

Class of 1927

Thesis

POLICY

Submitted by

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In one of his messages to Congress Washington said:
"It is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its own interest, and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it." Many Americans think that the history of the United States - especially in the last thirty years - has proved that, for their country at least, this is not true, and that altruism, not self-interest, governs our foreign relations. It is doubtful, however, if many foreigners could be found who would subscribe to such a view.

In endeavoring to ascertain what the present foreign policies of the United States are, and what their future trend is likely to be, it is necessary to look somewhat into the past history of the country. The influence of the past will always have greater weight with the mass of the people than will arguments of what courses future action may require; and, as public opinion will ever have a large effect upon the shaping of the foreign policies in a democracy, great underlying policies once accepted as gospel will exhibit strong vitality and resistance to change.

The two policies most widely known and accepted by the American people in their foreign relations are the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door. The one is political and the other economic. While the Monroe Doctrine was an enunciated policy more than three-quarters of a century before the policy of the Open Door received its pronouncement at the hand of John Hay, the latter policy was no new development, but rather a culmination of more than a century's efforts on the part of our government to promote foreign trade.

The history of the American colonies before the Revolution had been one in which the numerous wars of Europe

caused extensions of their hostilities to take place on the American continent. In addition to their struggles to subdue the wilderness and to combat hostile Indian tribes, the colonists were forced to take part in wars, the causes of which rested in Europe, and which concerned them only indirectly. Between 1689 and 1763 they assisted Great Britain in four wars against France and one against Spain. Such was one result of their European connection.

The first treaties to be signed by the United States were those with France, the one commercial and the other a military and political alliance, signed 6 February, 1778. The treaty of alliance with Louis XVI "recognized the independence of the United States, and declared the object of the alliance to be the achievement of that independence; provided for combined military movements; made the negotiations for peace conditional on joint consultation and approval; stipulated for the division of probable conquests; and mutually guaranteed the possessions in America of the respective parties." While this Treaty greatly assisted in obtaining the results of it were not entirely happy. Our peace commissioners, Franklin, John Adams and Jay, suspected France - and apparently with cause - of not playing fair with the United States in the matter of obtaining for her the territory south of the Ohio between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. They therefore negotiated secretly a preliminary treaty with Great Britain, which gave the United States this territory, and thereby exposed themselves to the reproaches of the French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, for acting contrary to the provisions of the treaty of 1778. Later, in 1793 during the French Revolution, the Directory appealed to the United States, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, for aid against Great Britain. The government and the people of the United States

were for a time bitterly divided on the question, but the excesses of the French Revolution, and the high handed course taken by the French Minister, Genet, after his arrival in this country, did much to alienate sympathy from France, and to cause Washington to issue his famous proclamation of neutrality in 1793.

It is probable that the memory of the colonial wars and of the recent difficulties incident to the French alliance caused Washington to enunciate, in his Farewell Address, what is still regarded as the foundation of our foreign policy: "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop."

That there was no question of domestic politics in this policy of abstention from foreign alliances was shown by Jefferson in his first Inaugural Address, when he uttered that famous phrase: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

Prior to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States had, for two years at the close of the 18th Century, conducted a limited, but never officially declared, war with France; had had numerous quarrels with both Great Britain and France during the Napoleonic wars on account of their interference with our commerce; had forced the Barbary states to forego the exercise of their means of livelihood so far as American ships were concerned; and had fought the War of 1812 with Great Britain over her impressment of our seamen, without, however, having that matter settled by the Treaty of Ghent. This period had also seen the purchase of Louisiana from France in 1803 and Florida from Spain in 1819; and the overthrow of

Spanish authority in North and South America and the establishment in its place of independent rule. It was a quarter of a century full of the most important events for the United States.

The purchase of Louisiana and Florida and the overthrow of Spanish rule left the United States in the fortunate position of having no near European controlled neighbors except Canada and the West Indies; and she was naturally pleased with this development, and desired no backward ^{steps} be taken.

After the overthrow of Napoleon in 1815, the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia formed themselves into the Holy Alliance, the real purpose of which was the stamping out of the movements for popular government kindled by the French Revolution and the strengthening of absolutism. The Alliance was later joined by the King of France. In October, 1822, the Holy Alliance held a congress at Verona to concert measures against the revolutionary government then existing in Spain. In April of the next year a French army invaded Spain on behalf of the Alliance, and, so successful were its operations, that the Alliance gave notice to Great Britain that it proposed to call another congress to consider putting down the revolutions in Spanish America.

