

Class of June, 1920

Thesis

TACTICS

Submitted by

Henry H. Baldwin
Commander H. A. Baldrige, U. S. Navy. | 880-

Naval War College
Newport, R. I.
15 February, 1921

Baldrige, H.A.

Class of June, 1920

THESIS

TACTICS.

Submitted by

Commander H.A.Baldrige, USN

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
15 February, 1921

TACTICS

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

I. OPERATIONS IN WHICH EACH FLEET WAS ENGAGED.

BRITISH.- The operations in which the British Fleet was engaged can be followed by reference to the German Plan III upon which has been indicated certain positions of the British forces in lead pencil.

The situation on 30 May, 1916, was as follows: "On 30 May, 1916, the Admiralty received news which pointed to early activity on the part of the German Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and the Vice Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet were informed accordingly. The Admiralty also informed the Commander-in-Chief that eight enemy submarines which they had reason to believe had recently sailed from German ports, were probably in the North Sea."

At 5:40 p.m. the same day the Admiralty sent its dispatch 1740 by land wire to both the Commander-in-Chief and to the Vice Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the dispatch reading: "YOU SHOULD CONCENTRATE EASTWARD OF THE LONG FORTIES PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITIES".

At this time the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Jellicoe, with part of the Battle Fleet was at SCAPA FLOW, the remainder of the Battle Fleet under Vice Admiral Jerram was at CROMARTY, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Beatty was at ROSYTH.

The force under Jellicoe sailed from SCAPA FLOW in obedience to the dispatch 1740 quoted above on the night of 30 May with the plan of arriving at a position A by 2:00 p.m., 31 May, in Latitude 57°-45' N., Longitude 4°-15' E., and then steering a course toward the Horn Reef. By 2:00 p.m. the next day the force under Jellicoe had been so delayed that it was some 18 miles NNW of the position A; the delay being chiefly caused by the entire fleet slowing from time to time to allow the destroyers to examine strange vessels that might prove to be disguised enemy scouts; the destroyers in this manner could make the examinations and rejoin quickly without undue expenditures of fuel.

The force under Vice Admiral Jerram sailed from CROMARTY on the night of 30 May with orders from Jellicoe to join by 2:00 p.m. at the rendezvous given as position A; Vice Admiral Jerram as a matter of fact joined up with Jellicoe at 11:15 a.m. the next day.

The combined force then under Jellicoe at 2:00 p.m. consisted of 24 dreadnaught battleships, 3 battle cruisers of the INVINCIBLE type, 8 of the older type of armored cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and about 53 destroyers including destroyer leaders. There were no air craft of any type nor submarines in the force.

The Battle Fleet was steaming on course S 50 E, zigzagging, speed of advance 14 knots, in one of their regular cruising formations, the battleships disposed in division columns, leaders disposed abeam light cruisers on each flank; screened 3 miles ahead by light cruisers and destroyers, the scouting line of armored cruisers with destroyers 16 miles ahead of the battleships, line of bearing of the scouts N 40 E and S 40 W; the screening force and the scouting line were linked up by an armored cruiser; 4 miles ahead of the scouting line with 2 light cruisers were the 3 battle cruisers of the INVINCIBLE type.

The weather was clear, sea smooth, with wind from the SE, force 2-3: (the German account states same weather conditions but the direction of the wind from the NW).

In the meantime Vice Admiral Beatty had sailed from ROSYTH on the night of the 30 May with the Battle Cruiser Fleet under orders from Jellicoe to pass through Latitude $56^{\circ}-40'$ N., Longitude $5^{\circ}-00'$ E., "which position xxxxxx he could reach by 2:00 p.m., 31 May, after which he was directed to stand to the northward to get into visual touch with the Battle Fleet". Beatty was informed of the position of position A and the above referred to plans of Jellicoe and of the course which Jellicoe expected to steer after 2:00 p.m., namely, toward the Horn Reef. Beatty was further instructed as regards "economizing fuel in the destroyers as much as possible".

The Battle Cruiser Fleet at this time consisted of 6 battle cruisers, 4 25-knot dreadnaught battleships of the BARHAM class, 14 light cruisers, 25 destroyers including destroyer leaders, and 1 air craft carrier.

At 2:00 p.m., 31 May Beatty was some 6 miles to the north of his position given him by Jellicoe and some 11 miles to the westward; he turned to the eastward for 17 minutes and then stood north toward the Battle Fleet some 53 miles to the north and west at this time; so far nothing had been seen of the enemy and neither Jellicoe nor Beatty had any idea of the close proximity of the enemy.

It might be stated here that the lack of fuel in the destroyers was causing the Commander-in-Chief some concern in the operations upon which the fleet was engaged. Before sailing from SCAPA FLOW he instructed Beatty about economizing fuel in his destroyers as "much as possible"; the whole fleet was delayed 18 miles to economize fuel in the destroyers with the Battle Fleet in order for them to make examinations of strange vessels and to quickly rejoin; this delay of 18 miles at a speed of advance of 14 knots per hour was equal to nearly 75 minutes of daylight and it was evident from the Admiralty dispatch that the enemy was expected to be in the North Sea on 31 May. At 1:55 p.m., this day, Jellicoe signaled all the battleships of the fleet requesting information as to what rate they could fuel destroyers and the replies ranged all the way from 20 tons to 150 tons.

It may also be noted that the 3 battle cruiser of the INVINCIBLE type were with Jellicoe instead of with Beatty; Beatty had the 25-knots battleships of the BARHAM class with him in place of the INVINCIBLES. Beatty had no submarines but did have 1 air craft carrier, the ENGADINE.

So far the operations with the exceptions noted had proceeded according to the prearranged plan and Beatty was standing to the northward "to get in visual touch with the Battle Fleet", nothing of the enemy having been sighted.

It was under the above conditions when at 2:20 p.m., that one of the eastern light cruisers of Beatty's force, the GALATEA, sighted two enemy vessels to the ESE, apparently engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. The contact was immediately reported by radio to Beatty and was also received by Jellicoe.

GERMAN.- The plan of the German operations which eventually resulted in the so-called Battle of Jutland can be learned from the book recently published by Admiral Scheer. The operations in which the German forces were engaged are very briefly described as follows.

Generally speaking for two weeks previously to 30 May it had been the intention of the German Commander-in-Chief to have U-boats stationed off the East coast of England to attack enemy men-of-war entering or leaving port, or such vessels that might return injured from any action that may have been fought; to make an aerial reconnaissance in the North Sea: the air forces and submarines to report any movements or information of the enemy. When conditions were favorable it was the intention of the High Seas Fleet to sally forth and attempt to engage the enemy forces south of the DOGGER BANK. It was part of the plan to engage in war on trade if time and circumstances permitted.

The above plan also involved a bombardment of SUNDERLAND on the east coast of England "to compel the enemy to send out forces against us", this probably the result of the recent statement to the British public by their First Lord, Mr. Balfour.

In general terms there was to be activity of all arms of the naval service in concerted action as the underlying principle-war against trade and men-of-war from the air, the surface, and from below, according to time and circumstances. It must not be inferred from this however that the German Forces intended to engage the superior British fleet under any and all conditions-it would engage under certain favorable conditions but as the German Commander-in-Chief has said he did "not want themselves to be forced into giving battle". There is no doubt also but that some kind of naval activity was made necessary at this time by the general political and military situation but no further remarks of this nature are necessary to an understanding of the operations which led to the battle we are studying.

Further long quotations could be made from Scheer's book going more into detail about the plans made before the 30 May but they are not thought necessary in a very brief description.

Suffice it to add that from the 18 May on the weather conditions as regards air craft did not permit of the first plans being carried out in toto as no aerial reconnaissance could be made to the northwest and without this it was not thought safe to proceed with the bombardment of SUNDERLAND, etc.; further, the U-boats could not remain on their stations very much longer, they having already proceeded to their stations in accordance with the first plans.

Admiral Scheer on 30 May decided that as the air forces could not be employed he would 'proceed with the plan but without them and to embark upon a campaign against cruisers and merchantmen outside and in the SKAGERRACK, with the expectations that the news of our cruisers in those waters would be made known to the enemy. With this object in view, they had been told to keep in sight of the coast of NORWAY, so that the enemy might be notified. In further describing the course of this undertaking, which led to the Battle of the SKAGERRACK, I (Scheer) keep

strictly to the official report, ^{as} I sent it.' Thus Scheer the Commander-in-Chief states the nature of the operations proposed.

This decision to embark upon these operations it will be noted were made on the same day, 30 May, that the British Admiralty sent its dispatch 1740 to Jellicoe and to Beatty.

Scheer was partly influenced to go north toward the SKAGERRACK by the protection afforded the right flank by the coast of DENMARK thus guarding against surprise from that quarter, as an advance in any other direction 'was not deemed advisable without aerial reconnaissance as the German forces did not want themselves to be forced into giving battle'. It will be remembered that the weather conditions were unfavorable for air craft.

Accordingly in the early morning of 31 May, 1916, the Reconnaissance Force, as Scheer terms it, under the command of Vice Admiral Hipper, sailed from the JADE BASIN, with orders to advance toward the 'SKAGERRACK out of sight of the Horn Reef and the DANISH Coast, to show itself off the NORWEGIAN coast before dark and then to cruise in the SKAGERRACK during the night, and at noon the next day to join up with the Main Fleet'.

Scheer did not evidently know that the entire British Fleet had put to sea to look for him.

Hipper's force consisted of 5 battle cruisers, 5 light cruisers, and as far as can be ascertained about 33 destroyers.

The general plan and what happened can be followed from the German Plan III attached.

By 2:28 p.m. the force under Hipper had advanced to the position shown on the attached chart, course north, weather same as described for the British operations except the direction of the wind which the German plan reports as from the NW; Commander von Hase, gunnery officer of the DERFLINGER says in his report that "the sea was smooth, and only a light northwest wind (force 3) was blowing".

