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Thesis

POLICY

Submitted by

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Naval War College

Newport, R. I.

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Part I.

.Its Relation to War.

War is generally understood to mean a condition existing between states, but it may be a condition existing between parts or factions within a state; for example, our Civil War, or the French Revolution, but, for the purposes of this paper, war will be considered in its general application.

Policy has been defined as "A definite course, or method, adopted by a Government." It is obvious that a Government may have a perfectly well defined course, or method, with reference to internal or domestic questions, as well as one in relation to external or international questions, but it is not probable that a well organized Government will deliberately pursue a policy which it knows will lead to revolution, or internal wars, so this discussion will be limited to "Policy; Its relation to International war possibilities."

All recent wars have resulted from policies of one kind or another. The Japanese-Chinese war was the result of conflict of the policies of Japan and China relative to Korea; the Russo-Japanese war was due to conflict of policies relative to Manchuria; the Spanish-American war to conflict of policies relative to Cuba; the World's War to conflict of many policies, chief of which was the balance of power in Europe. The United States entered the World's War on account of the conflict of German and American policies relative to the safety on the high seas of American lives and property. This leads us to the conclusion that policy leads to war, but this conclusion seems to be contradiction to the teachings of History. History shows that a majority of the recognized Governments of today have come into being as the result of wars; this is especially so of the Governments on the American continent. Our own Government and nation had its birth in the Revolutionary War, and most of the additions in territory has resulted from wars. All of the Central and South American Republics have become independent sovereigns through wars. Germany, as at present constituted geographically, is the result of many wars, and if we go back far enough we shall probably find that every sovereign state has been formed as the result of war. The policy of a state comes into being with the state, and if we begin our consideration with the birth of each state it would seem that war originates policy instead of policy leading to war. If we carry our investigation further, however, we find that the wars and revolutions, out of which new states have sprung, have been the result of policy, not of the new state, but of the mother state. Our Revolutionary War was the result of England's colonial policy. The colonial policy of Spain resulted in the loss of her American colonies and possessions out of which have been formed the independent states of Central and South America, Mexico and Cuba. A careful and thorough study of history, and the causes of war, will not reveal a single war which is not directly traceable to policy.

In order to show how policy leads to war we must start where the policy of any state begins; that is, with the birth of the state. When a new state is formed and a Government is reorganized, it immediately recognizes certain conditions and interests which have a material bearing on the welfare of the state. These interests at first are of a domestic nature, usually economic, religious, or moral, and the state takes certain steps in the defense of furtherance of these interests, and such steps become the State Policy. In the beginning a state is more or less isolated, she has no entangling alliances, or relations, and is able to concentrate her efforts on domestic affairs, but as the state grows, and her population increases, her interests expand and sooner or later she finds that she can no longer take steps for the defense of furtherance of these interests without considering the interests of other nations. When this condition arises it is only a matter of time until the two states find that their policies relative to these interests have become antagonistic. At first these differences will be smoothed out by diplomatic negotiations; compromise will be made by one, or both, states, which, in many cases, will effect a permanent settlement of the difficulty, as was the case of the Northwest Boundary between the United States and Canada, and the Behring Sea fishery question, but where issues are vital to the welfare or possibly the life of the State, compromise and concessions are only a postponement, and merely serves to delay the final settlement. In such cases, the time will come when neither state is willing to make further concessions and a resort to force (war) is the only means of settlement. An example of such interests is the case of the United States in the World's War. Germany adopted a policy which was detrimental to our commercial interests, jeopardised the lives of our citizens and flouted our national honor. Our ships were sunk, our trade practically driven from the sea in certain areas, and our citizens murdered. We negotiated, wrote note after note, and were finally forced to resort to war to protect our interests. So it will be in any case where policies, as to vital interests, are antagonistic, the inevitable result will be war. To submit without a struggle to injustice, or to the destruction of one's vital interests, is not in accordance with the psychology of human nature, nor will it ever be in accord with the nature of an ambitious self respecting nation.

We have, in the United States, the Sentimental School of which peace is the great aim which has attempted to foist upon the world the theory that war might be avoided by arrangement for universal arbitration. The League of Nations is a result of the efforts of this school. This theory is probably based on the analogy to civil action by which private quarrels are settled in law courts, but the analogy is false. A safer analogy is to be found in the administration of criminal law, in which the state makes war upon the offenders and uses force as a protection against them and to insure their punishment. To the utterances of this school of theorists we are indebted for such sayings as: "Splendid Isolation", "Absolute Neutrality", "Too proud to fight", "He kept us out of War", "A million men over night", "Watchful waiting", and others. These theorists fail to realize that no state will ever submit to arbitration questions affecting her vital interests, or her National honor, or existence; that self defense is the inherent right of the state as well as the individual; they regard exertions of force

in support of right, not as something which might be necessary, and for which the nation should be prepared, but as something altogether wrong; they fail to realize that the true responsibility of a state is not for the preservation of peace but for abstention from wrong, and that the penalty for wrong doing, whether it takes the shape of peace preserved by cowardice, or of a war in an unjust cause, is, for nations as for individuals, their own corruption and degradation. There can be no greater delusion than the belief that sentiment enters into the affairs of nations, - it is purely a cold blooded business proposition.