At this time the United States alone had recognized the independence of Spain's revolting colonies; but, with the removal of Spanish restrictions on trade, both British and American merchants had begun to build up a successful trade with the former colonies, and it did not suit Great Britain that this trade should be interrupted by a resumption of Spanish sovereignty and its accompanying colonial commercial restrictions. Accord-

ingly, Canning, the British foreign minister, proposed to the American minister that Great Britain and the United States issue a joint declaration against any intervention by the Holy Alliance.. As Great Britain controlled the sea, her veto of any overseas expeditions would be final.

Canning's proposal was at first looked upon with favor by the United States, but the taking of counsel led to a decision in favor of separate and independent action. When consulted by President Monroe at this time, Jefferson succinctly stated: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to intangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."

Accordingly, in his Annual Message to Congress on 2 December, 1823, President Monroe enunciated the famous doctrine which bears his name. The substance of the Monroe Doctrine was, first, that the American continents were not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers; and, second, that the United States would regard as dangerous to its people and safety any attempt to extend the European system to this hemisphere, or any interposition for the purpose of oppressing independent American governments or controlling their destiny. The Doctrine as enunciated was founded, not upon a desire to protect the newly acquired independence of the Spanish American republics, but upon a wish on the part of the United States to be free to develop after its own fashion without its safety being endangered by the proximity of any more European controlled territory than already existed. Corollaries of the Monroe Doctrine have been the policies to reduce whenever possible the territories already held by

European countries in the Western Hemisphere, as was done by the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 and the purchase of the Danish West Indies in 1917; to forestall foreign occupation of strategic positions by ourselves gaining control of them, as our annexation of Hawaii in 1898, the perpetual control of the Panama Canal Zone in 1903, and the perpetual right to construct a canal through Nicaragua obtained by treaty in 1914; and to prevent the transfer of European controlled territory to another - and perhaps stronger and more dangerous - European nation.

The effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine was called into question by the French occupation of Mexico during our Civil War, when French troops were used to place and keep the Emperor Maximilian on the throne and were only withdrawn when the end of the Civil War left the United States in a position to enforce its demands; in 1895 when President Cleveland forced Great Britain to agree to arbitration in its boundary dispute with Venezuela; and in 1902-3 when President Roosevelt prevented Germany from taking action in Venezuela which would have involved the occupation of territory. The Monroe Doctrine does not protect American republics from the consequences of any wrong doing on their part, nor prevent European Powers from enforcing the execution of any contractual obligations entered into with their nationals; but the action on the part of the European Power must not be such as to impair the sovereignty or alienate any of the territory of the American country at fault.

The United States has, however, always viewed with considerable alarm and disapproval any steps on the part of strong European Powers, which involved even a temporary landing of armed forces and occupation of ports and custom

houses, as it has seen too many instances in other parts of the world where such temporary occupations have become permanent. The dissatisfaction of certain European Powers with the Monroe Doctrine and their hunger for colonies has led the United States to prefer that the seemingly innocent first step in a permanent occupation be not taken. To prevent this with justice to non-American countries has at times involved interference with the domestic affairs of certain States. President Roosevelt stated the case in his Annual Message to Congress, 6 Dec., 1904, in which he said that "chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, might in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized power, and that in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine might force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." It is unfortunate, but inevitable, that this principle, following Secretary Olney's pronouncement in connection with the British-Venezuelan controversy that "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition," should have made the Monroe Doctrine at the present time unpopular throughout Latin-America. The strong and stable governments now resent it as patronizing, and the weak and unstable regard it as a cloak for American imperialism and fear for their independence.

To promote the growth of good feeling and co-operation among the States of the Western Hemisphere, Secretary Blaine in 1889 called together at Washington the

first International American Conference. Succeeding Conferences, held at Mexico City in 1901, Rio de Janeiro in 1906, Buenos Ayres in 1910, Santiago, Chile, in 1923, have served to strengthen the ideal of Pan-Americanism formulated by Secretary Blaine. The Pan-American movement so far has not included Canada, but, with the recent pronouncement by the British Imperial Conference of equality, within the British Empire, of Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions, and the appointment of a Canadian minister to the United States, there appears to be no valid reason why Canada should not be invited to send delegates to future Pan-American conferences.

