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THESIS

POLICY

Submitted By

Lieut. Colonel Walter Krueger, U.S.A.

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POLICY

I

The Source, Nature, and General Purpose of Policy.
The longer one ponders upon the historic evolution of

nations, the more one is inclined to doubt whether they have ever been masters of their destiny; and the more one is disposed to believe that nations have perhaps always been swept along more or less helplessly by the current of relentless secret forces, "analogous to those", as Le Bon so well says, "which compel the acorn to transform itself into an oak or a comet to follow its orbit."

Every nation is the product of its environment and of its heredity, its environment consisting of the geographic position, geography, climate, area, and natural resources of its country, and its heredity of the racial and national characteristics of its people. Providence did not treat the various nations with equal generosity, however, in dispensing these basic conditions, which, though quite beyond the power of a nation to control or even materially to modify, determine its numerical strength, its temper, and its cultural development. In consequence, the various nations never have had, and never can have, the same capacity to develop, to progress, nor the same ability constantly to cope with conditions, in other words, to survive the working of the inexorable law of the survival of the fittest.

Great Britain's favorable geographic position, generally mild climate, and insular character, for example, enabled her to develop in comparative security, free from outside interference, until she was strong enough to achieve her destiny by extending her dominion to every quarter of the globe, a destiny for the attainment of which her people possessed all the necessary qualities. Germany's unfavorable geographic position made that country the battleground

of Europe for centuries. This, combined with her limited area and resources, retarded her development and, in spite of the virility and ability of her people, unduly postponed her attainment of national unity. Russia, though endowed with a vast area and great natural resources, was seriously handicapped in her development by her geographic position, severe climate and a certain element of inertia inherent in the Slav character. Japan, though endowed with a favorable geographic position, generally mild climate and insular character, lacks the natural resources, area and probably the ability ever to build an empire comparable to that of Great Britain. The United States, finally, has been more richly endowed by Providence than any other nation. Its favorable geography, geographic position, climate, great resources and comparative isolation permitted it to develop quickly and in security from outside interference. The young American Republic had at its birth an area of some 890,000 square miles, which was ample to support a very large population, but likewise had a vast area available at its very door to which it could expand without running the risk of impairing the vital interests of nations strong enough to frustrate or at least seriously to impede such expansion. Its people, moreover, were virile and enterprising and possessed in a high degree all the qualities necessary to attain any goal they chose.

It is but natural that the basic conditions referred to and their resultants, together with many imponderables, consisting primarily of the frictional elements produced by the operation of natural forces and by the action of other nations, should determine the effort made by a nation to cope with conditions and should find its expression in the lines of action pursued by it - in fine,

in its Policies, which, taken as a whole, may be referred to simply as its POLICY. These Policies may be classified variously as national, local, social, political, home, colonial, economic, financial, commercial, tariff, military, naval, and so on, or, more broadly, as Domestic and Foreign, Domestic Policy consisting of the course of action pursued by a nation in respect to its internal affairs, Foreign Policy of that pursued by it in respect to its relations with other nations.

The determining influence of the factors referred to above upon Policy, is clearly apparent when we examine the Policies of some of the great powers. It is not surprising, for example, that Russia's primary aim for over a century should have been to mitigate her geographic handicap by acquiring access to open water. Since she could not gain this object except by force, it was but natural that her Domestic Policy should include provision for a large military establishment and that her Foreign Policy should bear an aggressive character. But in this effort to expand to open water, Russia was doomed to failure, for whichever way she turned, her Policy encountered strong opposition, of England at the Dardanelles and of Japan in the Far East.

Similarly, it was quite logical for the British to seek their destiny on the seas, in trade and commerce and in overseas dominions, since their home area and its resources set a definite limit to expansion. Instead of a large military establishment, Great Britain's Domestic Policy accordingly provided a large naval establishment, and her Foreign Policy was ever directed consciously or unconsciously toward building up a far-flung empire, while, at the same time preventing any other nation from becoming

a rival powerful enough seriously to threaten her safety. In continental affairs, she was accordingly invariably the sincere friend of the weak states, always played one strong power off against another, and was ever extremely sensitive and fearful of the spectre of one of the great continental military powers becoming a naval power strong enough seriously to challenge her supremacy at sea, for this would have spelled the ruin of her empire and would have laid the British Isles open to invasion.

It was natural for the Germans to endeavor, under the leadership of Prussia, to rectify the disadvantages inherent in the unfavorable geographic position of their country, by striving for national unity, and it was equally natural for the French, who had for centuries, until the downfall of Napoleon, had a virtual hegemony over Europe, to oppose these endeavors, as well as those of the Italians and of the Austrians to achieve national unity. But as Herbert Adams Gibbons says in his "Introduction to World Politics", "The unification of Germany and Italy and the reorganization of the Hapsburg dominions into a dual monarchy, were events beyond the power of statesmen to cause or prevent, or even greatly to control.....When European Powers became World Powers, it was inevitable that there should be a Germany, an Italy, and an Austro-Hungary."

But the unification of these Powers brought far-reaching results in its train, for, whereas their Policies had thitherto been directed primarily toward the achievement of national unity, they were henceforth directed toward the maintenance of what had been gained and toward further expansion. All this was as logical as it was inevitable, since it was predicated upon basic conditions

beyond the control of each of the nations concerned, each striving merely to achieve that destiny which, consciously or unconsciously, rightly or wrongly, it conceived as belonging to it. As Le Bon aptly puts it, "Every race carries in its mental constitution the laws of its destiny, and it is, perhaps these laws that it obeys with a resistless impulse, even in the case of those of its impulses which are apparently the most unreasoned." It was therefore logical that Germany's Domestic Policy should have been directed toward paternalism in government, toward building up and maintaining a strong military establishment, and, later on, toward creating and maintaining a strong navy; that her Foreign Policy should gradually have become more and more aggressive as the demands of her people for prosperity increased and as her strength rose more and more to the point where it seemed as if she could attain her place in the sun; and, finally, that her aims should have run counter to the vital interests of other powers.

It was inevitable that Japan should strive to rectify the handicap imposed upon her by lack of natural resources and area, and that both her Domestic and Foreign Policies should have been shaped primarily with the underlying motive of "Asia for the Asiatics". If she has failed so far to attain her aims, this is not due so much to the fact that there is anything inherently wrong in her aspirations, as to the fact that she was not endowed by Providence with the basic conditions to make the attainment of those aims possible.

It was natural for the United States, the moment it had achieved its national independence, to make the most of the extremely favorable basic conditions vouchsafed to it. Its thoughtful leaders soon recognized that if their

nation was to develop peacefully, it would have to avoid entangling alliances, would have to remain aloof from European quarrels, would itself have to occupy the area available for its expansion on the continent to prevent European Powers from doing so, and would have to prevent those Powers from establishing their political systems anywhere in the New World. The foregoing considerations dictated the early as well as most of the later Policy of the United States and found expression in Washington's Farewell Address, in his Neutrality Proclamation of April 22, 1793, in the Monroe Doctrine, ^{and} in the acquisition of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, the great Southwest, and the Pacific Coast States.

Washington's Farewell Address, for example, contained the following pregnant passages -

"Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections.....Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded.....The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.....'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.....It is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another.....There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.....To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace....."

His Neutrality Proclamation of April 22, 1793 fixed the attitude of the United States toward European

belligerents by saying, "The duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers."

The Monroe Doctrine, which was contained in President Monroe's Message to Congress at the opening session, December 2, 1823, declared inter alia -

"The American continents.....are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.....

"We should consider any attempts on their part to extend their systems to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.....

"Our policy in regard to Europe.....remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.....meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form with indifference....."

Needless to add, the Policies described in brief outline above, were not the only ones pursued by the nations concerned. But those cited should suffice to indicate that a nation's Policies are determined by certain definite basic conditions that are quite beyond its power materially to modify.

Until comparatively recent times, the Policy of practically every nation was dictated by rulers and statesmen, alone or with the aid of a small aristocracy. The masses scarcely counted and, in fact, most frequently did not count at all. Since then a momentous change has taken place, for today it is the masses whose voice is the decisive one in the formulation of a nation's Policy, which is, in truth, the summation in the last analysis of their fears, their desires, their hopes and their aspirations.

