported at 0605 3 cruisers in AF 7475 on course 90°. The Group thinks that they may have been wrongly identified destroyers; at 1102, 1 light cruiser, 15 smaller ships, of which 6 were destroyers and the other corvettes or guard boats, on a southeasterly course in AF 7810; at 1105, 3 light cruisers sailing southeast in AF 7550, at 1145, 1 (apparently) cruiser, 2 destroyers, on course 110° at a high speed in AF 7320. The ships were shadowed until 1440. Three planes were sighted north of the formation at 1135; at 1503, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers on a northerly course in EF 7610; at 1750, 1 battle cruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, 1 heavy cruiser in AF 7350 and small vessels in AF 7350. No details could be made out because of the fighter defense.

In the opinion of Group North, Fleet, the reports made at 0605 and 1503 concern the same formation. Group North Fleet thinks that the report of 1750 may indicate:

a. A carrier attack on a base which it has not been possible to reach by land based planes probably Narvik. Less probably Alta.

b. Flank protection for a landing operation or an approaching convoy.

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c. A demonstration similar to the movements on 8 and 9 Jul.

According to radio intelligence, the radio guardship of the eastbound formation "Distaff" reported at 1020 1 contact plane in AF 7568 and, at 1515, 2 more contact planes near the formation on course 20° in AF 7196. Another eastbound formation "Encore" reported, at 1105, 1 contact plane at about 62° N, the longitude being unintelligible.

2. Own Situation:

At 2108, Group North placed the battle group on 3 hour's readiness and called attention to the possibility of an attack by carrier based planes. The Group also requested 5th Air Force, in spite of its expressed objections,

a. to reconnoiter from Stadtlandet a sector between 290° and 0° for other enemy forces and

b. to maintain continuous patrol for a radius of 250 miles around the Narvik and Alta areas as protection against possible carrier operations.

If the heavy enemy group proceeds further into the Arctic area, Group North Fleet plans to send out submarines provided definite information is available.

For the North Coast of Norway and Arctic Coast areas up to North Cape of Norway State of coastal alarm I was ordered during darkness and bad visibility.

On 25 and 26 Jul., fire was exchanged between batteries in the area Rybatchi Peninsula/Petsamo. On 28 Jul., one Russian lead horned mine was cut off Vardoe. Because of the appearance of enemy PT boats near Ytteroy, convoys between Aalesund and Bergen have been stopped. On 25 Jul., Norwegians observed two planes dropping parachutes with foodstuffs which were picked up by 3 men near the electricity works in Kongsfjord. The parachutes were recovered.

Destroyer Z "23" left Narvik for Alta at 2000 on 27 Jul.

Fourteen ships were escorted to the north and 23 ships to the south.

Submarine U "601" entered Hammerfest. For the brief report on operation Aster II, see teletype 1458. The boat observed batteries in Belushiya Bay and great building activity at Cape Morosava and at Cape Lilie.

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Submarine U "625" entered Narvik. For brief report on the execution of operation Nelke I see teletype 1457. The boat noted strong air patrols in AT 72.

Submarine U "212" and U "639" put out for mine operations.

Group North Fleet plans to transfer destroyers "Fr. Ihn" and Z "31" to home bases, for routine overhaul, about the middle of August if the situation permits.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

No noteworthy changes from the daily routine were indicated in Kronstadt Bay or the area of the islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. Our barrage patrol "Seeigel" was attacked by enemy planes.

2. Own Situation:

One ELM/A-mine was cleared south of Hesselce. The Danish fishing smack ANNA struck a mine and sank southwest of Moen.

Twelve troop transports and 3 steamers were escorted in the Baltic Sea.

Group North Fleet has placed the motor ships OSTMARK and KAISER at the disposal of Naval Command, Baltic Sea or Commanding Admiral Defenses, Baltic for the Skagerrak operation. (See teletype 1547).

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Several boats have reported on the traffic situation in the Caribbean Sea in the areas Puerto Rico - Trinidad and Paramaraibo. For details, see Daily Situation. It is to be assumed that, due to the appearance of our submarines, traffic on the Brazilian coast has moved further out to sea.

2. Own Situation:

No successes have been reported.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:



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3rd Air Force had 202 planes in operation in the West area and 5 planes in the Mediterranean. Six Me 410-planes were sent out on free-lance pursuit over the Bay of Biscay but made no contact with the enemy. Eight Me 410-planes were sent out to attack London in the night of 28 Jul. During the day, several enemy formations totalling about 150 - 180 planes flew into northwestern Germany and out again after a preliminary sweep in the Heligoland Bight. One group advanced into the Osnabrueck area and two other groups flew into the area Osnabrueck, Magdeburg, Nordhausen, Kassel. Isolated planes reached Brandenburg and Halle. Forty more planes were reported flying into the area Bocholt - Buisburg via the Netherlands. All the formations were made up of Fortresses. They were reported to be flying at 4 - 8,000 meters and at a speed of 400 kilometers and over. Attacks were made on Amsterdam, Zeebrugge, Kassel and Aschersleben. For industrial damage, see Daily Situation.

In defensive operations, 443 flights were made by our fighters and heavy fighters. Thirty fortresses were shot down; 13 fighters were lost but some of the pilots were saved.

During the night of 28 Jul., only small enemy forces entered Reich territory for harassing attacks. Mines are suspected in the sea area Texel - Ameland.

Mediterranean Theatre:

On 27 Jul., a steamer of 8,000 - 10,000 BRT was heavily damaged at Syracuse, by ground attack planes. During the night of 27 Jul., 74 planes attacked shipping targets off Gela. One steamer of 7,000 BRT was probably sunk and three other freighters were damaged.

During the day, waves of enemy fighter bombers attacked the Straits of Messina and supply routes in Sicily. A few bombs were dropped on Naples in the night of 28 Jul.

The Italian Air Force has reported nothing but reconnaissance activity since 24 Jul.

Eastern Front:

On 26 Jul., 76 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front.

For reconnaissance operations by 5th Air Force, see Situation Northern Waters. Contact with the heavy enemy formation was lost to counteraction by fighters and heavy fighters.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

Enemy pressure against the XV Armored Division was continued undiminished. The hills northeast of Leonforte fell into enemy hands on 27 Jul. and Nicosia was lost on 28 Jul. Fighting is still going on for possession of Agrigento. There are 87 tanks and 19 assault guns in operational condition. The enemy is using phosphorous shells which set fire to the main battle field.

Situation at Sea:

Photographic reconnaissance of the Sicilian area and Malta on 26 and 27 Jul. revealed no important change from previous days. For details see Reconnaissance Report No. 3 by 2nd Air Force, teletype 0920. In enemy fighter-bomber attacks in the Straits of Messina on the afternoon of 27 Jul., one infantry landing boat was set on fire by bombs. From noon of 27 Jul. until dark, Taormina was subjected to uninterrupted fighter-bomber attack and bombardment from the sea from within shooting range. It was impossible to bring any coastal defense into action. On 28 Jul., the coast north of Catania was shelled from the sea. The bombarding vessels were not identified.

According to Italian reports, Italian coastal batteries sank 3 enemy PT boats in the Straits of Messina.

Our PT boats returned at noon to Taranto from an operation. No enemy vessels were sighted off the east coast of Sicily and no shipping traffic was observed off Syracuse.

At 0155 on 26 Jul., 4 naval landing craft west-southwest of Stromboli island were attacked by 3 enemy PT boats with anti-aircraft fire and torpedoes. Several of our boats received light hits. Two of the naval landing craft reported hits on the enemy PT boats. At 0700 on 28 Jul., 2 planes were shot down during an enemy air attack on one naval landing craft and one Sicel-ferry. Our vessels suffered casualties.

During the night of 27 Jul., 2 motor minesweepers were in operation in the Straits of Messina. No special events were reported.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

Twenty-three freighters, 1 tanker and patrol vessels left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. According to an Intelligence

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report several cruisers and destroyers are said to have left Glasgow for Gibraltar.

Cape Tres Forcas reports that a transport convoy of 7 big ships passed eastwards at 1100. No other ship movements were observed in the Eastern or Western Mediterranean.

Submarine positions were reported 22 miles south of Toulon and 10 and 16 miles east of Bastia.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

According to a report from Commander, Submarines, Italy, the Italian Navy is now calling back all submarines, allegedly because their fighting power is exhausted. After re-equipment, the boats are to operate north of Sicily and between Sardinia and the North African coast.

No special reports have been received from our submarines.

Submarine chaser "2210" sank an enemy submarine off Ajaccio after the French steamer CHANTEAU D'VQUEM (2,536 BRT) had been sunk by an enemy submarine 6 miles southwest of Ajaccio on 27 Jul.

Two Italian destroyers, 5 torpedo boats, 3 of our submarine chasers and 4 motor minesweepers were on duty in the escort service. Eight steamers were escorted in the island traffic. With reference to the sinking of the tanker ALBERTO FASSIO on 26 Jul., it is reported that after running aground off Prevesa, the ship hit one of our mines 7 miles west of the harbor. Twenty-seven of the 46 Germans on board were rescued.

According to a report from Naval Group, West, the 4th Italian Army has ordered a state of preliminary coastal alarm due to the reporting of an enemy convoy west of Sardinia.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

According to Intelligence report, there was a commission of three British naval officers in civilian clothes on board the Turkish passenger steamer KADES from Istanbul to Izmir on 15/16 Jul., for the purpose of inspecting Turkish traffic facilities. (See teletype 1829).

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Own Situation:

Convoy RE ALESSANDRO with destroyer EURO, en route from Salonika to Rhodes, was unsuccessfully attacked at 1645 by an enemy submarine 25 miles southeast of Kassandra peninsula. The submarine was attacked by the air escort. An oil spot was observed.

Other escort operations were carried out without incident.

The dredger which was sunk in the Corinth Canal has been raised.

Having been informed on the subject of torpedo stowage at the Suda base, the Fuehrer has ordered that the torpedoes be stowed so as to exclude the risk of the entire stock being destroyed by resonance ignition in case of explosions in the neighborhood.

Group South and Commanding Admiral, Aegean have therefore been ordered by Naval Staff to take the necessary measures and possibly to store parts of the stock separately. For copy, see teletype 2122.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

One submarine was located off Theodosia at 2355 on 27 Jul., and one south southwest of Idler at 0025 on 28 Jul. According to air reconnaissance there was another submarine 150 miles east-northeast of the Bosphorus at 1134.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation in the Far East:

No reports have been received.