Pan-Americanism has not met with an entirely friendly reception among all elements in Latin-America. The jealousy and fear of the United States has caused many to prefer a movement directed toward a closer affiliation with Spain and the other Latin nations of Europe, with which Latin America has such close ties by reason of blood, language, culture, and traditions. For the countries of South America, at least, this seems to be a movement with much logic back of it, for they do not feel the geographical pull which draws all the countries north of Panama into the orbit of the United States, despite their resistance. As the native bloods to the southward of the United States become more diffused throughout the populations of their countries and as these people rise in the social scale and acquire more education and power, the ties to Europe should become weaker. This applies to all countries from the Rio Grande to the temperate zone of South America. Whether these mixed races will find the American, with his strong color prejudices, any more to their liking than do the present whites of Latin extraction, remains to be seen. Certainly the ideal of

Pan-Americanism is a valuable one for the Western Hemisphere, but it is a tender plant with many adverse influences, and it must be carefully nourished by the promotion of mutually beneficial commerce and other interests.

In the expansion of her growth and influence, the United States, starting as a country with no territory bordering on the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, has become the predominant Power in that region. The first step was the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. This was followed by the acquisition of Florida in 1819. The treaty with Spain, however, renounced the claims to Texas, which the United States had inherited as part of the Louisiana purchase. Texas declared itself an independent republic in 1836, and immediately applied for annexation to the United States. The request was denied by Congress, and it was not until 1845, after another unsuccessful attempt the preceding year, that President Polk was able to have Texas annexed by joint resolution of Congress. This annexation brought on the Mexican War in 1846, which, while adding large territories to the westward, did nothing more to strengthen the United States in the Gulf of Mexico than by confirming its right to Texas.

The decade preceding the Civil War saw several unsuccessful attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain. Cuba at this time and for some years before had been looked upon as a logical field for American expansion, especially by Southern statesmen who were on the lookout for additional slave territory. In 1867, a treaty was negotiated for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, but on account of opposition to President Johnson it failed of ratification in the Senate. In 1868 Santo Domingo requested annexation, but a treaty negotiated

by President Grant in 1870 for this purpose was rejected by the Senate. The opposition to every proposed addition of territory to the United States, except in the case of Florida, is indicative of the strength that the anti-imperialist sentiment has always had in the country, and this sentiment appears to be stronger to-day than at any previous time. Such opposition heretofore has usually been overcome by feeling that the annexation of the territory in question was necessary for the safety of the United States by forestalling its occupation by some other Power. Now that the United States has attained to the position of the strongest single country in the world and hence has little to fear, it does not seem likely that the sentiment against further annexations will ever be less strong than at present, until such future time as overcrowding and economic pressure within force Americans to look abroad for outlets for their population and trade.

Following the failure of the Dominican treaty in 1870, the political situation in the Caribbean remained the same until the stench of Spanish misrule in Cuba became so great that the United States was forced to intervene in 1898. The treaty of peace following the Spanish-American War recognized the independence of Cuba, and ceded Porto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam to the United States. At the conclusion of the war American troops were placed in control of Cuba and the military government remained in charge until a suitable civil government could be inaugurated. The Platt Amendment, the provisions of which govern the relations between Cuba and the United States, provides that Cuba shall not enter into any compact with any foreign Power that will impair her independence; that

she shall contract no excessive debt; and that "the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence and to maintain a Government capable of protecting life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of peace on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba." Pursuant to its obligations under the Platt Amendment, the United States has several times had to intervene in greater or less degree in the internal affairs of Cuba. It is probable that the right and ability so to intervene exercises a great effect in keeping political conditions in Cuba in a comparatively sanitary state. The unsuccessful candidates for office know that a revolution will get them nowhere, and the successful candidates realize that their speculations must be kept within bounds.

The next forward step of the United States in the Caribbean was clearing the way for the building of the Panama Canal. In 1901 the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was negotiated, by which Great Britain wisely relinquished the right, acquired by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, for joint control of an Isthmian Canal. Then followed unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a treaty with Columbia by which the United States might take over the French Panama Canal Company's property and acquire the right to dig the canal. The Columbian Congress blocked this, and matters were at a standstill until in 1903 the province of Panama revolted and declared its independence of Columbia. The United States refused to allow Columbia to land troops on the Isthmus to put down the revolt, on the grounds

that this would interfere with freedom of transit of the Isthmus. A treaty was quickly negotiated with Panama whereby the United States acquired in perpetuity the rights necessary for the construction and operation of the canal.

