

SUBJECT NUMBER 8.

CAUSES OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR, AND THE NAVAL AND
COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC, INCLUDING THE
TRANSFER OF THE OREGON.

SUBMITTED BY

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State after state had torn itself away from Spain, so that in 1898, all that remained of that once world circling empire was the Phillipines and the Antilles. It was not so much a process of dismemberment as it was of disintegration. The Spaniard had slowly fallen away from the high places of the day of Charles the 5th when Spanish troops were accredited to "the best ~~infantry~~ infantry in Europe". He retained his pride and deep seated fiery valor, but events had passed him by.

Our infancy was accomplished under the shadow of Spanish ~~dis~~ disapproval, and our lusty growth always had against it the waning power of Spain. That despotism was apprehensive of freedom of the press and of speech, of equality of opportunity, and of religious tolerance. In fact these ideas did spread vigorously Southward, attacking the old time notions of Church and State. Soon as Spain had feared, thinking resolved itself into action. Her colonies flamed in revolt along a continental battle front. For over half a century she struggled feebly and ~~impotently~~ with growing impotence in a losing fight.

Though weak she was none the less vicious, and the bitterness of her resentment was chiefly directed at ourselves. Our government and people were keenly interested and deeply sympathetic with the revolutionists. Neutrality though perfect on paper was not strictly enforced even as to materiel. Many individuals filibusted ^{or} money, guns and supplies to the South Americans. As to words, printed and spoken, there was no pretense of impartiality. The press cheered each victory of the colonists, congressional speeches and even presidential messages ~~encouraged~~ encouraged them. So little restraint was imposed ~~that~~ that Spain more than once protested diplomatically. Again here it was ideas that she fought and feared.

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Her opposition took many forms. Much as she hated England, ^{and at war with her at the time} a ~~traditional enemy~~, yet during the Revolutionary War, her support morally, and by intrigue among the councils of Europe went to that country. A bit later, preceding and during the hysteria, occasioned by Aaron Burr's fantastic ~~shaming~~ scheming, that monumental fat fraud, General Wilkinson was her paid spy and agent. Also, he was ⁶ general in ^C chief the American armies. Her object here was the lopping off of Louisiana. Wilkinson's imaginative word pictures as to Burr's objective and resources, deceived both Jefferson and the Spanish minister. He got money from both?

With some reason Spain was suspected of stirring up the Seminole rebellion. At any rate, Andrew Jackson addressed to her through diplomats some very undiplomatic language.

During the period from 1836 to 1848 she more than once approached the Texans with fair words and promises. As far as she dared she aided the South during the Civil War. So these two ~~nations~~ nations, antagonistic in principles and form of government, in religious attitude, in race, customs and habits of people, slowly approached inevitable conflict.]

These were the fundamental cause of war, though the immediate irritation was the economic clash in Cuba and intense sympathy for the reconcentrados. Further Spain's animosity was heightened by the natural jealousy and envy of the aged, decrepit, and decadent toward vigorous growing youth.

Immediately after Lee's surrender, the United States, released from the tense absorption of Civil War, turned her attention to foreign affairs, to Mexico and to Cuba. In the later country, recurrent revolt had broken out.

For thirtyfive years immediately prior to the Civil War the United States had been the guarantee of Cuba to Spain. This was a peculiar twist to the situation in view of the underlying animosity between the ~~Two~~ countries. When the recently liberated republics of Mexico and of Central and South America organized a joint military expedition to wrest Cuba from Spain our ~~country~~ interposed her veto. The reason was that the leaders of the southern states could not regard with complacence free negroes in territory to all effects adjoining. Much sounder governmental policies led us to effectively checkmate both France and England in their frequent attempts to annex Cuba. Spain as well as both France and England were emphatically told more than once that we would not tolerate the transfer of either of the Antilles to any other power. Spain owed both France and England great sums of money and was not even meeting interest payments. A secret treaty between those two countries had as its object the sale of the islands ~~to the~~ in cancellation. This secret agreement was really the occasion for the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine. Both England and France were consistently in opposition to our attempts to acquire Cuba. These efforts of ours grew weaker as the conflict between free soillers and slavery men grew in force and intensity. At no time after 1840 would the senate have approved such an extension of slave territory, even if the acquiescence of Spain and other European powers had been obtained. So conflict and jeakousy as between two great parties within the United States, and jealousy without between the United States England and France insured Spanish retention of Cuba. She was the weakest and therefore the safest for all concerned to hold the Islands.

For a period long before the close of our civil war Spain herself was in chaos. Revolt and insurrection ravaged the Peninsula. All guarantees of liberty, of order, of property had disappeared. Government was by decree enforced by the bayonet wherever the governments bayonets were effective. The government itself changed hands over night, from reactionary to republican, from Carlist to absolute monarchy.

In view of her distracted condition it is extraordinary that her governments of whatever color held with such singular persistence to her despotism in Cuba. No matter what the preoccupations of her citizens were in killing each other in Spain they could always spare the men and the money to kill Cubans.

All trade with Cuba went through Spain. American Flour was relayed to Cuba through Spain, Cuban sugar followed the same trail back. Taxes were raised arbitrarily, imposed without notice, collected in advance and often were made confiscatory for the sole purpose of immediate confiscation. Under pretense of law Cuba was robbed and plundered without mercy. No Cuban could hold office, none had a voice in the affairs of their country.

Protests were made without number. In one case a petition carried the signatures of 24,000 native born of Spanish blood. These protests were met by half promises, evasions, interminable trifling pretexts for delay. Sometimes edicts came forth from Spain making changes in form only, never whole-heartedly, and always with a damning phrase retaining suzerainty in the Peninsula. Never has history afforded an example of such cruel and damnable stupidity as characterized Spain's rule in Cuba during the last half of the nineteenth century.

Desperate and without hope pure blooded Castilians raised the standards of rebellion throughout Cuba in October 1868

From the beginning the struggle was characterised by an inhuman ferocity initiated by the Count of Valmaseda in the following proclamation:-

1st. Every man from the age of fifteen years upward found away from his habitation, and who does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot.

2nd. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by troops.

3rd. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its inhabitants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.

Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their relatives, will collect on the town of Jig-uano or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly.

.....
Captain General

The Spanish placed the conflict beyond international law by this decree:

Vessels which may be captured in Spanish waters or on the high seas near to the Island, having on board men, arms, and munitions, or effects that can in any manner contribute, promote, or foment the insurrection in this province, whatsoever their derivation or destination, after examination of their papers and register shall be de facto considered as enemies of the integrity of our territory, and treated as pirates, in accordance with the ordinances of the navy. All persons captured in such vessels without regard to their number shall be immediately executed.