It is but just to the past, however, to say that even in the days when the masses were largely if not altogether without a voice in government and in determining its course of action, their inchoate fears, desires, hopes and aspirations were, to an extent at least, chrystallized in the Policy pursued by their rulers and statesmen. History bears eloquent testimony to the fact that the rise of the great European powers was not only powerfully influenced by but largely due to the sagacity and wisdom displayed by their great rulers and statesmen. The success of every one of these depended upon his appreciation at their true value of the powers and limitations, of the strength and weakness of the basic conditions of which his nation was the product, of their resultants, and of the imponderables, the frictional elements; upon his ability to improve those susceptible to improvement; and upon his capacity and wisdom to employ all of them to the best advantage in achieving the destiny of his people - in other words, upon the Policy pursued by him.

In our day, the Policy of a nation is formulated in the hearts of the masses. This is by no means an unmixed blessing, for the masses are merely vast crowds and as such little adapted to reasoning, but, on the contrary,

governed largely by their instincts, by their emotions, and by illusions. "The masses", says Le Bon, "have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their taste, preferring to deify error if error seduce them. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their master; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim." But, he continues, "Without a doubt human reason would not have availed to spur humanity along the path of civilization with the ardor and hardihood its illusions have done. These illusions, the offspring of those unconscious forces by which we are led, were doubtless necessary.....It is not by reason, but most often in spite of it, that are created those sentiments that are the mainsprings of all civilization - sentiments such as honor, self-sacrifice, religion, faith, patriotism, and love of glory.

The transformation of the masses into the governing classes has undoubtedly been productive of an immense amount of good, but instead of enthroning generosity and altruism in place of self-interest in the Policy of a nation, more particularly in its Foreign Policy, it has, if anything, merely served to intensify that self-interest. It may in fact be asserted that the effect produced by popular clamor upon Foreign Policy, or indirectly upon it through the shaping of Domestic Policy, is one of the most striking, and, at the same time, one of the most dangerous symptoms of our times.

The Policy pursued by the United States is usually cited as an argument to demonstrate the fallacy of the foregoing contention, but the argument will not bear close analysis. The United States did, indeed become a great power without having to fight great foreign wars to reach that goal. But this phenomenon was not due, as is so often

alleged, to our people being inherently peace-loving , virtuous and unselfish, but to a combination of favorable circumstances, chief among which was our geographical isolation. This geographical isolation is what saved us from having to struggle, as all other great powers have had to struggle, in order to survive and to develop. We have been fortunate, indeed, in not having had to suffer a defeat like Jena, Sadowa, Sedan, or - Versailles. We rode more or less rough-shod over the aborigines on this continent, as well as over Spain, Mexico, and Colombia, in order to get what we needed and wanted. If other virile peoples having racial and national characteristics radically different from those of the citizens of the young American Republic had inhabited the vast region west of the Alleghenys, we should have been forced to wage as bitter a struggle as other great nations have had to wage in order to survive, and our history would in all probability have been a record of aggressive wars instead of one largely of peaceful development. Our Policy has quite naturally been extremely liberal in domestic affairs and, on the whole, benevolent in foreign affairs. While self-interest has ruled our Foreign Policy, as it has ruled and must rule the Foreign Policy of every nation, it has never, except during the period of our continental expansion, been characterized by that grasping quality that has distinguished the Foreign Policies of the other great powers. And this is but natural, for we have been more generously endowed by nature than any people since time began. Nevertheless, our Policy has often been aggressive, and if the degree of this aggressiveness appears relatively small, this is due largely to the fact that it reacted upon nations that were too weak to offer

strong resistance.

But our population is growing by leaps and bounds and its demands are continually increasing. If the time ever comes when our present domain and its untold riches will no longer suffice to maintain our growing population and its already high and constantly rising standards of living, will our people still possess the virility to embark upon an aggressive Foreign Policy, even upon war, to maintain them, or will our people have become too habituated to luxury and sloth to meet the situation and eventually fall an easy prey to a stronger, hardier race ?

Many earnest people, to be sure, do not visualize the possibility of such a contingency or analogous ones. They have an all-abiding faith, which often savors of fanaticism, that the future will be radically different from the past. They believe firmly that struggles like those of the past with their tremendous sacrifices of blood and treasure will be unnecessary in the future, and are convinced that an era of universal peace is about to be ushered into the world.

It may well be questioned whether universal peace is attainable, for the very transfer to the masses of the power to rule and to shape and to direct Policies, would appear to make this impossible. There is, moreover, grave doubt whether universal peace, even if attainable, would constitute as much of a blessing for humanity as its advocates claim. But, be this as it may, there appears to be little prospect that the Utopia of the international idealists will be realized soon, for, as someone has so well said, "Men may prophesy and women pray, but peace will come to this world to abide forever, only when the dreams of childhood are accepted as the charts that guide to the

destinies of Man", and that is not likely to happen in our times.

Humanity is therefore likely to go on much as before, each nation formulating and pursuing a Policy designed to ensure the happiness, contentment and development of its people. The aims of this Policy may be summed up in the two words "security" and "prosperity". These aims may be achieved to a large extent by an enlightened, wise Domestic Policy, but cannot be attained by it alone. In order that they may be completely attained, the Foreign Policy of the nation must develop the rights and interests of the nation, and must safeguard them wherever and whenever they clash with those of other nations.

Domestic Policy is wielded by Politics, which may be defined as the science of government; whereas Foreign Policy is wielded by Diplomacy, which consists of the art of clearly visualizing the international situation, of gauging the interests of the various nations, and of making use of all this for the purpose of attaining the aims of Foreign Policy by means of international negotiations.

It goes without saying that Domestic Policy and Foreign Policy must be adequately balanced and that Politics and Diplomacy must be in step with each other, must be closely harmonized, otherwise the interests of the nation will suffer.

The governing idea is and remains the political end sought, in fine, the aim of Policy. This aim, in the very nature of the case, cannot be anything else than the safeguarding or satisfying of the interests of the nation, and nothing but national self-interest governs, or, for that matter can govern in this. A nation can afford to pursue an altruistic Foreign Policy, for example, so long

only as this does not adversely affect its own vital interests, for, as Bismark once aptly put it, "When the vital interests of two great powers conflict, altruism takes a back seat."

It must be borne in mind, however, that Foreign Policy has definite limitations in the very nature of the case. If its aims are so great, for example, as to be manifestly beyond the inherent power of the nation to attain, then those aims must be reduced or disaster will inevitably follow. History is replete with examples demonstrating the truth of this statement. We need only recall what happened when first Holland, then France, and more recently Germany challenged Great Britain's supremacy. The challenger was in each case doomed to failure, for, in the last analysis, he simply did not possess the inherent power to win the resulting fight.

II

The Relation of Policy to War.

The foregoing, which presents in brief outline the source, nature and general purpose of Policy, would obviously be incomplete without a discussion of the relation of Policy to war.

Before proceeding to discuss this relation, however, it is essential that the nature and purpose of war itself be clearly visualized. War has not changed its fundamental character materially in fifty centuries of recorded history, although its outward forms, its methods and means, have undergone constant modification, keeping pace with the material, moral and political progress made by mankind.

"War", says Clausewitz, "belongs not to the province of the arts and sciences, but to the province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to liken it to business, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still more like Policy, which again, on its part may be looked upon as a kind of business on a grand scale. Besides, Policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their germs."

"War", he says elsewhere, "is an act of force, designed to compel the enemy to comply without will.....War is not a diversion.....,it is a grave remedy applied for a grave purpose.....War of.....entire nations, especially of civilized ones, invariable~~x~~ originates from a political condition and is created by a political motive only. It is therefore a political act.....a true political instrument, a continuation of diplomatic intercourse, an ex-

ecution of the latter by other means....."

"War", he continues, "is an instrument of Policy, must of necessity bear the imprint of its character and must be gauged by its standards. The conduct of war, in its major outlines, is therefore Policy itself, which exchanges the pen for the sword."