War is an instrument of, and cannot be considered as independent of policy. The clashing of policies relative to certain interests which each state considers vital to its welfare produces war; that is, the policy of one state demands certain things relative to her interests; the policy of another state demands another solution relative to these same interests. If each state is determined that her policy shall prevail she endeavors to force her will upon the adversary by force, if necessary. War is the result; that is, "War is the instrument by which a state forces her will (policy) upon another State". It is a form of political action, and the only means by which a state can assert against challenge its conception of what is right. It is, therefore, an unalterable part of policy; in other words, war is policy,

carried on by force and policy does not end with the declaration of war, but continues to assist its instrument - war - in every way possible. In the Russo-Japanese War it was policy that put an end to the troublesome assistance the French were extending to the Russians. Policy regulates relations, not merely between state immediately concerned, but with those directly interested in the final issue, and whose sympathy, or ill will, may count for much. For this reason, war does not always put an end to negotiations between the belligerent powers. In the seven years' war, the English minister was not recalled from St. Petersburg. As one writer puts it "War is a chapter of national policy; its ends are those of the statesmen. The only difference between that chapter and the one that precedes it being that where the pages of war begins, the instrument used is force, where war has done its work, the thread continued in the next chapter is the same thread that ran through the blood stained passages called war".

The responsibility for war rests solely upon the statesmen of the state. In all Governments in existence today, the laws and regulations for safeguarding their interests are in the hands of representatives selected by various means. In most cases these lawmakers are representatives of the people, and selected by the people. The laws and regulations made by these representatives, or statesmen, are the only means by and through which policies come into existence. As war is a result of policy, it is upon the statesmen who bring these policies into existence that the responsibility for war must rest.

The consequences of war, successful or unsuccessful, cannot be foretold. The loss of life, property and interests in a successful war are enormous, and the sorrow and suffering during and after the war makes the most radical statesman hesitate in urging policies which will plunge his country into war. An unsuccessful war will carry with it the loss, destruction, sorrow and suffering incident to the war, and, in addition, the burden of compensating the successful

enemy, so far as it is possible to do so, for his losses and expenses during the war, and the humiliation of being forced to comply with the will of his policy. It may involve the very life of a nation. The loss of life and property, and the suffering and sorrow, due to the World's War is terrible to contemplate and it will take years to recover from the commercial and industrial disaster experienced since the war by the successful and unsuccessful states alike. With the prevailing forms of Government, and the terrible consequences incident to war, future wars will be impossible, except where great and vital national issues are involved. For this reason anything short of an extreme war will be unlikely in the future. It will be a duel to the death, an act of violence which knows no bounds, which recognizes no law except expediency. Sherman said "War is Hell", and those who went through the terrible battles of the World's War think he was too conservative.

Policy is the business of statesmen, and, as war is a part of policy, any statesman who neglects to study war neglects part of his business. This study should not be made with the idea of conducting war, for this should be left to the men especially trained in war, but should be made in order that the statesman should fully understand the theory of war so that he may properly exercise his functions relative to policy. It is necessary that policy and the means for enforcing policy - War - should harmonize, and it is only by such study on the part of statesmen that our policies may be so shaped that the terrible consequences of war may be avoided, or, if unavoidable, that the means for carrying out our policies are in such a state that the consequences of an unsuccessful war may be avoided. War should be regarded by every statesman as an unalterable part of policy, as a part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and an occasional warlike struggle as inevitable as commercial struggles. He should consider it as of practical use in defending or furthering the interests of the state; a means by which, some day, his nation will impose its will upon another nation, or, upon which the very life of the nation may depend, as an instrument of policy which should be studied accordingly.

In a Government such as ours, we have very few lawmakers who are worthy of the name of statesman. The politics of our country are not conducive to the development of men versed in state craft; our representatives are elected for a limited period and they usually hold office too short a time for them to become even more than casually interested in state craft - they are usually so busy bolstering up their political interests that their entire time is taken up with matters of interests to their local constituents to the exclusion of the consideration or study of national matters. The advice usually given to new representatives is "To avoid fancy committees such as that of Foreign Relations." Our citizens, in general, take very little interest in national affairs. The newspapers throughout the country are primarily responsible for this lack of interest, for most of these papers publish international news only when they lack local news sufficient to get out the paper, and for this reason our prominent men who may possibly be elected as representatives, have little chance to acquire other than a very casual knowledge of International affairs. It is, therefore, all the more necessary that our lawmakers should make a thorough and careful study, not only of our foreign relations and strategic conditions, but also of wars and the lessons to be gained therefrom.

Unless a state be rightly constituted and rightly ruled, and have sound policies, normal and healthy business relations are impossible and success in war is improbable. Mexico's condition today is an example of misrule and unsound policies. Honesty, justice and righteousness should be the aim of a Government, even more so than the individual. While our statesmen make the laws which establish our policies, the statesmen are elected by the people and it is the people's duty to see that every law made by these statesmen shall have justice for its aim and righteousness for its foundation, so that there may be no chance of their having to take up arms in behalf of wrong. They should see that these statesmen make every effort consistent with our national honor and vital interests to avoid war, at the same time keeping the nation in such a state of preparedness that she can defend her national honor and vital interests against all probable enemies. The theory that righteousness must prevail will not stand the test of war, and victory will go to the strongest regardless of right. A nation which fails to prepare for war is courting national disaster.