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Situation in Italy:

Stefani reports that the Italian cabinet has ordered the dissolution of the Fascist Party. The law concerning the Fascist Grand Council has been revoked and it has been decided to abolish the Special Courts for the Security of the State.

According to Radio Rome, it was stated at a session of the cabinet that there would be no change in foreign policy. Italian comments on Churchill's speech affirm that the hypocrisy of the British claim to be fighting only against Fascism has now been unmasked. British and neutral comments regard Churchill's declaration as a threat that the war against Italy would be intensified until she changed not only her character but also her alliance. According to Reuter, when asked whether Italy would retain her former possessions in North Africa after an "honorable capitulation", Eden replied "no."

In a broadcast speech, Roosevelt too has demanded unconditional surrender by Italy. The USA would be satisfied only with total victory over all her enemies.

Naval Staff, <sup>N</sup>aval Intelligence Division has informed the Group Commands and Naval Commands on the Italian situation as follows:

1. The change of the government has so far taken place without any significant incidents. A military state of emergency has been declared. The new government has dissolved the Fascist Party, revoked the law on the Fascist Grand Council and transferred the functions of the Special Courts for the Security of the State to military courts.

In a proclamation to the Italian people, General Eisenhower has declared that the presence of the German aggressors on Italian soil is the only remaining obstacle to peace. He asked that all assistance to the German forces be withheld and promised peace on honorable terms. If Allied prisoners in Italy were handed back and not sent to Germany, Italian prisoners would be allowed to return home.

Demonstrations for the King and for the new Head of the Government continue. Rome is beflagged.

In several cases, Italian authorities have again confirmed to German authorities in Rome and in the Balkans, their anxiety to cooperate.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff:

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I. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division referred to a report from Commanding Admiral, Submarines to the effect that the situation at Hamburg necessitates the removal of all ships not already destroyed as it is planned to evacuate Hamburg completely. The transfer of the submarine base calls for a decision. Chief, Naval Staff ruled that further clarification of the position must be awaited. Only the two Walther-Submarines in the Blohm and Boss yards should be transferred as soon as possible.

In regard to the request of German Naval Command, Italy for two Naval Artillery detachments to be assigned for the defense of the Straits of Messina, Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division suggested that the detachments be left in the Toulon area.

Concerning the allotment to the Mediterranean of new naval landing craft and naval fishing smacks, as they become available, Chief, Naval Staff directed that, as a general rule, only replacements for losses should be sent to the Italian area and that all other vessels of the above-mentioned types should be transferred to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Conference in a highly restricted circle:

II. Report by Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Branch:

a. Transfer of torpedo boats T "26" and T "27" to the West area, as per order 1/Skl I op 2109/43 Gkdos. Chfs. Copy in War Diary, Part C Vol.d. Naval Staff approved the transfer of both boats together.

b. In accordance with the suggestion of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group West (see War Diary 25 Jul.), Chief, Naval Staff approved the restriction of torpedo boat escort for the "Aquila" submarines up to 8° W. (see T/P 1301).

c. Fuehrer Directive No. 48 in regard to command organization and defenses in the Southeast area. For copy as per 1/Skl 2141/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV. This lays down that the previous regulations concerning the exercise of influence by the Navy and Air Force upon our allies shall remain in force. Commanding Admiral, Aegean will ensure execution of German directives in the coastal areas of the Italian 11th Army on all matters of coastal defense for which the Navy is responsible.

d. Preliminary Fuehrer order for Army Group B as per copy of 1/Skl 2135/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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e. Directive of Chief, Armed Forces, High Command on measures for the relief of transport difficulties in Italy, as per copy of 1/Skl 2134/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

f. Armed Force, High Command has issued directives to Commanding General, Southeast and Commanding General, West on the attitude to be maintained towards the Italian Armed Forces which, for the time being is to remain unaltered. The directive rules that Navy and Air Force orders will be issued exclusively by Commanding General, Southeast and Commanding General, West in cooperation with the highest authorities of these services. Naval Staff has instructed Group South, Group West and Commanding Admiral, Aegean to establish the necessary contacts with Commanding General, West and Commanding General Southeast.

For copy of the directive 1/Skl 2155/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

g. Chief, Naval Staff approved the opinion of Naval Staff that, for the time being, no courier mail should be entrusted to the 'Aquila' submarines.

III. Naval Group South made the following suggestions:

1. The Dodecanese, the coast of the Peloponnese and western Greece up to  $40^{\circ}15'$  N to be placed under the authority of Commanding Admiral, Aegean.

2. Subdivision in Naval Shore Commands:

Dodecanese with port captains at Leros and Rhodes.

Peloponnese, with port captains at Navarino, Gythion and Nauplia.

Western Greece, with port captains at Patras, Argostoli, Prevesa and Corfu.

3. The eastern coast of the Adriatic from  $40^{\circ}15'$  N up to Trieste to be placed under the authority of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic (to be established).

4. Subdivision in Naval Shore Commands:

Southern Adriatic; with port captains at Valona, Durazzo and Cataro, Dalmatia; with port captains at Gravosa, Spalato, Sebenico and Zara, Northern Adriatic, with port captains at Fiume, Pola, Trieste. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division estimated personnel requirement at about 30,000 men.

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Special Items:

I. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command Italy reported that the invitation to Admiral de Courten had been delivered. He is unable to leave his post at the moment but hopes very much for an early meeting with Commander in Chief, Navy and will personally forward further advise.

II. Naval Staff has forwarded the following assessment of the situation to Naval Commands East, North, Norway, and Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with copy to Commander, Submarines, West and to Groups West and North Fleet:

"The situation in Italy remains obscure. Sudden events of great political importance are not to be excluded, in which case there might be repercussions in the Italian Armed Forces which would necessitate immediate German action. For such an eventuality, it is necessary to make immediate preparations to keep the Italian military leaders present in the area and willing to fight, on our side, together with their formations to disarm the others, and take over their equipment, and, as far as possible, to concentrate them in camps until further decisions can be reached. Transportation of any kind must be denied to them, if necessary, by force.

Local developments may make it necessary for preparatory measures to be taken by commanding officers of the ranks of Divisional Commander and upwards, on their own initiative. The order of Armed Forces, High Command will be given by the key word "Lichse." Naval Group South and German Naval Command Italy have received separate directives through Commanding General, South and Commanding General, Southeast. Naval Group West will receive orders for its area through Commanding General, West."

For copy of teletype 1/Skl I a 2133/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

III. Commanding General, South requested that the orders obstructing the transfer of naval batteries and naval artillery detachments to the Italian area and under which vehicles becoming operational in the Marseille and Toulon areas are to be detained as from now, should be cancelled forthwith.

These orders were issued from Headquarters on 26 and 27 Jul. by Chief, Naval Staff in agreement with Chief, Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff.

Commanding General, South was therefore informed that the decisions reached in agreement with Armed Forces, High Command



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will be maintained for the present and that further information will be given later. For copy see teletype 1/Skl 21294/43 Gkdos. in War Diary Part C, Vol. X.

IV. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff requested a ruling from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, for 100,000 rounds of 10.5 cm explosive shells, cartridge SKC to be released to the Air Force by the Navy as quickly as possible since the Air Force had only 350 - 430 rounds per gun of this ammunition left, so that with the present rate of production, the 10.5 cm batteries of the Air Force would be out of action by the middle of August.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will follow up this matter.

V. On the subject of fighter protection for convoys in the North Sea and for the Swedish traffic to Rotterdam, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff stated:

The air defense of Germany has priority over all other duties of the fighter formations in northwest Germany and in the Netherlands.

Fighter protection for our convoys in the North Sea can be provided the weather is such as to make attacks by strong enemy formations against Reich territory unlikely or if intensive operations by our fighter formations are impossible. Within these limits, protection of the Swedish traffic to Rotterdam is the most urgent, with a view to preventing the Swedes from discontinuing it.

The only exceptions will be valuable large convoys which in each case, will be given close escort protection. This will ensure that, in case of a large-scale enemy attack, all available planes not with the convoy, can be called in for defense.

It is requested that demands for fighter protection be made in accordance with the above principles.

VI. Naval Staff, Operations Division issued the following directive to Group Commands and Naval Commands:

"In future all reports on air attacks in areas where the Navy is responsible for air defense, are to go first, via the Navy, to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff for the Fuehrer. It is therefore ordered that:

In areas where the Navy is responsible for air defenses and, in

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addition, wherever important naval interests are involved, Naval Shore Commanders and Coastal Defense Commanders, will report data on air attacks and forward the earliest possible details on defense and damage direct to Naval Staff. Direct transmission of reports by Central Observer Post, Wilhelmshaven for the Heligoland Bight area and by Air Reporting Central Station, Kiel for the Baltic Sea seems advisable. The Naval Commands or Commanding Admirals will send in supplementary final reports as soon as possible. The first reports will, whenever possible, be made by telephone direct to Naval Staff Situation room, at Berlin. Naval Staff, Operations Division will transmit them to Armed Forces, High Command."

VII. A summary of Information on the Enemy, obtained by Radio Deciphering and Radio Intelligence between 19 and 25 Jul. is contained in Radio Intercept Report No. 30/43.

Attention is called to page 5, enclosure 4. It appears that, due to the naval situation the North Atlantic convoy traffic is again using the shortest route, i.e. the Great Circle.

Situation on 29 Jul. 1943:

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-two planes were detected over the outer Bay of Biscay up to 46° N and 16° W.

At 0742 and 0906, Radio Intelligence intercepted a report from BE 8816 to the northbound convoy Seaplane in regard to one of our contact planes and, at 1655, a plane's report on an attack by 3 of our planes in BF 4527. Convoy Escort planes were located at an unspecified time in BE 9183; at 1151, in BE 6752; at 1232, in BE 6860 and at 1235 in BE 6910. One British ship was located at 1255 in BE 8590, one at 1802 in AM 71, one at 1019 in BE 9189 and one at 2355 in BF 4170.

At 0900, our air reconnaissance observed a northbound convoy with 1 anti-aircraft carrier in BE 9419. The same convoy was reported at 1911 on 28 Jul. in BF 3235, as consisting of 48 merchant ships, 1 cruiser, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers and 8 guard ships, on course 360°. It was travelling

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in formation of 12 lines of 4 ships each, with the carriers in the middle, the cruiser ahead, and the destroyers and guard boats in all-around screen. Ships of this convoy were repeatedly located during the night.