In discussing the influence of Policy upon war itself, he says, moreover: "Since war grows out of a political aim, it is natural for this initial motive, which called it into being, to remain the first and foremost consideration in its conduct. But the political aim is not necessarily an arbitrary guide on that account, for that aim must accommodate itself to the nature of the instrument it applies and is, in consequence, often wholly modified thereby, though it always remains the factor whose requirements must be given the first consideration. Policy will accordingly permeate the whole warlike act and will exert a continuous influence thereon, at least in so far as the nature of the forces liberated by it permits."

It should be pointed out that Clausewitz invariably has Foreign Policy in mind when he uses the term Policy. It should likewise be noted that throughout this discussion the term Policy is frequently used where the term Foreign Policy might appear to be more appropriate. But the term Policy is used advisedly, since under modern conditions, Domestic Policy frequently, if not, indeed, invariably exerts such a dominating influence upon Foreign Policy that Policy as a whole is concerned.

It seems self-evident that in case the aims of Policy represent vital national interests, and diplomacy has without success done all it can to gain them, Policy must either abandon them altogether, or must endeavor to gain

them by other means. If the nation is unwilling to abandon these aims and the situation permits of no other solution, nothing remains but to resort to the ultima ratio of Policy - war, in order to attain them by means of the sword.

One can not examine history seriously without perceiving that virile nations have invariably been more or less aggressive. Every one of the great nations of history owed its greatness in large measure, if not, indeed, wholly, to forging ahead aggressively toward its goal, its destiny, fighting whenever necessary to have the aims of its Policy prevail. No nation has hitherto ever abandoned its vital interests without resort to war, unless it was too weak to wage it without at least some prospects of success. Indeed, some nations have even preferred to fight rather than to abandon their vital interests, although all hope of winning was precluded.

No nation ever admits that it is in the wrong when its vital interests are at stake. It would seem, in fact, that in case a nation's vital interests are at stake, it is absolutely purblind, unable to see anything but its own side of the case, incapable of clearly distinguishing right from wrong, and much more apt to appeal to arms to gain what it conceives to be its rights than to submit. This is why a nation naturally feels, as Machiavelli says in his *Il Principe*, that "Every war is just which is necessary, and every battle holy in which lies our last hope."

Dynastic and religious wars are happily but spectres of the past and not likely to occur again in our time. But the world has become smaller and is continuing to shrink; nations are more powerful today than ever before and, with the people in control, prouder than ever of

their traditions, institutions, language, customs, manners, culture, and achievements, more insistent upon their rights, and more susceptible to an infringement of their dignity, an insult to their honor.

While some causes of war have been removed, or rather have disappeared, many others remain, and many others again have been created by the very nature, complexity and incidents of our modern life.

Since we have no way of gauging the future except through the lessons learned from the accumulated experience of mankind, we are forced to conclude that in the future as in the past, when the vital interests of one nation conflict with those of another, in other words, when their respective Policies clash in regard to vital matters that can not, in the nature of the case, be adjusted by any other means, they may be expected to resort to war.

Wars will therefore in all human probability continue so long as mankind is actuated by the instinct of self-preservation; so long as there are strong and feeble, aggressive and submissive, able and weak nations; and so long as the all-wise Providence that shapes the destinies of mankind shuffles the cards and deals more trumps to one nation than to another playing the great game of Policy, and each nation plays its cards for all they are worth.

While the rules of this great game of Policy have been modified somewhat, the stakes are greater than ever before, and while the players have changed, they are playing with a determination not equalled in the past, in order to win.

It seems a pity that this should be so. Yet, unless one is absolutely blind to the sober truth of history and

the fact that man himself has always been and, in all human likelihood, always will be actuated primarily by his instincts, by his emotions, and by illusions, one can not well help being convinced that the germs of war lie in the Policies pursued by nations and that war itself has always been and will continue to be a cosmic necessity, a part of the struggle for life.

So much for an academic discussion of the relation of Policy to War. In illustrating this relation by examples from history, it will suffice to consider primarily the main facts of European history since 1815, in particular the factors involved in the rise and development of the German Empire, for this will bring out more clearly than anything else could, how the basic condition, exemplified in the struggles for national independence and unity, in the growth of population, in modern industrialism, in the scramble for raw materials and for markets, produce rivalries and policies that inevitably lead to war.

One of the most profound changes of the last century, was the transformation of the Germany of 1806 from an ephemeral union that history calls the Holy Roman Empire, although it was neither Roman, holy, nor an empire, into a powerful state. This was the result of the spirit of nationalism that had been aroused during the French Revolution and that had come to animate practically all the peoples of Europe. National unity, as Seybel said, could not be achieved until one state should become so large as to overshadow all the rest and force them to recognize its ascendancy, then the selfishness of one would end in the unity of all. The unity of France and of England had been produced in this way, one state absorbing all of its rivals. But Germany was in a very different

situation, for two great powers had grown out of the German stock, Austria and Prussia. The former was a proud and haughty empire with a long record of history behind it, the latter an upstart, a veritable parvenu among the nations. Neither of them was strong enough to gain the ascendancy; each was desirous of maintaining its position; and both thus defeated the desire of the German people for national unity.

German unity seemed a vain dream, even Clausewitz saying, "Germany can achieve political unity only in one way, by the sword, by one of its states subjugating all the others." He was not far wrong, for it required the consistently ruthless Policy of blood and iron pursued by Bismarck to accomplish the national unity of the German people.

Picking a quarrel with Denmark over the complex Schleswig-Holstein question and inducing Austria to join Prussia, Bismarck contrived to make a dispute between Prussia and Austria growing out of the administration of the conquered provinces a *casus belli* which enabled Prussia to attack and to defeat Austria in one of the briefest and most successful campaigns in history, thereby definitely eliminating Austria as a factor capable of opposing Prussia's design to achieve the hegemony of Germany. Nothing was now required but a cause upon which all German states could unite under Prussia's leadership. This was soon furnished by France, which had enviously watched the success of Prussia, objecting to the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince for the vacant Spanish throne. By clever if unscrupulous means, Bismarck made the most of the situation presented and contrived to place France in the position of the aggressor, while at the same time uniting

all German peoples against their traditional enemy.

The Franco-German War, which resulted, thus proved to be the closing act of Germany's struggle for national unity. But while it completed the unification of Germany, it likewise created the Third Republic, made possible the independence of Italy, and brought about the formation of the Dual Monarchy.

The war raised Germany to the rank of the first military power in Europe and shifted the center of gravity of European politics from Paris to Berlin. Under Bismarck's guidance, the new German Empire gradually but surely established a virtual hegemony over the continent.

During the twenty years immediately following the war, the energy of the German people was absorbed by internal affairs. Industry and commerce grew by leaps and bounds and with them the material prosperity and well-being of the people. Standards of living improved to an unprecedented degree, and the belief of the nation in its mission and in its destiny increased in proportion. Whereas Germany had formerly exported men, she now exported goods in ever increasing quantities; her population increased more than fifty per cent in forty years; and she was obliged to look about for markets outside of Europe, for her capacity to produce had outstripped her power to consume.

The Treaty of Frankfort, May 10, 1870, which terminated the Franco-German War was fated to have far-reaching consequences. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was destined to be an ever present reminder to France of the humiliating defeat suffered at the hands of Germany. This annexation was really unnecessary for the unification of Germany, for that object had already been attained by the

whole-hearted cooperation of all the German states in the war. German union would have been just as effectively attained had Bismarck consented to make peace on the basis of France ceding - in Jules Favre's words - "not one inch of our territory, not one stone of our fortresses." It would have been far more wise for the Germans to have shown the same statesman-like wisdom and moderation toward France in 1871, in so far as French territory proper was concerned, that Prussia showed toward Austria in 1866 and instead to have compelled France to renounce the titles to her possessions in Africa and Asia. Bismarck would have been quite willing to content himself with the annexation of Alsace, which was predominantly German, leaving Lorraine, which was largely French, to France, but was overruled by the military party. Bismarck made no attempt to get France to recognize Germany's right to expand in Africa and Asia, but, on the contrary, encouraged the French to devote their energy toward the creation of a colonial empire, especially toward extending their influence along the north coast of Africa. By thus diverting French activity, he hoped to engage them permanently in ventures that would prevent them from re-opening the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and would at the same time keep them at odds with the Italians, who were still incensed because of the French defense of the temporal power of the Papacy and their occupation of Rome, which retarded Italian independence for ten years (1860-1870).