President Roosevelt's denial to Colombia of the right to land troops on the Isthmus to suppress the revolt was perhaps an arbitrary act, and it certainly created much ill-will and suspicion of the United States in Colombia and throughout the rest of Latin-America; but Colombia had been holding up the building of the canal by refusing to agree to terms, and the United States may be said to have exercised an international right of eminent domain, which was morally justifiable, even if its strict legality was debatable. Following Roosevelt's administration, attempts were made to negotiate a treaty with Colombia so that, with a suitable payment, that country's feelings toward the United States and Americans in general might be placed on a more friendly basis. Such a treaty, involving a payment of \$25,000,000, was finally ratified in 1921. Perhaps the fact that Colombia possesses considerable oil bearing territory, to develop which concessions are in demand, may have served to strengthen the hand of those favoring ratification. Considerable opposition to the treaty existed in the United States, on the grounds that it was an admission that the United States had acted dishonorably and that the \$25,000,000 was in the nature of a payment of damages. It is significant that Colombia consistently demanded arbitration of the matter, and that the United States would not consent to this.

The building of the Panama Canal brought to the

United states renewed interest in the Caribbean area, and a determination to maintain, as far as possible, peaceful and stable conditions in the countries bordering it, so that no European Power would have an excuse for intervention in any of them. Germany, in particular, was suspected of wishing to obtain a foothold there. The best means of preserving order appeared to be some arrangement whereby a fiscal control might be exercised in the backward countries. If these countries could be prevented from contracting any more debts, the existing debts refunded by a loan obtained in the United States, and the service of this loan guaranteed by the appointment of a receiver-general of customs, it was hoped that excuses for foreign intervention to collect debts would not be given, and that the supervision over financial disbursements would make revolutions to seize the government less profitable than they had been in the past.

The first instance in which this scheme was tried was with Santo Domingo in 1905. The political conditions and the finances of that country had gotten in a chaotic state, service on the foreign loans was in arrears, and certain European Powers, whose subjects held these loans, were growing restive. President Roosevelt negotiated a protocol with the Dominican Government, which provided for supervision of the administration of its finances and which guaranteed its territorial integrity. The protocol was put into effect without submitting it to the Senate, but the outcry against it was such that the President finally sent it to the Senate for ratification. On account of the clause guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic, the Senate refused to ratify

and it was not until 1907 that a treaty, with the guarantee clause omitted, was given the Senate's approval.

This treaty was beneficial, but it did not result in the suppression of internal disorders that had been anticipated. These disorders culminated in intervention in November, 1916, by the forces of the United States. The civil government then refusing to function, an American military government was set up, which remained in power until July, 1924, when, elections having been held, a new president was inaugurated and the U. S. Military forces withdrawn. A convention, dating from December, 1924, superseded the treaty of 1907. It provided for a new loan, part for refunding and part for improvements, and the continuation of the customs receivership until the loan is extinguished.

Conditions in the Haitian end of the island had been equally bad, and the political disorders finally culminated in 1915 in the violation of the French Legation in Port au Prince by a mob seeking the President, who was a refugee therein. This led to intervention by the United States and the negotiation of a treaty with Haiti in 1916, which provided for what amounts to a protectorate by the United States for a period of twenty years. The President of Haiti appoints, on nomination by the President of the United States, a receiver general of customs, a financial adviser, engineers to supervise public works and sanitation, and officers to organize a native constabulary. As in the Dominican Republic, a well organized and disciplined constabulary, receiving regu-

lar pay, has been counted on to do much toward maintaining in power a stable, legitimate government, stopping revolutions, and suppressing banditry. Whether or not the natives of these two countries are capable of maintaining a stable government for any length of time after the withdrawal of American advisory and administrative officials remains to be seen. The history of the countries bordering on the Caribbean makes it appear probable that a dictatorship tempered by revolution is the only kind of government to which their people aspire. Certainly it will require many years to education, social and economic progress, before these countries can stand alone without some kind of outside pressure or support, and take an equal place in the world with countries such as Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian kingdoms.