For deciphered radio messages on movements of light naval forces in the eastern part of the Channel and den Hoofden, see teletype 0810.

Our air reconnaissance reported heavy shipping traffic near Start Point in the afternoon.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

At 0420, off Ile de Re, submarine U "231" was damaged by a mine and put in to La Pallice with JAGUAR and 1 minesweeper.

Otherwise, the torpedo boat submarine escort operation has so far been carried out according to plan and without incident. In regard to anti-submarine operations in the Bay of Biscay Group West reports:

Due to recent frequent sightings of enemy submarines in the inner Bay of Biscay the following measures have been put into effect.

a. In the areas permanently open for submarine hunting:

1. All planes flying over these waters will immediately report by radio any submarines traveling without escort.

2. Planes will immediately attack unaccompanied submarines with bombs and gunfire provided that this does not affect execution of the plane's planned operation.

3. Upon receipt of radio report of sighting Air Commander, Atlantic Coast will immediately institute hunt by emergency forces.

4. As emergency forces, one FW "200-plane" will be held in readiness for the sea area North Spanish Coast 47° north up to 7° west, and one BV "138" or two Ar "196"-planes for coastal waters.

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5. Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will send out submarine chasers as the situation demands.

b. Outside the permanently open submarine hunting areas and in areas closed to submarine hunting, sighted submarines will be reported by telephone to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast, immediately upon the plane's return. Anti-submarine action will then be ordered as necessary after establishing through Commander, Submarines West whether the submarine is friend or foe.

Note: Commander, Submarines, West reports that in areas open for submarine hunt all submarines not escorted by naval forces are enemy boats. Our own submarines returning under escort from diving trials will not be reported by Commander, Submarines, West and the areas of free anti-submarine hunting will not be closed to them because it is impossible to mistake them for enemy submarines.

Channel Coast:

Four mines were cleared near Ostend. No other important events.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

During an attack by enemy PT boats on convoy "1157", 1 enemy PT boat was sunk by the 2 patrol boats near Terschelling. The convoy was taken on to the Elbe without further trouble. At 0314, patrol position "Kairo" drove off enemy PT boats by firing star shells.

One ELM/J-mine was cleared near Terschelling.

Another enemy plane shot down on the morning of 28 Jul. by naval anti-aircraft has been reported.

On 29 Jul., several enemy air formations flew in towards Heligoland and dropped explosive and incendiary bombs on the island and the dunes. Half the bombs fell into the sea. No damage worth mentioning was done. One plane was probably shot down north of the island by naval anti-aircraft artillery.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

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Twenty-nine planes were detected operating over the North Sea. Radio Intelligence intercepted a report on one of our convoys in the Skerries off Trondheim.

On 29 Jul., exhaustive air reconnaissance was made between 58° and 70° north in search of the naval forces reported on 28 Jul.

No enemy movements were observed, so that Group North Fleet is apparently right in assuming that the enemy activity has died down. The Group is now of the opinion that the operations were deceptive measures for the purpose of alarming our commands, and coastal defenses. Unfortunately, 5th Air Force lost 5 EV "138" planes during the contact flights on 28 Jul.

On 28 Jul., a submerged submarine was sighted by one of our planes 10 miles west of Slotteroy.

2. Own Situation:

For the night of 29 Jul. 5th Air Force has ordered reconnaissance by two FW "200" planes of the area off Trondheim up to 3° west in order to re-locate the carrier group. If this is unsuccessful reconnaissance is to be made of the areas south of the Arctic Circle and off the Norwegian coast up to the line 7° west - Faeroes - Orkneys - Stavanger as well as the areas between the Norwegian coast and 3° west up to 70° north. 5th Air Force has refrained from reconnoitering further to the north as the carrier group is unlikely to be there and as our forces are inadequate due to the losses of the previous day.

The waters between Bergen and Aalesund have been reopened for shipping and the formation of Commanding Admiral Cruisers was replaced on normal readiness as at 1800.

At 1530 on 28 Jul., destroyer Z "33" entered Alta. The battle group is carrying out exercises in the Alta-fjord. Destroyer Z "28" has been ordered to transfer to Germany for repairs, after being made ready to proceed.

On the forenoon of 27 Jul., the Romanov Battery was unsuccessfully shelled by an enemy battery on the Rybatchi Peninsula.

Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan. Twenty-four ships were escorted to the north and 32 ships to the south. Fifteen ships were held up in the Arctic Coast area because of lack of escort.

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Group North Fleet has submitted the operational order of Commander, Submarines, Norway on the mining of the eastern entrance of Petchora Bay near Yermak Bank (code word "Gladiole") and the mining of the western entrance of Petchora Bay (code word "Tulpe") by submarine U "486", as well as the operational order for the mining of the western exit of Yugor Straits (code word "Nelke") by the submarine U "625" and the operational order for mining Belushiya Bay (code word "Aster") by the submarine U "601". For copy of the orders as per l/Skl 2124, 2126, 2127/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see in War Diary Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Sksgerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the night of 28 Jul., Russian PT boats attempted to break through north and south of Tytters, but were spotted in time and driven off.

About midnight of 28 Jul., 6 bombs were observed to have been dropped between the net- and mine-barrages in AO 3519.

At 0251, on 27 Jul., near Korgulovo mine exploding vessel "12" observed an engagement between our minesweepers and a light enemy war vessel which was set on fire by shells and sank. This appears to confirm the sinking of a motor minesweeper.

In Kronstaat Bay, on 29 Jul. continuous artillery activity was kept up throughout the day. Three bombs were dropped at Kunda. Other bombs and gunfire attacks were made on the "Bismarck" Battery. Material damage was slight. An oil patch was observed by our planes west of Tytters. No listening results were obtained.

2. Own Situation:

At 1800, 4 enemy air formations flew into the Baltic Sea; one attacked Warnemuende and two others attacked Kiel. At Warnemuende explosive and incendiary bombs fell on the Arado works, the Naval Arsenal, the submarine base and harbor installations. The KFRG-(German magnetic minesweeping gear) tug KRONPRINZ was burned out. At Kiel, the dockyards and industrial installations on the eastern shore were the main targets. Heavy damage was done at Ellerbak and Neumuhlen - Diedrichsdorf. The permanent stores at the Naval Arsenal was hit. Copper forges and the lifting crane were damaged at the Kolbe dockyards. The Howaldt yard received more than 100 explosive bomb hits affecting all the large sheds. The mould loft was burnt out. One PT boat was sunk. No damage was caused to submarines.

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The experimental vessel FREIHER: VON STEIN of the Communications Experimental Command was hit in the bows. At Anschuetz, a big fire was started, the buildings of the Diedrichshof Naval Victualling Officer were heavily damaged but comparatively little foodstuffs was destroyed.

On the evening of 28 Jul., the mineship LITZ at the Odense dockyard sabotaged and damaged by an explosive charge and is lying on the bottom in 5 meters of water.

A mine exploded in a fishing net north of Laaland.

Mine clearance ship "11" has started sweeping the Sound-barrage South. Mine clearance ship "12" is continuing sweeping work in the Irben Narrows.

Convoy and transport traffic was carried out according to schedule and without incident. It is planned to escort ADMIRAL SCHEER to Swinemuende on the night of 29 Jul. Torpedo boat T "13" moved from Hamburg to Kiel during the night of 28 Jul.

When Skagerrak-barrages XVIII and IXX were approved, it was stated that the plans for barrages XX and XXI must be postponed for further decision at the end of Jul. Depleted mine stocks and the urgent, largely unmet, requirements in the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Channel now make it impossible for any further mines to be allotted to Naval Command Baltic Sea for the Skagerrak plan. Naval Command, Baltic Sea has been advised accordingly.

V. Merchant Shipping:

1. In regard to the request of the Mediterranean Representative of the Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping, (for opinion of Naval Staff, see War Diary 26 Jul.), Armed Forces High Command has decided:

The shipping space of 18,000 BRT up to now in operation in the Adriatic - Piraeus traffic, will have to remain on that route in order to carry coal, with deck-cargo of hay and straw to Greece and to bring back bauxite to Trieste. It is planned to use the above shipping space for traffic inside the Adriatic which will become necessary if the Corinth canal becomes unusable. All other ships are to be used exclusively in internal Aegean traffic and on the route from Varna to the Dardanelles.

2. Brief Report 10/43 of Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, contains information on the status of the Swedish merchant fleet in 1943, the employment of British experts in the administration of

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Turkish state controlled steamship traffic, shipping traffic between Turkey and the ports of the Red Sea, etc.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report from Spain, a convoy of 70 ships has left Dakar for the Mediterranean.

In the Yucatan straits, moderate traffic and little day or night patrol activity is reported. No location activities were observed.

2. Own Situation:

On 16 Jul., in DL 6415, U "84" sank a steamer of 6,000 BRT and, on 29 Jul., U "177" in KR 5726, sank the steamer CORNISH CITY (4,952 BRT). The sinking was observed and reported by a southbound ship. That ship was detected and pursued by the "Bachstelze."

Operations and successes in the Caribbean Sea and along the Brazilian coast have not come up to expectations. The enemy defense from the air is so strong that there is no opportunity for the boats to attack.

Commander in Chief, Navy has reached a decision in regard to the new concrete shelters on the west coast of France. Six new berths will be built at St. Nazaire and seven new berths at Bordeaux. At Tailmont and Brest a total of 51 berths is planned. The general distribution is planned as follows:

Lorient 46; St. Nazaire 26; La Pallice 41; Bordeaux 22, including 5 for the Italians; Tailmont 40 and Brest 46. Total 221.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

3rd Air Force had 160 planes in operation in the west area and 2 in the Mediterranean.

A Liberator was shot down 100 miles northwest of Brest. In an operation against a northbound convoy 320 miles west of Cape Finisterre on 28 Jul., a merchantman of about 6,000 BRT was damaged. This convoy was again detected at 0900 on 29 Jul.



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Our attacking planes sank a steamer of 10,000 BRT and damaged a steamer of 7,000 BRT. One FW 200 plane is missing.

In the forenoon of 29 Jul., enemy planes made numerous incursions. For attacks on Warnemuende and Kiel, see Situation Northern Waters. For the attack on Heligoland, see Situation Northern Waters. Two enemy formations flew simultaneously into the Amsterdam and Schelde River mouth areas. No attack was made. In defense against these daylight attacks, 12 planes were shot down by fighters and by anti-aircraft fire.