This policy completely failed to accomplish the desired end and resulted finally in Germany's undoing in that in every crisis growing out of the conflicting interests of the powers, she found herself invariably in the position of a claimant, never in that of a bargainer,

because she had nothing with which to bargain. Besides, despite the absorption of French ambitions in colonial ventures, her defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine continued to rankle in French minds, the idea of "revanche" never flagged, influenced her policy materially, and Moltke's prediction that "Germany would have to remain armed for fifty years to preserve her conquests" came true. As a consequence, both countries armed to the teeth, Germany to hold what she had gained, France to protect herself and to be in readiness for the day of revenge, for a war for the recovery of the lost provinces.

As Bismarck was determined to hold what he had gained and desirous of assuring Germany's peaceful development, he bent all his efforts toward rendering such a war impossible, or at any rate hopeless. To this end, he shaped his policy toward isolating France. His first move was the creation of a friendly political understanding between the emperors of Germany, Russia and Austria, known to history as the "League of the Three Emperors", which was entered into at Berlin in 1872 and which was to remain in force for three years. This league was, however, doomed to receive a decided check through the rival pretensions of Russia and Austria in the Balkans. Here the struggles for national unity had not, as elsewhere in Europe borne fruit, due to the constant interference on the part of the great powers, whose political interests were opposed to the emancipation of the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman yoke, and whose policies were accordingly all directed toward preventing the consummation of such emancipation. Thus "Greece", says Gibbons, in his Introduction to World Politics, "was created without Epirus, Thessaly and the larger Greek islands.

Moldavia and Wallachia were forbidden to unite, Serbian and Montenegrin frontiers were drawn arbitrarily to the exclusion of tens of thousands of kinsmen left under the Ottoman rule, and the suzerainty of the Sultan over all the states except Greece was insisted upon". Such progress as was made in the Balkans toward national unity was made by defying the powers, but each such action precipitated an international crisis. Out of this tangled situation, in whose troubled waters Russia and Austria fished, grew the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which ended with the total defeat of Turkey. When Russia forced the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878) upon Turkey at the conclusion of the war, Great Britain, backed by Austria, gave Russia the alternative of choosing between war and a revision of the treaty by a conference of the powers.

At the Congress of Berlin, which resulted, and at which Bismarck presided, Germany chose to stand by Austria, with the result that Russia, deprived of German support, upon which she had counted in view of the valuable services she had rendered that country from 1863 to 1870, was unable to resist the demands of the powers. The Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878, was accordingly a humiliating diplomatic defeat for Russia and a distinct success for Austria, which, although it had taken no part in the conflict was able to draw chestnuts from the fire with the aid of the Iron Chancellor, being permitted by the treaty to administer Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to occupy the Sanjac of Novi-bazar. France got nothing whatever out of it. For Italy it meant the blocking of the Pan-Slav dream of expansion to the Adriatic. Great Britain gained most by it, for she had again been successful in checking Russia's march

to the Mediterranean and had paved the way for her own subsequent occupation of Egypt. Aside from this, the Treaty recognized the independence of Montenegro and Serbia and the union - a fait accompli consummated before this in defiance of the powers - of Moldavia and Wallachia as the independent state of Rumania. The Treaty of San Stefano had created Bulgaria. It was the fear on the part of the Great Britain that Russia might gain control of that new state and thereby threaten or eventually gain control of the Straits that caused her insistence on the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Treaty of Berlin divided Bulgaria into two autonomous provinces, a provision that the Bulgarians tore to shreds just seven years later by accomplishing the union of these two provinces in defiance of the Treaty. Germany got nothing out of the Treaty of Berlin. She had laid the foundation for her subsequent friendship with Turkey, but she had gained the resentment of Russia. In addition, Salisbury, with the consent of Bismarck, had informed the French that there would be no objection to their intervention in Tunisia, provided they recognized the British control over Cyprus, which the British had obtained from Turkey as the honest broker's commission for their efforts in behalf of the abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano.

These facts constituted the germs from which were to spring two great international combinations, the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, factors of profound significance in the subsequent history of Europe.

Of these, the Triple Alliance was the first to be created and the more important. As Bismarck realized that Russia was deeply offended and resentful, he sought compensation for the loss of Russian friendship by forming

a closer union with Austria and concluded a treaty with her on October 1, 1879, which was kept secret until 1887. This treaty provided that if Russia attacked either Germany or Austria, they should be bound to aid each other reciprocally with their entire military power and should refrain from concluding peace except jointly and in agreement; that if any other power - for example, France - should attack either Germany or Austria, the ally should remain neutral, unless Russia joined the attacking power, in which case Germany and Austria should act together with their whole military force and should make peace in common. This was essentially a defensive alliance aimed particularly against Russia and to a lesser degree against France.

The same year that witnessed the consummation of the Austro-German alliance, brought forth the intervention by England and France in Egypt. It will be remembered that the Suez Canal was opened to navigation on November 16, 1869. In 1875, the Khedive sold his shares in the Canal Company to Great Britain to the great chagrin and irritation of the French. Egypt, saddled with an enormous debt by the profligacy of her ruler, was practically bankrupt and Great Britain and France were compelled in 1879 to intervene jointly in the interests of their investors. Rebellion against the control exercised by them led eventually to military intervention, in which, however, France declined to aid Great Britain. The British bombarded Alexandria on July 11, 1882, and an army under Lord Wolseley defeated the rebels and restored order. England had come to stay, and now became involved in an enterprise against the rebellious dervishes that had risen under the Mahdi in the Sudan. General Gordon was despatched to

succor the garrison at Khartoom, but was massacred with the 11,000 men composing it. A column despatched to his relief reached Khartoom January 28, 1885, only to find the flag of the rebels floating over that city. England had suffered a check that was destined not to be wiped out for many years to come.

Italy, meantime, joined Germany and Austria in 1882. This was a very curious alliance, without any element of permanence. Austria was Italy's traditional enemy and blocked her desire for expansion along the Adriatic. To Germany, however, she was indebted, for Italian freedom and unity were predicated upon and made possible by the German success in the War of 1870. Besides, Prussia and Italy had been allied against Austria in the War of 1866 and it was not to be easily forgotten that Venetia would not have been gained at its close without Prussia's insistence. Moreover, Germany and Italy were good mutual customers, Germany exporting coal to Italy in exchange for Italian products. As the French occupation of Rome had retarded Italian unity from 1860 to 1870, so the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 checked Italian expansion in North Africa. Bismarck, cleverly availing himself of Italian chagrin against France, received Italy with open arms into the alliance, the three powers, Germany, Austria, and Italy, henceforth constituting the Triple Alliance. Thus was created a combination of powers which dominated Central Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and which rested upon a military force of over two million men. At its head stood Germany. Europe now entered upon a period of German dominance in international affairs which was to continue until challenged by the creation of the Dual Alliance, that of Russia and France, in 1891.

Though he had concluded the alliance with Austria

in 1879, Bismarck sought to keep up a friendly understanding with Russia. So long as he was at the helm of the German ship of state, he was true to the Policy of preventing a rapprochement between France and Russia, and in this he succeeded. In 1884, the three emperors met again, renewed the old political understanding, the League of the Three Emperors, and agreed that if any one of them waged war with a fourth power, the other two should maintain a friendly neutrality. This agreement expired in 1887, but was then revived as a friendly reinsurance compact between Russia and Germany.

Matters were quickly drifting toward a climax, however. In 1888, French financiers came to Russia's assistance with a loan of one hundred and sixty million pounds sterling, and that year likewise witnessed the accession of William II to the German throne. Young, ambitious, impatient of restraint and tutelage, it was inevitable that his views should clash with those of the creator of the German Empire. As a consequence, Bismarck fell from power (1890), the Emperor refused to renew the reinsurance compact with Russia, France was released from the isolation to which the skilful Policy of the veteran Chancellor had for years confined her, the Dual Alliance, that between Russia and France, became inevitable, and Germany embarked upon her path of Weltpolitik. (World Politics).