In the meantime the Main Fleet under Scheer which had immediately followed Hipper out of the JADE BASIN was some 50 miles to the southward of the latter, steaming north according to plans already outlined; Scheer's force consisted of 16 dreadnaught battleships, 6 pre-dreadnaught battleships, 6 light cruisers, and as far as can be ascertained by about 42 destroyers.

Neither Hipper nor Scheer had submarines nor air craft carriers.

Between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. the "L" air ships, Nos. 9, 14, 16, 21, and 23 'ascended for long-distance reconnaissance in the sector to north and west of HELIGOLAND. They took no part in the battle which was so soon to follow, neither did they see anything of their own Battle Fleet, nor of the enemy, nor did they hear anything of the battle' says Admiral Scheer.

There were no German submarines present in the day battle notwithstanding the various reports of the British commanders to the contrary.

Referring to the information gained from the U-boats stationed off the coast of ENGLAND Scheer states "at 5:30 a.m., (transposing into British time) the U 32 reported at about 70 miles East of the FIRTH OF FORTH, two battleships, two cruisers, and several torpedo boats, taking a south-easterly course. At

6:30 a.m., a second message was received stating that she had intercepted wireless messages to the effect that two large battleships and groups of destroyers had run out from SCAPA FLOW. At 6:48 a.m., a third message came through from U 66 that about 60 miles east of KINNAIRD HEAD, eight enemy battleships, light cruisers, and torpedo boats had been sighted on a north-easterly course. These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's purpose. But the varied forces of the separate divisions of the fleet and their diverging courses did not seem to suggest either combined action or an advance on the German flight or any connection with our enterprise, but showed a possibility that our hope of meeting with separate enemy divisions was likely to be fulfilled. We were, therefore, all the more determined to keep to our plan".

Thus did Admiral Scheer express himself as to his plan of defeating the enemy in detail; the information received from the U-boats and the consideration given to him would seem to make certain that he was totally unaware of the enemy to be encountered before nightfall.

It was under the above conditions that at 2:28 p.m. Hipper received a report "that the ELBING, the west wing cruiser (light cruiser) on the scouting line had been sent to examine a steamer" to the westward and had sighted enemy forces.

The steamer under examination was the same one that the British light cruiser, GALATEA, of Beatty's force had sighted at 2:20 p.m.

The chief point of interest in this contact is that it was made in an orthodox manner of that period and was not made by air craft or submarines; weather conditions were unfavorable for them to operate as regards visibility; there were no submarines in the scouting line.

The two enemy Battle Fleets were about 103 miles apart, Jellicoe being to the Northwest.

II. THE MISSION OF EACH FLEET.

JELlicoe's MISSION: To locate and bring to action the enemy's battlefleet.

SCHEER's MISSION: To locate and bring to action the separate enemy divisions.

These are in general terms the stated missions of each Commander-in-Chief from the viewpoint of the writer. A book may be written upon the subject but the fact remains that the Admiralty sent the Grand Fleet to 'concentrate to the Eastward of the Long Forties prepared for any eventualities', it was thought the German Fleet was coming out; the fleet was not sent out to run away; it was superior to the German Fleet; the strategic concentration was made with a view to the getting in contact with the enemy; to locate him; after that 'prepared for any eventualities' if it did not mean to bring the enemy battlefleet to action did not mean anything after waiting nearly two years to get at this fleet. It would seem there could be no doubt of the mission either in the mind of the Admiralty or of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Jellicoe. The writer believes that the dispositions made by Jellicoe of the force under Beatty in sweeping the right flank to the southward from ROSYTH to the position given him to pass through by 2:00 p.m. and Jellicoe's ideas of the employment of battle cruisers as he has given them to us can lead but to one conclusion; that Jellicoe made his dispositions so as to search out the enemy's battlefleet with the idea of bringing them to action.

As regards Scheer's mission he has given it to us himself. The operation toward the SKAGERRACK was for the purpose of 'compelling the enemy to send out forces against us', but this part of the operation he hoped would lead to the success of 'his hopes and plans' of "meeting with separate enemy divisions" and of course with the consequent idea of bringing them to action.

Thus is briefly stated the two missions the two forces had when they sailed from their respective home ports.

III. EFFECTS OF THE CONTACTS UPON THE ORIGINAL MISSIONS.

(a) The effects of the contacts between the battle cruisers did not in any way modify the original missions of Jellicoe and Scheer. Jellicoe received information from these contacts that the enemy's battle cruisers with attendant light cruisers and destroyers were engaged by Beatty and later learned that the entire High Seas Fleet was standing to the northward toward the Grand Fleet and while in a sense it may be said that the first part of his mission had been accomplished, that is, to locate the enemy's battlefleet, it was still the mission to bring the enemy's battlefleet to action.

As regards Scheer his mission still remain^d the same for as yet the contacts between the battle cruisers did not give him any idea that the main British Fleet was at sea; he saw Beatty's cruisers and he says he also saw 5 battleships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH type with Beatty; he still thought that the force he saw was a "separate enemy division" and therefore the conditions remained the same for him and his mission remained unchanged. That this is so we read in Scheer's report under the date of 5:43 p.m., "there

was no longer any question of a cruiser campaign against merchantmen in the SKAGERRACK, as the meeting with the English fighting forces had already taken place. But we were bound to take into consideration that the English Fleet, if at sea, which was obvious from the ships that we had encountered, would offer battle the next day". The time referred to above was when the German Commander-in-Chief first became aware of the entrance of the 3 INVINCIBLES under Hood into the action from the North-east; Scheer thought them to be the head of the British Main Fleet; it was only about this time that Scheer's mission changed.

(b) The contacts between the ⁱⁿmain fleets still did not change Jellicoe's mission; it will still to bring the enemy's battlefleet to action; this he tried to do.

As regards Scheer this contact with the main fleet immediately changed the whole situation for him as we have seen in the quotation we have cited above; the advance toward the SKAGERRACK was no longer necessary; the enemy forces were here now; consideration must immediately be given by Scheer and, as he says "some steps would also have to be taken to shake off the English light forces before darkness fell in order to avoid any loss to our Main Fleet from nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks". Again he says "It was now quite obvious (the time was 6:20 p.m.) that we were confronted by a large portion of the English Fleet and a few minutes later their presence was notified on the horizon directly ahead of us by rounds of firing from guns of heavy caliber.

In spite of the above quotation from Scheer that he would now give consideration to the steps to be taken to shake off the light English forces before dark on account of the presence of the Main English Fleet (thereby changing his original mission) he proceeds at once to disclaim the idea that he is avoiding action for he says "there was never any question of our line veering round (to the eastward) to avoid an encounter. The resolve to do battle with the enemy stood firm from the first". This statement probably means that the turning movements to the east were first initiated before he was aware of the presence of the English Main Fleet.

There can be no doubt however that Scheer's mission was immediately changed when the two main fleets made contacts with one another in that the advance toward the SKAGERRACK was no longer necessary; in the sense that Scheer would still engage separate divisions of the enemy he would still fight; there can be no doubt of this; but now that the enemy main fleet was "on the horizon directly ahead of us" something had to be done. Scheer's mission was changed: he had to extricate himself from a difficult situation in which he was "capped" and he was fully aware of this when he executed his simultaneous change of course with his mainfleet.

IV. THE BATTLE CRUISER ACTION - THE FIRST PHASE.

(See British and German charts of action).

We have already seen that at 2:20 p.m. Beatty received his first news of the contact made by the GALATEA: at this time it will be remembered that Beatty was standing to the northward to get into visual touch with the Battle Fleet in accordance with the prearranged plans. The Battle Fleet under Jellicoe was 18 miles behind his schedule and standing to the southeast, he also received the wireless message sent out by the GALATEA.

At this time the disposition of the forces under Beatty was as follows:

The Lion (flagship of Vice Admiral Beatty) and the First Battle Cruiser Squadron (Princess Royal-Queen Mary-Tiger) were in single line ahead, screened by the light cruiser Champion and 10 destroyers of the 13th flotilla, with the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron (New Zealand-Indefatigable) in single line ahead three miles ENE of the Lion, screened by 6 destroyers (from the Harwich force which happened to have been in Rosyth) when Beatty got orders to put to sea). The Fifth Battle Squadron, the most powerful battleships of 25-knots speed under the Command of Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, was in line ahead five miles NNW of the Lion, screened by the light cruiser Fearless and 9 destroyers of the 1st flotilla; the battleships were in the following order; Barham-Valiant-Warspite-Malaya. The other battleship of this division the Queen Elizabeth was not present although the German High Seas Fleet thought that it was. It may be also stated at this time that the other "cat" battle cruiser the Australia was not present either.

The Light Cruiser Squadrons formed a screen eight miles SSE from the Lion, ships spread on a line of direction ENE and WSW, five miles apart in the order from west to east: 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron: Southampton(F), Nottingham, Birmingham, Dublin. 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron: Falmouth(F), Birkenhead, Gloucester. 1st Light Cruiser Squadron: Inconstant, Galatea(F), Cordelia, Phaeton.

The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between the light cruisers Gloucester and Cordelia, and the light cruiser Yarmouth acted as linking ship between the LION and the light cruiser screen.

Hipper's force was disposed as follows: the 5 battle cruisers standing north led by Hipper's flagship in the following order in column: LUTZOW, DERFLINGER, SEYDLITZ, MOLTKE, and VON DER TANN; the light cruiser ELBING with 3 destroyers was on the western wing of the scouting line; the light cruiser REGENSBURG with 4 destroyers was on the eastern wing of the scouting line; the light cruiser WIESBADEN with about 5 destroyers was on the starboard bow of the LUTZOW while the light cruiser PILLAU with 3 destroyers was on the port bow of the flagship; the light cruiser FRANKFURT with about 5 destroyers was ahead of the flagship. The doubt about the exact number of destroyers is because the German official accounts speaks of flotillas and half flotillas; a German Flotilla was ordinarily composed of 11 destroyers. The distances these various vessels were from the flagship is not known but probably well within the visibility of the flagship LUTZOW.