Both of these decrees authorized and instituted acts contrary to treaty rights of the United States. Both were immediately protested in strong terms by the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish. The latter he objected to under the common understanding of international law and under the specific terms of the treaty of 1795, and to the former, in addition, in the interest of civilization and humanity. He demanded that no

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person having the right to claim the protection of the United States "shall be sacrificed or injured in the conduct of hostilities on this basis." These protests were handled in the usual dilatory fashion and their actual revocation occurred too late for two humble Americans.

In June 1869 two Americans were summarily shot at Santiago. One Albert Wyeth of Pennsylvania, was a passenger seeking health in Jamaica, the other Charles Speakman had shipped in good faith aboard the schooner Grapeshot, ostensibly bound for Jamaica for Falmouth. However Cubans seized the schooner in the lower bay of New York and forcing the Americans to accompany them landed in Cuba. The small force was defeated by the Spaniards and the Americans captured. Both were shot with a mere semblance of a trial and despite the protests of the American consul. Rear Admiral Hoff, C-in-C of the American forces in the West Indies, himself investigated. He reported, "These men were cruelly murdered." Our minister at Madrid was instructed to demand full reparation.

About this time Marshall Prim became the head of the council of state, the one Spanish statesman of judgment and discretion for many years. Reparation was granted and generous consideration given to the offer of good offices of the United States to settle affairs in Cuba. This offer was initiated by President Grant whose sympathies were strongly with the Cubans. It contained provision for the declaration of an amnesty, the ~~xxxx~~ cessation of hostilities, a plebiscite on the question of independence, and if voted the Cubans to buy their independence the purchase price being underwritten by the United States. England supported this proposal which was very near to success. However, during Prim's temporary absence the terms thereof were prematurely published in such a manner as to sting the sensitive honor of the Spanish people. Negotiations were off for the time and before public opinion would permit its reopening Prim was assassinated.

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Things dragged along after this with savagery in Cuba, incompetence in Spain and growing irritation in the United States. Our government had much to complain of due generally to the reckless highhandedness of Cuban officials of the Spanish crown. Spain on her part wrote frequent protests in regard to the activities of Cuban juntas in this country.

These did flagrantly and successfully evade the neutrality proclamation, or rather the non-filibustering proclamation of President Grant. In spite of the unremitting watchfulness of our government which employed on patrol duty the greater part of the navy, bold soldiers of fortune, raw recruits lured by adventure, money, munitions and supplies dribbled continually into Cuba from sources in this country.

The major among these incidents was the matter of the steamship "Virginus". The Virginus, originally built to run the Southern blockade, continued in her devious and shady ways after her capture in Mobile and sale by the Federals. Sold once and taken back for debt, she was sold again in 1870 to one Patterson of New York. Though Patterson registered himself as the true and only owner yet a party of Cuban revolutionists were the real owners. She cleared from New York for Curacao in October 1870, but within four miles of Sandy Hook she was boarded by a party of Cubans. From an American schooner off Curacao she took on an armament of field pieces, small arms and ammunition. Her career thereafter was a wandering about southern seas in various enterprises hostile to Spain.

Her status became a vexatious question to officials of our state department because Venezuela and Colombia had recognized Cuban belligerency. Spain frequently and strongly demanded of these countries the forcible detention of the Virginus. However, the United States had not recognized Cuban belligerency and since the Virginus flew our flag and her papers were perfectly regular the United States representatives successfully combated these demands. Technical

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our stand was correct, though morally weak, since the activities of the *Virginus* were notoriously offensive to Spain. The ship's life was crammed with incident and action.

In July, 1873, the *Virginus* lay at Colon where also were at anchor the U.S. man of war *Kansas*, and the Spanish Steamship *Pizarro*. The Spanish Captain had declared his intention of taking the *Virginus* as soon as she should put to sea. Commander White of the *Kansas* having been informed by the American Consul that her papers were regular, determined to protect her. Accordingly, cleared for action, the *Kansas* accompanied her until the *Virginus* clearly proved that she had the heels of the *Pizarro*.

In time this interesting ship was now approaching her final tragic exploit. In October Captain Fry, a former officer of some note in the United States, and then in the Confederate Navy assumed command of her. On October 30, 1873/ he put forth from Hayti with a crew of fifty-two and with one hundred and three passengers most of whom were Cubans. Twenty-six of the crew were British, one was French, the rest American. Twelve Englishmen were among the passengers. The ship had aboard hundreds of rifles, a large number of revolvers, and a quantity of ammunition, medicines and provisions.

A few miles off Cuba she was sighted by the *Tornado* which gave prompt chase. After a seven hour run she was taken eighteen miles from Morant Bay Jamaica. She was carried into Santiago on November, 1.

A summary court martial was convened the next day. Speed, here, in contrast to usual Spanish lethargy. On November the 4th, an Englishman Ryan, and three Cubans were shot as pirates. On the 7th, with circumstances of skilled barbarity Fry with thirty-six, others were executed, and on the 8th twelve more, a total of fifty-three, despite vigorous protests from both the British and the American Consuls, and in reckless disregard of the specific treaty rights of the

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United States guaranteeing fair trial and counsel.

To the protests of our Consul a long delay in answering was ~~excused~~ excused in the following insulting terms, "to important and ~~peremptory~~ peremptory affairs to which I had to devote myself exclusively; further the past two days were holidays, upon which the officials do not come to their offices, being engaged as every one else in the meditation of the Divine mysteries of All Saints' Day".

General Burriel was equally insolent to the British Captain Lorraine of the Niobe saying, "I am not in the habit of being overawed by anyone, and I will not take notice of ~~any~~ any petition....."

Nor was the dignity of France any more gently handled.

The haughtiness of this official very nearly brought on war. The cables were immediately hot and there was a touch of steel in the tenor of the American notes. The Spanish government was slow to realize this. ~~No~~ No other incident more sharply illustrated the differences in national characteristics and temperament. The Spanish government, people and press ~~ensured~~ ensured for centuries to killing, burning, and torture could see no great importance in the execution of a few men more or less in arms against Spain. The legal status of the Virginus was to them the crux of the matter, while to the American people the murder of fellow citizens ~~was~~ overshadowed all else.

At this time ~~republicans~~ republicans controlled at Madrid and were fighting the royalists by sea and land. Also and most remarkably under such circumstances one hundred thousand troops made war in Cuba. How peculiar that the forces in Cuba should have always proved loyal to the faction holding Madrid! Those who for the moment spoke for Spain dreaded a foreign war and had no intention of bringing on one. Their expression of regrets ~~over~~ over the Virginus were sincere even though such may have been solely due to fear of consequences.