Conditions in Central America, as well as those in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, have given the United States cause for much thought and anxiety. The United States has been forced to intervene in certain of these countries from time to time in order to protect foreign lives and property interests. Various steps have been taken in the endeavor to eliminate the causes which produce the revolutions and civil disorders, but so far these steps have been attended with only a moderate success.

In 1907 representatives of the five Central American republics met in conference at Washington at the request of President Roosevelt of the United States and President Diaz of Mexico. The result of this conference was the adoption of a general treaty

of peace, providing for the settlement of existing differences and the establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, to which all future controversies were to be submitted. This Court had an unfortunate experience in connection with the treaty made by the United States with Nicaragua in 1914 for canal rights. In spite of the reservation attached to the treaty by the United States Senate to protect any rights which Costa Rica, Salvador or Honduras might have in the matter, Costa Rica and Salvador took the case to the Central American Court of Justice. Nicaragua refused to be a party to the cases, but the Court assumed jurisdiction and found in favor of the appellants. As the Court exercised no jurisdiction over the United States, it did not declare the treaty void. Neither the United States nor Nicaragua paid any attention to the Court's decision.

Secretary Knox in 1911 negotiated treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua providing for financial supervision to be exercised by the United States, but the treaties were rejected by the Senate. Later, in October of the same year, the United States intervened with military forces at the request of the President of Nicaragua and assisted in putting down the revolution then in progress and restoring order. A small legation guard of U. S. Marines was left in Managua. The guard was maintained there until August, 1925, during which time Nicaragua enjoyed an unaccustomed period of peace. On the withdrawal of the marines, the country soon was plunged into another of its revolutions, and it is only recently that the United

States has been able to recognize a newly elected government.

A further effort was made toward peace and stability in Central America, when a second Central American Conference met in Washington in 1922, and drew up treaties providing for the limitation of armaments; for international commissions of inquiry in cases of disputes which could not be settled diplomatically; for the non-recognition of governments, established by revolution; and for a new Central American Court of Justice, which was to be more arbitral and less political than the 1908 Court. The only one of these treaties signed by the United States was the one providing for international commissions of inquiry.

A new policy introduced by President Wilson in connection with Huerta in Mexico was the refusal to recognize governments which exist by reason of revolution and the overthrow of the legitimate government. Such a government, under the present policy, must have been confirmed by a national election, and the head of the revolution must not have been elected president. This policy seems an entirely logical one, except for the fact that in most countries between the Rio Grande and Panama the party in power nearly always manages to win the election. The political parties are based on personal leadership rather than any differentiating principles, and the defeated leader and his followers see small chance of ever attaining to office save by a successful revolution.

The long-standing American policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States has, thus,

in the Caribbean come into conflict with the interests and safety of the United States as set forth in the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, our vital interests have been projected well to the southward of that area by the building of the Panama Canal. The United States has, in Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, amply demonstrated that it has no desire for further territorial expansion in that region; but it has also given notice that the governments in this region must maintain peace and order in their countries and must meet their lawful obligations. The United States stands ever ready to lend a helping hand. President Taft well expressed this spirit of helpfulness, when he said: "It should be the policy of the Government, especially with respect to the countries in geographical proximity to the Canal Zone, to give to them when requested all proper assistance, within the scope of our limitations, in the promotion of peace, in the development of their resources, and in a sound organization of their fiscal systems, thus, by contributing to the removal of conditions of turbulence and instability, enabling them by better established governments to take their rightful places among the law-abiding and progressive countries of the world."

In Porto Rico and the Philippines, the United States has adopted the policy of protecting the native inhabitants from exploitation and of granting to them measures of self-government as fast as they are competent to assume them. The Philippines have been promised independence whenever they are ready for it. Until that time, the United States will give them protection and guidance, keeping such control over the

government as is necessary to ensure the continuance of peace and good order. No other country in the world has ever taken such an altruistic stand in connection with a territory which it has acquired by conquest or purchase. Whether this policy would stand if the Philippines were to develop into a great rubber producing country and every American had a personal interest in their retention under the American flag, is another question.

Turning now to the economic side of the foreign policy of the United States, let us take a brief glance at some of the aspects of this policy in the past.