Beatty recognizing the possibilities of the situation, immediately turned his forces to the SSE, the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get between the enemy and his base.

It will be noted here that Beatty had his 4 BARHAMS off to the NW some 5 miles on the side from which it was least expected that contacts might be made. Some hold this to be an unwise disposition as they are not in a position to support Beatty's battle cruiser. This is believed to be a wrong criticism for the following reasons: Beatty knew the maximum number of battle cruisers that the enemy could bring against him, namely 5. Beatty had 6 and in previous actions had been able to drive the enemy in; if the enemy saw the re-inforcements he had the enemy might run away again. Further if the contacts developed the facts that the High Seas Fleet was at hand then the position of the 4 BARHAMS was the

best for the reason that the distance of 5 miles to the NW was equivalent to that much more speed in case it became necessary for the Battle Cruiser Fleet for any reason to retire. This must be the reason for Beatty's dispositions and they seem thoroughly sound: he has been criticized because at this time he himself did not speed up to full speed or if not to full speed then in not ordering Evan-Thomas to join up at full speed. The writer does not join in these criticisms; the enemy's strength had not been developed, Beatty probably did not want the enemy to see the BARHAMS at this time, and the whole situation remained to be developed.

At 2:35 GALATEA reported 'a large amount of smoke as if from a fleet bearing ENE, followed by a report that the vessels were headed North:' Beatty followed to the northwards and at 3:31 identified 5 enemy battle cruisers.

In the meantime the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons without orders had turned to the eastward having sized up the situation correctly and formed a screen ahead of the heavy ships; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron under Commodore Good-enough came in 'at high speed towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of them on an ESE course, and at 3:30 p.m. sighted enemy battle cruisers bearing ENE.

When the report of the GALATEA came in at 2:20 Beatty sent two destroyers to assist the air craft carrier ENGADINE and ordered the latter to send up sea planes, this being the first time air craft had ever been employed in naval actions. A sea plane was sent up to scout to the NNE and due to the low flying clouds could not see very much but did observe four enemy light cruisers heading to the northward; this report reached Beatty at 3:30 p.m.

Jellicoe in the meanwhile thought that the enemy forces sighted would seek to escape via the SKAGERRACK so he detached the 3 INVINCIBLES under Hood with orders to frustrate such plans; at 4:00 p.m. he changed this plan and ordered Hood to re-inforce Beatty giving Hood Beatty's position, course, etc. Jellicoe first ordered the cruisers with him to have steam for full speed, then later the battleships, requesting the battleship divisions commanders to inform their ships of the situation as the information came in by wireless from the ships of Beatty's force. It is interesting at this stage to note that Jellicoe sent out first the signal to all his destroyers to reduce steam in all boilers not necessary for speed in excess of 21 knots, the third time it is officially recorded that he was worrying about the fuel supply of these vessels. Later he countermanded this order and they were ordered to keep steam for full speed. In the mean time reports by wireless came in to the effect that strange Telefunken wireless calls were heard close aboard; the Admiralty twice sent Jellicoe directional wireless hearings, the first that of enemy cruisers giving their position, course and speed which subsequently turned out to have been approximately correct, and the second time giving him the position course and speed of the High Seas Fleet. The Admiralty was also informed by wireless that fleet action was imminent and the air was full of messages about dock yards being gotten ready to receive ships, etc. The HARWICH force of destroyers under Commodore Tyrwhitt even got underway and proceeded to the scene of action later in the afternoon anticipating an affirmative request that had been made by wireless to the Admiralty to proceed: this request was denied and the force ordered to return. No explanation has ever been given for this action. In this connection it may be stated that in the fall of 1914 Jellicoe had stated his views to the Admiralty as to what he considered proper and necessary for the Admiralty to do in case fleet action ever became imminent; Jellicoe requested

in this correspondence that in such an event taking place that 'all cruisers, destroyers, etc., in home ports at the time, be sent to the scene of the action', "so that they can be of assistance in rendering the victory shattering and complete".

Jellicoe received at 3:40 p.m. a report from Beatty giving him information of the presence of the enemy 5 battle cruisers, and Beatty's position; he thus received this information within 9 minutes after Beatty himself first sighted the enemy battle cruisers. The Battle Fleet then increased speed to close Beatty's battle cruisers, and by 4:00 p.m., the Grand Fleet was steaming at 20 knots, zigzagging being discontinued, and every effort being made to close as rapidly as possible. It may be remarked here that the 18 lost miles was becoming of more vital importance all the time, and no doubt while some of it may be attributed to fog, the greater part was caused by use of destroyers to examine every strange vessel and to their low fuel supply.

In the meantime the German forces under Hipper had in developing the contacts of the ELBING to the westward ~~had~~ turned to the NW and at 3:20 p.m. Hipper made out Beatty's two columns of battle cruisers standing to the eastward, some 10 minutes apparently ^{before} Beatty's force made out the German battle cruisers. Hipper made out not only the force but soon was enabled to distinguish the type of ships in the formation when Beatty went into battle formation. Hipper recalled his scouting forces ahead and prepared to attack; he saw Beatty deploy to the southward and considered this "was a very welcome fact for us, as it offered the possibility of inducing the enemy (Beatty) to fall back on his own main fleet". Hipper therefore 'followed the movement (of Beatty), maneuvered to get within effective firing range, and opened fire at 3:49 p.m., at a range of about 130 hm".

Reference should be made to both charts of this action which in the main pretty thoroughly agree as to the essential features.

Just previous to this Beatty formed his ships into line of bearing to avoid the smoke, the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron astern of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas in station ahead. The course was ESE, 'slightly converging on the enemy, the speed 25 knots, and the range 23000 yards.

At 3:48 p.m. both sides opened fire practically at the same instant; that the gunnery of the Germans in establishing the range was superior is admitted by the British; Jellicoe says "at the commencement the fire from the German vessels was rapid and accurate, the LION (Beatty's flagship) being hit twice three minutes after fire was opened, and the LION, TIGER, and PRINCESS ROYALL all receiving several hits by 4:00 p.m." From the account by the gunnery officer of the DERFLINGER, the second ship in Hipper's column it must have been the leading German cruiser, Hipper's flagship, the LUTZOW, whose fire was so effective on the LION in the first three minutes. Boiling down all that has been written on this action there can be no doubt that the German gunnery was here superior and the German got the jump on the British and from which they never fully recovered until later when the BARHAMS entered the action; further, in this connection, it is the writer's belief that this advantage in gaining the initial superiority of fire resulted in the loss of the INDEFATIGABLE and QUEEN MARY later on despite the lack of armor on the decks, etc. There is no doubt also that the lack of closed in turret trunks, flaps on magazine doors, etc., were indirectly responsible; nevertheless, had the British gunnery been equal or superior to the Germans at this initial stage it is not believed that the two ships would have been lost. In other words while not denying the material factors that have been emphasized by

Admiral Jellicoe regarding the cause of the loss of the three Battle Cruisers during the entire day, the writer wishes to point out his view that it was chiefly a personnel defect that was responsible; the British never have publicly admitted until a short while ago the possibility even of this view being correct; it has been admitted in private, I am sure I am safe in stating. It is known at any rate that British gunnery officers present at Jutland have admitted this superiority.

Both Admirals accepted battle at this point and generally both fleets stood to the southeastward as shown on the charts of the battle attached hereto.

At about 4:12 p.m. torpedoes were now reported to be crossing the line of the British battle cruisers and reports were made that German submarines (periscopes) had been sighted by 'more than one ship'.

At about 4:13 p.m., some twenty-five minutes after the action had commenced the last ship in Beatty's column, the INDEFATIGABLE, was sunk by the fire of the rear ship in Hipper's column, the VON DER TANN.

At 4:15 p.m., 12 British destroyers in accordance with doctrine moved out to attack when a favorable opportunity should present itself; this movement on the British destroyers was countered by a similar movement of the destroyers of Hipper's force. The net result was a fierce engagement between the light forces, the German battle cruisers employing their secondary guns on the British destroyers; the British losses were 2 destroyers one of which was sunk later when the German Main Fleet came up and finished her; one destroyer was damaged but managed to withdraw. The German losses were 2 destroyers. The German boats fired their torpedoes at about 9 hm., as "it was impossible to push the attack closer on the enemy, as at the same time that Flotilla IX (German) got to work, 18 to 20 destroyers, covered by light cruisers, appeared on the scene to counter-attack and beat off our torpedo-boats." In all 12 torpedoes were fired at the British line.

None of the British ships was hit by torpedoes. The action of the German destroyers was undertaken by their commander without orders apparently in the same manner as that taken by the British in accordance with doctrine, each seeing the possibilities of the situation. Each side broke up the attack of the other generally speaking. The German Battle cruisers so maneuvered as to avoid the British torpedoes at about 4:30 p.m.

Throughout the battle so far the speed on both sides had been 25 knots.

At 4:30 p.m. Hipper turned ships left toward the east and stood on in this general direction until about 4:39 p.m. when he turned to the southward; Beatty's cruisers continued on in a southerly direction.

At about 4:19 p.m. Hipper observed new ships entering the action from the northwest and he made these out to be 5 battle-ships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH type. It will be observed that he reports 5 of these ships all through his reports notwithstanding that there were only four as we now know. The 4 BARHAMS joined up from the Northwest and opened fire at a range of about 19000 yards and they had great difficulty in seeing the ships of Hipper not more than 2 ships being visible at times.

Both sides altered course from time to time to confuse the range keeping parties.