As soon as a state is formed she becomes apprehensive of attack on her sovereignty and begins to consider ways and means of avoiding or defending herself against such attack, and in the same way, when a state determines upon any definite policy, she immediately considers ways and means of furthering or defending such policies. The first and most usual step taken by any state is to obtain possession, by purchase or otherwise, of strategic points the possession of which by an enemy, would threaten the state or interests involved. To make these points of the greatest value, or of any defensive value whatever, they should be strongly fortified. England, with her many overseas possessions, has been the most farsighted state in this respect—Gibraltar, Malta, Hongkong, and many other lesser possessions being the result. All other states have followed England's example to a more or less degree. The United States, more from chance and luck than farsightedness, is now in possession of practically all points which have a strategic bearing on her interests and policies. Cuba, Puerto Rico and St. Thomas control the Caribbean and the Atlantic end of the Canal. Honolulu, Guam, Samoa and Midway Islands will give ample bases for a force operating in the Pacific. These points have not been fortified, however, and until they are they may become the property of any nation just for the taking. Our statesmen should see that these points are fortified and equipped for any future operations we may undertake, and until they are so fortified and equipped, no matter what other preparations we may make, we are not prepared for war.

Our statesmen should make a careful and continuous study of our policies and their relation to policies and political conditions of other states, in order to determine which of our policies have war possibilities, and our probable enemy in each case, and with this information he should make every effort to place and keep the defences of the nation in a state of preparation to insure victory if war does come.

Having determined the probable enemy, or enemies, for each particular policy, the statesman should proceed to a more detailed and thorough consideration of this particular problem, and his investigation should proceed along the following lines:-

a.- Can the aims of this policy be attained short of war without sacrificing our national honor or vital interests?

b.- If war must come, then what are the aims this policy has set, and will we be satisfied with this aim as the objective of the war, or will we require more or less to bring the enemy to terms; in other words, policy fixes the aims and the objective of the war

and having determined these, the next step is to determine:-

c.- How this objective can be attained. To do this the statesmen will call in the strategic advisers, military and naval, and they will consider all pertinent facts, information and condition bearing on the problem, which include: -

a.- The enemy's and our own military, naval and financial resources.

b.- Strength, disposition, state of preparedness and efficiency of military and naval forces, our enemy's as well as our own.

c.- Ideas of strategy and tactics prevalent in both states.

d.- National characteristics that may be exhibited during the war.

e.- Characteristics of enemy's prominent military and naval officers, and their probable assignment during the war.

f.- Probable theater of operation.

g.- Extent of national support which each state may expect.

h.- Lessons of the past which show the political connections of other states, and effect war will produce in these states, and from this consideration a decision will be made as to the means which will be necessary to obtain the objective set by policy. It is then a mere question of figures to determine the cost.

Having determined the aim of policy, the objective necessary to attain this end, and the means necessary, and the cost, the next consideration of the statesmen is to figure whether the ends justify the means (the cost).

If the ends do justify, or demand, the sacrifice, the next duty of the statesmen is to provide the means. This he does by providing adequate funds, by establishing credits, if necessary, by providing adequate military and naval strength, by propaganda to unite the whole people in the support of the war, and by providing allies in the event of interference by other states.

Policy should temporize and delay until means are provided and should then assume a bold attitude, and force a settlement at once for failure to strike when ready, and when war is inevitable, discourages and disheartens the people, allows national spirit to cool, and creates shame and hopelessness in the hearts of many. An example of this may be seen in our "watchful waiting" attitude toward Mexico, and in our "too proud to fight" attitude during the World's War.

A statesman, who seeing war inevitable, fails to strike when ready, is on a par with the statesman who resorts to war without sufficient force to accomplish the end. Both are guilty of crime against their country and are inviting disaster and possible destruction.

Once a state enters upon war, the furtherance of policy becomes the work of the military and naval. The statesmen should do all in their power to assist their instrument, but should not interfere with the conduct of the war. This, unfortunately, has too often happened in the past. It began in the Revolutionary War and has continued in every war in which we have been engaged. Antagonism between aims of policy, the financial condition and the armed forces can only lead to disaster.

When the military forces, assisted by policy, has attained the objective, policy again becomes the directive force and determines when the war is to end, and, when this is accomplished, policy, again, assumes full control, and the Cycle "Policy-Negotiation- War"- starts again.

A careful study of our present political situation in connection with world affairs, shows that we have certain definite policies which have war possibilities, and we should, therefore, be prepared to defend these policies whenever they are challenged. These policies are:-

- a.- Our Monroe Doctrine, which includes our sphere of influence in the Caribbean and Panama, may be challenged by various powers in the order of probability as follows:- Japan, Italy, Germany.
- b.- The Japanese question in California is extremely irritating to Japan and may be challenged any time.
- c.- The Open Door in China may bring us in conflict with any of the great Powers, and particularly with Japan.
- d.- Our expanding merchant marine is sure to conflict with similar policies of England and Japan, and probably with Germany or Russia later.
- e.- Our Mexican question is waiting for settlement and, when it comes, we may have conflict with England or Japan.
- f.- The threatened alliance between Germany, Japan and Russia, if consummated, is bound to result in conflict with some of our interests.