In the afternoon, airfields in Belgium and northern France were attacked. During the night of 29 Jul. strong forces again raided Hamburg. Detailed information has not yet been received. According to reports so far, 30 enemy planes were shot down during the attack.

Mediterranean Theatre:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights. Photographic reconnaissance was made of Alexandria, Port Said, Sfax, and Sousse. No attack activities have been reported. During daylight, the enemy attacked the airfields at Viterbo near Rome and at Aquino near Naples. In the night of 29 Jul., 15 planes from England dropped propaganda leaflets in the Po delta. It is also reported that agents were landed.

Eastern Front:

Sixty-one enemy planes were shot down on the Army front on 27 Jul. and fifty-nine on 28 Jul. No other reports of any importance have been received.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

On the afternoon of 28 Jul., Nicosia was captured by the enemy. On 29 Jul., the enemy reopened the attack against the 29th Armored Division. Our counter-attack came to a standstill after a successful start. An attack against the right flank of 15th Armored Division was repulsed. At 2000, the enemy began attacking the right flank of the "Hermann Goering" Tank Division. Our right flank withdrew according to plans. The enemy air force continued to participate with strong forces in the land fighting. A total of 75 tanks and 20 assault guns are operational.

According to Intelligence report from a reliable agent in

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Paris, dated 19 Jul., the enemy expects Sicily to fall within three weeks.

On the other hand, the report contains an apparently great exaggeration to the effect that allegedly 700,000 men were landed in Sicily and that the Allies had 1.5 million men available in the Mediterranean.

Situation at Sea:

No enemy vessels were sighted by our air reconnaissance in the area between the west coast of Southern Italy and the north coast of Sicily or in the area west of Sardinia, including the coastal waters up to southeast of Sardinia. According to radio intelligence, it is probable that supplies for Sicily are being brought from the Eastern Mediterranean. During the night of 28 Jul., a battleship group was probably out to sea. Otherwise, the situation off the Sicilian coast is generally unchanged.

The next PT boat operation is planned for the night of 30 Jul. Four PT boats will move from Taranto to Crotona to refuel and take on torpedoes. The first PT boat for the Aegean, S "55" has transferred from Taranto to Salonika.

During the night of 28 Jul., enemy air attacks were made on Naples. No particular damage was caused.

No reports have been received on successes of our own or the Italian submarines.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

At 1145, a big convoy of 65 freighters, 5 tankers and 1 transport with 6 escort vessels passed Cante coming from the Atlantic. Five of the freighters entered Gibraltar. About 1930, another convoy of 50 ships passed through the Straits into the Mediterranean. This convoy picked up 8 loaded freighters from Gibraltar. On the same day, a U.S. auxiliary cruiser with 5 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. In addition, 1 cable-layer and 1 DICO-class cruiser, and a damaged aircraft carrier of the ILLUSTRIOUS class escorted by four destroyers entered Gibraltar. The DICO class cruiser that went into dock on 22 Jul. is said to be the SIRIUS all of whose deck guns have to be replaced because of bomb damage.

It is also reported that 2 U.S. cruisers of the BROOKLYN class,

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5 U.S. destroyers and 1 tanker left the Mediterranean for the Atlantic.

According to our air reconnaissance, at 0525, there were 9 merchant ships, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers sailing east, 30 miles west-northwest of Bougie.

According to radio intelligence, air reconnaissance activity in the northern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea and in the Gulf of Genoa has again increased. A report was intercepted on an aerial torpedo attack against a destroyer, another warship and a merchantman, with the assumption of hits.

On 28 Jul., submarine positions were reported 110 miles south of Naples and 90 miles east of Cape Spartivento.

No shipping traffic was observed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Radio Intelligence observed, conspicuous radio activity between Alexandria, Algiers, Tunis, and Bizerte and shipping traffic in the Bizerta - Tunis - Malta area. Also British air reconnaissance in the Rhodes area was detected.

No particular new information was obtained from photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria, Port Said, Sfax and Sousse. For details, see Daily Situation under Aerial Warfare.

The following Intelligence Report has been received:

1. Enemy signal troops were landed near Sassari on Sardinia on 27 Jul.

2. Anglo-American plans in the Mediterranean are said to have been completely altered. An attack on Crete would be too costly and of no practical advantage, and of no practical advantage, and as the Greek coasts are not favorable for operations and Turkey refuses to be drawn into the war against the Axis, the attack against the continent is to be made via Sicily - Sardinia - Corsica - Calabria - Lucania - Apulia - Campania. After occupation of the latter four provinces the Balkan countries are to be attacked, from the naval base of Taranto, in the following directions:

- a. Coast of Montenegro - Hertzogovina.
- b. Albanian coast from Durazzo to Corfu.
- c. Western coast of Greece from Corfu to Zakynthos.

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3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

Besides the enemy submarine sunk by submarine-chaser UJ "2210" on 27 Jul., another submarine was probably sunk on 28 Jul. off Ajaccio by the Italian torpedo boat ORSA. On the other hand, an Italian submarine was destroyed by an enemy submarine south-southwest of Cape Maria Leuca at 0600 on 29 Jul.

At 1325, the motor ship ALFIERE (4,200 BRT), escorted by a torpedo boat and 2 PT boats, was torpedoed by an enemy plane on her way from Messina to Naples southwest of Licosa. The ship is still afloat.

Two Italian destroyers and 6 torpedo boats as well as 2 PT boats, 1 mine layer, 1 submarine chaser, 3 motor minesweepers and 2 anti-aircraft corvettes were on duty in the escort service. Eleven steamers were escorted in the island traffic and off the west coast of Italy. The fast escort vessel SG "13" and 2 motor minesweepers entered Civitavecchia from Gaeta.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean:

The submarine warning to troop convoy RE ALLESSANDRO on 27 Jul. was a false alarm.

On 27 Jul., the mine layer VERGADA destroyed 2 or 3 attacking enemy planes. Our ship sustained only minor damage and casualties. A Greek auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk by gunfire from 2 American planes on 27 Jul. at a harbor near Cerigio.

Convoy and transport traffic without incident.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Eight submarines at sea were detected by Radio Intelligence. At 1443 on 28 Jul., a naval landing craft was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine, 24 miles west-northwest of Eupatoria. During the night of 28 Jul., two heavy calibre guns bombarded Taganrog from 2215 to 0200. The damage sustained is not particularly serious.

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Own Situation:

In regard to the attack by naval artillery lighters M&L "1" - "4" and (foreign-built) motor minesweeper RA "56" against the enemy front on the Mius River during the night of 27 Jul., it is additionally reported that, shortly after the bombardment was started, at 0316, an enemy armored train was sighted and that fire was then directed against it. The armored train returned fire with 4 - 6 guns. Our formation withdrew to a longer range, still keeping the train under fire, and scored a direct hit on the locomotive.

No more mines were cleared during minesweeping on the Danube. It is planned to re-open the river for traffic if further checks produce no results.

On 28 Jul., a lighter in the convoy Odessa - Sevastopol was heavily damaged by striking a mine and was beached near Eupatoria. At the same place another mine exploded in the sweeping gear.

The Kertch Straits ferry traffic and the Crimean and sea convoys were carried out as scheduled.

IX. Situation Far East:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance:

Rumors of Alleged Hungarian peace overtures made through Turkey have been officially denied in Budapest.

Naval Attaché, Rome has forwarded the following statements made by the new Italian Navy Minister, Admiral de Courten, on the occasion of the attaché's first visit:

"1. He said that he was fully aware that the change of government had at first caused surprise and some apprehension to the Germans but that for a long time, the feeling had been growing in authoritative Italian circles that something was wrong with the organization of the State and that things could not go on as they were. In the Italian State, a solution

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to such a situation was offered by the continuous line represented by the Head of the State.

2. The crisis which had arisen was a military one; due to the close interlocking of the Duce's military and political responsibilities, it necessarily led to a political crisis. Military causes of the crisis were to be found in the fact that thousands of men were not doing military service but were loafing about in the towns, that many factories were not fully employed on war production etc.

3. The situation in which the Duce at last found himself was created by Fascism itself i.e. by his closest colleagues in the Fascist Grand Council. The Great Fascist Council's plan to get rid of the Duce inevitably meant the break down of Fascism, as Fascism stands or falls with the person of the Duce. Thus the edifice was undermined by his own colleagues.

4. The fact that, following the majority resolution of the Fascist Grand Council, the Duce decided to appeal to the King, confirmed the suspicion that had been held for some time in authoritative circles that, as a result of illness, the Duce's strength was decreasing. Otherwise the Duce would have appealed to the people for confirmation of his authority instead of obeying the advice of the Fascist Grand Council. He lacked the strength of mind to do this.

5. In their own difficult position during the last few months, the Italian military leaders had been watching the focal points which were regarded as decisive for the common struggle, namely the submarine campaign and the Russian front, and had seen a drop in submarine successes and no sign of gaining the upper hand on the Russian front. This had contributed to their extremely pessimistic assessment of their own position in the Mediterranean war.

6. The outbreak of an unfriendly or hostile action towards the Germans at various places in Italy during the last few days was provoked by isolated subversive elements who would exploit the situation so long as the new government's internal measures were not yet fully put into effect. The Head of the Government had not been able to prepare his organization and measures until after assuming office. Those who insult the Germans, who are now carrying the heaviest burden of the battle against Italy's external enemy, deserve to be shot. Strong measures may be expected.

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7. De Courten emphasized his wish to continue close and confident cooperation with the German Navy. He would like to see Grand Admiral Doenitz personally as soon as possible but could not do so at the moment as he found himself suddenly in charge of a political mission which was new to him as a military man. Besides the newly-created post of Navy Minister necessitated his continued presence at the Council of Ministers for the present."

The Chief, Naval Staff is absent from Berlin at the Naval Hitler Youth rally at Stralsund.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

I. Admiral Nomura, through Naval Attache, Tokyo, has expressed his thanks to Commander in Chief, Navy for his pleasant and interesting journey on the MARCO POLO.

The glance into life on board, the spirit of comradeship and cooperation of the excellent crew had deeply impressed him. He had come to appreciate the Commanding Officer as an intelligent cautious but nevertheless very daring officer.

On the occasion of the explosion of the ammunition steamer, witnessed by Nomura from the cuning tower, the boat was endangered by a rain of fragments from the explosion.

II. Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division:

a. The Navy will place at the disposal of the Air Force 100,000 rounds of 10.5 centimeter anti-aircraft ammunition in two installments in July and August, as desired. The disorganization of the railway and communications traffic in the Hamburg district, due to the enemy air attacks, is temporarily causing some difficulty in the dispatch of the shipments from the depot at Seegeberg.

b. Commanding Admiral, Naval Group, West reported serious concern in regard to the plan of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to take over the remaining 50,000 BRT of French merchant shipping space regardless of the agreement with Laval. This would involve the last reserves and German - French relations would again be seriously endangered with consequent repercussions on working possibilities in the dock yards, sabotage activity etc.

Corresponding steps have already been taken with Laval. Naval

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Staff, Quartermaster Division has asked Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Operations Branch (Navy) to intervene.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff considers it inadvisable - apart from any other reason - to transfer more shipping space to Italian harbors at the present moment.

c. The question of the evacuation of Naval Staff and High Command, Navy from Berlin, in view of the serious air threat, calls for energetic consideration.

III. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff stated that it has been impossible to obtain from Armed Forces, High Command an official version of the position or plans in Italy, as requested from various quarters, and that - under the prevailing conditions - one is unlikely to be given. Naval Staff, Operations Division has so far kept the highest Navy commands as well informed as possible.

New instructions, to be regarded as the opinion of Naval Staff, have been issued to all Groups, Naval Commands, Commanding Admiral, Northern Waters, and Commanding Admiral, Cruisers as well as to the chief directors and directors, chiefs of Naval Staff, Communications Division; Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division; and Chief, Naval Staff, Submarine Division, as follows:

"Owing to the concentration of all the war leadership in his own person, Mussolini was no longer fully equal to the increasing strain in all sectors so that, even within the Fascist Party efforts were being made to decentralize authority in Italy in order to attain a higher degree of efficiency. Assumption of power by the King is a natural consequence in a monarchist state. Marshal Badoglio, as an old Army leader, enjoyed the special confidence of the nation. His declaration of willingness to continue the war is based on the general situation and cannot at present be doubted. Cooperation with Germany will be maintained and sought. It remains doubtful how far the new government will succeed in mobilizing the forces of the Italian nation and state for war and whether they will be adequate to hold out to the end. Realization of its own weakness or inability to master the situation may lead or force the government to take steps which cannot at present be foreseen. There is no doubt that Italy will continue to require strong German support, which to a large extent is arranged for. The transfer of German forces to Italy is in accordance with our opinion that the Italian mainland



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must, in no circumstances be left to the enemy without a fight. However unforeseen events must always be reckoned with."

Attention was called to the information in regard to "Achse" and to the attitude to be maintained towards the Italian Armed Forces.

Special Items:

Armed Forces, High Command, Intelligence Service, Foreign Armies Division, has forwarded reports from the Italian Naval Attaché, Nanking. For photostatic copies as per 1/Skl 21441/43 see War Diary Part C, Vol. a.

The reports deal with Russian/Anglo-American relations and Japanese Russian relations and contain interesting detailed information on the general situation.

Situation on 30 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

No particular reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché, Tokyo has been instructed, by Telegram 1054, to carry out the program for the Aquila submarines as planned, but not to send courier mail by them for the present.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has advised Naval Staff, Submarine Division and Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division in regard to the characteristics of the FLIEDER and of FLIEDER'S report of 30 Jul. that she will cross the equator on 1 Aug., reaching the rendezvous point 3900 N 3330 W on 11 Aug. Also, that, according to present estimates, she will not require docking. (See 1/Skl 2168/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary Part C, Vol. I).

All ships in foreign waters have been informed on the enemy situation by radiogram 1921.

According to radio intelligence, the Italian repatriation ships VULCANIA and SATURNIA were at a position 1110 N 2500 W at noon

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on 29 Jul.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has given a ruling on the question of top masts in the camouflage of blockade runners by Order l/Skl I k 20919/43 Gkdos. For copy, see War Diary Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

In the area of 19th Group, 60 planes and 3 sea rescue planes were observed in the outer Bay of Biscay up to 1430 W and Cape Villano. One British ship was located at 1948 in BE 9330 and one in BE 7160/90 at 2248.

Radio Intelligence intercepted numerous reports from planes on our submarines in BE 90 and 69. Furthermore, sighting reports on three of our submarines were intercepted in BF 71 between 0945 and 1233. They referred to outgoing tanker submarines "461" and "462" and to submarine U "504". The last report from submarine U "461" itself stated: "1146 engagement with 5 planes."

According to our air reconnaissance, 15 merchantmen were assembling near Sheerness at 1600. Fifteen steamers were observed entering Spithead at 1500. As of 29 Jul. it is additionally reported that a convoy of 20 steamers with 2 - 3 escort vessels was sighted about 300 miles west-northwest of Cape Ortegal on a southerly course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J-mine was cleared off La Pallice and one off the Gironde mouth. Destroyer Z "32" has submitted the brief report on the anti-submarine action of 23 Jul. For copy, see teletype 2330. At 1115, the "Friedrich August" Battery shot down one enemy plane.

The GREIF and 3 boats of 6th Minesweeper Flotilla left Lezardieux for Cherbourg at 2200.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

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North Sea:

Patrol boat Vpbt "2019", which was damaged and beached off West Kapelle on 28 Jul. has been brought in to Flushing.

Eleven ELM/J mines were cleared south of Heligoland and north of Tershelling. Three enemy planes were shot down by naval units in the Dutch coastal areas.

Escort and patrol services were carried out without special incidents.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Radio Intelligence, one of our submarines was reported in AT 7259 by the radio station at Belushiya.

Fifteen planes were detected in the area Faeroes - Iceland. Other planes were over the northern North Sea between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast. No activity by the Iceland squadrons was observed.

According to an Intelligence report of 30 Jul., from a diplomatic source in Lisbon, the Allies plan to land on the southwestern and central west coast of Norway between 5 and 15 Aug. The elimination by air raids of Hamburg, as the most important German supply port for Norway, was part of this plan.

Another Intelligence report states that specially picked Canadian troops, who have lived in Arctic areas, have been seen in Iceland. All northern Norwegians are also said to have been transferred from England to Iceland. The total strength of the troops in Iceland is estimated at 150,000 men.

2. Own Situation:

Patrol boat VP "5301" has towed the captured enemy PT boat "345" to Bergen. Convoy traffic was carried out without incident. Thirty-eight ships were escorted to the north and 33 to the south. Fourteen ships are held up in the area of Admiral Arctic Coast due to lack of escort.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

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1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay, about 30 low-flying planes repeatedly attacked our coastal batteries with bombs and gunfire during the morning. Three planes were shot down by naval anti-aircraft artillery. Two more planes were probably shot down. On the evening of 29 Jul., great anti-aircraft and searchlight activity was observed over Leningrad. In the afternoon of the same day, 12 planes attacked our boats south and west of Tytters. At 0032 on 30 Jul., six PT boats had an engagement with a minesweeper in AO 3639. The PT boats put up smoke screens when the minesweeper opened fire.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic, 17 vessels and 4 minesweeping planes were engaged on check sweeps. Three troop transports and 3 steamers were escorted. A fishing steamer went aground in the Samsøe Belt.

The leave transport between Hangoe and Reval and between Jakobstadt and Danzig was carried out without incident by 6 ships.

According to Finnish reports, the Finnish steamer KANOPUS was slightly damaged by a mine on 26 Jul. south-southeast of Sandhamaren. Investigations are still underway to whether it was a drifting mine or a ground mine.

A supplementary report on the minesweeper engagement south of Lavansaari on 27 Jul. states that one small enemy vessel blew up at 0228 and that another small vessel sank at the same place at 0303. A third, larger vessel, withdrew behind smoke after being fired upon. The enemy ships were not destroyed by gunfire but by mines.

Naval Staff has approved the plan of Group North Fleet (see War Diary 28 Jul.) to withdraw the mine ships OSTMARK and KAISER from Tromsøe on 15 Aug. for Naval Command, Baltic Sea.

V. Merchant Shipping:

1. According to a report from Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy to Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch, there are no big or small ships lying idle in the area of west Italy with the exception of 2 tankers. The increased delay and difficulties in regard to sea transport are caused by the extensive destruction of railway

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junctions which results in big traffic congestion. Chief Supply and Transport expects the position on the railroads to improve soon. Transport requirements remain at the same level as before. As freight traffic has now been switched over to coastal shipping i.e. barges and naval landing craft, the requirements for transport space already submitted have become most urgent, also for the Adriatic traffic. Chief, Supply and Transport is therefore in favor of transferring shipping space from the Aegean traffic to the Adriatic.

2. According to an Intelligence report from Wilhelms-haven, it is suspected that the Italian steamer FIDELITAS plans to desert while sailing from Hamburg to Harvik. Naval Staff, Operations Division has ordered Naval Command, Baltic Sea to take the necessary precautions but, in so doing, to act strictly in accordance with the orders issued and display no distrust of the Italians.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report from Vigo, of 29 Jul., the Spanish tanker CAMPANA has advised that a convoy of 16 - 18 ships left Aruba for Casablanca on 6 and 8 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received since 1146 from the group of submarines U "461", U "462", and U "504" which were attacked by enemy planes while outward bound through the Bay of Biscay. According to radio intelligence, enemy planes reported at 1230 that the three boats had submerged. As two British ships had been located in that area, the group was ordered to disperse, and proceed independently. Two other groups were also given permission to disperse if they were in the vicinity of the grid squares where the locations were made. The air escort asked for by the boats was unable to reach the area which is beyond the range of the Ju 88 planes.

The loss of tanker-submarines U "461" and U "462" would have serious consequences as it would make it necessary for the submarines now operating in the Caribbean Sea and in the Brazil and Freetown areas to return prematurely. The air and patrol situation in the Bay of Biscay is growing increasingly difficult. Fighter planes are the only means of effective counter action. The enemy air force has moved its center of activity to the outer Bay of Biscay and is working together

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with the destroyers and naval forces there. Submarines have been ordered to disperse as soon as surface forces come into sight.

The route along a west-northwesterly course, which has not been used for a long time, will again be tried by boats leaving ports in western France in the hope that, after passing the flying-in sector in the area west of Brest, they will be comparatively safe. The southern route close to the Spanish coast has the advantage, especially at night, that enemy locations are hampered by the numerous Spanish fishing vessels.

The submarines are having trouble with enemy planes in the other sea areas also. A number of attacks have been driven off. In FJ 91, an enemy plane was set on fire by the guns of submarine U "604".