During the opening stages of this action according to the report of Commander Hase gunnery officer of the DERFLINGER his ship, the second in the column, was not under fire for some time, which will probably account for the sinking of the QUEEN MARY, the target of the DERFLINGER, which occurred at 4:26 p.m.

The fire of the 4 BARHAMS became very effective at this time, about 17000 yards range, the situation for the Germans becoming critical says Admiral Scheer in his report, the "enemy fired with extraordinary rapidity and accuracy, with the greater ease as regards the latter that he met with almost no opposition, as our battle cruisers were fully occupied with Admiral Beatty's ships, "The range had decreased with Beatty's force to about 13500 yards by 4:27 p.m.; at 4:30 had further decreased to 12700 yards, while from Hipper's rear ship (VON DER TANN) it was 17300 yards to the BARHAM.

At about 4:20 p.m. Admiral Scheer with the Main Fleet 50 miles to the southward had in the meantime headed his fleet to the west, speed 15 knots, with the idea of placing Beatty's ships between himself and Hipper; about this time he received news from Hipper of the arrival on the scene of the British 5th Battle Squadron--the 5 QUEEN ELIZABETHS as he thought - and he turned to the northward again to go to Hipper's assistance; at 4:30 p.m. he sighted Hipper's battle cruisers.

At this stage of the action, 4:38 p.m., Commodore Goodenough with the SOUTHAMPTON as flag of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and reported the battleships of the German High Seas Fleet which then came in sight to the SE, heading North; the SOUTHAMPTON developed the contact running in to 13000 yards of the enemy battleships to observe their movements, etc. She received a very heavy fire but escaped as her courses were very frequently changed to confuse the fire control; that it was confused may readily be gathered from Scheer's remarks concerning the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron to the effect that "their vague and purposeless hurrying to and fro led one to think that our fire had reached them and that the action of our warships had so surprised them that they did not know which way to turn next".

The SOUTHAMPTON'S wireless report was received by both Jellicoe and Beatty.

At 4:42 p.m. Beatty upon sighting the enemy main battle fleet recalled his destroyers and by a head of column movement made a 16 point turn to starboard; Hipper at about 4:50 p.m. formed column and followed suit; Beatty had completed the turn by about 4:45 p.m. and the BARHAMS coming up astern did likewise at 4:57 p.m.

All forces were now proceeding to the northward toward Jellicoe although the Germans did not possess this information; the situation had just become reversed.

The particular points to note so far is that both sides steamed at high speeds-25 knots; Beatty formed on line of bearing to free himself from smoke; both sides changed course frequently to increase and decrease the range for fire control purposes in order to confuse the enemy; Scheer accepted battle and was glad of the course to the southeast which led the forces to his own main fleet; Beatty lost two battle cruisers and the German gunnery was superior in the commencement of the action; that Beatty had 6 battle cruisers to Hipper's 5 and that Beatty undoubtedly thought he was superior as he never did signal to Evan-Thomas to close up with full speed nor wait to begin action; that each side's destroyers moved out to the attack according to doctrine at about the same time trying to get into a favorable position for attack

well ahead; that each side frustrated the attack of the other: that Beatty's ships thought they sighted submarines when none were present: that Hipper avoided the torpedoes that came toward his ships by turning away from them; that each side lost two destroyers in the destroyer attack; that the attacks of the destroyers were not ^{high} home in the accepted use of this term but that the British destroyers fought a gallant action.

There is one point in regard to the fire distribution that is not clear and that is it would appear from the gunnery officer's report, Commander Hase of the DERFLINGER, that this vessel was not under fire for some minutes after the battle cruiser action had begun; how much this had to do with the destruction of the QUEEN MARY it is difficult to tell; I have seen no British observations on this subject.

On the whole the writer does not find anything to criticize in the actions on either side in the forces of Beatty and Hipper. Theoretically perhaps Beatty with the more powerful guns should have not attempted from a gunnery point of view to close the range giving up some of his advantage of long range guns and allowing Hipper the advantage of the superiority of rapidity of fire, but taking the situation as it stood, the attempt to destroy the enemy as soon as possible with a superior force, there certainly can not be room for criticism on this score even if the action did result in the loss of the two battle cruisers of the British. It was Beatty's job to hold on to them; they had escaped before from him.

After the turn to the north the BARHAMS took station astern of the Beatty's cruisers, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station in the rear while the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons which had been in the rear became the leading light forces, conforming to the movements of Beatty without signal from him.

The cruisers under Hipper after turning opened fire upon Beatty and the Main German Fleet under Scheer opened fire with its leading ships upon the Fifth Battle Squadron (the 4 BARHAMS) at about 18700 yards range with little or no damage.

The time here was about 4:55 p.m.

The German High Seas Fleet was steaming at this time in line of divisions on course 325° speed about 20 knots led by Battleship Squadron III, which was exceeding this speed in order to reduce the range to the Fifth Battle Squadron which very slowly drew ahead in spite of its 24 knots speed.

About 5:12 Beatty's cruisers lost sight of Hipper's cruisers and ceased fire; at 5:21 Hipper received orders to give chase to the British battle cruisers which by this time were fast disappearing to the northward whereupon Hipper's ships shifted their fire on to the Fifth Battle Squadron at a range of about 14000 yards; the visibility had now become very poor so that neither side could make any hits.

At 5:30 Beatty changed course to starboard to about course 15°, the range to Hipper's ships being 5 minutes later about 17000 yards; in the meantime the wind had shifted to the southwest and it was with difficulty that Scheer see his scouting divisions ahead. The range at this time from Evan-Thomas as to Hipper was about 14000 yards.

At about 5:36 the light cruisers of Hipper's force sighted a British light cruiser to the northeast which turned out to be the Chester which it will be stated here was attached to the force

of the 3 INVINCIBLES under Hood which Jellicoe had first sent out to intercept enemy forces that might attempt to escape toward the SKAGERRACK. It will be remembered that at 4:00 p.m. Hood had been recalled by Jellicoe and ordered to join up with Beatty; this Hood was attempting to do (not knowing where he was) and the Chester's contact was the result. The Chester was driven off in the action that followed and retreated to the northeast toward the 3 INVINCIBLES which had turned northwest at 5:40.

Before proceeding further it is best to give the formation of the Battle Fleet under Jellicoe.

Leaving out a long discussion about displacements, gun power, armor and speed of the two fleets it will be sufficient to add that generally speaking the British Fleet under Jellicoe was superior to that under Scheer in the proportion of 2:1.

Jellicoe's force consisted of the following ships disposed as follows at this time.

Whole force Course South 50° East, zigzagging, speed of advance 14.

Light cruisers Chester and Canterbury.

3 Battle Cruisers (Third Battle Cruiser Squadron)
(Invincible-Inflexible-Indomitable)

Commanded by Rear Admiral Hood.

20 miles ahead of Battleships-4 miles ahead of cruisers.

Second Cruiser Squad.
Cochrane-Shannon-Minotaur

First Cruiser Squadron.
Defense-Duke of Edinburgh-Black
Prince Warrior.

Hampshire linking ship 6 miles astern Minotaur
(Cruisers 16 miles ahead of Battleships, spread 8 miles apart, one destroyer with each cruiser spread 6 miles apart - line of bearing of cruiser line N 40°E and S 40° W.

Minotaur flagship, Rear Admiral Heath.

Defense flagship, Rear Admiral Arbuthnot.

3 miles ahead the 4th, 11th, and 12th flotillas with the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron were screening the Battleships.

Battleships

2nd Battle Squad.

King George V.	#Orion
Ajax	Monarch
Centurion	Conqueror
Erin	Thunderer
1st div.	2nd div.

4th Battle Squad.

##Iron Duke	#Benbow
Royal Oak	Bellerophon
#Superb	Temeraire
Canada	Vanguard
3rd div.	4th div.

1st Battle Squad. (right flank).

#Colossus	#Marlborough
Collingwood	Revenge
Neptune	Hercules
St. Vincent	Agincourt
5th div.	6th div.

= division flagships

= fleet flagship of Jellicoe

Division one and 2nd Battle Squadron Vice Admiral Jerram

Division two Rear Admiral Leveson

Division four and 4th Battle Squadron Vice Admiral Sturdee
 Division three Rear Admiral Duff
 Division Five Rear Admiral Guant
 Division Six and First Battle Squadron Vice Admiral Burney

The attached light cruisers Active, Boadicea, Blanche, and Bellona were on the flanks of the battleships.

The cruiser line was composed of the old armored cruisers, (the first and second cruisers squadrons).

At about 5:50 the British armored cruiser DEFENSE, the flagship of the First Cruiser Squadron and near the center of the scouting line 16 miles ahead of Jellicoe's battleships, fired on light cruisers belonging to Hipper's force, but the shells fell so far short that the German light cruisers never knew that they were being fired upon nor did they sight the firing ship.

At 5:55 the light cruisers of Hipper's force came under the fire of Hood's 3 INVINCIBLES at a range of about 10000 yards which fact was reported by the cruiser commander Rear Admiral Bodicker to Scheer the Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, who at once assumed that this was entry of the British Grand Fleet upon the scene of action led by the ships of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron; Scheer never knew until long after the Battle of Jutland that this was not the tactical situation; he thought and continued to think that Jellicoe was to the north-east.

In the meantime Hipper's cruisers went ships right through nearly 8 points to course nearly 45° for the reason that "light forces began a torpedo attack". Nothing is known of any British torpedo attack at this time. At 5:50 Hipper again changed course to the north engaging the Fifth Battle Squadron at about 15000 yards range.

During the run north the light conditions had so changed that the visibility was very good to the west but very poor to the east.

Beatty was leading the enemy north toward Jellicoe. At 5:35 the LION changed course gradually to NE in order "to conform to the signalled movements and resulting positions of the British Battle Fleet" says Jellicoe. The coordination here seems perfect.