It is evident from the foregoing that we cannot omit any one of the great Powers from our estimate of the preparations necessary to defend our interests, and the time may come when we will find not only one but possibly three Powers lined up against us. Are we ready?

We know that our outlying possessions are not fortified and we also know that command of the sea was the deciding factor in the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Spanish-American War, the South African War and the World's War, and history teaches us that a power, on the defensive at sea, cannot count on success in a land war carried on beyond the sea, the possession of which is contested. We need only to consider the present condition of our Navy to convince us that we are not prepared; with our personnel depleted, with half of our fleet laid up and the other half only half manned, and with the head of our Navy a confirmed pacifist, our fleet would make a sorry spectacle in an endeavor to obtain and maintain command of the sea against any first class power.

POLICY.

The United States has been successful in every war she has undertaken and, as a result, a great many of our people believe that we are invincible; they know that we have won without great pre-war preparation and they believe that we can always do so; they are satisfied to live in the achievements of the past, failing or refusing to see that, in each and every war, luck or Divine providence has been with us. In our Revolutionary War, we won because England was threatened in other quarters and was forced to divide her forces; the Spanish-American war has been called a military execution, and we won, but what a different story history might have written if we had not had England's friendship and sympathy to counteract Germany's activities in the Phillipines. In the World's War England's fleet saved our own fleet from destruction and gave us time to prepare, How different it would have been if the German fleet had been free to carry the war to our shores. If we persist in this unpreparedness, the time will come when we will feel the heel of the conqueror upon our necks and it will then be too late. A nation which has, and must have, aggressive policies such as ours, and fails to prepare is committing national suicide, while, on the contrary, a consistent, fearless avowed policy, based on efficient and adequate naval and military preparation will be the best course for safeguarding our interests and also for maintaining peace.

development of trade and by various pretexis of one sort or another, some of these Powers had secured and held ports, islands or territory of China, advantageously located for the furtherance of their trade interests in that country. These possessions were recognized as giving the country holding them paramount rights as to the interests involved, and gave rise to the "Sphere of influence" policy. Powers which had not been so fortunate as to secure territory giving them a "sphere" regarded those who had with a jealous eye and they were ever on the alert for an opportunity to even up these conditions and secure a foothold for themselves. Up to the time of the China-Japanese War, the two powers who are now most vitally concerned in the policies of the Far East, the United States and Japan, had taken no part in the "Sphere of influence" policy.

The United States had possessions in the Pacific and had shown an interest in the opening up and development of China, but this interest was extended along lines which evidenced a friendly spirit towards China, rather than one of furthering her own interests at the expense of that country. She had, jointly with other powers, clashes with China, but in every case these clashes were taken advantage of to further prove her friendship and disinterestedness towards this weak empire. The returning to China of indemnities is an evidence of this friendly spirit.

Japan is so situated, geographically, that her growth and development as a nation must inevitably be closely related to the development of China and the Far East. Her lack of participation in the "sphere" policy, prior to the China-Japanese war, was due to the fact that she had up to 1854, when Perry opened her doors and negotiated a treaty of amity, kept aloof from other nations and had followed strictly the policy of "Blandissid isolation", devoting her time to literature, art and the blessings of peace. The treaty of amity was followed by commercial treaties, and the development of Japan was the logical result, and so rapid was this development and growth that in the early 80's it had reached a point inevitably reached by every nation, where expansion outside of its own territory was necessary in order to secure an outlet for its overflowing population, and this need of Japan's was the direct cause of the China-Japanese war.

POLICY.Part II.With reference to the Policies of the United Statesin the Far East.

In order to get a clear understanding of the policies of the United States in the Far East, and their relation to the policies of other powers in the same area, it is only necessary to consider conditions as they existed just prior to the China-Japanese War and the political situations and questions which have affected these conditions since that time.

At this time (just prior to the China-Japanese War), by right of discovery, or by other means, the various and numerous islands in the Pacific were all in possession of some one of the great Powers. This fact gave these Powers more or less of an interest in the development of the Pacific and had resulted in a struggle for trade advantages in that area. At this time China was practically undeveloped and was, on account of the apathy of her people, and her unexploited wealth, recognized as a rich field for the development of trade and by various pretexts of one sort or another, some of these Powers had secured and held ports, islands or territory of China, advantageously located for the furtherance of their trade interests in that country. These possessions were recognized as giving the country holding them paramount rights as to the interests involved, and gave rise to the "Sphere of Influence" policy. Powers which had not been so fortunate as to secure territory giving them a "Sphere" regarded those who had with a jealous eye and they were ever on the alert for an opportunity to even up these conditions and secure a foothold for themselves. Up to the time of the China-Japanese War, the two powers who are now most vitally concerned in the policies of the Far East, the United States and Japan, had taken no part in the "Sphere of Influence" policy.

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In looking for territory to which her surplus population can migrate, it is only natural that a country will first consider territory in the closest proximity to the home country, and Japan's eyes naturally turned to Korea.