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However, they failed to realize the immediate resolution of the American mind. Delay was proffered here, a trivial obstacle there, the usual, Fabian policy dilatory to the completion of any subject whatever were fully employed. This attitude was rudely shocked, when on November the tenth, Minister Sickles presented a twelve day ultimatum, calling for apology, financial reparation, punishment to the guilty and a salute to the flag. Then and then only did Spain understand that the United States meant War, and instant war.

Negotiations were transferred to Washington where Admiral Polo de Bernabe was granted full powers with definite orders to maintain peace. A conclusion satisfactory to the United States was reached on November 29. Punishment of those responsible was promised, though it does not appear that General Burriel was ever brought to trial. Discussions over The Virginus were finished in twenty-nine days, a speed record for Spanish diplomats.

The Virginus brought her adventurous career to a fitting close when she foundered off Hatterass enroute to the jurisdiction of the United States.

In April, 1874, Secretary Fish despatched a final note on the subject, denying to Spain damages incident to the activities of the Virginus, and closing with a paragraph of warning which Spain might well have heeded.

Other wrongs pressed for solution. The Cuban Juntas were busy fomenting public opinion and organizing filibustering expeditions. Americans who held property in Cuba threw the weight of their influence toward intervention. President Grant had lost patience and was convinced of Spanish inability to win the victory. The House of Representatives actually passed a recognition of the insurgents. Mr. Secretary Fish had his hands full to so conduct affairs that blame should not attach to this country. Grant had at one time written a message asking for intervention.

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Fish himself thought that this government should and ~~must~~ must eventually take action. But he wanted to prepare, solidify and clarify ~~the~~ European public opinion against Spain. He also realized that a overwhelming preponderance of proof lay on the United States. The old time powers did not relish the appearance in world affairs of the parvenu Republic whose vast strength they grudgingly admitted amongst themselves. In the great civil struggle which so lavishly displayed that strength two of those powers were hostile to the United States.

Accordingly a rather famous public document known as number 266. This was in truth a magnificent ~~Public~~ state paper and stamps Mr. Fish as a great statesman.

recited

The Secretary of State all matters that had transpired between Spain and the United States since the initiation of the ten years war. He arranged in chronological order, incident, protest, delay and final result. The cruelty of the Spaniard, his maltreatment of American nationals, his cynical disregard of international law as evidenced by his officials in Cuba, his insolent indifference to remonstrance, his vexatious quibbling and irritating evasions, his grudging and dilatory apologies, were inexorably demonstrated step by step. It was a powerful and damning arraignment, couched in cold, unimpassioned language. Despite the fact that the instrument itself was in effect a charge and a challenge its manner was not minatory or provocative. On the contrary it was most friendly.

Among other things Mr. Fish said, "I referred to the arbitrary action of the authorities, by which the property of American citizens had been seized in violation of treaty provisions in absence of judicial proceedings, without hearing,....." "The authorities of Spain in Cuba, during all this time, have been and are using the revenues of the confiscated or embargoed estates, appropriating much of the property itself, in some cases executing long

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leases, or actually making sales....."

"In the cases of arrest and punishment, citizens of the United States, in like manner, have undergone punishment because the authorities of Spain do not meet the issue and decide the question."

In re the Virginus, "The higher and more imperative duty....., namely to bring to justice General Burriel and other principal offenders in this tragedy has been entirely neglected."

"No effective step have been taken to establish reform or remedy abuses....." "Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Spain has rejected all suggestions of reform or offers of mediation made by this government,..... the difficulty of the situation becomes increased.".....
".... and compels us to inquire whether the point has not been reached where longer endurance ceases to be possible."

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Moreover, apart from these particular questions, in the opinion of the President the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preservation of its commerce and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba."

"The United States feels entitled to be relieved of this strain."

".....are causes of annoyance and of injury to the United States, which a people cannot be expected to tolerate without the assured prospect of their termination."

The indictment goes on, friendly pleadings that Spain correct the situation, interspersed with decided threats though regretfully stated.

At the end this:-

" The President hopes that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation and to the speedy restoration of peace and the organization of a stable

and satisfactory system of government in the Island of Cuba
 No government is more deeply interested in the order
 and peaceful administration in this island than is that of
 the United States, and none has suffered as has the United
 States from the condition that has obtained there during
 the past six or seven years. He will therefore feel it his
 at an early day
 duty to submit the subject in this light and accompanied
 by an expression of the views above presented for the con-
 sideration of the Congress." "This conclusion is reached wi
 with reluctance and regret."

This paper was sent to Spain and to all the chancellor
 ies of Europe. Its reception outside of Spain was not per x
 se favorable. The moderation of its terms, did not lessen
 the resolution, however reluctant, with which cold steel was
 bared. Its substance if not ~~ixt~~ its tone was to close akin
 to that which the great powers themselves were accustomed t
 to direct toward weaker nations. Further it had
 behind it the weight of hundreds of thousands of veteran
 soldiers still of fighting age. These gave to it the whip-
 crack of authority. As Mr. Hughes once said in confidence,
 "When statesmen speak, they say it with battleships, not
 with roses."

However this note in transit crossed a communication
 from the Spanish Government which gave way to this country
 in all disputed points. Due to the personal friendship of
 Mr Cushing, our minister to Spain, with the Spanish Premier
 he was enabled to present 266 to the Spanish Government in
 such way that the sensitive honor of the Spaniard was un-
 -touched.

Much space has been given Public Number 266, for the x
 reason that it became a fundamental classic in the diplomat-
 -ic correspondence between the two countries. Both Grant and
 McKinley quoted from it. Passages and ^{facts} ~~facts~~ therefrom appear
 ed frequently in the interchanges between the two countries
 until their common troubles were settled in 1898.

The proposals from Spain contained in the communication referred to had a calming effect on President Grant. He consigned to the waste basket a message already signed calling for recognition of ~~Belligerency~~, an^d intimating if not recommending eventual intervention. Instead his annual message to the Congress, said, in regard to recognition of belligerency, that step to be, "unwise and premature", and "at present indefensible as a matter of ~~wright~~ right." He said, "Each party seems to be quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment. Under the circumstances the agency of others either by mediation or intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must, sooner~~k~~ or later, be invoked for the termination of the strife. At the same time while thus impressed, I do not at this time, recommend the adoption of any measure of intervention. And have performed our whole duty and all international obligations to Spain with friendship, fairness, and fidelity, and with a spirit of patience and forbearance which negatives every possible suggestion of desire to interfere or to add to the difficulties with which she has been surrounded." The date of this message was Dec. 7, 1875.