At the very time when German trade began to feel the need of world markets, it was confronted by the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878, of Egypt in 1882, the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, and Russian, French and British territorial acquisitions and dealings with China, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia, and the countries in the heart of Asia.

All the world was parcelled out. There nowhere appeared an opening to German trade expansion except in Asia Minor and perhaps in China. Literally, her only possibilities of trade expansion consisted of penetrating toward Asia Minor, getting an opening in China, and competing with France in Morocco and with Great Britain and Russia in Persia. To do this, required first of all the expansion of her merchant marine and the building of a navy to protect it, and secondly the finding of ways and means to imbue Germans abroad with pride in their homeland. The foregoing, in essence, constituted Germany's World Policy.

The Chino-Japanese War (1894-1895), which closed with the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), resulted in the cession of Port Arthur, the Liaotung Peninsula, the Island of Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands to Japan and with the recognition of the independence of Korea. But Japan was robbed of part of the fruits of her victory by the intervention of Russia, backed by Germany and France, which compelled her to give up the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur. On December 13, 1897, Russian warships entered Port Arthur and Russia leased that place and a part of the Liaotung Peninsula from China for a term of twenty-five years. This lease of territory was the beginning of the scramble for leases at Peking. The murder of two German missionaries in Shantung November 1, 1897, gave Germany the hoped for opportunity to gain a foothold in China. Kiaochau and Tsingtau were seized and by a treaty signed March 6, 1899, China was forced to cede Kiaochau and adjacent territory, including Tsingtau, to Germany for a period of ninety-nine years.

Meanwhile, France and Russia had formed the Dual Alliance in 1891, and Austria and Russia continued to

fish in the troubled waters of the Balkans. This was the danger zone of Europe. When Greece went to war with Turkey (1897) over the question of Crete, she was defeated. But while the great powers were already grouped into alliances constituting two armed hostile camps, they were able to interfere jointly to save Greece from the consequences of her defeat without becoming thereby involved in war with one another.

The formation of the Triple and Dual Alliances left Great Britain isolated. While she had watched the Dual Alliance with concern since its formation, Russian machinations in the Balkans and particularly in the Far East aroused her apprehensions and her distrust. In 1898, accordingly, she launched her huge naval program as a challenge directed against the Dual Alliance, two years before Emperor William, in 1900, declared at the launching of the "Wittelsbach", that the "Ocean is indispensable to German greatness".

In 1896, meanwhile, Great Britain had finally decided to take steps to recover the Sudan. General Kitchener moved into the Sudan with an Anglo-Egyptian army and after an advance and operations of unexampled difficulty, defeated the dervishes at the great battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1898. This victory electrified the whole British nation to such a pitch that when, a few weeks later, Kitchener bluntly demanded the hauling down of the French flag, which had been raised by Major Marchand at Fashoda on July 10, 1898, the British public wholeheartedly backed up Kitchener's stand and was prepared to fight to maintain it. France thus unequivocally put into a position to choose between war and acquiescence, reluctantly withdrew. War had been narrowly averted.

The year 1898 was memorable in that it marked the entrance of the United States into the arena as a world power by the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines, as a result of the war with Spain, and the annexation of Hawaii. The next year witnessed the beginning of the South African War, which was destined to end with the addition of South Africa to the British Empire in 1902.

While Germany was pursuing her aggressive Policy of World Politics, Great Britain had likewise been pursuing an aggressive Policy, however, one that made it necessary for her to wage war in earnest from 1895 to 1902. "Out of these seven years of almost constant fighting", says Gibbons in his Introduction to World Politics, "emerged West Africa, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Union of South-Africa." Had Germany and France been on friendly terms during this period, these British conquests would have been impossible and would have produced a European war. But the cards lay just right for Great Britain, and she played them for all they were worth.

The fear of Russian aggression in the Far East finally induced Great Britain to discard her traditional policy of aloofness and to conclude an alliance with Japan, January 30, 1902. This pledged her to come to Japan's aid in case France joined Russia in a war against Japan.

Meanwhile, her decision to give up her isolation in reference to continental European affairs, caused Great Britain to seek a rapprochement with one of the two great groups of powers. Kinship as well as tradition seemed, for a time, to impel her to seek the friendship of Germany, with which country she had never been at war. But a combination of circumstances was destined to prove far

stronger than all claims of kinship and tradition.

The phenomenal growth of Germany's industry, trade and commerce, and her acquisition of colonies, inevitably compelled her to create and to build a navy, which, while considerably weaker than the British navy, constituted a dangerous rival. This, coupled with Germany's continually increasing acquisition of a share in the world's markets and carrying trade and, in particular, her steady but sure progress toward Asia Minor, was watched with ever-growing apprehension in Great Britain. The time was fast approaching when Germany would equal Great Britain's commercial power, and might even surpass it. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, as a result of the Russian desire to reach open water, and ended in Russia's defeat, and thereby destroyed at one stroke the existing balance of power in Europe, these apprehensions reached their climax, drove England into the arms of France, and the Entente Cordiale became an accomplished fact (1904). While her war with and defeat at the hands of Japan laid Russia low for some time, it brought England and France still closer together.

Germany had arrived so late upon the scene that her path of colonial expansion was beset with almost insuperable obstacles. But between 1884 and 1886, she had nevertheless managed to secure footholds in Africa and in the Pacific, by annexing the region north of the Rovuma River on the east coast of Africa, Kamerun and Togo on the west coast of Africa and a part of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands and the Marshall Islands in the Pacific. In 1899, she acquired the Caroline, Pelew and Mariana Islands by purchase from Spain, and two of the Samoa Islands through an agreement with Great Britain

and the United States. When the Germans realized, however, that these colonial acquisitions did not amount to very much, either from a commercial or from a strategic point of view, they soon became convinced that their best chance lay in peaceful penetration of Asia Minor.

A group of German financiers had as early as 1888 secured the concession for constructing a railway in this region and from that year until 1905 German economic interests increased rapidly there. All this, especially the building of the railroad - now famous as the Berlin to Bagdad line - aroused the apprehensions of Great Britain, which, ever keenly sensitive to anything threatening her road to India and India itself, feared the danger of German penetration toward the Persian Gulf, and accordingly set herself to thwart the German designs by all the means in her power.

But while the German and British Policies thus clashed in Asia Minor, the Policies of those nations were for a time in complete harmony in North Africa. Here Morocco was taken over by France in the decade from 1904 to 1914, but not until Europe had gone from one international crisis to another because of it. Up to 1904, British and Germans contended that the Sultan of Morocco must not lose his independence. When Great Britain and France composed their differences in 1904, however, Great Britain getting a free hand in Egypt in return for promising France a free hand in Morocco, Germany was left the sole antagonist to the French Policy of expansion in Africa, Great Britain now standing behind France as heretofore she had been the principal power opposing French Policy in Morocco. On March 31, 1905, Emperor William landed in Tangier and with greetings to the Sultan let it be known

that Germany regarded Morocco as an independent country. This led the Sultan to refuse the demands made by the French and caused the fall of M. Delcasse, who advised his cabinet colleagues to refuse the German demand for an international conference on the status of Morocco, no matter what might happen. His colleagues feared war with Germany, however, and agreed to the German proposal, whereupon Delcasse resigned.

On January 17, 1906, a conference of European states, to which the United States was admitted, met at Algeciras to decide upon the international status of Morocco. While the German delegates at first maintained the thesis of the complete independence of Morocco, they finally yielded and conceded the exercise by France and Spain of the right to organize an international police force in Morocco, the convention embodying the agreements being signed April 7, 1906.

The following year, Russia and Great Britain composed their differences in Persia in a convention signed in 1907. This shut Germany off from another field and stimulated her to greater efforts in Turkey. England and Russia having thus succeeded in adjusting their conflicting interests, "the cooperation of British democracy and Russian autocracy", says Gibbons in his Introduction to World Politics, "in a war against Germany was made possible. For Great Britain was relieved of anxiety concerning India, and Russian statesmen were, in return, encouraged to begin the diplomatic negotiations that resulted in the abandonment by Great Britain of opposition to the eventual Russian annexation of Constantinople and the Straits. The Anglo-Russian agreement was a necessary corollary to the Anglo-French agreement in laying

the basis of the Triple Entente."