At about this time Scheer's force was in column, steering about 352°, speed having been reduced to 15 knots to allow the rear divisions to close up. His force was disposed as follows:

Battle Squadron III. (Dreadnaughts)

KONIG (flagship)
 GROSSER KURFURST
 MARKGRAF
 KRONPRINZ
 KAISER (flag)
 PRINZ REGENT LUITPOLD
 KAISERIN

FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE (Fleet flag leading B.S.I.)

Battle Squadron I. (Dreadnaughts)

OSTFRIESLAND (flag)
 THURINGEN
 HELIGOLAND

Battle Squadron I. (Dreadnaughts) (continued)

OLDENBURG
 POSEN (flag)
 RHEINLAND
 NASSAU
 WESTFALLEN

Battle Squadron II. (Predreadnaughts)

DEUTSCHLAND (flag)
 POMMERM
 SCHLESSEN
 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
 HANNOVER (flag)
 HESSEN

The light cruisers and destroyers of this force were disposed on Scheer's starboard side, the leading ships on his starboard bow.

At 4:45 p.m. Jellicoe received a report from Beatty in the LION giving the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet which taken together with the reports of Commodore Goodenough in the SOUTHAMPTON between 5 and 6 p.m., gave a "plot" which showed to Jellicoe that the Grand Fleet might meet the enemy's fleet approximately "ahead" and that Jellicoe's cruisers would sight the enemy nearly ahead of the center.

At 5:40 p.m. Jellicoe says "the first accurate information regarding the position of affairs was received from the BLACK PRINCE (the starboard wing cruiser) in which it was reported that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south, five miles". He assumed these to be Beatty's cruisers.

At 5:45 p.m. one of the light Cruisers stationed 3 miles ahead of the battleships, the COMUS, reported heavy gun-fire and flashes of gun-fire visible bearing to the south and south south west respectively.

At 5:50 p.m. the DEFENSE, the center armored cruiser, reported sighting ships in action bearing south south west and steering north east. Jellicoe thought these might be the enemy battle cruisers.

At 5:55 p.m. a signal was sent by Jellicoe to the starboard wing battleship inquiring what could be seen and the reply received at 6:05 p.m. stated "gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the starboard bow".

The Grand Fleet continued on course south east by south, speed 20 knots, same formation, line of division columns, guides abeam.

At 5:56 p.m. the admiral on the west wing battleship reported strange vessels in sight bearing south south west and steering east followed by a signal at 6:00 p.m. that these vessels as the battle cruisers of Beatty three to four miles distant, the LION leading.

Shortly after 6:00 p.m. the IRON DUKE, flagship of Jellicoe, sighted strange vessels at a distance of about five miles bearing south west. Flashes of gunfire were visible from ahead of the IRON DUKE to the starboard beam; the noise was heavy and continuous. The cruisers ahead of the battleships seemed to be hotly engaged but Jellicoe says "that the fact they were not closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents could hardly be battleships".

At 6:02 p.m. signal was made to Grand Fleet to change course to south; speed was reduced to 18 knots; it was Jellicoe's intention to close and clear up the situation as he could not make out the position of the enemy Battle Fleet. In this connection he received a signal from the SOUTHAMPTON, obviously incorrect as Jellicoe says, that the enemy battle cruisers bore south west from their battle fleet. Jellicoe felt that this report could not be true.

At 6:01 p.m. says Jellicoe "immediately upon sighting the LION, a signal was made to Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy's battle fleet; he received the reply from Beatty at 6:14 p.m. Have sighted the enemy's Battle Fleet bearing south south west; this report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment".

In the meantime before this report was received from LION which was in sight 3 to 4 miles ahead steering east, Jellicoe signalled the Grand Fleet destroyers to take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle which stations called for a deployment of the battle ships on the port wing column. He decided to deploy on the port division then at 6:08 p.m. without waiting for the answer from Beatty.

Due to this deployment and the subsequent alterations of the course of the battleships to the east, south and west (general directions) the destroyers never reached their battle stations until 7:25 p.m.

At 6:15 p.m. Evan-Thomas in the BARHAM signalled that the enemy's battle fleet was in sight bearing south south east; neither the report from Beatty nor this report gave the distance of the enemy's battle fleet, but Jellicoe concluded from the low visibility that the distance could not be more than 5 miles. Evan-Thomas had already been reported at 6:07 p.m. as having been in sight from the MARLBOROUGH, the leading battleship of the second division from the right; Evan-Thomas' bearing was reported as south west.

At 6:16 pm. Jellicoe made the signal to deploy on the port or left wing division, course south east by east, he assuming that the course of the enemy was the same as that of Beatty's battle cruisers.

In the meantime Beatty was continually hauling around to the North and East turning the head of the German Battle Cruisers and it was while so doing that he sighted Jellicoe's ships standing down from the north; Beatty apparently when he first saw these ships which were those of Jellicoe's right division supposed that Jellicoe was deploying on his right wing division at least his action at this time and that of Evan-Thomas would show that they both supposed that Jellicoe was being led by the MARLBOROUGH'S division; for their actions were such that they appeared to be placing their forces in the lead of the MARLBOROUGH division; this action if the deployment had been made on the right wing division would have placed Beatty's battle cruisers leading the Grand Fleet followed by Evan-Thomas in the 4 fast BARHAMS.

When Beatty observed that the deployment was being made on the left wing division he speeded up to pass in front of the battle fleet to take station ahead; this of course blanketed the fire of the Grand Fleet which had to slow down to allow Beatty to get in position ahead. In the meantime Evan-Thomas observing this deployment to the left had to turn his division and come in astern of the MARLBOROUGH division, turning to port; while executing this movement the third ship in his division jammed her helm, the

WARSPITE, and this ship made two complete circles toward the High Seas Fleet, receiving some damage, but managed to escape to the northward, where she retired from further action.

It ^{was} while he was speeding to the eastward to get into position ahead of the Grand Fleet that Beatty was forced to turn by the ships of the First Cruiser Squadron, the DEFENSE and WARRIOR which had come into action as described previously and it was just after this that the DEFENSE was sunk (6:16 p.m.), probably by the German battle cruiser LUTZOW, Hipper's flagship.

While this was taking place Hipper's ships made a further change of course to the right of about 90°, probably to avoid a destroyer torpedo attack made at this time by the British destroyer ONSLOW; Hipper kept on and made practically a complete circle and by 6:10 p.m., had come ahead on Scheer's battle fleet, steadying a course about Northeast; Scheer's battle fleet was at this time a short distance astern of Hipper's ships, following on a northeasterly course.

While Hipper was turning the circle referred to above the German Flotilla IX and Half Flotilla XII, advanced to cover their retreat and at a distance of about 6500 yards fired their torpedoes at the 3 INVINCIBLES under Hood who bore in a generally Northeasterly direction from the German Fleet.

At this time, 6:10 p.m., the German light cruiser, the WIESBADEN was put out of action, the ships of the Grand Fleet later after deployment firing at her and finishing her.

At 6:12 p.m. Scheer executed ships left two points for a few minutes to join up astern of Hipper and to make room for him. Scheer then went into column and followed Hipper as stated above.

At about 6:10 p.m. Hood with the 3 INVINCIBLES having terminated his action with the light forces of the enemy sighted the LION and at 6:16 p.m. signalled his squadron to form column ahead of Beatty's battle cruisers.

The general situation being thus at this time:

Jellicoe's Grand Fleet executing deployment on the port wing division, course SE by E, and slowing down to allow Beatty to draw ahead, the rear ships of Jellicoe in action with the leading ships of Scheer which were steering a northeasterly course preceded by Hipper with the 5 battle cruisers that had been engaging Beatty all the afternoon.

Beatty with Hoods battle cruisers now ahead attempting to get in position at the head of Jellicoe's battleships, but between Jellicoe and the German Fleet; the range from Jellicoe's fleet to that of Scheer's averaging about 13000 yards; British destroyers with German light forces and destroyers between the lines.

The visibility was best to the south but better to the westward than to the eastward; that is, visibility favored the British, at this stage of the action.

As regards Jellicoe's approach formation there seems to be no criticism for he was in line of divisions, line of bearing normal to the direction in which reports seemed to indicate he and his scouts would sight the enemy's battlefleet.

It strikes the writer however that there was a dearth of exact information reported to Jellicoe as to the latitude and longitude of the enemy; Beatty's flagship had her radio put out of commission

it is true but it would seem that from 2:20 p.m. until a little after 6:01 p.m., that Jellicoe should have received more definite information as to the course, speed, and position of the enemy battle cruisers and battleships. Jellicoe knew that Beatty was leading them to the Grand Fleet; he says so. We know of course there was a mistake made somewhere of 12 miles in navigation and that Jellicoe really expected to meet up with the enemy 12 miles further to the eastward; that he made actual contact with them 20 minutes before he expected to. Arrangements for transmission of information seem to the writer to have been defective.

Notwithstanding the erroneous report from the SOUTHAMPTON which Jellicoe said was inconceivable and in spite of which he was convinced that he would strike the enemy a little on his starboard bow, Jellicoe decided when Beatty was in sight in the LION steering east a little after 6 p.m. that he would deploy on the port wing column for he at 6:08 signalled to his destroyers without waiting for Beatty's reply as to where the enemy battle fleet was, to take such dispositions as would be necessary for a port deployment. He decided to deploy on that division which most nearly made it certain that he would not be thrown closer to the enemy.