Special Items:

1. In accordance with the new distribution of the submarine docking berth shelters Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section considers it advisable to arrange distribution of submarine flotillas in the harbors of western France as follows: Brest, Lorient, La Pallice, Talmont, 3 flotillas each; St. Nazaire, 1 flotilla; Bordeaux, 2 flotillas. Contrary to previous planning, it is assumed that 15 flotillas will be sufficient for western France. As from 1 Aug., submarine losses are expected to amount to 7% of the number of front-line boats available at the end of each month.

2. In regard to the current status of the submarine campaign, use of the following official version has been ordered

1. The big variations in the plotting curves of submarine successes in both the last and the present wars are characteristic. The curve shows peaks in the summer of 1940, spring of 1941 and late fall of 1942 and low points in the spring of 1940 and at the turn of the year in 1940/41 and 1941/42.

2. The reasons for this are mainly:

Variations in the number of submarines in operation, temporary lulls in traffic, sea and weather conditions, the withdrawal of boats for military operations entailing reduced action against merchant shipping, necessary reorganization to counter new operational measures by the enemy, and principally, alternating superiority in attack and defense.

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3. The current decrease is caused by the reinforcement and improvement of the enemy's defenses, especially by the use of planes. The air-gap in the Central Atlantic has been closed by long-range bombers, increased use of auxiliary aircraft-carriers and the enemy's use of helicopters.

Furthermore, the enemy's radio location equipment has been greatly improved so that it is easier to detect submarines in good time.

4. The current situation is transitory. The possibility of improving our own location equipment, anti-aircraft armament and the other fighting qualities of the submarines should be emphasized. Moreover the German Air Force and the Japanese Navy will be more actively employed against merchant shipping.

5. In order to explain the current naval situation attention should also be drawn to the gradual change-over from individual attack to convoy battles. It is not a matter of a continuous sinking-action by attacks on a large number of single steamers, but of convoy battles for which occasion is limited and whose outcome is dependent on the above factors.

6. In the race between offensive and defensive we will again win the lead; the submarine campaign will be prosecuted with all energy and will decisively paralyze the enemy's conduct of the war in foreign waters.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has informed Naval Attaché, Tokyo and Ship "28" of this official version.

## VII. Aerial Warfare:

### British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day, there were numerous incursions into the west area. In the forenoon, about 200 planes in two waves and on 6 routes flew in close formations over the Schelde mouth - Brussels - Aachen - Giessen - Kassel. From there 2 groups of 10 planes each flew into the Jena area and in the area southwest of Halle, returning with the main formation via Gottingen. They were then met by a formation of more than 100 planes in the Netherlands. The attacks were concentrated on the industrial area of Kassel - Bettenhausen. Among other things, the Junkers A.G. works and Fieseler A.G. works were heavily damaged. For further damage, see Daily Situation. Thirty enemy planes were shot down in defense.

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against these attacks. Other attacks were made on the same morning against the ship of airfield and, in the afternoon, in the Rouen area.

During the night of 30 Jul., a heavy enemy air attack with strong forces was made on Remscheidt, where considerable industrial damage was done. For details, see Daily Situation. According to reports so far received, 12 planes were shot down.

Mediterranean Area:

Our Air Force reconnoitered Bizerta and carried out photographic reconnaissance of Cyprus. No special information was gained by either of the two operations.

The enemy made strong attacks on airfields in southern Italy. Ten German and Italian planes were destroyed. Four of the attacking planes were shot down by our fighters.

Eastern Front:

On 29 Jul., 34 enemy planes were shot down on the Army front.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

A strong enemy attack against the right flank of the Tank Division "Hermann Goering" at Rigalbuto was broken. Catenna Nuova was taken by the enemy. The day was quiet on other sectors of the front. In order to protect the Gulf of Salerno, temporarily mobilized units of the parachute troops from Naples have been brought into the area southeast of Salerno.

Situation at Sea:

In the morning and afternoon of 29 Jul., enemy air forces were very active in the area of the Messina Straits. Only slight damage was done during an attack by 75 fighter bombers on the ferry landing place. At 2115, enemy forces were reported on an easterly course, 16 miles northeast of Punta Stilo. At 0425 on 30 Jul., presumably the same formation of 10 ships was 25 miles east-northeast of Catania on



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an unspecified course. According to our air reconnaissance, there were about 20 landing boats off Empedocle at 0930. There were only a few ships at Sciacca, Trapani and Marsala. Two light cruisers, 3 destroyers and 1 hospital ship were sighted at Palermo and 5 landing boats and 2 destroyers off Palermo. There was reported to be a large number of vessels in Licata. Fifteen large merchantmen were off Avola, as well as many smaller vessels. While many ships were reported at Syracuse, only a few merchant ship movements and 1 battleship in the harbor were reported from Augusta. According to radio intelligence, the Chief of Battle Group H was at sea in the Western Mediterranean.

On the evening of 29 Jul., 4 of our PT boats were sent out from Crotona against the enemy forces reported northeast of Punta Stilo but did not encounter the enemy. During the night of 30 Jul., no PT boats or other vessels were sent out for the defense of the Messina Straits.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

The damaged ILLUSTRIOUS-type carrier went into the dock in the afternoon of 29 Jul. after a DIDC-class cruiser had left the dock. The convoy which entered the Straits of Gibraltar from the Atlantic on the evening of 29 Jul. consisted of 50 ships of which 16 had entered Gibraltar by 2130 while the others went on into the Mediterranean. Nine freighters from Gibraltar joined the convoy. The two convoys that entered the Mediterranean have not so far been detected again.

At 1630, our air reconnaissance sighted 5 transports and one cruiser sailing east, 40 miles north of Philippeville and, at 1700, 2 destroyers sailing west and 5 destroyers sailing east, 40 miles northwest of Bougie. No particular results were obtained by reconnaissance of the harbors of eastern Tunisia on 29 Jul.

The sighting of a submarine southwest of Spezia was reported at 0430.

No special reconnaissance reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

According to an Intelligence report of 26 Jul., after the Straits of Messina have been crossed it is planned to make landings from Southern Italy on the west coast of Greece, i.e., on the island of Cephalonia near Santi Quaranta on the former Greek - Albanian frontier and south of Igoumenitsa.

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3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediter-  
anean, Naval Transport Situation:

The fast escort vessel SG "10", 5 motor minesweepers, 1 submarine chaser, 4 torpedo boats and 1 mine-layer were engaged in escort duties, escorting 4 steamers and 2 tankers in the island traffic. During the night of 29 Jul., the steamer RANDAZZO (7,200 BRT) ran ashore near Palmaiola island while on her way from Bastia to Genoa. The motorship ALFIER, which was damaged by an aerial torpedo, is being towed to Naples by 2 minesweepers under escort of 1 torpedo boat.

Details on the status of the barge program are given in Daily Situation, Western Area/South Coast. Up to now, 38 naval landing craft, 9 motor minesweepers, 73 tank barges, 10 freight barges, 5 "Seeloewe" barges and 15 tank lighters have left for Italy.

Naval Staff's statement on the dispatch of naval batteries and naval artillery detachments to the Italian area, forwarded on 29 Jul. to Commanding General, South, is again confirmed by the following directive from Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff to Commanding General, South:

"In view of the transport situation in Italy and in accordance with the present requirements of the general situation, the formations still outside Italy (Railway Battery "Gneisenau", 7 / Naval Artillery Battalion 201, 9/Naval Artillery Battalion 202, detachments of personnel of Naval Artillery Battalions 612 and 682 and the 21 cm guns given to the Navy by the Army) will be transferred to the area of the Italian 4th Army for the time being and will there be used to reinforce the incomplete coastal defense units. Subsequent transfer of these formations to Italy will be decided in accordance with the development of the situation,

The decision on the use of the other coastal batteries provided for "Alarich" remains suspended."

Naval Staff, on its part, has called the attention of Commanding General, South and German Naval Command, Italy to the report by Commanding General, South to the Fuehrer and the decision reached on that occasion.

In regard to the question of transferring shipping space and naval forces from the Western Mediterranean to the Greek area, Naval Staff is of the opinion that at present big ships can still be moved east via the Messina Straits, with some losses,

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and the transfer of small vessels, naval landing craft and light naval forces is still possible at the moment though the route will be cut in short order if the enemy advances further towards Messina. Naval Staff therefore thinks that the transfer of shipping space and light naval forces from the west of Italy area to the Greek area should be expedited. In deciding how many ships should be transferred, the future supply requirements for Sicily and Sardinia from the Italian, Corsican and possibly French areas, and the evacuation tasks that may become necessary, are countered by the fact that shipping space and defense forces in the Aegean are inadequate for the anticipated tasks in that theater. On the other hand, the whole question is a political problem of importance for our relations with Italy.

Naval Staff has therefore refrained, for the time being, from ordering any further transfer of PT boats, motor minesweepers, and other defense forces to the Greek area and has asked Armed Forces, High Command for a statement on this subject and a decision in regard to further transfers of shipping space. It was suggested that Commanding General, South be advised that every ship not in actual use be transferred to the Aegean without delay and that in the case of German escort forces transferred, a separate decision as to leaving them in the Greek Area be made in each case. In Naval Staff's opinion, the matter of Army evacuation is not the only deciding factor because if the naval forces in the Italian area are cut off, the existence of the armies in the Aegean will be jeopardized. The relative letter 1/Skl I a 21405/43 Gkdos. has been sent to Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy with copy to Commanding General, South; German Naval Command, Italy; Group South. For copy, see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

4. Area Naval Group, South:

Aegean:

Enemy Situation:

At 1115, a submarine was reported north of Rhodes. The harbor of Alimnia near Rhodes was attacked by planes in the afternoon and night of 28 Jul. The Italian steamer VASELLI (501 BRT) was burnt out. On 30 Jul., a plane attacked 2 coastal guard boats near Serifos. Casualties were sustained.

Own Situation:

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The Q-ship GA "45" is in operation in the Cyclades area. Troop transports were carried out without incident.