In 1908, the Young Turk Revolution and consequent unrest in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, resulted in Bulgaria's declaring her independence and in the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. This annexation caused general indignation, crushed Serbian hopes for a Greater Serbia and aroused the anger of Russia. War was narrowly averted only by Germany's determined backing of Austria.

The Berber uprising in Morocco in the spring of 1911, caused France suddenly to throw an army into Morocco. In the face of this, Germany inquired what compensation she would get for allowing France to have a free hand there. Upon receiving an evasive answer, Germany sent the Panther to Agadir (July 1st). The situation had meanwhile changed in Europe, however, for England now looked upon Germany as a possible enemy. The Germans were therefore compelled to change their attitude, and, while the crisis was acute, it was finally composed by their backing down upon receiving some territorial compensations from France in Africa, which enlarged their Kamerun possessions somewhat. During the entire crisis and the resulting negotiations, considerable animosity was shown in Germany against Great Britain, while considerable uncertainty existed in France as to British action. "The aftermath of Agadir", says Gibbons, in his Introduction to World Politics, "as far as it affected Morocco, resulted in the establishment of the French protectorate on March 30, 1912. The Sultan signed away his independence by the Treaty of Fez.....The aftermath of Agadir in France and Germany was an increase in naval and military armaments, and the creation of a spirit of tension that needed only

the three years of war in the Ottoman Empire to bring about the inevitable clash between Teuton and Slav."

Nothing was needed but a spark to set off the most gigantic explosion that the world has ever witnessed, and it was not long in coming, resulting in the last analysis from Policies representing conflicting vital interests of the great powers.

III

Foreign Policies of the U. S. in the Pacific.

When the American people declared their independence of the mother country almost one hundred and fifty years ago, their territory extended along the Atlantic seaboard from Canada on the north to Florida on the south and to the Alleghenys on the west. Few people then living could possibly have visualized that during the succeeding century the young Republic would extend its sway to the great ocean lying west of the American continent, and would become a great Pacific power.

Seventy years were to pass, however, before the United States was destined to acquire any possessions on the Pacific. But, meanwhile, American ships nosed around the Horn and into the Pacific in search of the whale, of guano, of the products of the South Seas and of the Orient, and of furs and gingseng on the Pacific Coast, thereby bringing the United States into relations with Oriental peoples and likewise with England, Spain and Russia on the Pacific Coast. Thus the "Empress of China", which entered the port of Canton in 1784, the first American ship to do so, was in truth the advance agent of American commerce in the Far East; and Captain Gray, who in 1792, in the American ship "Columbia", discovered the great river that bears the name of his ship, laid the basis for our claims to the Oregon region.

Meanwhile, Louisiana, which had been ceded to Spain by France in 1764 for the sole purpose of keeping it out of England's grasp, was re-ceded to France by the Treaty of 1802 and gave Napoleon an excuse for formulating a scheme to establish a French empire in this region with New Orleans as its capital. Although this scheme was rather visionary, it aroused such grave apprehensions in

America, that when Jefferson became President, "he completely reversed every item of his Foreign Policy", says Johnson in his America's Foreign Relations, "and adopted and maintained the Policy of those whom he had been most bitterly opposing. From being a Gallican he became an intense Anglican; from opposing 'entangling alliances', he became an advocate of them; and from being an apostle of peace, almost of peace at any price, he became the truculent champion of war, almost of war at any cost. Having once opposed and condemned Hamilton's conception of American domination of the continent, he out-Hamiltoned Hamilton as the propagandist of the 'manifest destiny' of the United States, to 'whip all creation'".

Fortunately, however, the outbreak of war in Europe induced Napoleon to abandon his schemes and to offer to sell Louisiana to the United States in order to keep it from falling into England's hands. Jefferson accepted that offer with avidity, the purchase was consummated and we thereby doubled our area, gained control of the mouth of the Mississippi, and were now fully launched upon a policy of expansion to the Gulf in the south and to the Pacific in the west.

The Louisiana purchase was but the opening wedge to the continental expansion of the United States and was followed in 1819 by the cession of Florida by Spain, the annexation of Texas in 1845, the settlement of the Oregon boundary by treaty with Great Britain in 1846, and the conquest of New Mexico, Arizona, and California during the Mexican War.

Rapid as its expansion over the entire continent had been, the United States for a long time showed no disposition to expand beyond the limits set by the Pacific

Coast. Treaties had, however, been made as early as 1833 with Muscat and with Siam through the instrumentality of Edmund Roberts; in 1842 we expressed our interest in Hawaii; and in 1844, we concluded our first treaty with China, which opened the ports of Kwang-chow, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo and Shanghai to commerce, residence and regulated trade.

However, events beyond the power of statesmen to control or to prevent were urging the United States to take advantage of its position as a power bordering the Pacific. "That ocean," says Fish in his American Diplomacy, "was filled with our shipping. The whale fishing was at its height, whale oil was the most prized illuminant, and we were the foremost nation in its pursuit. The whalers.... were forced to frequent the islands and coasts of the whole ocean and the American flag became everywhere familiar. Amid these sturdy little craft shifting nervously about following their quarry, passed the superb clippers, whose voyages, never deviating, from New York to Canton, could be measured almost to the day, to whom disaster was a word almost unknown. Sailing with the others to the Horn, but then hugging ~~the~~ the west coast of South America, had lately come the nondescript fleet bearing adventurers to the newly discovered gold mines of California. From the Isthmus up, the number increased, and the Caribbean was livelier than ever with vessels carrying from the Isthmus to the United States the goods brought down to its Pacific ports, and to the Isthmus those from the United States destined for California. The occasional wrecking of American vessels on the ocean coasts, as in Japan, the employment of islanders (Kanakas) on our vessels, and the use of Kanakas and Chinese labor on the Pacific slope added material for diplomacy."

It was but natural for these growing interests to develop treaty relations. Thus a treaty of friendship and commerce was made with the kingdom of Hawaii in 1849, and a new treaty with Siam in 1856, replacing the first one made in 1833. Moreover, in 1858, a new treaty was negotiated with China, which very materially extended the advantages granted us by the original treaty of 1844, particularly in that it granted religious freedom. In 1854, meanwhile, the United States had succeeded in negotiating a treaty opening the Lew Chew Islands to our commerce and, most important of all, Commodore Perry, U.S.N., had succeeded in making a treaty with the Empire of Japan. The last named treaty provided for the protection of American sailors shipwrecked on Japanese coasts, for the opening of two ports in addition to Nagasaki to foreign commerce, for the residence of a consul at Shimoda, and for the enjoyment by the United States of all privileges which might in subsequent treaties be granted to other nations.

While the policy pursued by the United States in the Pacific had thus been mainly devoted to opening commercial relations with the South Sea Islands and the Orient, particularly with China and Japan and to cultivating friendly intercourse with their people, the great European powers had pursued a totally different policy. In the Opium War of 1840, for example, Great Britain had prevented China from curtailing the opium trade and had taken Hongkong from her into the bargain, thereby establishing the precedent of preying upon China's weakness for territorial and commercial advantage. In the war of 1857-1860, France and England had, moreover, jointly advanced upon and captured Peking and exacted large indemnities

from China. Russia, which had stood by China during these troubled years, exacted as her honest broker's commission, the cession of the Chinese Maritime Province, which brought her to Vladivostok.

The United States stood aloof from this scramble for territorial aggrandizement in the Far East and, though she was the only one of the powers whose home territory fronted upon the Pacific Ocean, deliberately refrained from making use of her position to play a part in world politics by despoiling the Oriental nations, a policy that has been steadfastly adhered to ever since.

Meantime, however, the difficulties of reaching the Oregon region overland and the influx of settlers into that region, even before the settlement of the Oregon Boundary dispute in 1846, caused attention to be directed to the Central American Isthmuses. As a consequence, a treaty was concluded with Colombia in 1846, which guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama "with the view that the free transit from the one to the other ocean may not be interrupted."