During the colonial period and for about fifty years thereafter, all European Powers considered their colonies as areas closed to the trade of other nations. The colonies existed primarily for the benefit of the mother country. They could trade with the mother country and usually with each other, but that was all. The introduction of manufacturing by the British colonies was frowned upon, as this reduced by that much the market for British goods. The colonies were to supply the home market with raw materials that it did not itself produce, and in turn buy their manufactured goods in that market.

Pursuant to this policy, the West Indies and the Southern colonies were greatly valued for the sugar, molasses, rum, tobacco, rice, and indigo, which they furnished, and for the fine market which they furnished by reason of their entire lack of manufacturing facilities. The Northern colonies, on the other hand, supplied a good many of their own wants for manufactures,

and built up a thriving trade with the West India colonies, which was more or less in direct competition with that of Great Britain. They traded their lumber, fish and other foodstuffs for West Indian sugar, molasses and rum.

Between the years 1678 and 1786, trade between Great Britain and France was almost prohibited by reason of high duties and embargoes, and this forced Great Britain to develop her colonial trade. Even with her own colonies, however, there was no such thing as free trade. Both Great Britain and the individual colonies levied such import and export duties, as each saw fit. Frequently the British tariff on colonial products was all the trade could bear. The final straw in this policy of trade restrictions was the levying by the British Parliament of import duties to be collected in the colonies for the Crown. These and other taxes, and the interference with the political freedom to which the colonies had grown accustomed, brought on the Revolution.

After the Revolution the United States endeavored by the treaty of peace to have the West Indian colonies again thrown open to their trade, but unsuccessfully; and it was not until 1829 that a treaty with Great Britain was negotiated that permitted this. Another point at issue was the question of fishing rights on the Grand Banks, off the coasts and in the bays of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and the right to dry fish ashore. This fishing question passed through many vicissitudes and has been a subject in several treaties. Sometimes the United States obtained its wishes, and sometimes - as after the War of 1812 - it

found its privileges curtailed.

To compensate for the loss of the West Indian trade after its independence had been attained, the United States was forced to look elsewhere. The Spanish colonies were closed, and remained so until they achieved their independence in the twenties. The Orient was not yet opened to foreign trade, so the continent of Europe alone remained. The United States already had a commercial treaty with France, and she entered into treaties with Holland, Prussia, and other countries as fast as she was able. The Barbary Pirates remained a threat to American ships in the Mediterranean until they were put down by the Navy after 1800.

The European wars which followed the French Revolution put a severe strain on American commerce. The United States decided to remain neutral, and Washington in 1793 issued the famous proclamation of neutrality, which has since then remained a model. Unfortunately, the United States was a weak and struggling Power, and neither contestant in Europe paid much attention to the rights of American neutrality. A precedent had been established, however, which has grown until it is one of the cornerstones of the present structure of international law. The United States in its attitude toward neutrality has always been in favor of a strict observance, and of extending the rights of legitimate neutral trade and limiting the interference with it by belligerents. Similarly, the United States took the initial steps in negotiating the now almost universal treaties for the extradition of criminals who are fugitives from justice.

American ships in the early days of the Republic established trade connections with China, but it was

not until 1844 that the Cushing treaty was negotiated with that country to enable the United States to enter officially into political and commercial relations. Japan during this period was tightly closed to all occidentals except the Dutch. Numerous but unsuccessful attempts were made to enter into official relations and have the country opened to trade, but it was not until 1853 that Commodore Perry, by a shrewd mixture of persistent force and diplomacy, managed to establish communication with the Shogun. On his return the next spring the desired treaty opening Japan to limited political and commercial relations with the United States was signed by the Shogun. After the Mikado resumed the power, which had been exercised by the Shoguns for several centuries in the imperial name, the treaty was validated by the Emperor's signature in 1865.

The relations of the United States with both Japan and China have not been without friction which, at times, resulted in limited hostilities. In 1856 an American man-of-war had occasion to attack and capture some Chinese forts near Canton, which had previously fired upon American naval boats. An explanation and apology were demanded of the Chinese, but, as these were not forthcoming, the forts were taken and demolished. In 1859 Commodore Tatnall went to the assistance of the British, who were in a serious predicament in an attempt to capture the Taku forts at the entrance of the Pei-Ho River. Again in 1863 the United States joined with the British, French and Dutch in a naval attack at Shimonoseki to force the Choshu clan to re-open those straits. The most recent

and the largest expedition, in which the United States has taken part in the Far East, was the allied expedition for the relief of the foreign legations in Peking in 1900.