It took away the last hope of the Cuban revolutionists and encouraged Spain to greater effort. The last of the Cuban patriots surrendered in the winter of '75 and '78. So a Spanish peace was again spread over Cuba/
began

From this time until events leading to the finale in '98, desultory bickering on-ly occupied the statesman of United States and Spain. Trades disputes principally, though a U.S. merchant vessel was denied clearance because the purser on board had written unkindly of the Captain General and Spain filed complaints generally unfounded of filibustering activities.

In Cuba things were not bettered. To the Cubans, the Spanish Government was good at promises, long on evasion and de

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lay, and nil in performance. In despair Cubans throughout the world instituted liberty clubs, contributing a tenth of their earnings to a revolutionary fund. By 1895 this fund amounted to over a million dollars, and the Cubans themselves ~~were~~ ^{were} ready for the last throw of the dice.

For the last time Spain failed in her promises when she passed the sham autonomy law sponsored by Senor Abarzuza. Ten days later February 24, 1895, revolt broke out.

The potency of the movement was appreciated in Spain. Its leadership as well as the rank and file of its supporters were representative of the best in Cuba. There were ~~knack~~ brains in it, money behind it, joined with formidable determination.

Campos, the ablest general and sole statesman in Spain with wide powers and unlimite credit, was appointed Captain General. Thousands of troops were despatched to reinforce the garrison of thirteen thousand men. The war was joined with unequalled ferocity and destructiveness. Campos was out of place. He would not initiate or permit a war of extermination. His attitude toward the rebels was humane, even sympathetic. He always bent his efforts toward reconciliation by endeavoring to establish a more considerate and liberal government. Such efforts were nullified by the strong and vicious Peninsular party in Cuba.

Defeated in the field, out of favor with Spaniards in Cuba and in Spain, Campos gave up his office in January 1896. This fine man was received in Spain with coldness and studied insult. His suggestion that autonomy be granted the Cubans was branded an "insult" to the Spanish people. So that people ^{on} blindly and stupidly went to their humiliation.

His successor was the notorious Weyler, bad enough, it is true but not the monster he was painted in the lurid days of '97 and '98. Nevertheless he ^{was cognizant} was consent of, and harmonious with, Spanish character, and with the spirit of his orders. Those were to wreck and kill. His new determination

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-ion of ruthless war was speedily manifested.

On February the 16 he issued three proclamations. The first was the fearful reconcentrado order. The second delegated to certain commanders despotic powers, even that of life and death in designated cases. The third arbitrarily brought within the purview of military courts neutrals who in any way or by any means opposed or ~~even~~ criticized Spain. This in direct contravention of the law of nations and the specific treaty rights of the United States.

Instances of violations of the security of American nationals under the third general decree began at once and multiplied. Hand in hand with this was the insolent high-handedness of the Spanish military.

It was soon clear that public temper in the United States was such that provocation would not be long endured. Its people sensed their power, and the feeling grew that the archaic and outmoded Spanish system that had so long and stubbornly opposed them in California, in Texas, in Louisiana in Florida, in fact wherever there was contact, should be brought to a final accounting and a final farewell from the western hemisphere. The jingo press raved. W. R. Hearst has claimed the credit for bringing on the war. At any rate, the tide of opinion set against Spain.

Congress, too, was most undignified. Incendiary speeches became the fashion. Spain was showered with insult, invective and threat. Invocations to international law disclosed a painful ignorance of that subject. There was little for the American people in the conduct and utterance of that co-equal arm of their government which compelled only that measure of respect due the brutal force behind it. However, the executive was considerate and moderate, though firm. Resolutions calling for recognition, for intervention, for buying the Island, endorsing Cuba, condemning Spain, were discussed and voted on in both the House and the Senate. Senator Hale of Maine seems to have been a tower of good sense

amid a flood of loose violent talk.

The Spanish people and press reacted in a most natural manner to the assaults on Spain. The press demanded war against the American pigs. Americans were mobbed in Madrid and the consulate was attacked in Barcelona. These acts were promptly repudiated and punished by the Spanish Government.

That international relations were peculiar and so acknowledged by the American Government was shown when it failed to protest the entry of the Spanish ambassador into print. Senor Depuy de Lome published two strong and excellently presented articles in the New York Herald, that paper being one of the few that were not sensationally opposed to Spain. Senor Canovas also cabled to the New York World a very able statement of Spain's position. These declarations of Policy and purpose by these two diplomats were creditable to the vexed and harried Spanish government. Nevertheless, a concurrent resolution of great importance did eventually pass both houses.

~~It is directed that the President request Spain to grant Cuba~~
~~the independence of her government and that the United States~~
~~Spain shall recognize the independence of Cuba~~
~~the right of her power to her self government then the President~~

This resolution read, "That the friendly offices of the United States should be offered by the President to Spain for the recognition of the independence of Cuba."

This was not directive in its language. The President could act on it or not as he saw fit. Its importance lay in the fact that it was an accurate reflection of public sentiment in the United States. This President Cleveland recognized and accordingly despatched to the Spanish government a masterly document on the subject of intervention

In transmitting this note to his government Senor de Lome said, "When one considers the numerous resolutions of the two houses of congress, the popular agitation, the tide of public opinion, superficial but widespread, which

which has been inspired against Spain by our enemies, the attitude of the press and what it has been asking and is asking today-nay more, what has been demanded and is demand ed even now of the President of the Republic-we can do no less than admire the high qualities of rectitude and honor, the fearlessness and the respect toward ~~the~~ legitimate right rights of Spain shown in this note addressed by thi ~~s~~ gov- ernment throu^gh me to the government of ~~his~~ his Majesty." Nox higher praise could be rendered.

Secretary Olney's note proffered the good offices of the United States in most courteous terms. It urged Spain to immediately declare an armistice as the f^{ir}st step toward complete autonomy. It offered to underwrite a purchase price to be eventually paid by the Cubans. This very frendly communication held only one note of threat; that was the urgent desire of the President fo^r the prompt and perma- nent pacification of Cuba.

Favorable as was the impression created in Spain by these proposals, stubborn and foolish Spanish pride pre- vented their acceptance until the Cuban insurgents ^{should} had ^{have} been defeated in the field. A contingency not likely. The Spanish rejection was received gravely by Mr. Olney. Going further than diplomatic usage permits, he verbally warhed Senor De Lome, of the danger surely inherent in the in- coming and changing administration, he added, "that the situation here and in Cuba must be bettered". Mr Olney as surely foresaw war as the student in looking backward may see that it had become inevitable.