With the acquisition of California, the discovery of gold there, and the rush of miners and settlers to the Pacific Coast, the necessity for adequate transportation facilities across the continent became more and more manifest and led to proposals for the building of a transcontinental railroad and to a revival of the scheme for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal either via Nicaragua or via Panama. The result of all this was, (1) The conclusion in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, between the United States and Great Britain, which laid down their joint policy in reference to any isthmian canal that might be built and which provided, inter alia,

that neither power was to exercise exclusive control over such a canal, that no fortifications should be erected to command it, that it was to be neutral, and that its neutrality was to be guaranteed by the high contracting powers; (2) the conclusion in 1853 of a treaty with Mexico, by means of which the United States obtained on the Mexican border a strip of land - usually referred to as the Gadsden purchase - over which the proposed trans-continental railroad was to run, and secured the equal use, even for the transport of troops, of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; and (3) the actual construction in 1856, over the Isthmus of Panama of a railroad under the terms of the treaty of 1846 between the United States and Colombia.

It is evident from the foregoing that, as Fish says in his American Diplomacy, "up to the Civil War....the achievements of diplomacy toward the solution of the problem of transcontinental transit consisted of the formulation of a policy, with the securing of the free use of Panama for our commerce and travel, of Tehuantepec for commerce, travel and troops, and of a route for a railroad through the Gadsden purchase."

The absorption of the energies of the nation in the prolonged struggle of the Civil War and in economic reconstruction and the problems of interior development upon its termination, the disappearance of our merchant marine, and the decline of our whaling industry as a result of the introduction of petroleum as a substitute for whale oil, caused our material interests in the Pacific to diminish and public interest in our Pacific Policies to flag. Nevertheless, this period is by no means wholly devoid of interest. In 1864, for example,

the United States concluded a treaty with Japan, fixing the duties to be levied by Japan upon certain of our exports, and in that same year we for the first time departed from our traditional policy of non-interference in the affairs of a foreign nation, by joining Great Britain, France and the Netherlands in chastising the feudatory prince of Najato and Suwo, who in defiance of the Tycoon had closed the Straits of Shimonoseki. Moreover, the United States joined the above-mentioned powers in demanding an indemnity from the Tycoon and received a fourth of the three million dollars exacted from him. In 1866, in addition, the United States again joined those powers in forcing Japan to revise her tariff in accordance with a schedule prescribed by treaty. "This regulation proved burdensome to Japan", says Fish in his American Diplomacy, "after the revolution and the establishment of the power of the Mikado, and in 1872 a Japanese embassy made a circular tour to secure its reconsideration, as well as that of the earlier treaties which excepted foreigners from the jurisdiction of the native courts and gave the various consuls judicial power over their respective citizens. Secretary Fish wrote, September 14, 1874: 'The President is impressed with the importance of continued concert between the treaty powers in Japan, at least until after the revision of the treaties, and until the government of Japan shall have exhibited a degree of power and capacity to adopt and to enforce a system of jurisprudence and of judicial administration, in harmony with that of the Christian powers, equal to their evident desire to be relieved from enforced duties of extra-territoriality'".

Our policy in relation to China was benevolent and

resulted in 1868 in the conclusion of a treaty through the instrumentality of Anson Burlingame which granted China the right to appoint consuls to reside in the United States, gave us the privilege of aiding China in making internal improvements if she desired such aid, and prohibited the importation of coolies and forced emigrants into the United States.

Moreover, a treaty was concluded in 1867 with Nicaragua, which gave the United States the free use of the Isthmus of Nicaragua, even for the passage of troops, in return for a guarantee of neutrality, and in the same year Alaska was acquired by purchase from Russia. The year 1869, finally saw the completion of the first trans-continental railroad, which, although it diminished the interest theretofore entertained for the isthmian routes, tremendously facilitated communication and stimulated traffic with the Pacific Coast and thereby with the entire Pacific region.

While the United States had up to this time concluded a number of commercial reciprocity treaties, the principle of reciprocity had not been stressed unduly. But in the treaty concluded with Hawaii in 1875, that principle was applied to an extent never before attempted, for the treaty provided for free entry of practically all articles of exchange, inclusive even of Hawaiian sugar, established what to all intents and purposes was equivalent to a customs union between the United States and Hawaii, and indicated the growing conviction that Hawaii was of special interest to us. But while the people of the United States were perfectly willing to knit such close commercial ties with this island domain, they shied at Seward's proposal of annexation. The fact

of the matter was that the people of the United States were quite satisfied with the territorial expanse of their country, had come to believe that expansion was contrary to national policy, and had grown so firmly indisposed to countenance any movement tending toward a further extension of the national domain that nothing but the pressure of coming events was destined to shake their conviction in this respect.

Meanwhile the United States continued to pursue a policy designed to maintain cordial relations with the nations of the Orient. In 1878, for example, we concluded a commercial treaty with Japan by which we surrendered our tariff rights, although this served merely as an expression of our good will, since it was not to go into effect until the other treaty powers surrendered theirs, but we did not actually recognize the complete sovereignty of the Japanese Empire until 1894. In 1883, moreover, we returned our part of the Shimonoseki indemnity to Japan, a courtesy that did much to cement the good relations between the two countries.

While our relations with Japan were thus prospering, those with China received a rather rude shock, due to the fact that the attitude of the California electorate toward the Chinese exercised a sufficiently dominating influence upon our national policy to induce Congress to pass a bill in 1879 excluding the Chinese from the United States. President Hayes vetoed the measure, it is true, as being contrary to the Burlingame treaty, but the damage had been done. The President did, however, succeed in negotiating a treaty with China that permitted us to limit or to suspend the immigration of Chinese laborers and Congress was thereupon able to pass the

exclusion act of 1882, which, due to the continued entry of Chinese in evasion of the law, was followed by more and more drastic legislation in the premises, that of 1892 requiring the registration of all Chinese in the United States.

Meanwhile the United States had occupied Midway Island in 1867, had agreed in 1889 to control Samoa jointly with Germany and Great Britain, and, while all proposals to annex Hawaii continued to be rejected, that group of islands was considered for all practical purposes as part of the American continent.

The United States had thus far carefully refrained from all attempts to play a part in world politics. But this attitude was radically changed by the Spanish War, since with it the United States became a great world power in fact as it was such already in name. The exigencies of the war immediately threw the importance of the islands of the Pacific into high relief and resulted (1) in the annexation of Hawaii by Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898; (2) in the final settlement, in 1899, of the unsatisfactory Samoa agreement, which gave Tutuila with its fine harbor of Pagopago to us and the remainder of the group to Germany, Great Britain receiving compensation elsewhere; (3) in the assertion of our claim to Midway Island; and (4) in our occupation of Wake Island. Most important of all, however, the war itself ended with our acquisition of the Philippines, and thus brought us into direct contact not only with the Oriental nations, but with the great European colonial powers as well.

The acquisition of the Philippines gave the United States a commanding physical and moral position in the

Far East and this was immediately reflected in the Policy henceforth pursued by her to prevent the partitioning of China. This thought was in fact uppermost in the minds of American statesmen from the moment hostilities against Spain began, for one of the reasons for our sending Dewey's squadron to Manila was, as Johnson says in his America's Foreign Relations, to "offset the European spoliation of China, and for the sake of giving the United States a point of vantage from which it could readily safeguard its treaty rights in China and which would enable it to say that it, too, was a great Asiatic power and was therefore entitled to an equal place in all international councils in the Far East. This thought was second to no other in the mind of McKinley, when he decided upon the Philippine campaign. America at Manila was to be a counterpoise to Germany at Kiao-chau, Russia at Port Arthur, England at Wei-hai-wei, and France at Kwang-chau. It was not merely the conquest of the Philippines for which Dewey was sent to Manila on May day, 1898. It was for the opening and fastening open of the international door of equal rights and equal opportunities throughout the Chinese Empire..."