While the United States has been ready in the past to use force in the Far East - either alone or in conjunction with other Powers - it has always done so without any feelings of hostility toward the people or countries involved, and without any desire to take unfair advantage or to obtain territorial concessions. The American share of the indemnity of \$3,000,000, which was exacted of Japan for damages in connection with the Shimonoseki incident in 1863, was returned to her twenty years later. Similarly, the unused portion of the Boxer indemnity was returned to China and employed by her in the education of Chinese students in the United States.

The action of the European Powers and of Japan with regard to China during the nineties was such as to lead to the fear that, unless the movement was checked, China would soon, through concessions of railway and mineral rights and of actual territory and the setting up of spheres of influence, be to all intents and purposes as divided up among foreign Powers, as had been the continent of Africa. After the Chino-Japanese War Japan had obtained a lease on Port Arthur. This ^{she} was forced by Russia, Germany and France to give up. Two years later - in 1897 - Russia received from China a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and railway rights in Manchuria, which would in time make that Province Russian. Germany seized Kiaochao and obtained a lease on it, together with railway and mineral rights in Shantung. The

next year Great Britain leased Wei Hai Wei in Shantung and Mirs Bay at Hong Kong, and France Kwang Chau in the Province of Kwangtung. This movement, and the scramble for railway and mining concessions, was at its height while the United States was engaged with the Spanish War.

The war with Spain over, the United States turned its attention to the situation in China, and Secretary Hay, in September, 1899, addressed notes to Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France, Italy and Japan requesting their adherence to an international agreement to maintain the "open door" in China. The "open door" meant no special privileges, such as customs duties, port dues, or railway rates, to any country or countries, regardless of spheres of influence claimed. Great Britain at once accepted the idea, as did the other Powers later, when they had been maneuvered by American diplomacy into a position where they were forced to do so.

During the Boxer uprising - in July, 1900 - Secretary Hay addressed a note to the Powers engaged in the Relief Expedition setting forth the principles on which the United States was acting. The note concluded with the statement that "the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." Great Britain and Germany concurred in this note, and the other Powers, to which it was addressed,

failed to take exception to it.

Between this and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the United States had to bring diplomatic pressure on Russia to make her withdraw her objections to China opening up additional treaty ports in Manchuria. Subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War and before the World War, the United States was at various times engaged in diplomatic negotiations, first with a view to having the Russian and Japanese railways in Manchuria turned over to the Chinese Government, and later in connection with the raising of the Six Power Loan for China; but nothing definite came of these.

At the outbreak of the World War, the Japanese, assisted by the British, captured Kiaochao and took over German rights in Shantung. In 1915, the Japanese Government took advantage of the occupation of the European Powers with the war to present its Twenty-one Demands to China, following up these Demands with an ultimatum. The Demands required the extension of the Port Arthur lease and of the railway concessions in Manchuria from twenty-five to ninety-nine years; assent to the transfer to Japan of German rights in Shantung; special rights in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria; in case of foreign loans the first request made by China to be to Japan; numerous Japanese advisers; China not to cede or lease any territory along its coast to any Power; and other clauses, which were in direct contravention of the principles of the open door and the territorial integrity of China.

The situation created by the Twenty-one Demands, the Japanese occupation of Shantung, and of Eastern

Siberia, led to a condition in which suspicion of Japan's motives and actions in the Far East was rife in all countries, but particularly so in the United States. To find a solution for the growing competition in naval armaments, President Harding during the summer of 1921 issued invitations to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to send representatives to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, to meet in Washington on 11 November, 1921. On the agenda of the Conference was a number of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, for the consideration of which invitations were also sent to China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

Among the treaties growing out of the Conference was the Four Power Treaty - between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan -, by which the Contracting Parties "agreed as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean", and which superseded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; and the Nine Power Treaty - between all the Powers invited to the Conference - to adopt a policy "designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity". In other words, the purpose of the Nine Power Treaty was to protect the Open Door and the integrity of China. Steps were also to be taken, as the result of the Conference, toward gratifying China's desires for a change in foreign treaty rights which limited or

impaired her sovereignty, such as the maritime customs, foreign post offices, and extraterritoriality.