The Cleveland administration as well as the administra- tion of Grant was both strong and firm, both singularly free from the influence ofx popular outcry, and both frend- ly to Spain and determined on peace until forced to fight. If during the ten years war, or during that part of the second insurrection covered by the Cleveland administration either President had refered Cuban matters to Congress war would have resulted. It is a question whether it would not h

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have been better for the United States, Spain and Cuba if Grant had forced the issue.

The last days of the Cleveland administration was filled with correspondence relative to the violation of the rights of American citizens. The case of the ~~the~~ "Competitor", a parallel to the "Virginus", became almost crucial, though the crew of the "Competitor" was just saved the fate of that of the "Virginus" by the timely action of the Madrid government.

The Complexion of the government changed when McKinley was inaugurated and Sherman made Secretary of State. Sherman had been one of the most violent accusers of Spain ~~while~~ while in the Senate. The interchange of notes continued of course but ~~it~~ now became on the part of Mr Sherman a bit blustering and less well grounded.

Mr. McKinley's first message wherein the major subject was Cuba was an unusual effort. He recited in rather lurid style the charges against Weyler and Spanish conduct in Cuba, he depicted effectively the wrongs of American citizens involved in the island and vividly described and strongly deplored the fate of the reconcentrados. He intimat-
-ed that matters must change for the better and the ~~the~~ United States should change them. He then proceeded to quote from MR. Fish and President Grant and weakly arrived at the conclusion despite the arraigning preamble that he would not for the present make other recommendation than the maintenance of the status quo. This disappointed the Cubans and their adherents in Congress. It angered the Spanish minister into an expression of his opinion, not complimentary, of Mr. McKinley. While this was done in confidence in a letter to a friend, none-the-less the enterprising and yellow New York Journal intercepted it by fraud. Its publication forced Senor de Lome to take his departure.

The impact of menacing events felled the conservative cabinet in Spain, and a Liberal, Sagasta, took the controls in October, 1927. One of his first acts was to relieve the monstrously advertised Weyler by appointment of General Blanco, October 31. General Blanco was a good man and gentle, but not strong enough to ride the whirlwind.

The condition of the reconcentrados, and indeed of all Cubans was most deplorable. Funds for their relief were freely contributed by sympathetic Americans. Clara Barton, "the lady president of the Red Cross" was admitted into Cuba by the Spanish authorities, to administer the funds. Fifty thousand dollars was voted by Congress for the needs of ruined Americans. Riots broke out in Havana directed against Americans and also to some extent against the Blanco regime.

Consul General Lee asked for naval support which was later furnished under guise of a friendly visit.

The Spanish government was now ready to do most anything to avert the impending catastrophe, but the time for peace had past. The proved and tried dilatory tactics of her diplomats could not even slow down the swift march of war.

On February the 15th, at 9:40 P.M. the Maine blew up or was blown up in Havana Harbor. At Lee's request she had been there three weeks. Excitement was intense in the United States. The President could have instantly gone to war with the whole country a unit behind him. At any rate war was from that moment inevitable. The correspondence anent the disaster was voluminous but of necessity futile.

A few days later Congress voted without restriction to President fifty millions of dollars for the national defense. To impoverished Spain this was well nigh incredible, and brought home to the man in the street the resolute purpose of America, a purpose already known but not admitted by the Spanish ministry.

Photo of Maine

A last minute proposal to purchase Cuba went by the board. The President prepared his war message. In a hurry the Queen by proclamation, granted all demands of the United States. This edict reached Washington two days before Mr. McKinley transmitted his message to the Congress. Except for the addition of three short paragraphs it occasioned no change in the sense or wording of the message. No, apparently did it occasion any special comment in Congress.

In response to the President's recommendations Congress passed that resolution which on signature by the President became in itself an act of war.

The resolution reads:-

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

This was signed by the President at 11:24 A.M. of April 20th

CHAPTER II.

NAVAL AND COMBINED OPERATIONS
IN THE ATLANTIC.

The organization of the Navy Department was not suited for war. The Bureaus composed independent principalities whose sole coordinating authority was a civilian Secretary. This country was fortunate in that the Secretary of the Navy was a forceful and energetic man.

Insert Photo page II7, Vol. I. The New American Navy.

John D. Long was appointed Secretary only a few months prior to the outbreak of war. As early as December 1897, he was warning distant commanders of the probability of conflict. In January 1898, he began a systematic concentration of naval forces. Also, he felt strongly the need of independent advice from a disinterested professional source on war at sea. ~~xxxxxxx~~ This source should he thought be from administration and its burdens. Accordingly he instituted the war board, the first progenitor of the general board and the Office of Naval Operations.

Its membership was composed of Rear Admiral Crowhinsshield, chief of the powerful bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Sicard, until recently in command of the Atlantic Fleet, and the famous Captain Mahan. Captain Mahan's skilled hand may be detected in some of the decisions of the Navy Department.

(Insert here pictures of these three gentlemen over the legend; The War Board, Progenitor of the General Board and of the Office of naval operations.)

The Secretary and this board considered several plans of war.

Punitive raids on the coast towns of the Peninsula and nearby islands were rejected, because unless such raids were backed by a large expeditionary army, a measure not feasible

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ they could not be in any sense decisive and European opinion, already hostile, would hold them merely wanton destruction of life and property. Purely defensive dispositions were also considered because the political strength of the Atlantic seaboard demanded them. The terrorized people on the Coast did succeed in forcing certain placings of valuable fighting vessels. In not giving way further Mr. Long displayed considerable courage.

It was finally and correctly decided to exert all available naval pressure on Cuba. The control of that Island was our announced purpose for going to war as the retention thereof was Spain's. If that island were seized or even threatened seriously, in all logic the Spanish fleet must put forth to protect it. To do that it must sail into the guns of the American fleet. That it did. The success which attended the decision of the naval command must be held to prove a proper application of the Principles of War.

Public anxiety and pressure from politicians compelled a division of sea strength, which occasioned some misgiving. For though the Navy Department had received accurate reports as to disorganization and inefficient personnel and Materiel in the Spanish fleet it could not in safety give them complete credence. Until actually proved ~~ixxm~~ otherwise it must credit Spain with her paper strength.

The main force of the fleet under Sampson lay at Key West.

In response to public demand a squadron for the defense of the east coast under Schley was formed at Hampton Roads. With a happy genius for propaganda this force was called the ~~fly~~ "flying Squadron", though it contained the Massachusetts and the Texas. The Brooklyn, Minneapolis, and Columbia completed this idle and immobile detachment.