How this idea came to be enunciated in specific terms by our government is best told in the words of Professor Johnson (America's Foreign Relations):

"In the Spring of 1899, Great Britain and Russia partitioned commercial and industrial interests of the Chinese Empire between them, the former taking all south of and the latter all north of the Great Wall. Hay's answering stroke was prompt and effective. On September 6th of that year he addressed notes to the Governments of Great Britain, Russia, and Germany, and a little later

to those also of France, Italy and Japan, inviting them to give their formal adherence to an international agreement for the maintenance of the 'open door' in China.... The British Government....promptly accepted and approved the scheme. The others, with one accord, began to make excuses. They were all theoretically in accord with Hay's enlightened principles, but they were all practically averse to committing themselves to their maintenance.....

"John Hay was, however, at once too subtle and too direct a diplomat to be defeated by such evasions of the issue....he accepted the spirit and ignored the letter of the powers' replies to his note....he penned a reply which must have caused the chancellories to realize that they had met some one more than their master. He told them that in view of their favorable expressions toward the principles which he had proposed, the United States would consider their acceptance of those principles as 'final and definitive'. The powers thereupon declared their readiness to sign the proposed agreement.."

Unfortunately the Boxer Rebellion supervened and to a considerable extent defeated Mr. Hay's efforts. The United States declined to participate in the shelling of the Taku forts and joined in the Pekingrelief expedition reluctantly, whereas the other powers apparently availed themselves with avidity of the chance to reap advantages from the troubled situation in China, instead of making an honest effort to allay it. When the United States finally decided to participate in the Pekingexpedition, Secretary Hay declared July 3, 1900: "The Policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China,

to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

In the meantime, the developments in the Far East and in particular the voyage of the "Oregon" around the Horn had demonstrated the necessity for constructing a transisthmian canal. The efforts of a French Company under De Lesseps, which was operating under a concession granted it by Colombia in 1878, to build a canal having failed, steps were initiated by the government of the United States to build it. The completion of this canal and its opening to traffic in 1915 enormously enhanced the strength of the strategic position of the United States in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, since it enabled us to transfer our fleet at will to either ocean.

On February 8, 1904, meanwhile, Secretary Hay again invited Germany, Great Britain, and France to join the United States in urging Japan and Russia to recognize the neutrality of China in the Russo-Japanese War, which had just commenced. He was successful in this. Although Russia in January 1905 informed us that China was unable to maintain her neutrality and that Russia would therefore be forced to consider Chinese neutrality "from the standpoint of her (Russia's) own interests", Mr. Hay was able to make Russia recede from her stand. He was moreover able to obtain assurances from Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain and Italy that the war would not result in "any concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers." The United States finally was able

through Mr. Roosevelt to offer its good offices in bringing the war to a close by the Treaty of Portsmouth, in which the territorial and administrative entity of China as well as the policy of the "open door" were formally respected.

"But", says Gibbons in his New Map of Asia, "Secretary Hay failed in preventing Russia from closing the door in Manchuria, and after the Russo-Japanese War, when Russia was limited to Northern Manchuria, Mr. Hay's successor, Secretary Root, protested in vain against the surrender of China of her right to control over the municipalities of Northern Manchuria. In December 1909, a third American Secretary of State tried by diplomatic means to restore Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and thus secure equal privileges for the trade of other powers in Liao-tung and Manchuria. Mr. Knox proposed that the railways be turned back to the Chinese Government, and that their management be freed from Russian and Japanese influence, which were discriminating against American trade. The Japanese and Russian Governments rejected this proposal and compelled China to cancel a concession for a railway in Northern Manchuria that had been granted to a British-American syndicate. This latter act especially, was a failure for American prestige, because Secretary Knox had asserted that the syndicate would have the complete diplomatic backing of the American Government as a test to establish the open door once more in Manchuria."

While the attitude of the United States was naturally gratifying to China and the already existing friendly relations between the two countries had been further strengthened by our voluntary return of our part of the Boxer indemnity, our relations with Japan were severely strained by the objection on the part of our people on the Pacific Coast to Japanese emigration. Since this

question could not be settled as had been the analogous one with China, Secretary Root endeavored to find a solution by arriving at an agreement expressed in a series of notes exchanged during 1907 and 1908, whereby the Japanese Government itself undertook to prohibit the emigration of laborers to the United States. This, however, did not definitively settle the matter, for new complications arose, precipitated in 1913 by legislative action of California which discriminated against the Japanese, and more recently by drastic national legislation in the premises. All this has, of course, deeply offended the racial and national pride of the Japanese people and will doubtless contribute much to disturb the friendly relations between the two countries.

But the difficulties incident to the anti-Japanese legislation of 1913 were destined to be quickly overshadowed by a much more momentous event, the World War, which broke out in 1914 and completely changed the complexion of affairs in the Far East and had a far-reaching effect upon the Policy pursued by the United States there henceforth.

Japan entered the war as an ally of Great Britain, ousted Germany from the Carolines and from China and took virtual possession of the Shantung Peninsula, following this up in 1915 with the so-called twenty-one demands upon China, and as a result of this and other machinations found herself at the conclusion of the war in practical control of China. By secret treaties with the Allies and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 with the United States, Japan had fortified herself so effectively as to leave her position in China virtually unassailable and had even secured a grip upon Eastern Siberia. However, she had

manifestly overreached herself, for her erstwhile allies, though for the moment too exhausted by the war to interfere, looked askance at her because she had managed to gain all her objectives at practically no cost to herself, and, in consequence, she soon found herself completely isolated.

Mr. Harding, availed himself of this psychological moment to invite the powers interested in Pacific problems to come together in a conference to be held in Washington in 1922 to discuss them. Japan accepted the invitation reluctantly, but she dared not refuse.

This move by the United States was actuated by a desire (1) to set a limit to competition in naval armaments; (2) to break up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; (3) to restore the strategic balance in the Pacific; (4) to protect the interests of China and Siberia; (5) to assure the safety of the islands of the Pacific; and (6) to maintain for itself the open door to the islands renounced by Germany in the Pacific.

Many people are convinced that the Conference was on the whole one of the most successful ever held, largely owing to the hearty cooperation of Great Britain with the aims of the United States. But if we believe that Washington spoke the truth when he said in his Farewell Address, "There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation," then we are forced to suspect that from the point of view of the interests of the United States, it was perhaps not so successful after all, in that Great Britain's hearty cooperation with the aims of the United States was probably very much worth her while. Certain it is that we had it in our power to become the first naval power in the world and that it was beyond the power of

Great Britain to prevent it, but that with a magnificent gesture, whose generosity is not equalled in history, we disdained to play that role. Only the future can tell whether our policy in this respect was wise or -otherwise.

The Conference did indeed set^a/limit to naval competition in capital ships, did force Japan to disgorge Shantung, to evacuate Siberia, and to accede to the claims of the United States for the maintenance of the open door in the islands renounced by Germany in the Pacific. Most important of all, it broke up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But it failed to restore the strategic balance in the Pacific; its treaty relative to the use of submarines and noxious gas in warfare is still unratified; and it may well be questioned whether the islands of the Pacific, from our point of view, are any safer because of the action of the Conference, than they were before.

The outstanding feature of our post Conference Policy in the Pacific is the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924, which bars all Orientals, even Japanese immigrants, from the United States. Following so closely upon the heels of the great Japanese earthquake, it was a doubly hard blow for Japanese pride to bear, all the more so because they were so helpless, and to an unbiased observer it is difficult to reconcile with the generosity displayed by the United States in its proposals for naval disarmament, a generosity that was as magnificent as it was sincere. While the right of the United States to bar Japanese, or any other peoples, from its domain can not be questioned, one can not help but feel regret at the way it was done and at the choice of time for doing it.

Thus far the Policy pursued by the United States in the Pacific has been actuated by the desire for peace, equal commercial opportunities and friendship with all nations. While the Policy henceforth pursued by it there is bound to be shaped by events in the lap of the future, it will unquestionably be powerfully influenced by the traditions of the past. The eventual development of China into a strong, stable state, and the growth in population of the nations inhabiting the shores of the Pacific will inevitably increase the opportunities for trade and commerce and likewise the chances of friction, and are bound to force the United States to play a great, perhaps even a dominant role in the Pacific in the future.

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