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Thesis

POLICY

Submitted by

Commander H.E. Kimmel, U.S.N.

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Thesis on Policy and its Relation to War with a review
of the Foreign Policies of the United States in the Pacific
with special Reference to the Far East.

General Discussion of Policy.

As a result of the Great War and the Washington Conference we have produced a Naval Policy which is probably more complete and more clearly defined than any other Naval Policy this country has ever had. This Naval Policy approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 1 December 1922 defines Naval Policy as, "the system of principles, and the general terms of their application, governing the development, organization, maintenance, training and operation of a Navy. It is based on and designed to support national policies and American interests. It comprehends the questions of number, size, type, and distribution of Naval Vessels and stations, the character and number of the personnel, and the character of peace and war operations."

Professor Dealey says;

"The policies of a state are its well defined lines of action based on existing situations."

The policies of a state are primarily based upon and designed to support the interests of the state formulating the policy. It may be that the ruling class of a state will pursue a policy for the benefit of that class only; such a policy in modern times is not generally long lived though it may have a great effect upon the course of events.

Temporary policies may be the result of the whim, or notion, of some individual in power, or upon his lack of vision. Such policies being erroneously deduced, do not endure but may profoundly affect the fortunes of the state.

Some policies properly deduced are of long duration, while others equally well deduced are temporary. This because policies are properly based upon situations and situations change with conditions.

Conditions underlying policy.

The basal conditions underlying a nation's policy are

(1) the location of a country with relation to other land masses, (2) the fertility of the country, (3) the natural resources (including wealth of all kinds), (4) the territorial limits of the country, (5) the number, character and type of the population inhabiting both the country and the nearby land, (6) the population the country is capable of supporting, (7) the population the nearby land is capable of supporting, (8) the outlets to the sea, (9) the climatic conditions which affect the number, character, and type of the population and, in a large measure, the food supply. Situations, which are the result of basal conditions, and policies properly founded thereon will be reasonably permanent.

Kinds of Policy.

Policies may be divided into two broad general classes,-- domestic policies and foreign policies. The first deal with the internal problems of the state and are based upon what might be termed internal conditions. They are expressed in the action of the government toward public works, the adjustment of taxes, the grant of subsidies, the protection of infant industries, the encouragement of means of transportation, all questions which affect the security or welfare of the people. In a word, domestic policies properly have everything to do with insuring to the citizens of the state, "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness".

It is however often difficult to determine the dividing line between a domestic and a foreign policy. Each one influences the other. The two are very often closely related and frequently the foreign policy which has been forced upon a nation by external forces determines the domestic policy that must be pursued. The object of foreign policy is properly the same as the object of domestic policy,-- the welfare

of the citizens.

The foreign policy is the policy pursued by the government of a state in its dealings with other governments. It is expressed in treaties, the statements of responsible government officials, in diplomatic notes, in resolutions and in the literature of a state.

In a democracy the foreign policy is likely to be of slow growth. Radical changes in policy are less easily made than in a monarchy. A party elected upon a certain platform of foreign policies hesitates to deviate very far therefrom. It generally takes the will of the people expressed at the polls to produce any radical changes in either domestic or foreign policies.

The publicity means now existing in the United States greatly facilitate changes in policies both domestic and foreign. These same publicity means are, however, subject to control and therefore to very grave abuses by an unscrupulous combination.

An example of a radical change in policy was the difference in the policies of the Taft and Wilson administrations in the government of the Philippines. Following this came the reversal to the former Republican policy when Harding came into power. The results of these changes in policy are evident and show the bad effects of radical reversals of policy.

The foreign and domestic policies of a democracy are, in the main, the expressed will of the people and will receive their support. The policies of a democracy are therefore liable to be much more strongly supported than policies formulated by any other form of government.

The policies of a state are founded upon the interests of the people of that state. Very seldom are the interests

of the people of any other state considered from that angle alone. In a monarchy the interests of the people have some times been disregarded, but this has always proved to be a short sighted policy, and, in a large measure, accounts for the large number of representative forms of government now in the world.

Policies have seldom been based on a sense of justice, but the last century has seen an awakened sense of responsibility and interdependence among the nations of the world. The lessons of the Great War seem to be that war does not pay, and that settlement by reason and justice makes the only permanent settlement. We hear much these days of the spirit of Locarno, of security pacts and peace on earth. Every sincere step in this direction should be encouraged and the treaty just signed in London undoubtedly marks a most significant milestone in the World's history.