A weaker squadron composed of the San Francisco, the Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, and Yosemite formed the Northern Patrol and guarded the coast to the northward.

As to combined operations there was little to say at this time. The Army had no plans, or if so, they were for x the moment overwhelmed in the urgent crush to raise and equip an army. True it was understood that the War Department was preparing for the invasion of Cuba but just when or how was unknown. A force was being formed at Key West as a sort of quick liaison force with the Cuban insurgents. Orders were even prepared for an enterprise of this kind which directed a quick landing, a quick contact and a quick get away. This particular order in common with most issued around that date had the several "bucks" all ready for passing.

The Navy blessed with a force in the field which for the time protected the Department from the strain of war was ready. In the early morning of April 22nd, Sampson x sailed from Key West to establish a blockade from Cardenas to Cienfeugos.

The blockade was established, and held, a very creditable performance considering the capabilities of the vessels x involved.

Navy men proved themselves good sportsmen. They were x eager, daring, full of the spirit of adventure. Cable cutting and the baiting of shore batteries alleviated the monotony of blockade duty, even as rumors of the approach of the terrible Spanish fleet furnished pleasurable excitement.

All this time the Spanish forces at sea were having x their troubles. Cervera, a fine old sea-dog commanded afloat.

(Insert here a photo of Cervera, page 225 Vol. I. The New American Navy.)

As early as December he had urged the recruitment of his crews and the overhaul and supply of his vessels. He called the Viscaya a "boil in the fleet". By character he was ill adapted as the leader of a forlorn hope. He was a defeatist like Villeneuve.

and

His tendency was to magnify his own defects, the prowess of the enemy. He was licked before he started.

The Spanish minister of Colonies was a queer fellow. Cervera and his Captains in conference assembled requested revocation of their orders, stating that the execution thereof meant the loss of their vessels. The minister made no reply for the time but remarked to his associates,

"When two or three of them are sunk the war will be over."

Villamil, in command of the destroyers, telegraphed that he and his crews were being sent to their death. Senor Morret telegraphed back in English, "God bless you."

The orders to this squadron were to "destroy Key West and blockade the coast of the United States." Nothing whatever in the way of supplies and men that Cervera requested was granted him. In the meanwhile a board of Admirals at Madrid decided that a daring, even foolhardy, offensive was a proper role for a weaker force. The tale of deficiencies told by Cervera before his departure was heartrending. His strength at St. Vincent consisted of the Viscaya, the Oquendo, the Infanta Maria Teresa, the Cristobal Colon, and the destroyers Furor, Terror and Pluton.

In the meanwhile Admiral Sampson was all for striking a quick powerful blow. He requested permission to attack Havana, and made out a good case. Doubtless in light of present knowledge he would have been successful. It even appears that he made a nearer estimate of Spanish power than his contemporaries, though this view is weakened by his desire that the two battle ships of the Flying Squadron reinforce him when he explored San Juan for the enemy fleet. With the true Mahan touch this enterprise was denied him until "formidable Spanish men of war were disposed of."

ie. attacking Havana

The idea occurred to Mr. Long to establish a reliable system of espionage. Accordingly, two young Ensigns equipped, outfitted, and credentialed as Englishmen were ordered to Spain to shadow the Spanish squadrons. These two boys rampaged around the Peninsula the Mediterranean, and the West Indies generally keeping the enemy in sight and cabling information which always proved correct.

From one of these the Department was apprised of the departure of the Spanish fleet from the Cape Verde Islands. This was on April the 29th. Sampson estimated his destination as San Juan.

Primarily this was Cervera's objective but obstacles intervened.

In accordance with his estimate Sampson sailed for San Juan. He vastly overated the enemy's speed. He had thought that the Spaniards would make that port on April 9 or 9, and it was his endeavor to be off that port on the 8th. The slowness of the monitors prevented. On the 11th he sighted the harbor of San Juan but found no enemy men of war. In fact while he bombarded, Cervera ~~was~~ was at Martinique. In the bombardment Sampson fired over a thousand rounds of ammunition, a rather generous expenditure in view of the proximity of the enemy fleet.

Thirty six hours after its appearance, the Department was informed of the presence of the Spanish fleet at Martinique. Schley was ordered to Charleston, and Sampson then returning from Puerto Rico was notified by cable and scout. On April ¹⁵ Admiral Sampson arrived at Puerto Plata, San Domingo, from which port he informed the Department of newspaper information to the effect that Cervera had returned to Spain. He requested authority to return and capture San Juan. In reply he was given the good news that the enemy were at Curacao, and was ordered to Key West. Schley was also ordered to concentrate ~~xxxxxx~~ there.

The Spanish fleet was desperate. Its neutrel colliers ~~h~~ had failed it at Martinique and again at Curacao. Capt. Concas, chief of staff, made a real war college estimate of the situation.

Coal could be obtained at Willemstad but only in sufficient quantity to reach ~~ax~~ Cuban port. Return to the Peninsula was not possible. San Juan was impracticable for it could be readily captured. Havana was a real refuge, so he thought, but ~~xxx~~ there he expected to find our strongest force and that ~~xxx~~ port as well as Cienfuegos was uncomfortably close to the American base. Also, Cienfuegos was a harbor readily blocked, a "death trap." Santiago second capital of the Island securely fortified and garrisoned, and presumably supplied was chosen. ~~Santiago was chosen.~~

Our scouts were now kept quite busy, orders and counter orders kept the Yale, Harvard, Minneapolis and St. Paul constantly on the go. But the enemy evaded them all, without conscious effort. "By a miracle", said Capt. Concas, "The squadron entered Santiago, intact, at dawn April 19."

Both Admiral Sampson and the war board estimated the probable destination of the enemy as Havana or Cienfuegos

The reasons pointing to Havana are obvious. Rail connection between Cienfuegos and ~~Manik~~ Havana indicated the former. So it was determined to ~~S~~ send Schley reinforced by the Iowa to Cienfuegos for reconnaissance in force while Sampson with the New York, Indiana and the monitors guarded the Bahama and St. Nicolas channels. However, the chief of the military secret service, received from Havana a despatch to the effect that the Spanish squadron was probably in Santiago.

Schley was directed to proceed with all despatch to Cienfuegos and to ascertain at the earliest possible whether or not the enemy was in that harbor.

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Here began one of the bitterest controversies that ever disrupted the Navy. Though his orders were urgent, Schley ~~xxx~~dillied and dallied to Cienfuegos.

(Insert here Photo of Schley, Page 255 Vol. I. The New American Navy.)