In regard to this deployment Jellicoe has explained at great length the reasons therefore; he has drawn a chart showing what would have actually happened had he done so. The writer does not want to set his humble opinion against that of the British Commander-in-Chief but it keeps sticking in my mind how could Beatty (and Jellicoe did not know at this time that he had lost two battle cruisers) followed by the 4 BARHAMS engage the forces of Hipper from 3:48 p.m. up to 4:50 p.m., and then those of Hipper and Scheer up to 6:15 p.m., leading them as they were the last hour, unless the destroyer torpedo attack danger at the head of the enemy battlefleet had disappeared? If Beatty and Evan-Thomas could stick on the bow of the enemy for the past hour what torpedo danger would suddenly appear at the head of the German column at this time that Beatty and Evan-Thomas could not meet while the Grand Fleet was deploying on the right division?

In addition Beatty was there now; so was Evan-Thomas; Jellicoe had (as he supposed) 6 Battle Cruisers in plain sight followed by the BARHAMS (which he did not see but which had been reported being in sight at 6:07 p.m.) and could these vessels at this time, with the enemy battle ships in the favorable position Jellicoe seems to think they held, be in any more danger now than the right division ships would be if the deployment had taken place to the right? undoubtedly Beatty and Evan-Thomas were then in far more danger than the right two divisions of battleships would be if the deployment took place on their divisions. The danger that Jellicoe feared for the Grand Fleet then was already there; it actually existed for the 6 battle cruisers of Beatty and the 4 BARHAMS; not only this but the danger could not be obviated by a deployment on the port division; if the enemy battlefleet could have shot up the right divisions of the Grand Fleet when deployed to the right (under the cover of the protection of Beatty and Evan-Thomas) how much worse should have been the punishment inflicted upon Beatty and Evan-Thomas with no cover at all.

It seems to me that the reasoning is all wrong; the great danger that Jellicoe feared in the right wing deployment already existed because Beatty and the 4 BARHAMS were in this danger now; they should have assistance at once which could have been given by the First Battle Squadron in such a deployment.

This seems to me the important feature of the deployment question; all others will be passed over, such as increasing the range

of the enemy by the length of the battle ship column, losing the surprise feature, etc.

These remarks only apply to the danger that Jellicoe himself refers to on the right flank, the knuckle, etc.; granting all this danger then, he already had as he supposed 10 ships already in his position; his duty seems therefore to have been to have gone to their assistance by a right division deployment.

The First Cruiser Squadron seems to have been put entirely out of action without accomplishing anything worthy of note; at least what they learned was of no benefit to Jellicoe; there seems to be no criticism of the commander of this squadron; he simply ran into the enemy capital ships without realizing it due to probably the low visibility, although as far as the writer can find out the visibility favored him rather than the German to the south.

Hood seems to have had a proper conception of the battle when he sighted the LION and to have gone to his station very promptly for which he has been commended.

The battle cruisers under Beatty had so far been employed properly according to Jellicoe; the latter has made known the policy of employing vessels of this class "at a considerable distance from the Battle Fleet, etc., to make contact, hold it, and report the strength of the enemy to the Battle Fleet". This is what Beatty did. Hipper with his Battle Cruisers did likewise.

Beatty first sailed to the south and east of the Battle Fleet; that Admiral Jellicoe intended the Battle Cruiser Fleet to search the waters on his western flank for the enemy up to 2:00 p.m. 31 May and then join up with the Battle Fleet when the entire force would be looking for the enemy. At this particular time the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron consisting of the three INVINCIBLES was with Jellicoe so the latter had previously ordered the four fast 25-knot dreadnaughts of the BARHAM class to join Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet; Jellicoe has said that as these newest and fast battleships could make 25 knots he did not feel that the battle cruisers under Beatty would be in any danger if they encountered a superior force as they could if necessary on account of their high speed escape. We also have it from Admiral Jellicoe that "throughout the war it had been our policy to cause our battle cruisers, with their attendant light cruisers, to occupy when at sea an advanced position, often at a considerable distance from the Battle Fleet. Battle Cruisers were designed and built in order that they might keep in touch with the enemy and report his movements when found; hence the heavy guns which they carried. They were intended to find the enemy for the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy's strength in order to report to the Battle Fleet". Thus we have it that Beatty's force was to locate and maintain contact with the enemy reporting its strength. On this day then Beatty's force was really stronger than usual in the proportion of the 4 BARHAMS to the 3 INVINCIBLES.

The British forces were operating according to a prearranged plan to bring the enemy forces that might be in the North Sea to battle.

V. THE ENGAGEMENTS OF THE MAIN FLEETS-THE SECOND PHASE

(From 6:16 p.m. to 8:38 p.m.)
(See accompanying charts, British and German).

At 6:19 p.m. Evan-Thomas realized that the deployment was taking place on the left division so he attempted as had been described to form up astern of 1st Battle Squadron, which he did by 6:38.

At 6:33 p.m. Beatty's ships had passed clear of the Grand Fleet, the latter having in the meantime slowed down as much as to 14 knots, some of the ships having to stop, etc., to maintain station; fleet speed was then made 17 knots.

In the meantime ships in the rear of Jellicoe's column were under fire at 6:14 p.m., during deployment from the head of Scheer's battleships, at a range of 1300 yards, the MARLBOROUGH engaging a ship of the KAISER class. The High Seas Fleet was made out at this time steering east.

At about 6:38 p.m. the deployment was complete and the leading battleship the KING GEORGE, flag of Vice Admiral Jerram, headed to starboard one point to close in and apparently following Beatty.

The IRON DUKE at 6:30 p.m. satisfying herself that the battle cruisers had hauled well ahead opened fire but the visibility was such that it was "hard to distinguish friend from foe". Direction of wind about west south west, force 2, "causing the enemy's funnel smoke to drift towards our line" says Jellicoe. It might be added here that the weather conditions were worse for the Germans.

At 6:50 p.m. Jellicoe signalled change of course to south to close the range, it having been apparently opening. This large change of four points blanketed the fire of the 4th ships in the respective divisions.

Just prior to this change of course torpedoes were reported crossing the line of battleships in the rear near the MARLBOROUGH, which this ship avoided by altering course; another rear battle ship reported a submarine (it must be borne in mind that no submarines were present). At 6:54 p.m. the MARLBOROUGH was torpedoed, which incident when made known to Jellicoe later caused him to be quite impatient at the slowness of this ship in replying to his signal asking for particulars as to the material damage she had sustained. The MARLBOROUGH did not fall out of the line but kept her station during the fight.

The commander of the 2nd Battle Squadron anticipated the orders of Jellicoe and placed his squadron ahead of the IRON DUKE.

At 6:47 p.m. the IRON DUKE passed the wreck of the INVINCIBLE not knowing at this time that she had been lost at 6:34 p.m., having been suddenly destroyed at about 9000 yards range by the German battle cruiser, the DERFLINGER; her ending was much in the same way as that of the two battle cruisers earlier in the afternoon, suddenly going down with practically all hands.

At 7:00 p.m. Beatty signalled to Jellicoe that the enemy was to the westward.

At 7:05 p.m. the "whole battle line was turned together three more points to starboard to close the enemy", this making the course of the battle fleet now SW by S. Jellicoe had now changed his course toward the enemy by 8 points since the first signal for deployment.

A few minutes after this change of course had been made two ships ahead of the IRON DUKE reported a submarine (which of course we now know was not there) a little on the port bow.

At 7:10 p.m. Jellicoe observed a flotilla of enemy destroyers supported by a cruiser, approaching the fleet on a bearing S 50 W from the IRON DUKE, so he brought the fleet back to a southerly course (three points to port) to "turn on to the submarine and to bring the ships into line ahead, ready for any required manuevere".

At 7:23 p.m. Jellicoe turned the fleet away on account of the torpedo menace two points, followed almost immediately by another two points turn. In all this made a turn away from the enemy of 7 points.

At 7:33 p.m. the fleet was brought back to the course S by W; Jellicoe says "the total amount by which the range was opened by the turns was 1750 yards"; this is true for the 23 minute interval referred to, but if the course had not been changed but had been continued SW by S up to 7:41 p.m., Jellicoe would have been closer to the enemy by some 11000 yards than the fleet actually was by this time (7:41 p.m.)

The fleet was attacked again a second time at 7:25 p.m. by the enemy destroyers and this time they were countered by the British destroyers which had been able to get into position now supported by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron which was it will be remembered attached to Jellicoe. After ordering this squadron to the attack Jellicoe signalled it several times among other signals being one not to get too close to the enemy capital ships.

One is struck all through the battle by the great number of what would appear to be unnecessary signals. Even the air was full of wireless.

During the first destroyer attack (when MARLBOROUGH was hit) the ships of Hipper gradually turned to the south and to the west while Scheer at 6:30 p.m. with his "leading division heading south, the next three divisions heading east and the last two divisions heading about north east executed his remarkable manuever" of "ships right about". He did this to escape the "cap" which then threatened from Jellicoe's fleet, although Scheer still thought that Jellicoe was coming up from the southeast, entering the battle on a NW course. It was during this manuever that the DERFLINGER destroyed the INVINCIBLE. This movement was carried out under the cover of a smoke screen laid by the German destroyers of Flotilla III.

The High Seas Fleet continued to the westward until 6:55 p.m., freeing itself from the ships of Jellicoe, out of range; during this movement of the Germans it will be remembered that Jellicoe was just completing his deployment (6:38 p.m.)

At 6:55 p.m. Scheer executed his decision to go ships right about again heading toward the Grand Fleet: The situation as Scheer viewed it at this time was: There was 2 more hours of daylight and it was too early for him to try to escape; if he kept on the westward it would look like a retreat and adversely affect the morale of his personnel; he would be forsaking the

WIESBADEN and the LUTZOW; the British destroyers still had their torpedoes and could follow him at night and he wished to make them attack in daylight to expend their torpedoes, etc.; even should he evade the Grand Fleet tonight he would be forced to fight on the morrow.