The Fuehrer has issued a directive on the protection of current supplies and stocks for the formations operating in the southeastern area. It provides that available railway and shipping space will be allotted to the three services by Commanding General, Southeast. For copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 21419/43 Gkdos. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

In regard to Group South's request for intensified strategic reconnaissance in the Eastern Mediterranean (see War Diary 21 Jul.), Naval Staff has established that Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff holds similar views and is equally interested in the subject. However, owing to shortage of forces, no improvement is possible at the moment. Naval Staff has informed Group South accordingly with copy to Commanding Admiral, Aegean. Group South has submitted another estimate of the Situation as of 26 Jul. in which developments in Italy and their consequences in the Greek - Aegean area are discussed. The Group's views entirely correspond with those of Naval Staff.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to Radio Intelligence, there were no big units at sea but 7 submarines were detected. At 2230 on 29 Jul., PT boats passed Anapa on a northwesterly course at a distance of 4 miles. During the night of 28 Jul., Taganrog harbor was again bombarded with 26 rounds.

Own Situation:

At 2007, submarine U "24" sank the damaged tanker of 7,000 BRT off Suchum.

Ship "19" was sent out to combat an enemy submarine 35 miles west-northwest of Eupatoria.

During the night of 29 Jul., 4 boats of 1st PT boat Flotilla were in operation off the landing place at Iyshakov. The star shell barrage, which had been arranged with the Army in order to illuminate the landing places, was directed too

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far out to sea and illuminated our own boats which were subjected to strong artillery fire by patrol boats and land batteries. The operation was discontinued as it was no longer possible to achieve surprise. On the night of 30 Jul., 3 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla will carry out a submarine hunt southwest of Theodosia.

Fifteen miles west of Mariupol an auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk probably by a mine. The route from Mariupol to Taganrog has been enclosed.

Five inertia contact mines were cut south of Eupatoria. Minesweeping work was carried out on the lower Danube by 3 minesweeping planes, 1 mine exploding vessel and river minesweepers. The operations have so far been unsuccessful. The Danube mouth has been reopened to shipping.

Supply and ferry traffic over the Kerch Strait was carried out according to schedule.

IX. Situation East Asia:

In regard to the campaign in the Solomons, the Japanese Liaison Officer reports:

The American Air Force is extremely active and is making continuous attacks with strong formations of sometimes up to 200 planes on the main Japanese stronghold, Bougainville island. The Americans have so far landed one army division on Rendova island and one on New Georgia. On New Georgia, an unspecified number of Marines has also been landed. Japanese forces on New Georgia number 7 Army battalions and a few marines. These formations made a surprise attack on 18 Jul. against American landing places, with good results.

On New Georgia, the enemy landed about 4,000 men in Nassau Bay. Enemy light naval forces are disrupting the Japanese supply route to Lae in the Gulf of Huon.

The Japanese are at present on the defensive in this theater and have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy Air Force. It is estimated that a total of 550 enemy planes have been destroyed.

On the Burma front, a small scale enemy landing operation at the beginning of Jul. was repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy.

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Items of Political Importance.

Reuter reports that, at a press conference of 30 Jul., Roosevelt warned the governments of neutral countries against granting asylum to Mussolini or other Axis leaders. This was done in agreement with the British and Russian governments.

An article in Izvestia protests against the attempt to create an eastern and southeastern European Federation in order to keep Germany down and to raise a barrier against Russia. In decrying such activities by the governments in exile and by anti-Soviet circles in England and America, the paper appeals to the letter and the spirit of the Anglo - Russian treaty.

Italy's international relations are still unchanged. No mention has so far been made of negotiations with the enemy. Badoglio's government has not replied to General Eisenhower's proclamation which was falsely interpreted by part of the world press as an offer of armistice terms. The greatest threat of internal unrest seems to have been avoided for the time being by the appointment of an energetic General in place of the Military Commandant at Milan who was apparently too weak.

The effect of the German measures remain to be seen. The view already expressed that the intransigence of the Anglo-Americans is primarily furthering our interests in southern Europe is confirmed by the developments to date. Whatever the Italian attitude may be in the long run, it cannot for the moment be denied that the time gained has enabled us to take up and reinforce our positions in the Apennine and Balkan Peninsulas much more easily than would have been possible against the will of the Italians or their active and passive resistance.

Special Items:

I. A memorandum has been prepared on the visit of Commander in Chief, Navy to Fuehrer Headquarters from 26 to 28 Jul. and the conferences and measures taken during those decisive days. Some of the measures have already been reported on the relative dates. Copy of the memorandum 1/Skl 2240/43 Gkdos. Chfs. is attached to War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

Naval Staff has no information on operations "Kopenhagen", "Siegfried", and "Student" mentioned in this connection, since their performance concerns the Navy only indirectly or not at all.

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II. For Group West's suggestion in regard to execution of the directive of Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch for the organization of the area of Commanding Admiral, Southern Coast of France see teletype from the Group Command as per 1/Skl 2181 and 2182/43 Gkdos. Chefs. For copies, see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

III. Naval Staff has sent the following directive to Group West:

1. The AQUILA submarines are not allowed to leave for the time being; pretext — the situation in the Bay of Biscay and escort difficulties.

2. Measures as necessary are to be taken to make sure that any attempt by the Aquila submarines to break out is prevented.

IV. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch has made plans for the organization of the western Greek and Adriatic coasts in the three following eventualities:

a. Italy remains in the war, continues to defend the Adriatic coast and stays in the Greek area,

b. Italy remains in the war but confines herself to the defense of northern Italy, and finally

c. Italy withdraws from the war.

For copy of Skl Qu A II 2151/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see files 1/Skl I op II/17 "Alarich" and "Konstantin" - "Achse" - Organization and Mobilization.

V. A list compiled by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, credits naval anti-aircraft with the destruction of 16 enemy planes in Jun. 1943, while the destruction of 82 more is still awaiting recognition. Credit is acknowledged for the destruction of 132 enemy planes in the previous months. Since the beginning of the war a total of 1851 enemy planes are acknowledged to have been shot down and 176 claims are still under investigation. Naval Command, North holds the record with 623 claims acknowledged.

It is calculated that 1163 rounds of 7.5 - 10.5 centimeter and 3382 rounds of 2 - 4 centimeter ammunition were expended for every plane shot down.

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VI. Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division has forwarded the following Intelligence report dated 27 Jul.:

"According to the information of neutral diplomatic circles at Lisbon as of 23 Jul., landings in Sardinia and Crete will be made as soon as Sicily is completely occupied. A simultaneous small-scale landing attempt is planned in Norway between Kristiansund and Stavanger. Continuous strong offensive operations have been agreed upon with Russia from the beginning of July until the beginning of September. Following several negative discussions between U.S. and British representatives, a landing on the Italian mainland has been postponed for the time being. Unrest will be promoted by intensified propaganda and by diplomatic action."

Naval Staff, Operations Division has advised Group North Fleet and Naval Command, Norway.

Situation on 31 Jul. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Attaché, Tokyo has requested information on the new boundaries of the submarine operational area in order to prepare the sailing orders for the blockade runners.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-one planes and 2 sea-rescue planes were detected over the outer Bay of Biscay up to 15° West. British ships were located at 1946 in BF 1680/1910 and at 2100 in BE 9630. At 0634 a British plane reported being attacked by one of our planes in BF 1618.

According to an Intelligence report, a British steamer left Lisbon at 2320 on 30 Jul. on a southerly course. She was escorted by a corvette.

2. Own Situation:



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Atlantic Coast:

At 1112, patrol boat VP "624" struck a ground mine south of St. Nazaire but was able to proceed. 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla's submarine escort mission was postponed for 24 hours.

Group West has submitted for information a copy of the request of 3rd Air Force Command to the Reichsmarschall and Commander in Chief, Air Force concerning reinforcement of the formations of Air Commander Atlantic Coast. The request is substantially identical with the information already given by Chief of Staff, Air Force to 3rd Air Force at the conferences of 7 and 12 Jul. between Group West, 3rd Air Force and Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. For copy as per 1/Skl 2158/43 Gkdos, Chefs. see files I L 2/VI.

The request briefly notes that the units of 3rd Air Force are insufficient to give any effective assistance to the incoming and outgoing submarines in the Bay of Biscay. Unless the bomber, heavy fighter and fighter formations of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast are soon reinforced, a further increase in submarine losses in the Bay of Biscay will be inevitable. As particularly urgent measures in support of the submarine campaign, 3rd Air Force requests that the building-up of V. Bomber Group of Wing 40 into a long-range heavy-fighter wing of 3 Groups be started immediately; that a 4th Squadron be established at once; that 2 squadrons be added to 3rd heavy-fighter wing 1; that the FW 190 planes of Fighter Command of 1st Coastal Reconnaissance Squadron 128 be brought up to the establishment of a long-range fighter Squadron with the addition of sea-going crews from Air Force General Staff with Commander in Chief, Navy, and that the building up of the Squadron be continued so as to make it a group. 3rd Air Force further requested the allotment of a 3rd group and expansion of III. Heavy Fighter Wing 1 and of Fighter Command, Coastal Reconnaissance Squadron 128 so as to form one long-range Fighter Wing as well as the assignment of the long-range Bomber formation to anti-surface force operations off Cape Finis-terre.

Channel Coast:

At 0227, one enemy plane was shot down southwest of Boulogne by motor minesweeper R "81". During the night of 30 Jul., 4 boats of 2nd and 6th PT Boat Flotillas from Ostend unsuccessfully swept the gap in the British minefield near buoy Victor. The transfer of PT boats from Boulogne to Cherbourg and from Flushing to Ostend was carried out without incident. No other events were reported.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

North Sea:

One ELM/J mine was cleared off Esbjerg and ten north of Schiermonikoog and Terschelling.

At 0210, patrol boat VP "1313" was attacked by enemy PT boats near Texel. No casualties or damage was reported. One PT boat was probably damaged by a shell.

The transfer of the store ship ISAR (9,000 BRT) from Hook to the Elbe is planned for 1 Aug. Commanding Admiral, Defenses North has asked Commanding General, Air Forces, Center, for fighter escort.

Due to the destruction of the port of Hamburg it is necessary for more traffic to use Rotterdam. Naval Staff has ordered Naval Command, North, with copy to Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, to report plans on this subject. The above-mentioned commands were also asked to submit their opinions on the notification from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping that use of the steamer HARM FRITZEN (4,018 BRT) is refused because the ship is over 3,000 BRT. Naval Staff was so far unaware of the existence of a tonnage limit in the Rotterdam traffic.

As a result of the air attack on Hamburg, teleprint communication with the place is out of action. Teleprint traffic with Kiel, Cuxhaven, Aarhus and Oslo is also affected.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1136 on 30 Jul., a submarine was sighted north of Vardoe. Anti-submarine hunt was ordered. At 2235 of the same day, 2 PT boats were observed at a high speed on a southerly course west of the isle of Kinn, 30 miles south of Stadtlandet. A search operation was ordered. Air reconnaissance for these vessels on the morning of 31 Jul. produced no results.