In the past the framers of policy have employed all the means available to gain their ends and have been none too scrupulous in the means employed. While not wishing to detract from the settlements made in Europe it is significant that the great powers are still interested in the corners of the Earth which yield returns on investments. Great Britain apparently wants Mosul oil enough to fight for it, now that she has sufficient influence with the League of Nations Council to have it awarded to her.

With this and other examples before us we are reluctantly forced to conclude that the millenium is still a long way off.

History shows that it generally takes a nation a generation to get over "war weariness" and forget the lessons learned. The present "spirit of Locarno" is in part due to "war weariness" but aside from this it is believed a real advance has been made in international relations in the past

few years.

If the policy framer can ever be brought to see and be willingly influenced by his neighbor's problems we will have advanced a long way toward understanding and peace.

Self preservation is the first concern of all framers of policy. It is proper that this should be so. There is no higher or more righteous duty devolving upon the head of a state than the security of its citizens. Self preservation underlies nearly all vital policies. Our Monroe Doctrine, our Caribbean policy, Japan's policy in the Pacific, have all been primarily policies to obtain security.

Economic and commercial interests which are closely allied to self preservation are probably the second concern of the policy framers. We find a constant struggle among governments, diplomats, companies and individuals for commercial advantages, and special concessions of all kinds.

The political interests of a state generally go hand in hand with the economic and commercial interests, but it may happen that the influence of a group interested in some commercial venture will be directly opposed to the best political interests of the state.

The personality of the ruler of a country nearly always affects the policies of the State. In a democracy this is less marked than in a monarchy, but even in a democracy the personality of the head of the state has a marked influence on the policies pursued. We may note the difference in the policies of Roosevelt and Wilson which in many instances can be traced directly to a difference in temperament. The "Big Stick" and "Watchful waiting" could never emanate from the same individual.

War and Policy.

Having defined a policy we must have some instruments

which give force and effect to it. In domestic policies which are covered by the laws of the state we have the civil government with its police and judicial machinery to enforce these policies. In an emergency we have the military.

In our foreign relations we have no such instruments or powers and the instruments with which we are provided are Diplomacy and War.

Diplomacy includes all relations between states short of war. In our government the State Department is organized (as the senior department) to formulate our foreign policies and direct our foreign relations. Diplomacy concerns itself with all our foreign trade, economics, commercial relations and political interests. An efficient diplomatic staff is quite as necessary to a modern power as is a trained general staff for the military forces. In the diplomatic field the struggle for advantages is constantly going on. Diplomacy includes persuasion, demands, cautions and even threats. The language of diplomacy is guarded and moderate but none the less forceful on that account.

Diplomacy may be likened to war as in either case the participants are constantly seeking a strategical or tactical advantage.

When diplomacy fails to reach a settlement and the situation becomes such that a settlement must be reached on points which can not be arbitrated, a resort to force is inevitable.

In both diplomacy and war the object to be attained is to force our will upon the enemy. Our will is expressed by our policies. The transition from diplomacy to war substitutes one form of political intercourse for another. We break off diplomatic relations but political intercourse

still continues. War is a very definite form of political intercourse undertaken to settle a question or questions at issue.

War is properly a servant of policy. It is waged to attain some end. If this is not so then the war becomes useless and meaningless.

Before the statesman commits the nation to a line of action he should carefully consider,-

- (1) The chances of War due to the execution of the policy.
- (2) The resources of probable nations with which our policy conflicts.
- (3) Our own resources.
- (4) The resources of probable combinations of nations both in favor of and opposed to the policy.
- (5) The cost of carrying out a policy. If war must come, the cost of the war. The cost may be the friendship of some state, etc.
- (6) Our gain if we successfully carry out the policy.

When these factors have been considered the statesman can estimate the desirability, advisability and possibility of establishing a policy.

From the above data the military man can determine the reasonable preparations necessary to meet any probable combinations of enemies; and thus in being prepared, enable the statesman to carry out his policy.

It may ~~be~~ readily be seen that a nation's military resources must balance with its policies. The statesman being the true head of the state is responsible that the policies do balance with the military resources, and it is therefore necessary that he have military knowledge or be advised by one having military knowledge.

The military man is the servant of the statesman. He

must know the state's policies, and the extent and degree of conflicts of policies developed or that may develop. He must advise the statesman, of the armed forces necessary to enforce these policies, and by a timely preparation either avoid the resort to arms or by war, enforce the policy of his state.

The responsible statesmen in the United States have, in general, appreciated the relation between war and policy. In considering the enforcement of a policy they have weighed not only the armed forces of the United States, but the resources and armed forces of the probable combinations of nations supporting and opposed to the policy.