These are the salient points as emphasized by Scheer himself in his report of the battle made afterwards. How much of this really influenced him it is hard to say. Personally I believe that Scheer was "up in the air" to some extent; he realized by this time that it was the Grand Fleet ahead of him, but he still believed that it was steering to the NW and I am personally convinced that Scheer thought that by going back toward them he might pass under their stern and proceed toward home. The light conditions and smoke, etc., were even much worse for him than for Jellicoe; the latter we know about 9th ship from the head of his column was having great difficulty in sizing up the situation even after getting reports all the afternoon and he knew a great deal more about the strength and general position and course of Scheer than Scheer did of Jellicoe's fleet; we know that the British could hardly distinguish 'friend from foe'. How much more difficult then were the conditions under which Scheer labored some 13 ships from the head of his column; this is further brought out by the difficulty that the second ship in the column, the DERFLINGER, had in trying to see what it was all about; we get this from Commander Hase's report when he tells us how surprised he was to see what afterwards turned out to be the INVINCIBLE suddenly show up out of the mist at about 9000 yards range. In addition to this Scheer we know had been proceeding to the westward since 6:30 p.m. It is true Scheer ordered the Scouting Divisions I and II to attack head of enemy's column and as Commander Hase puts it "ram the enemy"; but this all looks like a forlorn hope; rather spectacular and if he really did signal the ramming signal as Hase says this taken together with the decision to go ships right about would appear *more* than ever like sheer desperation; to die in the attempt. The writer thinks that Scheer was making an attempt to escape by passing under the stern of the British Fleet; that the thought ^{that} this was heading NW and that he would sacrifice his scouting forces in order to facilitate the escape of his main fleet.

At 6:55 p.m. then Scheer went ships right about and headed toward Jellicoe.

Soon the cruisers of Hipper became engaged with Beatty's cruisers and the leading division of Scheer's battleships were forced to bend around to a southerly course preceded by the battle cruisers; the fire was particularly heavy at this period about 7:13, which it will be remembered was when Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet was standing on the course south, he just previously having been headed SW by S.

At this time Scheer decided to execute "ships right about" for the third time which he did, standing off on course about 260°; it was during this time that the two destroyer attacks took place that caused Jellicoe to turn away the four points he refers to (not counting the three point turn to run over the submarine). The first attack was pushed home to within about 6500 yards of the British Battle ships while the second was made at about the range of 6000 yards. A third attack was made by two German boats at the Fifth Battle Squadron when they had failed to rescue the crew of the WIESBADEN boat this attack in no way influenced Jellicoe because he did not know of it.

This was really the critical moment of the battle for the Scheer was now standing to the westward and Jellicoe standing to south and east; it was now nearly 7:30 p.m.-- and nearly an hour had passed away since the Grand Fleet had completed its deployment. Very little daylight remained considering the low visibility conditions. Scheer had escaped.

Very little remains to be said about the rest of the daylight action. At 7:41 p.m. Jellicoe decided to head SW by S which he did by division movements to close the enemy to see if they could be brought to action again. At 7:40 p.m. Beatty reported to Jellicoe that the enemy bore NW by W from the LION, distant 10 or 11 miles. One might suppose that Beatty was impatient when he made this signal as he followed it up a few minutes later with another one at 7:47 p.m. submitting that the van of Jellicoe's battleships follow him and cut off the enemy; Jellicoe finally did direct Jerram in the KING GEORGE, the van battleships to follow Beatty, but by this time, 8:10 p.m., it was useless as Jerram could not see Beatty and did not know where to follow.

A lot has been made of this dispatch and it has only recently come to light. The prominent points in connection with this whole situation at this time are that:

The Second Cruiser Squadron nearly two hours after the first contacts were made was still unable to get into position so that when obviously called upon to do so they were not able to link up Beatty with the van of Jellicoe's battleships; in fact Jerram had at times to change course to keep from running over these cruisers which had hard times making 20 knots; indeed Jerram at one time requested one of these cruisers to make less smoke. Here was Beatty keeping contact with the enemy as he had done since 3:31 p.m., fighting all the time; he had now lost 3 battle cruisers; he was holding on to the enemy; at 7:40 he signalled again that the enemy was NW; then he submits that the van battleships follow him; and what happens; there are no cruisers that are capable of linking up the gap. A head without a body; the trunk had become detached.

At 7:59 p.m. Jellicoe headed west by divisions but never again was there any real chance to engage Scheer. Much more might be written about Beatty hanging on, etc., but at 8:38 p.m. he lost contact with the enemy after engaging him from time to time through the mists. All chances of bringing the enemy to action during daylight had disappeared.

Neither is it necessary to follow in detailed movements the actions of Hipper and Scheer; they generally speaking stood toward the southwest avoiding action as much as possible until darkness should set in.

Had Jellicoe failed or was he successful? Was the mission of the British government fulfilled? Did they still have the so called command of the sea? Why did Jellicoe fail to 'defeat and annihilate' the enemy's battlefleet?

It may be useful in keeping the mission in mind to state a few facts that have become known through the recent publication of the Admiralty referred to above.

In the fall of 1914 Admiral Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty on the subject of destroyer attack with torpedoes on the fleet; speaking of the 'turn away' of the enemy under cover of torpedo boat destroyer attack Jellicoe says "is a move most difficult to counter x x x. There is no real counter. Nothing but ample time and superior speed can be the answer, and this means that unless the meeting takes place early in the day it is most difficult, if not impossible to fight the action to a finish.

Jellicoe would fight the action to a finish--if certain conditions did not confront him.

The above letter was written 30 October. Later he wrote another letter to the Admiralty saying "I foreshadowed in my letter of 30 October, 1914, x x x x the possibility of it being actually necessary purposely to delay bringing the fleet to close action for some time on account of the possibility which the mine and submarine give for preparing a trap on a large scale, and it should be understood that this possibility still exists x x x x x."

The Admiralty concurred in the above views.

Jellicoe also wrote other letters to the Admiralty in which he outlined his plans to fight the German Fleet in Northern waters near his own bases near to for any wounded ships; away from enemy air craft operations; at a great distance for enemy submarines to operate; where there would be less likelihood for the enemy to lay a mine field; where the cruisers constantly at sea would be more likely to have less requirements as to coal; etc.

He intended to fight but to take advantage of all controllable advantages if possible.

He further states he intends to take "the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy's battlefleet". He also requested the Admiralty that whenever fleet action became imminent that all cruisers, destroyers, etc., in home ports at the time, be sent to the scene of action "so that they can be of assistance in rendering the victory shattering and complete."

(1) The critics of Admiral Jellicoe contend that his mission was the destruction of the enemy fleet regardless of the risks that might be encountered upon the High Seas through enemy torpedoes, submarines and mines; that if the enemy fleet escaped back to port without being practically "defeated and" annihilated" the Commander-in-Chief had failed in his mission because so long as the German Fleet remained a "fleet in being" the German ruthless submarine campaign could be waged and the war prolonged, endangering the Allied operations on the continent.

(2) The other side of the question rests on the proposition that the so long as the British Navy remained superior on the seas the Allies had command of the sea and despite the submarine operations the surface communications were secure which would not be the case supposing this margin of superiority were lost; therefore, that so long as the German Fleet could be driven off the seas and the margin of superiority maintained the British Navy was accomplishing its mission.

According to the first view the mission of the British Navy would be to destroy the enemy fleet and according to the second view to keep the enemy fleet off the high seas.

It would seem that so long as the Admiralty had approved this plan of meeting certain eventualities that it therefore stamped with its approval the policy of maintaining under all circumstances the margin of superiority--that no risks were to be undertaken that would by any chance endanger this superiority; that if the German Fleet could be kept from operating on the high seas or against the Allied sea (surface) communications that all would be well. This appears to be specially emphasized by the fact that the plan proposed even admitted the possibility of the German Fleet escaping action after being encountered.

It would also appear that if the Admiralty approved this plan that it was further the approved policy of the government; that therefore the general mission of the government as regards its naval policy was the so called command of the sea and that this could be accomplished if the enemy fleet could be kept from operating on the high seas--that the essential point was not the destruction of the enemy fleet but that the essential point was that the enemy be prevented from operating--if this could be accomplished by his destruction so much the better.

We have no means of knowing the inner thoughts of the government but it must have occurred to them that the German Navy was untried as yet and thus far had done well at Coronel and fought well at the Falklands; their own history had gone a long way to prove that inferior fleets as far as strength of forces went had been in the past able to win victories. If the war was lost on the land the British would still have their Navy--if that were lost all was lost. The margin of superiority of their navy must have played its part from this point of view; how much no one can say.

But back of all this is the fact that the policy of not accepting the torpedo danger in a retiring action was initiated by Jellicoe in the fall of 1914; therefore, it would appear that the government and the Admiralty had given the Commander-in-Chief free reign--had empowered him to act as the circumstances seemed to warrant.

If this be true it would seem to give an idea of the Commander-in-Chief's conception of the naval strategy--that the naval superiority must not be endangered. It may also be stated that there can be no question but that Admiral Jellicoe sought the "defeat and annihilation" of the German Fleet; he stated so in the above referred to plan of 1914; still it must be admitted that this plan allowed the enemy to escape if he retired when encountered late in the day, etc. Admiral Jellicoe would defeat the enemy--destroy him--if the enemy did not do certain things--the risk of losing the superiority must not be taken.

So long then as this plan of handling the fleet was approved by the Admiralty, and the Commander-in-Chief had made known his decision as to how he would meet such unfavorable conditions, it follows that this decision to so act in the circumstances met the full approval of the Admiralty also; the decision then was in accordance with the mission; it follows that the mission was command of the sea and that the command of the sea did not depend on the destruction of the German Fleet--it was accomplished from the above viewpoint if the enemy were prevented from operating on the high seas even if he retired to his bases.