Once there, he lacked enterprise in obtaining information. On the 22nd the Iowa joined him off that port bearing orders from Sampson to leave one small vessel at Cienfuegos and proceed to Santiago. However Schley held to his theory that Cervera was in the harbor. Nor did he give over until Commander McCalla by communicating with the insurgents established the fact that there were no men of war in the port. This was on the afternoon of the 24.

In despatches announcing this information Commodore Schley stated his intention to sail for Santiago on the morrow. However, he did proceed at 7:45 P.M. Even then he procrastinated, delayed, drifted, complained of lack of coal and the difficulty of coaling. He announced to the Department his intention of returning to Key West to coal and actually did turn about. Again he changed his mind and arrived off Santiago at 6:00 P.M. May 29. Vacillation showed in his despatches, letters and actions.

On April 29, he discovered the Spanish fleet in the harbor. Not until two days later did he attack, and then at the absurd ranges of 7,000 to 11,000 yards.

In the meanwhile the Oregon had completed her famous voyage, and on June ^{and} the Sampson with the armored strength of the Navy was at Santiago.

His first request was for ten thousand troops which he stated would insure the capture of the City and fleet within ten days. The only Army force ready lay encamped at Tampa. This a division of 16,000 men under the command of General W.R. Shafter was placed under orders for Cuba.

On June the 7th, the marines captured Guantanamo and still hold it.

Sampson immediately proceeded to ~~ix~~ put into effect a plan for blocking up the harbor suggested by Naval constructor Hobson. The Merrimac was ~~loaded with explosives~~ equipped with electric mines, sea valves cut, anchors ready for letting go. On the morning of June 3rd with a crew of seven men Hobson steered the Merrimac into the channel and coolly sunk her. Not all the mines functioned so that the vessel drifted clear of the main channel and the operation failed though most creditably executed.

When the non-success of this enterprise was noted Sampson renewed the urgency of his requests for troops. Shafter's force was ready and embarked on June 14. But a false report of Spanish vessels to the north of Cuba caused their recall. The Department ordered Sampson to send fast ships to investigate. But the Admiral discredited the report and did not comply. However this rumor induced him to send Lt. Victor Blue on a scouting expedition to make certain that all the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. Blue landed and reconnoitered in uniform and identified all the Spanish vessels.

Reassured on this score the expeditionary force did sail from Tampa on June 14.

One other thing happened to complicate matters. On June the 18th, the reserve fleet of Spain consisting of the Battle ship Pelayo, five cruisers and four destroyers under Admiral Camara left Spain for the Phillipines. Dewey could not be left to face this force unaided. Monitors from the west coast were ordered across the Pacific to his support but they were so slow that they could not be counted on to arrive before the Spaniards. A ^a squadron was formed consisting of the Iowa, Oregon, the Newark, Yosemite, Yankee and Dixie, designated the Eastern Squadron and placed under the command of Commodore Watson. The widest publicity was given the purpose of this force which was announced to be an attack on The Peninsula. As a matter of fact it was to follow Camara to the Phillipines.

Sampson combatted this diversion of important units being convinced that the war would end with the defeat of the Spanish forces in Santiago. He was overruled, though ~~xxxx~~ he was permitted to ~~xxx~~ retain them until word was received that Camara had passed through the Suez Canal. The first of the Spanish ships began the passage of the canal on July the second the others passed through on the 5th and 6th. The destruction of Cervera's fleet compelled the return of Camara for the defense of Spain.

On June 22 the Army made a difficult but expeditious landing at Daiquiri and on June 23 the advance on Santiago began. Spirited resistance was encountered and hard fighting was necessary before the Spaniards began to weaken. The regulars did the fighting and Roosevelt got the credit. On July the second Elcaney hill and San Juan were taken by assault, and the investment of the city was completed.

This created a new situation for Spain. Blanco feared for the fleet and hence for Havana. He ordered Cervera to fight his way out. This Cervera knew to be impracticable. The port was closely invested now by day and by night. During the night searchlights from the Battle ships made the narrow harbor entrance bright as day. The force ready against him was always overwhelming. Further the secondary batteries from his vessels had been dismounted and with their crews formed important part of the defense of Santiago.

General Linares joined ~~xxxx~~ vigorously in the despairing protests of Admiral Cervera. To no avail. Blanco wired imperatively to Cervera to bring on board his guns and men and leave as the earliest practicable moment. Even now confronted with the second blunder of his superiors it did not occur to Cervera to disobey. Hopelessly he made his preparations for departure.

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Chapter III.

The cruise of the Oregon.

When trouble with Spain had reached the pronounced stage it was determined to reinforce the Atlantic fleet with the Battle ship Oregon. Captain Charles E. Clark assumed command of her on March 17th, and two days thereafter she left San Francisco on her historic voyage. Mr. Dooley christened her the O'Regon.

The gunboat Marietta then at Panama was made advance tender for the Oregon and preceded her down the South American coast. This vessel contracted for Coal at Callao. This port the Oregon reached on ^{Mar 29} and left immediately after coaling on March the 30th. At that port Capt. Clark was advised by the Navy Department that the Spanish torpedo boat Temerario was at Montevideo. The torpedo was a relatively new weapon and had a young and enthusiastic following much like the air service now. Much was prophesied for it including the now familiar claim that it marked the end of the battle ship. The Temerario caused a great deal of apprehension both to the Department and to Capt. Clark, who feared an attack in the narrow waters of the Strait. We are uniformly good at attributing superhuman qualities to our enemies.

Nearing and while in the Straits of Magellan the usual tempestuous weather prevalent in that locality at that time of the year was encountered. The old Oregon behaved much like a submerged rock. The safety of the ship was threatened in the straits when fog and rain became so thick that land could not be seen on either side of the narrow channel. Capt. Clark anchored and rode out the gale.

34 ✓

The Marrietta had preceded the Oregon to Sady Point^W and made arrangements for coaling. Which began on the 17 as soon as the weather permitted. There was then no cable to Punta Arenas so Captain Clark when he emerged from the Straits on April 21, was not apprised of the break in relations with Spain. Hard seas were encountered in the voyage up the South American coast which together with the low speed of the Marietta retarded the Oregon.

Officers and crew behaved splendidly, voluntarily doubling watches and foregoing sleep and rest.

Cervera's squadron had left the Cape Verde islands and the Departments concern for the Oregon was intensified. The Spaniards were accredited with converging^g for the purpose of sinking the Oregon, whereas, as a matter of fact, Cervera did not know that she had left the West Coast. Many plans were considered for protecting the Oregon but nothing was done as the prevailing impression was that she could take care of herself.