Close proximity was not the only reason why Japan in her extremity focussed her attention on Korea. The history of Korea is one long recital of corruption and misrule. Japan's growth and development was particularly odious to the Korean officials who profited most by the then political conditions of the peninsula. As China was, on her own account, disposed to back up the latter, conflicts and disputes between Korea and Japan became frequent. When Japan tried to press her own claims upon Korea she was met by the Chinese contention that Korea was a tributary state of China and was prepared to support this contention by force of arms. Finally in 1894, a revolution broke out in Korea and the crisis came. Japan was looking for territory in which to expand, and her untried army and navy were spoiling for a fight. The Sino-Japanese War was the result and Korea the prize.

When war actually broke out, the campaign was short and decisive, Japan was victorious, and as a result of the treaty of Shimnosaki, China was forced to pay Japan an indemnity of 200,000,000 Taels, and to cede to her the island of Formosa and the Liao-Tung Peninsula, with the fortress of Port Arthur, which really divided China from Korea and would have effectually blocked off China from further interference in that country, and would have left Japan with a free hand to work out her immigration problem with Korea.

Japan's natural elation at her victory was short lived, however, for European nations were watching her progress with a jealous eye, and Germany, taking the lead and holding out to the other nations the "Yellow Peril" menace, persuaded France and Russia to back her up, and Japan was forced to cede the Liao-Tung Peninsula and Port Arthur back to China in order to preserve the "balance of power."

The effect of this action was twofold: First, it gave a fresh impetus to the "Sphere" policy which threatened the dismemberment of China and resulted, directly or indirectly, in the acquisition by Germany of the port of Kiao Chau on the Shantung Peninsula, the occupation of Weihaiwei by the British and the leasing of Port Arthur by the Russians for 99 years. Secondly, this action of the powers greatly irritated Japan, who was especially incensed at Russia for taking Port Arthur, after Japan had been prevented from doing so, and this, with her need for expansion still unsolved, was the cause of the Russo-Japanese War and definitely indicated who the next antagonist was to be. Before Japan was ready, however, the Spanish-American war came on, and as a result the United States came into possession of the Phillipine Islands and their acquisition gave the United States a material interest in the Far East and a definite right to a voice in Chinese affairs, and completely changed the policy of the United States in the Pacific. Before this, she had considered Hawaii as an outpost and as part of the American system of "Splendid Isolation", and her interest consisted in preventing other powers from holding such an advantageous point of attack against her West Coast; henceforth, the Panama Canal became inevitable, Pearl Harbor became (on paper) a strongly fortified Naval base protecting our lines of communication to the Far East; these involve automatically a strengthening of the fleet in the Pacific, since that ocean has now definitely come within the field of activity. Our Commissioners at Paris, in demanding the cession of the Phillipines, declared it to be the purpose of the United States

to maintain the islands "An open door to the World's commerce."

This policy of 1898 was made applicable to China, under the influence of John Hay in 1899-1900, and originated the most important of the United States' Oriental policies; i.e., the maintenance of China's integrity and the principle of equal and impartial trade for all nations. This policy was intended to take the place of the "Sphere" policy which had been in existence up to this time, and to prevent the threatened disruption of China, and was agreed to by all the interested powers, Japan included.

The "Boxer" uprising in China in 1900 resulted in joint action by the powers, Japan included, against Peking. This uprising was an indication of the condition of unrest in China which had crystallized into an antagonist attitude toward foreigners. This was the first time that Japan had taken a place beside the Great powers in diplomatic demonstrations and it opened the eyes of these powers to the fact that Japan had become grown up and that, in future contingencies, she would have to be reckoned with. The Russo-Japanese War is of great importance in this discussion for its immediate results and aftermath completely upset conditions in the Far East, and accounts for the present unsettled and unstable policies in connection therewith, and the present conflict in Japanese and American policies.

In the ten years preparation preceding the war, one point stands out as of particular importance. This was the studious and gratuitous efforts on the part of Japan to allay the fears of the powers, and especially the United States, as to her intentions in regard to Korea. In the Anglo-Japan alliance, negotiated in 1902 to prevent the interference of a third power, the independence of China and Korea was recognized. During the six months preceding the war Japan had asserted many times that the "integrity and independence of Korea and Manchuria" was the one thing cherished above all others. In the rescript declaring war upon Russia (after hostilities had begun) occur the words "The dignity of Korea has long been a matter of gravest concern to our Empire, not only because of the traditional relations between the two countries, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our Empire." And in the Korean-Japanese protocol of 1904, Japan pledged herself to guarantee "for all time the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire," and "the safety and response of the Imperial House of Korea."

Japan's preparation completed, she found a pretext and, without a declaration of war, opened hostilities by an attack on the Russian fleet based on Port Arthur early in 1904.

The salient features of the conduct of this war are: The success which attended the Japanese arms from the beginning, and the fact that the sympathies of the United States were with Japan throughout; in fact it was through the good offices of President Roosevelt that negotiations for peace were entered into, and it was through his efforts that an agreement was reached, and the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the war, was signed in 1905.

By the terms of the treaty, Japan was acknowledged to have paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea.