No other mission can be reconciled with the approval by the Admiralty and government of the decision of the Commander-in-Chief to act tactically in the North Sea with its low visibility in a manner which admits that the enemy may escape entirely from battle after being brought to action. If the destruction of the enemy fleet was the mission then it never could be accomplished if the enemy was met in the afternoon and he decided to retire using the tactics that Jellicoe feared. This assumes that the German Fleet remaining behind its fortified bases had no effect on the war on the sea or at least the effects were small in proportion to those that might occur if the British superiority were endangered.

It is seen therefore that the strategic mission of the British Commander-in-Chief and that of the Admiralty was the same ~~and that of the Admiralty was the same~~ and that this mission was intimately associated with the tactical ideas of the Commander-in-Chief as influenced by the torpedo tactics of the enemy in a retiring movement. If the enemy could be defeated and annihilated so much the

better; if not the mission was accomplished if the enemy was forced to retire again to his bases and stay there. No other conclusion can be arrived at in view of the approval of the plan of 1914 which was still in force.

There is no question here of the superiority of the British fleet; this is premised in all discussions on all sides.

We are led to the inevitable conclusion that the destruction of the enemy fleet was not primarily essential to the Allied command of the sea as viewed by the Admiralty and the British Commander-in-Chief; command of the sea was exercised if the enemy was denied the sea and forced to seek his fortified bases.

There can never be any way of determining what Jellicoe's secret instructions were but from the above and from what has subsequently happened, keeping in mind the past history of Great Britain in her relations with her representatives, it certainly seems most probable that secret instructions had been issued at some time, the substance of which was that Great Britain's fleet must not be jeopardized to the extent that the naval margin of superiority might be lost. If such is the case Jellicoe is just the type of man to remain loyal to the Admiralty to the end and the truth may never be known.

It seems popular at this time to be a critic of Jellicoe but it must never be forgotten that no student of the Battle of Jutland can ever view the situation through the eyes of Admiral Jellicoe as this situation existed from shortly before 6:00 p.m., until 7:23 p.m.; the "fog of war" we can not reconstruct for ourselves try as we may.

One thing stands out clearly however in this as in all other critical moments bearing on military or naval actions and this is the psychological factor; the 'fog of war' for two different individuals will not produce the same impressions.

It may be remarked in passing that the United States in July, 1917, in setting forth its naval policy after we had entered the war virtually stated that we would keep our battle fleet on this side of the Atlantic, providing for future eventualities, in the event that the Grand Fleet met disaster at the hands of the High Seas Fleet. If we did the same thing is it impossible that the British Government should have adopted the same policy of providing for future eventualities, such as the losing of the war on the continent? Not that this is the right policy, but only to surmise that Jellicoe had been told not to seek decide engagements unless all risks had been eliminated.

VI. THE NIGHT ACTION MAY 31-JUNE 1.

Pages could be written as to the movements of the two forces from 8:38 p.m. until 5:00 a.m., 1 June.

The principle features are that Jellicoe stood south during the night, trying to get his battleships together and out of the scene of action to avoid the enemy destroyer attacks that could be expected; Jellicoe's destroyers were stationed five miles astern of the battleships to cover his rear; Beatty was given the course and speed of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe did not desire to fight a night action; he has given us the reasons which generally are considered to be sound.

Beatty after losing contact with the enemy hoped to renew the engagement at daylight deeming that it would be impossible for the enemy to avoid action.

The High Seas Fleet after continuing to the west and throwing off the pursuit turned and stood to the southeast passing to the north of Beatty and the Grand Fleet during the night heading for the Horn Reef which they were trying to reach by daylight; they ran across the destroyers and light forces of the British many times during the dark hours and several encounters took place.

The things to note in the night action are:

The German Destroyers some 70 of them, failed to locate the British capital ships; the British Destroyers failed to sink but one predreadnaught battleship; several cruisers and destroyers were lost through collision; though many of the contacts with Scheer's retiring battleships were made by British destroyers and light cruisers during the night, some of them plainly visible to the battle ships of Jellicoe, apparently no effort was made to change course so as to meet them at daylight; one destroyer did send a wireless message giving the enemy's course and speed, etc., but it never reached Jellicoe; it has been said that each destroyer thought of course that the other destroyers making contacts had reported them.

Jellicoe has said that he did not desire to be at the Horn Reef without his destroyers and that he feared the torpedo attacks that the enemy might make at this time unless his torpedo craft were present; it is true that by morning the British destroyers were pretty thoroughly scattered, and it may be further inferred that many of them must have been very short of fuel.

Jellicoe sent some ships to lay mines near the Horn Reef and let it go at that, contenting himself with collecting his scattered forces the morning of June 1; he evidently thought that the enemy might seek further engagement for after steaming for several hours in this vicinity after daylight and "the enemy giving no sign" he decided that he would return to home waters.

A lot more could be written about the events that took place but they are not essential to the study of this battle from a tactical standpoint.

The essential feature was that with ideal conditions existing for a night destroyer attack on capital ships after the demoralization of a day action, over 150 destroyers failed to sink but one second class battleship! over half of these destroyers failed to find any capital ship to fire at! One French Admiral in commenting on Jutland has said that "Jutland was a play without the second act"--referring of course to the failure of the destroyers to perform as had been expected they would under the circumstances.

There were no over head air craft at Jutland; there were no submarines present but their moral forces was such that Jellicoe's 24 battleships turned three points to run over one (that had been reported); the destroyers did no material damage commensurate with their potential strength but their moral force *influenced* Jellicoe not to deploy on his right division; destroyers worried Jellicoe from the time he sent Beatty the wire to leave ROYSTH; when he signalled the fleet at 1:55 p.m., 31 May inquiring about fuel. They caused Jellicoe to turn the fleet away 4 points at 7:23 p.m.; they caused him to lose contact with Scheer and never again to gain it. The gun did the material damage at Jutland; the torpedo the moral damage; it cheated Jellicoe of the 'defeat and annihilation' of the enemy battlefleet.

And lastly what has made an impression on the writer, whose last duty was in destroyers, is the fact that through the lack of proper types to make examination of strange vessels, the destroyers had to be employed for this purpose and Jellicoe lost 18 miles in effecting his concentration "eastward of the Long Forties"--an hour and a quarter of daylight--when the fate of the world might have depended on this amount of time.

(HAB/AAD 8 March, 1921)

CHART SHOWING TRACKS OF VESSELS OF H. M. FLEET

DURING THE NIGHT ACTIONS FROM 10 P.M. MAY 31ST TO 2:00 A.M. JUNE 1ST 1916.


Levellin
Admiral,
19 June 1916.

The Chart is constructed on the Mercator principle.

The **BLACK** lines show the track of H.M.S. "IRON DUKE"
 " **RED** " " " " " 12TH FLOTILLA
 " **BROWN** " " " " " 4TH FLOTILLA
 " **GREEN** " " " " " 11TH FLOTILLA
 " **PECKED BLACK** " " " " " BATTLE CRUISER FLEET

Numbered positions:


- ① *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Fortune*, attack enemy Battleships of 'DEUTSCHLAND' Class.
- ② *Castor* and XIth Flotilla in contact with 3 or more Enemy Battle Cruisers.
- ③ *Castor* sinks German T. B. D. 0:15 a. m.
- ④ 4th Flotilla in contact with German 1st Battle squadron XI:30 p. m.
- ⑤ *Sparrowhawk* out of action, witnessed German Cruiser capsize II:0 a. m.
- ⑥ 12th Flotilla sighted Enemy Battleships 1:45 a. m., Enemy Battleship sunk, and probably one other.
- ⑦ Active witnessed destruction of 4 funnel Cruiser by Enemy Battleship XI:0 p. m. (It is considered possible now, 18.6.16. that this was 'BLACK PRINCE')



Personal Copy of
Rear Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

MAY 31ST 1916



Orin Gray

Personal Copy of
Rear Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.



**GERMAN PLAN III.
THE ADVANCE ON 31ST MAY.**


NOTE: ALL TIME IS GERMAN TIME I.E. 2 HRS. IN ADVANCE OF G.M.T.

Personal Copy of
Rear Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.

**GERMAN
III**

GERMAN PLAN IV. BATTLE CRUISER ACTION.

NOTE. ALL TIME IS GERMAN TIME, I.E. 2 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF G.M.T.



Personal Copy of
Rear Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.

GERM



L 24 reported about 5 a.m. 12 large units
 3 heavy Cruisers at speed South at high
 speed. 2 Cruisers pursue Airship.

L 24 reported that Trawlers
 towed to their nets showed
 the Danish Flag on being
 passed but
 opened fire later.

11 flotilla reported at 10-45 p.m.
 4 Light Cruisers & many Destroyers

7 Destroyers
 8 p.m.

2.5 a.m. 4 Battle-cruisers
 reported by Seydlitz.

5.50 a.m. L 17 reported
 6 Battle-cruisers.

L 17 reported 5.40 a.m.
 3 Battle-cruisers
 course to turn to
 West course.

L 17 reported
 5.45 a.m. 12 English
 Battle-cruisers & many
 Light Cruisers at speed
 11.1 at high speed.

HOSTILE SUBMARINES

GERMAN PLAN VII.
RETURN OF THE MAIN FLEET 31ST MAY - 1ST JUNE.
 NOTE: ALL TIME IS GERMAN TIME I.E. 2 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF G.M.T.


PLAN OF
BATTLE OFF JUTLAND
 MAY 31st 1916

NOTE:-

- Black Line represents track of BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
- Red Line " " " BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS
- Brown Line (dotted) represents track of ENEMY SHIPS

In Service
 Admiral.
 19 June, 1916.

Personal Copy of
 Rear Admiral W. D. Sims, U.S.N.



At this period enemy apparently made two 18 point turns. This is confirmed by German accounts of the battle.

At VII-15 Battlefleet commenced to form Single Line Ahead

At VII-42 Battlefleet commenced to form Single Line Ahead on Course S.W.

Due to Marlborough's reduction of speed the B.S. were unable to take up correct station and remained astern of station during the night.