Air reconnaissance on 30 Jul. covering the entire area of the European Northern Waters between the northern end of the Shetlands and Pentland Fjord, as well as in the Barent Sea, produced no tactical results. No new information was obtained by reconnaissance of the harbors of Vårnek (Yugor Strait), the mouth of the Cola and Motka Bay.

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According to radio intelligence, the Russian submarines S "51" and S "54" were off the north coast of Norway early on 31 Jul.

2. Own Situation:

At 1230 on 28 Jul., Russian batteries fired on one of our convoys off Petsamo. Our batteries returned fire. On the same day, one Russian mine was cut on the west coast of the Rybatchi Peninsula. Other mines were cut on 30 Jul. in 8461 AC north of Vardoe. The grid square was closed due to suspected mines.

On 28 Jul., in a cave in the Persfjord, northwest of Vardoe, a complete sending and receiving set, code material, Russian rifles, pistols and hand grenades were found together with a chart and notes indicating a number of dropping-points for Russian supply planes in the areas of Naval Shore Commanders, Hammerfest and Kirkenes. Three persons, presumably one Russian and two Norwegians were killed in action.

Because of the sighting of the PT boats south of Städtlandet, shipping was suspended between Bergen and Orlesound.

The convoy service escorted 20 steamers to the north and 20 steamers to the south. Eighteen steamers are awaiting escort.

Submarine U "703" sank an escort vessel from a convoy of 2 steamers and 2 escort vessels in AT 7283.

Group North Fleet has submitted the operational orders of Commander Submarines, Norway in regard to the supplying of two BV 138 flying boats on the northern coast of Novaya Zemlya, to be performed by submarines U "255" and U "601". Submarine U "622" carrying an observation group, and submarines U "711" and U "354" as combat boats will be sent out at the same time.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 30 Jul. both sides in Kronstadt Bay put up light barrage fire. Air activity in the area of Kronstadt Bay and the island area was strong. German batteries and boats were attacked but no serious damage was done.

2. Own Situation:

One (apparently) combined mine was cleared in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic, 10 miles north

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of Seeland. No other special reports have been received from the Baltic Sea.

In the area of Commander, Baltic, Minesweepers, near Tytters, a new Russian submarine mine with lead horn firing-device, was observed in use as a watching mine. The coastal route Reval - Baltic Port has been checked by 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla because aerial mines were suspected.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has approved the position of experimental barrage Caesar of 50 LMF-mines as suggested by Naval Command, Baltic Sea.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Between 24 and 30 Jul., a submarine sighted 4 steamers off Bahia and heard another steamer. Traffic along the 200 meter line and the incoming and outgoing traffic is observed only by day.

2. Own Situation:

A steamer of 5,000 BRT was sunk northeast of Bahia. A submarine drove off 3 enemy planes on 30 Jul. and 1 enemy plane on 31 Jul. No damage is reported.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

British Isles and Vicinity:

There was strong enemy air activity in the occupied western territories during daylight. A number of airfields was attacked. One FW 190 plane was seriously damaged and 5 FW 190 planes slightly damaged. Our defenses shot down 4 enemy planes. Three reconnaissance planes flew in as far as the Augsburg/Munich area during the noon hours.

Mediterranean Theatre:

Our Air Force carried out complete reconnaissance of the Western Mediterranean up to Bone without sighting the enemy. In the night of 29 Jul., 56 of our bombers were sent out against shipping targets off Avola. One freighter of 8,000 BRT was set on fire by bombs. Other effective hits were observed in the town and harbor.

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Strong enemy fighter-bomber formations attacked San Giovanni and Messina as well as the Straits of Messina. One Italian PT boat was set on fire by strafing. Milazzo was continuously attacked throughout the day.

East Front:

No special reports have been received.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Landing in Sicily:

Situation on Land:

Our right flank withdrew according to plan. The enemy followed up slowly, and, apart from this, was preparing for an attack against the center of the front towards Troina.

Situation at Sea:

According to a report from Commanding General, South, enemy ships bombarded Acireale during the night of 29 Jul. On the afternoon of 31 Jul., there were 12 merchantmen on an easterly course north of Trapani. At that time, there were 4 merchantmen and several patrol boats in the harbor of Palermo. No new information has been received on the Malta area.

In the night of 28 Jul., Italian PT boats reported a brush with American PT boats near Cape Orlando (40 miles west of the Straits of Messina). During the night of 31 Jul., 3 motor-minesweepers are assigned to the southern part of the Messina Straits to protect ferry traffic and the ex-French destroyer FR "22" transferring from Naples to Taranto. Seven of our PT boats left Crotone for operations off the east coast of Sicily. Three boats have orders to return to Crotone while 4 are subsequently to move to Vibo Valentia. Naval Staff does not yet know the reason for this withdrawal to the west. Constant enemy air attacks throughout the day on the ferry traffic in the Messina Straits caused only minor damage. One fighter-bomber was shot down by a Siebel-ferry. It is additionally reported as of 27 Jul. that an infantry landing boat was burned out in the Messina Straits after being strafed by a fighter bomber. On the same day, casualties were sustained on a naval landing craft.

2. Enemy Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean:

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In the afternoon of 31 Jul., 4 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 DIDO-class cruiser arrived at Gibraltar from the Atlantic and 13 freighters entered in the evening from the Mediterranean. A transport with two escort boats passed westward through the Straits without entering the harbor.

The big convoys have not been detected again in the Western Mediterranean, nor have any other sighting reports been received.

Submarines were sighted on 30 Jul. west of Gaeta and southeast of Nice and at 0200 on 31 Jul. south of Piombino.

No reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

3. Own Situation in Other Parts of the Mediterranean Sea Transport Situation:

Commanding General, South has again urgently requested that, in view of his assigned tasks, the order for all vessels becoming operational in the Southern France area to be retained in that area be cancelled insofar as naval landing craft are concerned, as it has been for barges. Naval Staff has now complied with this request and has issued corresponding directives to Group West and German Naval Command Italy, with simultaneous advise to Commanding General, South and Armed Forces, High Command, Operation Staff.

On 30 Jul., at 1630, 40 miles south-southeast of Naples, the motor ship ALFIERI which was damaged by an aerial torpedo was again torpedoed by a plane and sank.

One Italian torpedo boat, 1 corvette, 1 minelayer, the fast escort vessel SG "10", 4 motor minesweepers and 3 submarine-chasers were in operation in the escort service. Six steamers and 1 tanker were escorted in the island traffic. The steamer RANDAZZO, which ran aground northeast of Elba has refloated and has reached Spezia. The fast escort vessel SG "13" escorted by two motor minesweepers left Piombino for Genoa but put back to Piombino because of the sighting of an enemy submarine.

In Weekly Report 22 - 28 Jul., German Naval Command, Italy states that offensive activity by enemy submarines and planes in the Tyrrhenian Sea has increased. Our own artillery defenses are still inadequate against an apparently systematic strafing campaign against the small-vessel traffic in the Messina Straits and along the coasts. Reinforcements are

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underway. Nevertheless, 13 planes have been shot down this week, including 7 by naval landing craft and Siebel-ferries.

With the change of the government at Rome, the dispatch of further troops to Sardinia and Corsica was stopped. Only current supplies are being forwarded. Big ship traffic with Sicily has been temporarily cancelled.

The naval landing craft are being used as much as possible in the Sicilian area. Six of these boats have been lost by air attack. Eighteen tanker barges for a capacity of 3,540 tons are lying idle at Spezia, Leghorn, Civitavecchia and Naples due to lack of cargo. More Siebel ferries are being converted into combat ferries. The installation of protective screens on small vessels has proved useful.

Of the German shipping space, 7 ships for 37,600 BRT are in operational condition while 14 ships for 30,825 BRT are out of action.

The need for stronger escort makes the lack of naval vessels and anti-submarine vessels all the more acute. The boats now in service are very liable to break down. No reinforcements can be expected in the near future.

Four German submarine chasers, 1 fast escort vessel, 5 motor minesweepers and 1 (foreign built) torpedo boat are operational and 6 submarine chasers, 1 (foreign built) torpedo boat, 2 fast escort vessels and 3 motor minesweepers are out of action. Of the Italian ships, 5 torpedo boats and 11 corvettes are operational and 21 torpedo boats and 8 corvettes are non-operational.

The Italian Navy has begun to lay minefields off Naples. Our Messina Straits defense formation is being used as anti-aircraft protection for the ferry traffic by day and, at the same time, is transporting troops across the Straits. At night, the ships of the formation take up positions at the southern end of the Straits.

The installation of our coastal batteries in Calabria and in the Messina Straits is being delayed by the traffic congestion and by the closing of routes. For further details, see teletype 1325.

4. Area Naval Group South:

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Aegean:

At 1240, a double attack with aerial torpedoes was made on the convoy of the steamer ELEI north of Miles but due to our anti-aircraft fire and air cover, it was unsuccessful.

An anti-submarine observation group has observed an enemy submarine base near Senodionigo on the island of Kinaro which is frequented regularly on Fridays or Saturdays.

PT boat S "55" arrived at Patras from Corfu. Convoy and transport traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, there were no big surface vessels at sea. Three submarines were detected. Air reconnaissance of the western and central Black Sea and the Sea of Azov failed to detect any shipping traffic.

Own Situation:

At 0330, the patrol group of 2 naval landing craft and 2 harbor guard boats in the inner Temriuk Bay, had an engagement with 5 enemy motor gunboats lasting until 0445. The enemy then withdrew behind smoke towards the north. In spite of considerable expenditure of ammunition on both sides, no results were apparently achieved by either.

In the area west of Eupatoria, Ship "19" and the "Yanter" continued the submarine hunt. No report has so far been received on the operation by 3 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla off the Caucasus coast during the night of 30 Jul.

Four naval artillery lighters and 3 boats of 1st PT Boat Flotilla, under the command of Commanding Officer, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, left Ivanbaba for the operational area off Primorsko - Akhtari. No reports have yet come in on the operation planned in that area.

Four boats of 11th PT Boat Flotilla were sent out on submarine hunt southwest of Theodosia.



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
Ferry traffic across the Kerch Straits, supply transports off the coast and steamer convoys were carried out as scheduled and without special incident.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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