Our military policy has been to maintain a small standing army for police purposes and to depend for national defense upon levies hastily organized, equipped and trained. This policy has served to maintain the nation in the situations which have confronted us. It has caused the United States to enter every conflict militarily unprepared, with the result that our wars have been unduly prolonged and enormously expensive in both blood and treasure.

President Roosevelt probably saw more clearly than any other statesman of recent years the true relation between war and policy. It was largely through his efforts and influence that the new Navy was built and the new Navy has unquestionably added to the prestige, and the weight of the opinion of the United States as expressed at many recent conferences.

The lack of coordination that has existed between the civil and military branches of the government will be reduced in proportion to the accurate knowledge that is available and made use of by the persons in authority. The part of the military and naval forces is to so educate the offi-

cers of the services, that they will prepare, and present, well considered plans to carry out policies in effect, or contemplated. Too often the statesman has been led astray by the ill considered statements of some military men, or left in a maze of doubt by the contradictory statements of various military experts. We can not hope for, nor is it desirable to have all officers think alike on all subjects. Healthy differences of opinion should be fostered in order to finally develop the best thought on a subject. Studies on military or naval subjects carefully prepared by competent officers will serve to check loose statements and to crystallize the best service opinion.

It is seldom that statesmen have embarked on new policies without giving some consideration to the method of enforcing them. With the improved organization of the State Department it is reasonable to suppose such instances will be more rare in the future.

When we consider that the coordination existing between the two main war making agencies of the government has left much to be desired, it is not remarkable that there has been some confusion in considering what national policy is desirable and possible.

The World War and the Washington Conference developed policies for both the Army and Navy along what are believed to be sounder lines, than have ever been in effect before. The coordinating and cooperating forces between the two services have been strengthened, with the result that considerable valuable work along these lines has already been accomplished.

In time of emergency the Army and Navy are only a part of the scheme of national defense. All the agricultural and industrial resources of the nation must be mobilized.

It appears therefore that the President with his Cabinet will form the best coordinating agency in future wars as they have in past wars. Additional committees some useful and some useless will be formed.

It is well to remind ourselves in these days of peace, when the security of the Republic has not been threatened, let alone seriously menaced, for sixty years, that the prime reason for the adoption of the Constitution of the United States was to obtain security; that the Federal Government is endowed with no more important duty than the maintenance of this security; that our national policies must always provide for this security; and that the coordination of War and Policy must always remain of paramount importance.

Foreign Policies of the United States.

Fish's American Diplomacy says, "The Characteristic feature of American policy before the World War, was its zoning of the world into regions which were differently fared. There was the zone of the Caribbean, over which we seemed determined to exercise control. There was the zone of the independent American states, for whose independence we stood sponsor, and with whom we would enter into as close relationships as they permitted. There was the zone of the Far East, in which we met as equals the European powers, whose policy toward the native peoples, or rather China, we sought to direct in cooperation. There was the zone of Europe, from which we stood apart. With all the world, we were willing to cooperate to a certain point for the suppression of international nuisances, such as the drug traffic, and to a limited extent in the application of legal methods to the settlement of disputes. The World War to some degree melted down the differences between these

regions, and made the maintenance of separate policies difficult. Nevertheless there has been an attempt on the part of the United States to return to them."

Foreign Policies of the United States in the Pacific with Special Reference to the Far East.

In undertaking a review of our policies in the Pacific it is well to give a brief resumé of the interests of foreign powers in the Pacific.

Japan confined to the islands of the Japanese group, teeming with people, and constantly increasing in population, demands an outlet. It needs territory for expansion and to gather the luxuries, as well as the necessities of life. Japan has led all oriental nations, due to her early realization that force is the only factor that checks the European aggression. Clearly realizing this and governing herself by European standards, she now possesses Formosa, Corea, parts of Sahgalien and numerous "concessions" in China. Her mandate over the former German Pacific Islands north of the equator has been recognized by the world.

Japan is vitally interested in all Pacific policies.

The United States has more contacts with Japan than any other power in the world save perhaps the British Empire and it behooves us to understand the aims and aspirations of this nation. We can scarcely blame Japan for wishing to establish an "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" though we might conceivably vigorously oppose the execution of such a doctrine. We should and have vigorously opposed any special trade privileges being accorded by China to Japan or any other nation.