Captain Clark's plan of battle in case he encountered the Spanish fleet was interesting. He proposed to fight a withdrawing action opposing the heavy stern fire of two thirteen inch and four eight inch to the four 11 inch or 9.8 bow guns of the enemy squadron. He hoped the Oregon could develop sufficient speed to cause the pursuing vessel to draw out into a line and become separated, thus affording an opportunity to destroy one before the others could come to her assistance.

Captain Clark arrived at Rio de Janeiro on April 30th, when he was informed that the war was on. Also he was given information of the movements of the enemy and granted discretion in avoiding the Spaniards. He left Bahia on May 10 about the time Cervera was at Martinique.

Sixty hours after the Spaniards left ~~Martinique~~ Curacao the Oregon was coaling at Barbadoes. On leaving there he circled the island in order to deceive any spies

and made to the northward on his way to Key West. I can remember the relief occasioned when she was sighted off Jupiter inlet. On the 28th of May this gallant old ship was ready to take her place in the battle line.

She had steamed a distance of fourteen thousand miles in sixty eight days, a most remarkable performance any way considered.

(Insert photo of CapT. Clark P 32 and the Oregon P. 57 the New American Navy Vol. II.)

Chapter IV.

Santiago.

On the morning of July 3, the New York was underway at 0855 off for Siboney to keep a date with Shafter. Sampson hoisted the routine but unfortunate signal, "Dis-regard ~~makksaxofxthex~~flagship movements of the Comdr-in-chief."

Not long after the gray nose of the leading Spanish vessel, The Infanta Maria Teresa showed under Morro Castle. Those ships stopped in turn to drop their pilots, a kindly act under the circumstance.

Capt Concas says, "I asked leave of the Admiral to open fire and that received I gave the order. The bugle gave the signal.....The sound of my bugles was the last echo of those which history tells us were sounded at the capture of Granada. It was the signal that the history of four centuries of ^{a.}grndier was at an end...."

One can imagine the relief with which the lads went to their battle stations. The blockade was over ^{and} the blockade was over the battle was on. As the Teresa moved out of the harbor the concentrated fire of four battleships and the Brooklyn ^{under} all vessels converged on the ill fated flagship.

The little Gloucester waited at the eastern end of the line until the appearance of the destroyers. And when they appeared she promptly closed them. The terror these boats inspired also attracted some major gun fire from the battle ships. A large shell practically cut the Furor in two. For awhile she steamed aimlessly in circles, then her bow shot up in the air and she sank. The Gloucester unaided disabled the Pluton and drove her on the rocks where she sank.

For some moments the American forces were uncertain as to the course the Spaniards would take. About this time the Brooklyn made her famous loop away from the enemy. Admiral Schley told Captain Cook that "close up" meant just over 1000 yards out of torpedo range. Already inside of that Cook ported the helm of the Brooklyn and opened out to a distance of around twenty-four hundred yards. During this maneuver she almost rammed the Texas causing that ship to back hurriedly. Now the Brooklyn and the Texas were the westernmost ships. Their tactics opened a hole ~~xxxx~~ in the line toward which Cervera promptly headed.

The Teresa was now under an overwhelming fire. Two twelve inch shells penetrated her armor exploded in the eastern torpedo room completely wrecking that compartment. Three eight inch shells struck, two of which exploded, the other passing completely through the ship. Many smaller projectiles hit her, killing and wounding men and starting fires. At 10:15 A.M. she headed for the shore and beached 6 and one half miles from Morro.

The ^Uquedo quickly suffered the same fate as the Teresa. The Viscaya held on a few miles further and she too made for the beach disabled and on fire. The Oregon showed again the stuff in her officers and crew. She was the only ship with steam on all boilers and led the fleet in the chase of the Colon. The good coal on the Colon was

soon exhausted and the Oregon overhauled her. The Brooklyn too was coming up. When shell began to fall again around her, having done all that men could the Colom broke the white flag and headed for the shore. Before abandoning ship her crew opened the sea-cocks. The victory was complete and decisive.

This action ended the war. Spanish power was broken.

There was some bickering between Shafter and Sampson. General Shafter's attack was meeting with determined resistance. He was insistent that the Navy force the harbor and silence the batteries. This move he was sure would force the surrender of the garrison. Admiral Sampson replied that he did not fear the batteries, nor anticipate any great difficulty in reducing ^{them}. However, he was certain that mines would cause the loss of one or more vessels and at the same time so block the harbor that further operations would be prevented. The international situation was such that the United States could not afford to lose any first class fighting vessel, so the Navy Department supported Sampson. The ~~controversy~~ controversy ceased when General Linares sent a flag of truce.

General Miles, senior to Shafter, arrived at Santiago after all the glory had been appropriated. In search of other fields he departed on an expedition to ~~Porto~~ Puerto Rico which island surrendered without a struggle indiscriminately to our armed forces first on the scene whether Army or Navy.

The war taught many lessons of which the Army was the immediate beneficiary. The breakdown of War Department organization and supply was bitterly attacked and criticized. The musty old Bureau ~~and~~ ^{system} ~~was~~ was sadly inadequate.

This country has never fought a war wherein the leadership and functioning of the supreme army command at Washington was so woefully inefficient, nor one wherein the individual officer and soldier in the field displayed to greater advantage or more conspicuous success his native courage, adaptability, initiative and resource. Having no force in the field the war fell unopposed on the War Department and wrecked it. Out of the wreck after the most determined Bureau opposition came the Military General Staff. And so the country profited.

As to the Navy the war was short. The fleet has ever been correctly staffed and organized for war. ~~war.~~ So while the Navy Department had the same inherent faults as the war department the forces afloat absorbed the shock. So short was the conflict that the strain of war was not transmitted to the shore establishment, and it escaped the censure that fell upon the Army. But thoughtful officers in the Navy knew the situation and it has been due to their efforts that the Navy was first made ready and then provided with the Office of the Chief of Operations which has most of the essentials of a General Staff.

The Navy has been ridiculed or belittled in some measure for poor shooting and because of feeble opposition. As to poor shooting, improvements in guns and in methods It has not increased the hits. have merely succeeded in opening the range. Our hits at any Santiago ~~xxxxx~~ indicated shooting as good as ~~ix~~ for its day and time. We have no right to expect more. And as to the character of the opposition, the Navy expected no easy job. It looked to meet a brave and skilful enemy. But this did not lessen the courage, dash and resolution with which officers and men went to war.

The Navy did a good Job.

*Political harangues
 see trumpets in
 Pen slides. @*