Both agreed to refrain from acts which would menace the security of Korean territory. Japan acquired Russia's interests in the Liao-Tung Peninsula. The exclusive administration of Manchuria, except the Liao-Tung Peninsula, was to be restored to China. The "open door" in China was acknowledged. The railway between Chang-Chun (Kuan-Ching-Tge) and Port Arthur, and all interests connected therewith, including the coal mines, was, with the consent of China, transferred to Japan. The Island of Saghalien, south of the fiftieth degrees of North Lat., and all islands adjacent thereto, were ceded to Japan. The principle of "the most favored nation" was recognized by Japan as applying to Korea.

The terms of the treaty was not satisfactory to Japan. The war lasted longer than she expected and, as a result, her finances were exhausted, for this reason she was very desirous of getting a large indemnity from Russia, but this reason also acted to prevent her obtaining such an indemnity for it made it impossible for Japan to continue the war.

It is of importance to note that in this treaty Japan had acknowledged and agreed to the "open door" in and the integrity of China, including Korea and Manchuria. But in the revised Anglo-Japanese alliance entered into in August, 1905, her policy of an "open door" in China, but not in Korea, was reiterated and Japan was acknowledged to have paramount political, military and economic rights in Korea, thus indicating that Japan was not sincere when she signed the Treaty of Portsmouth, for, at that time, she had already entered into an alliance with England, the terms of which indicating that she had already had a change of heart relative to the "open door" in and the integrity of Korea.

For some time after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, there was little on the surface to indicate the changes of policy which took place as a result of the war. There was a period of readjustment when all the powers moved cautiously feeling their ways and each other. The first definite demonstration of the shift was caused by the United States.

The "open door" policy in the Far East had become second in importance in the United States. Foreign policies, the Monroe Doctrine, being first. The fact was recognized, and an effort to sustain the autonomy of China by Hay was followed up by his successor, Elihu Root, who, after the Russo-Japanese War, had once more put Japan on record as guaranteeing the Hay Doctrine of the "open door" in China. Japan's administration in, and later the annexation of Korea and her action in Manchuria was a direct violation of her often repeated pledges for the "open door" and the integrity of Korea, and made the powers suspicious of her intentions with reference to China, and it was Secretary of State, Knox who forced the issue and gave the first exposure of the shift of policies of the various powers.

Mr. Knox proposed to eliminate the causes for international competition and opposition in Manchuria and the whole of China, by providing a basis for international cooperation in accordance with the principles of the "open door". He took Manchuria as a starting point, and his plan was to neutralize existing railways in that region, and for all the powers that so desired to participate in further development. This proposal resulted in lining up the powers on the "open door" question.

Mr. Knox evidently expected Japan and Russia to oppose the plan, but he counted on England's support and expected her course would influence France and Germany to accept it. It developed, however, that England had apparently traded her interests in the Far East for greater interests elsewhere. Therefore, when Japan and Russia got together and opposed the neutralization plan, Great Britain and France stood with them, and the Knox plan failed. The negotiations leading to the rejection of the Knox plan show an entire lack of regard for China's wishes and rights, and were contrary to the plain provisions of the Portsmouth treaty and seriously affected the friendly relations between Japan and the United States.

Japan's action in Manchuria and Korea, and towards the Knox plan, being contrary to her announced intentions and promise, aroused the suspicion of America and the antipathy of the State Department under the temporary influence of "big business", and resulted in the Knox proposal which was considered impossible by Japan and was the cause of suspicion and ill feeling toward the United States, where only friendly feelings previously existed; while on the other hand, the activities of Japan in China proper, have done much to dissipate our previously friendly attitude towards her.

The Chinese revolution in 1911-12, which threatened her very life as a nation, was the cause of another attempt on the part of the Great powers to stabilize conditions in China. China is always financially embarrassed, but her condition after this revolution was critical. The cost and indemnity of the Chino-Japanese War, the indemnity resulting from the Boxer uprising, and the cost of and loss by the revolution, had left her not only financially exhausted, but deeply in debt to the other powers, and this became the absorbing question during the reconstruction period following the revolution. Before the revolution, the Hukuang and currency loans had brought a certain international cooperation, and the so called 4 power financial group had been formed, composed of British, French, German and American Bankers. This group showed a willingness to come to the assistance of the Chinese Republic, and began to make advance for immediate use, and negotiations for a loan to completely finance the reconstruction of China were begun. These negotiations, which continued for nearly a year, were attended by many interesting developments. Japan and Russia, becoming uneasy, asked to be included in the group, although neither power had any money to loan. The 4 power group, as practical financiers, objected to a participation by these powers which they knew could only be fictitious. China, appreciating the motives of these two powers, objected, but the British and French, for the same reasons which aligned them with Japan and Russia on the Knox plan, felt compelled to admit these powers, and their participation was announced April 19, 1912.

These two powers wanted a stipulation in the loan agreement to the effect that Russia and Japan must be consulted about any provisions and expenditures in Manchuria, or that these powers would have the exclusive right to finance and supervise undertakings in Mongolia and Manchuria. American representatives, with the approval of the American Government, refused to participate further if any restrictions were placed on China's autonomy, and upon the "open door" principle; and it seemed that the group would dissolve on this issue, but Russia unexpectedly receded and the agreement was signed, constituting a 6 power group June 20th.