Russia through Siberia and the trans-Siberian rail-

road route has long had vital contacts with China. It has been said that the Russian psychology is similar to that of the oriental, that he is part oriental himself, and that he therefore understands the Chinese and Japanese better than any other European. Russia has always pursued a policy of aggression in the Far East except during periods of enforced inactivity such as the recent revolution furnished. Port Arthur (now Japanese) Vladivostok, part of Mongolia, Northern Manchuria and concessions of various kinds have been the objectives of Russian intrigue.

The Russo-Japanese war was fought mostly on Chinese territory with Chinese territory as the prize for the winner.

France with her territories in Indo China, her special concessions in Shanghai, Tientsein and other treaty ports, has large interests in Chinese trade and therefore politics. France has additional interests in the Pacific outside the Far East due to her possessions in the South Pacific and the East African Coast.

Mexico, Central and South American States bordering the Pacific have commercial and political interests in the Pacific. Relatively unimportant as they are at the present time, they will grow greater with the development of these countries.

The Netherlands, in the Dutch East Indies is vitally interested in trade with China and any Pacific Policy which disturbs her sovereignty in the Dutch East Indies.

Siam, an independent state with a traditional friendship for the United States is in existence now through the rivalry of Great Britain and France.

Great Britain through her trade in China and Japan, the possession or control of India, Burma, the Malay

States, Hong Kong and Wei Hei Wei, the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and numerous islands in the South Pacific will always attempt a leading role in the Pacific.

China has for the past century been in process of dismemberment by the European Powers and Japan. Concessions and territory have been forced from China under various pretexts. The list in part consists of Indo China, Formosa, Corea, Northern Manchuria, parts of Mongolia, Hong Kong, etc. Special Concessions such as treaty ports, extraterritoriality, the control of Chinese Customs, etc., have been demanded and obtained by various powers, until it may safely be said that China has not enjoyed complete sovereignty for many years.

Excuses for these concessions were frequently outrages committed by Chinese subjects against some trader or missionary.

The British opium war of 1842, the French occupation of Indo China in the sixties, and the Boxer rebellion are outstanding events which served the European in his demands for additional privileges in China at the expense of the Chinese people and the Chinese Empire.

In 1911 due to dissatisfaction with a corrupt government and partly through the efforts of the Chinese students, largely educated abroad, a republic was established in China. Since that time China has never been under a strong central government. Each provincial governor is a war lord accountable only to himself. Treachery and a realignment of forces overnight have more than once bewildered the foreigner in his estimate of the Chinese situation.

The continual fighting in China in addition to the monetary loss due to trade reduction, is of interest to the

world for other reasons. These Campaigns are serving to educate large numbers of Chinese in modern fighting methods, and a knowledge of the capacity, and limitations of modern engines of war. The China man is awakening to the fact that he can use the rifle, the bayonet and the gun, and that he need no longer be dominated by the white man.

Numerous Chinese students have been educated in the United States and Europe. The proceeds of the Boxer indemnity were devoted by the United States to this purpose. These Chinese students have served to educate a large and growing Class in China who are awake to the advantages to be gained by a United China.

These factors are fostering a new nationalism which may develop into a predominant factor in future Chinese relations. With the great number of dialects and the lack of education of the masses the spread of nationalism must of necessity be slow.

United States Policy in the Far East.

Since 1842 when an American naval officer demanded and obtained the same rights for American traders as those that had been accorded by the Chinese to the British, our policy in China has been a demand for trade privileges equal to those accorded to any other foreign power. In order to secure these equal trade opportunities in China, the United States has acted in concert with the "Powers" or singly to maintain the open door.

Our general policy has been to act with the powers, but to exert a restraining influence upon them and thus temper the demands made upon China. It was necessary that our policy balance with our means of enforcing it.

In 1899 Secretary Hay addressed notes to the great powers in which he proposed three things for their consid-

eration. First, that the powers having "spheres of influence" in China would not interfere with any treaty port which happened to be within that sphere. Second, that the duties should be fixed by the regular Chinese tariff and not by the European holding a "sphere". Third that European nations would levy within their "spheres" no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality than they levied on their own vessels, and no higher charges on railways within their spheres.

Very shortly after the powers had given their smiling and hypocritical assent to this doctrine the boxer rebellion broke out. Before the powers had an opportunity to make fresh demands upon China, Secretary Hay took the lead in his note of July 3, 1900 in which he stated, ".....the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

This policy of the United States served to keep the demands of the powers within bounds, when the indemnities for the damage caused by the "Boxer" rebellion were finally settled.

President Taft, and his Secretary of State, came to the conclusion that by refusing to support American Bankers in their Chinese investments, that they were doing China no good and were merely preventing American investments in a profitable enterprise. He then announced to Congress,-

"In China the policy of encouraging financial investment to enable that country to help itself has had the result of giving new life and practical application to the

open door policy. The consistent purpose of the present administration has been to encourage the use of American Capital in the development of China....."