The outcome of the Conference, so far as Japanese aggression in the Far East was concerned, has been quite successful. Japan has evacuated both Eastern Siberia and Shantung, and apparently has decided upon a different and more benevolent policy toward China. Her hold on Manchuria, it is true, has not been relaxed, but rather strengthened. The principal menace to-day to the Open Door and the integrity of China seems to be the chaotic condition of affairs in China herself and the disappearance of any semblance of a central government. So long as these conditions continue, the Powers, however willing, can do little toward carrying out the promised changes, without which the rising tide of Chinese nationalist sentiment may turn definitely anti-foreign and force the Powers to intervene to protect their treaty rights and the safety of their nationals. If foreign intervention should come again, it will require the most skillful leadership and diplomacy on the part of the United States to maintain its cherished policies in the Far East.

In endeavoring to forecast the probable trend of American foreign policies in the future, account must be taken of the great change that has occurred in the relative positions of the United States as a world Power at the beginning of the Spanish War as compared with the end of the World War. In 1898 she was militarily weaker than any of the Great Powers of Europe; economically, she was primarily an exporter of raw materials and foodstuffs and she

was heavily in debt to Europe. In 1919 she was, both from a military and a financial and economic point of view, the strongest nation in the world. She had changed to a country which each year was exporting a greater percentage of manufactured goods and importing fewer manufactures and more raw materials. She was the only place in the world where large amounts of new capital could be found, and most of the governments of Europe owed her large sums. Since 1919 the economic change has continued in the same direction. Each year the necessity for new markets for American manufactures grows, and each year a vast amount of American capital is invested abroad.

From the Revolution until the Spanish War, the United States had many times been assisted out of difficult situations, not by its own strength, but by the balance of power in Europe. European Powers that desired to interfere in our affairs were afraid to do so because of the opposition of some other Power. It was the support of France that gave us our independence. It was the word of Great Britain that made the Holy Alliance respect the Monroe Doctrine. It is commonly believed that the action of Great Britain at the time of the Spanish War prevented an attempt at interference by Germany and other Continental Powers. The mutual jealousy between France and Great Britain gave to the United States the territory between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, south of the Ohio, and later the Louisiana Purchase. During the 18th and 19th Centuries Great Britain had always

in European quarrels thrown her weight so as to preserve the balance of power and prevent any one country from becoming supreme on the Continent. During the World War, when it became apparent that the strength of the British Empire might not be sufficient to accomplish this and that Germany might become the dictator of Europe, the United States took a part to prevent such an outcome. She emerged from the war with a recognized strength such that her people feared aggression from no other. Yet so great a hold did the words of Washington and Jefferson against foreign alliances have on the minds of Americans, that they, the strongest nation in the world, feared to take their place, with practically all the other countries of the globe, in the League of Nations, of which their own President had been the founder.

However firm the decision of the United States may be not to become a member of the League of Nations, her interests throughout the world are becoming greater each year with her increasing foreign trade and investment, and she is bound to take a larger part in world affairs. She will do this in the interests of peace and justice. It is unfortunate that to-day the failure to assist in the settlement of post-war difficulties in Europe, the insistence on the collection of war debts, and an unexampled prosperity have combined to make the United States most unpopular in certain countries of Europe. The restriction of immigration has aided in creating this feeling. Time will serve to soften this, and then it is to be hoped that the real

purposes of American policy will be everywhere appreciated.

The United States may be expected to continue her Pan-American policy, with a view to maintaining friendly relations between all the countries of the Western Hemisphere and to removing such causes of friction as may exist between them. If conditions in the Caribbean can be stabilized, one of the greatest hindrances to the growth of good feeling between the United States on the one hand and the Latin American republics on the other will have been removed. Perhaps the co-operation of the more stable countries of South America may be enlisted in the effort to solve some of these problems, as was done by President Wilson in his difficulties with Mexico. Certainly the United States should not show itself unwilling to submit the justice of its case with a weaker country to the decision of arbitration.

The foundation of American foreign policies in the past has been self-interest, but the adoption of most of these policies by an unwilling and skeptical world has proved that their authors were far-sighted statesmen, who were content to seek a permanent benefit rather than a temporary advantage. Secretary Root expressed the purposes underlying American policy in an address delivered before the Third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro on 31 July, 1906: "We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations equal to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and deem the

observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every other American republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together."