This agreement provided that -

1. That China should state to the group the purpose for which the funds were required.
2. That China should adopt a system of audit to insure that the funds were spent for the purpose specified.
3. That the salt taxes which were to be assigned as security for the loan should be administered under foreign direction.

On account of violent agitation in China against the group syndicate, China endeavored to obtain a loan elsewhere but was unsuccessful and accordingly, on April 26, 1913, the reorganization loan agreement, known as the Consortium, was signed. Before it was signed, however, there had been a change in administration in the United States, and the American bankers refused to go on with the loan unless the United States Government requested them to do so. President Wilson refused to do this for the reason that this loan touched the independence of China, and by supporting the group the American Government might be led into the necessity of forcible interference in the affairs of China, and the American bankers withdrew. The loan was signed, however, on terms satisfactory to the 5 power group and Governments, and the United States lost her opportunity to have a voice in the reconstruction of China, and her trade also suffered. The breaking out of the World's War in 1914 rendered the consortium non-operative from that date, so that the United States interests and desires have not suffered by her non-participation as much as they otherwise might have done.

The World's War offered a favorable opportunity for Japan to proceed with her designs in the Far East, without interference from other interested powers, who were all, except the United States, too much preoccupied to give any attention in the "Far East" question, and this she proceeded to do.

Her first step was to declare her intention to enter the war in support of her ally Great Britain. Such action was not requested by Great Britain nor was it believed to be particularly desired by either she or her allies, and, as later events proved, Japan forced herself into the war in order to take advantage of the opportunities such a step would afford her to further her interests in the Far East.

Her next step was the ultimatum to Germany, relative to Kiao-Chan. This was a direct affront to the sovereignty of China, who had not solicited and did not want Japan's aid in handling situations within her territory. The ultimatum was not complied with so Japan seized not only Kiao-Chan but the whole of the Shantung Peninsula, which she still holds in violation of China's sovereign rights, notwithstanding her avowed purpose of the restoration of this territory to China.

Her next step was the presentation of her ultimatum of 21 points to China. The requirements of this ultimatum practically destroyed the sovereignty of China and made her a vassal of Japan. The only power in position to thwart Japan's purpose was the United States, and this nation sat supinely by, as she did when Japan annexed Korea and permitted Japan to force China to agree to practically all the 21 points. After it was over, the United States did announce to both China and Japan that she would not recognize any agreement which was contrary to her treaty rights.

In spite of the fact that she had on no less than five occasions agreed to the "open door" in China, and to act there in accordance with the "open door" commercial policies, we find Japan constantly violating these principles, and emboldened after each violation she has at last taken steps which, if permitted to stand, will destroy the independence of China.

In all her diplomatic negotiations with China over the 21 points, Japan exercised the utmost secrecy. When the 21 points were first presented she enjoined absolute secrecy on the part of China, and when the facts began to leak through, Japan used every means possible to prevent them being known. When questioned she lied and evaded the issue, and when finally forced to acknowledge the facts she did it with a brazen face, stating that she had no intention of trespassing the integrity and sovereignty of China.

These acts of perfidy and deception on the part of Japan, coupled with her friendly attitude toward Germany, when that power's star was in the ascendancy, has set her back 50 years in the World's diplomacy. No nation will ever again trust Japan.

The entry of the United States into the World's War is of importance in Far Eastern affairs, only in that it gave her a voice in the settlement of the world's affairs which was entirely upset by the war. It is also important as furnishing food for thought by the various powers, and especially Japan. Prior to this time the United States, as a military nation, was considered by Japan and many other powers as on a par with China. They considered us a nation money mad, who would not fight and could not fight if we would. Pacifist utterances such as "A million men overnight" gave credence to this belief. Germany did not believe we could be of any assistance to the powers, not at least for two years, and discovered her mistake too late. Japan's flouting of the "open door" during the war would not have occurred if she had not had this belief. The efforts put forth by the United States in the World's War astounded the World, and when they found in addition that our soldiers, as a fighting men, became more feared than the soldiers of any other country, they began to realize that war with an aroused United States was not to be lightly considered by any power.

The California-Japanese question has been a constant source of friction between the United States and Japan since 1906. Trouble first arose when the California school board of education passed an ordinance segregating into a special school all children of Oriental races. Japan, at once, protested and the

matter was taken up by the National Government. The Board agreed, after much discussion, to withdraw its ordinance, provided that further immigration of Japanese laborers was prohibited.. No treaty was made but Congress, in 1907, passed an act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States, and, in 1907-8, the so called Gentlemen's agreement was made, whereby Japan agreed to issue no passports to laborers desirous of coming to the United States. This agreement was affirmed in 1911. Trouble again arose in 1913 over the passage of a bill by the California legislature prohibiting aliens, who cannot become naturalized, from owning land - And a more recent question is the "War brides". Japan protested vigorously and the press of the two countries have done much to fan the flame and increase the hard feelings which naturally arose. Finding her protests of no avail Japan left off negotiations with the statement that the explanation of the United States was not satisfactory, but that the time had not yet arrived to press for a final settlement.