The conclusion to be drawn from this policy was that we would protect, with military force if necessary, the investments of Americans in China, as had been done in the past by European nations for their own nationals.

Mr. Wilson came into power however before the consummation of this scheme and he stated,-

"The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself; and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions."

Thus there came within a very short space a complete reversal of policy. President Wilson however reverted to the Taft policy again in 1918 and urged the American Bankers to make loans to China. The protection of their interests in China and other foreign countries is a part of the present policy of the U.S. This policy is in accord with European ideas, but is a radical departure on our part, due largely to the fact that we are now the principal creditor nation in the world.

During the Great War, Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of European States and sent the famous "twenty one demands" to China. In these twenty one demands the policy of Japan was clearly defined. This policy aimed at the control of all Chinese affairs. The enforcement of these demands would have made China a vassal state. We interposed no positive objections and China finally arrived at the conclusion that her hope lay in adjustments at the peace Conference. China's declaration of war and the subsequent publicity of Japan's de-

mands at Versailles were China's method of obtaining relief.

The treaty of Versailles awarded to the Japanese, Shantung, the German Pacific Islands North of the Equator and various other concessions. To China it promised a revision of the customs, the abolishment of extra-territoriality and the consideration of the Status of the treaty ports.

Due largely to American influence Japan got out of Shantung, withdrew from Manchuria, and ceased to press the most drastic of the twenty one demands.

The Limitation of Arms Conference called at Washington in 1921 accomplished a real service to the World in defining the policies of Great Britain, Japan, France and the United States in their relations to each other over the administration of the Islands of the Pacific, and their spheres of influence in the Far East. The guarantees given have served to create a feeling of confidence.

Since this conference the points of difference between this country and Japan have been of minor importance.

The Japanese exclusion act was unnecessary and unfortunate. It served to unduly humiliate a proud people. The circumstances under which it was passed were conducive to hysteria.

We will come in conflict with Japan if she pursues an imperialistic policy. Japan probably understands this most thoroughly and is too thoroughly cognizant of her strength and weaknesses to embark lightly on policies which will bring her into conflict with America.

Japanese policies have undergone a radical change since the war. Japan apparently realized the lack of balance between her power and the policy pursued toward China during the war. She has now substituted a policy of conciliation

toward China.

The most probable source of war in the Far East today is apparently between Japan and Russia. The Soviet government has revived the demand for an ice free port on the Asiatic Coast and this runs counter to Japanese interests. Both Japan and Russia have large interests in, and virtually control, different parts of Manchuria. The tenuous Chinese control of this province, with the resulting disorders, give both Russia and Japan an opportunity to profit at the expense of China. At the same time causes for conflict between them are developing. Japan has backed Chang Tso Lin while Russia has been supplying Feng with the sinews of war. Japanese troops are at present occupying Mukden.

Our traditional policy toward China has been further indicated by our support of the Chinese demands for a Custom Conference to restore tariff autonomy to China. Such a conference was promised in the Treaty of Versailles and is now in session at Peking. The Chinese are demanding tariff autonomy, the abolition of extra-territoriality and the return to China of the treaty ports. In a word, China is demanding complete sovereignty.

The acquisition of the Philippines did not change our traditional policy in the Far East, but our growing power and wealth increased our interest in Far Eastern trade. The Philippines serve as a most convenient base of operations, and their possession gave us a more vital interest in Far Eastern affairs. The sad administration of the Philippines during the last democratic administration hurt our prestige in the East, and has put the Filipino some years behind in his preparation for self government.

Our ultimate disposition of the Philippines is problematical. In any event we will feel a responsibility for

and will exercise a virtual protectorate over the Islands for many years to come.

Our Far Eastern Policy has been reasonable consistent and is sound. Our place in the Pacific is bound to be an important one. We have never exploited any of the so called subject races. Our treatment of China has made the Chinese people our friends. There is no real reason why we should fight Japan in the near future and probably not at all. Japan has no desire to engage in a struggle with her best customer. We may come in conflict over Japanese policies in China, but other European nations will be involved in the controversy and no one can foretell just what the line up will be.

American policies in the Pacific should be and probably will be policies supported by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. We should cultivate friendly relations with them and with the nations of South America in order that we may exercise our rights, meet our obligations, and contribute as we may, toward the well being and happiness of the many and varied races inhabiting the vast expanses washed by the waters of the Pacific.