The English possession of Canada, Australia and New Zealand have had the same disturbance relative to Orientals, and Australia and New Zealand have prohibited immigration altogether. So whenever the Oriental question comes up for settlement England will be compelled to side with the United States in whatever action she may take.

If we look for reasons why Japan did not pass the California-Japanese question, and why the United States did not take vigorous action against Japan for her action in China, they may be found in conditions surrounding the World's War. Japan was furnishing ammunition and supplies to Russia, and the United States was furnishing ammunition and supplies to England and the other allies, and any controversy at this time between Japan and the United States would have deprived the allies of supplies of which they were sorely in need, and it is reasonable to suppose that pressure was brought to bear to prevent a clash between these two powers.

The Treaty of Peace which ended the World's War contained the League of Nations, which was intended to prevent wars and settle the World's affairs by arbitration. The United States was responsible for the League being in the Treaty, but as yet the United States has not ratified the Treaty and is legally still at War. The League is in operation, however, and it remains to be seen what its effect will be.

At the termination of the World's War, many questions shrieked for settlement in the Far East, as well as elsewhere, and it is worth while to examine the condition at this time of the powers previously conceived in the Far East.

Germany has been eliminated as a World power and will be out of it for some time to come, and her possessions and interests in the North Pacific are held by Japan. Her possessions in the South Pacific are held by Australia and New Zealand.

France has financial and social troubles and will be concerned with interior affairs for many years, and may be left out of consideration in the Far East. Russia is torn with strife and revolution and bolshevism and is out of it for a long time.

This leaves England, Japan and the United States of the old powers, and upon whom will devolve the settlement of questions in the Far East.

England still has her great navy and will be a deciding factor in all questions which come up, but she is tied up with her Anglo-Japanese alliance, the terms of which no one knows, but her action in the Knox proposal and in the Consortium

indicates that she considers other of her affairs of more importance than the "open door" in China.

The last revision of this alliance gave Japan an interest in the affairs in India, and Japan believes she is the logical nation to take England's place in India. She has already evidenced a willingness to take up the duties and Great Britain has recently had to suppress Japanese propagandists there. England does not approve of the Japanese policy in China nor of her methods of secrecy and perfidy. These, with Japan's friendliness towards Germany when that power seemed sure of winning, has probably made this alliance less desirable to England than it previously was, - and Japan's procedure during the war revealed a purpose to proceed without Great Britain's help or interest, which deprives this Treaty of all advantage to the latter. The renewal of the alliance has been announced to the Council of the League of Nations, and when it comes up there may be some interesting developments and an indication as to where she stands.

The policies of Japan and the United States in the Far East are widely at variance. The United States stands for the "open door" and Japan wants a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. The powers of Europe are opposed to the action of Japan in the Far East, and China, of course, opposes Japan, but is powerless to resist.

These two powers are also at variance over the policies of the United States relative to Orientals in California. But Australia, New Zealand and Canada also have their Japanese question and have also taken steps to exclude them.

We thus see that the issues on which these two countries disagree, and which sooner or later must be settled, cannot be separated from the policies and interests of other nations; but in the Pacific, where the major elements must be worked out, this problem comprises two principal factors, - direct contact of the two Governments and people and conditions involved with the fate of China, and both are surcharged with forces making for international faction and war.

Recent happenings indicate that efforts have already been made towards a settlement of the Far Eastern question. The League of Nations provided for mandatories, and under this provision Japan has been given mandatories of the former German Islands in the North Pacific, and by the terms of the mandatories the "open door" must obtain in these Islands. This must materially affect Japan's policy of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for the Far East.

A new Consortium for China has been signed and Japan objected at first, but, in May, 1920, she came in as one of the participating powers, and the United States is the "big man" in this new agreement.

A statement was made in the press recently to the effect that England and the United States had entered into negotiations looking to a settlement of the Eastern question and the issues connected therewith between the United States and Japan.

An inquiry by the United States relative to Japan's violation of the sovereignty of Russia in violation of the Russo-Japanese in seizing and occupying the northern part of Saghalien indicates that the United States has in no way changed her pre-war attitude.

The above circumstances, taken with the fact that as yet the California-Japanese question has not been reopened, indicates one of two things,- either Japan has changed her pre-war aggressive policies, or she is waiting until she has sufficient strength to back up her policies.

Whether this change of attitude on the part of Japan marks a shift in policies, or whether Japan is simply biding her time until she is strong enough to assert herself, no one can say, but there are several facts which might indicate that Japan has really had a change of heart. These are a realization that she has lost prestige by her perfidy, deceit and concealment policy, the war strength of the United States as developed in the World's War, the fact that, for the first time in history, a non-military man has been elected as prime minister, but whatever the cause of her change of policy the duty of the United States is clear.

The fate of China, stability of the Monroe Doctrine, now embracing pan-Americanism, the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, and whether a yellow peril ever will become a reality are questions included in the outcome of the relations between Japan and the United States, and we should lose no time in putting our defenses in order, and making preparation for any emergency, and in this connection it is interesting to note that military experts estimate that Japan will have reached the peak of her military preparation in 1921.

(16 August, 1920).